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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL
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FOREWORD

The present publication contains basic documents on arms control and disarmament developments in 1985 and is the latest in a series of volumes that have been issued annually since 1960. The work of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1985 is described in its 25th annual report (see Bibliography).

The papers are numbered and arranged in chronological order, following a topical list of documents and lists of abbreviations and conferences. Other reference aids may be found at the back of the volume. These include a bibliography, a list of persons, and an index. The papers were compiled and annotated by R. William Nary and Ruth Ihara. The page proofs were reviewed by Kathleen Strang. Janet Athos provided assistance. Useful suggestions were received from officers throughout the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A/ — General Assembly [1]
ABM — antiballistic missile
ACDA — U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACIS — arms control impact statement(s)
ADM — Atomic Demolition Munition
Adm. — Admiral
AEA — Atomic Energy Act
AEC — Atomic Energy Commission
AECA — Arms Export Control Act
AID — Agency for International Development
ALCM — air-launched cruise missile
ANZUS — Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty Organization
ARMSCOR — Arms Corporation of South Africa
ASAT — antisatellite
ASW — antisubmarine warfare
AWACS — Air Warning and Control System
BIAE — Beijing Institute of Atomic Energy
BMD — ballistic missile defense
Brig. — Brigadier
BWC — Biological Weapons Convention (Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological [Biological] and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction)
C.1 — First Committee of the General Assembly [1]
C³ — command, control, communications
CAS — Committee on Assurances of Supply (IAEA)
CBM — confidence-building measure
CC — Central Committee
CCD — Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [1,2]
CD — Committee/Conference on Disarmament [1,2,3]
CDE — Conference on Disarmament in Europe (Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe)
CFR — Code of Federal Regulations
C³I — command, control, communications, and intelligence
COCOM — Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Security Export Control
COPUOS — Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (United Nations)
COPREDAL — Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America
CORRTEX — Continuous Reflectometry for Radius Versus Time Experiment
CPSU — Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTB — comprehensive (nuclear) test ban
CTBT — Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CW — chemical warfare/weapons
DARPA — Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DCL — Direct Communications Link
DEE — data encryption equipment
DNA — Defense Nuclear Agency
doc. — document
DoD, DOD — U.S. Department of Defense
DOE — U.S. Department of Energy
DOS — U.S. Department of State

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[1] Abbreviations used in documents of the United Nations organs or international conferences serviced by the United Nations Secretariat.

[2] Title changed from Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) with addition of eight new members.

[3] Committee on Disarmament replaced CCD in 1979 and in 1983 designated itself a conference effective 1984.

DSAT — defensive satellite
EIDC — experimental international data center
ENMOD — Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
EORSAT — Soviet electronic ocean reconnaissance satellite
EURATOM — European Atomic Energy Community
FAA — Foreign Assistance Act; Federal Aviation Agency
FAO — Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations)
FBIS — Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FRG — Federal Republic of Germany
FY — fiscal year
G.A. — General Assembly
GDR — German Democratic Republic
Gen. — General
GLCM — ground-launched cruise missile
GNP — gross national product
GSE — Group of Scientific Experts (CD)
GTS — Global Telecommunications Systems
HEW — U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare
H.J. Res. — House Joint Resolution
HOE — Homing Overlay Experiment
H.R. — House of Representatives
HUD — Department of Housing and Urban Development
IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM — intercontinental ballistic missile
IDC — intercontinental data center
INF — intermediate-range nuclear forces
IRP — Interagency Research Program
JMCL — Joint Military Communications Link
JCS — Joint Chiefs of Staff
LEU — low enriched uranium
LPARs — large phased-array radars
LRINF — long/longer-range nuclear force(s)
Lt. — Lieutenant
LTBT — limited test ban treaty (not comprehensive)
MBFR — Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (Negotiations on Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Europe)
MILSAT — military satellite
MILSTAR — communications satellite system
MIRV — multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicles
MOX — mixed plutonium oxide and uranium oxide
MV — miniature vehicle
MWE — megawatts electrical
MX — missile experimental
NAS — National Academy of Sciences
NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVSTAR — navigation satellite timing and ranging
NNA — neutral and non-aligned countries
NNPA — Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978
NPG — Nuclear Planning Group of NATO
NPT — Non-Proliferation Treaty (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)
NRC — Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSC — National Security Council
NSDD — National Security Decision Directive
NST — Nuclear and Space Arms Talks
NTM — national technical means (of verification)
NTS — Nevada Test Site
OAS — Organization of American States
OAU — Organization for African Unity
OPANAL — Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (*Organismo para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina*)
oper. par. — operative paragraph
OSD — Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSIS — on-site inspection
OTA — Office of Technology Assessment
par. — paragraph
PAVE PAWS — Phased-Array Warning System
PBW — particle beam weapon
PC — personal computer
P.L. — public law

PNE — peaceful nuclear explos(ion, -ive)
PNET — Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes)
PRC/P.R.C. — People's Republic of China
prt. — print
pt. — part
R&D — research and development
RECOVER — REmote COntinual VERification
Rept. — report
RES, Res — Resolution
ret. — retired
RORSAT — radar ocean reconnaissance satellite
RV — reentry vehicle
S. — Senate
SACEUR — Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAGSI — Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (IAEA)
SALT — strategic arms limitation talks/ agreements resulting from the talks
SAM — surface-to-air missile
SAS — Office of Security Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State
SCC — Standing Consultative Commission
SCG — Special Consultative Group
SDI — Strategic Defense Initiative
Sess. — session
SICM — small intercontinental ballistic missile
SIPRI — Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
S.J. Res. — Senate Joint Resolution
SLBM — sea-/submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM — sea-launched cruise missile
SMPR — Small and Medium Power Reactor
SNDV — strategic nuclear delivery vehicle
SNPI — Shanghai Nuclear Physics Institute
SRAM — short-range attack missile
SS — surface-to-surface
SSBN — submarine ballistic nuclear (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine)
START — Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
STAT. — Statute
supp. — supplement
SWERC — Southwest Reactor Engineering Research and Design Center (China)
TASM — Tomahawk ship-attack missile
TIAS — Treaties and Other International Act Series
TLAM - C — Tomahawk land-attack missile—conventional
TLAM - N — Tomahawk land-attack missile—nuclear
TRANSEAVER — TRAnsport of Nuclear Cargo by SEA VERification
TTBT — Threshold Test Ban Treaty (Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests)
UNCPICPUNE — United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy [1]

[1] Abbreviations used in documents of United Nations organs or international conferences serviced by the United Nations Secretariat.

UNDC — United Nations Disarmament Commission
U.N., UN — United Nations
UNGA — United Nations General Assembly [1]
UNIDIR — United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research [1]
UNSCEAR [1] — United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
UNTS — United Nations Treaty Series [1]
USA — United States of America/United States Army
USG — United States Government
U.S.C. — United States Code
USN — United States Navy
USSR/U.S.S.R. — Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UST — United States Treaty Series
UTC — Universal Coordinated Time
WMO — World Meteorological Organization

List of Principal Conferences and Organizations

United Nations and Affiliates

Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean

Established as a 15-member body by General Assembly resolution 2992 (XXVII) of December 15, 1972, to further the objectives of the declaration set forth in resolution 2832 (XXVI) of December 16, 1971, and expanded in succeeding years by General Assembly resolutions. Resolution 39/149 of December 17, 1984, renewed its mandate and requested it to hold three preparatory sessions, possibly four, in 1985. *Three sessions and two extra meetings in 1985*: January 28–February 8, March 25–April 4, July 1–12 (30 formal meetings), November 19, December 5, New York. *Members*: 48. *Chairman*: Sri Lanka (Wijewardane). *Vice Chairmen*: Australia (Okely), GDR (Grundmann), Indonesia (Ibrahim, followed by Abdullah), Mozambique (dos Santos). *Rapporteur*: Madagascar (Tahindro).

Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference

Established by General Assembly resolution 3183 (XXVIII) of December 18, 1973, as a 40-member body of non-nuclear-weapon states appointed by the President of the General Assembly. Mandate renewed annually since then, for 1985 by resolution 39/150 of December 17, 1984. *Two sessions in 1985* (82d–89th meetings): April 22–25 (4 meetings), July 15–19 (4 meetings). *Participants*: The 40 members and 1 non-member, the Soviet Union. Four non-members maintained contact with the *Ad Hoc* Committee through its Chairman: China, France, U.K., U.S. *Observers*: GDR, Laos, Oman, Viet Nam. *Chairman*: Sri Lanka (Wijewardane). *Vice Chairmen*: Poland (Tomaszewski) and Spain (Laclaustra). *Working Group*: Established by the *Ad Hoc* Committee in June 1974. *Two meetings in 1985*: July 16, 17. *Working Group Members*: Burundi, Egypt, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Spain. *Chairman*: Spain (Laclaustra).

Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

Appointed by the Secretary General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 37/99 F of December 13, 1982, to review and supplement the *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All its Aspects* [1] in the light of information and experience accumulated since 1975, and to submit the study to the General Assembly at its 39th session. Time period extended by General Assembly resolution 39/151 B of December 17, 1934. Began work, March 14, 1983. One session in 1985: January 21–February 8. *Chairman*: Tornudd.

Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

Set up by the Secretary General in autumn of 1978 in accordance with paragraph 124 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and functioned until autumn of 1981.[2] Revived in 1983 by the Secretary General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 37/99 K–III of December 13, 1982.

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[1] A/10027/Add.1. This was a special report prepared by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (Sales No. E. 76.I.7).

Functions also as Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research. *Two sessions (12th and 13th) in 1985*: May 6–10, New York; September 23–27, Geneva. *Members (24)*:

Algeria (Azzout)	France (Faure)	Romania (Ene)
Argentina (Ortiz de Rozas)	GDR (Mueller)	Sri Lanka (Hameed)
	India (Rasgotra)	U.K. (Mason)
Cameroon (Mboumoua)	Japan (Matsui)	U.S. (Doughtery)
China (Liang Yufan)	Mexico (García Robles)	USSR (Bykov)
Cuba (Lechuga Hevia)	Nigeria (Adeniji)	Yugoslavia (Golob)
Ecuador (Segarra)	Norway (Kristvik)	*Chairman:* Sweden (Björnerstedt)
Egypt (el-Shafei)	Pakistan (Shahi)	
FRG (Ruth)	Poland (Strulak)	

Conference on Disarmament (CD)

Established as the Committee on Disarmament (CD) in 1978 by the General Assembly at its Tenth Special Session to replace the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD); organized along lines set out in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of that session.[2] Designated itself as a conference at the beginning of 1984 in accordance with Section II of General Assembly resolution 37/99 K of December 14, 1982. *Two sessions annually; in 1985*: February 5–April 23; June 11–August 30 (288th-335th meetings; 29 informal meetings) in Geneva. Additional intersessional meeting on chemical weapons: September 30–October 18. Workshop on seismological verification of a test ban sponsored by Norway: June 4–7, Oslo. *Membership*: The 5 nuclear-weapon states (China,[3] France,[4] U.K., U.S., USSR) and 35 non-nuclear-weapon states:

Algeria	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
Argentina		Nigeria
Australia	German Democratic Republic	Pakistan
Belgium		Peru
Brazil	Hungary	Poland
Bulgaria	India	Romania
Burma	Indonesia	Soviet Union
Canada	Iran	Sri Lanka
China	Italy	Sweden
Cuba	Japan	United Kingdom
Czechoslovakia	Kenya	United States
Egypt	Mexico	Venezuela
Ethiopia	Mongolia	Yugoslavia
France	Morocco	Zaire

Secretary General of the Conference on Disarmament and personal representative of the U.N. Secretary General: Yugoslavia (Komatina). *Under Secretary General* of the Conference: Argentina (Berasategui). *Presidency* [5] rotated monthly in alphabetical order (by country). *Ad Hoc* Working Groups: Group of Scientific Experts To Consider International Cooperative Measures To Detect and Identify Seismic Events, *Chairman*: Sweden (Dahlman). On Chemical Weapons, *Chairman*: Sweden

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[2] The Final Document may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411 ff.

[3] China took its seat for the first time in February 1980.

[4] France was a member of both precursor bodies, the ENDC and the CCD, but it took no part in either. It took its seat for the first time in February 1979.

[5] As a consequence of the CD changing from a committee to a conference, the Chairman was designated as the President. See General Assembly Official Records: Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/39/27), p. 1.

(Ekeus). On Effective International Arrangements To Assure Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, *Chairman*: Pakistan (Ahmad). On Radiological Weapons, *Chairman*: Australia (Butler). On Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (created in 1985), *Chairman*: Egypt (Alfarargi).

Conference on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa

Regional conference organized within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign and sponsored by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, in cooperation with the Organization for African Unity. *One session in 1985*: August 11–12, Lomé, Togo. *Participants*: Over 70 representatives from research and educational communities and experts from various African countries.

Disarmament Commission

Established as a deliberative body and subsidiary of the U.N. General Assembly by paragraph 118 of the Final Act of the Tenth Special Session [a] to succeed the original Commission established by resolution 502 (VI) of January 11, 1952.[a] Continuation of its work in 1985 mandated by resolution 39/148 R of December 17, 1984. *One substantive session in 1985*: May 6–31, New York. *Membership*: All states members of the United Nations. *Chairman*: Pakistan (Ahmad). *Vice Chairman*: Representatives of Bahamas, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Iran, Mexico, Morocco. *Rapporteur*: Spain (Laclaustra).

Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets (to prepare price indexes and purchasing power parities for military expenditures of participating states)

Appointed by the Secretary General in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 37/95 B of December 13, 1982. Six sessions at United Nations Headquarters, New York, during 1983–1985: Two sessions in 1983: March 7–11, August 8–19. Two sessions in 1984: February 6–17, July 9–20, 1984. *Two sessions in 1985:* February 19–March 8, June 10–14. *Participants*: Battaglia (Italy), Encinas del Pando (Peru), Gallik (U.S.), Sasu and Lepadat (Romania), Odeka (Nigeria), Parwoto (Indonesia). *Chairman*: Cars (Sweden).

Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security

Appointed by the Secretary General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 38/188 H of December 20, 1983. Four sessions at United Nations Headquarters, New York, during 1984–1985: One session in 1984: July 23–27. *Three sessions in 1985*: January 7–18, April 8–19, July 8–19. *Participants*: Algeria (Achache), Argentina (Saracho), Australia (Thomas), China (Jin), GDR (Klein), India (Teja), Philippines (Suarez), Romania (Melescanu), USSR (Rozanov), Uganda (Otunnu), Venezuela (Cabana), Yugoslavia (Silovic). *Chairman*: Sweden (Ferm).

Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study on the Naval Arms Race, Naval Forces, and Naval Arms Systems

Appointed by the Secretary General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 38/188 G of December 20, 1983. Two sessions in 1984: April 9–13, October 15–26, Geneva. *Two sessions in 1985*: March 4–15, July 17–26, also in Geneva. *Participants*: China (Deng San Rui), France (Coutau-Bégarie), Indonesia (Alatas), Netherlands (van Rede), Peru (Morelli-Pando), Sweden (Prawitz). *Chairman*: Indonesia (Alatas).

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[a] Established as a six-member body (Security Council members—China, France, U.K., U.S., USSR—plus Canada), the original Commission was expanded by 14 states in 1957 by resolution 1150 (XII) of November 19 and to its present composition by resolutions 1252 D (XIII) of November 4, 1958, and 1403 (XIV) of November 21, 1959.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Board of Governors (35 members; China admitted 1984): In 1985 met February 19–21, June 11–14, September 19–20, 30, Vienna. *XXIXth General Conference in 1985*: September 23–27, Vienna. *President*: Ivory Coast (Manouan). *Vice Presidents* (8): Belgium, Cuba, India, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, U.S., USSR. *Membership*: 113. *Director General*: Blix (Sweden).

Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development

Fifty-four-member body appointed by the President of the General Assembly and convened in accordance with General Assembly resolution 39/160 of December 17, 1984. *One session in 1985*: July 29–August 9 (11 formal, 5 informal meetings), U.N. Headquarters, New York. *Members*: 54 appointed by the President of the General Assembly. *Chairman*: India (Dubey). *Vice Chairmen*: Cuba (Oramas Oliva), German Democratic Republic (Hucke), Norway (Huslid). *Rapporteur*: Kenya (Mudho).

Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

Preparatory Committee established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 35/112 of December 5, 1980, and in accordance with the objectives of resolution 32/50 of December 8, 1977. Five sessions held prior to 1985: 1981—August 3–7, Vienna; 1982—June 21–30, October 27–November 2, Vienna; 1983—March 28–April 8, U.N. Headquarters, New York. *Sixth session in 1985:* October 21–November 1, Vienna.

Regional Conference on Security, Disarmament, and Development in Africa

Held under the auspices of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and with the participation of UNIDIR, Department for Disarmament Affairs, and the General Secretariat of the OAU. *Three preparatory sessions in 1985*: March 27–29, Addis Ababa; April 29–May 2, Palais des Nations, Geneva; June 19–20, Lomé. *Two sessions of Regional Conference in 1985*: August 11–12, meeting of experts; August 13–16, ministerial conference; all in Lomé. *Participants*: Experts' meeting—over 70 experts representing African research, educational communities, and other relevant institutions. *Chairman*: Director of UNIDIR (Bota).

Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Preparatory Committee established and Third Review Conference convened in accordance with the Final Document of the Second Review Conference [7] and General Assembly resolution 38/74 of December 15, 1983. *Preparatory Committee*: First two sessions in 1984: April 2–6, October 1–11, Geneva. *Third session in 1985*: April 22–May 1, Geneva. *Participants*: 71 states parties to the treaty. *Chairman 1984 sessions*: 1st—Japan (Imai); 2d—Czechoslovakia (Vejvoda); 3d—Sri Lanka (Dhanapala). Third Review Conference: *One session in 1985*: August 27–September 21, Geneva. *Full participants*: 86 states parties to the treaty.[8] *Limited participants*: 3 signatory states, 10 observer states; representatives of international organizations (IAEA, League of Arab States, OPANAL, OAU, OAS); 48 nongovernmental organizations. *President*: Egypt (Shaker).

United Nations

40th Session of the General Assembly in 1985: September 18-December 20. *Membership*: 159. *Secretary General*: Pérez de Cuéllar. *President of the General Assembly*: Spain (de Piniés). *Chairman, First Committee*: Indonesia (Alatas).

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[7] NPT/Conf. II/22.

[8] Total NPT parties as of December 1985: 132.

United Nations Security Council

Membership: 15. *Permanent Members*: China, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States. *Nonpermanent members in 1985*: Australia (1986), Burkina Faso (1985), Denmark (1986), Egypt (1985), India (1985), Madagascar (1986), Peru (1985), Thailand (1986), Trinidad and Tobago (1986), Ukranian SSR (1985).

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

Originally established and developed by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 33/71 K of December 14, 1978, and 34/83 M of December 11, 1979, in accordance with the recommendation of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. Became an autonomous institution working in close relationship with the Department for Disarmament Affairs through General Assembly resolution 37/99 K–IV of December 13, 1982. Statute approved by the General Assembly through its resolution 39/148 H of December 17, 1984. *Two consultative meetings in 1985*: April 25–26 and July 1–5, Geneva. *Participants*: Representatives of UNIDIR, League of Arab States, Organization for African Unity, and International Atomic Energy Agency. Also conducts studies, seminars, and symposiums on various arms control subjects such as verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty, nuclear nonproliferation, etc. *Director*: Bota (Romania).

World Disarmament Campaign

Sub-Regional Conferences, February 9–16, Cairo; April 15–19, Stockholm.

MULTILATERAL CONFERENCES AND MEETINGS

Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL)

Established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).[9] The *General Conference* has met in regular session every 2 years since 1969. *Ninth regular session in 1985*: May 7–9, Mexico City. *Participants*: 23 Latin American states members; also a number of other non-member states. *President 1983–1985*: Ecuador (Martinez Cobo); *President, 1985–1987*: Mexico (Flores Olea).

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting

Meetings of contracting parties of the Antarctic Treaty provided for in Article IX to take place "at suitable intervals." *13th session in 1985*: October 7–18, Brussels. *Participants*: Consultative and non-consultative (by invitation) parties. Two new consultative parties: China and Uruguay.

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE)

Originated in a proposal by France in 1978, endorsed by the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and announced in its Concluding Document, September 9, 1983.[10] First stage in 1984. *Second stage in 1985* (Rounds V–VIII): January 29–March 22, May 14–July 5, September 10–October 18, November 5–December 20, Stockholm. *Participants*: 35 states which took part in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S., Canada, and 33 Western and Eastern European nations). *Delegation heads*: *U.S.*—Goodby, then Barry (from September). *USSR*—Grinevsky.

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[9] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

[10] The relevant portion of the Concluding Document may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 791–793.

MULTILATERAL CONFERENCES AND MEETINGS—Continued

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

Originally met July 3–7, 1973 in Helsinki; meetings held during 1973, 1974, and 1975 in Geneva. Issued Final Act, August 1, 1975.[11] Review Conferences: October 4, 1977–March 9, 1978, Belgrade; November 11, 1980–September 9, 1983, Madrid. *Third Review Conference on Tenth Anniversary of Signing of Final Act in 1985*: July 30–August 1, Helsinki. *Participants*: U.S. Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Ministers of 33 Western and Eastern European nations and Canada.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks—MBFR (Negotiations on Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Europe)

Negotiations began with preparatory talks and one round of talks beginning in October 1973; three rounds of talks held annually in Vienna since then. *35th–37th rounds in 1985*: January 31–March 28, May 24–July 19, September 26–December 5. *Regular participants*: NATO—Belgium, Canada, FRG, Luxembourg, Netherlands, U.K., U.S.; Warsaw Pact—Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland, USSR. *Special status participants*: Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Romania, Turkey. U.S. delegation head: Blackwill; USSR: Mikhaylov.

Nordic Parliamentarians Nuclear Weapons Free Zones Conference

November 29–30, Copenhagen, Denmark.

Six-Nation Summit Meetings

Meetings held in response to 1984 proposal by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to encourage arms talks among nuclear powers. First meeting in May 1984. *Second and third meetings in 1985*: January 28, New Delhi, India; August 6–7, Ixtapa, Mexico. *Participants*: Argentina (Alfonsín), India (Gandhi), Mexico (de la Madrid Hurtado), Sweden (Palme), Greece (Papandreou), Tanzania (Nyerere). Issued Delhi Declaration and diplomatic program of action: leaders would take turns visiting the five major nuclear powers (China, France, U.K., U.S., USSR) during following 5 months to stress, *inter alia*, "the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and a comprehensive test ban treaty."

South Pacific Forum

Sixteenth Forum held in 1985: August 5–6, Rarotonga, Cook Islands. *Participants*: Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Western Samoa, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Cook Islands, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Nauru, Tonga. Adopted South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone treaty.

Foreign Ministers' Meetings

U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS

Two in 1985: January 7–8, Geneva. *Participants*: U.S. — Shultz; USSR — Gromyko. *In preparation for summit meeting*: November 4–5, Moscow. *Participants*: U.S. — Shultz, McFarlane, Nitze. USSR — Shevardnadze, Korniyenko, Komplektov.

U.S.–Soviet Summit Meeting

November 19–21, 1985, Geneva. *Participants*: U.S. — President Reagan; USSR — Secretary General Gorbachev.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Consultations

Series of consultations pursued since 1982 as a result of discussions between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko at the United Nations

[11] The arms control portion of the Final Act may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–305.

U.S.-Soviet Negotiations—Continued

General Assembly session in October 1982. First session, December 1982, Washington, DC.; second, June 1983, Moscow (United States and Soviet Union agreed at that time to meet regularly twice a year); third and fourth sessions, February and November 1984 in Vienna and Moscow. *Fifth and sixth sessions in 1985*: April 15–19, Helsinki; October 18–23, Washington. *Participants*: United States — Kennedy; Soviet Union — Petrosyants.

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST)

Resumption of talks on strategic and intermediate-range weapons and beginning of talks on outer space weapons agreed upon by Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko during meeting in Washington, January 7–8, 1985. *Three sessions in 1985*: March 12–April 23, May 30–July 16, September 19–November 7, Geneva. *Participants*: U.S. delegation—Leader and Negotiator on Space and Defensive Arms (DST) — Kampelman; chief negotiator on Strategic Nuclear Arms (START) — Tower; chief negotiator on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Arms (INF) — Glitman. *U.S. Advisers*—Nitze, Rowny, Cooper. Soviet delegation—Leader and Negotiator on Strategic Nuclear Arms — Karpov; Negotiator on Space and Defensive Arms — Kvitsinskiy; Negotiator on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Arms — Obukhov

Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)

Joint U.S.-USSR body established pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding of December 21, 1972 [12] to promote implementation of the objectives and provisions of the SALT I agreements [13] and of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War.[14] *Two sessions in 1985*: XXVIII—April 10–June 14; XXIX—October 9–November 5, Geneva. *Commissioners*: United States—Ellis; Soviet Union—Starodubov.

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[12] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 868–869.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 197 ff.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 634–635.

1. Annual Report by President Reagan to the Congress on Nuclear Nonproliferation for the Year 1984: U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy [Extract], January 1985 [1]

Preventing the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries is a fundamental national security and foreign policy objective of the United States. President Reagan has repeatedly made plain his unswerving commitment to this objective, beginning with his comprehensive policy statement of July 16, 1981,[2] on non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation. Although the principles and guidelines set forth in the President's 1981 statement have been described in detail in earlier reports in this series, they remain the bedrock of U.S. non-proliferation policy and bear repeating here. As stated by the President, it is the policy of the United States to:

—Seek to prevent nuclear proliferation as a fundamental national security and foreign policy objective.

—Strive to reduce the motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives by working to improve regional and global stability and to promote understanding of the legitimate security concerns of other states.

—Continue to support adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [3] and to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).[4]

—View a material violation of these treaties or of an international safeguards agreement as having profound consequences for international order and United States bilateral relations, and also view any nuclear explosion by a non-nuclear-weapon state with grave concern.

—Strongly support and continue to work with other nations to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide for an improved international safeguards regime.

—Seek to work more effectively with other countries to forge agreement on measures for combatting the risks of proliferation.

—Continue to inhibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equipment and technology, particularly where the danger of proliferation demands, and to seek agreement on requiring IAEA safeguards on

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[1] ACDA files. This is Chapter I of the report submitted pursuant to section 601 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164. For the President's message transmitting the report, see Document 19.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 278–280.

[3] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[4] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

all nuclear activities in a non-nuclear-weapon state as a condition for any significant new nuclear supply commitment.

—Cooperate with other nations in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including civil nuclear power programs to meet their energy security needs, under a regime of adequate safeguards and controls.

In a major address before the United Nations Association of the United States in New York on November 1, 1984, Secretary of State Shultz restated the basic commitment of the United States to reduce the dangers to world peace and global stability posed by the potential spread of nuclear weapons. "It is no exaggeration," he declared, "to say that controlling the spread of nuclear weapons is critical to world peace and, indeed, to human survival. It is a cause that deserves and receives a top priority in our foreign policy." [5] The Secretary called particular attention to the fact that the President's approach to non-proliferation has resulted in closer cooperation with U.S. allies and friends and has strengthened the leadership role of the United States in international nuclear affairs. This carefully formulated approach has resulted in:

—A renewed sense of confidence in the United States as a reliable nuclear supplier to countries sharing the U.S. commitment to non-proliferation goals.

—Rational distinctions between close friends and allies that pose no proliferation risk and those countries and regions of the world that do present such risks.

—Improvements, in many cases at U.S. initiative, in the international regime of export controls designed to inhibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equipment, and technology, and to ensure adequate safeguards and controls on exports for peaceful nuclear purposes.

—New bilateral agreements that will further strengthen the international non-proliferation regime.

—An increased dialogue, as well as a limited degree of practical but non-significant nuclear cooperation, with certain countries for the purpose of encouraging them to improve their non-proliferation policies.

As in previous years, the Administration worked strenuously during 1984 to address the underlying causes of nuclear proliferation, not just its symptoms. Particular attention was given to:

—Persuading the leaders of nations that might be considering a nuclear weapons option that any "security" to be gained thereby is likely to be illusory—that proliferation only begets proliferation, contributes to instability, and is destructive of everyone's security.

—Providing political, economic, and security assistance to friendly countries that may have legitimate concerns about their security,

[5] For the complete text of the Secretary's address, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 775–783.

thereby demonstrating that there are practical alternatives to "going nuclear".

—Supporting and promoting efforts to resolve regional tensions that might prompt states to consider the nuclear weapons option.

Among the specific activities and accomplishments of the United States Government in the non-proliferation area during 1984, the following deserve particular mention:

Representatives of thirteen Western nuclear supplier nations met in Luxembourg July 11–13, 1984, to assess informally the established nuclear non-proliferation system and to discuss possible ways to make it function more effectively. The participants were Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. A number of suggestions were made for strengthening the framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation within a sound and effective non-proliferation regime. The participants identified a number of matters requiring further consideration and expressed their will to continue the dialogue, both among themselves and with other concerned countries. Among the topics discussed were the important role of the non-proliferation treaties and the IAEA, national export policies, the confidence-building role of safeguards, and newly emerging suppliers. In particular, there was a consensus view that adoption by all non-nuclear weapon states of comprehensive safeguards (i.e., IAEA safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities in such states) remains a highly desirable non-proliferation goal.

The United States and others will be seeking to build on the Luxembourg process by examining concrete ways of persuading additional consumer states to accept comprehensive safeguards. As it pursues its dialogue with newly emerging suppliers, the United States will also be working to ensure that they, too, come to understand and adopt the elements of the non-proliferation approach that traditional suppliers have developed over the past quarter century.

Negotiations on a new agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with the People's Republic of China were completed in 1984. A proposed text was initialled in Beijing on April 30 during President Reagan's state visit to China.[6] The agreed-upon text meets all requirements of U.S. law. The document will be submitted to the President for his approval, authorization of signature, and submission to the Congress once the United States reaches a full mutual understanding with China on matters relating to implementation of the agreement. Peaceful nuclear cooperation with China under the agreement can be expected to advance the worldwide non-proliferation objectives of the United States, enhance overall U.S. political relations with China, and benefit U.S. economic interests.

[6] The text of the Agreement as signed may be found in Document 118.

The process of negotiating the agreement with China had important implications for strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. China's decision to join the IAEA during the period when negotiations were in progress was a significant step. Its expressed policy of requiring IAEA safeguards on its future nuclear export commitments and its statement that it will refrain from assisting any other state to develop nuclear weapons are evidence of the evolution of its non-proliferation policy.[7]

During 1984 the United States continued the series of bilateral discussions on non-proliferation with the Soviet Union initiated as a result of an agreement between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko in the fall of 1982. Two rounds of discussions were held during the year—in Vienna in February and in Moscow in November. The United States and the Soviet Union have a broad common interest in non-proliferation which the periodic discussions in this area have served to clarify. Both sides have discovered more areas of agreement than disagreement, and it is expected that this quiet but useful dialogue will continue.

The United States continued its efforts during the year to encourage wider adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Accession to the NPT by Equatorial Guinea and by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in 1984 brought to 127 the number of parties to this Treaty. It is the most widely adhered-to arms control agreement in history and continues to be an exceptionally important instrument for securing peace and stability in the world community. A third NPT review conference is scheduled for 1985. The United States as well as other members of the Treaty devoted considerable effort during 1984 to preparations for the conference, including participation in two multilateral preparatory committee meetings. The U.S. goal is to see the 1985 conference result in a broadly supported reaffirmation of the Treaty's principles and objectives and an acknowledgment of the Treaty's critical contribution to international security and global peace.

During 1984 the United States continued to provide the fullest possible support for the IAEA and its safeguards system, a fundamental element not only in U.S. non-proliferation policy but also in international nuclear commerce generally. Recognizing that IAEA inspection capabilities must keep pace with advancing nuclear technology, the United States, through its Program of Technical Assistance to Safeguards, continued its extensive contribution to improving and strengthening the technical means of applying adequate safeguards. More fundamentally, the United States is persevering in its efforts to counter trends within the IAEA toward politically motivated controversy over issues extraneous to the Agency's statutory functions. Previous reports in this series described U.S. efforts to prevent a repetition of the 1982 IAEA General Conference's illegal rejection of Israel's

[7] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, p. 410.

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credentials and to forestall continuing attempts to deprive Israel of its rights and privileges as a member of the IAEA. Regrettably, the question of Israeli rights and privileges once again became an issue at the 1984 General Conference. A concerted effort led by the United States succeeded in protecting Israel's position as a member with full rights and privileges. Unfortunately, however, the United States and its supporters were not successful in persuading the majority of members that such political issues have no place in General Conference deliberations. As a consequence, further efforts are likely to be required before the issue is finally laid to rest.

In January 1984, members of the NPT Exporters Committee ("Zangger" Committee) formally expressed their agreement to a major revision of entries on the trigger list of items for the supply of which IAEA safeguards are required.[8] The revision pertains to items for gas centrifuge uranium enrichment and will substantially improve the multilateral control regime for this technology. During the year nuclear supplier nations continued work on further refining the trigger list for additional technologies of concern from a non-proliferation perspective; specifically, the trigger list entry for nuclear fuel reprocessing was reviewed in detail, with agreement near on a substantial clarification and extension of that entry. The United States also consulted with other supplier governments on the problem of "dual-use" exports—equipment having both nuclear and non-nuclear uses—with a view to broader international implementation of more effective nuclear export control standards and procedures.

Efforts were also undertaken during the reporting period on a nuclear export control problem of potential future significance: the need to assure that nations that are only now moving into the international nuclear market as suppliers will apply the same kind of stringent export controls that have been developed by current suppliers over the past two decades. If these "emerging" nuclear suppliers fail to adopt responsible export policies, the current regime could be badly eroded, or even destroyed. The United States explored the issue of "emerging" suppliers with a range of other nations—both current and future nuclear exporters—during the year. These contacts made an important contribution to alerting other nations to the problem and providing information about how responsible nuclear export policies can be effectively implemented.

In January, the Government of South Africa announced that it intended to adhere to the London Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines in connection with its future nuclear exports, including requirements for IAEA safeguards on such exports.[9] It also reopened discussions with the IAEA on safeguarding a new semicommercial enrichment facility. As South Africa is one of a number of countries

[8] IAEA INFCIRC/209/Mod. 2.

[9] The South African announcement is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 55–56. The guidelines are printed *ibid., 1978*, pp. 7–25.

with which the United States has been engaged in a dialogue designed to encourage an increased commitment to the international non-proliferation regime, these developments came as welcome indications of progress in this area.

As noted in previous reports in this series, President Reagan has stated that the United States will not inhibit civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development in countries with advanced nuclear programs that do not constitute a proliferation risk. In keeping with this policy, the United States has been discussing with Japan and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) advance, long-term arrangements on reprocessing and plutonium use in the context of new or amended agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation. Further discussions took place in 1984 and are expected to continue in 1985.

New agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation with Sweden and Norway entered into force on April 11, 1984, and July 2, 1984, respectively. The United States initialed a new agreement with Finland on June 20, 1984. Early approval by the President, signing, and transmittal to the Congress are expected.

As in the past, a small but significant number of countries continued during 1984 to pose a real proliferation risk. In seeking to inhibit these states and others from obtaining nuclear explosives, the United States employed a wide range of political, economic and security instruments. It resorted to control and, where necessary, denial of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology, and it consulted closely with other nuclear suppliers, urging similar prudence and restraint in their own nuclear export policies. The United States remains firm in its determination to maintain stringent nuclear export controls so that U.S. nuclear cooperation is not misused. Special priority is accorded to restricting sensitive nuclear activities in regions of instability and proliferation concern, such as the Middle East and South Asia. At the same time, the United States has not ignored, and will not ignore, the legitimate needs of countries, including those technologically less advanced, that wish to share in the peaceful benefits of the atom. It will continue to ensure, bilaterally and through the IAEA, that such benefits are made available on a reliable basis to countries that share U.S. non-proliferation goals.

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Document 1

2. White House Pamphlet, *The President's Strategic Defense Initiative:* Arms Control and the ABM Treaty [Extracts], January 3, 1985 [1]

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As directed by the President, the SDI research program will be conducted in a manner fully consistent with all U.S. treaty obligations, including the 1972 ABM Treaty.[2] The ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems and components that are space-based, air-based, sea-based, or mobile land-based. However, as Gerard Smith, chief U.S. negotiator of the ABM Treaty, reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1972, that agreement does permit research short of field testing of a prototype ABM system or component.[3] This is the type of research that will be conducted under the SDI program.

Any future national decision to deploy defensive systems would, of course, lead to an important change in the structure of United States and Soviet forces. We are examining ways in which the offense/defense relationship can be managed to achieve a more stable balance through strategic arms control. Above all, we seek to ensure that the interaction of offensive and defensive forces removes first-strike options from either side's capability.

The United States does not view defensive measures as a means of establishing military superiority. Because we have no ambitions in this regard, deployments of defensive systems would most usefully be done in the context of a cooperative, equitable, and verifiable arms control environment that regulates the offensive and defensive developments and deployments of the United States and Soviet Union. Such an environment could be particularly useful in the period of transition from a deterrent based on the threat of nuclear retaliation, through deterrence based on a balance of offensive and defensive forces, to the period when adjustments to the basis of deterrence are complete and advanced defensive systems are fully deployed. During the transition, arms control agreements could help to manage and establish guidelines for the deployment of defensive systems.

The SDI research program will complement and support U.S. efforts to seek equitable, verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear forces through arms control negotiations. Such reductions would make a useful contribution to stability, whether in today's deterrence environ-

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[1] White House, *The President's Strategic Defense Initiative*, January 1985, pp. 5–6, 8. Although the date January 3 does not appear in the pamphlet, that is the date on which it was released.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

[3] *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-second Congress, Second Session* (June 6, 20, 22, 28; July 18, 19, 21, 24, and 25, 1972), p. 377.

ment or in a potential future deterrence environment in which defenses played a leading role.

A future decision to develop and deploy effective defenses against ballistic missiles could support our policy of pursuing significant reductions in ballistic missile forces. To the extent that defensive systems could reduce the effectiveness and, thus, value of ballistic missiles, they also could increase the incentives for negotiated reductions. Significant reductions in turn would serve to increase the effectiveness and deterrent potential of defensive systems.

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Assertion: SDI violates the ABM Treaty.

Fact: The United States does not and will not violate its treaty obligations. The ABM Treaty explicitly permits the kind of research envisaged under SDI, and all such research will be conducted within its constraints. Critics who claim that SDI would violate this Treaty or others are simply wrong—often because they are critiquing an SDI program of a nature and direction of their own invention, rather than the research program the United States will actually carry out. Moreover, the Soviets have been conducting analogous research for many years. They have not called their research program a violation of the ABM Treaty—nor have we for that matter.

In contrast, the Soviet Union is constructing a large phased-array radar that will contribute to its ABM potential. Because of the location and orientation of this radar, it almost certainly constitutes a violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

The ABM Treaty provides for possible amendments and periodic review sessions in which possible changes can be discussed. When the SDI research has produced specific options to develop and deploy a BMD system, we would then address the question of availing ourselves of these procedures in order to modify the Treaty.

Meanwhile, however, the ABM Treaty specifically calls on the United States and USSR to take effective measures to reduce offensive nuclear weapons. The United States welcomes the Soviet Union's decision to return to such negotiations, which it has boycotted since late 1983.

Moreover, we have repeatedly told the Soviets we would like to discuss the implications of these new defensive technologies with them in a government-to-government forum. We have made suggestions about the venue and invited their ideas.

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Document 2

3. Joint Statement by the United States and the Soviet Union: Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, January 8, 1985 [4]

As previously agreed, a meeting was held on January 7 and 8, 1985, in Geneva between George P. Shultz, U.S. Secretary of State, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

During the meeting they discussed the subject and objectives of the forthcoming U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms. The sides agreed that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability.

The negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side, divided into three groups. The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

The date of the beginning of the new negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month.

4. News Conference Statement by Secretary of State Shultz: Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, January 8, 1985 [1]

I have just spoken with President Reagan, and he has received with satisfaction the news of the agreement to begin new negotiations that has been reached between Mr. Gromyko and myself, the text of which I am going to read to you.

[The Secretary read the joint statement, *supra*] [2]

While the statement speaks for itself, I would like to give you my own views on what has been accomplished during these 2 days of meetings.

From our perspective, these meetings represent an important beginning. We can't be sure where these negotiations will lead and, clearly, we have a long road ahead of us. There are many tough and compli-

[4] *Department of State Bulletin*, March 1985, p. 30.
[1] *Ibid.* The statement was followed by a question and answer session.
[2] Brackets in the source text.

cated issues still to be resolved. But we have here in Geneva agreed on the objectives for new negotiations on nuclear and space arms. We have also agreed that these negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side divided into three groups.

We came to Geneva with high hopes but realistic expectations. Our previous exchanges had confirmed that we were in general agreement that the problems of nuclear and space arms are interrelated and that both sides attach priority to achieving radical reductions in nuclear weapons as a first step toward their complete elimination.

But we also knew that we had our differences on how to go about achieving these goals. That we were able to reach agreement today on new negotiations signifies, we hope, a shared interest in moving forward in the necessary give-and-take required to reach agreement that satisfies both sides' concerns.

An important element of my presentation to Mr. Gromyko concerned our views on the nature of the strategic relationship and our goals for the future. For the near term, in addition to seeking radical reductions in nuclear weapons, I stated that we should reverse the erosion of the ABM [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty [3] that has occurred over the last decade.

On the subject of the Strategic Defense Initiative, I explained to Mr. Gromyko that SDI is a research program intended to determine whether it would be possible to shift to a more stable relationship involving a greater reliance on defensive systems. I noted that it is fully consistent with the ABM Treaty and that no decisions to go beyond research have been made nor could they be made for several years.

While the issues posed by SDI are for the future, I told Mr. Gromyko that we were now, nonetheless, prepared to discuss the question of strategic defense. Our views differ on the question, but we now have agreed on a form for tackling the issues head-on with the objectives of seeking reductions in nuclear arms and strengthening strategic stability.

In addition to a group in which we intended to address space arms, whether based or targeted on Earth or in space, we have agreed with the Soviets to establish two other new negotiating groups to address limitations and reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms. I told Mr. Gromyko that we have constructive new ideas to explore in all of these areas and that we hope for an equally constructive approach on the part of the Soviet Union.

In sum, as I agreed with Mr. Gromyko, our exchanges were frank, businesslike, and useful. We are addressing the substance of the most serious issues between our two countries.

It is a task worthy of our best efforts. Both sides will be giving these exchanges careful consideration and will be following up

[3] The text of the Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff.

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through contacts and diplomatic channels as we prepare for the new negotiations.

The success of our meeting here is due in no small part to the advice and support of the strong delegation that accompanied me here. Everybody really helped and contributed. And I especially thank national security adviser Bud McFarlane.

Members of our delegation will be briefing our allies and friends in the next few days. And we will, of course, be giving a thorough readout to the Congress. I will be reporting personally to the President tomorrow, as I did briefly over the phone tonight, the results of this meeting. I know that he intends to pursue these negotiations with persistence and determination.

5. Interview of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko by Political Observers [Extract], January 13, 1985 [1]

Gromyko. First, I would like to welcome you. You are familiar faces to me. You probably have quite a few questions. Please, ask me these questions, and I shall try to answer them.

Zhukov. Andrey Andreyevich, your meeting in Geneva with Secretary of State Shultz has aroused great interest both here in our country and abroad. How would you evaluate the results of this meeting as a whole?

Gromyko. On the whole, we evaluate the results of the meeting positively. The joint Soviet-American statement does indeed speak for itself.[2] We agreed on the subject of the coming talks and on the goals which should be achieved as a result of the negotiations. This is of course very important.

Zorin. Andrey Andreyevich, you said the questions of nuclear and space weapons will be discussed at the forthcoming negotiations as a complex, that is, as interconnected matters. This is a quite new approach. What brought it about?

Gromyko. It was brought about by this: If one is striving to stop the arms race, to eliminate the threat of war—in a word, if one is striving for lasting peace, then it is essential that the arms race should not begin in space and should be stopped on earth, on the earth as a planet. This was the chief task which faced the participants in the Geneva meeting.

There was very strong pressure by the American Administration not to permit the examination of questions of space, to work toward having the sphere of space open for the arms race. As we have said so many times, including on the eve of the Geneva meeting, this position

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[1] Moscow Television Service in Russian, January 13, 1985; FBIS *Daily Report*, January 14, 1985, vol. III, pp. AA1–AA13. The interview was conducted by Yuriy Zhukov, Valentin Zorin, Vikentiy Matveyev, and Vladimir Bogachev.

[2] Document 3.

is totally unacceptable. Agreement upon the conditions for this meeting did not go smoothly, but in the end it was agreed that this question can and must be discussed. As you know, space also figures in the statement, and the prevailing viewpoint is that it is impossible to examine either the question of strategic armaments or the question of intermediate-range nuclear weapons without examining the question of space, or more precisely, the question of averting an arms race in space. In the end the American side agreed to adopt such a viewpoint. This fact is a positive one.

I would like to say here that after my return from Geneva, and, correspondingly, after the return of U.S. Secretary of State Shultz to Washington, he sent me a letter—I received it here in Moscow—which said that the U.S. Administration intends to fulfill that which was agreed upon in Geneva, and that it is serious about the obligations it assumed in accordance with this agreement. This is a positive indicator. As the saying goes, we shall see what we shall see.

Matveyev. Andrey Andreyevich, since so much importance is attached to the questions of space arms and since they have such key significance for progress at the talks, what can be said about the essence of the difference in the approaches of our country and those of the United States to these questions?

Gromyko. The essence consists exactly in setting the space issue aside and dealing only with those types of arms on which talks have already been held: ground-based strategic nuclear arms and medium-range arms, including nuclear, in Europe. At least this was expressed with the greatest clarity before the Geneva meeting. The point is this: The Soviet Union categorically objected to such a viewpoint. It was of the opinion and is of the opinion that it is impossible to set the space issue to one side. In the final analysis, one can, theoretically, imagine a situation in which success has been reached regarding the questions of strategic arms and the questions of medium-range nuclear arms. I repeat: Success has been reached—but what is taking place in space is the arms race, being filled up increasingly with corresponding types of arms. Not only would this bring to nought what has been done on earth, but it would take things even further and as a result the balance, as far as peace is concerned, would be a negative one.

The situation would be complicated and even more dangerous. This we said with all directness to the U.S. Administration; we told its allies about it; we told the whole world about it; and we also said this in Geneva. Moreover, we spoke firmly and—I am ready to use such a word—sharply. We wanted the U.S. Administration and those who have supported and who now support its viewpoint regarding the questions of space to become aware of this.

The conclusions we reached we repeated in Geneva, too. It is as follows: that it is impossible to examine productively the questions of strategic nuclear arms and the questions of medium-range nuclear arms without examining the questions of space and outer space.

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Bogachev. Andrey Andreyevich, what specifically is meant when we say that the Soviet Union is resolutely against militarization of space?

Gromyko. What did we mean? We meant that arms intended for use against targets in space should be banned categorically and also that arms intended for use from space against the earth as a planet—in other words, against targets on the ground, in the sea and in the air—should be banned categorically. We constantly stressed this viewpoint. Well, this is what we meant and this is what we still mean.

Zorin. Andrey Andreyevich, those who were able to observe the course of the Geneva talks at close quarters, so to speak, got the impression that these talks were not easy at all. Is that the case?

Gromyko. One can say this: The talks were not easy at all. I would say that at times they were very complicated, if not tense, in the political sense of the word. Of course, we did not hammer our fists on the table and did not throw our glasses on the table [laughter], but that is what they were like. However, on the whole—and I want to stress this—they were businesslike and serious, and frank, I repeat, frank, in the sense that this term is usually used when one speaks about talks during which the sides were not afraid to speak their minds perfectly clearly and did not always bother with politeness.

Matveyev. Andrey Andreyevich, in connection with this I have a question about the U.S. large-scale missile defense program. When they usually talk about such a defense in Washington, they claim that they do not intend to test and deploy such systems in outer space, but merely want to restrict themselves, so to speak, to scientific research work which, they say, does not run counter to the antimissile defense treaty.[3] Well how, in your opinion, should one react to this American position?

Gromyko. I must tell you that in the course of a long period of time supporters of this plan in the United States—the plan for so-called large-scale missile defense—submerged, so to speak, certain elements, certain stages of this problem, and made no differentiation between them.

Later, when they sensed that, naturally, this entire position was a weak one, and under the pressure of criticism, and—I would say—exposure of the essence of it, they amended it somewhat and came to the conclusion that the stationing of such facilities and their testing might be prohibited. They told us this clearly in Geneva, for the first time, even. They told us clearly in Geneva.

And as far as scientific-research work is concerned, then this had to continue. The reason they gave for this was that it made no difference—research work could not be banned because it could not be monitored. Well, the question as to whether you can or cannot monitor it is complex. Of course, if research work is carried out in terms of

[3] I.e., the ABM (SALT I) Treaty. For the text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197 ff.

the preparation of the relevant papers, inside premises, then, evidently, it will not be so easy to monitor it. But it frequently happens that next to the laboratory is some kind of testing ground, used for the appropriate purposes.

But even assuming that it is altogether difficult to monitor this, one is prompted to ask: Why carry out such work—even if one calls it research or scientific-research work—while an understanding exists that one should steer matters toward the full and definitive destruction of nuclear weapons? Why, one asks oneself, should scientific-research work be carried out in order to create a whole system of new types of armaments to be deployed in space? Thus, this position of the American Administration, a position in favor of holding scientific-research work, is a weak and vulnerable position. Why make—even in the first phase—why make preparations for subsequently testing and deploying a new type of armaments? And who, one might ask, could give a guarantee that after the completion of scientific-research work, a halt would be called? Surely it is possible there will be people, both scientists and nonscientists, who will say: Excuse us, but we have spent so many billions of dollars on scientific-research work, why should this amount of money be lost?

Matveyev. $26 billion!

Gromyko. They will say: Is it not better to use it, and to move on to the next stage, of which everyone now disapproves and on which it has been agreed that they—that is, the testing and deployment—must be banned? Is such a situation possible? Yes it is.

We know the handwriting of the U.S. Administration, and we know the situation in the United States. Thus the position—this I want to stress with all possible determination—in a political and moral sense, on the conduct of scientific-research work which aims to create a large-scale missile defense system, does not withstand criticism; it is vulnerable; and it must be rejected. You know, if one were to say it frankly, then, from such a position to the absurd, there is a very small distance.

Bogachev. Allow me to ask a question on control. The U.S. side not infrequently claims that the Soviet Union underestimates the importance of the problem of monitoring, the monitoring of the observance of agreements. Sometimes one can even hear that the Soviet Union supposedly violates the pledges it has undertaken. What would you say to this question?

Gromyko. Yes indeed, the U.S. side has long been using this argument, one may say, from the very beginning of the examination of the issues of disarmament after the end of World War II. But I would reply in this way: that not a single state has submitted a more radical or a more far-reaching proposal on the issues of control than the Soviet Union, the Soviet state, has. With the appearance of nuclear weapons, when this question on monitoring arose, we submitted under the aegis of the United Nations Organization a proposal to ban these weapons once and for all.

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We were told: What about monitoring? And what about other types of weapons? Our reply was simple—let us raise the question of other types of weapons as well, and let us come to an agreement on monitoring. On what monitoring? On the widest, most comprehensive monitoring, the deepest monitoring—in a word on universal monitoring. We submitted this proposal; no other state did. Our friends fully supported this, our joint proposal; and we insisted in the course of many years on the adoption of a proposal on universal disarmament under universal control.

Do you think the West and the United States went for this? No, they did not go for this. They did not go for either universal disarmament and the banning of nuclear weapons, nor did they go for universal monitoring. This proposal currently lies on the table of the U.S. Administration and of other governments of the NATO bloc, and in general, other governments in the world. We are still prepared today to consider such a broad proposal, a proposal envisaging universal and total disarmament, under universal and total international monitoring—international, I stress. This means that American representatives, too, can take part in this supervision. And as for all these insinuations that the Soviet Union supposedly does not fulfill certain obligations in a signed agreement on verification, on monitoring, they are fabrications.

Note that these memoranda and notes, which are sent by the U.S. Administration to Congress and are sometimes brought to the attention of the United Nations, to the effect that such actions, which I mentioned, supposedly take place on the part of the Soviet Union. They contain expressions like these: There are doubts about whether the Soviet Union is fulfilling some obligations or other; or it appears that some obligations or other are not being fully carried out; or the question arises of verifying whether such-and-such obligations are really being fulfilled by the Soviet Union. But nowhere are there direct statements with proof, using facts, that the Soviet Union is actually violating anything. We deny this categorically. No! The Soviet Union is not accustomed to violating its obligations that are in accordance with treaties and agreements under which its signature and the signature of other states stand, whether it is a bilateral or a multilateral agreement. We are proud of this.

And, by the way, the world has grown accustomed to this; it is accustomed to it. When the Americans declare that supposedly not all is in order with the Soviet Union's fulfillment of provisions on verification of some agreement or other this, you know, is listened to with some indifference; and other states have never made statements to us to the effect that there is actually confirmation of this. No, no.

Our conscience is clear here. We do not conclude agreements in order not to fulfill them. We fulfill these agreements in every aspect, from start to finish.

Zhukov. Official U.S. representatives hint that they intend to hold serious negotiations only about nuclear arms, whereas as far as space

weapons are concerned, here the American side supposedly intends merely to explain the meaning of these systems for the consolidation of peace. How do you assess such statements?

Gromyko. You know, if there are such free interpretations of the American position in connection with the accord that was achieved in Geneva, then they do not express the spirit of that accord, if the statement is understood as any reasonable person must understand it. It is directly stated there that it is a question of negotiations which will embrace such-and-such and such-and-such and such-and-such spheres: space strategic nuclear arms, and intermediate-range nuclear arms. And if someone has a situation in mind whereby in the discussion of the space issue one side would merely carry out the exercise of elucidating its own position, not corresponding to the spirit of the accord, while the other side would listen, then they are off the track. We do not envisage that kind of seminar. That is a pointless exercise. It would be an empty exercise.

Without accord, a simultaneous and mutually linked accord on all three aspects, no progress can be made towards fulfilling what was agreed upon in Geneva. One would wish rather that there might be fewer such statements of a frivolous nature by the United States, and best of all, none at all. A serious approach to these matters is required. They brook no such liberties.

Matveyev. What prospects in the area of reducing strategic armaments would be opened up in the event of an accord being reached on preventing the militarization of outer space?

Gromyko. Yes, I have to say that more favorable prospects would be opened up than to date. I have already said that it is impossible to examine a ban on strategic armaments excluding space. But if the problems of space were examined in the necessary direction and if accords in this area became clear, then it would be possible to move forward also on questions of strategic armaments. The Soviet Union would be willing not only to examine this problem of strategic armaments but would also be willing to reduce them sharply, upholding of course the principle of equality, of identical security, but to reduce strategic armaments. That kind of possibility would be opened up. And on the contrary, if there were no movement forward in space questions, then it would be superfluous even to speak about the possibility of a reduction in strategic armaments.

Bogachev. Andrey Andreyevich, are the agreements previously reached on strategic armaments working?

Gromyko. This question does arise. Concerning the SALT I Treaty, which was concluded when Mr. Nixon was the U.S. President, despite the fact that the period of validity for the treaty expired, in due time the sides agreed to exchange official statements to the effect that the obligations assumed by the sides under this Treaty remained in force. I therefore may reply that they remain in force today. We are prepared to regard this Treaty as such in future.

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Concerning the second treaty, SALT II, which was duly signed in Vienna on our side by Leonid Ilich Brezhnev and on the U.S. side by former President Carter: This Treaty, as is known, was not ratified by the United States.[4] The obligations assumed by the sides under this treaty therefore are not legally in order and do not remain valid.

But the sides reached an agreement that whatever is of positive significance should, in fact, operate in this agreement, too. Why such a formula? Because the contents of this agreement are complicated in many respects, in particular in the respect that some of the points of the agreement—and this is something that should be clear—for instance those on cruise missiles, no longer apply. This was a temporary factor—these points no longer apply and are no longer operating. There was a protocol as an addendum to the accord. It does not exist any more. That is why it is correct to say that what is positive now in connection with this accord should be in operation. There is an understanding between the two sides here and this is good.

Zorin. The U.S. Administration stresses emphatically and emphasizes the fact that the presence in the Soviet Union of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles is a destabilizing influence and consequently insists that these systems be sharply reduced. In your view are there grounds for presenting the issue in this manner?

Gromyko. No, there are absolutely no grounds for presenting the issue in this way. When at one time negotiations on strategic weapons were being conducted, our so-called heavy missiles, which Washington particularly dislikes at the moment, represented a component part of the accord—I repeat, a component part of the accord. At that time we made allowances on issues of forward-based U.S. systems, including those in Europe. We did not involve in this Treaty U.S. bases in Europe, although we announced that this issue should be settled in subsequent negotiations. But as far as SALT II is concerned, this issue was not involved in it. In return, the United States deemed it justified for the Soviet Union to have these heavy missiles, the missiles about which so much is being said at times and such a fuss is made of in the United States. So the Soviet Union has remained and remains also in this matter a supporter of the principle of equality and equal security.

Moreover, we have drawn the attention of the American Administration to the fact—although, generally speaking, there are thinking people over there. It itself also understands that the history of the formation of strategic armaments in the USSR and in the United States is such that these armaments have taken shape differently. The United States has always had a powerful Air Force, a bomber Air Force. We have in mind first of all aircraft as delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons. Such a factor as submarines also worked in that direction. Therefore, to take and eliminate this difference in one stroke, including in the structure of the strategic nuclear forces, is not serious. And it looks as if, in the end, even official American circles

[4] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 189–222.

have started to understand that their demand, which they previously stressed in every possible way in connection with our heavy missiles, is excessive and, in short, inappropriate. And ever more frequently they have started to say: Yes, indeed, the history of how strategic nuclear forces have taken shape in both countries, needs to be accepted here.

We have not given up and are not giving up the sacrosanct point which needs to be accepted in talks on nuclear armaments: the principle of equality and equal security. This is how it was before; this is how it is today, and this is also how it will be in the future. That is the only healthy, convincing basis by whose observance the accords and positive solutions of questions of nuclear armaments, questions of space, questions of intermediate-range weapons can be sought. I hope that I have answered your question.

Zhukov. Incidentally, on medium-range nuclear weapons, what will the situation be if the Americans continue with the deployment of their new nuclear missiles in Europe during the time of the talks?

Gromyko. If the United States continues to deploy its medium-range weapons in Europe, then I must say bluntly that the situation will be made more complicated, and greatly more complicated. The fact that we proposed a freeze on these weapons is well known. Indeed, in Geneva we warned the United States quite clearly that if it did so—if it continued with the deployment; and it was at great pains to emphasize that it had plans, and that it intended to carry out those plans—then it would put in question the talks that were due to begin in accordance with the understandings reached in Geneva. I repeat—we warned the United States about this. We hope that it will bear this in mind.

Matveyev. Now, tell us, please, have Washington and the U.S. allies as well reviewed their attitude on the question of counting the nuclear weapons of Britain and France in tackling the question of medium-range nuclear armaments?

Gromyko. From what we have heard from U.S. representatives in Geneva and elsewhere, you know, American statesmen come out virtually every day with statements, commenting on first one side, then the other, on nuclear armaments, the situation in general, East-West relations, and relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and it appears that they have not shifted their position on the question of British and French armaments. We have answered them, are answering, and will continue to answer them by saying that British and French armaments must be taken into account. Britain and France are members of the North Atlantic alliance. It would be most unjustified if the North Atlantic alliance obtained a kind of addition, or a bonus if you like, in the form of the British and French armaments. This is the crux of the disagreement between us, and this is a basic disagreement in connection with the discussion of the medium-range weapons problem.

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We made proposals as to the basis on which an understanding could be reached between the Soviet Union and the United States. We declared on repeated occasions that we do not, all told, put matters in the following way: Britain and France must scrap their weapons. What we say is that they must defend themselves. This means that if British and French weapons remain at their disposal, then American weapons must be reduced by the corresponding number. This is, so to speak, one campaign—a campaign taking place on one side of the barricade, figuratively speaking.

Bogachev. You have already mentioned the problem of airborne nuclear armaments. Another question that arises is whether the Soviet position presupposes taking into account in the overall balance of forces medium-range nuclear weapons carried by ship-borne aircraft, aircraft which carry nuclear weapons and are based on aircraft carriers, in the European zone?

Gromyko. This is actually an exceptionally important question. Up to now, during the talks we have held, we have taken six American aircraft carriers into account—aircraft carriers which, by and large, either frequent European waters, for instance the Mediterranean, or which are found near European waters. There are, I repeat, six such carriers. Altogether, and this, at the end of the day, is a well-known fact, the United States has 14 aircraft carriers; and a 15th is being built—by all accounts its construction is nearing completion, or at any rate completion is not far away. Each of these aircraft carriers has 40 aircraft which carry nuclear weapons. Each aircraft has two or three nuclear warheads. Just look: If you take a mere 6, a mere 6, then you end up with 480 nuclear warheads. But they number 15 in all: Surely it is not complicated or difficult in some kind of extreme situation to bring aircraft carriers closer to Europe from other parts of the world? No, not particularly difficult.

So what we have in mind is that a certain stage in the talks, we can raise the question not just of the 6, but of the 15 aircraft carriers. That is, we will include those which we have not counted hitherto.

Even if you take a mere 6 aircraft carriers and assume that each aircraft has just 2 nuclear warheads, then, as I have already said, you get 480. But if you take twice that number of nuclear-capable aircraft, that is aircraft as carriers carrying nuclear weapons, and twice as many nuclear warheads, then this is more than 1,000 nuclear warheads. [sentence as heard] This is a colossal force, a colossal force. We intend to keep this in reserve.

If the talks go in such a way that the use of this factor is justified, we shall do that; we have a right to do so. It is not a luxury but it is a necessity. I have attempted to give you the mathematical justification of such a formulation of the issue.

The Americans know this, although, sometimes, evidently regarding it as the height of subtle tactics, do not speak in this spirit, forgetting about this issue, as it were, and putting it to one side.

Zorin. There is another aspect to the question. It is sometimes said in the West nowadays that the talks on which an accord has been reached in Geneva are merely a resumption of the talks which were interrupted earlier, and that they are taking place allegedly because the new American missiles are being deployed in Europe. How would you comment on assertions of this kind?

Gromyko. Of course, this is not a resumption of the talks. They are completely new talks. The Americans, and the U.S. Secretary of State personally, have also agreed that these are new talks, not a resumption of the old talks. And since they were at first trying to use expressions, trying to slip them in as it were, about talks having been resumed, when we explained that it would be closer to the truth, they agreed that the talks are of course completely new. And the way the issues are put is completely different than how it was previously during these talks; the way the issue is put has to be quite different.

What mainly should be stressed here? It mainly has to be stressed here that if before talks were conducted separately on strategic weapons and on medium-range weapons, and both sides agreed that it was proper to conduct the matter in that way, and that it might be easier to find agreement that way, then now it has definitely become clear that it is not in fact possible to hold talks on strategic weapons and to try to reach agreement without resolving the issue of medium-range weapons. It is not possible. Why is it not possible? Because for the Soviet Union, medium-range weapons are also strategic weapons. Medium-range weapons are such only according to the parameters of their range; but in effect, and of course in power, in effect they are strategic weapons for the Soviet Union. Why? Because they can reach the Soviet Union's territory. They can reach the Soviet Union's territory, while the type of weapon which is opposed all the time, day and night, by the United States and its allies, our SS–20 missiles, medium-range weapons, none of them can reach the territory of the United States. That is one of the arguments in favor of there now having to be an integrated approach, an integrated approach to resolving the problems.

The issue of strategic nuclear weapons cannot be examined in isolation from that of space. Also, the issue of medium-range nuclear weapons cannot be examined in isolation from that of space. The issue of strategic weapons cannot be examined as separate from medium-range weapons. It is essential to examine these only in combination, not to mention the fact that, lumped together, weapons, strategic medium-range weapons, cannot be examined separately from weapons in space. That is the reason why we have come to the negotiations, to the talks of a preliminary nature, to the talks with the United States, in order to tell the truth: this is the situation today, this is the situation that has arisen today. All these problems can only be examined together. If the United States, or, more precisely, the U.S. Administration, did not have any plans to create a so-called large-scale missile defense, then the question would not arise in involving space

and examining it all together—space must be clean. The arms race must not spread there. On this count there are appropriate statements, or if you prefer, accords with the participation of the United States, but, after all, this position is different. So that, at the moment, these two problems of strategic armaments and medium-range weapons can only be examined jointly. But the most important thing that it is essential to bear in mind here is that all this is a single complex [*kompleks*]. This is being done, you see, not because on paper it is easier to operate with three complexes, to draw up some kind of results, to search for points of some kind which do not coincide. No, life itself forces one, the real situation forces one, to approach the matter as a complex. In the final analysis, people are indifferent as to how they die, whether from a bomb coming from space, or a bomb launched by a strategic missile or by a medium-range missile. But it is possible to solve the first, the second, and the third. I am talking here about a correct approach—a desire and will to reach an agreement.

Matveyev. But what about the security interests of our allies at forthcoming talks, of the fraternal socialist countries? How will they be taken into account?

Gromyko. We will fully take them into account, fully take them into account. We conducted the talks both in our own name—the Soviet Union speaks to Western countries and to the United States in its own name and in the name of its allies. Our principled policy is a united one, and this gives strength to our policy. Periodically we discuss these issues at conferences of the Political Consultative Committee and other Warsaw Treaty bodies, and we reach agreement. This is a joint policy. And so we are speaking both for ourselves and for them, and we consider that their security interests must also be fully protected in the same way as the Soviet Union's interests should also be protected.

Zhukov. I would like to return to the space issue. Let us assume that the United States, bearing in mind its past behavior, were to embark upon violating the accords reached in the area concerning the need to avert the space arms race. What would be the consequences of such a situation?

Gromyko. The consequences would be very grave indeed, very grave indeed. If it were to embark upon this, the talks would be wrecked. We gave this warning to the American representatives. There is no choice here, and no intermediate course. One either deals with space seriously—preventing an arms race in space and keeping it unmilitarized—or there is an arms race. A half measure here does not solve the issue. A half measure, perhaps a half measure today, could lead tomorrow to an intensification of the arms race, so that space becomes a terrible and threatening arena for deploying the appropriate types of weapons, and becomes a great danger for humanity, for the very existence of humanity. This is not churning out cliches, not at all. When people talk about so-called star wars, and about a broad-scale missile defense system, they are talking about life and death. This is

how the question stands. We consider it our duty to tell the truth not only to the United States but to the world. Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko has spoken of this more than once in his statements and appeals to the American President, when he drew attention to the need to prevent competition in the deployment of weapons in space.

On this question, the question of space, we will fight to the end. Irrespective of what strong words one uses in connection with this, they will still not be sufficient to express the whole of the danger which would be attendant upon deployment of arms in space and upon the spread of the arms race to space.

Bogachev. Andrey Andreyevich, which side put forward the proposal regarding the structure of the forthcoming talks?

Gromyko. It was we who put it forward, it was the Soviet side that put this proposal forward. And it is a logical one. This is what we argued—and it is this that the Central Committee and the Politburo were guided by—since it is essential to examine the problems in space and the problems of strategic nuclear arms and medium-range nuclear arms jointly, then it is also logical to build the structure of the talks in such a way that they should accord with each other. That is why we suggested that each side should field a single delegation, although it should naturally include three groups, so that one group can deal with the questions of space, the second with strategic nuclear arms and the third one with medium-range nuclear arms. We explained in detail what content this structure should contain: Each group would deal with its own field, should deal with its own field.

However, questions which will also be of interest to another group will arise, will inevitably arise—questions which are connected with those under examination in the other group and in the third group. I have already spoken about it. That is why, a single delegation should, in this case, examine the situation in its full composition, and see how various questions relate to each other, so that a situation does not arise here in which an accord begins to take shape in one group independently of the second and of the third.

I have already spoken about space and the inconceivability of excluding space from any accord on other issues. This is obligatory. We do not lay down any strict rules regarding after what time the delegation should meet in full complement to examine these issues: This is presently impossible to foresee. The progress of negotiations will dictate the need for the appropriate procedure. There should thus be a combination both of in-depth examination by separate groups of issues in the appropriate spheres, and of all issues from the point of view of their combination. Three directions means a mass of diverse components. There are not just plusses here, for the more components there are, the more possibilities there are of exchanging and adapting them in various ways. There are difficulties, too, and both the one and the other must be taken into account. There is no other way out.

And altogether, we should not be frightened of this structural complexity—if the desire and will are there, one can find them, for all this

can be calculated. Furthermore, without any particular difficulty it can be mathematically counted up, adjusted, and made equivalent. The possibility exists. We have people, masses of people, who have a good grasp of the factual material, who have resources at their fingertips, as they say. There will be no holdup over that. Will and desire, that is what is needed.

Zorin. Andrey Andreyevich, it is hard to make predictions, of course, but I should nevertheless like to ask you the following question: What can you say about the future of negotiations—to the extent, of course, to which one can judge matters at present, before the negotiations have started?

Gromyko. In my opinion, this is a very hard question to answer, if a precise answer is what is wanted. I think you could ask 100 wise men, and they would not be able to give you a precise answer. I can speak only for the Soviet side.

We hope that the negotiations will be businesslike, that the approach will be serious, that those goals which were marked out in Geneva will really be sustained, that the two sides will not resort to cunning, and that neither of them will try to lead the other astray and try to gain some kind of advantage in violation of the principle of equality and equal security.

It is not easy to do that now. Each side must proceed from the fact that the other side will not allow deviation from this principle. We are in favor of achieving peace, a mutually acceptable solution, and the preparation of appropriate agreements: this applies both to space, to strategic arms, and to medium-range weapons. I have turned your question around just a little, but I think it needed to be turned around, and I have tried to give an answer.

Zhukov. Are there some other issues related to nuclear arms which, though they will not be the subject of talks just now, could even now be resolved independently?

Gromyko. Yes, there are such issues. We have stated them to the American side, and even cited such issues. Without giving an exhaustive list of them, for example, there is the possibility, irrespective of the state of affairs in all these three fields, to conclude an agreement on stopping nuclear weapons testing. Why should this not be solved? It can be. There are no objective obstacles to agreement and to drawing up these accords and agreements. We have proposed this, propose it now, and will propose it again. Then, there is the question of freezing nuclear arsenals. This issue can be singled out. We are in favor of resolving it, the sooner the better, irrespective of the state of play in any of the three fields we have been speaking about all the time.

A third example: We consider that the agreements signed between the Soviet Union and the United States several years ago concerning explosions for peaceful purposes and the threshold agreement on nu-

clear weapons tests, could be put into effect.[5] There has simply been obstructionism on this on the part of the United States. It deliberately and demonstratively failed to bring this to a conclusion. It could be done.

There are also several other similar spheres which could be resolved without particular difficulty, we are convinced, without setting conditions in the spheres of which I have spoken. I would class the issue of a pledge by the nuclear powers not to be first to use nuclear weapons among such issues. Any nuclear country could, and in our opinion should, adopt such a pledge at any time—today, tomorrow, the day after tomorrow. The Soviet Union has adopted such a pledge, and you know that the whole world applauded it.

Bogachev. The Soviet Union is now starting new talks with the United States. But where is the guarantee that it will not again use them as a screen, as cover for its plans to attain military superiority? Where is the guarantee that it will not lead them into a dead end again?

Gromyko. Well, I do not know who could guarantee that the stance of the United States will always be decent and constructive. After all, we know what it had in mind in the past. I have cited several examples where agreements that were concluded were refuted or declared invalid. And so I would not like to work in such conditions. But we clearly know that in the interests of peace, in the interests of the United States, of the Soviet Union and of the whole world, everything possible has to be done in order for things to go along the right road, for accords to be implemented, and for agreements to be reached which have to be reached, for those issues which need resolving, which must be resolved, to be resolved. That is something one can say with confidence.

I would like, on my own initiative and proceeding from the spirit of your questions—the direct question has not yet been asked, perhaps you have it in mind, so to speak—to highlight one important question.

It should be more properly understood among our people, and among those abroad who are interested in these problems, and by foreign public opinion, that the American side describes its plan regarding outer space—the plan of so-called large-scale missile defense—as a defensive one. And they maintained frequently to us in Geneva, especially at the start of the talks: why, they say, do you object to this plan? After all, it's a defensive plan. We, they say, want to create weapons that can knock out missiles launched against the United States. So that is defense! Therein lies a pretty crafty and artful trick. Imagine that they managed to create such a system, or something like it. I mean the United States, or more precisely, the U.S. Administration. In other words, they create a shield to protect them from missiles. For they are saying that they fear a nuclear strike from

[5] For the texts of these agreements, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1976*, pp. 328–332, and *ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–229.

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the Soviet Union; therefore they need a shield. Suppose they create a shield—they are saying that this shield is of a peace-loving nature. It is designed to destroy the other side's missiles, so that these missiles do not reach their target. So this is what they mean by a shield—one directed against the other side, against the Soviet Union. But this, of course, would be in an extreme situation. But from their point of view, what's all this? There's no danger here for the United States, and they even try to convince us that there is no danger to us either.

We are told this: After all, the United States does not have the intention of striking a blow at the Soviet Union. We tell them: Well, then, it follows that the Soviet Union must rely on your conscience, on the conscience of Washington. Well, first of all, we are not very convinced that Washington has very great reserves of this merchandise; we do not have that conviction, bearing in mind certain facts. And second, if we were to mentally trade places with you, the United States of America, then it follows that you must think the same way as we, the Soviet Union, do. In other words, would our corresponding statements then, if we were trying to create such a system, corresponding statements, statements to the effect that: You should rely on our conscience. Would they be sufficient for you? Silence. Silence. Therefore the fact that the U.S. Administration has christened this plan as defensive, or the word "system" is more to their liking, a defensive system—large-scale, defensive—does not change anything. Some social strata do get misled, one must say frankly, but of course, there is absolutely nothing defensive here. These weapons are offensive, and this whole plan, to speak frankly, this plan is aggressive, aggressive. We are resolutely against it; resolutely. It seems to us that everyone who tries to take up an honest position in these questions should realize what aim is being pursued by this plan.

Let us assume even from the point of view of theoretical analysis, let us assume even that the United States, well, does not use, well, has created this system and does not use its capabilities for launching missiles against the Soviet Union and striking a nuclear blow and also that this is so from the start, but it would have the ability to do so. If it had a protective shield, if it had this, would this really not be used for pressure, for blackmail? Of course it would. This fits in with the policy which aims to obtain domination or a dominating position in the world, such a position as would enable the United States of America to dictate its conditions, in this case to the Soviet Union. We decisively reject this entire system, this entire plan, and I wish to reemphasize that equality, equality, equality and equal security is the granite basis for conducting matters also in future. There is no other position.

If there are people in the United States who assume that somehow or other the United States will achieve a dominating position with the bringing to completion of its plan to set up this system or without bringing it to completion, and the Soviet Union will be in a subordinate position, this is an error, this is a gross error. This must not occur!

I want to take this opportunity to stress once again what Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko has said in his statements and what he has written personally to Reagan, the American President—that such a position is ruled out. We will not allow that. We have colossal resources, both material and intellectual, sufficient to enable us to secure our position, and this applies to the Soviet Union and our allies and friends. Our people found within themselves the source whereby they emerged victorious from a war against German fascism unprecedented in the scale of its destructiveness. The whole world was amazed at the way in which this took place, for our people bore upon their shoulders the main burden of the war. Putting it figuratively, our people, in the political sense, gave out nuclear energy, and emerged the victors. They will never allow any country or group of countries guided by ideological considerations to dictate its condition to them at any time. The fact that American plans are permeated by these ideological considerations to a considerable extent, this is beyond doubt and, I think, understood by every Soviet person and by others, too.

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6. Address by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam): New Arms Control Negotiations, January 14, 1985 [1]

The new year began on a positive note, with agreement last week between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko to commence new arms control negotiations.[2] The President has set as our immediate objective the reduction of nuclear arms and the strengthening of stability, with the ultimate goal the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. While the agreement in Geneva is only a first step, the groundwork has now been laid to make 1985 a year of intense dialogue and negotiation.

The differences between the United States and the Soviet Union are many and profound. One of the most important differences is the way policy is made. Policymaking in the Soviet Union is the exclusive domain of a self-perpetuating ruling elite.

In the United States, of course, policies are the product of open debate and political competition. In this spirit I shall today discuss our approach to the new arms control negotiations, with particular attention to the interrelationships between offense and defense, between weapons on Earth and weapons in space, and between forces that exist today and those that may emerge in the future.

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[1] Department of State, Current Policy No. 647. The address was given before the Foreign Policy Association in New York.

[2] Document 3.

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Keeping the Peace

Our fundamental objective is to avoid war while preserving our freedom and that of our allies. Keeping the peace requires a strategy with many facets.

First, we must have a strong defense. An equitable balance of forces (both nuclear and conventional) reduces the likelihood of conflict. The United States does not seek superiority over the Soviet Union, but we will do whatever is necessary to deny the Soviets superiority. We are modernizing both our nuclear and conventional forces to correct imbalances and give us the strength to deter aggression against the West.

Second, we are working closely with both our Atlantic and Pacific allies to strengthen our collective defenses. Last year NATO began deployment of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles in response to the Soviet buildup of SS–20s. This year, special attention is being devoted to enhancing allied conventional defenses.

Third, we seek to negotiate equitable and verifiable agreements to reduce nuclear and conventional forces, to ban chemical weapons, and to enhance stability and reduce the risk of war.

These three efforts are mutually reinforcing. Our modernization program offers the Soviets an incentive to join us in negotiating significant reductions in nuclear arsenals. While all three must be pursued in a balanced way, today I shall focus on arms reduction negotiations. It is vital to the success of these negotiations that the Congress continue to support the modernization program, including the MX missile, and that the alliance remain strong and united.

We will maintain a stable balance of forces with or without arms control. But our strong preference is for reductions to much lower, equal levels of forces.

Nuclear arms reductions can make a contribution to enhanced stability. While stability requires our own efforts to deploy survivable forces, arms reductions can provide incentives for an evolution of forces in stabilizing directions, such as toward small, single-warhead missiles. Agreements can place special restrictions on destabilizing systems and limit the threat to our forces. Agreements can also stabilize the transition from the current offense dominance to a new relationship in which defenses play a major role.

By any measure, our experience in arms control negotiations to date has fallen far short of these realistic possibilities, not to mention the exaggerated hopes that some have held. Fifteen years of arms negotiations have not resulted in significant constraints on Soviet offensive forces. On the contrary, the number of Soviet missile warheads has grown by a factor of four over this period.

We can and we must do better. One of the priority objectives of this Administration is to negotiate equitable agreements that will reduce nuclear arsenals and reduce the risk of war. This has been the principal subject in exchanges between President Reagan and Chairman Chernenko. It was the dominant subject in the President's meeting last October with Foreign Minister Gromyko. The ideas that Sec-

retary Shultz presented to Gromyko in Geneva last week reflected considerable time and attention by the President and his principal advisers.

U.S. Approach to Arms Control

Four principles underlie our arms control proposals.

Substantial Reductions. That is, reductions to equal levels well below current levels. To repeat, the eventual goal is zero.

Equality. Agreements must result in overall equality between the United States and the Soviet Union in measures of military capability.

Stability. Special emphasis must be given to the most destabilizing systems, such as large, land-based MIRV [multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles] missiles that threaten the forces of the other side.

Verification. Given the asymmetries between our two societies, agreements that cannot be verified can easily turn into unilateral constraints on ourselves. The United States would comply—with the Congress and the press monitoring closely—but we could not be certain about Soviet performance. Verification is intrinsically difficult, the more so as agreements become more ambitious and technology permits smaller, more mobile forces. A major obstacle is the Soviet record; they have not lived up to the terms of past agreements. There are serious problems with Soviet compliance with the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty,[3] with SALT II [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks],[4] and with other agreements. We have discussed these problems at some length with the Soviets but have been unable to resolve them. This experience obliges us to redouble our efforts to make agreements that are verifiable. But verification can never be perfect, and we must not put ourselves in a situation in which the Soviets can gain a decisive advantage through violation or circumvention of agreements.

We had previously made specific proposals consistent with these four principles. We proposed to cut strategic missile warheads by a third and to take other steps that would substantially reduce the destructive capability of missile forces. Such deep cuts would help to restore the situation we envisioned in the 1970s, when we sought a balance of comprehensive constraints on both offense and defense. We also offered to consider any equal number of intermediate-range missile warheads between 0 and 572 (our planned deployment), as an interim step toward our goal of eliminating such missiles. We demonstrated our flexibility by adjusting our proposals a number of times to address Soviet concerns.

In the new talks announced last week, we have no intention of compromising our basic principles. We do recognize that there is more than one way to meet these criteria, and the President made clear again last week that the United States will continue to be flexible in the negotiations. We envision tradeoffs that balance U.S. and Soviet

[3] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[4] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

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advantages to achieve overall equality despite the asymmetries in forces.

Soviet Approach

The Soviets have a different approach and different priorities. The Soviets acknowledge the need for reductions but give top priority to constraining weapons in space, which for the most part do not yet exist and will not for many years. The United States seeks to reduce offensive nuclear forces, which exist today in great numbers right here on Earth.

There is no little irony here. For example, the only operational "space weapons" today are the Soviet antisatellite system and the Soviet ABM system, which have been deployed for many years. And just a few years ago, in talks on antisatellite systems held at the initiative of the United States, the Soviets exhibited great skepticism about space arms control.

No point would be served by speculation about the motivations for this change in the Soviet approach or for the Soviet agreement last week to resume formal negotiations. But the priority subject the Soviets want to address in the new negotiations is the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Strategic Defense Initiative

You have heard a great deal recently about that initiative. It is worthwhile to establish a few basic facts.

- The SDI is a research program. Its purpose is to explore new technologies that may lead to a reliable defense of the United States and our allies from ballistic missile attack. This program is completely consistent with the ABM Treaty and other agreements.
- The SDI puts primary emphasis on technologies that do not use nuclear weapons. This approach contrasts with the present Soviet ABM system, which relies on nuclear-armed interceptors.
- The SDI is a long-term program. No decisions on deployment of new defenses are expected for a number of years. If, in the future, we decide to pursue such defenses, this should be a matter for prior discussion with our allies and between the United States and the Soviet Union. If such defenses appear feasible and beneficial, we will want to discuss with them how these defenses can be fitted into a stable relationship between offense and defense.
- In the near term, the SDI program directly responds to the ongoing and extensive Soviet missile defense effort. The Soviets are expanding their ABM system to include all the actual deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. They also have a major program to explore new defensive technologies, including technologies like those being pursued in our SDI program. The effort the Soviets devote to strategic defense is vastly greater than the relatively small U.S. program and even approximates the massive effort the Soviets devote to strategic offense. The SDI represents a prudent hedge against any Soviet decision to expand rapidly its

ballistic missile defense capability beyond the bounds of the ABM Treaty.

- In the longer term, SDI offers the possibility of shifting away from total reliance on the threat of retaliation and toward greater reliance on defensive systems. As the President has said, "The human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence."

We do not now know whether the technologies we are exploring will result in defensive systems that are effective, survivable, and cost effective. There have been major advances in recent years, and we are trying hard to push the state of the art further. It would be irresponsible not to invest in the research that can determine whether future strategy can be based less on threatening other countries and more on defending our own, especially if that defense can be non-nuclear. We will have to live for some time with uncertainty as to the outcome of SDI. If and when we do decide that defenses can contribute to our security, we will not proceed unilaterally: This will be a matter for discussion with the Soviets and with our allies.

The SDI research program—the object of much Soviet criticism—is being conducted strictly within the limits of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet defense program, by contrast, includes a large radar in the central Soviet Union near Krasnoyarsk which is identical in appearance to other Soviet radars for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles. The location and orientation of this radar almost certainly violate both the letter and spirit of the Treaty. This is a serious concern and causes us to question the Soviet Union's long-term intentions in missile defense. It is important that the integrity of the ABM Treaty be reestablished and its terms be fully complied with.

Geneva Meeting

So this is the situation Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko faced in Geneva:

The United States seeks negotiations where we can pursue equitable and verifiable agreements leading to deep reductions in offensive nuclear weapons, both strategic and intermediate range. We are prepared to discuss defenses, both space based and Earth based, but will protect our right to pursue research on defensive technologies that may provide a basis for a more stable relationship in the future. We do not believe there should be constraints on research that has such positive potential; and, in any event, constraints on research would not be verifiable. We also intend to protect our right to continue our modernization program to maintain deterrence, restore the balance of offensive forces, and provide incentives for the Soviets to agree to reductions.

The Soviets profess an interest in "radical" reductions but in the past have resisted any meaningful program to bring about such reductions. They are pressing primarily for a ban on space weapons. By focusing on space, the Soviets are trying to establish a forum in which

to discuss a ban on many of the concepts being pursued in our SDI research program. The Soviets themselves have an extensive ground-based missile defense program, a deployed antisatellite system, and their own strategic defense research program; and we will be discussing these subjects in the negotiations. We anticipate that the Soviets will seek to protect their programs for both offensive and defensive forces. Certainly this has been an overriding Soviet goal in previous negotiations.

At Geneva, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko laid out their ideas in some detail. Then they went to work on a negotiating structure that would allow each side to discuss the positions it considers important. Given the relationship the United States sees between offense and defense, and the relationship the Soviets see between weapons in space and weapons on the ground, they agreed on a new complex of negotiations to consider the entire range of questions concerning nuclear and space arms. Each delegation will be divided into three groups—one for reductions in strategic forces, one for reductions in intermediate-range forces, and one new group. In this new forum the United States plans to discuss space-based systems and ground-based systems that can attack targets in space. We will address as well the potential benefits of moving in the future toward a defense-oriented deterrence. Agreement was thus reached on a structure that permits each side to pursue its objectives without prejudice in formal negotiations.

The underlying notion that offensive and defensive systems are closely related and cannot be considered in isolation from each other is hardly revolutionary. Offense and defense were considered together in SALT I. The subsequent inability to conclude a comprehensive agreement on reductions of offensive arms, as called for in the ABM Treaty, is one of the main reasons that it is necessary to reexamine the question of defenses. While the issues posed by the SDI are for the future, we are prepared now to discuss space arms and the broader question of defenses, including existing Soviet defensive weapons. In parallel we will press for reductions in offensive nuclear forces, which should be mankind's highest priority.

The agreement with the Soviets at Geneva to begin new negotiations is a useful first step. But to consider the outcome in Geneva as simply a resumption of formal dialogue misses the real significance of the process we are now embarking upon. We have established a forum where we can address the full spectrum of means for enhancing stability and reducing the risk of war. Our strategic concept can be summarized in the following single paragraph:

For the next 10 years, we should seek a radical reduction in the number and power of existing and planned offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether land based, space based, or otherwise. We should even now be looking forward to a period of transition, beginning possibly 10 years from now, to effective non-nuclear defensive forces, including defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period

of transition should lead to the eventual elimination of nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A nuclear-free world is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

The accord reached in Geneva is, of course, only a beginning. While Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko were successful in working out a basis for new negotiations, their discussions made clear that there are major differences of substance between us. There is a long road ahead. With patience, determination, and flexibility on both sides, the process set in motion last week in Geneva can successfully lead to a more stable peace.

7. Chinese Press Statement on Nuclear Policy, January 18, 1985 [1]

Chinese Vice-Premier Li Peng reiterated here today that China had no intention, either at present or in the future, to help non-nuclear countries to develop nuclear weapons and would abide by the stipulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He stressed that China's nuclear cooperation with other countries was confined to peaceful purposes alone.

Li Peng made this statement in an interview with *Xinhua* before the signing of a contract on building a nuclear power station in Guangdong, a joint venture of Guangdong and Hong Kong. The vice-premier said that the construction of the power station marked China's beginning in building large nuclear power station. It is the biggest joint venture China has ever undertaken since it implemented the policy of opening to the outside world, he added.

Li said China was cooperating or discussing cooperation in nuclear energy with France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, Brazil, Pakistan and Japan.

On China's nuclear policy, he said that Premier Zhao Ziyang declared at the Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress held in May 1984 that China was critical of the discriminatory "treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" and had declined to accede to it, and that, on the other hand, China by no means favored nuclear proliferation, nor did it engage in such proliferation by helping other countries develop nuclear weapons.[2]

Li Peng said: "I would like to reiterate here that we have no intention, either at present or in the future, to help non-nuclear countries develop nuclear weapons."

He said: "Last year, China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency and was appointed a council member country. China will

[1] Beijing *Xinhua* in English, January 18, 1985; FBIS *Daily Report*, January 18, 1985, vol. I, pp. E1–E2.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, p. 410.

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maintain good relations of cooperation with the agency and commit itself to its due obligations and abide by the agency's stipulations."

Asked about China's policy on developing nuclear power, Li said that in view of its energy resources, China would, in the near future, mainly develop thermal power in addition to hydraulic power, with nuclear power as a supplement.

He said that China would rely on itself for the fuel needed by its nuclear power stations and establish a comprehensive nuclear fuel cycling system.

In building the first batch of such stations, the vice-premier noted, China would enter extensive cooperation with other countries. It would import technology as well as equipment, and, through co-production, gradually increase its ability to manufacture nuclear power equipment, thus laying a foundation for its further development of nuclear power.

8. News Interview of President Reagan: SALT II Limits Regarding Trident Submarines [Extract], January 26, 1985 [1]

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Q. Mr. President, you've said twice in recent days that the U.S. would abide by the unratified SALT II agreement.[2] But, your Navy Secretary says he's waiting for a decision from you on the next action required to stay within SALT limits regarding two Trident submarines. Have you made that decision and has it been communicated to the Defense Department?

The President. No. What he's talking about is the fact that, as we continue with our Trident submarines, we are approaching a point at which, if we abide completely by the SALT II agreement, we would then have to find other weapons to eliminate. We have eliminated some in going forward with this, and we've run out of, I think, of the particular weapon that we were eliminating—that we'll have to do that, or discuss whether we actually go above. And, in that regard, we have to take into consideration that the Soviet Union has, we believe, not stayed within the limits.

Now, do we want to join them in that and forget the whole idea, or do we want to talk to them about going forward. But the—we haven't

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, February 4, 1985, p. 93. The President was interviewed by representatives of independent radio networks.

[2] For the texts of the Agreement and accompanying documents, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189–222.

made a decision because, and I say, that's down the road aways, and it's a few Trident submarines away from where we are now.

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9. Executive Order 12502: Establishment of a Chemical Warfare Review Commission, January 28, 1985 [1]

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to establish, in accordance with the provisions of Section 1511 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 (Public Law 98–525), and of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. I), a Chemical Warfare Review Commission, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. *Establishment.* (a) There is established the Chemical Warfare Review Commission. The Commission shall be composed of no more than nine members appointed or designated by the President. The membership shall be bipartisan.

(b) The President shall designate a Chairman from among the members of the Commission.

Sec. 2. *Functions.* (a) The Commission shall review the overall adequacy of the chemical warfare posture of the United States with particular emphasis on the question of whether the United States should produce binary chemical munitions. In conducting its review, the Commission shall take account of the considerations specified in Section 1511 of Public Law 98–525.

(b) The Commission shall make sequential reports to the President on its findings and recommendations, by February 15, 1985, as to the need to maintain a chemical retaliatory stockpile; by March 1, 1985, as to the adequacy of the current stockpile if one has been determined to be needed; and by March 15, 1985, as to whether the United States should produce binary chemical munitions or undertake other actions.

Sec. 3. *Administration.* (a) The heads of Executive agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the Commission such information as it may require for purposes of carrying out its functions.

(b) Members of the Commission shall serve without any additional compensation for their work on the Commission. However, members appointed from among private citizens may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the government service (5 U.S.C. 5701–5707), to the extent funds are available therefor.

(c) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Commission with such administrative services, facilities, staff and other support services

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, February 4, 1985, pp. 99–100.

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as may be necessary. Any expenses of the Commission shall be paid from such funds as may be available to the Secretary of Defense.

Sec. 4. General. (a) Notwithstanding any other Executive order, the functions of the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, except that of reporting to the Congress, which are applicable to the Commission, shall be performed by the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator of General Services.

(b) The Commission shall terminate 30 days after submission of its report, or on September 30, 1985, whichever date is earlier.[2]

10. Delhi Declaration by the Leaders of Six Nations, January 28, 1985 [1]

Forty years ago, when atomic bombs were blasted over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the human race became aware that it could destroy itself, and horror came to dwell among us. Forty years ago, also, the nations of the world gathered to organise the international community, and with the United Nations hope was born for all people.

Almost imperceptibly, over the last four decades, every nation and every human being has lost ultimate control over their own life and death. For all of us, it is a small group of men and machines in cities far away who can decide our fate. Every day we remain alive is a day of grace, as if mankind as a whole were a prisoner in the death cell awaiting the uncertain moment of execution. And like every innocent defendant, we refuse to believe that the execution will ever take place.

We find ourselves in this situation because the nuclear weapon states have applied traditional doctrines of war in a world where new weapons have made them obsolete. What is the point of nuclear "superiority" or "balance" when each side already has enough weapons to devastate the earth dozens of times over? If the old doctrines are applied in the future, the holocaust will be inescapable sooner or later. But nuclear war can be prevented if our voices are joined in a universal demand in defence of our right to live.

As a result of recent atmospheric and biological studies, there have been new findings which indicate that in addition to blast, heat and radiation, nuclear war, even on a limited scale, would trigger an arctic nuclear winter which may transform the earth into a darkened, frozen planet, posing unprecedented peril to all nations, even those far removed from the nuclear explosions. We are convinced that this makes

[2] Extracts of the Commission's report are printed in Document 90.

[1] A/40/114–S/16921, pp. 3–5. The declaration was adopted by Argentinian President Alfonsín, Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, Mexican President de la Madrid, Swedish Prime Minister Palme, and Tanzanian President Nyerere.

it still more pressing to take preventive action to exclude for ever the use of nuclear weapons and the occurrence of a nuclear war.

In our Joint Statement of May 22, 1984 we called upon the nuclear weapon states to bring their arms race to a halt.[2] We are encouraged by the worldwide response to our appeal. The international support we received and the responses of the nuclear weapon states themselves have been such that we deemed it our duty to meet here in New Delhi to consider ways to further our efforts.

The nuclear weapon states have a particular responsibility for the dangerous state of the arms race. We urge them to join us in the search for a new direction. We welcome the agreement in Geneva on January 8, 1985, between the Soviet Union and the United States to start negotiations on "a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms—both strategic and intermediate range—with all the questions considered and resolved in their inter-relationship".[3] We attach great importance to the proclaimed objective of these negotiations: to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, ultimately to eliminate nuclear arms everywhere. We expect the two major nuclear weapon powers to implement, in good faith, their undertaking and their negotiations to produce, at an early date, significant results. We will follow their work closely and we expect that they will keep the international community informed of its progress. We stress that the agenda for and the outcome of these negotiations is a matter of concern for all nations and all people.

We reiterate our appeal for an all-embracing halt to the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Such a halt would greatly facilitate negotiations. Two specific steps today require special attention: the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Outer space must be used for the benefit of mankind as a whole, not as a battle-ground of the future. We, therefore, call for the prohibition of the development, testing, production, deployment and use of all space weapons. An arms race in space would be enormously costly, and have grave destabilising effects. It would also endanger a number of arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

We further urge the nuclear weapon states to immediately halt the testing of all kinds of nuclear weapons, and to conclude, at an early date, a treaty on a nuclear weapon test ban. Such a treaty would be a major step towards ending the continuous modernisation of nuclear arsenals.

We are convinced that all such steps, in so far as necessary, can be accompanied by adequate and non-discriminatory measures of verification.

A halt to the nuclear arms race is at the present moment imperative. Only thus can it be ensured that nuclear arsenals do not grow while

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 420–421.
[3] Document 3.

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negotiations proceed. However, this halt should not be an end in itself. It must be immediately followed by substantial reductions in nuclear forces, leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the final goal of general and complete disarmament. Parallel to this process, it is urgently necessary to transfer precious resources currently wasted in military expenditure to social and economic development. The strengthening of the United Nations must also be an essential part of this endeavour.

It is imperative to find a remedy to the existing situation where hundreds of billions of dollars, amounting to approximately one and a half million per minute, are spent annually on weapons. This stands in dramatic contrast to the poverty, and in some cases misery, in which two-thirds of the world population lives.

The future of all peoples is at stake. As representatives from non-nuclear-weapon states, we will not cease to express our legitimate concern and make known our demands. We affirm our determination to facilitate agreement among the nuclear weapon states, so that the required steps can be taken. We will seek to work together with them for the common security of mankind and for peace.

We urge people, Parliaments and Goverments the world over to lend forceful support to this appeal. Progress in disarmament can only be achieved with an informed public applying strong pressure on Governments. Only then will Governments summon the necessary political will to overcome the many obstacles which lie in the path of peace. The world disarmament campaign launched by the United Nations represents a very important element in generating that political will.

For centuries, men and women have fought for their rights and freedoms. We now face the greatest struggle of all—for the right to live, for ourselves and for future generations.

Forty years ago, in Hiroshima and San Francisco, the horror of nuclear war was matched by the hope for peace. We would like this year of 1985 to be the year when hope begins to prevail over terror. We dare to hope that by October 24, 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, we might see the first concrete steps to avert the threat to the survival of humanity.

11. Message From President Reagan to the Congress Transmitting the Unclassified Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements, February 1, 1985 [1]

During 1984, at the request of the Congress, I forwarded two reports to the Congress on arms control compliance. The first, forwarded

[1] ACDA files.

last January, was an in-depth analysis of seven specific issues o violations or probable violations by the Soviet Union of arms contro obligations and commitments.[2] The second report, forwarded in Octo ber, was an advisory study prepared independently by the Genera Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament.[3] These re ports indicate that there is cause for serious concern regarding th Soviet Union's conduct with respect to observance of arms contro agreements.

In the FY–1985 Defense Authorization Act [4] and the Conference Report on that Act, the Congress called for additional classified and unclassified reports regarding a wide range of questions concerning the Soviet Union's compliance with arms control commitments. The Administration is responding to these requests by providing both classified and unclassified reports which update the seven issues initially analyzed in the January 1984 report, and analyze a number of additional issues.

In this unclassified report the United States Government reaffirms the conclusions of its January 1984 report that the USSR has violated the Helsinki Final Act,[5] the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons,[6] the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,[7] and two provisions of SALT II [8]: telemetry encryption and ICBM modernization. The United States Government also reaffirms its previous conclusions that the USSR has probably violated the SS–16 deployment prohibition of SALT II and is likely to have violated the nuclear testing yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.[9] In addition, the United States Government has determined that the USSR has violated the ABM Treaty (through the siting, orientation and capability of the Krasnoyarsk Radar),[10] violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty,[11] and violated the SALT II provision prohibiting more than one new type of ICBM, and probably violated the ABM Treaty restriction on concurrent testing of SAM and ABM components. Evidence regarding the USSR's compliance with the ABM Treaty provision on component mobility was determined to be ambiguous. In addition, the United States Government is concerned about Soviet preparations for a prohibited territorial ABM defense. Further, the USSR was determined to be currently in compliance with those provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures that deal with reuse of dismantled

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[2] Cf. *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 33–39.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 715–725.
[4] P.L. 98–525, Sec. 1106; see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, p. 749.
[5] The arms control portion of the Helsinki Final Act may be found *ibid., 1975*, pp. 304–308.
[6] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.
[7] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[8] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.
[9] The text of the Treaty may be found *ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–229.
[10] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[11] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.

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ICBM sites and with the reconfiguration of dismantled ballistic missile launching submarines.[12]

Beyond the issues that are treated in the unclassified report released today, there are other compliance issues that will not be publicly disclosed at this time but which remain under review. As we continue to work on these issues, we will brief and consult with the Congress in detail and will, to the maximum extent possible, keep the public informed on our findings.

In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less. To do so would undermine the arms control process and damage the chances for establishing a more constructive US-Soviet relationship.

As I stated last January, Soviet non-compliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. With regard to the issues analyzed in the January 1984 report, the Soviet Union has thus far not provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective actions sufficient to alleviate our concerns. The United States Government has vigorously pressed, and will continue to press these compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels.

Our approach in pursuing these issues with the Soviet Union is to ensure that both the letter and intent of treaty obligations and commitments will be fulfilled. To this end the Administration is: analyzing further issues of possible non-compliance; as noted above, seeking from the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels explanations, clarifications, and, where necessary, corrective actions; reporting on such issues to the Congress; and taking into account in our defense modernization plans the security implications of arms control violations. At the same time, the United States is continuing to carry out its own obligations and commitments under relevant agreements. Our objectives in the new negotiations which begin in March are to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty and to seek equitable, effectively verifiable arms control agreements which will result in real reductions and enhanced stability. While all of these steps can help, however, it is fundamentally important that the Soviet Union take a constructive attitude toward full compliance with all arms control obligations and commitments.

The Administration and the Congress have a shared interest in supporting the arms control process. For this reason, increased understanding of Soviet violations or probable violations, and a strong Congressional consensus on the importance of compliance to achieving

[12] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 202–204.

effective arms control, will strengthen our efforts both in the new negotiations and in seeking corrective actions from the Soviet Union.

I look forward to continued close consultation with the Congress as we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements.

12. Report From President Reagan to the Congress: Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements, February 1, 1985 [1]

INTRODUCTION

In January 1984, the President, in response to Congressional requests, reported to the Congress on several issues involving violations or probable violations by the Soviet Union of existing arms control agreements, including: the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons,[2] the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,[3] the Helsinki Final Act,[4] the ABM Treaty,[5] SALT II,[6] and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.[7]

In that report the President stated:

> If the concept of arms control is to have meaning and credibility as a contribution to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements comply with them. Because I seek genuine arms control, I am committed to ensuring that existing agreements are observed.

The President further noted that:

> Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. It increases doubts about the reliability of the USSR as a negotiating partner, and thus damages the chances for establishing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship.[8]

The current unclassified report provides updated information on the seven issues previously reported and additionally reviews six other compliance issues that have been intensively studied since the January 1984 report was completed, for a total of thirteen issues. The six new

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[1] ACDA files.
[2] The text of the Geneva Protocol may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.
[3] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[4] The arms control portions of the Final Act may be found *ibid., 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.
[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[6] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.
[7] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–229.
[8] *Ibid., 1984*, pp. 33–34.

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cases involve questions of Soviet compliance with provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement,[9] the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) [10] and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

—With regard to the SALT I Interim Agreement, this report examines the evidence on two issues: (1) whether the USSR has made prohibited use of remaining facilities at dismantled former ICBM sites; (2) whether the USSR has reconfigured dismantled ballistic missile submarines in a manner prohibited by Treaty or Protocol provisions.

—With regard to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), this report examines whether the USSR vented nuclear debris from underground nuclear tests beyond its territorial limits in contravention of the LTBT.

—With regard to the ABM Treaty, this report examines whether the USSR has: concurrently tested SAM and ABM components; developed, tested or deployed mobile ABM components; and/or has provided a base for territorial defense.

In this report the United States Government reaffirms the conclusions of its January 1984 report [11] that the USSR has violated the Helsinki Final Act, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and two provisions of SALT II: telemetry encryption and ICBM modernization. The United States Government also reaffirms its previous conclusions that the USSR has probably violated the SS–16 deployment prohibition of SALT II and is likely to have violated the nuclear testing yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. In addition, the United States Government has determined that the USSR has violated the ABM Treaty through the siting, orientation and capability of the Krasnoyarsk Radar and the Limited Test Ban Treaty; by testing the SS–X–25 ICBM in addition to the SS–X–24 ICBM, violated the SALT II "new types" provision limiting each party to one new type ICBM; and probably violated the prohibition against concurrent testing of SAM and ABM components. Moreover, the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Evidence regarding the USSR's compliance with the ABM Treaty provision on component mobility was determined to be ambiguous, and the USSR was determined to be currently in compliance with provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures that deal with re-use of dismantled ICBM sites and the reconfiguration of dismantled ballistic missile launching submarines.

In addition to the issues regarding Soviet compliance with arms control agreements which are addressed in this unclassified report, there are other compliance matters currently under review which cannot be publicly disclosed at this time and which we intend to brief to the Congress on a classified basis in the near future.

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[9] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 202–204.
[10] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[11] *Ibid., 1984*, pp. 34–39.

In examining the issues in this unclassified report, as well as in the classified report to follow, we have focused on questions of Soviet noncompliance. Questions of Soviet noncompliance have not arisen with regard to several other provisions of these agreements, nor with certain other treaties, such as the Antarctic Treaty,[12] the Outer Space Treaty,[13] the Non-Proliferation Treaty,[14] the Seabed Arms Control Treaty,[15] the Environmental Modification Convention,[16] and others.

The issues we have analyzed raise very serious concerns. The United States Government firmly believes that in order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global and regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and the United States Government will not accept anything less: to do so would undermine the arms control process and damage the chances for establishing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship.

THE FINDINGS

BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION AND 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL

1. Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons

—*Treaty Status:* The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (the BWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol are multilateral treaties to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are parties. Soviet actions not in accord with these treaties and customary international law relating to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are violations of legal obligations.

—*Obligations:* The BWC bans the development, production, stockpiling or possession, and transfer of: microbial or other biological agents or toxins except for a small quantity for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. It also bans weapons, equipment and means of delivery of agents or toxins. The 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules of customary international law prohibit the first use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices; and prohibits use of bacteriological methods of warfare.

—*Issues:* The January 1984 compliance report addressed whether the Soviets are in violation of provisions that ban the development, production, transfer, possession and use of biological and toxin weapons. Soviet compliance was reexamined for this report.

—*Finding:* The U.S. Government judges that evidence during 1984 confirm and strengthen the conclusion of the January 1984, report that

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[12] *Ibid., 1945–1959,* vol. II, pp. 1550–1556.
[13] *Ibid., 1967,* pp. 38–43.
[14] *Ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.
[15] *Ibid., 1971,* pp. 7–11.
[16] *Ibid., 1977,* pp. 322–326.

the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Although there have been no confirmed chemical and toxin attacks in Kampuchea, Laos, or Afghanistan in 1984, there is no basis for amending the January 1984 conclusion that the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY

2. Underground Nuclear Test Venting

—Treaty Status: The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)) is a multilateral treaty that entered into force for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963. Soviet actions not in accord with this treaty are violations of a legal obligation.

—Obligations: The LTBT specifically prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. It also prohibits nuclear explosions in any other environment "if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted."

—Issue: The U.S. examined whether the USSR's underground nuclear tests have caused radioactive debris to be present outside of its territorial limits.

—Finding: The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices have resulted in the venting of radioactive matter and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union has failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite U.S. request for corrective action.

THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

3. Nuclear Testing and the 150 Kiloton Limit

—Treaty Status: The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed in 1974. The Treaty has not been ratified but neither party has indicated an intention not to ratify. Therefore, both parties are subject to the obligation under customary international law to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT. Soviet actions that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT are therefore violations of their legal obligation. The United States is seeking to negotiate improved verification measures for the Treaty.

Both Parties have separately stated they would observe the 150 kiloton threshold of the TTBT.

—*Obligation:* The Treaty prohibits any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under the jurisdiction or control of the Parties, beginning March 31, 1976. In view of the technical uncertainties associated with estimating the precise yield of nuclear weapons tests, the sides agreed that one or two slight unintended breaches per year would not be considered a violation.

—*Issue:* The January 1984 report examined whether the Soviets have conducted nuclear tests in excess of 150 kilotons. This issue was reexamined for this report.

—*Finding:* The U.S. Government judges that, while ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and verification uncertainties continued in 1984, evidence available through the year confirms the January 1984 finding that Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which banned underground nuclear tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons. These Soviet actions continue despite U.S. requests for corrective measures.

HELSINKI FINAL ACT

4. Helsinki Final Act Notification of Military Exercises

—*Legal Status:* The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Helsinki in 1975. This document represents a political commitment and was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, along with many other States. Soviet actions not in accord with that document are violations of their political commitment.

—*Obligation:* All signatory States of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to give prior notification of, and other details concerning, major military maneuvers, defined as those involving more than 25,000 ground troops.

—*Issue:* The January 1984 compliance report examined whether notification of the Soviet military exercise Zapad-81 was inadequate and therefore a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment under the Helsinki Final Act. The USSR's compliance with its notification commitment was reexamined for this report.

—*Finding:* The U.S. Government previously judged that the Soviet Union violated its political commitment to observe the prior-notification provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act, which requires notification and other information concerning exercises exceeding 25,000 ground troops. A major Warsaw Pact maneuver (Zapad-81), exceeding the 25,000 troop limit, was conducted in 1981 at a time great pressure was being put on Poland, and the Soviet Union did not provide the pre-notification or other information required. The judgment that the Soviet Union did not observe the prior notification provisions of the Helsinki Final Act is confirmed.

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While the USSR and Warsaw Pact states have generally taken an approach to the confidence-building measures of the Final Act which minimizes the information they provide, Soviet compliance with the exercise-notification provisions was much improved in 1983. However, during 1984, the USSR returned to a minimalist stance, providing only the bare minimum required under the Final Act.

SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT

—Treaty Status: The SALT I Interim Agreement entered into force for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972. Dismantling procedures implementing the Interim Agreement were concluded in 1974. The Interim Agreement, by its own terms, was of limited duration and expired as a legally binding document in 1977. The applicability of the Interim Agreement to the actions of both parties has, however, been extended by the parties by a series of mutual political commitments, including the President's May 31, 1982 statement that the United States would refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint.[17] The Soviets have told us they would abide by the SALT I Interim Agreement and SALT II. Any actions by the USSR inconsistent with this commitment are violations of its political commitment with respect to the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

Two issues were analyzed for this report: Soviet activities at dismantled ICBM sites, and reconfiguration of a Yankee-Class ballistic missile submarine.

5. Mobile Missile Base Construction at Dismantled SS–7 ICBM Sites:

—Obligation: The SALT I Interim Agreement and its procedures prohibit the parties from using facilities remaining at dismantled or destroyed ICBM sites for storage, support, or launch of ICBMs. Any Soviet actions inconsistent with this commitment are violations of a political commitment with respect to the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

—Issue: The U.S. examined whether the USSR has used former ICBM sites in a manner inconsistent with its political commitment under the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

—Finding: The U.S. Government judges that Soviet activity apparently related to SS–X–25 ICBM deployments at two former SS–7 bases does not at present violate the agreed implementing procedures of the SALT I Interim Agreement. However, ongoing activities raise concerns about compliance for the future, since use of "remaining facilities" to support ICBMs at deactivated SS–7 sites would be in violation of Soviet commitments. The U.S. will continue to monitor developments closely.

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[17] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, p. 332.

6. Reconfiguration of Yankee-Class Ballistic Missile Submarines

—Obligations: The SALT I Interim Agreement and its procedures require that submarines limited by the Agreement be dismantled or be reconfigured into submarines without ballistic missile capabilities. Any Soviet actions inconsistent with this obligation are violations of a political commitment.

—Issue: The U.S. examined whether the USSR's reconfiguration of a submarine to increase its length, and for use as a platform for modern long-range cruise missiles is consistent with its political commitments under the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

—Finding: The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union's conversion of a dismantled SSBN into a submarine longer than the original, and carrying modern, long-range cruise missiles is not a violation of its political commitment under the SALT I Interim Agreement, but constitutes a threat to U.S. and Allied security similar to the original Yankee-Class submarine.

SALT II TREATY

—Treaty Status: SALT II was signed in June 1979 and has not been ratified. In 1981 the United States made clear to the Soviet Union its intention not to ratify the SALT II Treaty. Prior to this clarification of our position in 1981, both nations were obligated under customary international law not to take actions which would defeat the object and purpose of the signed, but unratified, Treaty. Such Soviet actions prior to 1981 are violations of legal obligations. Since 1981, the United States has observed a political commitment to refrain from actions that undercut the SALT II Treaty so long as the Soviet Union does likewise. The Soviets have told us they also would abide by these provisions. Soviet actions inconsistent with this commitment are violations of their political commitment with respect to the SALT II Treaty.

Three SALT II issues are included in this unclassified report: encryption of telemetry, SS–X–25 ICBM, and SS–16 ICBM deployment.

7. Encryption of Ballistic Missile Telemetry

—Obligation: The provisions of SALT II ban deliberate concealment measures that impede verification by national technical means. The Treaty permits each party to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including encryption, but bans deliberate denial of telemetry, such as through encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification.

—Issue: The January 1984 compliance report examined whether the Soviet Union has engaged in encryption of missile test telemetry (radio signals) so as to impede verification. This issue was reexamined for this report.

—Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the January 1984 report that Soviet encryption practices constitute a violation of a legal obligation under SALT II prior to 1981 and a violation of their political commitment since 1982. The nature and extent of such

encryption of telemetry on new ballistic missiles, despite U.S. request for corrective action, continues to be an example of deliberately impeding verification of compliance in violation of this Soviet political commitment.

8. The SS–X–25 ICBM

—Obligation: In an attempt to constrain the modernization and the proliferation of new, more capable types of ICBMs, the provisions of SALT II permit each side to "flight test and deploy" just one new type of "light" ICBM. A new type is defined as one that differs from an existing type by more than 5 percent in length, largest diameter, launch-weight and throwweight or differs in number of stages or propellant type. In addition, it was agreed that no single reentry vehicle ICBM of an existing type with a post-boost vehicle would be flight-tested or deployed whose reentry vehicle weight is less than 50 percent of the throwweight of that ICBM. This latter provision was intended to prohibit the possibility that single warhead ICBMs could quickly be converted to MIRVed systems.

—Issues: The Soviets declared the SS–X–24 to be their allowed one new type ICBM. The January 1984 report examined the issues: whether the Soviets have tested a second new type of ICBM (the SS–X–25) which is prohibited; whether the reentry vehicle (RV) on that missile, if it is not a new type, is in compliance with the provision that for existing types of single RV missiles, the weight of the RV be equal to at least 50 percent of total throwweight; and whether encryption of SS–X–25 flight test telemetry impedes verification. The U.S. reexamined these issues for this report.

—Finding:

a. *Second New Type*

The U.S. Government judges that the SS–X–25 is a prohibited second "new" type of ICBM and that its testing, in addition to the SS–X–24 ICBM, thereby is a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the "new" type provision of the SALT II Treaty. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken.

b. *RV-to-Throwweight Ratio*

The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion of the January 1984 report regarding the SS–X–25 RV-to-throwweight ratio. That is, if we were to accept the Soviet argument that the SS–X–25 is not a prohibited new type of ICBM, it would be a violation of their political commitment to observe the SALT II provision which prohibits the testing of such an existing ICBM with a single reentry vehicle whose weight is less than 50 percent of the throwweight of the ICBM.

c. *Encryption*

The U.S. Government reaffirms its judgment made in the January 1984 report regarding telemetry encryption during tests of the SS–X–25. Encryption during tests of this missile is illustrative of the deliberate impeding of verification of compliance in violation of a legal obligation prior to 1981, and of the USSR's political commitment subsequent to 1981.

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9. SS–16 Deployment

—*Obligation:* The Soviet Union agreed in SALT II not to produce, test or deploy ICBMs of the SS–16 type and, in particular, not to produce the SS–16 third stage or the reentry vehicle of that missile.

—*Issue:* The January 1984 report examined the evidence regarding whether the Soviets have deployed the SS–16 ICBM in spite of the ban on its deployment. The U.S. reexamined this issue for this report.

—*Finding:* The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the January 1984 report. While the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and we cannot reach a definitive conclusion, the available evidence indicates that the activities at Plesetsk are a probable violation of the USSR's legal obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of SALT II prior to 1981 when the Treaty was pending ratification, and a probable violation of a political commitment subsequent to 1981.

ABM TREATY

—*Treaty Status:* The 1972 ABM Treaty and its Protocol [18] ban deployment of ABM systems except that each party is permitted to deploy one ABM system around the national capital area or, alternatively, at a single ICBM deployment area. The ABM Treaty is in force and is of indefinite duration. Soviet actions not in accord with the ABM Treaty are, therefore, violations of a legal obligation.

Four ABM issues are included in this unclassified report: the Krasnoyarsk radar, mobile land-based ABM systems or components, concurrent testing of ABM and SAM components, and ABM territorial defense.

10. The Krasnoyarsk Radar

—*Obligation:* In an effort to preclude creation of a base for territorial ABM defense, the ABM Treaty limits the deployment of ballistic missile early warning radars, including large phased-array radars used for that purpose, to locations along the periphery of the national territory of each party and requires that they be oriented outward. The Treaty permits deployment (without regard to location or orientation) of large phased-array radars for purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

—*Issue:* The January 1984 report examined the evidence regarding the construction of a large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia. It was concluded that this radar was almost certainly a violation of the ABM Treaty. The U.S. reexamined this issue for this report.

—*Finding:* The U.S. Government judges, on the basis of evidence which continued to be available through 1984, that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of

[18] The Protocol may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 229–231.

1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Continuing construction, and the absence of credible alternative explanations, have reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken.

11. Mobility of New ABM System

—Obligation: The ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or components.

—Issue: The U.S. examined whether the Soviet Union has developed a mobile land-based ABM system, or components for such a system, in violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty.

—Finding: The U.S. Government judges that Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility are ambiguous, but the USSR's development of components of a new ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively little or no preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This and other ABM-related Soviet actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

12. Concurrent Testing of ABM and SAM Components

—Obligation: The ABM Treaty and its Protocol limit the parties to one ABM deployment area. In addition to the ABM systems and components at that one deployment area, the parties may have ABM systems and components for development and testing purposes so long as they are located at agreed test ranges. The Treaty also prohibits giving components, other than ABM system components, the capability "to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory" and prohibits the parties from testing them in "an ABM mode." The parties agreed that the concurrent testing of SAM and ABM system components is prohibited.

—Issue: The U.S. examined whether the Soviet Union has concurrently tested SAM and ABM system components in contravention of this legal obligation.

—Finding: The U.S. Government judges that evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient to assess fully compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty, although the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The number of incidents of concurrent operation of SAM and ABM components indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In several cases this may be highly probable. This and other such Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

13. ABM Territorial Defense

—Obligation: The Treaty allows each party a single operational site, explicitly permits modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components, and explicitly recognizes the existence of ABM test

ranges for the development and testing of ABM components. The ABM Treaty prohibits, however, the deployment of an ABM system for defense of the national territory of the parties and prohibits the parties from providing a base for such a defense.

—*Issue:* The U.S. examined whether Soviet ABM and related activities provide a base for a territorial defense.

—*Finding:* The U.S. Government judges that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

13. Report From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the Congress: Nuclear Arms Reductions, Related Diplomatic Priorities, and Compliance [Extract], February 4, 1985 [1]

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1. Nuclear Arms Reductions

The United States has long exercised restraint in its nuclear posture. We now have 25 percent fewer nuclear warheads and 75 percent less nuclear explosive power (measured in megatonnage) than we had in the 1960s. The reductions in our nuclear arsenal during the past two decades attest to our commitment to retain the fewest possible nuclear forces consistent with the requirements of defense and deterrence.

We are in the process of implementing similar substantial reductions in NATO's nuclear arsenal, independent of any arms control agreement. As part of the December 1979 dual-track decision on the modernization of longer range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF),[2] NATO decided to withdraw 1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe, an action completed in 1980, and to remove one nuclear warhead for each of the 572 Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles deployed. After careful study of the Alliance's nuclear needs, the NATO defense ministers decided in October 1983 to remove an additional 1,400 nuclear weapons from Europe over the next few years.[3] As a result of those decisions, we will have withdrawn more than five nuclear warheads for each new LRINF warhead deployed—even if we do not succeed in reaching an intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) arms reduction agreement.

Unfortunately, the Soviet performance has been quite different. Rather than reducing, or even curbing the growth of its nuclear arsenal, the Soviet Union has engaged in an unprecedented and relentless

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[1] *Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1986 Budget, FY 1987 Authorization Request, and FY 1986–90 Defense Programs*, pp. 59–63.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.
[3] *Ibid., 1983*, pp. 917–918.

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expansion of its nuclear forces. Disregarding our efforts to establish a stable balance at lower force levels, the USSR took advantage of U.S. restraint to try to achieve clear nuclear superiority. As a consequence, the United States has gone as far as it should with unilateral nuclear arms reductions. Further reductions must be negotiated bilaterally.

The United States is committed to far-reaching nuclear arms reductions that are equitable and verifiable and increase international stability and security. The approach taken by earlier agreements like SALT I and II, which simply limited, and thereby legitimized, future growth is not enough; at best, they can only divert us from the real goal of actual reductions.[4] Furthermore, the record of Soviet noncompliance with earlier arms control agreements demonstrates how vital it is that future accords be precisely drafted, include effective verification provisions, and be complied with by all parties. In this regard, if arms control is to be an effective stabilizing force in the future, it is imperative that the Soviet Union take a more constructive approach to its obligations than it has in the past.

In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) negotiations, the United States proposed deep cuts in nuclear arms, focusing on the systems of greatest concern to each side. In START, we called for a 33 percent decrease in the number of warheads deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.[5] In the INF negotiations, we proposed the elimination—or at least a substantial reduction—of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles.[6] Additionally, in START we have called for limitations on bombers and other strategic systems. Regrettably, the Soviet Union walked out of the INF talks in November 1983, and shortly thereafter refused to agree to a date for the next round of START.

In June 1984, although the USSR had not returned to either START or the INF talks, it proposed that our two governments meet in Vienna in September to begin "talks to prevent the militarization of outer space." [7] The United States promptly accepted the proposal, and at the same time, made it clear that we considered the most pressing task to be reductions in offensive nuclear arms. The United States pointed out that the militarization of space began when the first ballistic missiles were tested and when such missiles and other weapons systems using outer space were first deployed.[8] Faced with a positive U.S. response to their proposal, the Soviets then demanded that we institute a moratorium on antisatellite (ASAT) weapons tests before opening any talks.[9] That precondition represented an unacceptable attempt to pre-

[4] The SALT Agreements may be found *ibid., 1972,* pp. 197 ff. and *ibid., 1979,* pp. 189 ff., respectively.
[5] *Ibid., 1984,* p. 471.
[6] *Ibid.,* p. 444.
[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 494–495.
[8] *Ibid.,* p. 495.
[9] *Ibid.,* pp. 504–505.

serve a Soviet weapons monopoly and consequently to weaken U.S. deterrence capability. Since the United States is only now developing an ASAT capability, a testing moratorium would leave the USSR as the only nation with an operational ASAT weapon.

In his September 1984 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Reagan suggested a bold initiative to break the impasse in nuclear arms reductions:

> We need to extend the arms control process to build a bigger umbrella under which it can operate—a road map, if you will, showing where, during the next 40 years or so, these individual efforts can lead. This can greatly assist step-by-step negotiations and enable us to avoid having all our hopes or expectations ride on any single set or series of negotiations. If progress is temporarily halted at one set of talks, this newly established framework for arms control could help us take up the slack at other negotiations.[10]

After discussing the President's proposal, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to begin negotiations on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer-space arms. Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met in Geneva in January 1985 to discuss the agenda and objectives of the negotiations. They agreed that the forthcoming talks would address a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range.[11] The timing and location of the negotiations will be arranged through diplomatic channels. We expect that each delegation will be divided into three groups and will address strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and space and defensive arms. In that last forum, we plan to discuss both the means of moving toward a more defense-oriented deterrence, as well as space-based systems that can attack targets in space.

There is a clear relationship among all the different types of arms to be addressed in the negotiations. Since the Strategic Defense Initiative is only a research program, and while we are still many years away from any decision on whether to develop and deploy advanced defenses against ballistic missiles, nevertheless, we are prepared to discuss with the Soviet Union the issue of strategic defense. However, these talks will consider existing Soviet defenses as well as each side's research programs in this area.

The agreement between Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko marks a welcome new beginning. We have a long and difficult task ahead of us, but if we are patient and persistent, I have every hope that we can achieve deep reductions in nuclear weapons along with increased strategic stability, both of which are in the best interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, our allies, and indeed, the entire world. In order to achieve that goal, we must

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 691.
[11] Document 3.

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retain the same determination to preserve the military balance that has encouraged the USSR to return to the negotiating table. Our firm commitment to nuclear force modernization, to the continued development of an antisatellite (ASAT) capability, and to strategic defense is vital to the success of the coming negotiations.

While we seek bilateral nuclear arms reductions with the Soviet Union, we must also be attentive to the problem of nuclear proliferation. If the number of nuclear-armed nations were to increase, the risk of nuclear war would grow. Moreover, the spread of nuclear weapons raises the possibility of these weapons falling into the hands of subnational groups. Along with more than 100 other nations, the United States supports the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which recognizes the universal interest in controlling the spread of nuclear arms.[12] In recent years, the United States and the Soviet Union have discussed this issue periodically. We have now decided to hold these consultations on a regular basis.

2. Related Diplomatic Priorities

We also are actively engaged in seeking other important force reductions. In April 1984, the United States presented a draft treaty to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament calling for a comprehensive and verifiable global ban on the production, stockpiling, possession, transfer, and use of chemical weapons.[13] To ensure that parties to a global ban would not be able to violate it, as has been the case with the Geneva Protocol forbidding chemical weapons use,[14] the U.S. draft treaty provides for unique, cooperative verification measures.

In the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks, the United States and its NATO allies are negotiating with the Warsaw Pact to reduce conventional forces in Central Europe. NATO has called for reductions to 700,000 ground force personnel and for a combined total of no more than 900,000 air and ground force personnel on each side.[15] Progress in the MBFR talks has been stymied primarily because of the Warsaw Pact's intransigence in agreeing to provide force level data and permit adequate verification measures. In April 1984, the West presented a new initiative designed to overcome those obstacles. It offered Western flexibility on the data question in exchange for Warsaw Pact flexibility on verification.[16]

In other discussions with the Soviet Union, we are seeking agreements on measures to reduce the risk that conflict could ever break out as a result of accident, miscalculation, or misunderstanding. While such steps—known as confidence-building measures—would not affect the level or type of military forces, they could help ensure that those forces are never used inadvertently.

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[12] The text of the Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968,* pp. 461–465.
[13] *Ibid., 1984,* pp. 269–299.
[14] The text of the Protocol may be found *ibid., 1969,* pp. 764–765.
[15] *Ibid., 1979,* p. 818.
[16] Cf. *ibid., 1984,* pp. 322–324.

In April 1983, with strong congressional support, I recommended to the President several improvements in the U.S.-Soviet communications network that would significantly enhance our ability to resolve a crisis or avert a misunderstanding. Specifically, I called for the addition of a high-speed facsimile capability to the Direct Communications Link (or "hotline"); the establishment of a Joint Military Communications Link for the transmission of urgent military-related information; and the establishment by both the U.S. and Soviet Governments of improved communications with their embassies in each other's capital.[17]

The President endorsed those proposals,[18] and we began negotiating with the Soviet Union in August 1983. In July 1984, the two sides agreed to add a high-speed facsimile capability to the Direct Communications Link (DCL).[19] This modest but positive step will enable the U.S. and Soviet heads of government to transmit messages over the DCL far more rapidly than they can now. For the first time, they will be able to use the DCL to exchange graphic materials such as maps and photographs; that kind of information could be invaluable in helping to resolve an ongoing crisis or military incident.

In his September 1984 United Nations speech, the President suggested several further bilateral measures to enhance U.S.-Soviet knowledge and understanding. These include regular U.S.-Soviet Cabinet-level meetings on a variety of issues, sharing of information on weapons procurement and development plans, exchange of observers at military exercises, and direct measurement of nuclear test yields.[20]

In January 1984, the United States, its NATO allies, the Warsaw Pact, and Europe's neutral and nonaligned states opened the 35-nation Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). Early in the conference, NATO proposed a set of measures designed to reduce the risk of conflict by surprise attack or miscalculation, limit the opportunities to use military force for political intimidation, and enhance communications among the signatory states. These measures include: an open exhange of information on ground and air forces; forecasts and notification of, and observer invitations to, a range of military activities; verification through on-site and aerial inspection; and methods for improved communications.[21]

3. Compliance

As the President stated in his *1984 Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements,* if the concept of arms control is to have meaning and credibility as a contribution to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements comply with them. Unfortunately, the Soviet record of compliance is not

[17] *Ibid., 1983,* pp. 309–324.
[18] *Ibid.,* pp. 442–444.
[19] *Ibid., 1984,* pp. 520–523.
[20] *Ibid.,* p. 692.
[21] *Ibid.,* p. 43.

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supportive of this objective. In his January 1984 report to the Congress, the President concluded that the Soviet Union has violated or probably violated several of its major arms control obligations and political commitments.[22]

Thus the Soviets have used, or supported the use of, chemical agents and toxin weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia in violation of the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention. They have violated the Helsinki Final Act requirement of advanced notification of certain major military exercises,[23] and the SALT II limits on encryption of missile test telemetry. A new large phased-array radar that they are now building in the central USSR is almost certainly in violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. The SS–X–25 missile is probably a second new ICBM type, prohibited by the SALT II agreement; if it is not, it violates the SALT II provisions regarding the permitted ratio between the weight of an ICBM reentry vehicle and the missile's total throw-weight. In addition, it is likely that the Soviets have violated the Threshold Test Ban treaty limits on the size of underground nuclear tests,[24] and they probably have deployed SS–16 missiles in violation of SALT II.

In response to additional requests from the Congress, the President will submit a further report of his findings regarding other Soviet arms control noncompliance issues. Furthermore, at congressional request, in October 1984, the President submitted both classified and unclassified versions of an independent review by the bipartisan General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Based on a year-long analysis, that report cited numerous instances of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements over the past 25 years.[25]

Dialogue with the Soviet Union must encompass our compliance concerns as well as our arms control objectives. We are continuing to pursue these issues with the Soviet Union, seeking explanations, clarification, and corrective actions. In current and future arms negotiations, just as in our defense policy, we must take into account the Soviet compliance record as we search for productive avenues to preserve peace and enhance global stability.

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[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 33–39.
[23] *Ibid., 1975,* pp. 304–308.
[24] The text of the Treaty may be found *ibid., 1974,* pp. 225–227.
[25] *Ibid., 1984.* pp. 715–725.

14. Interview of President Reagan: Military Buildup, Strategic Defense Initiative, and Arms Reductions [Extract], February 7, 1985 [1]

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Q. On the broad question of arms control and the U.S.-Soviet relationship, you talk about arms control agreements with deep cuts and offensive weapons and extensive verification. When you do that—aren't you really asking the Soviet Union to become an entirely different kind of country? And can we really expect that in our lifetimes?

The President. Well, I'm not going to be euphoric about this, but I do think that one of the things we have going for us at this time, that hasn't been present in much of our previous negotiations, is that we go to the table now in a situation in which you're not going there looking at the Soviets as if, "Well, they're people just like us, and maybe if we talk sweetly enough, why they will be conned into being nice, too." No. The only way you're ever going to succeed in negotiations is if you can go there with a situation in which it is to their practical interest also, that their interests are served by coming to an agreement.

And I think the fact that we go there now with our own military buildup, with them seeing that the alternative to legitimate arms reduction could very well be an arms race with an industrial power that they know they cannot match; in other words, we're saying to them, "We're not going to let you get a monopoly on power to the point that you can start winning by simple ultimatums—threats of, 'Surrender, or die'—so make up your mind. You either join in a legitimate reduction in which both of us will reduce in such a way that neither one of us represents a threat to the other, or you face that kind of a race."

It was all summed up in a cartoon. I know your paper doesn't have cartoons, but——

Q. Sort of—[*Laughter*]

The President. Sort of—all right. But a cartoon one day and it—right back early on in our military rebuilding—and it was two Russian generals, and one of them was saying to the other: "I liked the arms race better when we were the only ones in it." And I think that's been the situation over a number of years.

Q. On the military buildup, one of the prominent things is the Strategic Defense Initiative. And would you continue to favor this, even if your own scientists concluded that it could never be leak-proof

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, February 11, 1985, pp. 154–155. The President was interviewed by the *Wall Street Journal*.

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and that even a few missiles would always get through and destroy cities?

The President. Oh, I've never asked for 100 percent. That would be a fine goal, but you can have a most effective defensive weapon even if it isn't 100 percent, because what you would have is the knowledge that—or that the other fellow would have the knowledge that if they launched a first strike, that it might be such that not enough of their missiles could get through, and in return we could launch the retaliatory strike.

Now, that isn't really the goal of the Strategic Defense Initiative. I tie that to what I think is the goal of these arms negotiations. The Soviet Union—Chernenko and Gromyko both have publicly stated that they would like to see the elimination, ultimately, of nuclear weapons. All right, they've said it. That's what our goal is.

Now, if they really mean it, we can go to a table and sit down and start negotiating reductions, aiming toward the elimination of those weapons. If they don't mean it—or either way—I think that to go forward with this research on a strategic weapon is hand in hand with that goal, that ultimate goal. If you could have that kind of a defense in which they would have to say, "Well, wait a minute. How many missiles would we have to build to get enough through on a first attack that we wouldn't be threatened with, then, the retaliation?" And then they will see the value that this is what I mean by making nuclear weapons obsolete—they'll see that this defensive weapon could be a contributing factor to eliminating such weapons.

We're not going to—if we come up with such a weapon, we're not going to stand there and say, "Okay, now we've got you. We can launch the first attack." I don't think this country is ever in a position where it wants to do that. We don't start wars. We have no intention of starting one now. But what we would then be able to say to them is, "Look, we're willing to join you. We'll do away with ours. You do away with yours. We've got this thing here now, this defensive weapon, and we're very willing to use this, not to enable us to fight you, but to simply do what we both want, and that is get rid of the weapons."

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15. Agenda Adopted by the Conference on Disarmament for its 1985 Session, February 7, 1985 [1]

The Conference on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

[1] CD/550.

The Conference, taking into account, *inter alia*, the relevant provisions of the Documents of the first and second special sessions [2] of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
II. Chemical weapons;
III. Other weapons of mass destruction;
IV. Conventional weapons;
V. Reduction of military budgets;
VI. Reduction of armed forces;
VII. Disarmament and development;
VIII. Disarmament and international security;
IX. Collateral measures, confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Within the above framework, the Conference on Disarmament adopts the following agenda for 1985 which includes items that, in conformity with the provisions of Section VIII of its Rules of Procedure,[3] would be considered by it:

1. Nuclear test ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
4. Chemical weapons.
5. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
6. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
7. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
8. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
9. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

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[2] For the Final Document of the first special session, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411 ff. Excerpts of the concluding document of the second special session are included *ibid., 1982*, pp. 421–430.

[3] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 64–65.

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16. Soviet Working Paper Submitted to the Conference on Disarmament: Compliance With Arms Control Agreements, February 9, 1985 [1]

NOT SABOTAGE BUT COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS

The attention of people throughout the world is riveted on the negotiations due to begin on 12 March between the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear and space weapons: well-founded hopes and expectations are bound up with those negotiations.

The recent meeting in Geneva mapped out a realistic framework—and the only one possible in present conditions—for the examination and resolution of the issues to be covered by the negotiations. It also designated the final objective at which the efforts of the two sides should be directed, namely, the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere. As Mr. Chernenko emphasized in his answers to questions from S. Loory, an American television company correspondent, if both sides were to display an honest approach to the negotiations, good will, a readiness to reach reasonable compromises and to work out meaningful agreements, this would open up the possibility of resolving the cardinal problems of securing peace.

The agreement on negotiations in Geneva has aroused in people the belief that it is possible to halt the slide towards the danger line through agreements, the conclusion of new treaties to halt and reverse the arms race. As is well known, in the 1970s considerable progress was made in this direction. In recent years, however, as a result of the United States Administration's policies and activities, the limitation and reduction process has been dealt a severe blow—it has, in essence, been thrown into disorder. At the same time, Washington has begun to give increasingly frequent voice to its contempt for the agreements previously concluded in this field, and has even been declaring openly its intention to terminate or renounce them.

All the designs of the Washington Administration have been concentrated on one objective: to seek to attain military supremacy over the Soviet Union at any price. And whenever international obligations have interfered with this design, the United States has acted according to the principle "too bad for those obligations". For Washington, apparently, international law, ethical norms and the generally accepted rules of intergovernmental relations did not exist.

Following this approach, the United States sabotaged and ultimately wrecked the negotiations on strategic arms and on intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, and launched military programmes of unprecedented magnitude. Washington has embarked on a course of systematically violating and circumventing the existing limitations on nuclear weapons.

[1] CD/572.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly drawn the attention of the United States Administration to all this, advancing concrete, incontrovertible facts. Suffice it to recall the Soviet memorandum transmitted to the United States State Department on 27 January [2] and the TASS statement of 21 October 1984.[3] The Soviet Union has repeatedly made pertinent, serious claims of the United States in the Standing Consultative Commission, the body specially set up to further the goals and provisions of strategic arms limitation agreements. The United States has yet to give any convincing responses to these questions from the Soviet side, despite the fact that the issues concerned are extremely serious.

Firstly, the United States has adopted a course aimed at undermining the indefinite 1972 ABM Treaty.[4] The United States President himself virtually officially declared this intention when he announced his "Star Wars" programme for the creation of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements, a system which is directly prohibited by the Treaty.[5] The United States has already programmed the allocation of 26 billion dollars to achieve this illegal goal. And this is only the first step in plans for an arms race and the undermining of strategic stability on the implementation of which Washington is prepared to spend a total of over a trillion dollars.

It is by no means only theoretical investigation and scientific research in which they are engaged in this connection. Work is going ahead at full speed on the development of mobile ABM phased-array radars, Minutemen missiles are being tested to give them an anti-missile capability, multiple warhead components are being developed for anti-missiles, etc. All of this is in obvious violation of the clear provisions of the 1972 Treaty.

Part of Washington's effort to prepare for the establishment of a large-scale anti-missile defense system is the deployment within the United States of the PAVE PAWS phased-array radar system, which provides radar coverage of the major part of the territory of the United States.

These facts are general knowledge, and the United States Administration does not even attempt to refute a single one of them.

Second, with regard to the SALT II Treaty,[6] it is now clear that the United States never intended at all to "refrain from activities" which undermine this Treaty. The idea was to demand the implementation of the Treaty by the other side, and simultaneously to prepare a wide range of measures aimed at destroying the military balance and acquiring a disarming first-strike capability.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984,* pp. 48–53.
[3] *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Vol. XXXVI, No. 42, pp. 4, 31; *Pravda* and *Izvestiya,* October 21, 1984, p. 4.
[4] The text of the ABM Treaty may be found *ibid., 1972,* pp. 197–201.
[5] Cf., *ibid. 1983,* pp. 199–201, 206–207.
[6] The text of the SALT II agreement may be found *ibid., 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

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The United States affected not to oppose the limitation of long-range cruise missiles, but was in fact preparing for the widespread deployment, now in progress, of this new and dangerous type of offensive strategic weapon. It was in agreement with the obligation not to circumvent in any way the SALT II Treaty which established military strategic parity, but in fact it already had prepared plans for the deployment in Europe against the USSR and its allies of several hundred essentially strategic nuclear missiles. It subscribed to the principle of equality and equal security, but was planning and doing everything it could to ensure that there was no equal security, that it had overwhelming military supremacy. Supremacy thanks to which it could count on impunity for its aggressive activities, on being able to get into a commanding position from which to dictate its will to other peoples.

Third, let us look at the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty on underground nuclear weapon tests:[7] here again the same line, the same hand, are to be found. The United States signed the Treaty, but has already gone 11 years without being willing to ratify it. The reason here is plain—they do not even do much to hide it in Washington: the United States is afraid to put into effect the clear and effective system envisaged in the Treaty for the control of the power of explosions. After all, if the United States accepted that control, it would be so much more awkward for it constantly to develop new nuclear warheads, including warheads for new, powerful offensive missiles.

While in the tunnels of the United States test-site in Nevada rehearsals for nuclear war are going on, accompanied by the testing of nuclear warheads exceeding the agreed 150-kiloton threshold and by the release of radioactive substances into the atmosphere, official United States departments are engaged in inventing all kinds of excuses for avoiding compliance with the established limits on underground nuclear explosions, and for not allowing the resumption of negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon testing.

Fourth, humanity is threatened not only by the danger of nuclear annihilation; chemical weapons, that barbaric means of mass destruction, pose no less a threat to people. In the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the international community outlawed the waging of chemical warfare.[8] The Soviet Union was one of the first Parties to that Protocol and complies strictly with its provisions. It took the United States 50 years just to ratify the Geneva Protocol. During that time, the United States toxic substances killed and maimed thousands upon thousands of inhabitants of Indochina and did irreparable damage to that region's natural environment. Many United States servicemen were also victims of the chemical war waged by the Pentagon in South East Asia.

[7] *Ibid., 1974,* pp. 225–227.
[8] *Ibid., 1969,* pp. 764–765.

And now, while posing as a supporter of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the United States Administration is in fact blocking all international agreement on this subject, is supplying chemical weapons to the Afghan bandits who are making war on their own people, and has prepared for the chemical rearmament of the United States. Here again there is a glaring contradiction between the United States obligations and Washington's deeds, which are aimed at non-compliance with and circumvention of those obligations.

Fifth, the United States put its signature to the Helsinki Final Act, to which document it made, as is well known, no little effort to become a party. Together with other States, it assumed a solemn undertaking to foster peace in Europe, security, rapprochement and co-operation among the European States, and the deepening, development and strengthening of the process of détente here.[9]

But what has the United States actual policy in European affairs proved to be? The exacerbation of military tension in Europe, the deployment here of new first-strike nuclear weapons, attempts to call into question established European realities and to disorganize and hinder normal trade, economic, scientific and cultural co-operation in the region—such is the United States "contribution" to the development of the Helsinki process. Here again, the United States has subscribed to one thing, but is doing something completely different.

The facts which have been presented—and their number could be multiplied—necessarily raise the major, the fundamental question of the honesty of Washington's attitude towards the international obligations it has undertaken, and consequently of confidence in its policy. This question is increasingly being asked by a very wide range of the world's States.

Evidently the United States Administration is also becoming aware of this; but it does not draw the proper conclusions. It is busying itself with something else, with seeking to conceal its course of exacerbating international tension and the arms race and of violating existing agreements by making far-fetched accusations against the other side. They write "reports" on this subject, submit them to Congress, and almost portray themselves as the guardians of international law and order.

The White House recently issued another opus in this series. It contains a further rehash of the same old distasteful fabrications concerning alleged "violations" by the Soviet Union of its obligations.[10]

However, fabrications and pseudo-arguments do not become any more convincing by being repeated. Why then are they advanced over and over again, and why precisely now? The objectives being pursued are different, although the general unseemly direction is obvious.

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[9] The arms control portions of the Final Act may be found *ibid., 1975*, pp. 304–308. The entire text is in *Department of State Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

[10] Document 12.

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Firstly, they would like, with the help of slander about the Soviet Union's policy, to push the usual military programmes through Congress.

Second, they are striving to dismantle and bury the existing international arms limitation agreements on the pretext that they are ineffective.

Third, they wish to cast a shadow from the outset over the forthcoming Geneva negotiations, and to create doubts about the possibility and utility of agreements with the Soviet Union.

All this is aimed in one direction—to inculcate into the minds of the public the idea that there is no reasonable alternative to the United States Administration's present policy of strengthening military preparations, and that the arms race is inevitable and efforts to halt it vain.

Washington officials have never managed and, needless to say, never will manage to undermine the high prestige of the Soviet Union's policy. The USSR scrupulously observes its international obligations, and the whole world knows this.

However, the fact that Washington is taking such steps on the eve of the Geneva negotiations with the clear hope of poisoning the atmosphere surrounding them and hindering the businesslike, constructive consideration of the problems which they are to resolve, cannot fail to put us on the alert.

If Washington imagines that with the help of propaganda tricks it can slough off responsibility for the unfavourable state of Soviet-United States relations and for the lack of progress in arms limitation and the reduction of the danger of war, its hopes are groundless. It is time that the United States at last ceased the practice of breaching the obligations it has undertaken, and turned its efforts, not in words but in deeds, to preventing an arms race in outer space and halting the arms race on Earth. This is incumbent upon the United States under the Soviet-United States agreement to hold negotiations in Geneva, all parts of which must be strictly observed.

17. Interview of President Reagan: Military Balance, Treaty Violations, and the Strategic Defense Initiative [Extracts], February 11, 1985 [1]

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Arms Control

Q. And a question on arms control: Are we going into negotiations in a position of inferiority?

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, February 18, 1985, pp. 169–170, 172, 174–175. The interview was conducted by Bernard Weinraub and Gerald Boyd of the *New York Times*, which published portions thereof on February 12.

The President. That we are not up to a strength level of the Soviet Union———

Q. Right.

The President. ———militarily?

Q. Yes.

The President. Oh, I don't think there's any question of that, and we have been for quite some time. We have fewer—for example, in nuclear weapons—we have fewer warheads than we had in 1967. But I think, in one way, we're going in in a stronger sense than we have in recent years, because over recent years, we followed a policy of kind of unilaterally disarming and the idea that maybe the others would follow suit.

This time, with the refurbishing of our military defenses that we've been undergoing for these 4 years, we're going to the table, and they have the knowledge that not only are we stronger than we were, even though we have not caught up with them as yet, but they have the awareness that we're determined to not allow them to have a superiority over us to the extent that our forces wouldn't be a deterrent. And I think in that regard, we sit down to the table with a little more realism than there's been in the past.

Q. Isn't there a—statements by yourself during the campaign, Mr. President, and by Secretary of State George Shultz, to the effect that we have been able to reestablish the military balance in the few years and that otherwise we could not negotiate on an even basis?

The President. Well, I was trying to be completely accurate here that, obviously, we have not completely caught up with the imbalance between us. For example, we have in uniform in the military 17 divisions. Well, they've got more than that on the Chinese border. So, we have not caught up with the naval buildup. But the fact that we are doing that, the fact that there are—we have 24 more ships, I believe, out there scheduled for addition to the fleet—that is what I think brings us to the table. They know our industrial power. They know what we've been able to achieve when we set our minds to it.

So, they know that there's been a change of attitude, that we are not canceling weapons systems, and—without getting anything in return. And, from that standpoint, I think this is what they mean—that our whole attitude is different now, and they can look down the road and see that there's a point at which they won't have any margin of superiority.

Q. Can you———

The President. And they don't have enough of a margin today, I—to tempt them into a first strike.

Q. On the subject of arms control treaty violations, you and your administration have said for several years that the Soviets are violating these treaties. A, what do you intend to do about that, and B, would you sign treaties in the future, without clearing up those matters?

The President. Well, I think all of that is part of what has to be negotiated and probably under the cap of—or the part of the negotia-

tions that'll deal with verifiability. In other words, it's not enough to have an agreement; it's got to be a verifiable agreement.

And some of the violations that they're doing are violations of what had previously been negotiated as the right of each one of us to know about the other. The encrypting of the signals that some of their nuclear tests would—ordinarily that we would be able, simply electronically, to have the facts that it was agreed upon we should have, both sides should have. But then they have been encrypting so that we don't get that full information from a test. And all of these will be part of the negotiations.

Q. Do those violations block the possibility of another agreement until they are cleared up?

The President. I—now we get into the area of the actual negotiating, and I don't think that I should be discussing those particular facets of what are we going to do, what are we going to offer, what are we going to trade. I don't think that should be voiced in advance.

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Strategic Defense Initiative

Q. Mr. President, to go back to the issue of arms control and, particularly, to your Strategic Defense Initiative—if, in the Geneva negotiations, the Soviets were to agree to go along with the deep reductions in offensive weapons that you've proposed, would you still want to proceed with this Strategic Defense Initiative, or would you be ready to call it off in return for that?

The President. No. I would want to proceed with what we're doing, which is research to discover whether there is such a weapon and whether it is practical and feasible. And then I, myself, have said that my own view would be that if that is determined and there is—we can produce such a weapon, that then before deployment I'd be willing to sit down and, in a sense, internationalize.

In other words, to negotiate then, before there would be any deployment or anything, to make sure that they understood that we weren't trying to create the ability of a first strike ourselves, that we're—our goal was still the elimination of nuclear weapons; and that I would see that defensive weapon as another step in attaining that goal; that if we could say that this virtually makes those weapons, if not obsolete, certainly most ineffective—the nuclear weapons—then we've got a real reason for saying, "Now, let's all do away with them, because we've come up with this defensive weapon." That would eliminate any of the protests that some of the people on the Soviet side have made that we're seeking a first-strike capability.

I don't think anyone in the world can honestly believe that the United States is interested in such a thing or ever would put itself in that position.

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Q. So, proceeding with the Strategic Defense is independent of whatever agreement is reached———

The President. That's right———

Q. ———on offensive weapons.

The President. ———because it's not in violation of the ABM Treaty,[2] and they have been conducting—you know, who are they kidding? They've been conducting research in this sort of thing for a long time. And they already have—far beyond anything we have—and we believe, in violation of the ABM Treaty, that kind of defense.

And we're seeking a nonnuclear weapon that could render these weapons obsolete.

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Q. Mr. President, taking it back to the question of your Strategic Defense Initiative. Throughout history there's always been a question of offensive being able to overcome defense, and it always has in the past. Here we're about to embark on the expenditure of a lot of money to test this proposition again. Why do you think this time the defense might be able to prevail over the offense?

The President. Well, all right, let me give you a parallel that I've used here among our own people. World War I—poison gas came into being for the first time, and it was horrible. 1925—all the nations of the world met in Geneva and ruled out poison gas in the future for war.[3] But by that time the gas mask had been developed, and gas mask has been standard soldier equipment in just about every army in the world ever since 1925. We haven't thrown the masks away.

Now, we're talking about a weapon that has been developed for which there is no defense whatsoever. The only program we have is MAD, Mutual Assured Destruction. And—why don't we have MAS instead, Mutual Assured Security?

Now, we all know how to make that weapon. Suppose that we were so successful at the arms talks that we all agreed to do away with them, just as we agreed to do away with poison gas. And the years go by, but we all know how to make them. You can't take out of your mind the knowledge that we now have. And sometime, in a time of stress and, whether it's the two great countries or some other countries, somebody is going to say, just as they have in recent years, maybe it would be handy for us to produce a few of these things. And you wouldn't be able to tell if they had or not. But at least your security would be your own kind of gas mask—that if somebody does cheat after you've tried to eliminate them, and comes up with those, you'd have a weapon in which you could knock them down, just as

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197–201.

[3] The Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons is printed *ibid., 1969,* pp. 764–765.

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today, you could put on the gas mask if somebody cheats and decides to use poison gas.

So, I think it would be well worth having. And then, of course, there's the possibility that you can't get everybody to eliminate those weapons as we're seeking to do, and, therefore, you have made it through defense. You've changed the whole ratio—the opponent that might want to be expansionist and resort to war has to say in the face of that defensive weapon: How many of these things do I have to have before I can be sure that enough get through that they won't be able to blow me out of the water?

Q. Mr. President, you've talked at times of two different kinds of a defense—one, defending cities, the whole population. Somebody referred to it as an "Astrodome" defense, so to speak. And you seem now to be talking about a defense that would be around our missiles. Which is it you want—a limited defense or a total defense?

Mr. President. I want a defense that simply says that if somebody starts pushing the button on those weapons, we've got a good chance of keeping all or at least the bulk of them from getting to the target. Because, even if it's around missile sites, that's the type of weapon anymore in which there's no way to restrain that from killing any number of people, or now, as a great many reputable scientists are telling us, that such a war could just end up in no victory for anyone, because we would wipe out the Earth as we know it. And if you think back to a couple of natural calamities, back in the last century, in the 1800's, just natural phenomena from earthquakes—or, I mean, volcanoes, we saw the weather so changed that there was snow in July in many temperate countries. And they've called it the year in which there was no summer. Well, if one volcano can do that, what are we talking about with a whole nuclear exchange: the nuclear winter that scientists have been talking about? It's possible.

So, I think if you have a defensive weapon, I don't think of it in terms of let's put it around this place or that place. Let's put it in such a way that those missiles aren't going to get to their target.

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18. Statement by the Soviet Embassy in Washington: Allegations of Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements, February 11, 1985 [1]

On February 1, 1985 the Department of State made a statement to the Soviet Embassy in connection with the administration's report to

[1] Moscow TASS in English, February 13, 1985; FBIS *Daily Report*, February 14, 1985, vol. III, pp. AA1–AA2.

the Congress on "Soviet noncompliance" with arms control agreements.[2]

On February 9, 1985 the embassy, on instructions from Moscow, delivered a response to the above statement, in which the Soviet side resolutely rejected as unsubstantiated and groundless the "representations" made to the Soviet Union by a representative of the Department of State in the conversation on February 1. The response further states that it is not the first time that the U.S. Administration has made an attempt to cast aspersion, resorting to all sorts of false assertions, on the consistent peace-loving policy of the USSR, or has ascribed to the Soviet side nonexistent violations and failures as far as compliance with arms limitation agreements is concerned. We have already provided a characterization of such unseemly actions by the U.S. That characterization remains totally valid also with regard to what was said on the U.S. side in the conversation mentioned.

Secondly, it is also noted that the U.S. side has neither the moral, nor the formal right to portray itself as a guardian of the agreements, a cavalier attitude toward these agreements being, unfortunately, in recent years an integral part of the policy and practical actions of the U.S.

This is evident in Washington's policy aimed at undermining the 1972 Permanent Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,[3] in the refusal to ratify and the circumvention of the SALT II Treaty,[4] the unwillingness to put in force and strictly observe the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests,[5] the unconstructive position the the U.S. on the subject of a complete ban on chemical weapons and in the open sabotage of the Helsinki process of strengthening peace, security and cooperation in Europe.[6]

It is a matter of major and important issues of principle, and the position the U.S. Administration has taken with regard to these issues cannot help but cause profound concern and condemnation. All this, as well as specific questions arising in this connection, has been brought to the attention of the U.S. Administration by the Soviet side on more than one occasion, specifically, in aide memoire of January 27 [7] and the TASS statement of October 21, 1984.[8]

However, no intelligible answer to the matters that we raised has been forthcoming so far from the American side. The Soviet side expects that the administration will, after all, draw proper conclusions and that it will take specific steps in order to correct the situation and

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[2] For the report, see Document 12.
[3] The text of the Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[4] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.
[5] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–227.
[6] *Ibid., 1975*, pp. 304–308.
[7] *Ibid., 1984*, pp. 48–53.
[8] *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 42, pp. 4, 31; *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, October 21, 1984, p. 4.

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to cease its actions which run contrary to the international obligations incumbent on it.

Publishing all sorts of "reports" containing inventions about the policy of the other side, however, in no way relieves the U.S. Administration of its eminent duty to observe the international obligations in an honest and consistent manner.

Thirdly, the response states that the questions of compliance with the existing agreements on the limitation of strategic arms should not be discussed for the sake of doubtful propaganda effect, rather, it should be done solely in order to ensure a normal functioning of those agreements and accords.

The Soviet side would like it to be recalled that it is for these purposes that the mechanism of the Standing Consultative Commission has been established. The Soviet side operates in that Commission with these purposes in mind. It is prepared in the future also to engage in businesslike cooperation with the American side in that commission.

The response finally stresses that one cannot help but come to the conclusion that the aforementioned actions of the U.S. side are only capable of putting in doubt its intentions with regard to the existing arms limitation agreements and to reaching such agreements in the future. At any rate, this does not contribute to a favorable atmosphere for the forthcoming negotiations on nuclear and space weapons. As a matter of fact, the American side should be no less interested than the Soviet side in the positive outcome of these negotiations.

19. Message From President Reagan to the Congress: Annual Report on Nuclear Nonproliferation, February 12, 1985 [1]

I have reviewed the activities of United States Government departments and agencies during the calendar year 1984 related to preventing nuclear proliferation, and I am pleased to submit my annual report on this subject pursuant to section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95–242).[2]

The Report concludes that the United States during 1984 continued to make important progress in its efforts to achieve its non-proliferation goals.

It is my firm conviction that preventing the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries is essential to world peace and stability. It forms an indispensable complement to the efforts we have undertaken to bring about deep reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. It is no exaggeration to say that the future of

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, February 18, 1985, p. 176.

[2] An extract of the report is printed in Document 1. For the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118 ff.

mankind may well depend on the achievement of these goals, and I intend to pursue them with unflagging determination and a deep sense of personal commitment.

20. Message From President Reagan to the Conference on Disarmament, February 12, 1985 [3]

Mr. President, distinguished delegates:

As the Conference on Disarmament begins its 1985 session, I extend my heartfelt greetings and earnest encouragement in the work before you.

This session opens at a moment of opportunity in which the American people look for real achievements in arms control. As you know, in a very promising step, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to begin negotiations on 12 March on offensive nuclear arms reductions and on defensive and space arms.

The Conference on Disarmament has a unique and profound responsibility to translate the universal desire for peace into greater international stability and significant, verifiable arms reductions and constraints. I encourage the Conference to work vigorously towards an effective global prohibition of chemical weapons, as the United States has proposed; to consider further a radiological weapons ban; and to continue work on verification and compliance issues relating to nuclear test limitations.

The quest for peace involves many countries, large and small. We must put our energies and talents together to overcome differences, and to realize man's hopes for a safer and more stable world. In this Conference we join in the pursuit of peace, and in doing so we serve ourselves, our countries and future generations.

21. Statement by ACDA Director Adelman to the Conference on Disarmament, February 12, 1985 [1]

Mr. President and distinguished delegates, it is a great pleasure to be here in Geneva at this auspicious time. When this Conference convened last year, the major nuclear arms talks were stagnated. Today, we face a new beginning, as a result of our successful efforts with the Soviet Union just last month.

One month from this very day, full negotiations between my country and the Soviet Union will commence here in Geneva. Our goals for the talks are set forth in the 8 January communiqué.[2]

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[3] CD/PV.290, pp. 8–9. The message was read by ACDA Director Adelman during his statement to the Conference, *infra*.

[1] CD/PV.290, pp. 7–15.

[2] Document 3.

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The strategic concept of the United States can be summarized in the following single paragraph:

> For the next 10 years, we should seek a radical reduction in the number and power of existing and planned offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether land based, space based, or otherwise. We should even now be looking forward to a period of transition, beginning possibly 10 years from now, to effective non-nuclear defensive forces, including defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition should lead to the eventual elimination of nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive.
>
> A nuclear-free world is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

The United States enters these talks with profound hope, with realistic expectations, and with full recognition of the daunting obstacles we face. The task will be neither quick nor easy. There should be no illusion about that. I do not believe that there is, and that is all for the good.

Months of extensive, painstaking top-level analysis, ranging from questions of tactics to the over-all United States-Soviet strategic relationship, preceded Secretary of State Shultz's January sessions with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Let me assure you, President Reagan and the American people place the highest priority on reducing the risk of war, on radically reducing—and eventually eliminating—the nuclear threat.

The co-ordination and teamwork on the American side in Geneva, under the able leadership of Secretary Shultz and with the direct participation of the President's National Security Adviser, contributed significantly to this diplomatic success. That teamwork will surely continue.

Now, after the initial session, we have put in place an outstanding team for the negotiations. Process, preparation, and personnel cannot guarantee success, but they are clearly necessary to achieve success. And that is our deep desire.

The United States strongly believes that deterrence and stability between my country and the Soviet Union can be maintained at greatly reduced, equal levels of nuclear forces. We hope the Soviet Union believes likewise. We hope further that the Soviet Union will act accordingly.

Today, I have the dual privilege of addressing this honoured international assembly and of greeting the Conference President, and new United States Representative, Ambassador Donald Lowitz.

I know I reflect the sentiments of all gathered here in congratulating you, Mr. President, on your new duties. You bring to your assignment the wisdom of many years' experience in government and in the legal profession. It is clear testimony to President Reagan's high regard for the Conference on Disarmament that he chose an individual of your calibre to lead the United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament. As we say in the States, we care enough to send the

very best. I also know that you will do your utmost to ensure that the Conference on Disarmament fulfills its mandate to help construct a more secure, more stable, world.

Mr. President, I have today the high privilege of conveying a message from President Reagan to the Conference on Disarmament.

[Here Mr. Adelman read the message printed *supra*.]

Building such a world is critically important today, in light of the potential horror and destruction of war. We need to work together to reduce and eventually eliminate the risks of war, which are particularly dangerous in the nuclear age. We do not need proof of the hypothesis of "nuclear winter" to know that it would be unmitigated disaster, an unimaginable nightmare. All of us here must agree with President Reagan's often repeated conclusion that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

Unfortunately, in viewing these critical problems, some people come to despair, believing that no solution whatsoever is possible. Indeed, they seem to think that abandoning one's defenses might be more stabilizing than continuing our deliberate efforts to maintain a balanced defense while seeking to negotiate substantial arms reductions.

It is clear to all that the United States will never and should never surrender its inherent right to national and collective self-defense. Neither will the United States yield to hopelessness in its arms control efforts. Nor should any member of this Conference.

To be sure, arms control is often a painfully slow process. But that should strengthen, and not lessen, our resolve to build, stone-by-stone, step-by-step, the firm foundation for *lasting* arms control which can enhance stability. We cannot abandon this goal. We must never obscure it.

The two major nuclear Powers surely carry a heavy burden and a special responsibility for reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear arms. But the *multilateral* arms control process is an essential complement to the bilateral negotiations. The two can and must be mutually reinforcing.

Every nation—nuclear or non-nuclear, large or small, aligned, or non-aligned or neutral—shares in the broader responsibility to seek and maintain peace. Arms control—and compliance with arms control agreements—is truly a responsibility all nations share. This magnificent Council Chamber, part of the beautiful Palais des Nations where we now sit, for almost 50 years has symbolized man's intense, enduring desire for and pursuit of peace.

Seventy-one years ago in Sarajevo, a single act, growing out of decades of nationalist violence and rivalry, helped ignite World War I. The tragic effects of this event are still palpable today. Following those few pistol shots by a lone assassin, 10 million people lost their lives over four long, horrible years. Those few pistol shots set off a historical chain leading to the grimmest half century of barbarism the modern world has had to endure.

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That ominous event taught us that small sparks can set off great fires. To prevent those fires, we must deal with the conditions before the spark ignites. Thus, we must fashion a stable international system in all its various dimensions. In the four decades since the end of World War II, 150 or more conventional conflicts have raged, leaving millions of casualties strewn across the world stage. The problems of achieving peace are pervasive. Only if we work together can we hope to build a safer world. This is the real task at hand for all 40 countries gathered here today.

We have the foundation on which to build this co-operation. The United Nations Charter sets the standard for State behaviour in international affairs, forbidding any nation to use force or even to threaten the use of force against the territory or the political independence of another nation. Every member of this body is obligated to adhere strictly to these provisions. Every nation on earth is so obligated.

Equally important is the binding obligation of all nations to abide by their other international legal obligations, including their undertakings in arms control agreements. Non-compliance with agreements—failure to keep one's promises—is a profound matter. It puts at risk the important security benefits derived from arms control and could create new security risks for those States relying upon the rewards of arms control. Further, it undermines the confidence essential to a continued effective arms control process.

As members of the only multilateral organization charged with the task of forging arms control agreements of global scope, we in the Conference on Disarmament cannot close our eyes to the problems of compliance which are confronting us today. In January 1984, at the request of the United States Congress, President Reagan submitted a report on seven violations or probable violations of arms control obligations or related political commitments by the Soviet Union.[3] Last week a follow-up report was submitted to the Congress which reconfirmed our conclusions of last year and in some cases strengthened them. It also dealt with a number of additional yet critical problems of non-compliance with existing commitments.[4]

These reports come as no surprise to the Soviet Union, since we have vigorously pressed, and will continue vigorously to press, these issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels.

The majority of the problems presented by Soviet non-compliance are related to bilateral undertakings—the SALT I and SALT II agreements and the ABM Treaty.[5] Other cases, however, deal with the very important multilateral treaties. More specifically, the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices have resulted in considerable venting of radioactive matter and its movement beyond Soviet territorial

[3] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 33–39.
[4] Document 12.
[5] The SALT agreements may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff. and *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

limits. That violates the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.[6] The Treaty was designed in part to prevent health risks to innocent peoples beyond a testing country's borders. Violations to that Treaty could endanger that very goal.

In addition, the Soviet Union has violated its obligations under the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention [7] and under international law as embodied by the 1925 Geneva Protocol.[8] Thankfully, there have been no confirmed attacks with lethal chemical toxin weapons in Kampuchea, Laos or Afghanistan in 1984. If those kinds of activities have indeed stopped, and we hope they have, that is all to the good and constitutes a testimony to the policy—practiced here today—of being forthright in raising arms control violations. The goal is not aimless accusations of another country but stopping such violations. It is a testimony to the outcry of people everywhere that such sentiments can and do stop such unacceptable activities.

This underscores the fact that compliance is not just a bilateral concern. To be serious about arms control is to be serious about compliance.

This Conference is, I know, serious about arms control and thus must be serious about the twin issues of compliance and verification. In this regard, the United States delegation today is introducing the President's message to the Congress of the United States, and his unclassified report on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements, as a Conference Document.

It is now clear that provisions of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which regrettably contains no verification provisions, have been violated at the cost of many lives of innocent peoples in less developed, and non-aligned countries. The United States recognizes that it was one of the States that did not fully appreciate the danger of the lack of adequate compliance provisions. It now sees a need to fashion such provisions.

Negotiations on the issues the Conference deals with must factor in whether the activities to be limited can be effectively verified. Just as we dare not sit by and permit our past efforts to be debased through violations, we likewise need to take the past compliance record fully into account as we seek to formulate new agreements. Each of us must tackle this urgent task. Better still, we can tackle it together.

I would now like to turn to another critical issue before this Conference: how to pursue fresh arms control initiatives. I would be the first to caution, in this regard, that progress should not be measured by the number of words committed to paper, nor by the ability to produce a non-controversial draft. There is already an abundance of both. Rather, progress needs to be measured by meaningful and effectively verifiable arms control agreements, as well as by a better understand-

[6] *Ibid., 1963,* pp. 291–293.
[7] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 133–138.
[8] *Ibid., 1969,* pp. 764–765.

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ing of each State's security and arms control goals and concerns. We can accomplish this if we approach the task with realism, and with seriousness.

This Conference's predecessor bodies have had their share of successes, which have contributed to stability and helped—really helped—reduce the risks of war Highest among those successes surely is the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.[9] With over 120 parties, it is the most widely adhered-to arms control agreement in history, and among the very best. For it is the very cornerstone of international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and as such has significantly enhanced all countries' security. Of course, proliferation problems remain in various parts of the world, and we need to remain vigilant and press for universal adherence to this Treaty. We all—in my view, including the non-signatory States—have an interest in ensuring that the treaty and its purposes are reaffirmed this year in the NPT Review Conference beginning in September.

The Conference on Disarmament is today often criticized for not achieving more agreements and for not reaching agreement more quickly. This criticism comes from within this chamber as well as from without. Unfortunately, this criticism has a ring of truth to it. The Conference on Disarmament has clearly lost momentum over its seven-year existence.

I believe that this trend can and must be reversed. We can restore our purpose by new and verifiable agreements and a better understanding of each member's concerns, and also by serious work on unresolved arms control problems. These include most prominently as I mentioned, verification and compliance.

To do this, however, we must set realistic objectives. We should, first identify those global security concerns of highest priority which can be addressed appropriately through multilateral solutions. All items on this Conference's agenda are proper subjects for attention of this group but not all are of equal priority. Banning chemical weapons is to me the top priority.

In 1915, at the beginning of World War I, clouds of chlorine gas rolled across the battlefields in Belgium. A Major Auld then wrote:

> Try to imagine the . . . troops, as they saw the vast cloud of greenish-yellow gas spring out of the ground and slowly move downwind toward them, the vapour clinging to the earth, seeking out every hole and hollow . . . first wonder, then fear; then, as the first fringes of the cloud enveloped them and left them choking and agonized in the fight for breath—panic. Those who could move broke and ran, trying, generally in vain, to outstrip the cloud which followed inexorably after them.

Chemical weapons caused over 1 million casualties and 90,000 deaths in World War I. In the 1930s they were used in Ethiopia by

[9] *Ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.

Mussolini's forces. Then, for 30 years, no nation used them on the battlefield.

In the late 1960s, however, there was evidence of their reappearance on an obscure battlefield in Yemen. In the mid-1970s, the Hmong people of Laos became the next victims of chemical warfare. In 1979 began reliable reports of chemical weapons being used by Soviet forces in Afghanistan. And Vietnamese and Lao troops, Soviet surrogate forces, continued to use chemical weapons against the Hmong resistance. Then, in 1983 the world witnessed Iraq using chemical weapons in its dismal war against Iran.

All this despite a major international agreement that bans the use of chemical weapons. The Geneva Protocol, completed in 1925 with the grim lessons of World War I then so fresh in mind, has been a major bulwark against chemical weapons use. More than 100 countries are parties. But that international legal restriction and the morality which lay beneath it have been in danger of crumbling as a result of these barbaric practices since 1975.

The political, moral and legal barriers against the use of chemical weapons are in danger of being torn down by such violations. We need now to re-establish and further buttress those longstanding norms of acceptable and civilized international behaviour. Today, there are even more threatening, toxic killer chemicals available. They are weapons of mass destruction, and weapons of mass suffering inflicted on defenseless civilians; thus far in non-aligned, poor countries. And as the Iraqi example makes clear, they are relatively cheap and readily available.

Two years ago, in his speech to the United Nations second special session devoted to disarmament, President Reagan noted that: "The use of chemical and biological weapons has long been viewed with revulsion by civilized societies. No peacemaking institution can ignore the use of these dread weapons and still live up to its mission".[10]

It is the view of the United States Government—and, as those of you who have worked with me in the United Nations and elsewhere know, my strong personal conviction as well—that this Conference should put its highest priority and its utmost efforts toward achieving a complete global ban on chemical weapons. Make no mistake about it, the dangers of chemical weapons proliferation are increasing. The problem is getting much worse.

Last April, Vice President Bush introduced our draft convention,[11] and the negotiations subsequently intensified. We should not ease up until we have succeeded in effectively abolishing these weapons. Our proposed ban on chemical weapons focuses world attention on the issue and thereby helps to re-establish international norms long respected and now so much in danger of eroding.

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[10] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, p. 384.
[11] *Ibid., 1984*, pp. 269–299.

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In this connection, we were very heartened when the United Nations Secretary-General, on 5 February, urged that a comprehensive test ban on chemical weapons be completed by the end of 1985.[12] We fully endorse his injunction. We hope that the Soviet Union will engage in serious negotiations on every element of the United States draft with that goal in mind. Were that goal met, 1985 would become a historic year in the annals of arms control—much as 1968 became with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference on Disarmament would be infused with new importance to world affairs, which is so badly needed.

We recognize that chemical weapons pose some of the most confounding verification problems encountered in the vast realm of arms control. For this very reason, we are seeking new and rather bold approaches, including an "open invitation" for mandatory international inspection on short notice.

As I noted earlier, overcoming the problems of verification and compliance is essential. Arms control is empty without compliance; and compliance, particularly for a closed society, is impossible to establish without verification. A ban on chemical weapons honoured by open societies and violated by closed societies would be no ban at all. It would constitute unilateral disarmament in the guise of multilateral arms control.

During the course of these discussions, I also encourage the Conference to look carefully at how to handle chemicals normally used in industry or agriculture, but which also can be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons. Chemical weapons used in Iraq's war with Iran were produced from just such substances. To help prevent development and use of chemical weapons in the future, we need to ensure that steps are taken to control the export of such chemicals and related equipment and technology. Countries with advanced chemical industries have a special obligation in this regard, and in the future should exercise considerable restraint. Personally, I believe this is an ever-increasing priority in arms control.

Besides the first priority of a global chemical weapons ban, the basis for an agreement banning radiological weapons has existed since 1979 in parallel United States-Soviet proposals.[13] Considerable effort has been directed towards concluding an agreement on this proposal, as well as on a United States proposal to strengthen the agreement's compliance mechanisms. We hope this abundance of material will culminate in an early agreement that precludes this entire category of weapons, which, to date, are not known to exist and which, fortunately, have thus far attracted little military interest.

Serious work on verification and compliance issues should also receive priority in the Conference's work related to a nuclear test ban. The worldwide experiment sponsored by the Conference's *Ad Hoc*

[12] Cf. CD/PV. 288, p. 9.
[13] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 357–361.

Group of Scientific Experts to exchange seismic data has proven a promising contribution to this effort. The Conference might also consider additional expert study on the possibility of monitoring the atmosphere through radioactivity and acoustic data exchanges.

In this regard, I would note that President Reagan laid the groundwork for a related measure last fall. In his speech before the United Nations General Assembly, he proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union arrange for experts to visit each other's underground test sites to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapon tests.[14] This step could enable the two countries to establish the basis for verification of effective limits on underground nuclear testing. We continue to await a positive response from Moscow, and have done everything possible to encourage such a response.

Multilateral efforts to improve nuclear testing verification would be very useful at this juncture. The United States has been ready and willing to discuss important aspects of a nuclear test ban. In this regard, we joined with other Western delegates in supporting a draft mandate for an *ad hoc* committee tabled last year in the Conference on Disarmament. We continue to support that mandate and we hope that those who have not agreed to it will do so very soon.

The situation on outer space arms control has also changed materially since last year. Next month will begin the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations on defense and space weapons. This Conference could begin its complementary multilateral work with a comprehensive examination of existing multilateral agreements. There is much that the Conference can usefully consider in this vital area, as reflected in the mandate for an *ad hoc* committee proposed by a group of Western States. But the insistence of some members on a negotiating mandate threatens to leave the Conference on Disarmament out of the space arms control picture altogether.

This is my second visit to Geneva since the new year began. Last month, in my first visit, the United States succeeded in reopening the bilateral arms control dialogue with the Soviet Union and in establishing a broad framework for those critical arms control negotiations.

Now, in this visit, I hope we will all rededicate ourselves to this international body's founding principle: that effective arms control is every nations' responsibility.

The Conference on Disarmament truly has a unique and a profound responsibility in the continuing quest for world stability. But any consensus reached here will have to surmount the differences in outlook and the conflicts of interest that invariably divide countries, especially the extreme differences in principles and in practices between open societies and closed societies, between democracies and totalitarian States.

Our job here is not easy. In many respects, multilateral negotiations are more difficult and more demanding than bilateral ones. As the

[14] *Ibid., 1984*, p. 692.

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American diplomat and historian George F. Kennan once wrote: "Everyone knew that in multilateral, international negotiations the difficulty of reaching agreement increased with the square of the number of parties present at the table."

But, if one weighs the difficulty of our task against the potential rewards then it seems a light burden to bear indeed. The world expects no less of us than to bear such burdens and to attain such rewards.

22. Reply by Soviet President Chernenko to an Address Entitled "Treaty Now" by the Nordic Anti-War Organization: February 13, 1985 [1]

Esteemed participants in the movement for a nuclear weapon-free Nordic Europe,

I have closely studied your address, containing an appeal for concluding at the earliest possible date a treaty on a nuclear weapon-free zone in Nordic Europe. The movement for peace and against the nuclear arms race has become an important moral and political force in the European Continent, including your region, Nordic Europe. Your appeal sounds very topical in the present-day situation.

We Soviet people share your worry over the dangerous worsening of the international climate, the continued arms race, which certain quarters now want to extend into space, and the nuclear threat looming over mankind. A dangerous situation is taking shape in Europe, for which the doctrine of a 'limited nuclear war' was devised in the first place and which is being turned into a staging area for a nuclear conflict with the deployments of first-strike weapons in it. Veritable mountains of nuclear weapons have been piled up in our continent today. The deployment of new U.S. nuclear missiles in some West European countries is further aggravating the situation and detracting from security in Europe and all over the world. The forces of war are heading for denying the Europeans the benefits of a life of peace, which they have been enjoying for almost 40 years now thanks to victory over fascism.

The Soviet Union is a resolute opponent of senseless competition in the production and stockpiling of ever deadlier types of weapons. We stand for most radical measures aimed at preventing the arms race in space and ending it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear armaments to the point of their complete elimination and at strengthening strategic stability. The Soviet-U.S. talks due to begin in Geneva in March will be devoted to the comprehensive solution of those closely interrelated problems. At the same time there are certain questions

[1] Moscow TASS in English, February 13, 1985; FBIS *Daily Report*, February 13, 1985, pp. G1–G2

bearing on nuclear weapons which are not related to the subject of the forthcoming talks and lend themselves to independent solutions. These problems include the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones.

You say in your address that the people of Nordic Europe ask themselves what contribution towards disarmament and peace is within their powers. I think it is well within their powers to make a great and important contribution, namely, to make the north of Europe a nuclear weapon-free zone. Judging by the scope of your movement, the establishment of such a zone enjoys the support of mass public organisations, many political parties, broad parliamentary circles—in short, representatives of most different strata of the population regardless of their political views and convictions. Efforts bear fruit when the public acts energetically and perseveringly without waiting for an outside impetus.

At the same time the solution of this question is, of course, unthinkable without initiative on the part of the governments of Nordic countries. It is they who are to discuss the practical aspects of this problem and to resolve it.

The establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Nordic Europe would undoubtedly open up fresh possibilities for building confidence and lessening tension both in Europe and in the whole world.

Can such a zone become reality? In our view, it both can and must. There are precedents, such as the Antarctic Treaty [2] and the Tlatelolco Treaty [3] establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America. These examples confirm that such projects are realistic. Regrettably, far from everyone in the West thinks so. Opinion is voiced there, including at a high level, against the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones.

You ask in what way our country could exert a positive influence so as to establish such a zone in the north of Europe. I would like to reply to this question in the following way. The Soviet Union has stated on more than one occasion that it shall never use nuclear weapons against those countries which have renounced the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and have no such weapons in their territories. Specifically, we are ready to assume the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against those Nordic states which will participate in a nuclear weapon-free zone, that is, which will renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and their deployment in their territories. This guarantee could be formalized either in a multilateral agreement with our participation or in bilateral agreements with each of the member countries of the zone.

I use this opportunity to reiterate the Soviet Union's readiness to become a guarantor of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the north of

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[2] The text of the Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550–1556.

[3] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

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Europe and to consider certain substantial measures with regard to its own territory adjacent to the zone so as to contribute to the strengthening of its non-nuclear status. We would be prepared, in particular, to discuss with interested sides the question of granting a non-nuclear status to the Baltic Sea.

We do not make all these steps of ours conditional on the positive attitude of Western powers to the non-nuclear zone, although, naturally, the significance of the establishment of the zone to all the participants in it would be fuller if the NATO nuclear powers assume similar obligations.

It is often said that this question can and must be resolved only in a broader, European context. It cannot be denied, of course, that the settlement of a number of problems of European security in advance could promote the appearance of nuclear weapon-free zones in different parts of our continent, say, in the north and in the Balkans. However, in our view it would be an error to make the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones in the European Continent dependent on this matter.

The appearance of such zones could contribute to the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe. It could become a step on the road to the complete abolishment of weapons of mass destruction. The establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Nordic Europe would also be useful in general context of struggle for improving the international situation.

I wish you and all the other participants in the peace movement in Nordic countries every success in your noble efforts.

23. News Conference Statement by the Spokesman of the Soviet Delegation to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (Kokeyev): Soviet Proposal, February 14, 1985 [1]

Today at the Vienna negotiations the Soviet Union has submitted the draft agreement, "The Basic Provisions of an Agreement on the Initial Reduction by the Soviet Union and the USA of Ground Forces and Armaments in Central Europe and the Follow-on Non-increase of the Level of Armed Forces and Armaments of the Sides in this Area." This new constructive move has been made on behalf of the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic—direct participants in the Vienna negotiations.

The head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador V. Mikhaylov, stressed at the plenary session that, guided by invariable desire to prevent the menace of war, to improve the international situation, and

[1] ACDA files.

to stop the arms race, the Soviet Union together with other Warsaw Treaty member-states seeks businesslike resultative negotiations be it in Geneva, Stockholm, or Vienna.

The proposal the Socialist countries have submitted today should give an impulse to the Vienna negotiations, bring about first concrete results, initiate the process of reducing concentration of forces and armaments in Central Europe. To reach these goals it is suggested to concentrate on implementation of reduction of a certain part of Soviet and American forces in the interrelationship with the follow-on freeze in an appropriate legally-binding form on the level of armed forces and armaments of all direct participants in the mentioned area.

Within one year from the time of the entry into force of this agreement ground forces of the USSR and the USA in Central Europe would be reduced by 20,000 and 13,000 respectively in combat military units together with their organic armaments and combat equipment and up to 10 as individuals [*sic*]. It is also provided for that upon the completion of reductions of Soviet and American forces, all states-parties to the agreement would undertake an obligation on a collective and national basis not to increase the level of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe for the duration of this agreement.

Along with the use of national technical means of verification at the disposal of the sides, such concrete measures to ensure the implementation of the agreement are proposed as an exchange of lists of units to be reduced and withdrawn, notification of the start and the completion of practical reduction measures, establishment of 3–4 check points for the period of withdrawal of forces to be reduced by each side with this withdrawal to be carried out through these check points.

The draft agreement contains an understanding that negotiations on further, more substantive reductions would be continued to reach equal collective levels of 900,000 armed forces of the sides in Central Europe, including 700,000 of ground forces.

The proposed agreement would enter into force upon the day of its signing and would be in force during 3 years.

The draft agreement is based on the approach and scheme of reductions contained in the February and June 1983 initiatives of the Socialist states.[2] Remaining fully in force, they provide the shortest way to reach a mutually acceptable agreement.

The new initiative of the Warsaw Treaty member-states is a constructive and practical one. It takes into account a number of elements of the Western position and allows to reach in a short time the first tangible result at the talks in Vienna. It would, no doubt, contribute to the creation of necessary confidence, favourable climate, and soil for further combined efforts to strengthen stability in Europe without diminishing security of the sides.

[2] These are discussed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 234–236, 572–574.

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24. Letter From ACDA Director Adelman to the Congress Submitting Fiscal Year 1986 Arms Control Impact Statements, February 15, 1985 [3]

On behalf of the President, I am submitting the fiscal year 1986 arms control impact statements pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2576, as amended. Classified and unclassified impact statements are submitted as required by the statute.[4] I am also submitting abbreviated statements for those programs that meet the statutory criteria for arms control impact statements but which have not received in-depth analysis for the reasons indicated.

The fiscal year 1986 budget cycle marks the 10th year in which arms control impact statements have been submitted to the Congress. This year a new section has been included in each impact statement describing Soviet weapon systems which are counterpart systems to the U.S. programs being analyzed.

The administration has concluded that while many of these programs will require continuing review, all of the programs analyzed in the fiscal year 1986 budget are consistent with current U.S. security and arms control policy. The specific programs planned to be carried out during fiscal year 1986 are also consistent with the terms and provisions of existing arms control agreements.

25. Address by the Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze): Strategic Defense Initiative, February 20, 1985 [1]

Introduction

Since the dawn of the nuclear age 40 years ago, there have been countless proposals to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. That has been the professed objective of both the Soviet Union and the United States. But until recently it has not been a practical goal.

The President is determined to do more, to look even now toward a world in which nuclear weapons have in fact been eliminated. The present situation—in which the threat of massive nuclear retaliation is the ultimate sanction, the key element of deterrence, and thus the basis for security and peace—is unsatisfactory. It has kept the peace

[3] *Fiscal Year 1986 Arms Control Impact Statements: Statements Submitted to the Congress by the President Pursuant to Section 36 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act* (Jt. Com. Prt.; 99th Cong., 1st sess.), April 1985, p. v.

[4] The classified version is retained in committee files. This publication is the unclassified version in its entirety. [Footnote in source document.]

[1] ACDA files. The address was given before the Philadelphia World Affairs Council.

for 40 years, but the potential costs of a breakdown are immense and, because of continuing massive Soviet deployments of both offensive and defensive weaponry, are not becoming less. If we can, we must find a more reliable basis for security and for peace.

This concern prompted the President's decision to proceed with the Strategic Defense Initiative. He has directed the scientific community to determine if new cost-effective defensive technologies are feasible that could be introduced into force structures so as to produce a more stable strategic relationship. We envisage, if that search is successful, a cooperative effort with the Soviet Union, hopefully leading to an agreed transition toward effective non-nuclear defenses that might make possible the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Strategic Concept

In preparing for Secretary Shultz's January meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko, we developed a strategic concept encompassing our view of how we would like to see the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship evolve in the future. That concept provides the basis for our approach to next month's talks in Geneva. It can be summarized in four sentences:

> During the next 10 years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

It would be worthwhile to dwell on this concept in some detail. To begin with, it entails three time phases: the near term, a transition phase, and an ultimate phase.

The Near Term

For the immediate future, at least the next 10 years, we will continue to base deterrence on the ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation. We have little choice; today's technology provides no alternative.

That being said, we will press for radical reductions in the number and power of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms. Offensive nuclear arsenals on both sides are entirely too high and potentially destructive, particularly in the more destabilizing categories such as the large MIRVed Soviet ICBM and SS–20 forces.

At the same time, we will seek to reverse the erosion that has occurred in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty regime,[2] erosion that has resulted from Soviet actions over the last 10 years. These include the construction of a large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia, in violation of the ABM Treaty's provisions regarding the location and orientation of ballistic missile early warning radars.

For the near term, we will be pursuing the SDI research program—in full compliance with the ABM Treaty, which permits such research. Likewise, we expect the Soviets will continue their investigation of the possibilities of new defensive technologies, as they have for many years.

We have offered to begin discussions in the upcoming Geneva talks with the Soviets as to how we might together make a transition to a more stable and reliable relationship based on an increasing mix of defensive systems.

The Transition Period

Should new defensive technologies prove feasible, we would want at some future date to begin such a transition, during which we would place greater reliance on defensive systems for our protection and that of our allies.

The criteria by which we will judge the feasibility of such technologies will be demanding. The technologies must produce defensive systems that are survivable; if not, the defenses would themselves be tempting targets for a first strike. This would decrease, rather than enhance, stability.

New defensive systems must also be cost-effective at the margin, that is, it must be cheap enough to add additional defensive capability so that the other side has no incentive to add additional offensive capability to overcome the defense. If this criterion is not met, the defensive systems could encourage a proliferation of countermeasures and additional offensive weapons to overcome deployed defenses, instead of a redirection of effort from offense to defense.

As I said, these criteria are demanding. If the new technologies cannot meet these standards, we are not about to deploy them. In that event, we would have to continue to base deterrence on the ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation. However, we hope and have expectations that the scientific community can respond to the challenge.

We would see the transition period as a cooperative endeavor with the Soviets. Arms control would play a critical role. We would, for example, envisage continued reductions in offensive nuclear arms.

Concurrently, we would envisage the sides beginning to test, develop, and deploy survivable and cost-effective defenses at a measured pace, with particular emphasis on non-nuclear defenses. Deterrence would thus begin to rely more on a mix of offensive nuclear and defensive systems, instead of on offensive nuclear arms alone.

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[2] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

The transition would continue for some time, perhaps for decades. As the U.S. and Soviet strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arsenals declined significantly, we would need to negotiate reductions in other types of nuclear weapons and involve, in some manner, the other nuclear powers.

The Ultimate Period

Given the right technical and political conditions, we would hope to be able to continue the reduction of nuclear weapons down to zero.

The global elimination of nuclear weapons would be accompanied by wide-spread deployments of effective non-nuclear defenses. These defenses would provide assurance that were one country to cheat, for example, by clandestinely building ICBMs or shorter range systems, such as SS–20s, it would not be able to achieve any exploitable military advantage. To overcome the deployed defenses, cheating would have to be on such a large scale that there would be sufficient notice so that countermeasures could be taken.

Were we to reach the ultimate phase, deterrence would be based on the ability of the defense to deny success to a potential aggressor's attack. The strategic relationship could then be characterized as one of mutual assured security.

Comments

Having thus outlined our strategic concept, let me offer some comments, and perhaps anticipate some of your questions.

First, the concept is wholly consistent with deterrence. In both the transition and ultimate phases, deterrence would continue to provide the basis for the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship.

Deterrence requires that a potential opponent be convinced that the risks and costs of aggression far outweigh the gains he might hope to achieve. The popular discussion of deterrence has focussed almost entirely on one element, that is, posing to an aggressor high potential costs through the ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation.

But deterrence can also function if one has the ability, through defense and other military means, to deny the attacker the gains he might otherwise have hoped to realize. Our intent is to shift the deterrent balance from one which is based primarily on the ultimate threat of devastating nuclear retaliation to one in which non-nuclear defenses play a greater and greater role. We believe the latter provides a far sounder basis for a stable and reliable strategic relationship.

My second comment is that we recognize that the transition period—if defensive technologies prove feasible and we decide to move in that direction—could be tricky. We would have to avoid a mix of offensive and defensive systems that, in a crisis, would give one side or the other incentives to strike first. That is precisely why we would seek to make the transition a cooperative endeavor with the Soviets, and have offered even now to begin talking with them about the issues that would have to be dealt with in such a transition.

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My third comment is that we realize that a world from which nuclear weapons have been eliminated would still present major risks. The technique of making nuclear weapons is well known; that knowledge cannot be excised. The danger of break-out or cheating would continue. Moreover, there would also be the potential problem of suitcase nuclear bombs and the like.

But even if all risks cannot be eliminated, they can be greatly reduced. Nothing is wholly risk-free; one must compare the alternatives. It seems to me that the risks posed by cheating or suitcase bombs in a world from which nuclear arms had been eliminated from military arsenals would be orders of magnitude less than the risks and potential costs posed by a possible breakdown in the present deterrence regime based upon the ultimate threat of massive nuclear retaliation.

The Geneva Talks

U.S. and Soviet delegations will meet in Geneva in roughly 3 weeks time to begin negotiations on nuclear and space arms. In those talks, we will advance positions consistent with and designed to further the concept I have outlined.

At the end of January, I was asked by the press whether I was confident about the outcome of the upcoming talks. I replied that I was more confident than previously—that is before the Geneva meeting between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko—but I still wasn't very confident; we must bear in mind that there are profound differences of approach between the two sides.

In Geneva, Mr. Gromyko stated the Soviet position clearly and unambiguously. It has since then been repeated by many Soviet commentators.

The Soviets insist on the "nonmilitarization" of space; by that they mean a ban on all arms in space that are designed to attack objects in space or on earth, and all systems on earth that are designed to attack objects in space. They have expressed opposition to research efforts into such systems, in spite of their own sizable efforts in this field, which include the only currently operational ABM and antisatellite systems.

As to offensive arms reductions, the Soviets have yet to acknowledge legitimacy to our concern about the threat we see in their large highly MIRVed ICBM force. They continue to demand compensation for British and French nuclear forces, and assert that U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles somehow represent a more odious threat than that posed to NATO Europe by the hundreds of SS–20 missiles now deployed.

In addition, the Soviets maintain that the three subject areas—strategic nuclear, intermediate-range nuclear, and defense and space arms—must not only be discussed in their interrelationship, but that it is not possible to implement an agreement in one area without agreement in the others. We believe otherwise; if the sides come to agree-

ment in one area, we see no sense in a self-denying rule that would prevent the sides from implementing an agreement that would serve the interests of both.

There are obvious differences. We will present our views and listen carefully to Soviet proposals.

We do not expect the Soviets to accept immediately our viewpoint or our concept as to how the future strategic relationship should evolve. The negotiators have their work cut out for them; the process will be complex and could well be lengthy. But with persistence, patience and constructive ideas, we hope the Soviets will come to see the merits of our position—that it will serve their national interests as well as as ours.

Conclusion

At the beginning of my remarks, I noted that the elimination of nuclear weapons has often seemed an impractical goal, one which has received little more than lip service. As you can see, the United States is going beyond that; the President has initiated a serious effort to see how it can be accomplished.

We do not underestimate the difficulties in reaching that objective. Quite frankly, it may prove impossible to obtain, and, even if we do eventually reach it, it will not be for many many years, perhaps well into the next century.

But we can not be anything but uneasy about the current situation, in which the nuclear arsenals of the world total tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. We owe it to our children, our grandchildren, and—in my case—to my great grandchild, to hold out for and to work toward some brighter vision for the future.

I thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. I'd be happy to address any questions you may have.

26. Agreement Between the Soviet Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Soviet Union, February 21, 1985 [1]

Whereas the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter referred to as "the Soviet Union") is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the "Treaty") which was opened for signature at Moscow, Washington and London on 1 July 1968 and which entered into force on 5 March 1970; [2]

Whereas States party to the Treaty undertake to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (herein-

[1] INFCIRC/327, July 1985. The agreement entered into force on June 10, 1985.
[2] The text of the Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

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after referred to as the "Agency") safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities; [3]

Whereas non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the Agency, on all source and special fissionable material in all their peaceful nuclear activities for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of their obligations under the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

Whereas the Soviet Union, a nuclear-weapon State as defined by the Treaty, as an act of good will, has expressed its willingness to place under Agency safeguards some of its peaceful nuclear facilities, namely several nuclear power stations and nuclear research reactors;

Whereas the Soviet Union has made this offer and has entered into this agreement for the purpose of promoting widespread adherence to the Treaty, further development of Agency safeguards and encouraging their acceptance by an even greater number of States;

Whereas the purpose of a safeguards agreement giving effect to this offer by the Soviet Union would thus differ necessarily from the purposes of safeguards agreements concluded between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty;

Whereas it is in the interest of Members of the Agency that, without prejudice to the principles and integrity of the Agency's safeguards system, the expenditure of the Agency's financial and other resources for implementation of such an agreement not exceed that necessary to accomplish the purpose of the Agreement;

Whereas the Agency is authorized, pursuant to Article III of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Statute"), to conclude such a safeguards agreement, [4]

Now, Therefore, the Soviet Union and the Agency have agreed as follows:

PART I

BASIC UNDERTAKING

ARTICLE 1

(a) The Soviet Union shall accept the application of safeguards by the Agency, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in peaceful nuclear facilities to be designated by the Soviet Union within its territory with a view to enabling the Agency to verify that such material is not withdrawn, except as provided for in this Agreement, from those facilities while such material is subject to safeguards under this Agreement.

[3] Criteria for safeguards under the NPT which were adopted by the IAEA may be found *ibid., 1971,* pp. 218–244.

[4] For the statute, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956,* pp. 915–933 (8 UST 1093).

(b) The Soviet Union shall, upon entry into force of this Agreement, provide the Agency with a List of the facilities referred to in paragraph (a) of this Article and may, in accordance with the procedures set forth in Part II of this Agreement, add facilities to or remove facilities from the List as it deems appropriate.

(c) The Soviet Union may, in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Agreement, withdraw nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement from facilities selected by the Agency in accordance with Article 2(b).

APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS

ARTICLE 2

(a) The Agency shall have the right to apply safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in facilities which are on the List provided in accordance with Article 1(b), with a view to enabling the Agency to verify that such material is not withdrawn, except as provided for in this Agreement, from those facilities while such material is subject to safeguards under this Agreement.

(b) The Agency shall, from time to time, select facilities on the List provided by the Soviet Union in accordance with Article 1(b), in which the Agency wishes to apply safeguards, and shall notify the Soviet Union of such facilities. The facility shall be considered to be selected upon receipt by the Soviet Union of such notification.

IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS

ARTICLE 3

(a) The Soviet Union and the Agency shall co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in this Agreement.

(b) The source or special fissionable material subject to safeguards under this Agreement shall be that material in the facilities selected by the Agency in accordance with Article 2(b) at any given time.

(c) The safeguards to be applied by the Agency under this Agreement shall be implemented using the same procedures followed by the Agency in applying its safeguards on similar material in similar facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States under agreements pursuant to paragraph (1) of Article III of the Treaty.

(d) In applying safeguards under this Agreement the Agency shall be guided by the objective of ensuring the further development and improvement of safeguards techniques.

ARTICLE 4

The safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed:

(a) to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the Soviet Union or international co-operation in the field of peace-

ful nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear materials;

(b) to avoid undue interference in the Soviet Union's peaceful nuclear activities, and in particular in the operation of facilities; and

(c) to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities.

ARTICLE 5

(a) The Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Agreement.

(b)(i) The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of this Agreement, except that specific information relating to the implementation thereof may be given to the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Board") and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities in implementing this Agreement.

(ii) Summarized information on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement may be published upon decision of the Board if the Soviet Union agrees thereto.

ARTICLE 6

(a) The Agency shall, in implementing safeguards pursuant to this Agreement, take full account of technological developments in the field of safeguards, and shall make every effort to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness and the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the extent that present or future technology permits.

(b) In order to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness, use shall be made, for example, of such means as:

(i) containment as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting purposes;

(ii) statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material; and

(iii) concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel cycle involving the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, and minimization of verification procedures in respect of other nuclear material, on condition that this does not hamper the Agency in applying safeguards under this Agreement.

SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING FOR AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF THE SOVIET UNION

ARTICLE 7

(a) The Soviet Union shall maintain a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.

(b) The Agency shall apply safeguards in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement in such a manner as to enable the Agency to verify, in ascertaining that there has not been any withdrawal of nuclear material, except as provided for in this Agreement, from facilities while such material is subject to safeguards under this Agreement, findings of the accounting and control system of the Soviet Union. The Agency's verification shall include, *inter alia*, independent measurements and observations conducted by the Agency in accordance with the procedures specified in Part II. The Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the accounting and control system of the Soviet Union.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE AGENCY

ARTICLE 8

(a) In order to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, the Soviet Union shall, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II, provide the Agency with information concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material.

(b)(i) The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under this Agreement.

(ii) Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary for safeguarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.

(c) The Agency shall be prepared to examine, if the Soviet Union so requests, on premises of the Soviet Union design information which the Soviet Union regards as being of particular sensitivity. Such information need not be physically transmitted to the Agency provided that it remains readily available for further examination by the Agency on premises of the Soviet Union.

AGENCY INSPECTORS

ARTICLE 9

(a)(i) The Agency shall secure the consent of the Soviet Union to the designation of Agency inspectors to the Soviet Union.

(ii) If the Soviet Union, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time after a designation has been made, objects to the

designation, the Agency shall propose to the Soviet Union an alternative designation or designations.

(iii) If, as a result of the repeated refusal of the Soviet Union to accept the designation of Agency inspectors, inspections to be conducted under this Agreement would be impeded, such refusal shall be considered by the Board, upon referral by the Director General of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Director General"), with a view to its taking appropriate action.

(b) The Soviet Union shall take the necessary steps to provide Agency inspectors with facilities for effective discharge by them of their functions under this Agreement.

(c) The visits and activities of Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as:

(i) to reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the Soviet Union and to the peaceful nuclear activities inspected; and

(ii) to ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information coming to the inspectors' knowledge.

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

ARTICLE 10

The Soviet Union shall apply to the Agency (including its property, funds and assets) and to its inspectors and other officials performing functions under this Agreement the relevant provisions of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency [5] as accepted by the Soviet Union.

CONSUMPTION OR DILUTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

ARTICLE 11

Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement upon determination by the Agency that the material has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practicably irrecoverable.

WITHDRAWAL AND TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

ARTICLE 12

(a) If the Soviet Union intends to exercise its right to withdraw nuclear material from facilities selected in accordance with Article 2(b), the Soviet Union shall notify the Agency of such withdrawal. Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material in respect of which such notification has been given.

(b) Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the right of the Soviet Union to transfer material subject to safeguards under this Agreement

[5] INFCIRC/9/Rev.2. [Footnote in source document.]

to destinations not within or under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union shall provide the Agency with information with respect of such transfers in accordance with Article 89. The Agency shall keep records of each such transfer and, where applicable, of the re-application of safeguards to the transferred nuclear material.

PROVISIONS RELATING TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED IN NON-NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

ARTICLE 13

Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, the Soviet Union shall agree with the Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under which the safeguards on such material may be terminated.

FINANCE

ARTICLE 14

The Soviet Union and the Agency will bear the expenses incurred by them in implementing their respective responsibilities under this Agreement. However, if the Soviet Union or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which inspectors may request.

THIRD PARTY LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE

ARTICLE 15

The Soviet Union shall ensure that any protection against third party liability in respect of nuclear damage, including any insurance or other financial security which may be available under its laws or regulations, shall apply to the Agency and its officials for the purpose of the implementation of this Agreement in the same way as that protection applies to nationals of the Soviet Union.

SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS

ARTICLE 16

Any claim by the Soviet Union against the Agency or by the Agency against the Soviet Union in respect of any damage resulting from the implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, shall be settled in accordance with international law.

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MEASURES RELATING TO VERIFICATION

ARTICLE 17

If the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the Soviet Union is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is not withdrawn, except as provided for in this Agreement, from facilities selected in accordance with Article 2(b), the Board may call upon the Soviet Union to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures have been invoked pursuant to Article 21 for the settlement of a dispute.

ARTICLE 18

If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General, finds that the Agency is not able to verify that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is not withdrawn, except as provided for in this Agreement, from facilities selected in accordance with Article 2(b), the Board may call upon the Soviet Union to remedy the situation forthwith. In the event there is a failure to take fully corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford the Soviet Union every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance.

COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE AGENCY

ARTICLE 19

(a) In co-operating in the implementation of this Agreement, the Soviet Union and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult each other about any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement.

(b) For the purposes specified in the preceding paragraph a Liaison Group shall be established, composed of representatives of the Soviet Union and the Agency. The Group shall meet at the request of either party to this Agreement.

ARTICLE 20

The Soviet Union shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement be considered by the Board. The Board shall invite the Soviet Union to participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board.

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

ARTICLE 21

Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, except a dispute with regard to a finding by the Board under Article 18 or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding, shall be settled by negotiation or other procedures agreed to by the Soviet Union and the Agency. Where the parties agree to submit such dispute to an arbitral tribunal, it shall be composed as follows: the Soviet Union and the Agency shall each designate one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so designated shall elect a third, who shall be the Chairman. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions shall require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the arbitral tribunal. The decisions of the arbitral tribunal shall be binding on the Soviet Union and the Agency.

SUSPENSION OF APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS UNDER OTHER AGREEMENTS

ARTICLE 22

If the Soviet Union notifies the Agency of agreements relating to the application of safeguards in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union and the Agency shall enter into consultations with a view to arranging for the suspension of the application of safeguards under such other agreements while this Agreement is in force. The Soviet Union and the Agency shall ensure that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement shall be at all times at least equivalent in amount and composition to that which would be subject to safeguards in the Soviet Union under the agreements in question. The detailed arrangements for the implementation of this provision shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements provided for in Article 39.

AMENDMENT OF THE AGREEMENT

ARTICLE 23

(a) The Soviet Union and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult each other on amendment to this Agreement.
(b) All amendments shall require the agreement of the Soviet Union and the Agency.

ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION

ARTICLE 24

This Agreement or any amendments thereto shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the Soviet Union written notification that constitutional and statutory requirements of the Soviet Union for entry into force have been met.

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ARTICLE 25

The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of the entry into force of this Agreement, and of any amendments thereto.

ARTICLE 26

This Agreement shall remain in force so long as the Soviet Union is party to the Treaty. However, either party to this Agreement may, upon giving six month's notice to the other party, terminate this Agreement if, after consultation between them that party considers that the purpose for which this Agreement was intended can no longer be served.

PART II

GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 27

The purpose of this part of the Agreement is to specify the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.

OBJECTIVE OF SAFEGUARDS

ARTICLE 28

The objective of the safeguards procedures set forth in this part of the Agreement is the timely detection of withdrawal of significant quantities of nuclear material from facilities selected in accordance with Article 2(b), other than withdrawal carried out in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 29

For the purpose of achieving the objective set forth in Article 28, material accountancy shall be used as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures.

ARTICLE 30

The technical conclusion of the Agency's verification activities shall be a statement, in respect of each material balance area, of the amount of material unaccounted for over a specific period, and giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated.

SYSTEM FOR ACCOUNTING FOR AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF THE SOVIET UNION

ARTICLE 31

Pursuant to Article 7 the Agency, in carrying out its verification activities, shall make full use of the Soviet Union's system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of the Soviet Union's accounting and control activities.

ARTICLE 32

The Soviet Union's system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement shall be based on a structure of material balance areas, and shall make provision, as appropriate and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, for the establishment of such measures as:

(a) a measurement system for the determination of the quantities of nuclear material received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from inventory, and the quantities on inventory;

(b) the evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the estimation of measurement uncertainty;

(c) procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating differences in shipper/receiver measurements;

(d) procedures for taking a physical inventory;

(e) procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured inventory and unmeasured losses;

(f) a system of records and reports showing, for each material balance area, the inventory of nuclear material and the changes in that inventory including receipts into and transfers out of the material balance area;

(g) provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are being operated correctly; and

(h) procedures for the provision of reports to the Agency in accordance with Articles 57 through 63 and 65 through 67.

STARTING POINT OF SAFEGUARDS

ARTICLE 33

Safeguards under this Agreement shall not apply to material in mining or ore processing activities, as well as to uranium or thorium until they have reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle where they are of composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment.

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CHANGES IN FACILITY LIST

ARTICLE 34

The Soviet Union may, at any time, notify the Agency of any facility or facilities to be added to or removed from the List provided for in Article 1(b):

(a) in case of addition to the List, the notification shall specify the facility or facilities to be added to the List and the date upon which the addition is to take effect;

(b) in the case of removal from the List of a facility or facilities then currently selected in accordance with Article 2(b):

(i) the Agency shall be notified in advance, other than in exceptional circumstances, and the notification shall specify: the facility or facilities being removed, the date of removal, and the quantity and composition of the nuclear material contained therein at the time of notification;

(ii) any facility in respect of which notification has been given in accordance with sub-paragraph (i) shall be removed from the List, as well as from the Listing provided for in Article 39, and the nuclear material contained therein shall cease to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement in accordance with and at the time specified in the notification by the Soviet Union.

(c) in any case of removal from the List of a facility or facilities not then currently selected in accordance with Article 2(b), the notification shall specify the facility or facilities being removed and the date of removal. Such facility or facilities shall be removed from the List at the time specified in the notification by the Soviet Union.

TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS

ARTICLE 35

(a) Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, under the conditions set forth in Article 11. Where the conditions of that Article are not met, but the Soviet Union considers that the recovery of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement from residues is not for the time being practicable or desirable, the Soviet Union and the Agency shall consult on the appropriate safeguards measures to be applied.

(b) Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, when it is withdrawn in accordance with Article 12(a). The Soviet Union shall notify the Agency in advance of such withdrawal, except in exceptional circumstances. The notification shall specify: the facility or facilities from which nuclear material is being withdrawn, the date of its withdrawal, and the quantity and composition of such material. Safeguards shall terminate from the time the nuclear material is withdrawn.

(c) Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, under the conditions set forth in Article 13,

provided that the Soviet Union and the Agency agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable.

EXEMPTIONS FROM SAFEGUARDS

ARTICLE 36

At the request of the Soviet Union, the Agency shall exempt nuclear material from safeguards, as follows:

(a) special fissionable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as a sensing component in instruments;
(b) nuclear material, when it is used in non-nuclear activities in accordance with Article 13, if such nuclear material is recoverable; and
(c) plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238 exceeding 80%.

ARTICLE 37

At the request of the Soviet Union the Agency shall exempt from safeguards nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards, provided that the total quantity of nuclear material which has been exempted in the Soviet Union in accordance with this Article may not at any time exceed:

(a) One kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of the following:

(i) plutonium;
(ii) uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20%) and above, taken account of by multiplying its weight by its enrichment; and
(iii) uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20%) and above that of natural uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment;

(b) ten metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above 0.005 (0.5%);
(c) twenty metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below; and
(d) twenty metric tons of thorium;

or such greater amounts as may be specified by the Board for uniform application.

ARTICLE 38

If nuclear material, exempted from safeguards, is to be processed or stored together with nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, provision shall be made for the re-application of safeguards thereto.

SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS

ARTICLE 39

(a) The Soviet Union and the Agency shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which shall:

(i) contain a Listing of those facilities selected in accordance with Article 2(b) and thus containing nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and

(ii) specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in this Agreement are to be applied.

(b) The Agency shall also notify the Soviet Union of those facilities to be removed from the Listing which have not otherwise been removed pursuant to notification by the Soviet Union in accordance with Article 34. Such facility or facilities shall be removed from the Listing upon such notification to the Soviet Union.

(c) The Subsidiary Arrangements may be extended or changed by agreement between the Agency and the Soviet Union without amendment to this Agreement.

ARTICLE 40

(a) The Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force as soon as possible after entry into force of this Agreement.

(b) The Soviet Union and the Agency shall make every effort to achieve the entry into force of the Subsidiary Arrangements in respect of facilities selected in accordance with Article 2(b) within ninety days of the selection of the facility in question by the Agency. An extension of that period shall require agreement between the Soviet Union and the Agency.

(c) Upon selection of a facility by the Agency in accordance with Article 2(b), the Soviet Union shall provide the Agency promptly with the information required for completing the Subsidiary Arrangements, and the Agency shall have the right to apply the procedures set forth in this Agreement to the nuclear material listed in the inventory provided for in Article 41, even if the Subsidiary Arrangements have not yet entered into force.

INVENTORY

ARTICLE 41

The Agency shall establish, on the basis of the initial reports referred to in Article 60, a unified inventory of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, irrespective of its origin, and shall maintain this inventory on the basis of subsequent reports and of the results of its verification activities. Copies of the inventory shall be made available to the Soviet Union at intervals to be agreed.

DESIGN INFORMATION

General Provisions

ARTICLE 42

The time limits for the provisions of design information in respect of any facility selected in accordance with Article 2(b) shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and such information shall be provided as early as possible after such selection.

ARTICLE 43

The design information to be provided to the Agency shall include, in respect of each facility selected in accordance with Article 2(b), when applicable:

(a) the identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine business purposes;

(b) a description of the general arrangement of the facility with reference, to the extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of nuclear material and to the general layout of important items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material;

(c) a description of features of the facility relating to material accountancy, containment and surveillance; and

(d) a description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear material accountancy and control, with special reference to material balance areas established by the operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical inventory taking.

ARTICLE 44

Other information relevant to the application of safeguards shall also be provided to the Agency in respect of each facility selected in accordance with Article 2(b), in particular on organizational responsibilities for material accountancy and control. The Soviet Union shall provide the Agency with supplementary information on the health and safety procedures which the Agency shall observe and with which the inspectors shall comply at the facility.

ARTICLE 45

The Agency shall be provided with design information in respect of a modification relevant for safeguards purposes, for examination, and shall be informed of any change in the information provided to it under Article 44, sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary.

Purposes of examination of design information

ARTICLE 46

The design information provided to the Agency shall be used for the following purposes:

(a) to identify the features of facilities and nuclear material relevant to the application of safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification;

(b) to determine material balance areas to be used for Agency accounting purposes and to select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be used to determine flow and inventory of nuclear material; in determining such material balance areas the Agency shall, *inter alia,* use the following criteria:

(i) the size of the material balance area shall be related to the accuracy with which the material balance can be established;

(ii) in determining the material balance area advantage shall be taken of any opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of flow measurements and thereby to simplify the application of safeguards and to concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement points;

(iii) a number of material balance areas in use at a facility or at distinct sites may be combined in one material balance area to be used for Agency accounting purposes when the Agency determines that this is consistent with its verification requirements; and

(iv) a special material balance area may be established at the request of the Soviet Union around a process step involving commercially sensitive information;

(c) to establish the nominal timing and procedures for taking of physical inventory of nuclear material for Agency accounting purposes;

(d) to establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation procedures;

(e) to establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quantity and location of nuclear material; and

(f) to select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and techniques and the strategic points at which they are to be applied.

The results of the examination of the design information shall be included in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

Re-examination of design information

ARTICLE 47

Design information shall be re-examined in the light of changes in operating conditions, of developments in safeguards technology and of experience in the application of verification procedures, with a view to modifying the action the Agency has taken pursuant to Article 46.

Verification of design information

ARTICLE 48

The Agency, in co-operation with the Soviet Union, may send inspectors to facilities to verify the design information provided to the

Agency pursuant to Articles 42 through 45, for the purposes stated in Article 46.

RECORDS SYSTEM

General Provisions

ARTICLE 49

In establishing a system of nuclear materials accounting and control as referred to in Article 7, the Soviet Union shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each material balance area. The records to be kept shall be described in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

ARTICLE 50

The Soviet Union shall make arrangements to facilitate the examination of records referred to in Article 49 by inspectors.

ARTICLE 51

Records referred to in Article 49 shall be retained for at least five years.

ARTICLE 52

Records referred to in Article 49 shall consist, as appropriate, of:

(a) accounting records of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and
(b) operating records for facilities containing such nuclear material.

ARTICLE 53

The system of measurements on which the records used for the preparation of reports are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in quality to such standards.

Accounting Records

ARTICLE 54

The accounting records shall set forth the following in respect of each material balance area:

(a) all inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at any time;
(b) all measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory; and
(c) all adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory changes, book inventories and physical inventories.

ARTICLE 55

For all inventory changes and physical inventories the accounting records shall show, in respect of each batch of nuclear material: material identification, batch data and source data. The records shall ac-

count for uranium, thorium and plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear material. For each inventory change, the date of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient, shall be indicated.

Operating Records

ARTICLE 56

The operating records shall set forth, as appropriate, in respect of each material balance area:

(a) those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and composition of nuclear material;
(b) the data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the derived estimates of random and systematic error;
(c) a description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking, a physical inventory, in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and
(d) a description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude of any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur.

REPORTS SYSTEM

General Provisions

ARTICLE 57

The Soviet Union shall provide the Agency with reports as detailed in Articles 58 through 67 in respect of nuclear material in facilities selected in accordance with Article 2(b).

ARTICLE 58

Reports shall be made in Russian.

Reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with Articles 49 through 56 and shall consist, as appropriate, of accounting reports and special reports.

Accounting Reports

ARTICLE 60

The Soviet Union shall provide the Agency with an initial report on all nuclear material contained in each facility selected in accordance with Article 2(b). Such reports shall be dispatched to the Agency within thirty days of the last day of the calendar month in which the Agency selects the facility, and shall reflect the situation as of the last day of that month.

ARTICLE 61

The Soviet Union shall provide the Agency with the following accounting reports for each material balance area:

(a) inventory change reports showing all changes in the inventory of nuclear material. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days after the end of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were established; and

(b) material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical inventory of nuclear material actually present in the material balance area. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days after the physical inventory has been taken.

The reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be corrected at a later date, as required.

ARTICLE 62

Inventory change reports shall specify identification and batch data for each batch of nuclear material, the date of the inventory change and, as appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient. These reports shall be accompanied by concise notes:

(a) explaining the inventory changes, on the basis of the operating data contained in the operating records provided for under Article 56(a); and

(b) Describing, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the anticipated operational programme, particularly the taking of a physical inventory.

ARTICLE 63

The Soviet Union shall report each inventory change, adjustment and correction, either periodically in a consolidated list or individually. Inventory changes shall be reported in terms of batches. As specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, small changes in inventory of nuclear material, such as transfers of analytical samples, may be combined in one batch and reported as one inventory change.

ARTICLE 64

The Agency shall provide the Soviet Union with semi-annual statements of book inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, for each material balance area, as based on the inventory change reports for the period covered by each such statement.

ARTICLE 65

Material balance reports shall include the following entries, unless otherwise agreed by the Soviet Union and the Agency:

(a) beginning physical inventory;

(b) inventory changes (first increases, then decreases);
(c) ending book inventory;
(d) shipper/receiver differences;
(e) adjusted ending book inventory;
(f) ending physical inventory; and
(g) material unaccounted for.

A statement of the physical inventory, listing all batches separately and specifying material identification and batch data for each batch, shall be attached to each material balance report.

Special Reports

ARTICLE 66

The Soviet Union shall make special reports without delay:

(a) if any unusual incident or circumstances lead the Soviet Union to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material that exceeds the limits specified for this purpose in the Subsidiary Arrangements; or
(b) if the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to the extent that unauthorized removal of nuclear material has become possible.

Amplification and clarification of reports

ARTICLE 67

If the Agency so requests, the Soviet Union shall provide the Agency with amplifications or clarification of any report in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.

INSPECTIONS

General Provisions

ARTICLE 68

The Agency shall have the right to make inspections as provided for in Articles 69 through 82.

Purposes of Inspections

ARTICLE 69

The Agency may make *ad hoc* inspections in order to:

(a) verify the information contained in the initial reports;
(b) identify and verify changes in the situation which have occurred since the date of the relevant initial report; and
(c) identify and if possible verify the quantity and composition of the nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement in respect of which the information referred to in Article 89(a) has been provided to the Agency.

ARTICLE 70

The Agency may make routine inspections in order to:

(a) verify that reports are consistent with records;
(b) verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and
(c) verify information on the possible causes of material unaccounted for, shipper/receiver differences and uncertainties in the book inventory.

ARTICLE 71

Subject to the procedures laid down in Article 75, the Agency may make special inspections:

(a) in order to verify the information contained in special reports; or
(b) if the Agency considers that information made available by the Soviet Union, including explanations from the Soviet Union and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this Agreement.

An inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine inspection effort provided for in Articles 76 through 80 or involves access to information or locations in addition to the access specified in Article 74 for *ad hoc* and routine inspections, or both.

Scope of Inspections

ARTICLE 72

For the purposes specified in Articles 69 through 71, the Agency may:

(a) examine the records kept pursuant to Articles 49 through 56;
(b) make independent measurements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement;
(c) verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and other measuring and control equipment;
(d) apply and make use of surveillance and containment measures; and
(e) use other objective methods which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible.

ARTICLE 73

Within the scope of Article 72, the Agency shall be enabled:

(a) to observe that samples at key measurement points for material balance accountancy are taken in accordance with procedures which produce representative samples, to observe the treatment and analysis of the samples and to obtain duplicates of such samples;
(b) to observe that the measurements of nuclear material at key measurement points for material balance accountancy are representative, and to observe the calibration of the instruments and equipment involved;

(c) to make arrangements with the Soviet Union that, if necessary:

(i) additional measurements are made and additional samples taken for the Agency's use;
(ii) the Agency's standard analytical samples are analysed;
(iii) appropriate absolute standards are used in calibrating instruments and other equipment; and
(iv) other calibrations are carried out;

(d) to arrange to use its own equipment for independent measurement and surveillance, and if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, to arrange to install such equipment;
(e) to apply its seals and other identifying and tamper-indicating devices to containments, if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and
(f) to make arrangements with the Soviet Union for the shipping of samples taken for the Agency's use.

Access for Inspections

ARTICLE 74

(a) For the purposes specified in Article 69(a) and (b) and until such time as the strategic points have been specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency inspectors shall have access to any location where the initial report or any inspections carried out in connection with it indicate that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is present.
(b) For the purpose specified in Article 69(c), the inspectors shall have access to any facility selected in accordance with Article 2(b) in which nuclear material referred to in Article 69(c) is located.
(c) For the purposes specified in Article 70 the inspectors shall have access only to the strategic points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and to the records maintained pursuant to Articles 49 through 56.
(d) In the event of the Soviet Union concluding that any unusual circumstances require extended limitations on access by the Agency, the Soviet Union and the Agency shall promptly make arrangements with a view to enabling the Agency to discharge its safeguards responsibilities in the light of these limitations. The Director General shall report each such arrangement to the Board.

ARTICLE 75

In circumstances which may lead to special inspections for the purposes specified in Article 71 the Soviet Union and the Agency shall consult forthwith. As a result of such consultations the Agency may:

(a) make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort provided for in Articles 76 through 80; and
(b) obtain access, in agreement with the Soviet Union, to information or locations in addition to those specified in Article 74. Any disagreement concerning the need for additional access shall be resolved

in accordance with Articles 20 and 21; in case action by the Soviet Union is essential and urgent, Article 17 shall apply.

Frequency and Intensity of Routine Inspections

ARTICLE 76

The Agency shall keep the number, intensity and duration of routine inspections, applying optimum timing, to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation of the safeguards procedures set forth in this Agreement, and shall make the optimum and most economical use of inspection resources available to it.

ARTICLE 77

The Agency may carry out one routine inspection per year in respect of facilities contained in the Listing made pursuant to Article 39 with a content or annual throughput, whichever is greater, of nuclear material not exceeding five effective kilograms.

ARTICLE 78

The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of facilities contained in the Listing made pursuant to Article 39 with a content or annual throughput of nuclear material exceeding five effective kilograms shall be determined on the basis that in the maximum or limiting case the inspection regime shall be no more intensive than is necessary and sufficient to maintain continuity of knowledge of the flow and inventory of nuclear material, and the maximum routine inspection effort in respect of such facilities shall be determined as follows:

(a) for reactors and sealed storage installations the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing one sixth of a man-year of inspection for each such facility;

(b) for facilities, other than reactors or sealed storage installations, involving plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility 30 $\times$V—E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms. The maximum established for any such facility shall not, however, be less than 1.5 man-years of inspection; and

(c) for facilities not covered by paragraphs (a) or (b) of this Article, the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility one-third of a man-year of inspection plus 0.4 $\times$E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms.

The Soviet Union and the Agency may agree to amend the figures for the maximum inspection effort specified in this Article, upon determination by the Board that such amendment is reasonable.

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ARTICLE 79

Subject to Articles 76 through 78 the criteria to be used for determining the actual number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of any facility contained in the Listing made pursuant to Article 39 shall include:

(a) the form of the nuclear material, in particular, whether the nuclear material is in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items; its chemical composition and, in the case of uranium, whether it is of low or high enrichment; and its accessibility;

(b) the effectiveness of the Soviet Union's accounting and control system, including the extent to which the operators of facilities are functionally independent of the Soviet Union's accounting and control system; the extent to which the measures specified in Article 32 have been implemented by the Soviet Union; the promptness of reports provided to the Agency; their consistency with the Agency's independent verification; and the amount and accuracy of the material unaccounted for, as verified by the Agency;

(c) characteristics of that part of the Soviet Union's nuclear fuel cycle in which safeguards are applied under this Agreement, in particular, the number and types of facilities, the characteristics of such facilities relevant to safeguards, notably the degree of containment; the extent to which the design of such facilities facilitates verification of the flow and inventory of nuclear material; and the extent to which information from different material balance areas can be correlated;

(d) international interdependence, in particular, the extent to which nuclear material is received from or sent to other States for use or processing; any verification activities by the Agency in connection therewith; and the extent to which the Soviet Union's nuclear activities are interrelated with those of other States; and

(e) technical developments in the field of safeguards, including the use of statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material.

ARTICLE 80

The Soviet Union and the Agency shall consult if the Soviet Union considers that the inspection effort is being deployed with undue concentration on particular facilities.

Notice of Inspections

ARTICLE 81

The Agency shall give advance notice to the Soviet Union before arrival of inspectors at facilities contained in the Listing made pursuant to Articles 39 as follows:

(a) for *ad hoc* inspections pursuant to Article 69(c), at least 24 hours; for those pursuant to Article 69(a) and (b) as well as the activities provided for in Article 48, at least one week;

(b) for special inspections pursuant to Article 71, as promptly as possible after the Soviet Union and the Agency have consulted as pro-

vided for in Article 75, it being understood that notification of arrival normally will constitute part of the consultations; and

(c) for routine inspections pursuant to Article 70, at least 24 hours in respect of the facilities referred to in Article 78(b) and sealed storage installations containing plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, and one week in all other cases.

Such notice of inspections shall include the names of the inspectors and shall indicate the facilities to be visited and the periods during which they will be visited. If the inspectors are to arrive from outside the Soviet Union the Agency shall also give advance notice of the place and time of their arrival in the Soviet Union.

ARTICLE 82

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 81, the Agency may, as a supplementary measure, carry out without advance notification a portion of the routine inspections pursuant to Article 78 in accordance with the principle of random sampling. In performing any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall fully take into account any operational programme provided by the Soviet Union pursuant to Article 62(b). Moreover, whenever practicable, and on the basis of the operational programme, it shall advise the Soviet Union periodically of its general programme of announced and unannounced inspections, specifying the general periods when inspections are foreseen. In carrying out any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall make every effort to minimize any practical difficulties for the Soviet Union and for facility operators, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of Articles 44 and 87. Similarly the Soviet Union shall make every effort to facilitate discharge by Agency inspectors of their functions under this Agreement.

Designation of Inspectors

ARTICLE 83

The following procedures shall apply to the designation of inspectors:

(a) the Director General shall inform the Soviet Union in writing of the name, qualifications, nationality, grade and such other particulars as may be relevant, of each Agency official he proposes for designation as an inspector for the Soviet Union;

(b) the Soviet Union shall inform the Director General within thirty days of the receipt of such a proposal whether it accepts the proposal;

(c) the Director General may designate each official who has been accepted by the Soviet Union as one of the inspectors for the Soviet Union, and shall inform the Soviet Union of such designations; and

(d) the Director General, acting in response to a request by the Soviet Union or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform the Soviet Union of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an inspector for the Soviet Union.

However, in respect of inspectors needed for the activities provided for in Article 48 and to carry out ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 69(a) and (b) the designation procedures shall be completed if possible within thirty days after the entry into force of this Agreement. If such designation appears impossible within this time limit, inspectors for such purposes shall be designated on a temporary basis.

ARTICLE 84

The Soviet Union shall grant or renew as quickly as possible appropriate visas, where required, for each inspector designated for the Soviet Union.

Conduct and Visits of Inspectors

ARTICLE 85

Inspectors, in exercising their functions under Articles 48 and 69 through 73, shall carry out their activities in a manner designed to avoid hampering or delaying the construction, commissioning or operation of facilities, or affecting their safety. In particular inspectors shall not operate any facility themselves or direct the staff of a facility to carry out any operation. If inspectors consider that in pursuance of Articles 72 and 73, particular operations in a facility should be carried out by the operator, they shall make a request therefor.

ARTICLE 86

When inspectors require services available in the Soviet Union, including the use of equipment, in connection with the performance of inspections, the Soviet Union shall facilitate the procurement of such services and the use of such equipment by inspectors.

ARTICLE 87

The Soviet Union shall have the right to have inspectors accompanied during their inspections by representatives of the Soviet Union, provided that inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.

STATEMENTS ON THE AGENCY VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

ARTICLE 88

The Agency shall inform the Soviet Union of:

(a) the results of inspections, at intervals to be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and

(b) the conclusions it has drawn from its verification activities in the Soviet Union, in particular by means of statements in respect of each material balance area, which shall be made as soon as possible after a physical inventory has been taken and verified by the Agency and a material balance has been struck.

INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS

ARTICLE 89

(a) The Soviet Union shall provide the Agency with the information specified in the letter from the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the International Organizations in Vienna to the Director General of the Agency dated 10 July 1974 (reproduced in Agency document INFCIRC/207 dated 26 July 1974) with respect to international transfers of nuclear material of the kind specified in that letter from or to a facility selected in accordance with Article 2(b). Any modification of the scope of the information specified in that letter shall require the agreement of the Soviet Union and the Agency.
(b) Where information has been provided to the Agency in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Article, a special report, as envisaged in Article 66, shall be made if any unusual incident or circumstances lead the Soviet Union to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material, including the occurrence of significant delay, during the transfer.

DEFINITIONS

ARTICLE 90

For the purposes of this Agreement:

A. *adjustment* means an entry into an accounting record or a report showing a shipper/receiver difference or material unaccounted for.
B. *annual throughput* means, for the purposes of Articles 77 and 78, the amount of nuclear material transferred annually out of a facility working at nominal capacity.
C. *batch* means a portion of nuclear material handled as a unit for accounting purposes at a key measurement point and for which the composition and quantity are defined by a single set of specifications or measurements. The nuclear material may be in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items.
D. *batch data* means the total weight of each element of nuclear material and, in the case of plutonium and uranium, the isotopic composition when appropriate. The units of account shall be as follows:

(a) grams of contained plutonium;
(b) grams of total uranium and grams of contained uranium-235 plus uranium-233 for uranium enriched in these isotopes; and
(c) kilograms of contained thorium, natural uranium or depleted uranium.

For reporting purposes the weights of individual items in the batch shall be added together before rounding to the nearest unit.

E. *book inventory* of a material balance area means the algebraic sum of the most recent physical inventory of that material balance area and of all inventory changes that have occurred since that physical inventory was taken.

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F. *correction* means an entry into an accounting record or a report to rectify an identified mistake or to reflect an improved measurement of a quantity previously entered into the record or report. Each correction must identify the entry to which it pertains.

G. *effective kilogram* means a special unit used in safeguarding nuclear material. The quantity in effective kilograms is obtained by taking:

(a) for plutonium, its weight in kilograms;

(b) for uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1%) and above, its weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment;

(c) for uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1%) and above 0.005 (0.5%), its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and

(d) for depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below, and for thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005.

H. *enrichment* means the ratio of the combined weight of the isotopes uranium-233 and uranium-235 to that of the total uranium in question.

I. *facility* means:

(a) a reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or

(b) any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used.

J. *inventory change* means an increase or decrease, in terms of batches, of nuclear material in a material balance area; such a change shall involve one of the following:

(a) increases:

(i) import;

(ii) domestic receipt: receipts from other material balance areas, receipts from a non-safeguarded activity or receipts at the starting point of safeguards;

(iii) nuclear production: production of special fissionable material in a reactor; and

(iv) de-exemption: re-application of safeguards on nuclear material previously exempted therefrom on account of its use or quantity.

(b) decreases:

(i) export;

(ii) domestic shipment: shipments to other material balance areas or shipments for a non-safeguarded activity;

(iii) nuclear loss: loss of nuclear material due to its transformation into other element(s) or isotope(s) as a result of nuclear reactions;

(iv) measured discard: nuclear material which has been measured, or estimated on the basis of measurements, and disposed of in such a way that it is not suitable for further nuclear use;

(v) retained waste: nuclear material generated from processing or from an operational accident, which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being but which is stored;

(vi) exemption: exemption of nuclear material from safeguards on account of its use or quantity; and

(vii) other loss: for example, accidental loss (that is, irretrievable and inadvertent loss of nuclear material as the result of an operational accident) or theft.

K. *key measurement point* means a location where nuclear material appears in such a form that it may be measured to determine material flow or inventory. Key measurement points thus include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs (including measured discards) and storages in material balance areas.

L. *man-year of inspection* means, for the purposes of Article 78, 300 man-days of inspection, a man-day being a day during which a single inspector has access to a facility at any time for a total of not more than eight hours.

M. *material balance area* means an area in or outside of a facility such that:

(a) The quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each material balance area can be determined; and

(b) The physical inventory of nuclear material in each material balance area can be determined when necessary, in accordance with specified procedures,

in order that the material balance for Agency safeguards purposes can be established.

N. *material unaccounted for* means the difference between book inventory and physical inventory.

O. *nuclear material* means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute after the entry into force of this Agreement which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under this Agreement only upon acceptance by the Soviet Union.

P. *physical inventory* means the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of batch quantities of nuclear material on hand at a given time within a material balance area, obtained in accordance with specified procedures.

Q. *shipper/receiver difference* means the difference between the quantity of nuclear material in a batch as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at the receiving material balance area.

R. *source data* means those data, recorded during measurement of calibration or used to derive empirical relationships, which identify nuclear material and provide batch data. Source data may include, for example, weight of compounds, conversion factors to determine weight of element, specific gravity, element concentration, isotopic

ratios, relationship between volume and manometer readings and relationship between plutonium produced and power generated.

S. *strategic point* means a location selected during examination of design information where, under normal conditions and when combined with the information from all strategic points taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for the implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and verified; a strategic point may include any location where key measurements related to material balance accountancy are made and where containment and surveillance measures are executed.

DONE in Vienna on 21 February 1985 in duplicate in the Russian language.

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	FOR THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
(signed) A.M. Petrosyants	*(signed) Hans Blix*

27. News Conference Statement by the Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy (Petrosyants): Agreement Between the Soviet Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities in the Soviet Union, February 21, 1985 [1]

The Soviet Union consistently favours an all-round consolidation of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is believed in the USSR that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons on earth is one of the chief directions in the effort to avert the threat of nuclear war, restrict the race of nuclear armaments and achieve nuclear disarmament.

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Konstantin Chernenko pointed out in his speech on March 2nd 1984 that our country strives to achieve that "proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form be prevented, that these weapons or control over them be not handed over to anyone." [2]

We regard the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency as a major integral part of the non-proliferation regime and favour further growth of the effectiveness of the IAEA's activity connected with assuring non-proliferation.

Guided by this principled approach of ours, the Soviet Union expressed readiness to place under agency safeguards some of its civilian

[1] Moscow TASS in English, February 21, 1985; FBIS *Daily Report*, February 22, 1985, vol. III, pp. CC3–CC4.

[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, p. 135 (variant translation).

nuclear facilities as an act of good will. Precisely such a statement was made by First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Foreign Affairs Minister of the USSR Andrey Gromyko at the second special session of the U.N. General Assembly on Disarmament on June 16th [12th] 1982.[3] Negotiations between the USSR and the IAEA started in Moscow in May 1983. They were continued in Vienna. The USSR's sincere aspiration to conclude an agreement as soon as possible and the IAEA's full understanding facilitated the early attainment of the objective.

The agreement largely corresponds to the structure and the content of safeguards agreements concluded by non-nuclear states parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.[4] At the same time, it takes into account, naturally, the voluntary step of the Soviet Union and its status as a state possessing nuclear weapons.

The agreement stipulates that the agency will be guided in its work by the task of further developing and perfecting methods and procedures of inspection. At that, safeguards will be applied through the same common procedures used by the agency in safeguards work at similar facilities in non-nuclear weapons states.

In implementing the agreement, we will facilitate in all ways the creation of all necessary conditions for the agency' effective control in the USSR.

Our country decided to sign the agreement, meeting halfway the aspirations of many countries parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and seeking to impart to IAEA control a more universal character and enable agency inspectors to gain experience of work at new types of facilities, specifically of the types the Soviet Union exports or plans to export to other countries.

The Soviet side and the agency are working together so that the IAEA could start applying safeguards as early as possible.

The Soviet Union's decision vividly confirms that the USSR positively regards international control, implying that control of this kind should effectively serve the aims of limiting armaments and achieving disarmament.

As Andrey Gromyko stressed during a talk with political news analysts on January 13th 1985, "no state other than the Soviet Union has advanced a more radical and further-reaching proposal on control issues." [5] Following the emergency of nuclear weapons when the question of control arose, the Soviet Union suggested introducing from the very beginning wide-ranging, comprehensive and universal control. Our foreign minister said that "today as well, we are prepared to consider such a broad proposal, the proposal envisaging general and complete disarmament under general and complete international control."

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[3] *Ibid., 1982,* p. 361.

[4] The text of the Treaty may be found *ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465. The safeguards agreement is printed *supra.*

[5] Document 5.

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Such is our principled approach to control, and the just concluded agreement is another convincing example of our practical attitude to control.

In conclusion, I would like to stress the importance attached by the Soviet Union to the steady consolidation of international nuclear non-proliferation. We express the confidence that the third conference of the states parties to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, due in Geneva in September 1985, that is to consider its progress will become a new important landmark in safeguarding nuclear non-proliferation in the interests of all of mankind.

28. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Conference on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, February 21, 1985 [1]

Mr. President, today the Soviet delegation would like to dwell on one of the most important items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, namely the question of a nuclear-weapon-test ban.

The problem is not new. It came into being with the appearance of nuclear weapons on Earth. Moreover, it has been placed on the agenda of international diplomacy and been considered a matter of priority for some time. More than 30 years have elapsed since April 1954, when that eminent statesman of our time, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of independent India, raised this question as a matter of priority, and proposed the conclusion of an agreement for the cessation of nuclear tests.[2] It is indicative that from the very outset his initiative met with a positive response from the Soviet State, which as early as 1955 put forward a proposal for States possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons to assume an obligation to "cease testing such weapons".[3]

Not only is the question of a nuclear-test ban not new; it is also one of the most fully debated of all disarmament problems. This is not surprising. For decades, it has been considered at sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and discussed within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. Secondly, trilateral negotiations relating to it have been conducted for many years by the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom. No one can deny the fact that active consideration of the issue of a nuclear-weapon-test ban has produced positive results. In 1963, the Moscow agreement on a partial nuclear-weapon-test ban was signed.[4] In the 1970s, on a bilateral Soviet-American basis, two agreements governing underground test

[1] CD/PV.293, pp. 11–18.
[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 408–411.
[3] Cf. *ibid.*, Documents 112, 119, 141.
[4] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.

explosions were elaborated and signed.[5] Thirdly, a significant contribution towards the successful elaboration of a comprehensive agreement was also made by the trilateral negotiations.

In this connection, attempts to bury in oblivion all the positive results achieved in this area, to portray matters as if the question of a nuclear-test-ban had only arisen yesterday are merely bewildering, to say the least.

We fully agree with the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Carasales, who said in the meeting on 19 February that:

> The prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is undoubtedly a most urgent measure in the field of disarmament, which has been discussed and considered in negotiations more than other issues, which involves fewer difficulties and unknown aspects, which is easier and simpler from the standpoint of the elaboration of an agreement and which would have at the same time the broadest and most positive consequences for both the present and in the longer term.[6]

To state the opposite is openly to sin against the truth.

The main conclusion of this is that the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests must be resolved, and must be resolved today. It must be resolved on the basis of the prohibition of tests by all and everywhere, since only such a solution will constitute a serious barrier to the creation, development and perfecting of all new types and systems of nuclear weapons and at the same time curb and finally end the nuclear-arms race. That is the demand made by the peoples of the world, that is the international community's understanding of the problem, that is the position of the USSR.

Another important conclusion to which many representatives have come in their statements—and we also agree with this conclusion—is that the foundation, the basis for working out an agreement already exists. It is the draft basic provisions of an agreement on a nuclear-weapon-test ban submitted by the Soviet Union as long ago as 1982, which take account of the degree of agreement reached during the trilateral negotiations held in the second half of the 1970s.[7] It is the draft nuclear-weapon-test-ban treaty submitted by Sweden which, in our opinion, also makes a concrete contribution to the efforts being made to resolve this problem.[8] It is, lastly, the—quite numerous—comments and proposals which have been made by many States with regard to the specific content of an agreement on a nuclear-weapon-test ban, including the question of verification.

The third conclusion contained in the statements by a majority of delegates is that the explanation for the absence of an agreement is not that there is no basis for its elaboration but that there is a lack of

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[5] I.e., the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties; *ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–227 and *ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.
[6] CD/PV. 262, p. 19 (variant translation).
[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 717–721.
[8] *Ibid., 1983*, pp. 468–478.

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political will on the part of certain nuclear Powers to resolve the test ban problem in principle. We fully agree with this conclusion as well.

Here, Mr. President, I should like to make a small digression. It would perhaps have been unnecessary, if an attempt had not been made in one of the statements at the previous meeting of the Conference to interpret the fact that tests by the Soviet Union have continued as evidence of a lack of sincerity in its statements concerning its interest in the prohibition of such tests. This shows that all our explanations on this point have either not been listened to carefully or have simply been ignored. It is precisely because of this that we are obliged to repeat them once again.

Yes, the Soviet Union is indeed concerned about its security. The Soviet people have had to pay too dearly for foreign intervention, for the so-called campaigns by the Entente against young Soviet Russia at the dawn of our State's existence, and for the perfidious attack on the Soviet Union by the forces of fascism during the Second World War, to ignore the interests of its security. It is precisely in the interest of security that we are also obliged to conduct nuclear tests. Can we refuse to carry out such tests when other nuclear Powers are perfecting their nuclear arsenals which, by their own admission, are aimed at us? No, I repeat, no. At the same time, we firmly disagree with the statement that the Soviet Union bears equal responsibility with other nuclear Powers for the continuance of nuclear tests and for the lack of progress with regard to their prohibition. The Soviet Union, obliged to conduct nuclear tests in order to preserve its security and the security of its allies, has consistently supported and continues to support the speedy conclusion of an agreement to ban them. Our position in this question is honourable and we are concealing nothing.

It is entirely clear that it would be the height of absurdity, and I believe, I hope, that all will agree with me, to speak about prohibiting nuclear tests by only one State. However, as Ambassador Carasales rightly pointed out, at present only one of the five nuclear Powers is prepared to hold negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on a comprehensive test ban. Yes, we are really prepared to hold negotiations. We are prepared to resume trilateral negotiations. We are prepared to bring into force, i.e. to ratify, the bilateral agreements of 1974 and 1976. We have made our contribution to the work on this problem in a multilateral forum as well, having submitted a draft for a relevant agreement in 1982. Lastly, pending the conclusion of an agreement, we are also prepared at present to cease nuclear tests on a reciprocal basis.

The steps which we have taken on questions relating to the scope of a ban, a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and the application of certain international verification procedures, including on-site inspection, all show that we do not lack goodwill. This list of compromise measures, confirming our genuine desire to resolve the test ban issue, can be extended further. For example, as is known, we have given evidence of our willingness for an agreement on the gener-

al and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests to enter into force for a given period only for three nuclear-weapon States, if the other two are not prepared to accede to it at the very beginning. At last year's session of the Conference, we stated that we would be prepared under certain conditions to consider the possibility of organizing, as proposed by Sweden, an exchange of data on radioactivity of air masses including the establishment of appropriate international data centres on the same basis as that provided for in regard to the exchange of seismic data.[9]

However, despite the flexibility we have displayed, the issue of a test ban unfortunately continues to remain at a standstill. Simply walking away from the trilateral negotiations, which were in the concluding phase, our former partners are blocking the initiation of negotiations on this problem at the Conference on Disarmament as well. They also refuse the moratorium we proposed on nuclear weapon tests pending the conclusion of an agreement. In addition, the United States does not wish to ratify bilateral agreements which have been signed already, limiting underground nuclear explosions. Instead of the entry into force of these agreements, they now propose to us an exchange of observers, who would simply record nuclear explosions. As A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, said in this connection:

> The conclusion is automatically drawn that they do not wish to prohibit but jointly to legalize, more precisely, to legitimize, the conduct of nuclear weapon tests.[10]

It is clear that the Soviet Union will not agree to this.

The political reality underlying the United States position is clear: it is aimed at creating conditions for the implementation of the so-called comprehensive strategic programme for the 1980s, which is on an unprecedented scale and provides for the rapid development of new systems of strategic offensive forces.

What is the situation now? At present, only one nuclear State is prepared to ban nuclear-weapon tests. Another nuclear-weapon State has set such a prohibition as a kind of long-term objective, postponing it virtually until the third millennium. This position is essentially also that of one of its nuclear-Power allies. With regard to the other two nuclear States, which up to the present have generally circumvented this question, we have recently heard one of them state its readiness to reconsider its position on participation in the Conference's *ad hoc* committee on a test ban, if it is established.

Of course, we have taken note of the statement which the Chinese representative made on this point at the meeting on 19 February. However, I must say frankly that the basic position of China on the problem of a nuclear-weapon-test ban is not entirely clear to us after

[9] *Ibid., 1984*, p. 310.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 785 (variant translation).

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that statement. At the thirty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, China, as is known, abstained in the voting on all three resolutions on this question. In this connection, I should like to put the following question to the representative of China: Is China prepared, in the light of its recent statement, actively to work for an agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear testing and to cease testing its own nuclear weapons, on a basis of reciprocity? [11]

In these circumstances, what are we to do in the Conference on Disarmament? It has now been suggested, for example, by the distinguished representative of Australia, that we should abandon even the thought of holding negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement since this is supposedly now unrealistic. Instead, it has been proposed to set up an *ad hoc* committee of the Conference in which there would be only an exchange of views on this problem, mainly on aspects concerning control. In this connection, Ambassador Butler has almost accused the socialist and non-aligned countries of blocking the achievement of any progress in this field because they are insisting on a negotiating mandate for the *ad hoc* committee.

We, of course, understand, we well understand that the Australian people, like peoples of other countries, wish to see agreement quickly reached on a nuclear test ban. We also understand the desire of the Australian Government to respond to this demand of its people. However, I should like to ask whether the method proposed to solve the problem will help to achieve the objective? I think that the answer here is simple. No, I repeat, no.

Before explaining why that is the way matters stand, I should like to say a few words concerning the construction put on our approach to an *ad hoc* committee of the Conference, which was heard in the statement by the Australian delegation. The representative of Australia said that we, supposedly without foundation, and indiscriminately, insist on a negotiating mandate for all subsidiary bodies, thereby blocking progress on many disarmament issues, primarily matters relating to a nuclear test ban. No, that is not so. That is definitely not so. I should like to recall that the first mandate given to the subsidiary body on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and the mandate for the *ad hoc* Committee on a test ban in 1982 and 1983 did not involve negotiations and all members of the Conference did not object to it, including, of course, the Soviet Union.

However, the question of what basis we are to take for the mandate of an *ad hoc* committee on a test ban this year is a different matter. It is precisely this that will determine whether the problem of a test ban will once again be put off or whether we shall finally be able to proceed to tackling it without delay. This is precisely the watershed between those who are in fact in favour of a nuclear test ban and those who, invoking various procedural aspects, are trying to block it.

[11] For China's response, see CD/PV.293, p. 23.

The basic agrument put forward by Ambassador Butler for adopting the Western draft mandate contained in document CD/521 [12] was that the mandates proposed by the non-aligned and socialist countries are unacceptable to the West. However, if this logic is followed, would it not be fair to expect the Western Powers to reject a mandate which is not supported by the majority and to adopt as a basis the drafts contained in documents CD/522 or CD/521, which do indeed enjoy majority support.

Ambassador Butler said that the position of those States which are, so to speak, calling for a "negotiating" mandate for the *ad hoc* committee, is preventing an exchange of views on the problem of a test ban. However, that does not correspond to the facts. Diplomats of more than one generation have been holding discussions relating to the consideration of this problem. We ourselves have continued to be concerned with it for many years, as can be seen in particular by the statments of the delegations of Argentina, Australia, Mexico, Sweden, the German Democratic Republic, Egypt, the Soviet Union and other countries at this session of the Conference. It is not, therefore, a question of holding a discussion, which we can do in any form, [*forum?*], even in the plenary meetings of the Conference; it is a question of proceeding without delay to achieve a solution to the problem itself.

What is the main shortcoming of the draft mandate, contained in document CD/521? It is that the draft in fact negates the priority character of the question of a nuclear-test ban; it is transferred to the rank of long-term tasks. If it is agreed that this problem is not ripe for negotiations and requires continued "substantive examination of specific issues"—and this is precisely what the authors of the above-mentioned draft mandate are trying to indicate—then the logical conclusion is that the question of a nuclear-weapon-test ban has been insufficiently studied, and this means that there can be no question of an urgent need to conclude such a ban as a matter of priority. Thus, this draft mandate conceals an attempt to revise or to cast doubt on paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament and on many decisions of the General Assembly of the United Nations in which it is pointed out clearly that an agreement on prohibition "is a matter of primary importance", "is a matter of great importance", "urgent need", and so forth.[13]

An attempt is now being made to convince us that continuing the work of the Conference on the question of a test ban on the basis of a

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[12] The document was submitted to the CD by Australia, Belgium, Canada, FRG, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, U.K., and U.S. It called for the resumption by an *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban of the "substantive examination of specific issues relating to a comprehensive test ban, including the issue of scope as well as those of verification and compliance" and for an examination of "the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing, and operating an international seismic monitoring network. . . ."

[13] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 421.

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"non-negotiating" mandate can supposedly help to devise means to verify compliance with a test ban. In this context also, I should like to make some comments.

Firstly, we fully share the view of most States which was so well expressed in the statement by the representative of Sweden on 5 February, who said that there are no insurmountable technical obstacles to ensuring verification of compliance with an agreement on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban.[14] States cannot use the so-called inadequacy of verification measures as a pretext for refusing to hold serious negotiations on such an agreement. Clearly, it is surprising that the same standpoint was reflected in the message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Conference on Disarmament which was read out by his Special Representative, Ambassador Komatina, at the first meeting of the current session.

By the way, I should like to draw attention to the fact that several delegations, including Western delegations, have referred to a large number of nuclear tests, basing their statements on Swedish sources. Those delegations clearly assumed the reliability of such data. Thus, they willingly or unwillingly support the view of Sweden concerning the adequacy of existing technical means for monitoring a test ban.

Secondly, an argument frequently advanced for considering the technical possibilities for control is that they are continually being improved. It is, of course, true that the technical means are being improved. However, a question arises: if a test ban is to relate to some remote future, is there any sense seriously to develop at present verification means which can be applied only during the next century? We are convinced that this is an unnecessary waste of time. Why? Because at present technological advances are proceeding at such a pace that these means will inevitably be obsolete in about 15 to 20 years.

Thirdly, the work of the *Ad Hoc Committee* or *Ad Hoc Group* in 1982–1983 provided an opportunity for detailed consideration of the questions of verification and control. In our considered opinion, the draft mandate proposed in document CD/521 is nothing other than an attempt to go over the same ground again. Therefore, a similar draft mandate was rejected last year, and the negative attitude of many States towards it was confirmed once again in the vote on paragraph 4 of resolution 39/53 at the last session of the General Assembly, in which this mandate was actually reproduced.

An attempt is also being made to persuade us that the consideration of control issues, however abstract they might be, will be a means for exerting pressure on those States which refuse to enter into negotiations on the agreement itself. We firmly disagree with this as well. On the contrary, there is great danger that the appearance or illusion will be given that practical work is being done on this question thereby reducing the pressure of public opinion on those countries which are

[14] CD/PV.288, p. 31.

in fact blocking the negotiations. Thus, the initiation of the work of the *ad hoc* committee on the basis proposed to us by the West will not only be useless but, it seems to us, even counterproductive, since it will mislead world public opinion. Such actions by the Conference can only cause further harm to the Conference's reputation and not help to improve it, as suggested in one of the statements at the last meeting of the Conference.

Those are some considerations which occurred to the Soviet delegation during the examination of the question of a nuclear test ban at recent meetings.

Our criticism of the mandate proposed by the Western countries does not mean that we do not have a constructive programme which, in our opinion, should be acceptable to all those who sincerely, not in words but in deeds, are interested in the speedy resolution of the priority task before us. Specifically, we propose that work should be begun on the drafting of an agreement, taking as a basis the documents available on the Conference table. Of course, we would prefer in this respect to have the above-mentioned Soviet draft; however, we adopt a very flexible position on this issue. Let us place on the negotiating table all available and future documents and proposals and, basing ourselves on the positive and mutually acceptable points contained in them, begin to elaborate article by article, provision by provision, the text of an agreement which the peoples of the world have been expecting from us for so long. Of course, productive work will be possible only if all nuclear States confirm their position as set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the question of nuclear tests.

In conclusion, I wish to quote the words of K.U. Chernenko in his reply to the message from the leaders of the Argentine movement "Appeal of one hundred for the sake of life", which will be circulated at the request of the Soviet delegation as a Conference document:

> In the present troubled times—the Soviet leader noted—a confirmed historical truth is growing increasingly obvious: the fate of the world depends to a very great extent on the will and active solidarity of peoples. Today they can, and are urged to do so, say a firm 'No' to nuclear death, and halt the senseless arms race.[15]

We are convinced that the attainment of agreement on a complete and general nuclear-test ban will be an exceptionally important step on the road towards curbing the arms race.

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[15] CD/569.

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29. Statement by the Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany (Wegener) to the Conference on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, February 21, 1985 [1]

I would like to take the floor spontaneously to express the extent to which my delegation has been impressed with the elaborate statement that we have just heard from the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union.[2] My delegation was gratified to hear the firm commitment of the Soviet delegation to the necessity to conclude, early on, a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This certainly coincides with the view of my own country, which I expressed in a statement on 7 February in this room.[3]

I intend to return to the testing issues *in extenso* during the current spring session of our Conference but may I be allowed to contribute at this moment four comments on the statement by the distinguished Soviet Ambassador.

Firstly, Ambassador Issraelyan has convincingly pointed out that as long as testing is not prohibited, his country legitimately and in the search for its own security continues testing itself. However, this argument does not explain why the Soviet Union consistently over the last few years has chosen not only to test more than any other nuclear Power, but more than all other nuclear Powers together.

Secondly, my delegation has listened with great interest to the chronology of earlier attempts to reach a comprehensive test ban. However, as in earlier statements by the Soviet delegation, one historical fact is conspicuously missing from the enumeration of past events: the fact that in 1958 the United States stopped nuclear testing and that for three years by tacit agreement of the two Great Powers, no tests were conducted. However, in 1961, it was the Soviet Union which chose to depart from this tacit agreement. This historical fact is still a matter of great regret to my delegation.

Thirdly, one major portion of Ambassador Issraelyan's statement was devoted to the necessity to have a subsidiary body of our Conference on nuclear testing, equipped with a firm and complete negotiating mandate. I do not want to take issue with the desirability of such a mandate but I would like to remind all delegates that we have a situation in which such a negotiating mandate is not possible because our Conference is run by consensus. I state the situation, I do not comment, or give my own value judgement on it. But this being so, the call for a full negotiating mandate and the simultaneous refusal to embark on any kind of work in the field of nuclear testing in its absence are futile. Those who ask for too much achieve nothing, and they prevent us from tackling some of the essential issues that we will

[1] CD/PV.293, pp. 19–20.
[2] *Supra.*
[3] CD/PV.289, p. 10.

have to deal with, with or without a negotiating mandate, if we are serious about a stop to nuclear testing. If there is no subsidiary body equipped with a general or specific mandate of whatever kind on this matter, where can we discuss the issues of verifiability? Of scope? Of the modalities of a seismic observation network? Of the institutional needs the future test ban regime would have? Those who ask for too much achieve nothing, and when we again in this Conference achieve nothing on this matter during the current year, the question of responsibility arises and we will have to think very precisely to find out where the responsibility will lie at that time.

Fourthly, Ambassador Issraelyan has, as often before, referred to present factual observations about testing in an intention to prove that all the verification problems are solved. I am afraid that there is a logical fallacy involved here. Today, testing is permitted, although not morally condoned by the international community. When testing is permitted, nobody has to conceal. We can take the statistical figures which institutes observe as a fair indication of the tests that are actually held; but when a CTBT is in force, then the issue is completely different because whoever wishes to test has to make arrangements to conceal. Then the question is put anew. Are our scientific capacities enough to detect concealed testing?

I have given my four comments, and as I have said before I would wish to revert to the matter in due course.

30. Address by Soviet President Chernenko to the Electorate of the Kuibyshev District of Moscow: Forthcoming Nuclear and Space Arms Talks [Extract], February 22, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

The cornerstone of our foreign policy today is, of course, the struggle to end the arms race imposed by imperialism and avert the threat of a world nuclear war.

We are on the threshold of new negotiations with the United States. Both sides have stated that they are entering upon them to forestall an arms race in space and end it on earth. And they have agreed to consider and resolve questions of space-based and nuclear weapons as a package, in their mutual relationships, as is absolutely indispensable for the success of the undertaking. This is the basic rationale of the Geneva accord. I should like once again to state with absolute clarity what our intentions are in connection with the forthcoming talks.

First: *We do not seek to obtain any unilateral advantages* over the United States or over the NATO countries with a view to achieving military

[1] CD/574, pp. 3–4.

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superiority. We do not need it, as we have no intention of threatening them or imposing our will on them, but want to live in peace and maintain normal, good relations with them.

Second: *We want termination, not continuation of the arms race.* That is precisely why the USSR raises the question of such initial steps as a freeze of the nuclear arsenals of the parties, an end to further deployment of missiles, etc. Utilization of the talks for contrary purposes – for justifying and camouflaging further build-up and deployment of means of mass annihilation—would in our view be immoral and dishonourable, a deception practised upon peoples and a crime against them.

And third: *We want a real reduction of arms stockpiles, destruction for a start of a substantial portion of them, not the creation of ever newer weapons systems,* whether in space or on earth and whether the arms be offensive or purportedly defensive. Our ultimate objective here is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere on this planet, the complete removal of the threat of nuclear war.

The divergence between the parties' views on the questions that are to be discussed is at present wide. That is obvious to all. There is no shortage of gloomy forecasts dooming the negotiations to failure in advance. But we do not share this attitude.

Agreement is absolutely necessary and quite possible. It is necessary because otherwise the world will slide ever faster down the slope of the arms race and the threat of war will increase. Agreement is fully possible, because all that is needed for it is to respect the rights and legitimate security interests of both parties and not seek to upset the existing equilibrium of forces.

We call upon the leaders of the United States of America to approach the forthcoming negotiations seriously and in good faith. We call upon them to put aside vain thoughts of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and negotiating with us "from a position of strength." We appeal to them to refrain from attempts to impose on us an agreement that would unilaterally tie the hands of the Soviet Union in strengthening its defences but throw the doors wide open to implementation of the record-breaking military programmes planned by Washington.

Such attempts have no prospect whatsoever of success, but they can undermine the possibility of agreement, to which our country's peoples are looking forward, as are all peoples who desire a lasting peace and a serene, happy life.

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31. Statement by the Chief Negotiator of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties (Stoessel) Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Proposals To Ban Nuclear Testing, February 26, 1985 [1]

In the interest of time, I will try and summarize parts of my prepared testimony which, certainly the initial part, is really historical as to how it came about that there was a negotiation for a Threshold Test Ban Treaty and how I was designated chairman of the delegation as Ambassador in Moscow.[2]

That treaty prohibiting tests which would have a yield over 150 kilotons seems to represent quite a step forward in the provisions and the protocol for the exchange of data about the geology of the test areas of each country. This was the first time that such an agreement had been reached. As I say, it seemed to be a step forward.

That treaty provided for the negotiation of a subsequent Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Negotiations [Explosions] [3] to cover that aspect of the nuclear testing picture since it is impossible to differentiate between a test for peaceful purposes and a weapons test. So it was felt that that had to be covered as well.

The negotiations for the peaceful nuclear explosion agreement began in the fall of 1974. They went on for some 18 months, and were very detailed and, certainly in my recollection, very arduous. Attention was focused on the details of the verification procedure, and it was provided that, for group explosions of nuclear devices intended for peaceful purposes, there would be provision for onsite inspection. There would be arrangements made for observers to come to the test site with equipment including cameras, their own communication equipment and so on to observe and verify the test, the yield of the test and so on.

This too, seemed to be a real breakthrough in our efforts to improve the verification procedure. It was really not expected that there would be very many group explosions of the type mentioned in the treaty. The United States did not have its own active peaceful nuclear explosion program, and the Soviets seemed to be limiting theirs to single explosions. In any case, the provisions for this onsite inspection which were very detailed, seemed to be a step forward.

We did feel at the time that the agreements which had been negotiated and the procedures for verification, exchange of information and so on were adequate to permit verification of the limits called for in

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[1] *Proposals to Ban Nuclear Testing: Hearings and Markup Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science . . . on House Joint Resolution 3*, 99th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 55–57.

[2] The text of the Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–227.

[3] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.

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the agreements. As a negotiator, I felt that they were pretty good treaties at the time.

However, since those treaties were negotiated, and it is over 10 years now since the Threshold Test Ban Treaty was negotiated, there have been developments which I think place these conclusions about the adequacy of the provisions for verification in doubt. There is continuing controversy regarding our ability to verify with sufficient accuracy the yields of nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union.

MR. BERMAN. Could you repeat that, please?

MR. STOESSEL. I said there is continuing controversy regarding our ability to verify with sufficient adequacy explosions taking place in the Soviet Union. I think the discussions we have had this afternoon indicated that. As Senator Kennedy said, one of the laboratories, Livermore, feels that we do have sufficient ability to verify; Los Alamos feels we do not. Some of the articles quoted by Congresswoman Boxer were to the effect that we can verify down to 1 kiloton, and there are many other scientists who would say, no, that is not true.

It seems that even though techniques and technology have progressed, such progress has perhaps added to the complexity of this problem. There is this continuing controversy. Also there is a record of Soviet violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and of other arms control agreements. The President said in his latest report to the Congress in February that Soviet activities for a number of nuclear tests constitute a likely violation of obligations under the test ban treaty.[4]

So given the persistent controversy over verification technologies and the record of Soviet noncompliance, including noncompliance with provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, my own conclusion is that it would be desirable to provide for enhanced verification procedures in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty before they are ratified by the U.S. Senate.

Now the President suggested in his speech to the U.N. General Assembly last September that such enhancement could be in the form of onsite observation of nuclear explosions.[5] It is already provided for in the PNE Treaty in the case of group explosions, and the procedures which were worked out for those circumstances could be utilized for individual peaceful nuclear explosions as well as for nuclear weapon testing under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

The observers operating under these procedures would have very specifically formulated tasks to perform. They would not, as General Secretary Chernenko asserted last October, merely dispassionately ascertain the fact of the explosion.[6] They would be able to determine yield and other characteristics of the explosions.

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[4] Document 12.
[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, p. 692.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 733.

Now, I understand that the U.S. administration has made proposals to the Soviet Union in this sense; the Soviets have not yet responded officially; I believe the administration should continue its efforts in this regard, since I do feel that ratification of the two treaties, and particularly the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, would be a positive and practical step forward in our endeavor to limit nuclear testing.

If ratification could be accomplished, the experience gained in the implementation of the agreed verification procedures under the TTBT and the PNE treaties could be useful in moving forward a comprehensive test ban. I do feel for the present, however, that the uncertainties about the verification technology and the Soviet record of violations make it unwise for us to proceed to bilateral or resume trilateral negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty with the Soviet Union.

I think we should focus in the near term on ways to improve verification. Also, work in this regard could be done in the Committee on Disarmament, which operates in Geneva. There is a working group on verification procedures which has not been active for the last year. It would be desirable for that group, in a multilateral forum, to continue its work on verification.

I feel that a comprehensive test ban should remain a goal, but that in the period before that can be achieved, weapons testing should continue within the limits set in the TTBT.

I do feel that testing will be necessary to ensure the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, to assure the viability of the weapons which are already in the stockpile as well as conducting tests for a new and smaller warhead to be associated with the single warhead, mobile, intercontinental ballistic missile called the Midgetman. The latter weapon is intended as a contribution to the stability of the strategic equation and it is possible that other weapons testing directed at the same objective may be required.

We can hope that negotiations with the Soviets can result in a radical reduction of offensive nuclear weapons, and if current research in both the United States and the Soviet Union can in time make effective nonnuclear defensive forces practical, then one can envisage an environment in which a complete cessation of nuclear testing would be entirely rational. Such a step would fit in with the ultimate objective of the elimination of both offensive and defensive nuclear arsenals.

Developments of this kind take time to mature. In the interim, and assuming a functioning threshold test ban regime, it might be possible to envisage a further limitation of nuclear testing through establishing quotas for the number of tests to be conducted by both sides. Such a system would operate to preserve the credibility of the deterrent and would at the same time be another move in the direction of a cessation of testing.

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32. News Interview of New Zealand Prime Minister Lange: Nuclear Policy [Extract], February 26, 1985 [1]

Lane. Mr. Lange, according to the Australian press, you are a reluctant advocate of a nuclear-free New Zealand and that that policy has been forced on you by the party. Is that true?

Lange. No.

Lane. Well, now, could you tell me what your personal views are?

Lange. I am a person who has, as I have said . . . when you have been (?moving in) politics for about 8 years, you tend to lose some of the fringe issues that might have motivated your entrance into the theater of politics. But there are some convictions that burn, and one of them is that I am opposed to nuclear weaponry. The references to being unwilling or reluctant come from the argument which went on and on about nuclear propulsion. Because, you see, I do not conceive that there is some inevitability that all nuclear technology has to be evil. Some of it, I think, can be good. But I can draw a distinction between nuclear development which is good and constructive and nuclear development which is designed to explode with the awesome effects. Weapons per se, I think, are wrong. Nuclear weapons are wrong. So that you end up looking at the argument again. That is the case that we went through, and the simple fact is that nuclear-powered vessels are also nuclear-capable and the argument became academic.

Lane. Are you surprised at the level of public support that you have, particularly for a controversial policy like the ban on nuclear-armed ships? I ask that because in Australia it would be highly improbable that any prime minister who took the position that you have would get the support of the majority of the people. What I am trying to get at is why New Zealanders are different from Australians on this issue.

Lange. Well, we are absolutely opposite to you. The people here tend by a majority of about three to one to support this particular policy. And it is the policy which has a heavy level of support in the reverse in Australia. New Zealanders do not see having nuclear weapons in or around our country as enhancing our security. They see that as a potential threat to our security. It says something about us as a country that we have, maybe an unreal, but I think, a proper sense of remoteness from specific threat, and we do not pretend or sense ourselves as being, if you like, a major power in any physical sense, whereas, Australia, which has a different track, different history of defense development, is of course a country which is large. It is enormous. It has a sense of a medium-size power and, I believe, that its people equate the level of armament as somehow reflecting their

[1] Melbourne Overseas Service in English, February 26, 1985; FBIS *Daily Report*, February 27, 1985, pp. M5–M6. This is from "Australian Insight" program moderated by Margaret Jollow. Mr. Lange was talking via satellite to Terry Lane.

perception of their scale. And I can understand why the Australians embrace that. If you take the argument further abroad, you know, if New Zealand was placed a bus trip away from a bristling Soviet missile site and it was targeted on them, then the New Zealanders might have a different feel about security and insecurity. But there is no doubt whatever that our policy has received, not only in the endorsement of the general election, but constant public support ever since. . . .

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33. Statement by the Soviet Union: Allegations of Non-compliance With Arms Control Agreements, February 27, 1985 [1]

A few days ago the USSR Embassy in Washington made a representation to the U.S. Department of State in connection with a slanderous campaign set off in the United States by another "report" of the administration to U.S. Congress, which alleged "violations" by the Soviet Union of its international obligations.[2] The unsubstantiated and groundless charges contained in the White House "report" have been categorically rejected.

The American side has neither moral, nor formal right whatsoever to pose as a guardian of agreements, since its record of disregard for them in recent years has been a component of the U.S. policies and practices.

1. It is not for the first time that Washington, using all kinds of inventions, is attempting to cast aspersions on the consistent peace-loving policy of the USSR, to ascribe to the Soviet side nonexistent "violations" and "omissions" regarding compliance with arms limitation agreements. Such unseemly actions by the United States have already been properly characterized, in particular, in the Soviet aide-memoire published on January 30 [3] and in the TASS statement of October 21, 1984.[4] This new propaganda move by Washington demonstrates yet again that the U.S. Administration has been inventing "accusations" against Soviet policy to distract the attention of public opinion from unprecedented military programmes it is pursuing, from its policy of disrupting the system of arms limitations and measures to strengthen international security, the building of which took so many years.

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[1] Moscow TASS in English, February 27, 1985; FBIS *Daily Report*, February 27, 1985, vol. III, pp. AA2–AA5.
[2] Document 12.
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 48–53.
[4] *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 42, pp. 4, 31; *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, October 21, 1984, p. 4

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2. The Washington talk of alleged Soviet "violations" is intended to camouflage the fact that the United States long ago set about to undermine the 1972 treaty on the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems—a most important instrument of unlimited duration which made it possible to conclude the 1972 Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms [5] as well as the SALT–2 Treaty.[6] This intention was, in fact, officially disclosed in connection with the announcement of "star wars" programme calling for the establishment of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements, which is prohibited by the 1972 Treaty.

Things have gone beyond mere statements. In direct contravention to the clear provisions of the 1972 Treaty, the United States has proceeded full speed to developing mobile ABM radars, testing of the Minuteman type missiles for giving them ABM capabilities, developing multiple type warheads for ABM missiles, and deploying the "Pave Paws" radars to provide radar support for anti-ballistic missile defense of a greater part of the U.S. territory, and so forth.

Major industrial corporations and research centres in the United States are being involved in the plans for militarizing outer space. Enormous resources—26 billion dollars—have been earmarked for these purposes. This is only a beginning. Total outlays for implementing the plans of an arms race in space strike weapons are to exceed one trillion dollars.

Washington can hardly fail to understand that carrying out the programme of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements would inevitably result in an uncontrolled arms race in every direction, make limitations, let alone reductions, of strategic offensive arms impossible, and would dramatically heighten the risk of nuclear war. In spite of this they stubbornly refuse to abandon the scheduled programmes, seeking to make them irreversible in order to deny the U.S. leaders freedom of choice for the decades to come. They would also like to impose the current diplomacy of force and the policy of militarism and arms race on the future generations.

What is more, attempts are also being made to involve the West European allies of the USA in the space adventure. Counting primarily on the support of Bonn, a front of proponents of transforming outer space into a springboard for aggression is being knocked together. This is how the NATO's unity and solidarity are seen in Washington. This is a far cry from vital interests of the peoples, including those of the countries which are allies of the United States.

3. The sole purpose of declarations by American representatives to the effect that strike weapons are defensive arms is to deceive people, conceal the desire to achieve military superiority, to obtain a possibility for delivering a nuclear strike with impunity. The futility of such

[5] The ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff.
[6] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

plans in no way makes them less dangerous. And this should be clearly seen in order to preclude the irreparable.

It is not an accident that attempts are being made on the American side to shake loose in some way or other and then to wreck the ABM treaty which is of unlimited duration. No doubt, it is an obstacle to militarizing outer space, it stands in the way of those who are set on this inhuman and immoral task. By its attacks on the treaty Washington is seeking to torpedo the process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction altogether.

It is a firm stand of the Soviet Union that the ABM Treaty should remain fully valid. This is the premise from which it proceeds in its practical actions. It is a fact that no amount of slander can disprove.

4. As to the SALT–2 Treaty, Washington has refused to ratify that document altogether and has actually wrecked it, which in itself is a gross violation of universally recognized international norms. This action of the present administration is an affront to the entire world public opinion which highly appraised the SALT–2 Treaty and rightly hoped that its entry into force would pave the way towards new effective agreements aimed at halting the arms race and reducing the threat of war.

Washington would not reckon with the interests of the peoples. And what is more, it has become clear now that its statements of intention to "refrain from actions" undermining the SALT–2 Treaty were made but for the sake of form. The actual plan was different—to circumvent the limitations established by the Treaty, attempt to upset the parity recorded in it and obtain military advantage.

This has found its crudest and outrageous expression in the decision to start the deployment of new U.S. nuclear missiles in some NATO countries. The Pershing–2 and ground-launched cruise missiles which are being deployed in Western Europe are strategic weapons. More than that, they are first strike systems. This is how Washington treats the obligations it assumed to limit offensive nuclear arms.

And it is by far not the only example of the U.S. side trying to circumvent or, in other words, violate the agreed provisions. It is also done through direct participation by the United States in building up and improving nuclear missile systems of some NATO countries both through the transfer of such systems or their components and through providing technological information.

During the SALT–2 negotiations the U.S. side, like the Soviet side, acknowledged the need for limitations on long-range cruise missiles. Later, however, the U.S. started massive deployment of this dangerous new kind of strategic offensive arms and refused to impose any limitations on such cruise missiles.

5. Washington's true attitude to the obligations resulting from the SALT–2 Treaty is also revealed in the fact that the draft defense budget for the fiscal year 1986 just submitted to Congress by the administration lays down plans for deploying strategic offensive weapons which, if implemented, would mean a radical U.S. break-out

of the treaty limitations on ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. They are trying to lecture others on the need to comply with international obligations while themselves actually preparing for yet another flagrant violation.

6. Another example is the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests.[7] The same line is evident here. The U.S. did sign the Treaty but has been refusing to ratify it for eleven years now. The reason is simple: Washington obviously does not wish to put into effect the clear-cut and effective system of verification of the yields of tests which is provided for in the Treaty. Indeed, such verification would become an obstacle for the Pentagon in carrying out tests of ever new nuclear devices which more often than not are accompanied by breaches of the agreed threshold of explosive yields and, in some cases, by ejections of radioactive substances into the atmosphere. In short, the United States refuses—under all sorts of contrived pretexts—to ratify the 1974 Treaty, in order to avoid abiding by the constraints placed on underground nuclear explosions. In doing so, it also blocks the resumption of negotiations on a complete and general nuclear weapon test ban which are clearly and unambiguously mandated by the Treaty.

7. An enormous threat to mankind is posed by such barbarous weapons of mass destruction as chemical weapons. The international community has outlawed chemical warfare in the 1925 Geneva Protocol [8] which has been strictly complied with in its entirety by the Soviet Union—one of the first to accede to that instrument. It took the United States fifty years just to ratify the Geneva Protocol. In the meantime, U.S.-made chemical agents have killed and maimed thousands upon thousands of people in Indochina and have caused irreparable damage to the environment of that region. Many U.S. servicemen have also suffered from the chemical warfare conducted by the Pentagon in South East Asia at the orders of the administration.

Now again, while portraying itself a proponent of a ban on chemical weapons the United States is obstructing an international agreement in that regard. In the meantime chemical weapons are supplied to bands invading Afghanistan, and America is poised for chemical rearmament. Here again there is a clear contradiction between words and deeds, between U.S. obligations and Washington's practical actions aimed at grossly violating and circumventing those obligations.

8. The USA has affixed its signature to the Helsinki Final Act.[9] Along with other states it has solemnly committed itself to promoting the cause of European peace and security, of bringing the European states closer together and enhancing their cooperation, as well as of

[7] I.e., the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. For the text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–227.
[8] The text of the Protocol may be found *ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.
[9] The arms control portion of the Final Act may be found *ibid., 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

deepening, developing and consolidating the process of detente on the continent.

What, however, has been the actual U.S. policy with regard to European affairs? Whipping up military tensions in Europe, deploying new first strike nuclear weapons in the region, trying to question the existing European realities, to disrupt and impede the normal course of trade, economic, scientific and cultural cooperation in the region—such is the U.S. "contribution" to the development of the Helsinki process. Here again, the USA professes one thing but does something entirely different in flagrant violation of its commitments.

9. The above facts, the list of which could be continued, cannot but raise the question, and a major and principled one at that, as to Washington's good faith as regards the international obligations assumed.

The Soviet side has repeatedly drawn the attention of the U.S. Administration to the above-mentioned facts as well as to relating specific issues.

So far the U.S. side has provided no articulate answer to the questions raised. The publication of voluminous "reports" containing falsifications of the other side's policy cannot justify avoiding these issues.

The issues regarding compliance with the existing agreements on the limitation of strategic arms, if approached seriously, as the Soviet Union does, should be discussed not for the sake of dubious propaganda effects, but exclusively with a view of ensuring the normal functioning of these agreements and accords. The Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission was established, as is known, to provide a mechanism for this purpose. The Soviet side in the Commission proceeds from the above-mentioned purpose, while the U.S. side takes a different approach, one devoid of elementary decency.

The Soviet Union strictly complies with its international obligations and the entire world knows it. No one will succeed in impairing the high prestige of the Soviet Union's policy.

10. One cannot but be put on guard by the fact that the U.S. side is resorting to such unseemly tactics just as the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons are about to start in Geneva, with the clear intent to poison from the outset the atmosphere surrounding those talks, to hamper businesslike and constructive consideration of the issues to be resolved.

If some in Washington believe that propaganda ploys can help shirk responsibility for the poor state of Soviet-American relations, for the lack of progress in limiting arms and reducing the threat of war, such beliefs are groundless. The United States will be well advised to give up the practice of violating the obligations assumed, and to turn its efforts to curbing the arms race.

This is required by the Soviet-American agreement on holding the negotiations in Geneva, and this agreement should be strictly implemented in all its components. The U.S. side should be no less interested in a positive outcome of the negotiations than the Soviet side.

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The Soviet Union is ready to seek at the negotiations radical solutions which would prevent the arms race from spreading into outer space and would lead to its cessation on earth. A potential for resolving these tasks exists. It will take political will, readiness for reasonable compromises and a genuine desire to see stability and peace strengthened.

34. Statement by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization Director (Abrahamson) Before the House Defense Policy Panel: Arms Control and the Research and Technology Program [Extract], February 27, 1985 [1]

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The U.S. currently faces an imbalance in strategic offensive force capability and a much greater imbalance in deployed defensive capability.

The Soviets have spent roughly as much on defense as they have on significantly expanding their offensive force capability. In addition, they have a substantial defensive research program exploring many of the same technologies covered by SDI. In an attempt to avoid such conditions, we have entered into treaties and agreements that limit both deployed forces and development and demonstration activities that provide a posture for either side to break out of the agreement and quickly gain a significant advantage.

How to limit development and demonstration has been one of the thorniest problems. Clearly, these limits are largely driven by our ability to verify compliance. To be verifiable, research must (1) emerge from the laboratory; (2) be clearly associated with the applications that are subject to control, not only to avoid ambiguity, but also to avoid unwarranted constraint on technology base developments that are applicable to a broad range of DoD problems; and (3) be observable in testing by sources that would enhance the confidence of the nation seeking verification. These limits were carefully crafted in the ABM Treaty [2] for the class of weapons being limited. In addition, a requirement was included to discuss weapons based on new physical principles when they reached certain levels of development. A forum for such discussions was established. Any negotiations of additional limits on development and demonstration of new weapon forms could only take place after their development was mature enough that the negotiated controls would be verifiable.

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[1] *The MX Missile and the Strategic Defense Initiative—Their Implications on Arms Control Negotiations: Hearings Before the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services. . . .* pp. 8–9.

[2] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

These conditions gave new emphasis in arriving at definitions of the various activities in research and development that were acceptable to both sides. The definition of such words and phrases as "development" and "testing in the ABM mode," were difficult points of negotiation. The fact that we were not totally successful is reflected in the points of contention on compliance that are raised from time to time. Nevertheless, we have a commitment that we have worked with and complied with for over a decade, and we understand its strengths and weaknesses.

I have made this statement earlier but it is worth repeating for emphasis:

We are conducting the research and technology program of the SDI in compliance with the ABM Treaty.

Further, as a research program, the SDI is not a weapons development program, nor is it a program with preconceived notions of what a potential defensive system against ballistic missiles should entail. Emphasis in the program is being given to nonnuclear weapons for defense. The defense that might evolve from the SDI will not be intended to defend only our strategic weapons systems, nor should it lead to an arms competition in space. In general terms, we are considering ways to defend both ourselves and our Allies against the ballistic missile threat. As the work moves ahead, we will continue to hold extensive discussions with our Allies. It is a research program designed to answer a number of scientific and engineering questions that must be addressed before the promise of new technologies can be fully assessed. An appreciation of these tenets is essential to an understanding of the SDI.

Finally, I want to observe that since the Government is currently preparing for the upcoming round of negotiations, it would be improper for me to speculate about the U.S. position. I do feel confident that the U.S. position is sound and has always had elements of flexibility. This does not represent a change. It does represent an opportunity for some progress if the Soviets will join us in this activity with the same measure of flexibility. Given the complexity of the arms negotiations, we are prepared to move forward in the areas identified. We will give due consideration to any proposal the Soviets wish to make. But, for our part, the U.S. stands committed to pursue the SDI research program for the reasons we have already discussed in detail.

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35. Responses by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization Director (Abrahamson) to Questions Submitted by the House Defense Policy Panel: Relationship of the Strategic Defense Initiative to an Antisatellite Treaty and the Antiballistic Missile Treaty [Extract], February 27,1985 [1]

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SDI–ASAT

Question: Does the survivability of an SDI system depend on an ASAT Treaty?

Answer: The survivability of an SDI system cannot rest on an ASAT Treaty, especially when a comprehensive ban on ASATs would be impossible to verify.

While it might be possible to agree to selected limits on specific types of space systems or activities in space, we must concern ourselves in SDI research with the threat posed by current and projected Soviet ASAT capabilities and provide defensive options that can counter such capabilities, independent of potential ASAT restrictions.

Question: Would an ASAT Treaty now be a desirable hedge against future Soviet threats to an SDI system, even if we later decided to equip our satellites and SDI assets with maneuver or defensive capabilities?

Answer: No, an ASAT Treaty now would not be a useful hedge against future Soviet threats to an SDI system. Much more work needs to be done in the U.S. ASAT program and in the SDI research and technology program before the impact of an ASAT Treaty could be fully understood, but it would appear that potential ASAT restrictions would be too limited to have major application to an SDI system.

Question: If we reject an ASAT settlement now, does that imply a less than candid attitude on our part toward the development of a survivable Soviet space-based strategic defense?

Answer: No, not at all. We are prepared to work in cooperation with the Soviet Union toward the establishment on both sides of a survivable strategic defense.

SDI–ABM Treaty

Question: The ABM Treaty of 1972 *prohibits* development, testing and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based and mobile land-based systems. It *allows* development and testing of fixed land-based systems and for their limited deployment.[2]

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[1] *The MX Missile and the Strategic Defense Initiative—Their Implication on Arms Control Negotiations—Hearings Before the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services. . . .*, pp. 38–39.

[2] The text of the Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

Under SDI, interest seems to be focused primarily on space-based and fixed land-based alternatives. Although unrestricted *deployment* would not be permitted in either case, testing of fixed land-based systems might take place within agreed test ranges. Space-based systems may not be *developed* or *tested* in either case. *Research,* however, would be permitted in both cases.

What definition does the Administration employ to demarcate between "research" (which would be permitted under the ABM Treaty) and "development" or "testing" (which would not be permitted)?

Answer: The Administration definition of these terms is provided by the negotiating record of the ABM Treaty which was summarized in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1972 by Gerard Smith, the U.S. negotiator of that treaty, as follows: "The prohibitions on development contained in the ABM Treaty would start at that part of the development process where field testing is initiated on either a prototype or breadboard model. It was understood by both sides that the prohibition on 'development' applies to activities involved after a component moves from the laboratory development and testing stage to the field testing stage, wherever performed." [3]

Question: At what specific stages in the SDI program will the United States be faced with withdrawing from the ABM Treaty or successfully negotiating a change to the treaty with the Soviets?

Answer: Because SDI is a program of research that is not prohibited by the ABM Treaty, we do not envisage any need in the immediate future to address this issue. By the early 1990s, we would hope to be in a position to make an informed decision on whether to proceed with system development. The SDI research program will be consistent with all U.S. treaty obligations, including the ABM Treaty.

Question: Assuming the Soviets refuse to negotiate the requisite changes, what impact will the restrictions in the treaty have on the SDI program as currently envisioned?

Answer: Once again, we envisage no near-term implications for the SDI program since it is one confined exclusively to research activities sanctioned under the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

Question: Which aspects of the SDI program could be completed without a change to the ABM Treaty?

Answer: There are no impediments in bringing the entire SDI program to a conclusion within the terms of the ABM Treaty.

VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY OCCURRENCE

Question: With regard to the current SDI program plans, when would the first violation of the ABM Treaty occur? Please indicate the date of the first definite violation and the date of the first possible

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[3] *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-second Session,* p. 377. (July 18, 1972)

violation. Also indicate the nature of the test and of the likely possible violation.

Answer: The current SDI is a research and technology program. All planned tests and experiments are compliant with the ABM Treaty.

36. Report by Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the Congress: The Potential Effects of Nuclear War on the Climate [Extract], March 1985 [1]

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2. Summary Observations on the Current Appreciation of the Technical Issues

The Department of Defense recognizes the importance of improving our understanding of the technical underpinnings of the hypothesis which asserts, in its most rudimentary form, that if sufficient material, smoke, and dust are created by nuclear explosions, lofted to sufficient altitude, and were to remain at that altitude for protracted periods, deleterious effects would occur with regard to the earth's climate.

We have very little confidence in the near-term ability to predict this phenomenon quantitatively, either in terms of the amount of sunlight obscured and the related temperature changes, the period of time such consequences may persist, or of the levels of nuclear attacks which might initiate such consequences. We do not know whether the long-term consequences of a nuclear war—of whatever magnitude—would be the often postulated months of subfreezing temperatures, or a considerably less severely perturbed atmosphere. Even with widely ranging and unpredictable weather, the destructiveness for human survival of the less severe climatic effects might be of a scale similar to the other horrors associated with nuclear war. As the Defense Science Board Task Force on Atmospheric Obscuration found in their interim report:

> The uncertainties here range, in our view, all the way between the two extremes, with the possibility that there are no long-term climatic effects no more excluded by what we know now than are the scenarios that predict months of sub-freezing temperatures.

These observations are consistent with the findings in the NAS report, summarized earlier in this report. We believe the NAS report has been especially useful in highlighting the assumptions and the considerable uncertainty that dominate the calculations of atmospheric response to nuclear war. While other authors have mentioned these uncertainties, the NAS report has gone to considerable length to place them in a context which improves understanding of their impact.

[1] ACDA files.

We agree that considerable additional research needs to be done to understand better the effects of nuclear war on the atmosphere, and we support the IRP as a means of advancing that objective. However, we do not expect that reliable results will be rapidly forthcoming. As a consequence, we are faced with a high degree of uncertainty, which will persist for some time.

Finally, in view of the present and prospective uncertainties in these climatic predictions, we do not believe that it is possible at this time to draw competent conclusions on their biological consequences, beyond a general observation similar to that in the NAS report: if the climatic effect is severe, the impact on the surviving population and on the biosphere could be correspondingly severe.

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37. Report by President Reagan on Continuing the Acquisition of the Peacekeeper (MX) Missile: Executive Summary Conclusions, March 4, 1985 [1]

Conclusions

The President's report documents his review of the Peacekeeper program requested in the 1985 Department of Defense Authorization Act.[2] The President has concluded that further acquisition of operational Peacekeeper missiles is in the national security interests of the United States and is consistent with United States arms control policy. The President has reviewed the effect of the acquisition and deployment of Peacekeeper missiles on the vulnerability of the U.S. land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force and found that the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission remain valid.

The President's review also concludes that the continued efforts of the Soviets to expand their strategic forces has heightened the military need for the Peacekeeper missile. The Report also notes that Peacekeeper production and deployment is closely related to our chances of achieving significant reductions in nuclear arsenals in Geneva. It notes that should the Congress decide to terminate the Peacekeeper production and deployment program during the negotiations, the Soviets' long-term efforts to reduce U.S. strength without meaningful negotiating and without having to make equitable concessions of their own would be realized in considerable measure. Finally, the Report concludes that Peacekeeper deployment in existing silos is essential to enhance deterrence and to maintaining crucial options for restoring the

[1] *The President's Report on Continuing the Acquisition of the Peacekeeper (MX) Missile: Executive Summary*, March 1985.

[2] P.L. 98–525, Sec. 110(a), (b), and (e).

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survivability of land-based ICBMs in a cost-effective manner in the years ahead.

In re-endorsing the Scowcroft recommendations the President strongly recommends that production and deployment of the Peacekeeper missile continue as planned in parallel with development of a new small ICBM.

38. Letter From President Reagan to the Congress: Nuclear Cooperation With the European Atomic Energy Community, March 4, 1985 [1]

The United States has been engaged in nuclear cooperation with the European Community for many years. This cooperation was initiated under agreements concluded over two decades ago between the United States and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) which extend until December 31, 1995.[2] Since the inception of this cooperation, the Community has adhered to all its obligations under those agreements.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 amended the Atomic Energy Act to establish new nuclear export criteria, including a requirement that the United States have the right to consent to the reprocessing of fuel exported from the United States.[3] Our present agreements for cooperation with EURATOM do not contain such a right. To avoid disrupting cooperation with EURATOM, a proviso was included in the law to enable continued cooperation until March 10, 1980, if EURATOM agreed to negotiations concerning our cooperation agreement, which it did.

The law provides that nuclear cooperation with EURATOM can be extended on an annual basis after March 10, 1980, upon determination by the President that failure to cooperate would seriously prejudice the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security and after notification to the Congress, President Carter made such a determination five years ago and signed Executive Order 12193, permitting continued nuclear cooperation with EURATOM until March 10, 1981.[4] I made such determinations in 1981,[5] 1982,[6] 1983 and 1984 [7] and signed Executive Orders 12295, 12351, 12409 and 12463, permitting continued nuclear cooperation through March 10, 1985.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, March 11, 1985, pp. 255–256. The letter was addressed to the Speaker of the House (O'Neill) and the President of the Senate (Bush).
[2] 9 UST 1116, 10 UST 75, 11 UST 2589; TIAS 4091, 4173, 4650.
[3] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–184.
[4] *Ibid., 1980*, p. 39.
[5] Cf. *ibid., 1981*, pp. 69–70.
[6] Cf. *ibid., 1982*, pp. 105–107.
[7] Cf. *ibid., 1983*, pp. 159–160.

In addition to numerous informal contacts, the United States has engaged in six rounds of talks with EURATOM regarding the renegotiation of the U.S.-EURATOM agreements for cooperation. These were conducted in November 1978, September 1979, April 1980, January 1982, November 1983 and March 1984. The European Community is now considering U.S. proposals relating to our cooperation agreements, and further progress in the talks is anticipated this year.

I believe that it is essential that cooperation between the United States and the Community continue and, likewise, that we work closely with our Allies to counter the threat of nuclear explosives proliferation. A disruption of nuclear cooperation would not only eliminate any chance of progress in our talks with EURATOM related to our agreements, it would also cause serious problems in our overall relationships. Accordingly, I have determined that failure to continue peaceful nuclear cooperation with EURATOM would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives and would jeopardize the common defense and security of the United States. I intend to sign an Executive Order to extend the waiver of the application of the relevant export criterion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act for an additional twelve months from March 10, 1985.[8]

39. Statement by New Zealand Prime Minister Lange to the Conference on Disarmament: Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Free Zones, and Comprehensive Test Ban, March 5, 1985 [1]

I am honoured to have the opportunity to speak to the Conference on Disarmament. New Zealand follows the work of the Conference closely. We recognize the heavy responsibility which the Conference bears as the single multilateral forum for negotiating arms control agreements. The Conference and those who participate in it have been given a unique mandate to resolve the most vital issue of our time.

I am here today because it is my unfaltering conviction that countries which are not nuclear Powers have a right and a responsibility to make every effort to bring the nuclear-arms race to a peaceful end. New Zealand is a small country and remote but if there should be nuclear war the mutual destruction that the nuclear-weapon States wreak upon themselves will surely destroy New Zealand and the rest of the world as well. Ours is an island country. But it would not be a sanctuary.

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[8] The President signed Executive Order 12506 on the same day.
[1] CD/PV.296, pp. 10–16.

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I believe that in our common humanity there is sufficient community of interest for the nuclear Powers and all other States to negotiate real and lasting arms control and arms reduction agreements.

I want to emphasize New Zealand's thoroughgoing commitment to real measures of disarmament and arms control. It is our deepest hope that the parties to the comprehensive arms negotiations which begin in this city next week will reach genuine agreements on reductions in nuclear weapons, leading in the end to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Government of New Zealand rejects the false logic of escalation which has brought the nuclear Powers to arm themselves with weapons more than enough to destroy them and all the rest of us. We acknowledge and accept the principle that there can be no significant measures of arms control unless the security of all parties is maintained. New Zealand is not an advocate of any measure of arms control which concedes the advantage to one side or the other. Any serious arms control measure must enhance security, not diminish it.

It is in this context that New Zealand, not itself a nuclear Power, has applied a limited measure of arms control—the exclusion of nuclear weapons from New Zealand. That action has been misunderstood, and I should like today to correct any misunderstandings. What we are doing has sometimes been misinterpreted. I intend here to place our action in its true context. The measure of arms control which New Zealand has been able to implement is in complete accordance with the principles which must govern all arms control negotiations if they are to succeed.

New Zealand is a fortunate country. It faces no external threat to its security. The possibility of intrusion by outside interests into the South Pacific is best met at this time by economic and social development and by friendly association within the region. New Zealand has pursued those objectives in the South Pacific. We shall, if we are able, continue to pursue those objectives.

The security of the South Pacific is neither directly threatened by nuclear confrontation nor is it guaranteed by nuclear weapons. New Zealand would betray its own best interests and the interests of the region if it played any part in allowing a nuclear confrontation to develop. That would be to acquiesce in the process of escalation which has already brought us all to the brink of the precipice.

New Zealand has chosen to resist that process of escalation. Two factors have guided its course of action. The first is the longstanding public concern in New Zealand about nuclear weapons. The testing of nuclear weapons by France at Mururoa Atoll has been strongly resented in the South Pacific region for many years. Concern about nuclear weapons has long been a public issue in New Zealand and was demonstrated again in last year's General Election. That concern compels action by the New Zealand Government.

The second factor which enables New Zealand to exclude all nuclear weapons from its territory is the fact that New Zealand is not, and has

never been, part of a global or regional nuclear strategy. No nuclear weapons have ever been based or stored in New Zealand. New Zealand has not assisted and does not assist in any system of strategic nuclear defence. The ANZUS alliance, of which New Zealand forms part, has no formal command structure and imposes no specific military obligations on its members. It is a regional alliance which depends on self-reliance and respects the integrity of each member in the formulation of its foreign policy. New Zealand's exclusion of nuclear weapons from its soil and from its harbours means in practice the exclusion of the tactical nuclear weapons which were occasionally brought to New Zealand in the vessels of our friends and allies. Our perception is that this action of ours has not altered in any way the global nuclear balance which will be weighed in this city next week.

Let me make it plain to this Conference that New Zealand is not half-hearted in its course. When we exclude nuclear weapons from New Zealand, we exclude the possibility of a nuclear defence of New Zealand. We do not ask to be defended by the nuclear weapons we exclude and we do not ask any nuclear Power to deter any enemy of New Zealand by the threatened use of nuclear weapons against that enemy. Any such proposition is not relevant to the strategic circumstances of the South Pacific and to introduce it would be to submit to the compulsive competitiveness which has characterized and sustained the arms race.

New Zealand is a member of the ANZUS alliance because we see its usefulness as a conventional alliance to us and to our region. It is a useful means of interaction among the conventional forces of three countries of broadly similar outlook and interest in the region. If that were not the case, if ANZUS were purely a nuclear alliance, then there would be no point in New Zealand staying in it. It is clearly valuable as a conventional alliance. New Zealand remains willing and able to contribute to conventional defence relationships. That contribution has been substantial in the past and will not willingly be diminished in the future.

New Zealand is committed to those values of democracy, freedom, justice and the pursuit of individual liberty, which characterize the membership of ANZUS and the wider Western community of nations. We are not, by our actions, moving towards a position of non-alignment or neutrality. Nor, I repeat, has there been any change in our position that disarmament and arms control measures must not be a submission of one side to the other but must enhance the security of all parties equally.

New Zealand's strategic circumstances are such that it can implement a measure of nuclear arms control which positively diminishes the possibility of nuclear conflict in or near New Zealand while in no way disturbing the global nuclear balance. New Zealand is fortunate in that. The action we have taken may not be taken so easily elsewhere. We in New Zealand understand that. It would be unfortunate if others failed to place New Zealand's action in its true context as a

serious and responsible measure of arms control and one that will enhance our security and that of our region.

In this connection, New Zealand has given its full support to the proposal adopted by the South Pacific Forum, on the initiative of Australia, for the establishment of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

At their meeting in Tuvalu in August last year, the Heads of Government of Forum countries spelt out the principles which will be applied in constructing such a Zone:

—There should be no use, testing or stationing of nuclear devices in the South Pacific.
—No South Pacific country would develop, manufacture, receive, acquire or test any nuclear explosive device.
—Nuclear activities in the South Pacific would be conducted in accordance with applicable international principles and treaties, notably the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
—The Zone would respect the principles of navigational freedom and over-flight.
—South Pacific countries would retain their unqualified sovereign right to decide for themselves, consistent with their support for the objectives of the Zone, their security arrangements and such questions as the access to their ports and airfields by vessels or aircraft of another country.

The principles agreed at Tuvalu for the construction of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone are close to the arrangements that were arrived at in the Treaty of Tlatelolco.[2] I am honoured today to be addressing in this gathering Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, one of the people most closely associated with the development of that Treaty, which is the only formal instrument concluded so far that establishes a nuclear-free zone in a populated area. It is my hope that a treaty implementing a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone will be completed in the near future. I am able to tell you that excellent progress has been made at meetings of the working group comprising members of the Forum in the drafting of that Treaty, and I am confident that a text will be ready for consideration at the next meeting of the Forum to be held in early August. Once that has been settled within the region, we shall look to the nuclear-weapon States to co-operate with us, as they have with the States of Latin America, to make the South Pacific [*Nuclear Free*] Zone a reality.[3]

Nuclear-free zones such as those negotiated in the Latin American region and in Antarctica,[4] and that being drafted in the South Pacific, will play a useful role if they are fully supported by the States of the region and are respected by the nuclear Powers. They will help to

[2] I.e., the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the text of which may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.
[3] The Heads of Government of the Forum endorsed the Treaty on August 6. See Document 137.
[4] The text of the Antarctic Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, Vol. II, pp. 1550–1556.

reduce the areas of nuclear competition and are a powerful expression of the determination of the States concerned to play their part in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.

We recognize, however, that if the international community is to reverse the current nuclear-arms race this will be done only through global measures and that the nuclear-weapon States will play the major role in their negotiations. The primary responsibility in this area must fall on the United States and the Soviet Union who between them control 80 per cent of the weapons in the nuclear arsenal.

Last year was a bleak year for disarmament negotiations at the global level and particularly in the bilateral negotiations between the two major Powers. As a result of the Soviet Union's regrettable decision to walk out of the two sets of negotiations being conducted in this city and then its failure to meet in September last year to discuss space weaponry, a whole year passed without the two sides even sitting down together at the bargaining table. New Zealand was not alone in speaking out against the unacceptability of that situation. There can be no justifiable reason for refusing to talk on these vital issues.

We learned with great satisfaction of the agreement reached in January this year for the resumption of comprehensive arms negotiations between the two major Powers.[5] We are pleased that the prevention of an arms race in outer space has been included in the agenda.

No one should under-estimate the extraordinary difficulty in reaching agreements that will promote a mutual, balanced and verifiable reduction in the level of nuclear weapons. We all know that it will not be easy to manage a safe transition to a more secure world where, as a stage in the road to their elimination, the number of nuclear weapons is drastically reduced and innovations in weaponry are not of a kind that cause instability, but we also know that the difficulties of the attempt are nothing compared to the terrible prospects which face us if we do not make the attempt.

We, and many other countries expect that the resumption of the bilateral negotiations will give a new impetus to the work of this Conference. It functioned poorly last year. We were particularly concerned at the lack of any progress on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. New Zealand, in conjunction with Australia, has since 1972 taken the lead in sponsoring a resolution in the General Assembly calling for the urgent conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We are a patient people but the absence of any progress last year in this Conference towards the negotiation of a Treaty was both frustrating and disappointing. I am aware of the difficulties members of the Conference have experienced in trying to establish an *Ad Hoc* Committee to consider this issue but I am not convinced that the differences of opinion are unbridgeable.

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[5] Document 3.

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If members of the Conference on Disarmament are serious in their commitment to a nuclear-test ban and if they want to resolve the most important problems facing all of us they cannot let intransigence frustrate the reaching of consensus.

The hard truth is that consensus usually means that no one party is completely satisfied by the agreement reached but is prepared to give a little in order to gain much. In this case the benefits of establishing an *Ad Hoc* Committee to work with vigour and devotion to the development of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are so great that the Conference must reach an early consensus on this matter.

The attainment of a verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a primary goal of my Government. It follows from our deep concern about nuclear weapons that we should pursue this most practical and immediate way of halting the development of these weapons. We have, and will continue to promote, a General Assembly resolution on a Comprehensive Test Ban. Given that the joint New Zealand/Australian resolution achieved the overwhelming support of the international community in 1984,[6] we surely have a right to expect that this body will take seriously its responsibilities to the wider membership of the United Nations.

I acknowledge that there were differences of opinion over the paragraph in our General Assembly resolution that suggested ideas for the future work of this Conference on a nuclear test ban. But I wish to reemphasize my concern that the stakes are far too important for the Conference to miss another opportunity to initiate action on a Comprehensive Test Ban. I sense however, from the discussion that has already taken place in this spring session, that the chances of the Conference carrying out work on this agenda item are somewhat better than they were last year. I would draw attention to the statement made last week by the representative of Pakistan when he told this body that "a discussion, even under a less than satisfactory mandate, is better than no discussion at all".

New Zealand and other South Pacific countries take particular exception to the fact that nuclear testing continues in our region. But our advocacy of a Comprehensive Test Ban is not motivated solely or even primarily by our opposition to French nuclear testing. It stems from a conviction that States possessing nuclear weapons must demonstrate their commitment to the reduction of existing levels of nuclear armaments.

But we recognize that there are serious issues to be resolved if a test ban is to be achieved. Foremost among these issues is that of verification. No arms control or disarmament agreement would be worth the paper it was written on if there were no means of checking whether its terms were being complied with. All countries are entitled to assure

[6]G.A. Resolution 39/53 of December 12, 1984, which was adopted by 124 votes to 0, with 24 abstentions.

themselves that nuclear explosions in contravention of a test ban treaty will be detected.

New Zealand has made a concerted effort to contribute to work in this field through its participation in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts. We have contributed information gathered from the network of seismological stations established by New Zealand. We hope that the recently concluded test on the elements of a network to detect seismic events and the evaluation of that test by the Group of Scientific Experts can provide a basis for the establishment of a full-scale international network to monitor nuclear explosions. The data available from that test should also help determine the capacity of such a network to monitor compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty. There is much work that can still be done by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts and it is therefore very disappointing to hear some voices suggesting that the future of the Group is in doubt. We hope that is not to be the case. Our commitment to the Group will continue.

There are other important questions that will have to be resolved in the course of negotiating a test ban. Foremost amongst those is that of the scope of the proposed ban. A test ban must be comprehensive—it must prohibit all explosions in all environments for all time. We have difficulty with the suggestion some have made that a test ban treaty could be limited to the testing of nuclear weapons. It is an inescapable fact that any nuclear device that causes an explosion can be used for hostile purposes. It would, to our mind, be unforgiveable if a test ban treaty were to be held up over difficulties in drawing a distinction between nuclear explosions for military purposes and so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. All tests should be banned.

The test ban issue is of particular significance this year as we prepare for the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A Comprehensive Test Ban is not only a fundamental step for controlling the further development of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States: it is also a vital part of international efforts to prevent the further spread of these weapons to other countries. We see the Non-Proliferation Treaty as essential to world security.[7] Without it, the world would be a more dangerous place than it is today. My Government will work hard both to preserve the benefits of non-proliferation and to strengthen the Treaty at the forthcoming Review Conference.

New Zealand is grateful to the Conference on Disarmament for the opportunity to contribute to its work. We appreciate that the negotiation of disarmament agreements is a difficult, arduous process. We have followed with particular interest the work on a Chemical Weapons agreement and hope that the parties involved in the negotiations will keep up the momentum developed last year on this issue. The international community needs a comprehensive and verifiable ban on

[7] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

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these weapons as soon as possible. The events in the Middle East show the urgency with which the negotiations on a draft convention must be brought to a successful conclusion. The New Zealand delegation will participate in these negotiations and on other items of the Conference's agenda to the extent our resources allow. I look forward to the time when New Zealand will be able to be more directly involved in this most important Conference.

We have no illusions about the difficulty ahead, the magnitude of the task facing the Conference on Disarmament, for other multilateral and bilateral forums, for individual countries, and for countless people and organizations all over the world, in bringing the nuclear-arms race to an end. My country has no nuclear weapons. It has no intention of ever acquiring any. It asks others not to bring nuclear weapons to New Zealand. It does not ask to be defended by them. But the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals cannot be carried out except by the countries which control them.

My Government will, indeed it must, respond to the concern of New Zealanders about the continuing escalation of the nuclear-arms race. We shall reflect, in our policies, their hopes and their determination that the nuclear-weapon States will heed the calls which the international community has for so long made on them, and which in recent years have fallen on stony ground.

The people and Government of New Zealand have rejected participation in the nuclear-arms race. We do not say to any country in the world, "Do as New Zealand does"; all we say is that when the opportunity is given to any country to pursue a serious and balanced measure of arms control, then that country has a duty to all of us to undertake that measure.

New Zealand asks all the members of this Conference to listen to what we, the people of the world, are saying about the nuclear-arms race. We ask you to use all your energy, wisdom and skill to confront that dreadful issue.

40. Statement by the U.S. Representative (Lowitz) to the Conference on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, March 5, 1985 [1]

Today, I want to address the very important subject of agenda item 1, Nuclear Test Ban. As I begin, I want to recall the foundation of our work in the Conference on Disarmament, this multilateral forum which seeks to strengthen international security through arms control and disarmament. That foundation is a need to accept our differences in views, and to seek areas of accommodation through which we can make progress toward a safer world, a world ultimately free of threats

[1] CD/PV.296, pp. 17–20.

and counterthreats. In order to do this, we must respect each other's positions.

My delegation is, of course, very much aware of the strong interest in negotiating a nuclear test ban, an interest that continues to be expressed in this and in other forums, an interest often described as an "urgent need". No one can ignore the years of effort that have been devoted to this issue—effort that continues today. Accordingly, I want to state again the views of the United States on this important matter.

A comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions remains a long-term goal of my Government, in the context of broad, deep and verifiable nuclear arms reductions, expanded confidence-building measures and improved verification capabilities. At this time, however, it is an important objective, but not the most important objective. The United States believes it is a mistake to imply that a comprehensive test ban is as urgent a matter as are efforts to reduce arsenals of weapons already in existence. This view is the same as was stated at the United Nations General Assembly in October 1982, by the then Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Rostow: "The United States does not believe that, under present circumstance, a comprehensive nuclear test ban would reduce the threat of nuclear war because such a ban would not reduce the threat implicit in the existing stockpile".[2]

In addition to serious verification problems there continue to be significant concerns about other national security implications of a comprehensive test ban. Given the continuing dependence of the United States and its allies on nuclear weapons, any consideration of a total test ban must be related to the West's ability to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent.

My delegation has listened with great interest to the many statements on the nuclear test ban issue made by delegations here during the past two weeks. In particular, I would recall the remarks of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 28 February.[3] There are a number of matters in this statement with which I can agree, such as the importance of not seeking military superiority and the importance of the reduction of weapons. And my delegation takes due note of the new agreement between the Soviet Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency placing certain Soviet nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards for the first time.[4]

However, with regard to the situation on a nuclear test ban, I must dissent from the claim that existing technical means of verification are sufficient for ensuring compliance with a comprehensive, global ban on nuclear explosions. I believe that our experience, in the brief examination of this issue that was possible in the subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban in 1982 and 1983, indicates the contrary. There was

[2] A/C.1/37/PV.13, pp. 29–30. See also *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, p. 45, and *ibid., 1981*, p. 489.
[3] CD/PV. 295, pp. 20–24.
[4] Document 26.

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then, and I believe there continues to be, a great variety of views on this crucial question. It would be most useful if the Conference would, without delay, resume its efforts to resolve these differences.

In his plenary statement of 21 February,[5] Ambassador Issraelyan referred to the proposal made by President Reagan in his address to the United Nations General Assembly last September, that the United States and the Soviet Union send observers to each other's test sites to measure the yields of tests of nuclear weapons. Ambassador Issraelyan suggested that the United States sought by this proposal to legitimize nuclear testing. That is not correct. The United States has no such intention. The purpose for our proposal was made clear by President Reagan in his address. It was "to enable the two countries to establish the basis for effective limits on underground nuclear testing".[6]

We have also been reminded recently of proposals for a temporary moratorium on nuclear testing, to be entered into while negotiations on a test ban treaty are going on. We do not believe such a moratorium would lead to a reduction in world tensions. A moratorium now, in the absence of reductions in nuclear arsenals and in the absence of sufficiently effective means of verification, could promote the opposite conditions: instability and increased international insecurity. Such a moratorium would not move us closer to resolving the verification and compliance issues which have proven so difficult. Nor would it affect the need to accomplish broad, deep and verifiable nuclear arms reductions. A moratorium based on presently available verification capabilities would, in our view, not be effectively verifiable.

It is worth recalling that the mutual suspension of nuclear explosions of the United States and the Soviet Union from 1958 to 1961 was not embodied in a binding agreement and did not make provision for effective verification. Rather, it was the result of unilateral declarations by the Soviet Union and the United States that said, in essence, "we will refrain from further nuclear tests if you will". But the ensuing breakdown of this test suspension in August of 1961, when the Soviet Union resumed testing, demonstrated the need for carefully negotiated obligations and precise limitations, lest arms control arrangements generate mistrust and suspicion rather than any long-term solution or genuine relaxation of tensions. Then, as now, trust and good will alone were not enough.

In his September 1984 address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Reagan reaffirmed that the United States recognizes "that there is no sane alternative to negotiations on arms control and other issues" between the United States and the Soviet Union, both of whom have the capacity to destroy civilization as we know it. He continued, "(the) task must be to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world. I am committed to redoubling our negotiating efforts to achieve real results: in Geneva, a complete ban

[5] Document 28.
[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, p. 692.

on chemical weapons; in Vienna, real reductions—to lower and equal levels—in Soviet and American, Warsaw Pact and NATO, conventional forces; in Stockholm, concrete practical measures to enhance mutual confidence, to reduce the risk of war, and to reaffirm commitments concerning non-use of force. In the field of nuclear testing, improvements in verification essential to ensure compliance with the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions agreements; and in the field of non-proliferation, close co-operation to strengthen the international institutions and practices aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons, together with redoubled efforts to meet the legitimate expectations of all nations that the Soviet Union and the United States will substantially reduce their own nuclear arsenals." [7]

My delegation believes that the two nuclear-weapon States possessing the largest arsenals must redouble their efforts to agree on radical reductions of nuclear weapons. We must work steadily towards the goal of a world in which the threat of nuclear war no longer exists.

Next week, the United States and the Soviet Union begin new bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms here in Geneva. My delegation was pleased to introduce the Joint United States-Soviet Statement of 8 January 1985 concerning these negotiations as a Conference Document, CD/571, at the same time that the Soviet Union introduced this statement as document CD/570. As the Statement describes it, "The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms . . ." [8] We all can share in this common objective. The United States has been diligently pursuing it, and will continue to do so. As we continue our efforts, we make no claim that, although there has been no nuclear war in nearly 40 years, the world in which nuclear weapons play a large role in security considerations is a good world. We claim only that we have not yet been able to replace the role of nuclear deterrence in preventing major conflict with security arrangements in which nuclear weapons are not an integral part.

In this context, certain questions can be raised: would a comprehensive test ban now in fact contribute to the essential objective of maintaining and strengthening world stability through deep reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons? Would implementation of a comprehensive test ban now have the opposite effect, and delay such reductions, or possibly even cause an increase in the total numbers of weapons? Would not placing all our efforts on negotiating such an agreement now—as the litmus test of nuclear arms control—be to get the arms control cart before the arms control horse? In light of questions such as these, I do not share the view that a comprehensive test ban is the place to start the process of eliminating nuclear arms.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 690.
[8] See Document 3.

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In his statement of 12 February, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, pointed to the United States objective of a radical reduction in the number and power of nuclear arms.[9] He noted that we should look toward a period of transition to effective non-nuclear defences. This period should lead to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. In the context of such events my delegation does not see a comprehensive nuclear test ban as an agreement that would establish the initial condition for achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The United States supports the prompt establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on agenda item 1, nuclear test ban. This would be a useful and highly desirable step. There are issues and questions that ought to be addressed now. We believe the mandate for such a committee, which Australia and eight other Western States, including the United States, proposed last year, as contained in CD/521, would allow all of us to make substantive progress on the basic issues of a nuclear test ban, including scope, verification and compliance. My delegation pledges its very best efforts in contributing to the practical work of such a committee.

Later this month the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts will meet to begin preparing their report analysing the results of their technical test last fall. The preliminary information available to my delegation strongly suggests how valuable the experience of exchanging and processing the data produced by a global network of seismic stations is in assessing the capabilities of such a network. We expect that this report will shed useful light on future work for the *Ad Hoc* Group, and perhaps point as well to other possibilities for improvements in underground seismic monitoring. My delegation continues strongly to support the work of this important body.

The United States takes its work in this forum very seriously, and will continue its efforts with all the energy it can bring to bear. My delegation will continue to seek consensus and to work for progress where progress is possible. However, if some insist that their goals must be fulfilled all at once, or that otherwise there can be no subsidiary body formed, and no work accomplished, then this Conference will continue to make little substantive progress on the issues of a nuclear test ban.

There are essential questions to be addressed in an *ad hoc* committee on a nuclear test ban, and the United States is ready to begin working on them now.

[9] Document 21.

41. British Working Paper Submitted to the Conference on Disarmament on Verification of Nonproduction of Chemical Weapons: Proposals for Inspection Procedures and Data Exchange, March 6, 1985 [1]

Introduction

1. In an earlier paper (CD/353 of 8 March 1983) the United Kingdom Delegation made proposals for verification of the non-production of chemical weapons, including monitoring by routine random inspection of certain sectors of the civil chemical industry, in order to ensure that the industry was not used as a source of agents for chemical warfare.[2] Attention was focussed on a list of key precursors and high-risk chemical substances which have a potential for use as chemical weapons. Other delegations were invited to furnish data on the production of these substances by the chemical industries of their own countries. In the light of the replies received (CD/CW/WP.57 of 17 August 1983 and CD/CW/WP.86 of 10 August 1984), a further paper (CD/514 of 10 July 1984) took the United Kingdom proposals a stage further by classifying the relevant substances according to the risk they posed to the Convention. The relation between the different types of verification and the requirements for an inspectorate to perform them were analysed in the pioneering paper by the Netherlands Delegation (CD/445 of 7 March 1984).

2. It is not one of the objectives of the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention to encroach upon the legitimate freedom of States Parties to develop their respective chemical industries. Nor is it the purpose of the Convention to impose upon the chemical industry procedures which would disrupt the day-to-day working of that industry. What, however, the Convention must do is to provide all States Parties with the assurance that these products, manufactured for wholly innocent purposes, are not subsequently used for illicit military purposes.

3. As chemical warfare agents may be manufactured from relatively accessible materials, the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention must endeavour, through adequate measures of verification, to ensure that no substances are diverted for covert manufacture of such weapons. Therefore, a careful balance needs to be struck between the need for an acceptable inspection regime to assure compliance and sufficiently flexible procedures to permit the chemical industry to proceed unimpeded with its operations. This paper puts forward United Kingdom proposals on how the routine monitoring arrangements envisaged in CD/353 and developed in CD/514 might be applied in practice and embrace the important requirement for commercial confidentiality.

4. As stated in CD/514, confidence in the Convention should rest primarily upon routine methods of verification such as those proposed

[1] CD/575. The annexes are not printed here.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 164–168.

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in this paper. It is essential, however, that any party to the Convention should have the right to challenge any other party suspected of non-compliance with any aspects of the Convention, including the provisions on non-production. Proposals for challenge inspection have been addressed in the United Kingdom paper CD/431 and elsewhere.[3]

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

5. The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency has been in existence for many years and provides a wealth of practical experience of verification by on-site inspection and other methods to ensure that materials are not diverted from peaceful to military purposes.[4] It is the most comprehensive system of the kind in existence and it enjoys wide confidence in the international community. It would therefore seem desirable to draw as far as is relevant on the experience of IAEA Safeguards in devising a system of inspection for the Chemical Weapons Convention.

6. The statute of the IAEA embraces two fundamental and complementary principles. On the one hand the Agency has the objective of promoting the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, on the other it must endeavour to ensure that assistance provided by it or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purposes.[5] Similarly one of the primary aims of the verification system under a Chemical Weapons Convention would be to provide assurances that substances produced for purposes permitted under the Convention were not diverted or transformed to make chemical weapons.

7. The IAEA Safeguards System is based on strict control of the two chemical elements uranium and plutonium by means of materials accounting, containment and surveillance. The problem of verifying that materials used for peaceful purposes are not diverted to military uses prohibited in a Chemical Weapons Convention is much more complex than it is in the nuclear field. Because of the variety and nature of the chemical substances whose diversion would pose a potential threat to the Convention it would not be practicable to monitor specific chemical elements as is done by the IAEA for uranium and plutonium. The proposals contained in the United Kingdom paper CD/353 for verification of non-production of chemical weapons were therefore based on the principle of routine inspection on a random basis of declared sites where key precursors of chemical warfare agents are produced.

8. The basic purpose of routine inspections under a Chemical Weapons Convention would be to perform impartial observations which would then be compared by the relevant organization with the data submitted to it by the State as required by the Convention. The right

[3] *Ibid., 1984,* pp. 70–74.
[4] *Ibid., 1961,* pp. 21–34; *ibid., 1965,* pp. 446–460; *ibid., 1971,* pp. 218–244.
[5] The IAEA statute is printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956,* pp. 915–933 (8 UST 1093).

to conduct inspections would accordingly be crucial. Inspections would be conducted by the international organization established by the Convention to be responsible for the prohibition of chemical weapons (hereafter referred to as the Organization). As indicated in the Netherlands paper CD/445 this Organization would comprise a Consultative Committee, and Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat consisting mainly of inspectors and supporting staff. Inspections would be carried out on the basis of detailed principles agreed in advance and incorporated into the Chemical Weapons Convention.

9. Inspectors would be chosen for their competence and personal integrity, appointments also taking into account the principle of equitable geographical representation. A State should have the right under the Convention to refuse to accept an inspector suggested by the Organization which would then designate or substitute another inspector. Only two such refusals would be allowed. The careful process of appointing a team of inspectors for a country might take a brief period. However, experience in the IAEA has shown that the number of problems arising either from the names put forward by the Agency or from the activities of inspectors is very low.

10. During an inspection visit under the Chemical Weapons Convention an inspector might be authorized to carry out the following functions:

—to examine relevant records held on the site;
—to make independent measurements of all substances subject to control under the Convention;
—to check measurements and control equipment;
—to observe facility measurement, sampling and calibration procedures;
—to take duplicate or additional samples and measurements and arrange for the transfer of such samples to the Organization for analysis.

11. Rights of access of inspectors, as well as their privileges and immunities, would need to be carefully laid down in the Convention (or the annexes thereto) and agreed between the Organization and the State concerned. It would be necessary for the rights of inspectors, particularly in relation to access to relevant parts of the plant, to be defined in advance in relation to each declared plant by agreement between the Organization and the authorities of the State concerned. This would be done within the framework of general principles contained in the Convention designed to ensure uniformity of requirements for all parties to the Convention. These arrangements would be designed not to hamper the safe or normal operation of the chemical plant being inspected. Limitations on the movement of inspectors would reflect the need for such operation. Inspectors might need to be accompanied by a representative of the authorities of the State whose plant was being inspected. The movement of inspectors in plants or installations under inspection would be governed by the provisions of a detailed agreement between the Organization and the State con-

cerned. They would not, for example, be permitted to operate or direct the operation of any equipment belonging to the operator of the plant. These limitations would at the same time need to be designed to ensure the effectiveness of the inspection itself.

12. These arrangements should contain effective provisions protecting the information (including commercially sensitive information) gained by the Inspectorate through inspections and the reports it was entitled to receive from the State. The International Inspectorate would not be permitted to communicate any information to any other State organizations or persons. Only those staff members of the Organization who needed to know would have access to restricted information. In the event that inspection results gave no cause for concern, the Organization would report only this fact. It would provide the State in whose territory the inspection had taken place with an assessment of the results of inspections and of the conclusions to be drawn from its verification activities. Only in the event of problems arising from an inspection of wider relevance to the Convention than the private interests of the inspected State would the information and assessment in question be given to the Executive Council.

13. Allocation of the costs of inspections would need to be dealt with in the Convention. The United Kingdom Delegation suggests that the IAEA principle should be followed, and that the State and the Inspectorate should each bear their own expenses.

Declarations and Routine Monitoring Procedures for Declared Facilities

14. Annex I to this paper contains the detailed proposals of the United Kingdom for suggested inspection procedures for declared production facilities for high risk chemicals and precursors. It covers the content of the declaration to be made to the Organization in respect of each facility, the procedures for the inspection of a plant, the production details to be made known to the inspection team and the areas of the plant to be visited. In many, perhaps most, cases the high risk substances will be used on stream or on the same site for further transformations into materials that will not pose a high risk to the Convention. To the extent that this is not the case and that such substances are transported to other sites for processing and storage, these sites will also need to be subject to random routine inspection as appropriate. The special case of transfers of designated compounds from one country to another has been considered in document CD/439 tabled by the Federal Republic of Germany.[6]

15. Annex II to this paper contains the United Kingdom's proposals for a system of reporting to the Organization of data relating to compounds in both the high and medium risk categories as defined in CD/514 by Parties to the Convention in relation to their own territories. The facilities at which high risk chemicals and precursors are produced, stored or processed would, under these proposals, be liable

[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 100–103.

to routine inspection on a random basis in accordance with Annex I of this paper. In contrast, there would be no liability to routine inspection for facilities producing, storing or processing compounds in the medium risk category some of which are produced in large quantities for civil uses. As indicated in paragraph 5 of CD/353, it is proposed that the Convention should contain a requirement for declaration of information to the Organization. Many of the compounds in this category are highly toxic and are subject in many countries to national reporting requirements for purposes of health and safety. For example European Community legislation requires companies with plants that produce or process certain chemicals to notify their national safety executives of the existence of these chemicals on site: the levels at which notification is required varies from one substance to another. The experience gained in the European Community in this reporting system, which was originally introduced to reduce major industrial hazards, could with advantage be applied in the development of a system of reporting for compounds posing a risk to the Chemical Weapons Convention. In the view of the United Kingdom Delegation the general availability in this information would reduce suspicion and enhance confidence in the Convention. It would of course be possible for any suspicion in this regard to be allayed by means of the system of inspection by challenge which would be applicable to all systems of the Convention.

Settlement of Dispute Procedures

16. It will be necessary to institute methods of settling disputes or other problems arising out of the conduct of routine monitoring. Two categories of problems are likely to arise:

(i) procedural or administrative difficulties;
(ii) substantive problems, as a result of an inability on the part of the Inspectorate to verify adequately that there is no ambiguous situation at the facility being inspected.

If the Inspectorate and the State Party concerned are unable, in consultation, to resolve differences between them of the first kind, then the State Party should have the question submitted to the Executive Council for consideration. If the State Party is not a member of the Council, it should have the right to attend and participate in the relevant discussion. In addition, provision should be made in the Chemical Weapons Convention for arbitration of difficulties which cannot be settled within the Executive Council.

17. As for substantive problems arising from concerns about illicit diversion emerging in the course of an inspection, if these are not satisfactorily allayed by the State Party concerned, the Organization will be obliged to bring the matter before the Executive Council for prompt action in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention.

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Conclusions

18. The proposals contained in this paper and its annexes are comprehensive and detailed. They are intended simultaneously to provide the necessary confidence that the Chemical Weapons Convention is being observed and to avoid hampering the activities of legitimate chemical industries. The United Kingdom believes that they are sufficiently flexible to achieve these aims and hopes that they may form a sound basis for further discussion in the CD of this crucial topic.

19. The United Kingdom Delegation would emphasize again that the proposals contained in this and earlier papers are designed not to place any unnecessary restrictions or burdens on the operation and further development of the chemical industry. The purpose of the measures is to provide the international community with the essential assurance that products manufactured for innocent purposes are not being misused. The United Kingdom Delegation believes that these proposals would achieve this result.

20. The United Kingdom Delegation hopes that those Delegations who have not already furnished data on their civil chemical industries similar to that contained in CD/CW/WP.86 will be encouraged to do so. We consider that agreement on a Convention with adequate measures of verification of non-production will create a positive climate of greater international co-operation and exchange between States Parties, and will remove a source of international suspicion and facilitate the expansion and development of the civil chemical industry.

42. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Conference on Disarmament: Outer Space [Extract], March 7, 1985 [1]

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Regrettably, space is associated not only with the names of Gagarin and Armstrong, or with joint international research projects and television linkups between peoples of various continents. Space can also be the source of mortal danger for the whole of mankind, if turned into an arena of enmity and confrontation.

To be sure, the international community has not just arrived at this conclusion. It was precisely in recognition of the potential dangers of space militarization that a number of treaties now in force were drafted to include provisions foreclosing certain possible avenues for an arms race in space. Those agreements have established some prerequisites for continuing the efforts to ensure a peaceful regime of outer space. However, the subsequent course of events has proved them far from sufficient. But why is it precisely now that it becomes more

[1] CD/PV.297, pp. 25–30.

urgent than ever to take radical steps to ensure that mankind could live without fearing that the outer space it has yearned to reach for millennia will be the source of its destruction? Why do the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, in particular at its latest session, call for immediate action towards that end? What has happened? The answer to this question is close at hand. It was the adoption by the United States of its vast space militarization programmes that made the entire world realize that all the horrors which hitherto belonged to the realm of theoretical speculation or pessimistic science fiction now clearly threaten to become a present-day reality.

The "Star Wars" programme announced by the President of the United States in his March 1983 address envisages the development of a large-scale ABM system with spacebased elements, as well as the creation of antisatellite weapons.[2] It is on these two goals, along with the planned military use of the Shuttle spacecraft, that the United States Administration's efforts to spread the arms race into outer space are concentrated.

The programme envisages the deployment of a multilayered ABM defense system composed of several tiers and designed to "shield" United States territory. It is planned to develop a system capable of destroying the other side's missiles in the boost phase, at the very beginning of their launch into space towards their targets, or later as they fly through space, as well as during the final stage of their trajectory at re-entry into the atmosphere. According to the system's advocates, it will allow the United States effectively to defend itself against a massive nuclear strike and thus render nuclear weapons themselves "impotent and obsolete". They even go as far as to portray the deployment of combat systems in outer space as something of a panacea, as virtually the only way to achieve nuclear disarmament and to ensure universal peace, stability and prosperity. Let us now, however, look and see if this is indeed the case and if the global prospects offered by those programmes are indeed so bright.

The first question to be raised is that of stability and international security. The Soviet Union has consistently favoured the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms and eventual nuclear disarmament, but it remains a fact of life today that stability in the presence of nuclear weapons is assured by the over-all military and strategic balance. To maintain strategic stability is, in particular, the purpose of the 1972 ABM Treaty concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States, which is, as is well known, of unlimited duration.[3] The deployment by either side of a new large-scale ABM system with spacebased elements would actually mean seeking to create a "shield" for protection against the retaliatory strike after a first strike has been delivered. Expert analysis demonstrates that any such calculations are totally groundless and that a nuclear aggression can achieve nothing

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 199–201.
[3] The text of the Treaty may be found *ibid.*, 1972, pp. 197–201.

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but a global nuclear conflagration which will incinerate everyone including the aggressor. Yet for all the delusiveness of such hopes, the very temptation of committing an aggression with impunity would be a psychological poison which would erode stability.

The Soviet Union is resolutely opposed to competition in the build-up of any armaments, including space weapons. It is all too obvious, however, that in the face of a threat from space it will be forced to take actions reliably to guarantee its security. The choice is not ours, but we shall have to act to redress the strategic balance. The equilibrium will be redressed, but at a higher level of armaments. Will the security of all nations, including the United States itself, be enhanced once it rests on still greater piles of weaponry? We believe that this question too has an obvious answer.

In this connection we cannot disagree with the opinion expressed by such authoritative United States statesmen as McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara and Gerard Smith. In their view, one definitely cannot avoid the conclusion that "Star Wars" would not mean increased security but rather an indisputable and considerable buildup of offensive and defensive systems on both sides. They are convinced that this is not a recipe for eliminating or limiting the threat posed by nuclear weapons, but one for an infinitely expensive, long and dangerous competition.[4]

This assessment is shared by the world-famous American scholars Hans Bethe, Richard Garwin, Kurt Gottfried and Henry Kendall, who have concluded, upon analysing the "Star Wars" programme, that "it is difficult to imagine a system more likely to induce catastrophe than one that requires critical decisions by the second, is itself untested and fragile and yet is threatening to the other side's retaliatory capability".

Later on we intend to make some further comment on the sincerity of statements describing the "Star Wars" programme as being aimed at nuclear disarmament, but for the present we wish to stress another point of considerable importance. It is perfectly clear that an arms race in space, along with increasing the risk of a global nuclear catastrophe, would also pose other additional threats to the security of all nations. For once systems designed for antisatellite and antimissile operations are deployed in space, their use for other purposes cannot be ruled out. With the advent of new generations of attack space systems they would be transformed into dangerous offensive arms hovering permanently over the planet and capable of instant action against any region or State, any aircraft or vessel.

Let us now address the question of how the "Star Wars" programme would affect the process of disarmament. For our part at least, it is becoming our strong conviction that the stationing of attack systems in space would have the most damaging consequences for that process. One of those would be in the sphere of verification which, incidental-

[4] See their article, "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control," in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 63, No. 2 (Winter 1984/85), pp. 264–278.

ly, is so often invoked by the United States itself. It is quite obvious that compliance with a ban on a certain category of weapons can be much more easily verified before they are developed and tested.

Another consequence of the spread of the arms race to outer space would be the undermining, through an inevitable and unprecedented buildup of other types of weapons, primarily strategic offensive arms, of the over-all prospects of arms limitation and reduction.

And finally, one cannot fail to mention the international legal implications of the militarization of outer space. A comprehensive ABM system with space-based elements can be made operational only at the cost of abrogating the ABM Treaty. A broad-scale research and development effort, or the testing of the system's individual components, will objectively undercut this vitally important Soviet-American agreement. This was actually recognized by General Abrahamson, head of the United States ABM programme, who stated on 17 December 1984, that as soon as the comprehensive ABM system was at least partly developed and ready for operation, the United States would have to reach agreement with the USSR on the modification, in other words, changing of the ABM Treaty, since some of its provisions would enter into conflict with the tasks of the system.

For the sake of acquiring a comprehensive ABM system the United States is prepared to tear down a number of other international arms control and disarmament agreements as well. For instance, the deployment of X-ray lasers may jeopardize the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty which prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in space, in the atmosphere and under water.[5] X-ray lasers can be produced using nuclear explosions and would, of course, not be deployed without considerable testing.

The deployment of X-ray lasers would violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty which prohibits the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.[6] In any case that Treaty would be violated in spirit since it provides that space must be used for peaceful purposes only. Orbiting an ABM system cannot be regarded as a peaceful activity since it can also be used for offensive purposes, that is, as an antisatellite weapon.

In analysing the pernicious implications of the United States course at militarizing outer space one certainly cannot overlook the fact that it involves enormous waste of financial, material and human resources. From 1986 to 1989, the United States "Star Wars" research programme alone will absorb 26 billion dollars. As for the creation of a multilayered ABM system with space-based elements, its estimated cost amounts to 1.5–2 trillion dollars. Naturally, this cannot but considerably aggravate and multiply the world economic problems of today. Considering the economic difficulties encountered by many countries, and the developing countries in the first place, in solving acute global

[5] The text of the Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[6] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 38–43.

problems such as combating famine and disease, one can hardly regard the above-mentioned expenditures as justified or motivated by humanitarian concerns.

These are some of our considerations regarding the dangerous implications of the implementation of the "Star Wars" programme. A legitimate question arises, and I think we are not the only ones to ask it: do we all wish or need to pay that price for being saved from the nuclear threat? Especially since it turns out that the threat will not diminish as a result, but may instead be much increased.

Apparently, the matter is that the "Star Wars" programmes pursue quite different aims. There can be no doubt that the space militarization plans the United States is working on are of a clearly aggressive nature. This was underscored by A.A. Gromyko, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, in a statement to his constituents on 19 February 1985: "Today our country is giving warning as loudly as it can about a new threat to humanity. This threat stems from a plan for militarizing outer space which has been put forward by Washington. . . . It dramatically heightens the threat of nuclear war. That is why we raise with such urgency the question of preventing the militarization of outer space. Any efforts to camouflage the substance of that plan, by labelling it as 'defensive', must not mislead anyone." [7]

The calculation behind the fine-sounding term "Strategic Defence Initiative" is to put up a shield for protection against a retaliatory strike after having delivered a first strike. If this is not the case, one might reasonably wonder about the purpose of the unprecedented buildup of the United States strategic nuclear arsenal parallel to the development of space-based systems. MX ICBMs are being produced, Pershing-II missiles deployed in Europe, B–1 bombers built, and approval has been obtained to develop and produce the new "Stealth" bombers, cruise missiles and Trident–2 SLBMs. And the United States Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger does not even think it necessary to conceal the fact that all of those strategic armament programmes are designed to dramatically increase the United States nuclear first-strike capability.

The following legitimate question may also be asked: if the plan is to rely on defense, why then deploy first-strike nuclear systems at the borders of the Soviet Union and of its allies?

Proponents of the new ABM system dream of using various new types of weapons such as infrared, ultraviolet and X-ray lasers, high-energy particle accelerators, generators of ultra-high-frequency radiation and the like. Judging from the information made public in the West, those "space-age" weapons are already at various stages of development.

[7] See *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVII, No. 8 (March 20, 1985), p. 13 (variant translation), *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, February 20, 1985, p. 2.

True, they are now trying to persuade us that the "Strategic Defence Initiative" is limited to research and development which, it is being claimed, do not yet present any serious danger of resulting in the deployment of a comprehensive ABM system.

Such assertions are hard to believe since it is obviously not for the love of pure science or technological progress that billions of dollars are spent on research and development programmes. The testing of large-scale ABM defence components already conducted or envisaged by the Pentagon is directly aimed at reaching a stage where the only thing missing would be a decision to go ahead with the practical deployment of the systems in question. The Soviet Union would thus be faced with a certain United States capability to deploy on short notice a comprehensive ABM defense system. No references to "research" can change the substance of the matter.

It would be naive to expect that the programme, once started, would be confined to the research stage. Progress in the field of military technology unfortunately has an inherent momentum that triggers the deployment of weapon systems as soon as it becomes technically feasible. What, for example, would be the point in the November 1984 decision to establish a unified space command of the United States Armed Forces, if the acquisition of actual space weapons was not envisaged? Meanwhile, a military space operations centre is being set up and a special military Space Shuttle launch complex is under construction, the Shuttle programme having been actually placed under Pentagon supervision.

Another testimony to the fact that the research in question is by no means abstract or preliminary, or conducted "just in case", but rather a well-organized effort subject to, and even in advance of, a definite schedule, was provided by the United States Assistant Secretary of Defence F. Ikle, who recently stated before the Senate sub-committee on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces that the strategic defence initiative is not just a backstage option in United States defence activities, but has a central role.[8]

An equal threat to international stability is posed by the United States drive to acquire antisatellite weapons, including an ASAT system. Those weapons are particularly dangerous since they can be eventually used as dual-purpose systems, that is, not against satellites only, but also to intercept and destroy nuclear-missile warheads.

Confidence between States is far from strengthened by statements like those made by Mr. Ikle whom I have just mentioned. He has also said quite openly that the use of antisatellite systems as a component of a first strike to destroy all or many of the enemy's "key" satellites should considerably impede a retaliatory strike. One could not be more explicit and straightforward.

The Soviet Union most emphatically points to the need for urgent measures to prevent the militarization of outer space.

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[8] The *New York Times*, February 22, 1985.

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However, we do not stop at warning of the threat which looms over the world; we are putting forward concrete proposals for a radical solution of the problem of preventing an arms race in space. The Soviet Union submitted relevant draft treaties for consideration by the world community in 1981 [9] and 1983,[10] and followed up on them in 1984 with a new initiative entitled "Use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of mankind".[11]

In particular, the Soviet Union proposes that no attack weapons of any kind—conventional, nuclear, laser, particle beam or any other—should be placed and deployed in outer space, whether on manned or unmanned systems. Space weapons, however based, should not be developed, tested or deployed either for anti-ballistic-missile defence or as antisatellite systems or for use against targets on Earth or in the air. Any such systems already in existence must be destroyed.

The use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth, as well as from Earth against objects in space, should be prohibited for all time. The USSR proposes that agreement be reached on a radical solution of the question of preventing the militarization of space—on banning and eliminating the whole class of space attack weapons, including anti-satellite and anti-missile space-based systems, as well as any land-based, sea-based or air-based systems designed to destroy objects in space.

Agreement on banning and eliminating the whole class of space attack systems clearly lends itself to reliable and effective verification of compliance by both sides with their obligations. Verification is made easier if only because of the fact that our proposal calls for a complete ban on developing such systems and the elimination of the few that have already been developed.

These are briefly some of the Soviet Union's ideas regarding the possible ways of preventing arms race in space. As to where this problem should be addressed, we are in favour of negotiating appropriate adequately verifiable accords as early as possible and therefore prepared to deal with it on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis.

We hope that the Soviet-United States negotiations beginning next week will produce effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and halting it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and strengthening strategic stability. What is most important, however, is that both sides in the negotiations should display goodwill in working towards an agreed aim and prove willing to accept reasonable compromise while strictly observing the principle of equality and equal security. K.U. Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, stated in this connection that "we intend to conduct (the negotiations) in a businesslike and constructive manner. Let us hope

[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 334–336.
[10] *Ibid., 1983*, pp. 684–686.
[11] *Ibid., 1984*, pp. 730–731.

that the United States too will assume an honest and responsible attitude".

The Soviet delegation intends to take the same kind of constructive position at the negotiations in the *ad hoc* committee of our Conference which, as we hope, will be established according to the mandate recommended by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

43. Statement by the Swedish Representative (Ekéus) to the Conference on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, March 7, 1985 [1]

A nuclear test ban is not only the priority item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament but also the priority item on the international disarmament agenda. The Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden stated on 22 May 1984 that halting all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems should be a first step to be followed by a continuing programme of arms reduction leading to general and complete disarmament.[2] In the Delhi Declaration of 28 January 1985, the six Heads of State or Government urged the nuclear-weapon States to immediately halt the testing of all kinds of nuclear weapons, and to conclude, at an early date, a treaty on a nuclear-weapon test ban.[3] It is the belief of the Swedish delegation that the urgency of a test ban is a widely shared view among the delegations of this Conference.

Why is it, then, that we have so far not even been able to agree to sit down and elaborate a treaty? True, the differences around mandates reflect political realities. Our debates on mandates are elements in an exchange of views from sometimes widely divergent political positions. The consultations carried out on these questions are therefore part of a political dialogue on the substance of the matter. Nevertheless, my delegation has come to the conclusion that the wording of the mandate for an *ad hoc* committee on a nuclear test ban has been given an importance out of all proportion.

The efforts of delegations to elaborate in great detail different mandates have had the intentional or unintentional effect of creating a stalemate in the Conference, with delegations restating their own positions and rejecting others', while having no recourse to any effective means to analyse in detail the differences with a view to finding, hopefully, common approaches.

My delegation recognizes to the fullest extent the difficulties and the wide-open differences between the delegations on the issue of a nuclear test ban. However, bearing in mind the key importance of the

[1] CD/PV.297, pp. 36–41.
[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 420–421.
[3] Document 10.

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nuclear test ban not only as a disarmament measure in itself but also as an element in the realization of the goals behind item 2 on the agenda—"Cessation of the nuclear arms race"—and item 3—"Prevention of nuclear war"—it should be in the interest of all delegations to do their utmost to promote progress towards a nuclear test ban.

No substantive progress on item 1 on our agenda can be achieved within the Conference without establishing a subsidiary body to deal with the issue of a nuclear test ban. Some delegations have however objected to giving such a subsidiary body a negotiating mandate since that could imply an obligation to immediately conclude a test-ban treaty. Others have stated that they do not want a subsidiary body to work without a full negotiating mandate because such work, they assert, would only create a smokescreen and give the outside world a wrong sense of hope. Better to give no hope at all than to risk giving rise to groundless expectations, they argue.

We are told that the carrying out of nuclear tests is, in terms of credible deterrence, a necessary security precaution, at least as long as the other side is pursuing such tests. Another argument put forward for not wanting full and complete negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is that it would not be possible to fully verify such a treaty considering the state of the art of monitoring capabilities. When scrutinizing these arguments, we believe it is necessary to evaluate them separately as well as in their interrelationship.

Considering the first of the two arguments advanced against a halt on nuclear testing—that such testing should be necessary for security reasons—it appears that the Soviet Union would be prepared to enter into a commitment not to test, provided the other side, the United States, would do likewise. On the other hand it seems clear that for the United States a declared halt or freeze of Soviet testing would not be sufficient reason for halting United States testing. Less clear to my delegation would be the position of the United States if a fully verifiable treaty would be ready for signing and ratification. The question is: Would the United States consider that its security concerns could be taken care of if it thus could get full and verifiable assurances that the Soviet Union would completely halt all testing?

In his statement on 5 March 1985 the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Lowitz, declared that for his Government a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions remains a long-term goal and he added, "in the context of broad, deep and verifiable nuclear arms reductions, expanded confidence-building measures and improved verification measures". He recognized that a nuclear test ban is an important objective but underlined that reductions of weapon arsenals are more urgent than such a ban. He questioned further whether a nuclear test ban now would not delay reductions in nuclear arsenals or even cause an increase in the total numbers of weapons.[4]

[4] Document 40.

Needless to say my delegation does not share the views expressed by Ambassador Lowitz. We consider, and on this point we may agree with the United States delegation, that the modernization of nuclear weapons is not only stimulated by nuclear testing, but that it has such testing as a necessary prerequisite. We do not, however, draw the same conclusion from this postulate. My delegation most certainly differs with the United States delegation when we state that the modernization of nuclear weapons accelerates the nuclear-arms race and tends to destabilize the relations between nuclear-weapon Powers.

Recent history gives us ample evidence as to the effects of the modernization of the nuclear-weapon systems. The MIRVed systems, developed by the United States, were rapidly followed and expanded upon by the Soviet Union. The intermediate-range weapons, the SS-20, developed and deployed by the Soviet Union, were rapidly compensated by the development and deployment of a similar system, the Pershing II missiles by the United States. The same pattern is now repeated with regard to cruise missiles. All of us know of scores of similar examples, illustrating the point that modernization of weapons systems stimulates and accelerates the arms race through the mechanisms of imitation or counter-measure. I know of no evidence to the contrary. My delegation doubts that a new round of modernization of nuclear-weapon systems will turn out to be the first exception from the too-well-known pattern just described.

I do not need to illustrate the destabilizing consequences hitherto of the nuclear arms race. The United States itself has many times over pointed to what it considers the destabilizing expansion of the land based MIRVed ICBMs of the Soviet Union. Similarly the Soviet Union has stressed the destabilizing effects of the expansion of the submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile systems of the United States. New developments in the field of nuclear weapons do frequently tend to create insecurity and tension.

Returning to that part of the statement of the delegation of the United States which implies that a nuclear test ban now would have the opposite effect to strengthening stability through deep reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons, we ask ourselves, how has the United States arrived at a conclusion that runs squarely contrary to what would appear to most of us as a perfectly reasonable and sound proposition, namely, that a nuclear test ban would support efforts to achieve a cessation of the nuclear arms race? Our understanding of the philosophy behind the United States position is that the reduction of nuclear arsenals should be achieved through the reduction of the number of nuclear war heads rather than of the number of missiles. The number of MIRVed missiles, i.e. missiles carrying several war heads on each missile, and older and less accurate systems, would probably be reduced. If these systems were to be replaced by fewer and smaller but more precise new systems, a modernization programme has to be put into effect. A need to trim, streamline and modernize the nuclear arsenals within the framework of the bilateral

arms reduction talks could not be compatible with a policy to give up access to nuclear testing. Thus, if the bilateral arms reduction talks are to become a vehicle for modernization, a refusal to go along with a nuclear test ban can make perfect sense. I cannot help asking myself if we are not witnessing a process where Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are being replaced with Strategic Arms Modernization Talks.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban would render more difficult the realization of a modernization programme for nuclear weapons. As such a programme would mean an acceleration of a destabilizing arms race, my delegation considers a test ban as the most important step for halting the arms race and preventing a nuclear war.

We also see a nuclear test ban as a step towards achieving substantial reductions in nuclear arms. In conformity with what was stated by the Group of 21 on 21 February, bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament should in fact facilitate and complement each other. My delegation would accept the notion that a nuclear test ban might be more easily accomplished if negotiated within the general framework of ongoing arms reduction talks. We should, therefore, take the bilateral nuclear arms limitation talks into consideration when working on a test ban. An evaluation of security concerns of both sides could thus be better understood in the total context of arms reduction and disarmament talks. Reasonably rapid progress in the bilateral talks resulting in substantive reductions of nuclear arsenals would most probably enhance the prospects for an agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty, and vice versa. A nuclear test ban treaty would most probably enhance the prospects for agreements on reductions.

In the opinion of my delegation this Conference should therefore not passively wait for the outcome of these bilateral talks but immediately address itself to substantive negotiations on the provisions of a test ban treaty. Only so can the Conference address remaining differences on substance and elaborate in detail all necessary provisions. And only so can the Conference come to grips with the second of the two reasons for refusing a test ban—that is the alleged lack of sufficient verification capabilities.

In the opinion of my delegation there are no insurmountable technical obstacles to concluding a verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty. This does not mean, on the other hand, that all practical and technical details with regard to verification have been worked out. We understand that some other delegations may have a different attitude, holding the view that it is not possible to establish an effective verification system with the currently available technical knowledge. Of course we respect this position, even if we do not share it.

To reach an agreement on the verification provisions of a treaty would be the single most important step towards a treaty. If we could manage to elaborate together a viable verification system the major obstacle to concluding a treaty would have been removed.

The Swedish delegation would therefore—within the framework of an *ad hoc* committee—be eager to enter into a dialogue with those

delegations holding similar or different views on the issue of verification. Such a dialogue could take the form of joint elaboration of the provisions necessary for the verification of a treaty. It could be supported by the continuous work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts. Areas of disagreement could be identified in this process and the work should of course be concentrated on bridging these differences. The recently concluded technical test of the international data exchange system was encouraging in this respect. The *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts is examining technical problems and will soon be able to provide us with such result of their work which may support our effort to elaborate the verification provisions of a treaty.

The delegation of Sweden holds the view that the elaboration of the verification provisions of a treaty could effectively raze to the ground any technical obstacles put in the way of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This being done, nobody could use the absence of a verification system as a pretext or as a viable argument against such a treaty.

The reason why I, in this intervention, am speaking at some length on the verification question is that those opposing the concluding of a treaty now use the verification problem as the reason for their opposition. That does not exclude that there are other important problems remaining to be solved. In this context I will only mention the scope of a treaty and especially the problem of how peaceful nuclear explosions would be taken care of. On this problem there exist among delegations different positions which can only be taken care of in the form of the negotiations of provisions of a treaty.

We should by now have learnt that it is a futile exercise to try by means of far-reaching mandates to force an unwilling government to commit itself in advance to concluding a treaty before it knows the full contents of that treaty. For example, this multilateral negotiating forum has for many years (15 years) registered progress in the very complicated task of reaching a Chemical Weapons Convention without a negotiating mandate. It was not until last year that the subsidiary body was entrusted with a full negotiating mandate. If our predecessors in this body had applied the same policy of requiring full negotiating mandates as we ourselves try to do now with regard to a nuclear test ban, the Conference would not be even close to negotiations on chemical weapons. Happily enough they took a more pragmatic approach, with the effect that we are now drafting a Convention on the subject.

The reason for not simply resigning in the face of the political realities created by the opposition to a nuclear test ban treaty is that in themselves negotiations on provisions of a treaty can change these political realities.

The Swedish delegation is pleading with all delegations to concentrate now on getting some tangible results by solving remaining problems of substance. We cannot and should not try to solve the very entire complex of a nuclear test ban through a mandate formula. It will simply not work.

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A moratorium on all nuclear tests would undoubtedly be the interim measure which could most effectively promote negotiations on a test ban treaty. However, it may be said that a moratorium appears at present not to be a proposition with favourable prospects, since only one of the major nuclear-weapon Powers has expressed itself in favour of it, the other strongly objecting. The delegation of the United States has even gone so far as to state that a moratorium could promote instability and increased international insecurity.[5]

Another possible interim measure, a so-called threshold treaty, has been advanced by Japan. According to this proposal a threshold for test explosions should be put at the level of existing monitoring possibilities and then gradually be pushed downwards following further developments of detection capabilities.[6] In this way a process to gradually improve the verification techniques would be put in motion so as to meet the requirements of those who are not content with existing capabilities. The delegation of Sweden has in some detail expressed its views on this proposal in its statement on 9 August 1984.[7] Ambassador Theorin in her statement on 5 February this year reiterated our concerns.[8] On the same occasion she repeated that a threshold approach could be acceptable to Sweden if it would be directly linked to a comprehensive test ban treaty effective from an agreed date, and if the phase-out period be kept short.

We have now for some time analysed the problems of a threshold arrangement to try to find out what kind of a proposal may be a viable one while at the same time considering to the largest degree possible the views of other delegations in the Conference.

Since one problem, admittedly a minor one but still a problem, for the major nuclear-weapon Powers is to adjust their nuclear testing systems to a situation with no testing at all, a phase-out programme or rather a transitional arrangement might make it easier for them to go along with a comprehensive test ban. The necessary link to the treaty would be that such a transitional arrangement should constitute an integral element of the comprehensive test ban treaty. The transitional arrangement would thus be operative within the framework of a treaty being in force.

The period of transition should be as short as possible without being insignificant. A period no longer than three years could, in our view, be considered.

Tests would, during this period and according to the transitional arrangement, only be allowed to be carried out at one test site in each nuclear State adhering to the treaty. Test explosions should not reach above a certain yield level. A threshold should be set at yields of a size that could confidently be detected and identified at, as Ambassador Imai of Japan put it in his statement on 26 July 1984, "the existing

[5] Document 40.
[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 543–544.
[7] CD/PV. 280, pp. 14–15.
[8] CD/PV. 285, pp. 27–33.

technical level of multilateral verification capability".[9] It is clear from statements of independent as well as of government experts in some nuclear-weapon States that on this basis a threshold in the range of 5 kilotons could be set at the present time.

Since an arrangement of this kind requires a capacity to estimate exact yields, special preparations should be made to provide confident yield determination at the test sites. These preparations could be undertaken according to the verification agreements in the bilateral treaties on the Threshold Test Ban of 1974 and on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions of 1976.[10]

They should include exchange of detailed geological and geophysical information concerning the test sites. They should also include the establishment of a limited number of local seismological stations close to the test sites. These stations could be similar to those national seismic stations agreed upon during the trilateral negotiations. Since accurate yield estimations depend on measurements of calibration explosions at the actual sites with well determined yields, a certain calibration procedure should be foreseen in the transitional arrangement.

To monitor the treaty the verification arrangements outlined in article IV and Protocols I through III of the draft treaty on a nuclear-weapon-test ban (CD/381) presented by Sweden on 14 June 1983, could be employed.[11] These arrangements comprise the use of national technical means, the establishment of international co-operative measures including exchanges of seismological data and data on atmospheric radioactivity and additional, international measures to facilitate the monitoring of the treaty. It further includes procedures for consultations, on-site inspections, and the establishment of a Consultative Committee supported by a Technical Expert Group and a Secretariat.

The verification system should then be further developed during the phase-out period so that, at the end of the three years, the system would provide global monitoring capabilities acceptable to all. We are confident that this will be possible.

PNEs could, during the phase-out period, be handled in accordance with the procedures outlined in the PNE Treaty of 1976. However, the yields of these explosions should be limited to the same threshold as that for nuclear weapon explosions. The extensive verification arrangements agreed upon in the PNE Treaty should be modified to apply to this lower threshold. This would not create any particular technical difficulties.

In this final part of my statement, I have in very general terms given an example of how a transitional arrangement could be outlined. One striking feature of this outline is its quite far reaching control arrange-

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[9] CD/PV. 276, p. 25.
[10] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–227 and *ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.
[11] *Ibid., 1983*, pp. 468–478.

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ments for the sole purpose of monitoring yields up to a certain threshold. On the other hand such monitoring arrangements could of course be useful in giving added confidence to the verification and compliance machinery of the end product, the comprehensive test ban treaty. As my delegation sees it, there are reasons to question the necessity of introducing a transitional arrangement at all. However, if the idea of a transitional arrangement could edge the nuclear Powers towards the goal of a comprehensive test ban treaty, the outline we have presented here might be of some help.

In this era of an unabated nuclear arms race, all the delegations of the Conference have a duty to do everything possible to promote a comprehensive nuclear test ban, an indispensable step towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the prevention of a nuclear war.

44. Statement by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (McFarlane): Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, March 8, 1985 [1]

The President met this morning with the three negotiators leading the groups on strategic offensive arms, intermediate-range arms, and defense and space systems as they prepared to depart for Geneva this afternoon. In that meeting, the President expressed the hope that he places on these negotiations, premised foremostly upon the declared objective of the Soviet Union and the United States to agree upon reductions in offensive systems, leading ultimately to their total elimination.

At the same time, the President stressed his concern over trends in the strategic balance which are worrisome and must be arrested, and he focused in particular upon the fact that the balance is out of kilter in offensive systems, particularly in those which have a prompt, hard-target, kill capability.

He referred, as well, to new systems which are in the wings which promise to contribute a further destabilizing element, and he mentioned in particular the possibility of MIRVed [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle], mobile, land-based systems. He also referred to the poor record of Soviet compliance with past arms control agreements and the importance that we deal forthrightly with it if we are to achieve agreements in which both sides can have some confidence in the future.

He believed that in some, these several activities—the trends and the balance, the character of new systems, the history of noncompliance—has called into question the fundamental framework on which deterrence has rested for the past 10 years or so. At the same time, he said that there are promising elements in the mix, and, in particular,

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, May 1985, pp. 56–57.

he said he believes that if we and the Soviets can come to terms, there is on the horizon the possibility that we can move away from offensive nuclear systems and toward defensive systems and that we should open promptly a dialogue with the Soviet Union in this regard.

Turning to the specific agenda of these negotiations, the President stressed that his objective remains significant reductions in offensive forces; in addition, under terms that would be verifiable, that would lead to equality, and which would improve stability. Secondly, he stressed that we must try to arrest the erosion of the ABM Treaty,[2] which was treated in last month's compliance report sent to the Congress.[3]

Further, however, the President said that in our approach to how we get reductions in offensive forces, the United States need not try to dictate the character of the Soviet force structure and that we should approach that issue flexibly. The ultimate goal remains to achieve significant reductions in START but we are willing to meet the Soviet Union halfway in the approach we take to this.

The Soviet Union has approached these talks in the past, focusing upon launchers as a unit of account; the United States, on the other hand, focusing upon ballistic missile warheads and throwweight.

The President has provided guidance that makes possible the bridging of these differences for this round. We have no desire to dictate the structure of U.S. and Soviet missile forces. We simply want to set overall limits on them.

In addition, because bombers and their weapons pose less of a threat to stability, they are fundamentally retaliatory systems that are poorly suited for use in a surprise attack. We believe that they ought to be limited separately from ballistic missiles and their warheads. Nevertheless, we are also proposing limits on heavy bombers and on the number of ALCMs [air-launched cruise missiles] that they carry below the limits that were set in SALT II.[4]

We're, therefore, ready to explore trade-offs between areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage and interest to consider provisions that would allow a Soviet advantage in ballistic missile capability in return for a U.S. advantage in bomber capability. We are prepared to recognize in our outcome and in our negotiating strategy that there are, obviously, significant differences between U.S. and Soviet force structures and asymmetries in them.

An important part of our proposal is ballistic missiles and heavy bombers could be limited under a common ceiling and, similarly, that ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs could also be limited under a common ceiling.

With regard to INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces], the U.S. position in the past provides, we think, a satisfactory framework in

[2] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[3] Document 12.
[4] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

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which a good agreement can be reached. You recall our objective has been a zero-zero outcome.

But we've made clear that as an interim measure, we could accept a balance at equal levels of warheads in a global context and, further, in 1983 as the Soviets left, we made clear that we were in a position to not necessarily—deploy our full entitlement in Europe, that the number of Pershing IIs would be decreased accordingly in any reduction from our intended deployment and that we were, as well, prepared to talk about aircraft limitations.

The United States is prepared at this time as well to consider various approaches that will give us at the end of the day a zero global ceiling. And the flexibility is at hand in this round for exploring any number of different approaches.

The third basket of negotiations deals with defense and space arms. The President has stressed in his instructions of more than a dozen pages that we should begin in this session to establish the U.S. view on the relationship between offense and defense, to present the U.S. concerns on the erosion of the ABM Treaty, to provide the Soviet Union with a comprehensive rationale for the U.S. strategic defense program, and to take up some dozen different issues with the Soviet Union—including our view of the current strategic situation imbalance; our strategic concept which was laid out at Geneva as to how we view the evolution in strategic forces in the next 10 years and the transition over time away from offense and toward defensive forces; a treatment of why we're concerned about the erosion of the ABM Treaty; a treatment, in the extension, of our concerns over compliance with it; a discussion in depth of our concern about air defenses and the potential for upgrade and their use as antiballistic missile systems; a discussion of emerging technologies, and how and why we believe that they can lead to a more stable framework for deterrence.

As a final personal comment, I have to say that I know many of you have heard that there was a family of options presented to the President, particularly for the strategic aspect of these talks, and that is true, which features a half dozen different options.

The President reviewed all of these and, at the end of the day, believed that our tradition of moving incrementally by the adoption of a single option, sending a team to negotiate it, getting a reaction, then coming back—all for the purpose of changing one number or two or three—prevents dynamism and inhibits the pace of negotiation. And, consequently, the President established the outcomes which he believed would serve U.S. interests and serve as a more stable framework of deterrence: outcomes built around warheads, destructive capacity, and delivery vehicles but stressed that there are many, many ways that you can get there. And in a sense, the President chose all six and provided the flexibility for our negotiators to proceed to explore a number of different avenues that could lead to this outcome.

I have to say I have never seen instructions that have provided any negotiators with greater latitude for serious give-and-take.

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45. Interview of the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces (Tolubko): U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, March 8, 1985 [1]

Tolubko. The idea about the so-called two-tier system of antimissile defense was set forth quite frankly for the first time, in an article entitled: "Defense in Outer Space—This Is by No Means 'Star Wars'", which was published at the end of January 1985 in *The New York Times Magazine.* The authors of this article were not just anyone, but quite special people, namely Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's former national security adviser, as well as Max Kampelman, the leader of the U.S. delegation to the Geneva negotiations, and Robert Jastrow, a physics professor. From the technical point of view, the idea of a space-based antimissile defense represents a two-tier system. The first basic system will be deployed over the territory of the USSR. It will include four artificial earth satellites in stationary orbits over the USSR at a height of 35,000–36,000 km. Their task will be to quickly register launches of Soviet missiles and to automatically signal the launches to the antimissile command headquarters situated on the territory of the United States. In addition to this, the installation is envisaged of 10 artificial satellites on solar-synchronized orbits at heights of 20,000, 10,000, and 6,000 km, through which 100 other artificial satellites carrying antimissile weapons will be guided and commanded. Each of these 100 satellites will have 150 antimissile missiles on board with heat-operated self-propelling missile heads that will weigh 200 to 400 kg. They are supposed to strike Soviet missiles during their flight at a height of 100 to 800 km over the territory of the USSR. By the year 2000, these artificial satellites are to be replaced with stations for laser, ray, or electromagnetic strikes.

Atanasov. How effective is the first tier expected to be?

Tolubko. The first tier is expected to strike at 70 percent of the Soviet missiles prior to the separation of the launch platforms from the warheads. The remaining 30 percent are within the range of the second tier, deployed on U.S. territory and within the air and outer space territory of the United States. It will consist of 10 reconnaissance and guidance aircraft that will maintain contact with the four satellites in stationary orbit over USSR territory. On the territory of the United States a total of 5,000 antimissile missiles, each weighing 2 tons, will be deployed. They are envisaged to strike at 70 percent of the platforms carrying warheads that have passed the first tier. Thus, it is envisaged that the total effectiveness of the overall system will reach 90 to 92 percent.

Atanasov. What about the cost of constructing this system?

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[1] Sofia *Rabotnichesko Delo* in Bulgarian, March 8, 1985, p. 6; FBIS *Daily Report,* March 12, 1985, vol. III, pp. AA3–AA4. The interview was conducted in Moscow by Atanas Atanasov, *Rabotnichesko Delo* correspondent. An introductory paragraph by the paper is not printed here.

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Tolubko. According to initial U.S. evaluations, expenditures for the first tier are supposed to exceed $45 billion, the construction of the second tier will cost over $15 billion, and total expenditures will exceed $60 billion. According to recent specifications, the total cost of this system is already estimated to amount to approximately $100 billion. The U.S. Administration considers this quite an acceptable amount, and is planning to complete the deployment of the two-tier system for antimissile defense after 1990.

Atanasov. At first glance everything seems in order, there is talk only about defense. . . .

Tolubko. This is only how the U.S. Administration describes things. First of all, the first tier of the system, as to its very essence, is no longer a defense measure, but represents an offensive operation because it is aimed at destroying Soviet missiles on Soviet territory. In addition to this, where is the guarantee that the 100 artificial satellites are carrying antimissile weapons on board charged with ordinary weapons, and not with nuclear warheads? This is precisely why we can say that this is by no means a defensive system, but a striking-offensive plan to strike the first, disarming blow.

As Comrade Konstantin Chernenko correctly remarked in his recent interview with a reporter from the U.S. CNN television company, . . . "The goal is pursued to make an attempt to disarm the other side, to deprive it of the possibility of a reciprocal strike in case of nuclear agression against it. To put it more simply, the task is assigned to achieve the one-sided possibility of a nuclear strike relying on impunity under the cover of an antimissile defense." [2]

Atanasov. In other words, the development of a strategic antimissile defense plays a destabilizing role as a means to liquidate the ability of the other side to inflict a reciprocal strike, which increases the temptation to unleash a so-called "instant" war.

Tolubko. This is precisely so. No one can deny that for as long as 40 years no global conflict has erupted, not because imperialism has become less aggressive, but because the Soviet Union and the Soviet Armed Forces, together with the armies of the other Warsaw Pact member-countries are capable of reciprocating any aggressive step. Nothing but the prospect of inevitable retaliation has cooled down and is still cooling down the passion of many warmongers.

Atanasov. This is sometimes called a state of "balancing on the brink of fear."

Tolubko. Names are not important in this respect. It is the essence of the situation that matters. Under the circumstances of a situation in which we cannot talk about mutual confidence among states with different social systems, it is precisely the fear of retaliation by the Soviet Union that has prevented certain circles from implementing their plans for total nuclear war against the socialist community. It is precisely the manner of thinking in categories such as a "balance on

[2] *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVII, No. 5 (February 27) p. 12.

the brink of fear" that was laid down as the basis of the SALT I and SALT II Treaties,[3] and to a great extent this was also the essence of the entire practical concept of detente in the seventies. This concept envisaged an increase of security through a reduction of armaments, and not through development of antimissile systems. The U.S. Administration today is gradually withdrawing from these concepts. Even if we should presume that the aforementioned 100 earth satellites will carry only antimissile missiles, there are still the U.S. strategic missiles based on the ground, in the air, and under water, which are constantly being modernized and increased.

Atanasov. Actually, these missiles would remain "uncountered" [*nepokriti*] thanks to the existence of a 90 percent effective antimissile defense.

Tolubko. This is precisely so, because if the United States should introduce the aforementioned antimissile defense, the balance of forces will automatically be upset to its advantage. This fact will automatically and enormously increase the possibility of inflicting a nuclear strike against the USSR without risking the danger of reciprocal action. I once more repeat: All this applies to the situation under which the 100 satellites are not charged with nuclear warheads. What kind of defense is this? The aforementioned system is purely aggressive. It is a new demonstration of policy based on a position of strength.

The argument that space weapons will bring more security is an outrageous lie. They can only produce a further escalation of tension in the world and result in a new round of the escalation of the arms race, and on a much higher and much more dangerous level. The Soviet Union will never agree to the existing balance of forces being upset and if necessary, as many times before, the USSR will adopt all measures for the preservation of this balance of forces. However, we all hope that things will not go that far, and that common sense will prevail at the forthcoming Geneva talks.

46. Address by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev on the Death of President Chernenko [Extract], March 11, 1985 [1]

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[3] For the texts of the Treaties, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff. and *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[1] Moscow *Pravda* in Russian, March 12, 1985, First Edition, p. 3; FBIS *Daily Report*, March 12, 1985, vol. III, p. R2. [Unattributed report: "Speech by Comrade Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 11 March."]

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As regards relations with the capitalist states, I want to say the following: We will firmly follow the Leninist course of peace and peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Union will always respond to goodwill with goodwill, and to trust with trust, but everyone must know that we will never waive the interests of the motherland and its allies.

We value the successes of detente achieved in the seventies and are prepared to participate in a continuation of the process of establishing peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation between states, on principles of equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in internal affairs. New steps in this direction could fittingly mark the 40th anniversary of the great victory over Hitlerite fascism and Japanese militarism.

Never before has such a frightful threat loomed over mankind as in our day. The only sensible way out of the present situation is an accord between the forces opposed to each other on the immediate cessation of the arms race, primarily the nuclear race, and the nonallowance of it in space; an accord on an honest and equal basis, without attempts to outplay the other side and dictate its conditions to it; an accord that will help us all to move forward toward the desired goal: the full destruction and banning forever of nuclear weapons, and the full elimination of the threat of nuclear war. We are firmly convinced of this.

The negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States will begin tomorrow in Geneva. The approach of the Soviet Union to these negotiations is well known. I can only confirm yet again: We are not striving to achieve unilateral advantages over the United States or over the NATO countries, or for military superiority over them. We want a termination to the arms race and not a continuation of it, and thus we are proposing to freeze nuclear arsenals, to cease the further deployment of missiles. We want a real and major cutback in the armaments that have been stockpiled, and not the creation of more and more weapons systems, in space or on earth. One would like our partners in the Geneva negotiations to understand the position of the Soviet Union and to reciprocate. Then an agreement would be possible, and the peoples of the world would breathe a sigh of relief.

47. Statement by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Perle) Before Subcommittees of the House Committees on Science and Technology, and Interior and Insular Affairs: Nuclear Winter, March 14, 1985 [1]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to participate in this hearing.

[1] *Nuclear Winter: Joint Hearing. . . .* 99th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 37–42.

I must say I'm a little disappointed at what I've heard thus far. I came to this hearing never having met Dr. Sagan before, but aware of his reputation as a scientist, expecting that he might enlighten this committee and those of us from the Defense Department who came to hear him about the phenomenon of nuclear winter, about efforts to narrow the uncertainties that he knows well exist about the parameters associated with that phenomenon, in short, about the science on which he's expert.

I didn't hear a word of science this morning. I heard a shallow, demagogic, rambling policy pronouncement. Not only would I give it an F if it were a policy paper in the bureaucracy, I wouldn't keep a GS–13 whose recommendations in the face of what he believes to be and what we share in our belief is a serious problem. [*sic*] The recommendations are so shallow and, in some cases, absurd as to leave one aghast at what words transpired since the discovery of this phenomenon by Dr. Sagan.

The idea that the solution to this problem lies in putting Russians and Americans in a room where they will receive nuclear components, the idea that this is to be taken seriously as a solution to the problems posed by the phenomenon of nuclear winter leaves me practically speechless.

Mr. Chairman, I think one of the reasons for the confusion this morning is that there has been behind practically all of the remarks this morning from both the witness and a number of members of the committee the presumption that it is inevitable that, because of the nuclear winter phenomenon, there must follow changes in American strategic doctrine and policy. The presumption, I say because there hasn't been a shred of evidence introduced to the effect that our current doctrine and our current policies are not better suited to deterring the war that we are all trying to prevent, or mitigating its consequences if it should occur, than any other policy that's been pu. in its place.

And while Dr. Sagan, when pressed in a question put to him, refused clearly to say that we are to make unilateral reductions, I think it was entirely clear from the thrust of his remarks that the only logical consequence that can flow from his view of the world is that we ought to make unilateral reductions because, if we ever use the weapons that he thinks we might use, we would bring about nuclear winter and international suicide and, for that reason, it would make perfect good sense unilaterally to reduce those weapons. I only wish he had had the courage to see his logical structure through to a logical conclusion.

Now this administration accepts the proposition that there are levels of nuclear weapons exchange at which the phenomena described in the nuclear winter studies would occur with devastating consequences. But we recognize, and would hope that others would recognize, that there is a significant range of uncertainty as to precisely how many weapons under precisely what circumstances would produce precisely

what climatic changes. We think it's important to continue to do work in order to refine those estimates and those judgments, but the range of uncertainty is very sizable indeed. And it does not, in my judgment, advance our scientific understanding when loose statements are made that attribute a degree of certainty we do not have the privilege of now possessing, to the levels at which different climatic effects would occur. When Dr. Sagan says, as he has in the past, that 100 weapons on 100 cities would be enough to produce nuclear winter, that suggests a degree of certitude that he cannot possess, because we, the scientific community, do not possess it.

We have a Research Program aimed at refining the judgments that go into understanding the phenomena involved. It's a sensible Research Program. I think there was regret expressed this morning that we had put $2.5 million rather than the $5 million recommended into it. I think there's a misunderstanding there. The total Government funding is on the order of $5 million. The Defense Department contribution is roughly half of that to a broader administration effort.

Now what are the implications, granting that there is some level of nuclear exchange at which the phenomena described as nuclear winter would occur, for American policy, for our security, for world peace, for our survival, and not least of all for our freedom and independence?

The first implication that we would draw is that we had better assure the effectiveness of our deterrent force because, whether we like it or not, the best hope we have of preventing nuclear winter, and the other consequences short of nuclear winter that would nevertheless be devastating beyond belief, is to deter that war from ever taking place. And the policy of this administration and previous administrations is aimed at doing precisely that. And the programs of this administration are not different in significant respects from the programs of previous administrations. Virtually the whole of the Reagan Strategic Modernization Program, for example, has its roots in the plans and programs of previous administrations. So, first, we need to assure the effectiveness of our deterrent forces.

Second, I believe we need to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world and, in this, I agree with Dr. Sagan. I think, as he put it, there are too many nuclear warheads in the world. But let's recognize, first of all, that the United States has, in fact, been reducing the number of nuclear warheads in the world. We have 8,000 fewer nuclear weapons today than we had in 1967. You didn't hear that from Dr. Sagan, nor did you hear him reflect on the fact that the Soviets have added more weapons than we have reduced in this same time period. So while there are indeed too many nuclear weapons in the world today, one important reason for that is that the Soviet increases have outpaced the American reductions. And not only do we have 8,000 fewer nuclear weapons today than we had in 1967, we have reduced the megatonnage of those weapons to a bare 25 percent of what it was in the 1960's. That, I believe, is the right direction for

us to move in, in the hope that we will eventually get to levels where the nuclear winter phenomenon will not be a concern. I think we all agree on that.

And there is no point starting a discussion on this issue with demagogic attacks on the sincerity of the administration when it comes to arms control, because the reductions I have just referred to, Mr. Chairman, came about not as a result of arms control agreements that permitted massive increases.

And the answer to Dr. Sagan about what treaties the President supports is that none of the treaties he refers to have had the consequences he thinks they might have of reducing weapons. The reductions I referred to were unilateral reductions undertaken on the part of the United States in the best interests of developing, procuring, and deploying a sensible deterrent as we see it.

And the arms control process to which I have heard again and again this morning, the most sublime homage paid, has failed to achieve the kinds of reductions that we have introduced unilaterally. And there is no sense kidding ourselves. This is a serious problem, it deserves a serious solution, and we ought to examine the history of arms control to see how effective it has been in bringing about reductions in the number of nuclear weapons in the world.

I participated for a couple of years in chairing a committee of the North Atlantic Alliance that, a little over a year ago, recommended the United States reduce by an additional 1,400 the number of its nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, and we are now undertaking that reduction. And the committee deliberately decided that we would not approach the Soviet Union with a view to an arms control negotiation over reductions in those weapons because we know that the moment we introduced that issue into arms control negotiations, it would be years, if ever, before the reductions actually took place.

So I must say I am a little bit tired of hearing, as a last retreat in the absence of any concrete advice commensurate with the concern expressed, that the administration has sent to Geneva people who are not serious about arms control. The people who were serious about arms control, whose seriousness is never questioned—Mr. Warnke, for example, from the previous administration, or Gerard Smith from an administration before that—brought us treaties that have today produced thousands and thousands of additional weapons beyond the weapons that were in the possession of the Soviet Union on the day those agreements were signed.

Now in order to achieve the kind of significant reductions beyond those that we are able to undertake safely and unilaterally, we need, in my view, a significant arms control regime. But how do we get it? We don't get it by putting a couple of people in a room, a proposal that assumes that the agreement has already been reached that we are going to bring about reductions.

This administration—and Dr. Sagan knows it, and if he doesn't know it, it's because he hasn't bothered to look—has proposed deep

reductions in strategic offensive nuclear forces, the very forces that he believes could create a nuclear winter. This administration has proposed the total elimination of intermediate nuclear forces. And we've made both of these proposals and sustained them over the last 2½ or 3 years in Geneva. We've kept these proposals alive, even in the face of the Soviet walkout from Geneva. And I frankly think it is outrageous that, given the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to respond positively to our proposals for reductions, we should stand accused of not sending people to Geneva who are serious about negotiating arms control.

Now in addition to continuing the effort, and we will continue that effort—by every means we know how, we will try to persuade the Soviet Union that reductions are in their interest as well as ours—we need also to pay close attention to the strategic doctrine that we employ and the way we target our weapons. And the fact is that our strategic integrated operational plan calls for the ability of the President to withhold weapons from the cities of the Soviet Union, not because of the nuclear winter phenomenon, but because we have no desire to inflict millions of casualties on innocent men, women and children.

And let me say that absent in the whole of this hearing until now has been any recognition that the Department of Defense, which has been chastised for not discovering nuclear winter and for not embracing it with the same grandiose rhetoric as the administration's critics, the Department of Defense has understood for a very long time what an immense tragedy a nuclear war would be with or without nuclear winter. The idea that our policy should be fundamentally different because, instead of the destruction of hundreds of millions of people through prompt and immediate effects of a nuclear war, that our policy should be fundamentally different because we now realize that the consequences are even worse than was realized before, misses the fundamental point. We are serious about avoiding a nuclear war because the consequences that we have known about before the discovery of nuclear winter are persuasive enough reasons for avoiding a nuclear war by any means that men of good will can devise to do that.

Now the issue has been raised about the Soviet interest in nuclear winter. And I was sorry that Dr. Sagan didn't comment, because I think he's probably in a position to do so, about how our scientific community has been struck by the difference between scientific views expressed by the Soviets in private and those that they express in public which are—it will come as no surprise—the party line, whatever the party line happens to be. It poses a real problem for serious scientific cooperation with the Soviet Union when we know that their scientists say to us that they hold views that they are unable to express, because the only view they are able to express is the approved political view. And I sat here and listened to a Member of the U.S. Congress say to us that the Department of Defense is playing politics with a scientific issue.

Now what Mr. Markey didn't know was that the memorandum he had seen, was referring to, was a conversation between a State Department official and a deputy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, in which the proposal to which he referred was made and it was subsequently withdrawn. And I have grave doubts about whether it was ever made with sincerity in the first instance.

Now let me say a little bit about the strategic defense initiative on which Dr. Sagan is also an expert. What this administration has proposed to do is conduct a 5-year program of experimentation to see, to find out, whether the development of technologies largely in the civilian sector that could bear on the development of a strategic defense have put the United States in a position where we might be able—where we might be able—to develop a reliable system of strategic defenses. We don't know whether it's going to prove possible or not. We know the Soviet Union is working hard on the development of such a system, has been doing so for years with increasing vigor following the ABM Treaty of 1972,[2] and I think we ought to be smart enough to know that if we abandon our program in a manner that couldn't possibly be verified by arms control, the Soviets will carry on with their program just as they have carried on with a number of programs in violation of the existing treaties between us.

Is Dr. Sagan suggesting that we abandon our research program? Is he so sure of the unworkability of a strategic defense that he can now declare before the research is done that it's not possible? I think the only sensible reaction to the situation in which we find ourselves, with massively growing Soviet offensive nuclear forces, with no certainty that we will achieve an arms control agreement that provides for significant reductions, and with a significant Soviet SDI research program on the way, is to conduct an SDI research program of our own. And if we should prove to be successful, would Dr. Sagan not prefer that that strategic defense intercept the warheads that would produce the nuclear winter if they detonated on the surface of the earth?

Dr. Sagan has urged when pressed for recommendations that his first recommendation is that the Congress should be given a report prepared by the Air Force. Now either Dr. Sagan has seen that report and is prepared to speak for its wisdom and validity, or it seems to me he squandered his opportunity to give this committee advice by proposing as his first order of priority that you be given a report that he hasn't seen. I rather suspect that he's seen it. And I am advised by my colleagues that it is a political science paper, does not bear on the science of nuclear winter—which is what I think this committee was interested in, and properly so—and, like a lot of papers, we think it isn't a very high quality piece of work. Dr. Sagan is free to disagree with that, but I wish he'd introduce the arguments from that paper that he finds appealing and not attempt to turn this issue into a false

[2] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

issue of the administration somehow concealing some brilliant piece of work which, if only it came to light, would produce immediate changes in administration policy.

Mr. Chairman, I think I've talked long enough. I hope that there will be some questions from the committee. I hope in particular that we can focus our time on why it should be assumed that the phenomenon of nuclear winter automatically requires that the administration change the strategic doctrine and policy of the United States, because I say to you that our policy and doctrine is aimed at preventing a nuclear war, and the potential of a nuclear winter is an even more powerful reason for preventing a nuclear war. And it is by no means obvious to me, as it evidently was to Dr. Sagan, that the discovery of nuclear winter obviously entails changes in our strategic policy.

48. Address by British Foreign Secretary Howe: Strategic Defense Initiative [Extract], March 15, 1985 [1]

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Much has been said and written about President Reagan's strategic defence initiative. The first point to make is that, as U.S. spokesmen have made clear, this is a research programme, conducted in full conformity with the limits of the ABM Treaty.[2] As a research programme, it is also full of questions. The answers may be clear or obscure. They may not even emerge at all. As the U.S. Administration themselves recognise, the programme is geared to a concept, which may in the end prove elusive.

The second point is that treaty obligations specifically allow for research to continue into defensive systems. Evidently, it is pointless to try to impose constraints which cannot be verified. Most activities in laboratories or research institutes come into that category. The ABM Treaty recognised this when it drew a distinction between research on the one hand and development, testing and deployment on the other.

The third, equally important point is that a balance must always be maintained between U.S. and Soviet capabilities, in research as in other aspects. Given what we know of Soviet activities in the research field over a number of years, there is a clear need for the United States to match the present stage in Soviet programmes. It is for this reason that the Prime Minister has repeatedly expressed our firm conviction that U.S. research should go ahead.

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[1] Press release issued by the British Embassy Information Department, Washington, D.C. The address was given before the Royal United Services Institute in London.
[2] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

But what should happen if and when decisions are required on moving from the research to the development stage?

In evaluating the results of research, and in taking any such decisions, we shall need to ask ourselves some very basic questions about the future nature of Western strategy. In particular, we shall have to consider how best to enhance deterrence, how best to curb rather than stimulate a new arms race. At that stage, the judgements to be made will only partly depend upon technical assessments about the feasibility of defences. Even if the research shows promise, the case for proceeding will have to be weighed in the light of the wider strategic implications of moving down the defensive road.

But can we afford even now simply to wait for the scientists and military experts to deliver their results at some later stage? Have we a breathing space of five, ten, fifteen years before we need to address strategic concerns? I do not believe so. The history of weapons development and the strategic balance shows only too clearly that research into new weapons and study of their strategic implications must go hand in hand. Otherwise, research may acquire an unstoppable momentum of its own, even though the case for stopping may strengthen with the passage of years. Prevention may be better than later attempts at a cure. We must take care that political decisions are not pre-empted by the march of technology, still less by premature attempts to predict the route of that march.

The questions to be faced are complex and difficult. I want to emphasise that they are questions and not prior judgements. The answers will only emerge in time.

There would inevitably be risks in a radical alteration of the present basis for Western security. How far would these risks be offset by the attractions of adopting a more defensive posture: that is to say, of developing what might prove to be only a limited defence against weapons of devastating destructive force. Could the process of moving towards a greater emphasis on active defences be managed without generating dangerous uncertainty?

Let us assume that limited defences began to prove possible, and key installations began to be protected by active defences. In his 1983 address President Reagan himself acknowledged that a mix of offensive and defensive systems could be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy.[3] Uncertainty apart, would the establishment of limited defences increase the threat to civilian populations by stimulating a return to the targeting policies of the 1950s?

Most fundamental of all, would the supposed technology actually work? And would it, as Mr. Paul Nitze has noted, provide defences that not only worked but were survivable and cost-effective? [4] These are the key questions to be answered by the research that is being undertaken on both sides.

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[3] *Ibid., 1983*, p. 200.
[4] Document 25.

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It would be wrong to underestimate the enormous technological expertise and potential of the United States. But, as we all recognise, there would be no advantage in creating a new Maginot Line of the twenty-first century, liable to be outflanked by relatively simpler and demonstrably cheaper counter-measures. If the technology does work, what will be its psychological impact on the other side? President Reagan has repeatedly made it clear that he does not seek superiority. But we would have to ensure that the perceptions of others were not different.

What are the chances that there would be no outright winner in the everlasting marathon of the arms race? And if the ballistic missile indeed showed signs of becoming, in President Reagan's words, impotent and obsolete, how would protection be extended against the non-ballistic nuclear threat, the threat posed by aircraft or cruise missiles, battlefield nuclear weapons or, in the last resort, by covert action? What other defences in addition to space-based systems, would need to be developed, and at what cost, to meet these continuing threats?

If it initially proved feasible to construct only limited defences, these would be bound to be more vulnerable than comprehensive systems to counter-measures. Would these holes in the dyke produce and even encourage a nuclear flood? Leaving aside the threat to civilian populations, would active defences provide the only feasible way of protecting key military installations? Might we be better advised to employ other methods of protection, such as more mobile and under-sea forces?

Finally on the technology side, could we be certain that the new systems would permit adequate political control over both nuclear weapons and defensive systems, or might we find ourselves in a situation where the peace of the world rested solely upon computers and automatic decision-making?

Then there is the question of cost. The financial burden of developing and deploying defences goes far beyond the additional cost of providing defences against the nonballistic missile threat. No-one at present can provide even a guestimate of the total sums involved. But it is fair to assume that these will run into many hundreds of billions of dollars.

We know only too well that our defences must be cut to the cloth of our financial resources. We shall have to ask ourselves not only whether the West can afford active defences against nuclear missiles. We must also ask whether the enormous fund to be devoted to such systems might be better employed.

Are there more cost-effective and affordable ways of enhancing deterrence? Might it be better to use the available funds to improve our capability to oppose a potential aggressor at a time of crisis with a credible, sustainable and controllable mix of conventional and nuclear forces? In short, how far will we be able to impose new burdens on defence budgets already under strain? And what would be the effect

on all the other elements of our defences, on which Western security will continue in large part to depend?

The implications for arms control must also be carefully considered. Would the prospect of new defences being deployed inexorably crank up the levels of offensive nuclear systems designed to overwhelm them? History and the present state of technology suggest that this risk cannot be ignored. Or could the same prospect—the vision of effective defences over the horizon—provide new incentives to both sides to start at once on reducing their present levels? This explains the importance of the second point agreed at Camp David last December.

In his statement to Congress last month President Reagan spoke of the need to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty. It represents a political and military keystone in the still shaky arch of security we have constructed with the East over the past decade and a half. But to go beyond research into defensive systems would be inconsistent with the terms of the ABM Treaty as it stands. It was agreed at Camp David last December that any deployment beyond those limits would have to be a matter for negotiation. We would have to be confident that that formidable task could actually be managed on a mutually acceptable basis.

We have heard recently from Moscow a lot of dogmatic statements and pre-conditions for the success of the new talks. I discount much of these. But I do attach importance to convincing the Soviet leadership that we in the West are indeed serious in our aim of maintaining strategic stability at significantly lower levels of nuclear weapons. We do not want to give them the impression that we have something else in mind. We are serious about arms control. And we must be seen and heard to be so.

Finally, as members of the Atlantic Alliance, we must consider the potential consequences for this unique relationship. We must be sure that the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Europe would indeed be enhanced as a result of defensive deployments. Not only enhanced at the end of the process, but from its very inception.

Many years of deployments may be involved. Many years of insecurity and instability cannot be our objective. All the allies must continue at every stage to share the same sense that the security of NATO territory is indivisible. Otherwise the twin pillars of the alliance might begin to fall apart.

Other things being equal, we welcome any cost-effective enhancement of deterrence to meet palpable weakness on the Western side. But we also have to consider what might be the offsetting developments on the Soviet side, if unconstrained competition in ballistic missile defences beyond the ABM Treaty limits were to be provoked. In terms of NATO's policy of forward defence and flexible response, would we lose on the swings whatever might be gained on the roundabouts?

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I have posed a lengthy list of questions, to which the answers cannot be simple. Some do not admit of answers now. But that does not acquit us of the duty to pose them. They are questions so vital to our future that we cannot afford to shrug them off. It is right to ponder and debate them as research continues. In this way we stand the best chance of reaching the right policies. The attractions of moving towards a more defensive strategy for the prevention of war are as apparent as are the risks. It would be wrong to rule out the possibility on the grounds that the questions it raises are too difficult.

But the fact there are no easy answers, that the risks may outweigh the benefits, that science may not be able to provide a safer solution to the nuclear dilemma of the past forty years than we have found already—all these points underline the importance of proceeding with the utmost deliberation. Recent testimony to the U.S. Congress by Secretary Shultz and Mr. Nitze, and the continual process of alliance consultation, confirm the Prime Minister's statement last December that the U.S. Administration see matters in very much the same light.

Deterrence has worked, and it will continue to work. It may be enhanced by active defences, or their development may set us on a road that diminishes security. We do not know the answer to that question. Meanwhile, four clear points emerge.

First, as the Prime Minister reminded the United States Congress last month, in the words of Sir Winston Churchill: "Be careful above all things not to let go of the atomic weapon until you are sure, and more than sure, that other means of preserving peace are in your hands." [5]

Secondly, impressions can be created by words as well as deeds. Policies, aims, visions—all these can and must be clearly stated. Without the approval of an informed public, the governments of the West are wasting their breath. But we must be especially on our guard against raising hopes that it may be impossible to fulfil. We would all like to think of nuclear deterrence as a distasteful but temporary expedient. Unfortunately we have to face the harsh realities of a world in which nuclear weapons exist and cannot be disinvented. Words and dreams cannot by themselves justify what the Prime Minister described to the United Nations as the perilous pretence that a better system than nuclear deterrence is within reach at the present time.

Thirdly, any deployments of space-based or other defences must be a matter for negotiation. The Prime Minister agreed this with President Reagan at Camp David, and they reaffirmed it in Washington. In the words of the White House statement of 3 January, deployments of defensive systems would most usefully be done in the context of a cooperative, equitable and verifiable arms control environment.[6] A

[5] "Address to the United States Congress," January 17, 1952, in *Winston Churchill. His Complete Speeches, 1897–1963.* (New York and London: Chelsea House Publications in association with R.R. Bowker Company, 1974), vol. VIII, p. 8328.
[6] Document 2.

unilateral Soviet deployment of such defences . . . would destroy the foundation on which deterrence has rested for twenty years. I warmly welcome the clear statement of the U.S. Administration's view that deployments would need to be a cooperative endeavour, to be embarked upon in an arms control context.

There is a fourth factor: the linkage between offensive and defensive systems. The White House statement of 3 January recognised the merit in controlling both the offensive and defensive developments and deployments on both sides. If defensive systems are to be deployed, they will be directed against the then levels of offensive forces. If the latter can be lowered dramatically, then the case for active defences may be correspondingly strengthened. Conversely, radical cuts in offensive missiles might make the need for active defences superfluous. Equally, the effectiveness of defences will be directly governed by the numbers of missiles and warheads which they are intended to destroy. If the levels rise dramatically, then the effectiveness of defences may not be adequate.

It is therefore clear that there is and will continue to be an integral relationship between measures to control offensive forces and any decisions to move to the development of active defences. The U.S. Administration have always recognised such a linkage. Belatedly, the Russians now seem to have reached the same conclusion. As the new negotiations, finally launched this week, get underway, a key question for all our futures will be the extent to which reductions in offensive forces prove possible and the impact this will have upon the incentive to develop defences.

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49. Address by Belgian Prime Minister Martens Before the Belgian Parliament: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Deployment in Belgium [Extracts], March 15, 1985 [1]

The Government has reached the conclusion that, in accordance with the Government's statement of 18 December 1983, it must today confirm the decision it took on 12 December 1979 [2] and 19 September 1980 jointly with its allies and has therefore given its consent to the deployment of the first 16 missiles.

The Government nevertheless stresses that this decision is in no way aggressive or hostile. The deployment in Western Europe of a limited number of intermediate-range missiles—much smaller than the number already deployed by the USSR—is solely intended to restore

[1] CD/580. All extracts that are printed in document CD/580 are printed here.
[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

some balance of forces and the deterrence without which the country's security would be seriously impaired. The Government would have preferred that security to be ensured by a balanced agreement between East and West, and it will continue to work to that end, but it is aware that failure to respect the agreed time-tables would not influence the negotiations in the desired direction of a substantial reduction of the threat weighing upon Western Europe.

In its continuing search for a negotiated settlement, the Government strongly reaffirms that the stationing of any missiles in Belgian territory is reversible: it can be halted, or the missiles may even be totally dismantled, if that is provided for under the agreements reached through negotiations.

The Government will abide by the international undertakings binding upon Belgium. In this spirit, the Government announces that the actual use of the missiles stationed on our territory can only take place within the strictest respect for the consultation and decision-making procedures provided for in NATO, as well as for the international treaties and undertakings to which Belgium is a party.

In this context, it must be stressed that the Atlantic Alliance is purely defensive, and that the Treaty setting it up refers explicitly to the right of self-defence provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. NATO has solemnly declared (Washington Declaration of May 1984) that none of its weapons will ever be used except in response to aggression.[3] It goes without saying, therefore, that the conventional or nuclear weapons stationed on Belgian territory will never be used by NATO for aggressive purposes.

Besides the international undertakings already ratified, the Government will ask Parliament to approve the protocols additional to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions which Belgium signed on 10 June 1977.[4]

With regard to the 32 cruise missiles which remain to be deployed in 1987, the Government has taken the following decision:

If, before the end of 1987, the negotiations have led to an agreement under which the zero option can be implemented, any need for such deployment by Belgium will disappear;

If, before the end of 1987, the negotiations have led to an agreement providing for limited deployment by the Alliance, Belgium will take its due share;

If, before the end of 1987, the negotiations have ended in failure or have been broken off, Belgium has decided to take its agreed share of the deployments planned by the Alliance;

If, on the contrary, the negotiations are still going on at that time, the stationing of the 32 missiles will be deferred for a period of six months, at the end of which, in the absence of any agreement, the stationing will automatically take place without any further decision being required.

[3] *Ibid., 1984*, p. 429.
[4] *International Legal Materials*, November 16, 1977, issue No. 6, pp. 1391 ff., 1442 ff.

This position allows maximum opportunities for the success of the negotiations.

50. Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Wolfowitz) Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: The ANZUS Alliance [Extract], March 18, 1985 [1]

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The current New Zealand Government has banned nuclear-armed and -propelled ship visits in order to get away from, and protest, "things nuclear." According to the New Zealand Government, the country's location—far removed from potential adversaries—renders any "nuclear defense" unnecessary and unwanted.

The U.S. view is that the safest course in a dangerous world is to make clear our commitment to defend freedom. We believe the best way to prevent a large war is to keep small wars from starting. The commitments of the Western allies to each other over four decades have helped to prevent nuclear war.

Our efforts to keep New Zealand within the framework of Western defense have been persistent. After election of the Labor Government in July 1984, Secretary Shultz—in New Zealand for the ANZUS Council—met immediately with Prime Minister-elect Lange. Secretary Shultz reaffirmed publicly that, in our view, an alliance by definition requires an interaction of forces—an ability to operate together and benefit from mutual cooperation. In the words of the 1984 ANZUS Council communique: "Access by allied aircraft and ships to the airfields and ports of the ANZUS members was reaffirmed as essential to the continuing effectiveness of the alliance." [2]

In the interests of finding a harmonious solution, however, we proceeded with restraint, deferring any ship visit request for 6 months. During this period, we engaged in intensive discussions with the New Zealand authorities to try to find a way to permit visits of U.S. warships without disclosure of information important to potential adversaries. We had hoped that the Government of New Zealand could accept our "neither confirm nor deny" policy regarding the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard ships and would remove barriers to nuclear-powered warship visits based on their impeccable safety record. As a first step, in January 1985, we nominated the *U.S.S. Buchanan*, a conventionally powered destroyer, the only ship submitted

[1] Department of State, Current Policy No. 674. The statement was made before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, p. 526.

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since the port ban went into effect. We were disappointed when the New Zealand Government refused the visit, which was to take place after an ANZUS exercise with Australian and New Zealand forces. That refusal was based on the Labor Government's insistence on a virtually explicit guarantee that the ship was not nuclear armed.

During the period of negotiations and since, we have made a number of facts very clear.

First, the United States is not pro-nuclear; it is proalliance. U.S. policy in the event of conflict is to employ the lowest level of defense necessary to turn back an aggression, to preserve the territorial integrity of the United States and its allies, and to restore peace on an acceptable basis. Indeed, the foremost purpose of our alliances is to prevent war from ever occurring. By weakening one of those alliances, New Zealand, in a small way, is detracting from that purpose.

Second, we are fully aware of the non-nuclear policy of the Labor Government. We applaud New Zealand's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty [3] and resulting commitment neither to receive nor acquire nuclear weapons or explosive devices. While we have welcomed New Zealand's opinion on desirable defense strategy and tactics, we have not asked that New Zealand become involved in planning or other consultative arrangements involving potential use of our nuclear forces, as is the case among our NATO allies.

Third, it is obvious that there is little nuclear threat now in the South Pacific area. It is in the common interest to keep it that way. The presence of strong defense capabilities, necessarily naval in this maritime region, is the best guarantee against eruption of conventional conflict. And, if conventional conflict can be deterred, the threat of nuclear conflict is significantly diminished.

Fourth, we have only one navy—not one conventionally capable navy and one nuclear-capable navy; not one navy to accommodate one country's policy and another navy for the rest of the world.

Fifth, for ships, it would be irresponsible and would weaken the deterrent value of our forces to advertise to potential adversaries when they are or are not carrying nuclear weapons.

Sixth, in our view, New Zealand's "example" does not stimulate mutual control of arms. It only encourages potential adversaries to wait out other signs of unilateralism and antinuclear sentiments in the West, thereby avoiding the need for any reciprocal concessions to contain or reduce Western strength.

In sum, we believe that New Zealand's policy, whatever its intentions, is not good for the alliance or for the cause of peace. While we do not exaggerate the effect of that policy, we cannot ignore it.

The U.S. public has a strong commitment to maintaining forces for peace in the Pacific, as elsewhere. But the American public will not long support commitments and alliances that protect others if those others will not uphold their own responsibilities. New Zealand's refus-

[3] The text of the Treaty may be found *ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.

al to allow access to its ports for our ships confronts us with such a situation today.

With words New Zealand assures us that it remains committed to ANZUS; but by its deeds New Zealand has effectively curtailed its operational role in ANZUS. A military alliance has little meaning without military cooperation—without some equity in sharing both the burdens and the rewards. New Zealand can't have it both ways.

In light of New Zealand's diminution of cooperation with us, we have reduced our own military and security cooperation with New Zealand. We have made these reductions with regret given New Zealand's history as an ally—one that has fought with us in four wars in this century. But unless our alliance partners bear a commensurate share of military cooperation essential to the alliance, our partnership cannot be sustained practically or politically.

We recognize that New Zealand's decision has been a product of the democratic process. New Zealand is under no compulsion to cooperate with us militarily if it feels that this does not serve its interest. But the United States is also a democratic nation with broad responsibilities. We must husband our defense resources for use in areas where our help is wanted and appreciated. Our people would tolerate nothing less.

We still, however, regard New Zealand as a friend and have sought to avoid petulant reactions. We have not resorted to punitive measures, such as economic sanctions, and have carefully limited our response to avoid totally cutting off cooperation even in the military and security areas. We have merely responded in a prudent and measured way to the changed situation in which we found ourselves as a result of the New Zealand decision. We have not acted precipitately but have given the New Zealand Government abundant opportunity—over 7 months—to sort out its position. Once its decision was clear, we have tried to avoid bullying and have maintained cooperation with the New Zealand Government as we would with any friendly, democratic Western state.

We have emphasized that the adjustments we have made in military and security cooperation are all reversible when our ships are permitted in under acceptable conditions. As President Reagan said on February 7:

> We deeply regret the decision by the New Zealand Government to deny port access to our ships. . . . It's our deepest hope that New Zealand will restore the traditional cooperation that has existed between our two countries.[4]

While the New Zealand Government has not yet given any signs of moving back from its present stance, the door remains open to restore cooperation within ANZUS to normal levels.

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[4] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, February 11, 1985, p. 148.

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Some in Congress are understandably impatient with New Zealand's actions against American ships in light of the great exertions we have made on behalf of it and other allies. Some ask whether we should not back away from our commitments to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty [5] or reshape the Treaty into a strictly bilateral U.S.-Australian instrument. While we fully agree that our cooperation with Australia must be protected—and we are proceeding to do so through bilateral military and political cooperation which will substitute for former trilateral activities—we are reluctant at this time to dismantle the treaty or fall back from our commitment to it.

We hope that the Government and people of New Zealand consider carefully their security interests. We strongly desire that reason will prevail and New Zealand will return to full defense collaboration with us and the other Western democracies.

51. Chinese Working Paper Submitted to the Conference on Disarmament: Arms Race in Outer Space, March 19, 1985 [1]

1. With the intensification of the development of anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile weapons, the question of preventing an arms race in outer space is becoming ever more urgent. Resolution A/39/59 adopted at the thirty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly by an overwhelming majority with only one abstention fully reflects the grave concern and anxiety of the international community about an arms race in outer space.

2. Consistent with its stand against any arms race, China is opposed to an arms race in outer space. It holds that the exploration and use of outer space should in the interest of mankind serve to promote the economic, scientific and cultural development of all countries. China fully subscribes to the objective of "the non-militarization of outer space" and "the exclusive use of outer space for peaceful purposes."

3. In principle, 'the non-militarization of outer space" requires both space weapons with actual lethal or destructive power and military satellites of all types be limited and prohibited.

4. In view of their complexities, the limitation and prohibition of military satellites may be left to be considered and resolved at an appropriate time in future.

5. At the present stage, the primary objective in the efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space should be "the de-weaponization of outer space", i.e. banning the development, testing, production, deployment and use of any space weapons and the thorough destruction of all space weapons.

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[5] 3 UST 3420; TIAS 2493; 131 UNTS 83.
[1] CD/579.

6. The aforesaid space weapons should include all devices or installations either space-, land-, sea-, or atmosphere-based, which are designed to attack or damage spacecraft in outer space, or disrupt their normal functioning, or change their orbits; and all devices or installations based in space (including those based on the moon and other celestial bodies) which are designed to attack or damage objects in the atmosphere, or on land, or at sea, or disrupt their normal functioning.

7. While certain restrictions on the military activities in outer space have been provided by the existing international legal instruments regarding outer space, especially the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,[2] these documents, however, because of their limited scope, are far from being adequate for the total prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is, therefore, necessary to undertake an analysis and examination of the major existing instruments, and to formulate new provisions and conclude new agreements.

8. The two Powers which possess the greatest space capabilities and are right now intensifying their efforts in the development and testing of space weapons bear special responsibilities for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They should demonstrate genuine political will, conduct their bilateral negotiations in good faith and keep the Conference on Disarmament appropriately informed of the progress of the negotiations.

9. The prevention of an arms race in outer space is a priority agenda item of the Conference on Disarmament. As the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament should establish a subsidiary body and undertake negotiations on this subject. The mandate of the subsidiary body should have a clear ultimate objective, i.e. the conclusion of an agreement or agreements; and at the same time, may include an exploratory stage to identify issues.

10. In order to create conditions and an atmosphere favourable for negotiations, all countries with space capabilities should refrain from developing, testing and deploying space weapons.

52. Statement by the U.S. Representative (Lowitz) to the Conference on Disarmament: Outer Space, March 19, 1985 [1]

In my remarks today, I want to address an item added to our agenda relatively recently, but which is of considerable importance to my delegation, as it is to all of the States represented here. The Confer-

[2] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 38–43.
[1] CD/PV.300, pp. 22–28.

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ence on Disarmament has had under consideration the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space for only four years. Work on this issue in this and other forums has attracted the attention of the world community because of the role that the boundless environment of outer space increasingly plays in our daily affairs.

One cannot overestimate the benefits to the world that have resulted from the peaceful uses of outer space, which began some thirty years ago, and have multiplied to the point that instantaneous, global telecommunications made possible by artificial earth satellites are almost taken for granted. We also tend to forget how recently we have developed the ability to monitor the world's weather system in near-real time, to track the progress of major storm systems, to provide early warning to citizens, and to aircraft and to ships on the high seas. Most of us have probably seen the striking photographs which remote sensing satellites send back to Earth. These assist in locating natural resources, and in averting natural catastrophe from erosion or land misuse.

At the same time, we must very frankly acknowledge the fact that, in parallel with the great benefits from the peaceful uses of outer space that I have mentioned, and the myriad of other such uses far too numerous to describe here, outer space has long occupied an important role in the military activities of States and alliances of States. This role has included communications, navigation and monitoring the activities of military forces on the Earth's surface. Early warning against the possibility of large-scale attack by nuclear forces is another military activity of fundamental importance.

I think it is fair to say that all of the States represented in this chamber have a stake not only in the peaceful uses of outer space, but in the military uses as well. All of us, I believe, can agree that the monitoring by satellite of a number of international agreements in the arms control area, such as the bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, is an important application of space technology that directly serves international security and stability. Co-operative measures, such as the "Hot-Line" Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, also rely on the use of space—in this case to provide the communications links.[2]

All of us can recognize as well that outer space has been the location of military activities related to the testing of weapons, and, in at least one instance, the Soviet ASAT weapon system, the operational environment of an existing system for the destruction of satellites. Moreover, every time an intercontinental ballistic missile is tested, from the first such test by the Soviet Union in 1957, the trajectory of the missile's flight passes through outer space. The fact of operational ballistic missile forces possessed by a number of States is, of course, directly relevant to the security of every nation.

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[2] For the "Hot Line" Agreements, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 236–238, *ibid., 1971*, pp. 635–639, and *ibid., 1984*, pp. 520–523.

It is evident that the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is not a simple matter. It has many aspects, and all of them need to be considered. One such aspect of considerable importance is a development that many delegations here have already welcomed. That is the convening of bilateral negotiations between my country and the Soviet Union on 12 March here in Geneva, having the objective of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth. A number of interventions in the Conference have stressed the special responsibilities of the two major Powers, due to the extent of their involvement in outer space, and have urged them to give special attention to the arms control issues that involvement implies. Indeed, this is exactly what we hope will take place in these bilateral negotiations. One of the three negotiating groups in which the bilateral negotiations will take place will address defence and space weapons.

However, to say that two Powers presently have the greatest involvement in outer space does not mean that other States do not also have a presence and a role in that environment. Everyone recognizes that States and consortia including China, France, Japan, India, and the European Space Agency, have launched their own satellites into outer space. Many other States have made use of launching facilities of those States or consortia which offer them and similarly now have satellites operating in orbit. Thus, there is unquestionably a multilateral dimension to the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, and the Conference on Disarmament needs to address this question in depth.

My delegation has joined with other Western delegations in proposing, as a compromise, that the Conference decide to establish an *ad hoc* committee, to identify, in the first instance, through a thorough and substantive examination, issues relevant to our agenda item. The Committee would take into account all existing agreements, and also take into account existing proposals and future initiatives.

In his statement of 12 February, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, addressed the question of an *ad hoc* committee. He suggested that the Committee undertake the task, complementary to work in the bilateral negotiations, of a comprehensive examination of existing multilateral agreements.[3]

We recognize, Mr. President, the useful consultations which, under your guidance, have been continuing on the question of establishing a subsidiary body, and we hope that these consultations will soon bear fruit so that the Conference can get down to work within the framework of an *ad hoc* committee.

As long ago as 1982 my delegation spoke in a plenary meeting of the Conference on the important role played by present commitments in arms control agreements in ensuring international peace and stabili-

[3] Document 21.

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ty. These agreements include the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water; [4] the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; [5] and the 1972 bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.[6] My delegation will have considerably more to say on agreements such as these, within the context of the work of the *ad hoc* committee. At this point, let me simply note that the present network of international agreements respecting the outer space environment already provides exceptionally important, legally binding limitations on military activities in that arena, and my Government considers compliance with those obligations to be of the greatest importance.

Let me turn now to a related issue which has been very much in the forefront of public attention over the past several months, a subject which was raised by the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, in March of 1983,[7] and which is known as the Strategic Defense Initiative. I think it important to address this issue here today because so much has been said that is either misleading or plainly wrong. We need to consider the Strategic Defense Initiative on the basis of fact, not fantasy.

The essential idea in the Strategic Defense Initiative is this: suppose that research could demonstrate the feasibility of constructing a defensive system that could render far less potent, or even harmless, the threat posed by nuclear-armed ballistic missiles? Would it not be better, in this event, to agree to restructure the basis of strategic stability, from one relying ultimately on the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons to one relying on a defensive system that posed no such threat? Would this not be a more stable system of international security, of deterrence of war, than the present one? And would it not contribute toward the objective—an objective that we all fully share—of the total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere?

We should ask ourselves: why not open the floodgates of creativity for ideas to increase the chances that nuclear weapons will never be used, to ensure that a nuclear war—which can never be won—will never be fought? These are objectives to which all members of this Conference have committed themselves for many years: the search for international security, the attempt to bring ideas and diplomacy to bear on the most crucial problem of our age. I hope, then, that States represented here will not leap to criticize, but rather will consider carefully what my Government has in fact proposed. After all, if members of this body have attacked the theories of mutual terror or mutual assured destruction as inadequate or even immoral, is it responsible now for them to insist that defensive systems cannot and should not be devised that would lead to an escape from these theories and toward nuclear disarmament? Is it not defeatist *a priori* to deny

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[5] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 38–43.
[6] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[7] *Ibid., 1983*, pp. 199–201.

that technology can serve stabilizing and not only first-strike scenarios?

In his statement on 12 March, the distinguished Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Richard Luce, succinctly described the basis of the programme of research on which my Government has embarked. He cited four points as agreed between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher, and President Reagan. I believe these points bear being described again:

> First, the objective of the Strategic Defense Initiative is not to create a situation in which the United States or the West would somehow achieve superiority. Rather, the objective is to seek a situation of balance, taking into account developments by the Soviet Union.
>
> Second, any deployment of weapons related to the Strategic Defense Initiative would, in view of our obligations under existing treaties, in particular the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, have to be a matter for negotiations.
>
> Third, the objective of the Strategic Defense Initiative is to enhance the deterrence of war, not to increase the prospects of conflict.
>
> Fourth, we seek, in our negotiations, to strengthen international security and to bring about reductions in the levels of offensive nuclear weapons on both sides.[8]

With regard to these four points, I want to stress that the United States has taken, and continues to take seriously, its obligations under existing arms-control agreements. Consistent with this position, the United States has not conducted and has no intention of conducting any of the research under the Strategic Defense Initiative in a manner inconsistent with its treaty obligations, particularly its obligations under the ABM Treaty. In fact, as numerous statements by officials of the United States Government have made clear, one of the objectives of our bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union is precisely to stop and reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty.

I think it is salient to note, in this connection, that the obligations assumed by the parties to the ABM Treaty do not include limitations on research. Research is not prohibited by this agreement, and, in fact, the United States has engaged in a limited research programme on technologies related to defense against ballistic missiles for many years, extending back to the entry into force of the Treaty and before. This, of course, is also the case with the other party to the Treaty. However, our assessment is that the activities of the Soviet Union in the area of defensive technologies have been considerably greater than our own. Indeed, we estimate that over the last two decades their commitment of resources to strategic defense has been roughly comparable—I repeat roughly comparable—to the very high levels of their expenditures on offensive forces and has been many times higher than United States expenditures on defensive systems. Moreover, the Soviet

[8] CD/PV.298, p. 13.

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Union continues to deploy a system of anti-ballistic missile defenses, while the United States has not done so for nearly a decade. The Soviet Union has also engaged in a programme to upgrade the capabilities of their ABM system. The investment of the Soviet Union in advanced technologies related to missile defense has also been considerable, for example, in the area of directed energy systems such as high-energy lasers.

Naturally, in the Soviet Union such programmes are not the subject of parliamentary or public debate. Who in the USSR raised doubts about the Soviet space initiative? We have no way of knowing. We here all know well that Soviet weapons become the subject of debate—outside the Soviet Union—after they have been deployed. In the West, we discuss weapons long before we decide to produce them.

As explained in document CD/561, introduced by my delegation on 12 February, my Government has concluded that the large phased-array radar under construction by the Soviet Union in Siberia at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of its obligations under the ABM Treaty.[9] Moreover, other Soviet development activity and deployments of "air defense" surface-to-air interceptors with potential capabilities against strategic ballistic missiles raise more questions regarding Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty. In short, those who would complain about the actions of my Government with regard to research on defensive technologies would do well to direct their attention, their analysis, their questions, and their complaints elsewhere.

As a simple matter of prudence, my Government's investigations into strategic defensive technologies are needed to ensure that it is in a position to balance the developments by the Soviet Union to which I have referred. Such research constitutes an essential "hedge" against a developing potential by the Soviet Union to "break out" suddenly from the constraints imposed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It serves, as well, as a response to the erosion of the strategic balance caused by the continuing build-up by the Soviet Union of offensive arms. The United States cannot afford to allow a unilateral advantage to the Soviet Union that might open the door to a potential first strike. The activities of the Soviet Union must and will be taken into account so as to correct and stabilize the military balance. The United States will, of course, raise this issue in the bilateral negotiations and in other diplomatic channels.

On 5 [7] March, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, made a statement to this body on the same agenda item to which I am speaking today.[10] I welcome his reference to important co-operative efforts in the peaceful uses of outer space, not the least of which is the SARSAT–COSPAS rescue system, which my country has joined with the Soviet Union, Canada and France in developing and operating. The United Kingdom, Den-

[9] Identical with Documents 11 and 12.
[10] Document 42.

mark, Norway, Sweden and Bulgaria have now also joined thi system. These efforts are heartening evidence of how States can worl together to advance the international framework of co-operation. Th scientific missions to explore Venus and Halley's Comet on its clos approach to the sun next year are other fascinating and profitabl ventures in international co-operation.

Therefore, it was with some concern that I listened to other parts o Ambassador Issraelyan's statement, in particular his characterization o threats to international security supposedly arising from "vast space militarization programmes" recently adopted by the United States, including the Strategic Defence Initiative and the United States development programme for an anti-satellite weapon system. This characterization of the present situation can only be described as bizarre.

It was not the United States that first tested intercontinental ballistic missiles transiting through outer space. It was not the United States that developed a fractional orbital bombardment system using nuclear warheads—a system with no Western counterpart. It is not the United States that for over a decade has deployed and continued to test an operational anti-satellite weapon system. It is not the United States that maintains and is improving an operational anti-ballistic missile system. It is not the United States that has constructed a radar in violation of the obligations of the ABM Treaty. In sum, it is not the United States whose military development, testing and procurement have given a basis for fears that sudden abandonment of the ABM Treaty may be envisioned and plans for a first strike might be in preparation.

As stressed in document CD/561, non-compliance with arms control agreements now in force is a matter of crucial importance to my Government. But non-compliance is equally important to the world community. For whatever insistent calls may be issued here and there for sweeping new disarmament measures, often without regard to their verifiability, each of us here knows full well that arms control without confidence in strict compliance by all parties is a contradiction in terms. Such arms control does not add to world stability and security. It directly undermines these goals. Accordingly, the Conference on Disarmament surely has a vital stake in upholding the integrity of arms control agreements currently in force.

Let me generalize now on the actions of the Soviet Union that I have cited in the field of strategic offense and defense. As a whole, they have created a definite current imbalance and they threaten future strategic stability. But the Soviet Government did not raise the alarm over the "militarization" of space when it undertook its vast strategic buildup. Only now, when there is concern that this arsenal could be rendered less potent, or even harmless, is the militarization of space decried by some. This is understandable—transparent, but understandable.

We welcome the expression of resolute opposition by the Soviet Union to competition in nuclear or any other arms. This is entirely

consistent with our own position. The United States has made clear that if our research into defensive systems indicates their feasibility, survivability and cost-effectiveness, the deployment of such systems will be the subject of discussion, consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty, and consistent with the Treaty's provisions for amendment. As President Reagan recently described it, our long-term commitment is to "internationalize" missile defenses if they can be made effective. It is, thus, without foundation to suppose that the United States, by its efforts, seeks to increase and not reduce prospects of a nuclear confrontation.

I have already pointed out that the United States intends to undertake its research activities in full compliance with its Treaty obligations. Ambassador Issraelyan has argued that it would be "too naive" to assume that a programme of research would not inevitably lead to deployment because of "inherent momentum" in military technology. I can only speak for my Government on this account: we see no such inherent momentum in any piece of equipment or technology, and we trust that there is no such mechanistic or "inherent" momentum in the military technologies for defensive weapons under research in the Soviet Union. We trust that Ambassador Issraelyan does not mean his remarks to be an announcement of future deployment of defensive systems in contravention of the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the Outer Space Treaty, because of some inherent momentum in military technology.

I also take issue with Ambassador Issraelyan's claim that the United States programme to develop an anti-satellite weapon system is a particularly dangerous threat to international stability because of a potential dual-purpose role, as both an anti-satellite and an anti-nuclear missile warhead system. Rather, the United States programme is a measured response to deter Soviet use of their operational ASAT system and to provide a capability to counter Soviet satellites that, while not weapons themselves, can help target terrestrial forces of the United States and other nations. And the specious claim that Western deployments of intermediate-range weapons in Europe are deployments of "first-strike" nuclear systems merits no rebuttal except to say that the deployment by the Soviet Union of its SS–20 missiles with over 1,200 warheads is being met with a measured and much smaller response.

I share Ambassador Issraelyan's hopes for a completely successful outcome to the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union that began last week. I also echo the intention he voiced to be constructive in ensuring successful work in the Conference on Disarmament. That intention will be best served by avoidance of polemics.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize that my delegation is heartened by the receptiveness being indicated by so many delegations to the compromise mandate proposed for the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee to undertake serious, practical work to consider arms con-

trol and disarmament measures applicable to outer space. The time to establish a Committee is surely now.

53. Statement by ACDA Director Adelman Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: ACDA Authorization for Fiscal Years 1986–1987 [Extract], March 20, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to submit to the Subcommittee ACDA's request for the Agency's authorization level for FY86 and FY87 and ACDA's request for an increase in the Agency's authorization level for FY85. I am including with my prepared statement a copy of the proposed language for an amended authorization bill for FY85 and for the Agency's authorization bill to cover FY86 and FY87.

I hope you will appreciate that this year has been an extremely unusual one from the standpoint of being able to estimate our resources requirements. As you know, Secretary Shultz's meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko took place in early January of this year, and the agreement to resume arms control talks with the Soviets has changed our support requirements significantly. Since that meeting we have been working closely with the State Department, OMB, and other agencies to establish the level of support for the new arms control delegations in Geneva. We have now determined the amount of additional resources and personnel that will be needed for the work of the delegations in Geneva and also for our backstopping activities here in Washington. For FY85 we are requesting an increase in the authorization level from $21,932,000 to $23,789,000. This will permit an addition to ACDA's appropriation for this fiscal year of $4,321,000. For FY86 we are requesting an authorization level of $25,614,000. This will permit an appropriation of up to $6,146,000 over the amount requested in the President's budget submission to the Congress.

I know that the committee has traditionally sought a specific authorization figure for each fiscal year. However, because of the uncertainty that relates to our financial requirements for FY87 we plan to request an authorization level which is set as "such sums as may be necessary." Until we have more experience with the resource needs of the delegations, we cannot accurately forecast the authorization we will need for FY87, and I strongly believe that year's authorization amount can be most appropriately handled in this manner.

The above authorization levels have been arrived at by reviewing additional personnel requirements for the delegations and backstop-

[1] *Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Years 1986–1987: Hearings and Markup . . .*, 99th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 9–16.

ping work, enhanced security items, improved office automation, more modern communications facilities, translator requirements, housing for the increased number of Ambassadors and their staff, and other items which will be essential for the smooth operation of the delegations. Included in these totals is funding for 207 full-time equivalent positions for 1985 which is an increase of 9 positions over the present budgeted staff complement. For FY86 we have made provision for 208 full-time positions. In addition to these provisions, there are the Ambassadors in Geneva and their immediate staffs. Therefore, we also have the salary expenses for these 20 individuals who have been assigned to ACDA on a reimbursable basis. We have already provided to the committee staff some supporting documentation to illustrate the major budget category changes that make up the totals of the requested authorization levels. I will be very happy to provide additional details of this request in response to any questions you may have today or submit this information for the record.

When funds are authorized, they will be devoted primarily to the conduct of, and support for, the new negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms, and on defense and space arms control; on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions; negotiations at the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures on Disarmament in Europe; at the 40 nation Conference on Disarmament, where we are working to develop effective limitations on nuclear testing and on chemical weapons; and at the United Nations in New York.

In addition, these funds will support implementation of our policy to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to other countries; to support our obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [2] and this year's NPT Review Conference; and to enable us to fulfill other statutory arms control responsibilities.

Section 2 of the proposed bill would upgrade several key executive positions in the Agency to put them on the same level as their counterparts in other U.S. Government agencies. No change is sought in the Director's present Executive Level II, which is purposely on the same level as the Deputy Secretaries of the State and Defense Departments. But the bill would upgrade the position of the Deputy Director of the Agency from Executive Level IV to Level III. This would make him equal in rank to the Under Secretaries of State and Defense. The bill would also upgrade the positions of the Agency's four Assistant Directors from Executive Level V to Level IV, the same rank as Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense and Assistant Administrators of AID.

As pointed out in the Library of Congress Congressional Research Service report 84–519, "the Deputy Director, and the Assistant Directors [are] at Executive Pay Levels one step below those of parallel positions in the Departments of State and Defense. . . . Regardless of

[2] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

what the law stipulates regarding the functions of the agency and its officers, these differences in pay level can have meaning in reference to power and precedence in interagency negotiations and politics".[3] Therefore, I earnestly seek your support for legislation, first sought by the President in the last Congress, to remedy this inequity. The present situation is particularly detrimental to our effort now in view of our increased arms control responsibility.

Mr. Chairman, two years ago when I appeared before this Committee on the FY 84–85 ACDA authorization request, I pledged "to invigorate ACDA to the fullest of my abilities."[4] Today I would like to report to you on my efforts.

When I became ACDA Director, there were many vacancies within the Agency which hindered its ability to fulfill its responsibilities. These vacancies included critically important positions such as Deputy Director, and three of the four Assistant Director slots. We are now fully staffed. Former Congressman David Emery who has served on the House Armed Services Committee joined ACDA as my Deputy. As for the Bureaus, Thomas Etzold serves as Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs, Henry Cooper as Assistant Director for Strategic Programs, Lewis Dunn as Assistant Director for Nuclear and Weapons Control and Manfred Eimer as Assistant Director for the Verification and Intelligence Bureau.

In addition, we have created a new office—the Office of Congressional Affairs—separating this function from the General Counsel's Office where it previously existed. We have taken this step out of recognition of the strong interest and role of Congress in U.S. arms control policy. Both our legal and Congressional responsibilities have increased. Thomas Graham, Director of the General Counsel's Office will also serve as the Legal Advisor to the Geneva arms control delegation. It was our desire at ACDA to be fully responsive to Congressional needs to further the Executive-Legislative Branch process of consultation on arms control. As you are aware, I selected the new Director of the Congressional Affairs Office, Alison Fortier, from the Staff of the Committee. Alison also has working with her a deputy and two other Congressional Relations Officers who all have extensive Hill experience.

To review the integral role which ACDA plays in the U.S. arms control policy process, I would like to summarize briefly some of our recent activities.

First, ACDA has been deeply involved in the preparations for the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks in Geneva. We have fully participated in drawing up the U.S. negotiating positions for the INF, START, and Space groups. The Deputy Negotiator for the Defense and Space Group is Henry Cooper who, as I previously mentioned, is ACDA's

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, p. 392.

[4] Congressional Research Service, "The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Data on Management, Personnel, Budget, Status and Related Matters, 1981–83," by Charles R. Gellner and Lynn F. Rusten, February 1, 1984, 84–519S, p. 15.

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Assistant Director for Strategic Programs. Dr. Cooper co-chaired the Interagency Group tasked with preparing the U.S. positions on Defense and Space. In addition, ACDA, as an agency, is represented on each of the three negotiating teams and ACDA is back-stopping in Washington all three of the teams. We are providing for the record an outline of the U.S. delegation for the Geneva talks.

Moreover, consistent with ACDA's statutory authority, under the direction of the President and the Secretary of State, for management of United States participation in arms control negotiations, the Agency will manage the operation of these negotiations.

In another important area of arms control, Dr. Manfred Eimer, ACDA's Assistant Director for the Verification and Intelligence Bureau co-chaired the Arms Control Verification Committee Analysis Group which prepared the recent reports to Congress on Soviet compliance with existing arms control agreements.

ACDA heads the U.S. delegation to the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. ACDA also heads the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Disarmament Commission, the U.S. delegation to the UNGA First Committee which treats arms control issues, and ACDA heads the U.S. delegation to the NATO Disarmament Experts which meets twice a year in Brussels. The U.S. Deputy Representative to the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) is an ACDA official.

ACDA is also the lead agency in the Executive Branch for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Dr. Lewis Dunn, my Assistant Director for Nuclear Weapons and Control, has the lead in U.S. preparation for the September 1985 NPT Review Conference. These activities and many others are described in greater detail in our Congressional Presentation Document.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, I conclude by asking your support for the Fiscal Year 1986–1987 ACDA authorization request and for the supplemental authorization for FY85. We look forward to working with this committee and with the Congressional Arms Control Observer Group and to do everything possible to facilitate the rightful role of Congress in the arms control process.

54. Communique of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, March 27, 1985 [1]

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) met in Ministerial Session in Luxembourg on 26th and 27th March 1985. Spain attended as an observer.

2. On the basis of a comprehensive briefing by the United States Secretary of Defence we reviewed the status of nuclear forces includ-

[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 33, No. 2 (April 1985), p. 33

ing all aspects of the negotiations which recently began in Geneva and the United States strategic modernization programme. NATO's strategic forces are the ultimate deterrent to preserve security, peace and freedom. Therefore we support the United States and United Kingdom efforts to maintain the credibility of their strategic nuclear deterrent capabilities.

3. We welcome the opportunity offered by the negotiations which started in Geneva on 12th March, encompassing defence and space systems, strategic nuclear forces and intermediate-range nuclear forces. We discussed the prospects for progress in each of these areas stressing that continued close consultation among the Alliance partners was essential. We noted that these negotiations would be difficult, long and complex. We strongly support the United States approach to these negotiations and call on the Soviet Union to participate constructively in them.

4. We have continued the comprehensive consultations on the political and strategic implications of the United States' Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). This is designed to establish whether recent advances in technologies could offer the prospect of significantly more effective defence against ballistic missiles. We support the United States research programme into these technologies, the aim of which is to enhance stability and deterrence at reduced levels of offensive nuclear forces. This research, conducted within the terms of the ABM Treaty,[2] is in NATO's security interest and should continue. In this context, we welcome the United States invitation for Allies to consider participation in the research programme.

5. We noted with concern the extensive and longstanding efforts in the strategic defence field by the Soviet Union which already deploys the world's only ABM and anti-satellite systems. The United States strategic defence research programme is prudent in the light of these Soviet activities and is also clearly influenced by the treaty violations reported by the President of the United States.

6. We are concerned about the continuing build-up of Soviet nuclear forces. We note that they are completing development and testing of a wide range of new strategic systems, including two Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), a new Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), and a new bomber. A new generation of ground-, air- and sea-launched cruise missiles is beginning to enter operational service. The current SS–20 force is composed of 414 SS–20 launchers with 1,242 warheads. The Soviet Union continues to update and improve its shorter-range nuclear forces.

7. In contrast to the growth of Soviet nuclear forces at all levels, it is NATO's policy to maintain only the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary for deterrence. At Montebello in 1983, we decided to withdraw 1,400 warheads over the next five or six years.[3] SACEUR

[2] For the text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[3] See *ibid., 1983*, pp. 917–918.

presented his plan to achieve this by the end of 1988. SACEUR's plan embraces reductions in a variety of warheads. Taken together with the withdrawal of the 1,000 warheads following the 1979 dual-track decision,[4] the total number of warheads removed from Europe since 1979 will be 2,400, resulting in the lowest NATO stockpile level in 20 years. In addition, since one further warhead is being removed from the stockpile for each Pershing II or Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) deployed, the NATO stockpile level will not be affected by deployment of Longer-Range INF (LRINF).

8. In the context of the reductions agreed at Montebello, we also agreed to undertake the necessary actions to improve our forces across the spectrum of capabilities to ensure a continuing credible deterrent. Accordingly, SACEUR was tasked to develop recommendations. As part of this process, we received a report from SACEUR on the improvement aspects of the Montebello Decision for the maintenance of a survivable, responsive and effective nuclear force structure in support of flexible response. We agreed to consider SACEUR's recommendations in detail and to continue close consultations on the implementation of his improvement proposals. At the same time we reiterated our determination to continue the process of improving NATO's conventional defence capabilities.

9. We noted the progress made on LRINF deployments by NATO nations and the fact that negotiations on INF systems are underway again. We reviewed, in particular, prospects for these negotiations and expressed support for the United States negotiating position developed in close consultation with its Allies. We emphasized NATO's determination to continue the deployment of LRINF missiles as scheduled in the absence of a concrete negotiated result with the Soviet Union obviating the need for such deployment. At the same time, we reiterated our willingness to reverse, halt or modify the LRINF deployment including the removal and dismantling of missiles already deployed—upon achievement of a balanced, equitable and verifiable agreement calling for such action.

10. Greece expressed its views in a statement included in the minutes. Denmark reserved its position on the INF part.

55. Statement by the Federal Republic of Germany on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, March 27, 1985 [1]

1. The American-Soviet negotiations, which began on March 12th 1985 and with which the two great powers have linked the desire for a general improvement of their relations, open up new possibilities for East-West relations as a whole. A stable relationship between the

[4] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 814–816.

[1] Hamburg DPA in German, March 27, 1985; FBIS *Daily Report,* March 27, 1985, vol. VII, pp. J1–J3.

United States and the Soviet Union is decisive for flourishing developments in Europe. There is now an opportunity, based on the existing agreements and the CSCE process, to arrive at more stable and more durable East-West relations which include positive developments in the political, economic, cultural, and humanitarian spheres. We Germans have a special interest in improvements for the people in our divided country.

This development confirms the Harmel concept of the Western alliance, strongly supported by the Federal Government, which calls for constructive dialogue and extensive cooperation on the basis of guaranteed defense capability.

As a result of the meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko the following, among other things, was agreed on January 8th, 1985:

Both sides agreed that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions that will concern space and nuclear weapons, both strategic and medium-range weapons, and indeed with all the questions that must be brought into consideration and solved with respect to their reciprocal relationship. The aim of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements directed at preventing an arms race in space, at ending it on earth and at limiting and reducing nuclear weapons and strengthening strategic stability.[2]

The Federal Government supports the negotiating goals set out in this statement.

2. In the opinion of the Federal Government the following is necessary in accordance with the negotiating goals formulated in Geneva:

—To prevent an arms race in space, end it on earth and to consolidate strategic stability,

—To drastically reduce and limit nuclear strategic and medium-range weapons, which also is in accordance with the preamble to the ABM Treaty [3] and Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,[4]

—To allow research by both sides on the SDI and its problems to lead to cooperative solutions,

—To reaffirm [*bekraeftigen*] the ABM Treaty as long as no other mutual agreements have been concluded.

In this connection, the Federal Government points to the statement in the declaration of 8 January 1985 that the issues on the agenda for negotiation are to be weighed and solved in their "interrelationship." In this, particular significance will be attached to the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons for the strengthening of stability.

3. The security policy of the Federal Government and of the alliance is and remains the policy of preventing war of any type. All our

[2] Document 3.
[3] For the text of the ABM Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–207.
[4] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

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efforts in the sphere of deterrence, defense, disarmament, and arms control are directed toward this goal.

The Federal Government considers it of decisive importance that the whole spectrum of the military balance of forces between West and East should be incorporated into the arms control dialogue: no type of weapon should be exempt from negotiations. We want concrete progress in:

—The Vienna negotiations on bilateral and balanced troop reductions in Central Europe
—The Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe.
—The negotiations on the complete worldwide ban on chemical weapons at the Geneva disarmament conference.

4. President Reagan has repeatedly made clear that the SDI is a long-term research program directed exclusively at defense, whose goal is to examine possibilities for the development of new non-nuclear antiballistic missile defense systems. It is to be established whether it may be technologically possible to reduce the threat from ballistic missiles by new defensive systems which would also protect the United States' allies.

5. The Federal Government welcomes the U.S. Government's statement that

—No superiority is being sought by means of the SDI
—The results of the research phase must be awaited before decision which go beyond research can be made
—It is ready for continuous and intensive consultations with its allies.

6. The treaty on the limitation of ABM systems of 1972 permits research work. All the signs speak for the view that the Soviet Union has been exploring for a long time new technology which could be used for antimissile purposes; in addition, the Soviet Union possesses the only ABM system capable of functioning and is modernizing it. Research for the U.S. President's SDI is therefore justified.

7. We are also in agreement with our alliance partners that

—The strategy of flexible response must remain effective, without change, for the alliance as long as there is no more effective alternative for the goal of preventing war,
—The political and strategic unity of the alliance must remain protected,
—The security of Europe must not be detached from the security of the United States,
—The conventional imbalance in Europe must be reduced.

8. The Federal Government welcomes the fact that intensive consultations by the U.S. Government with the alliance partners are taking place on all subjects in the Geneva negotiations and on issues concerning the SDI. They are indispensable for us and emphasize what impor-

tance the United States attaches to agreement with its alliance partners.

9. The Federal Government will use these consultations in the alliance for strengthening the Western negotiating position and in the interests of the unity of the alliance.

10. The Federal Government will continuously pursue and assess the economic and technological aspects of the SDI research program.

It will also, with regard to the SDI, continue to endeavor to ensure that the Europeans will bring a united attitude to the consultations.

56. Statement by the U.S. Representative (Lowitz) to the Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, March 28, 1985 [1]

Mr. President, negotiations to ban chemical weapons have been under way for over 10 weeks thus far this year. During our plenary sessions devoted to these important negotiations, it is appropriate to take stock—to determine what has been accomplished and what remains to be done. That is what I propose to do today.

1985 marks the sixth year of the existence—in one form or another—of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons. Under the leadership of a series of dedicated chairmen, significant progress has been made towards a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Many delegations have contributed to the development of guiding concepts and to the elaboration of specific provisions.

Last year my own delegation presented a draft convention (document CD/500) which built upon the work already accomplished in the Conference and incorporated a number of new ideas of our own.[2] The convention would provide a complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons without undue interference in the use of chemicals for permitted purposes. To ensure confidence in compliance—confidence which is essential for an effective ban—the convention would provide for a system of routine declarations and inspections of key facilities, supplemented by a flexible system for resolving concerns that may arise. It is our view that the types of verification measures contained in the United States draft convention would serve the interests of all countries.

This year, Finland and the United Kingdom [3] have presented carefully elaborated and very constructive Working Papers. We welcome their dedicated work.

But despite our efforts, an impartial assessment of our present situation must be that the really difficult problems remain. Moreover, time

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[1] CD/PV.303, pp. 7–13.

[2] For the text of the U.S. draft convention, see, *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 269–299.

[3] CD/CW/WP.92 and Document 41.

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does not favour those that seek a chemical weapons ban. Let me address the latter point first.

Information available to us—and the dramatic evidence that chemical weapons have been used in several recent conflicts—make clear that chemical weapons capabilities are spreading. In fact, more than a dozen States possess chemical weapons. The spread of chemical weapons poses a threat to all countries, particularly developing countries.

As more countries acquire chemical weapons, the likelihood increases that chemical weapons will be used, causing horrible suffering and a weakening of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.[4] Both fashion and fear may prompt additional countries to obtain chemical weapons and this dangerous process of the spread of chemical weapons could begin to feed on itself. At some point an effective chemical weapons ban could become almost impossible to negotiate because of the number of countries with security requirements to be satisfied, not the least of which would be the extensiveness of the verification system.

The United States has expressed concern over the use of chemical weapons by several countries in various regions of the world—in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and in South-East Asia. We have strongly supported international investigation of reports of the use of chemical weapons. We believe that the legal and moral authority of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 must be upheld and that urgent attention by the world community is called for whenever use of chemical weapons is reported.

A year ago, on 13 March 1984, the United States representative to this Conference conveyed our conclusion that Iraq had used lethal chemical weapons in its conflict with Iran and that this constituted a serious breach of the Protocol and of related rules of customary international law.[5] Today it is my sad task to report our conclusion that Iraq has again used chemical weapons, in the recent fighting with Iran. My Government condemns the use of chemical weapons in violation of international law and conventions whenever and wherever it occurs, including this latest instance.

There is little doubt that recent violations of the Geneva Protocol are a threat to the integrity of the most venerable of arms control agreements and, in fact, a threat to the foundations of the arms control process itself: the belief that States may find genuine security based on international agreements and law instead of their own armaments. This should be a sobering thought for a conference seeking to negotiate new arms control agreements.

All States need confidence that the treaties they enter into are being complied with. When that confidence is eroded so is the hope we place in an international structure based on law.

Many nations prefer to treat compliance concerns as a matter only for the accuser and the accused. Yet in matters of international securi-

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.
[5] CD/PV.249, pp. 24–25. See also *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 135–136.

ty, especially in the nuclear age, there can be no spectators. A State's responsibility for an arms control agreement must not end when it is signed. States cannot remain indifferent when such basic interests as the integrity of present and future treaties are involved: they must take an active role. However, the United States is not asking other nations to choose sides, but only to realize that the allegations are sufficiently troubling—especially but not exclusively in the area of chemical weapons—to warrant an active interest in the matter, including a search for resolution of the disputes.

Some States have justified silence by citing their high standards of proof. Indeed, we would agree that the evidence is complex and that the world rarely yields incontrovertible proof. But does this mean that States should do nothing at all? Would they have those responsible for law enforcement in their own countries refuse even to investigate a case until the courts could guarantee a conviction? Such an approach would yield neither justice nor confidence within a country, and it cannot by expected to provide a stable system of international agreements.

States must realize that there is a direct relationship between the manner in which compliance concerns have been dealt with in the past and the kinds of verification measures in new arms control initiatives. The verification proposals in the United States draft convention are, in part, a direct result of our experience with the international response to our concerns about non-compliance. This experience forms a key part of the background to understanding our proposals.

Time is working against us in another way—through the development of science and technology.

Unfortunately, chemical weapons are not difficult to make in comparison with nuclear weapons. As more countries develop their chemical industries the potential for manufacturing chemical weapons will inevitably expand as well.

Moreover, the chemical warfare agents known today are relatively primitive. They were discovered largely by trial and error. But our knowledge of biochemistry is rapidly growing, and such information about the chemical processes in the human body provides in turn the ability to manipulate those processes. Thus, the invention of new and even more deadly types of chemical warfare agents become technically feasible.

As another example, there are chemicals which are present naturally in the body in small quantities, but which in larger amounts could be injurious. Advances in biotechnology make it possible to produce large quantities of such chemicals.

Finally, we are concerned about development of chemicals which could make existing protective equipment useless.

All of these disquieting developments have prompted my Government to try to accelerate the negotiations. Since 1983, we have taken a number of initiatives, including the introduction of a complete draft convention. On behalf of President Reagan, Vice-President George

Bush has twice visited the Conference to stress the urgency of negotiating an effective ban of chemical weapons. We have explained our positions in detail and expressed our readiness to negotiate. And what has been the result? So far, not much. There is no sense of urgency. There is no spirit of problem-solving.

As I have argued today, the effective prohibition of chemical weapons is an urgent matter which should concern us all. Such weapons are not limited to the super-Powers or a handful of industrialized countries. In fact, the majority of chemical-weapon States are developing countries in the Middle East and Asia. It is in the developing world where chemical weapons have been used in recent years and where the risk of use in the future is greatest. And it is precisely developing countries which are the most vulnerable and which can least afford to divert scarce resources to chemical defence. We cannot agree with those who argue that a ban on chemical weapons should somehow be dependent on progress in other matters before the conference or that it is a matter of interest to only a few countries.

I believe that an effective chemical weapons convention can be achieved. The disturbing trends mentioned earlier do not have to get out of hand. But it will require a new sense of urgency and dedication from all of us. The Conference cannot continue on a "business as usual" basis and expect to succeed.

What then is to be done? Let me offer some specific suggestions.

First, our work must be put on a more rational schedule. Under the present arrangements no serious negotiations take place between mid-August and late February. Almost half of each year is being wasted. No other international negotiation operates in such a fashion. Our experiments with a three-week session in January have not succeeded—for a variety of reasons. A better way needs to be found. For this reason my delegation strongly supports the proposal for a six-week negotiating session in the autumn.

Understandably, a number of delegations have pointed to the difficulties such a schedule would pose for existing staffing patterns. Concern has been expressed that the benefits might not outweigh the costs. I believe that a more rational schedule would lead quickly to better results. Of course, there is no way to know in advance. But there is a way to ensure that negotiations do not move forward in the six months between August and February. If there is no negotiating session there will be no progress. Instead of following a course that will clearly not help to accelerate the negotiations, let us take an initiative to provide the framework for swifter progress.

The second suggestion for accelerating the negotiations is for the Conference to identify and focus on the truly pivotal issues. At times it seems that the negotiations have become entangled in a thicket of secondary issues. Each of these issues is important to at least one delegation. But solving these numerous complex issues one-by-one will not move the negotiations ahead very quickly. The Conference should concentrate its efforts on those issues which are the keys to

progress. In every negotiation there are a few such issues. If progress can be made on these pivotal issues, momentum will build up and secondary issues will be resolved much more rapidly.

At the current stage of the negotiations, three issues seem to my delegation to be the keys to progress. One is the declaration of locations of chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities. A second is how to ensure that chemical weapons are not produced under the guise of commercial chemical production. The third is what approach to take to challenge inspection. Today I will briefly recall the approach to each issue proposed in the United States draft convention (CD/500) and elaborated in the statement by my delegation on 23 August 1984.[6]

Regarding the first issue, the United States has proposed that the locations of chemical weapons stocks and of chemical weapons production facilities be declared within 30 days after a State becomes a party to the convention. In our view this is essential for assessment of whether all stocks and facilities have been declared and thus for ensuring confidence in compliance. It is the key not only to assessing the initial declarations, but also to monitoring the declared stocks and facilities until they are destroyed.

On the second issue, the importance of ensuring that the chemical industry is not misused for chemical weapons purposes has been emphasized by Western, Socialist and Group of 21 delegations alike. The United States strongly supports the approach developed by the United Kingdom. Under this approach the level of verification would depend on the level of risk, and unnecessary interference in civil use of chemicals would be avoided.

As for the third issue, an effective compliance mechanism, including challenge inspection, is an essential safety net. It would supplement the system of routine verification, which should be the principal means for ensuring confidence in compliance. My Government, beginning with an assessment of the verification difficulties unique to chemical weapons and the dangers posed by undeclared stocks and sites, has taken the unprecedented step of proposing to open our country to mandatory inspection anywhere, any time. We are proud of this commitment: it was not an easy one to make. Yet it represents in our view the best and most effective way that we know of to deter possible violations—by ensuring that suspect activities are promptly dealt with.

These, then, are my delegation's views on where the real problems lie. We would welcome the views of other delegations, so that the negotiations can be focused on the major obstacles to a convention.

The third suggestion for accelerating work on a chemical weapons ban is related to delegations' readiness to negotiate. This means establishing clear positions, responding constructively and promptly to proposals from others, and working co-operatively to develop new, mutu-

[6] CD/PV.284, pp. 12–16.

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ally-acceptable solutions. This factor is something of a truism, but I feel compelled to underscore its fundamental importance, because this is perhaps the area of greatest disappointment for my delegation. The United States has established detailed positions. It has responded to numerous questions. And it has made clear that the United States proposals have not been presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis.

Unfortunately, the actions of the delegation of the Soviet Union give us the impression that the Soviet Union is not yet prepared to negotiate with the United States or others in this Conference. There is no point in speculating here about the reasons that may lie behind this unresponsiveness. The regrettable fact is that detailed substantive responses to proposals from us and others have not been made.

The Soviet delegation has not responded to major Western initiatives that have been before this Conference for a year or more. What is the Soviet response to the proposals made by the United Kingdom for ensuring non-production of chemical weapons? [7] We do not know, although the basic approach was first presented two years ago. What is the Soviet response to the United States draft convention presented a year ago? It is whispered in the corridors that the Soviet delegation intends to ignore the United States draft. So it seems, but this can hardly be called negotiation.

The Soviet delegation has responded to the United States proposal for "open invitation" challenge inspection.[8] But not constructively. Those who choose to criticize have a responsibility to present an equally effective alternative. But the Soviet delegation has not done so. Furthermore, it has rejected or ignored United States efforts to meet Soviet concerns and continues to misrepresent the United States proposal for propaganda purposes.

What my delegation is looking for is a problem-solving approach by our Soviet negotiating partners—for evidence of a commitment to try to work out mutually-acceptable solutions that accommodate our concerns. The delegation of the Soviet Union would find that such a commitment to co-operation would be fully reciprocated.

This is no empty promise. My delegation is prepared to match words with deeds. Let me give some specific examples.

The United States delegation has explained in detail the reasons why the locations of chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities must be declared promptly for the convention to be effective. In an effort to meet the concerns expressed by the Soviet Union, the United States is willing to consider the possibility that a party could move its chemical weapons stocks before declaration from their original storage sites in combat units to regional depots.

Since only the regional depots—and not the combat units—would contain chemical weapons, only the locations of these depots would have to be declared. Thus, the locations of combat units would not be

[7] For the British working paper, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 164–168.
[8] The U.S. proposal may be found *ibid., 1984*, pp. 300–304.

revealed. The locations of depots would be declared within 30 days after the convention enters into force for the State.

As a second example, with respect to destruction of chemical weapons, the Soviet delegation has insisted that a party be allowed to divert some chemicals to industrial uses. My delegation has not been in favour of this concept. The Soviet delegation has not made clear what would be diverted nor how the peaceful use of the chemical would be verified. However, in an effort to meet the concerns expressed by the Soviet Union, the United States is willing to explore in detail whether a mutually-acceptable solution can be developed which would permit diversion under effective verification.

As a third example, the issue of how to identify so-called "key precursors" has consumed considerable amounts of time and energy. The Soviet position has been that "objective criteria" must be agreed to before lists can be developed. My delegation and others have questioned whether criteria could be established that were not subject to varying interpretation. The United States view has been that efforts should focus on the lists themselves, rather than on abstract and imprecise criteria. However, in an effort to meet the concerns expressed by the Soviet Union, the United States is willing to work in parallel on guidelines for the lists and on the lists themselves. In this way the interests of both sides could be accommodated.

The final example of our co-operative attitude is in the area of challenge inspection. My delegation believes strongly that mandatory, short-notice challenge inspection is essential for an effective chemical weapons ban. It is essential because of the difficulty in distinguishing between permitted and illicit production of chemicals and in establishing confidence that all declared stocks and sites are in fact all the stocks and sites there are.

However, as we have made clear on numerous occasions, we are willing to consider any counterproposal that is designed to meet our concerns. We have never insisted on retaining every jot and tittle of our convention: we have sought only to satisfy our security concerns. The collective efforts of this body may develop a better, more effective way of meeting these concerns, and we would welcome such a development. Furthermore, in an effort to meet concerns expressed by the Soviet delegation, let me state again that my delegation is prepared to explore means to ensure that all relevant facilities are subject to challenge inspection, regardless of whether they are privately or State-owned.

I began this statement with a fairly pessimistic assessment of the present state of affairs. I pointed out the increasing risk that the negotiations to ban chemical weapons completely will be overtaken by the spread of chemical weapons capabilities and by the emergence of completely new types of chemical weapons. For my Government these developments are compelling reasons to accelerate the work of the Conference on a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

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How can we accelerate the negotiations? By adopting a problem-solving attitude. The four specific topics I mentioned a moment ago would be good places to start. My delegation is ready to work on them, as well as on all other aspects of the future agreement. Our hope is that all delegations are prepared to join us.

57. News Conference Statement by the Netherlands Representative (van de Mortel) to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, March 28, 1985 [1]

During this round, the East has tabled its draft basic provisions and has elaborated on them. The West has asked questions on the new Eastern proposal and has received explanations and elaborations from its Eastern colleagues in response. The West also used the plenary and informal sessions to raise a series of issues which need to be dealt with by the sides if they are to negotiate an effective agreement on reductions and limitations.

We have listened closely to what the East has had to say about its basic provisions, and the West is giving the new Eastern proposal its attention. We hope that we can rely in equal measure on the East to give close attention to the points raised this round by the West. The West will continue to make every effort to enable the sides to achieve a mutually satisfactory and sound outcome.

In today's Plenary session, the Acting United States Representative, Mr. Vladimir Lehovich, speaking for the West, offered some considerations on elements of effective arms control, particularly as they relate to the Vienna negotiations. He noted that reflection on such considerations in the weeks ahead would enable participants to prepare constructively for the next round of negotiations. I would like to reiterate a few of his principal remarks.

The first element that must be taken into account concerns the realities of the situation. For example:

—Geography imposes considerable disadvantages upon the West, and there are also important areas of Eastern numerical superiority in conventional forces in Central Europe.
—The implications of an agreement are distinctly different for indigenous as contrasted with non-indigenous forces.
—The subject of the negotiations is the relationship of forces between East and West in the agreed reductions area and not within each alliance. The Western alliance is a collective one, in which decisions are taken on a basis of consensus. In the Western view, Eastern and Western forces should be treated collectively with the sole exception of United States and Soviet forces for which exception important reasons exist.

[1] ACDA files.

—Given the problems inherent in reductions of and limitations on armaments, focusing initially on manpower is more likely to achieve timely results.

A second element essential for effective arms control is agreement on common goals. Our common objective, as defined in the Final Communique of 1973,[2] is to contribute to a more stable relationship and to strengthening of peace and security in Europe. Our agreed principle for reaching this objective is the principle of undiminished security. The security of the West would be put at hazard if it were in effect denied the ability regularly to exercise its reinforcement capabilities or carry out other normal peacetime activities. Also, it is important to ensure that the security of participants with special status is not diminished.

A third element of effective arms control is the establishment of standards which relate an agreement to its goals. *Inter alia*, the sides need to know, for each stage in the process, the reduction amounts for each side and the resulting interim, as well as final, limitations. These need to be expressed numerically. Undiminished security can be maintained only if reductions and limitations are clear, calculable, predictable and verifiable.

Indeed, an integral element of effective arms control is adequate verification. The importance of verification as an integral part of arms control agreements has increasingly been recognized, reflecting the fact that agreement on reductions and limitations cannot by itself enhance stability. Reliance on political goodwill and national technical means are not sufficient; verification measures need to take into account the nature of the reductions and limitations obligations undertaken and the objectives and goals of the negotiations. Verification, moreover, must be part of the arms control process from the beginning. As with a voyage, in arms control the end is too late to determine that one is on course.

The West, in its July 1982 draft treaty and April 1984 initiative, has offered an approach which takes the aforementioned considerations into account and contains the elements of an effective agreement.[3] During the recess, we shall be reflecting on these negotiations, giving of course due attention to the East's February 14 proposal. As we do so, we will have in mind such considerations as the ones mentioned. We invite the East also to use the weeks ahead to reflect upon the requirements for effective arms control.

In this way, both sides will return to our work in May better prepared for the next round of negotiations.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1973*, pp. 363–364.

[3] For an account of the draft treaty as given by the Western participants, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 420–421.

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58. News Conference Statement by the Polish Spokesman (Matuszewski) at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, March 28, 1985 [1]

In his plenary statement today, the Head of the Delegation of the Polish People's Republic, Ambassador Stanislaw Przygodzki, summed up the results of the 35th round of the Vienna negotiations.

He emphasized that by putting forward on February 14, 1985 the draft of "The Basic Provisions of an Agreement on the initial reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States of ground forces and armaments in Central Europe and on a follow-on non-increase of the levels of armed forces and armaments of the sides in this area" the Socialist countries have opened new possibilities of achieving a breakthrough at the Vienna negotiations.

Ambassador Przygodzki stressed, in particular, the following advantages of the new proposal:

1. It enables a prompt elaboration of an agreement on initial U.S. and Soviet reductions in Central Europe as well as on a following non-increase of forces and armaments of all direct participants in the area, with no need to resolve at this stage the questions in which the positions of the sides fall particularly far apart from each other. Thus, it would make possible to start expeditiously the process of reducing the level of military confrontation in the center of Europe without having to wait until all divergences between the sides are resolved.

2. It is fully consistent with the basic principle of undiminished security for each participant and with the mandate of the talks. The proposed scopes of the initial U.S. and Soviet reductions are more than fair, taking into consideration the unilateral withdrawal of 20 thousand Soviet troops from the GDR on the one hand, and a considerable increase in American forces in Western Europe on the other. Equally just and equitable is a no-increase commitment on a collective and national basis.

3. Due to its compromise nature, the proposal of the Socialist countries further enhances a scope of mutual agreement. It takes into account the Western position on a number of important aspects such as the contractual form of the commitments both with regard to reductions and a follow-on "freeze", the form of initial reductions, and other elements.

4. The Draft of February 14 provides for necessary measures of control fully adequate to the needs of effective verification of the observance of the proposed agreement.

5. Although the initiative of the Socialist countries aims at concentrating efforts on achievement, without further delay, of the first tangible results in Vienna, it does not change our long standing aspiration for reaching a comprehensive agreement. On the contrary, we

[1] ACDA files.

believe that the attainment of the partial agreement covering initial U.S. and Soviet reductions and no-increase commitment would create conditions conducive to further talks on subsequent, more substantial reductions of forces and armaments of all direct participants. The Draft spells out a clear obligation to continue negotiations with a view to achieve equal collective levels of 900 thousand men including 700 thousand in ground forces on each side. The Socialist countries' comprehensive Draft Agreement of 23 June 1983 remains in force.[2]

6. A prompt realization of the steps proposed by the Socialist countries would have, first and foremost, a considerable political and psychological effect. It would help to improve international atmosphere and enhance mutual confidence. One should not however underestimate the military significance of such steps. It is evident that the withdrawal from Central Europe of 33 thousand soldiers together with their armaments and combat equipment as well as a subsequent "freeze" of the levels of forces and armaments in the heart of the European continent would not be of a symbolic value only.

The delegations of the Socialist states have answered all the questions raised by the West with regard to the February 14 initiative and expressed readiness to discuss and to take into account any suggestions of the Western side provided they are constructive and do not undercut the very sense of the proposal.

The Head of the Polish Delegation pointed out that the situation in the Vienna negotiations in their 12th year is such that necessity for prompt, concrete actions has become imperative. The Warsaw Treaty countries have made their contribution to this end. What is needed now is a serious, constructive and timely response of the West.

59. Administration Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative: Compliance of the Strategic Defense Initiative With the ABM Treaty [Extract], April 1985 [1]

B.1.1 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

The following addresses " . . . the status, from the present year to completion, of each Program, Project and Task under the Strategic Defense Initiative and related programs with respect to compliance with the ABM Treaty." The likely need for modification to the ABM Treaty to proceed beyond the SDI research program is discussed. The existing process for ensuring compliance with Strategic Arms Limitation (SAL) Agreements, including organizational responsibilities and

[2] Cf. the Soviet Representative's brief account of the draft agreement may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 572–574.

[1] U.S. Department of Defense, Strategic Defense Initiative, *Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985*, Appendix B, pp. B1–B6.

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reporting processes and their application to SDI and the ABM Treaty, is also described.

The President's Strategic Defense Initiative, January 1985, makes clear that SDI is a research program. It states:

- The President announced his Strategic Defense Initiative in his March 23, 1983, address to the nation. Its purpose is to identify ways to exploit recent advances in ballistic missile defense technologies that have potential for strengthening deterrence and thereby increasing our security and that of our Allies. The program is designed to answer a number of fundamental scientific and engineering questions that must be addressed before the promise of these new technologies can be fully assessed. The SDI research program will provide to a future President and a future Congress the technical knowledge necessary to support a decision in the early 1990s on whether to develop and deploy such advanced defensive systems.
- As a broad research program, the SDI is not based on any single or preconceived notion of what an effective defense system would look like. A number of different concepts, involving a wide range of technologies, are being examined. No single concept or technology has been identified as the best or the most appropriate. A number of nonnuclear technologies hold promise for dealing effectively with ballistic missiles.[2]

B.1.2 POLICY

There are three major points to be made regarding United States Policy on compliance with the ABM Treaty.[3]

First, the SDI research program is being conducted in a manner fully consistent with all U.S. Treaty obligations. The President has directed that the program be formulated in a fully compliant manner and the DoD has planned and reviewed the program (and will continue to do so) to ensure that it remains compliant. Specifically, our review has found that the research necessary to support a decision on the potential utility of the SDI technology can be conducted in accordance with U.S. Treaty obligations.

Second, because there are gray areas that are not fully defined in the ABM Treaty, it is necessary in some cases to set additional standards to make certain that the U.S. is in compliance.[4] This review has been conducted using reasonable standards of U.S. compliance. Four of the more important working principles of this review are that:

- Compliance must be based on objective assessments of capabilities which support a single standard for both sides and not on subjec-

[2] *The President's Strategic Defense Initiative*, p. 1.

[3] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–204.

[4] An example is the issue of components versus subcomponents. ABM components are defined in the Treaty as currently consisting of ABM missiles, launchers, and radars. Subcomponents, which are not limited by the Treaty are not defined by the Treaty. [Footnote in source text.]

tive judgments as to intent which could lead to a double standard of compliance.

- The ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems and components that are space-based, air-based, sea-based, or mobile land-based. However, that agreement does permit research short of field testing of a prototype ABM system or component. This is the type of research that will be conducted under the SDI program.
- New technologies and devices should not be subjected to stricter standards than have evolved for existing systems.
- The ABM Treaty, of course, restricts defenses against strategic ballistic missiles; it does not apply to defenses against non-strategic ballistic missiles or cruise missiles.

Third, this report does not consider Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. We do reserve the right to respond to those violations in appropriate ways, some of which may eventually bear on the Treaty constraints as they apply to the United States. The United States Government must guard against permitting a double standard of compliance, under which the Soviet Government would expect to get away with various violations of arms agreements while the U.S. continues to abide with all provisions.

B.1.3 OVERALL COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT

The entire SDI research program as submitted in the FY 1986 authorization request is being conducted in compliance with the ABM Treaty. The SDI program consists of near-term technology research projects and longer-term technology experiments. The technology research projects directly support the experiments by providing the necessary technologies. These near-term technology research projects and tasks are well defined and clearly compliant. The major technology experiments to be conducted in later years are being planned to be fully compliant. These experiments are designed to demonstrate technical feasibility, that can be established without involving ABM systems or components or devices with their capabilities. Thus, compliant space-based as well as fixed land-based experiments are possible.

The SDI research program can be conducted in a fully compliant manner to reach a decision point in the early 1990s on whether to proceed to development and deployment of an SDI-related system. The compliance evaluation process is an on-going one, as current programs become better defined, new programs are added, and some programs are eliminated or modified. Development and deployment, given a decision to proceed, would almost certainly require modifications to the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty provides for possible amendments at any time and five year review sessions during which possible changes can also be discussed. Also, Article XV (2) provides a right to withdraw from the Treaty. In this connection, during the negotiations Gerard Smith stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on

strategic offensive arms following agreement on an ABM Treaty and the interim SALT Agreement. He stated:

> If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved in five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute the basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.[5]

B.1.4 EXISTING COMPLIANCE PROCESS FOR SDI

DoD has in place an effective compliance process (established in 1972 after the signing of the SALT I agreements), under which key offices in DoD are responsible for overseeing and will continue to oversee SDI compliance with all existing strategic arms control agreements. Under this process the SDIO, the relevant Agencies and Services ensure that the implementing program offices adhere to DoD Compliance Directives and guidelines.

Specific responsibilities are assigned by DoD Directive 5100.70, 9 January 1973, *Implementation of SAL Agreements*. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USDRE) ensures that all DoD programs are in compliance with existing SAL agreements. The Service Secretaries, Chairman JCS and Agency Directors ensure the internal compliance of their organizations. The DoD General Counsel provides advice and assistance with respect to the implementation of the compliance process and interpretation of SAL agreements.

DoD Instruction S–5100.72 establishes general instructions, guidelines, and procedures for ensuring the continued compliance of all DoD programs with the existing agreements. Under these procedures questions of interpretation of specific agreements are to be referred to the USDRE to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. No project or program which reasonably raises an issue as to compliance can enter into the testing, prototype construction, or deployment phases without prior clearance from the USDRE. If such a compliance issue is in doubt, USDRE approval shall be sought. In conjunction with the DoD General Counsel, the USDRE applies the provisions of the agreements, as appropriate. Military departments and DoD Agencies are to certify internal compliance quarterly and establish internal procedures and offices to monitor and ensure internal compliance.

As a new agency, SDIO was instructed to submit quarterly reports certifying its compliance and to monitor its projects, as required of other DoD Agencies. The Services are to ensure that SDI projects under their auspices are monitored and implemented in a Treaty com-

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[5] The complete and exact statement reads: "A formal statement was made putting the U.S.S.R. on notice that if an agreement providing for more complete arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized and should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the Treaty." See *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Arms: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-second Congress, Second Session*, p. 288. Also printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, p. 425.

patible manner. They are to include SDI compliance in the quarterly reports they submit under DODI S–5100.72.

B.1.5 CATEGORIES OF TREATY COMPLIANT ACTIVITIES

There are three basic types of activity that are permitted in compliance with the ABM Treaty. The SDI major experiments described in a later section have been classified according to these categories.

Category 1—Conceptual Design or Laboratory Testing. This activity precedes "field testing" and was considered during the ABM Treaty negotiations to be research that was not verifiable by National Technical Means (NTM) and that was not subject to Treaty limits. In testimony provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1972, Gerard Smith presented the following statement:

> The SALT negotiating history clearly supports the following interpretation. The obligation not to develop such systems, devices, or warheads would be applicable only to that stage of development which follows laboratory development and testing. The prohibitions on development contained in the ABM Treaty would start at that part of the development process where field testing is initiated on either a prototype or breadboard model. It was understood by both sides that the prohibition on 'development' applies to activities involved after a component moves from the laboratory development and testing stage to the field testing stage, wherever performed. The fact that early stages of the development process, such as laboratory testing, would pose problems for verification by National Technical Means is an important consideration in reaching this definition. Exchanges with the Soviet Delegation made clear that this definition is also the Soviet interpretation of the term 'development'.[6]

Category 2—"Field Testing" of Devices that Are Not ABM Components or Prototypes of ABM Components. As noted earlier, Article V prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems or components that are space-based, sea-based, air-based, or mobile land-based.

The Smith statement shows it was clear in 1972 that "development" begins when "field testing" is initiated on either a "breadboard model" or "prototype" of an ABM component. This definition of "development" was used as a basis of ratification by the Senate and has been used as a U.S. Government standard for the last thirteen years. The definition of "development" coupled with Article V led to the prohibition on "field testing" of "ABM systems" and "components", or their "prototypes" and "breadboard models", which are other than fixed land-based. SDI "field tests"of space- or other mobile-based devices cannot involve ABM "components" or "prototypes" or "breadboard models" thereof. All SDI Category 2 experiments must meet this criteria.

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[6] *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Arms: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-second Congress, Second Session,* p. 377.

"ABM systems and components" are defined in Article II as follows:

> For the purpose of this treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of: (a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode; (b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and (c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

No space-based, air-based, sea-based or mobile land-based launchers, interceptors, and radars may be "tested in an ABM mode". Toward this end, an interceptor missile is considered to be "tested in an ABM mode" if it has attempted to intercept (successfully or not) a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight. Likewise a radar is considered to be "tested in an ABM mode", if it performs certain functions such as tracking and guiding an ABM interceptor missile or tracking strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight in conjunction with an ABM radar which is tracking and guiding an ABM interceptor missile. "Strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight" include ballistic target-missiles with the flight characteristics of strategic ballistic missiles or their elements over the portions of the flight involved in testing.

Category 2 experiments must also meet the obligation of Article VI not to give non-ABM launchers, missiles, or radars the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. Allowed Category 2 activities include tests of experimental devices to demonstrate technical feasibility and gather data prior to reaching the stage of prototype or breadboard model of an actual ABM component or weapon system. Tests of ABM sub-components and non-ABM systems performing functions consistent with Treaty obligations (such as air defense and early warning) are also legitimate Category 2 activities.

Category 3—"Field Testing" of Fixed Land-Based ABM Components. "Field Testing" of fixed land-based ABM components or systems is permitted as long as other Treaty provisions are met. Under Article IV all tests must take place at agreed ABM test ranges (for the U.S., White Sands Missile Range and Kwajalein Missile Range) and the total test launcher count must not exceed 15. Paragraph 2 of Article V addresses limits on launcher capabilities as follows:

> Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

An Agreed Statement adds the prohibition on "delivery by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead" to Article V.

Summary. The SDI projects and experiments have been reviewed to ensure that they will be implemented in accordance with one of the three categories of treaty compliant activities. The Services and the SDIO are obligated to plan and implement them in a compliant manner. In this assessment many of the SDI devices do not use traditional technology, but are "based on other physical principles" (such as lasers). In these cases they were reviewed by considering their capability to substitute for traditional ABM components, whether they will be "tested in an ABM mode" by analogy to the requirement for interceptors, launchers, and radars, and the intended use of the device in the experiment.

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60. Eighteenth Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Confidence-Building Measures [Extract], April 1, 1985 [1]

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The signatories to the Helsinki Final Act are required by the Act's Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament to give prior notification of "major military maneuvers exceeeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with possible air or naval components." Notification is required for maneuvers that take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating state and must be made 21 days or more in advance of the start of the maneuver. The notification "will contain information on the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the maneuver, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, and the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. Participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces." [2]

In addition, signatories are encouraged to engage in other confidence-building measures (CBMs) on a voluntary basis. These voluntary CBMs include the invitation of observers to maneuvers and prior

[1] Department of State, Special Report No. 130, "Eighteenth Semiannual Report, Implementation of Helsinki Final Act, October 1, 1984–April 1, 1985," p. 16.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 305–306.

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notification of major military movements and exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops.

Implementation

The United States and its NATO allies continue their excellent record of implementation of these CBMs. The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) notified the major maneuver "Central Guardian," which took place on January 21–31, 1985, on F.R.G. territory with the participation of approximately 72,000 troops from the United States, the F.R.G., Luxembourg, and France. Observers were invited to attend by the Federal Republic. A voluntary notification was also made by Norway of the maneuver, "Cold Winter 85," which took place on March 15–21 on Norwegian territory with the participation of about 10,000 troops from Norway, the Netherlands, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

Among the neutral and nonaligned (NNA) countries, Sweden made a voluntary notification of the maneuver "Vastgrans," which took place from February 18 to March 5, 1985, involving 22,000 Swedish troops. Observers were also invited to attend.

The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies did not provide formal notification of any military maneuvers in the present reporting period, and there is no indication that maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops occurred. The G.D.R. media reported on February 9–10 that a combined military exercise involving Soviet, East German, and Polish troops would take place on G.D.R. territory but did not indicate the duration of the exercise or the size of the forces involved. Such reports cannot be considered a notification under the Final Act.

The Eastern record of compliance with the spirit, and in some cases the letter, of the confidence-building provisions in the Final Act has generally been poor. When notifications are made, they usually provide the bare minimum of information required. Czech notification of "Shield 84" last August failed to specify the dates and location of the exercise as well as the countries taking part. Similar omissions occurred in the notification of "Shield 82" by Bulgaria. In September 1981, at a time when great pressure was being put on Poland, the U.S.S.R. failed to live up to its Helsinki obligations by not specifying the number of troops participating in the major maneuver "Zapad 81," which led to a formal protest by the United States. The voluntary notification of maneuvers involving fewer than 25,000 troops and the invitation of observers from NNA or NATO countries have also been the exception rather than the rule. The only discretionary notification by the U.S.S.R. occurred in 1983 for the maneuver "Dnestr" to which, in a rare move, observers were invited to attend from Turkey, Greece, Italy, and a few NNA states.

It remains to be seen whether the Eastern performance noted above will improve when the Warsaw Pact next holds maneuvers of a size which will require notification.

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61. Decision Adopted by the Conference on Disarmament: Establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, April 1, 1985 [3]

In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament,[4] the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an *Ad Hoc* Committee under item 5 of its agenda entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

The Conference requests the *Ad Hoc* Committee, in discharging that responsibility, to examine, as a first step at this stage, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1985 session.

62. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, April 4, 1985 [1]

Today, we wish to consider in detail the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, which has a special place in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. World-wide public opinion expects the Conference to resolve this issue as early as possible. The activities of the Conference on Disarmament are ever more closely associated in the minds of many with the chemical weapons negotiations. No one would deny that much has been done in this area over the past years. The beginning of intensive negotiations this year on banning chemical weapons under the guidance of the Committee Chairman Ambassador Stanislav Turbanski is also a source of satisfaction.

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[3] CD/584.
[4] For the Final Document, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411 ff.
[1] CD/PV.306, pp. 12–16.

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Nevertheless, we remain concerned at the slow pace of the negotiations. The talks continue year after year and there are still no tangible results, no radical breakthrough. Some of the parties, as if frightened by the possibility of the negotiations being successfully completed and the convention signed, come out from time to time with deliberately unacceptable and, I would say, extremist proposals.

In spite of all these serious complications resulting from the position of certain parties, the Soviet Union still believes in the possibility of solving this urgent problem and continues to make efforts towards concluding a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons on terms acceptable to all the negotiating parties.

For more than half a century, ever since the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,[2] and up to the present day, the Soviet Union has been following a consistent, unswerving course aimed at drawing up and signing a convention which would ban chemical weapons completely and for all time while posing no risks to the security, economic or any other interests of any State taking part in the negotiations.

It may be of some interest to the members of this Conference that as early as 1928 the Soviet delegation to the Preparatory Commission for the General Conference on Disarmament introduced a proposal to supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol with a new one containing, in particular, the following provisions: all the means and devices serving the purposes of chemical warfare, namely all asphyxiating gases used for military purposes as well as all devices for the diffusion of such gases, in particular gas-throwers, spray devices, balloons, flame-throwers and other devices in service with troops, as well as stored in depots or in the process of production, were to be destroyed. Furthermore, it was proposed that industrial facilities producing chemical weapons should immediately stop their production.[3]

Had those proposals of the Soviet Union been accepted by the other parties to the negotiations, chemical weapons would have long since been eliminated and there would be no need for the difficult and protracted discussions we are presently engaged in on this issue.

What is today the main obstacle, the main hindrance to the progress of chemical-weapon negotiations? Apparently, the continuing efforts by some of the parties to impose their own approaches and their own selfish perceptions on others. This attitude is utterly unsound. We are convinced that in the search for mutually acceptable solutions, in particular to key problems, one should bear in mind the specific political, economic and defense interests of each party, as well as remember the historical experience of every nation and people. I wish particularly to stress this. Some, and namely the Soviet Union, which has lost dozens of millions of lives as a result of foreign intervention and aggression, have been taught by the hard experience of their history to be especially cautious about various proposals calling for

[2] The text of the Protocol may be found in *Documents on Disarmament*, pp. 764–765.
[3] *Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference*, series VIII, p. 64.

"openness", "publicity", unlimited verification and other dubious ideas. Meanwhile others, who have not had to go through the same ordeals as our people has, are proceeding mainly from the "experience" of petty suspicions, trumped up and blown out of all proportion by their own propaganda.

We were recently told in this chamber that, and I quote, "anyone with nothing to hide can agree to specific verification measures". This is probably true, provided that the one applying such measures acts in good faith and without ulterior motives. But given our historical experience, can we rest assured that such will always be the case?

The distinctive feature of Soviet proposals is precisely that we are not trying to force on others provisions which might impair their national security or inhibit their economy. Let us look, for instance, at the Soviet Union's approach to the question of chemicals used for permitted purposes.

This approach would spare the civilian, commercial chemical industry the considerable burden of intrusive outside verification procedures which would otherwise have extended virtually to each individual enterprise. At the same time, for the purposes of the convention, we feel obliged to propose several specific restrictions on the operations of chemical industries. We are suggesting that the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals should be restricted, as well as that of one particular class of substances which poses the greatest threat while having almost no peaceful uses—namely the methyl-phosphorus compounds. Such restrictions could not do any significant damage to any party to the future convention. We would like to recall in this connection that limitations on the production of certain chemicals are not completely unusual. It is common knowledge that pesticides are not nearly as dangerous to humans as are supertoxic lethal chemicals. Yet the production of some pesticides is actually subject to definite restrictions.

Indeed, do the peaceful branches of chemical industry in fact depend on supertoxic lethal chemicals as greatly as is sometimes portrayed by certain delegations? Would it not be wiser to consider including in the convention a provision allowing for such amendments with regard to supertoxic lethal chemicals and methyl-phosphorus compounds as may be required in view of scientific and technological developments and industrial needs in the future?

The other approach, which is not ours, is that of extending verification to all chemical industries, which would, in our view, be unpracticable and could most adversely affect the economic activities of States.

This has been only further proved to us by the Working Papers of the United Kingdom (CD/514 and CD/575) [4] which reveal under close scrutiny that their authors would like to make hundreds and even thousands of different chemicals subject to all kinds of rigorous monitoring, which would be all-embracing rather than focused on the most

[4] Document 41.

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dangerous technological stages of production. Now is this actually feasible?

One might properly ask what would be less burdening for the chemical industry—a certain number of reasonable restrictions or an expensive across-the-board monitoring whose implications for the economic and other interests of States might prove to be far from benign?

Another question which demands a very cautious, balanced and responsible approach is that of the elimination, dismantling or conversion of chemical-weapon production facilities. Everyone will probably agree that toxic chemicals, including ones intended for chemical-weapon purposes, are obtained in the chemical industry as a result of several production stages, each having a different technological set up. One of these is the final technological stage in the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals or key components of binary systems. What, then, should be the object of practical interest from the viewpoint of drawing up the convention? Should the entire facility be eliminated, or would it be more appropriate to eliminate only the part responsible for the final technological stage? The answer to this seems obvious.

The reluctance of certain negotiating parties to accommodate the positions of others and the desire to impose one's own unilateral approach explain why the question of destroying chemical-weapon stockpiles has not yet been resolved at the negotiations. The main thing that remains to be done here is, in our view, to agree on a procedure for destroying the stockpiles of chemical weapons that would not offer unilateral military advantages to anyone at any stage of the destruction. We are prepared to examine all kinds of proposals submitted during the negotiations, including the working proposal by one of the delegations to alternate the destruction of the more dangerous weapon stockpiles with that of less dangerous weapons, thereby taking account of such factors as the increase in mutual trust between States as stocks are destroyed, the capacity maintained during that time for adequate reaction to possible convention violations by parties or non-parties, and so forth.

Throughout the long history of international negotiations, the partners in any talks have first established agreed baselines and criteria and only then proceeded to formulating specific definitions on their basis. This has also been the case with the talks on banning chemical weapons. Toxicity criteria have been defined with utmost precision on the basis of objective factors, a tentative definition of key precursors has been provided, work has been done on certain other provisions of the future convention. And now after several years of strenuous negotiating efforts, it is suggested that we should give up objective criteria and replace them with such purely subjective categories as, for example, the notion of "risk" presented by various chemicals. I repeat, this is a subjective concept. It will mean one thing to one State and something else to another State. And it will certainly be very hard to

reach agreement on this basis. This kind of approach actually turns the question of key precursors upside down. It is our firm conviction that the first thing to do is to define the criteria and have them agreed upon, and only then, based on those criteria, should a list of key precursors be drawn up. We believe that a technical solution to this problem has already evolved and that it should now be set out as a draft clause for the future convention.

This would open the way to drawing up the list of key precursors as such. Arguments to the effect that certain individual precursors may fail to meet all the established criteria do not stand up to criticism. We presume that exceptions to the general rule, where they are truly necessary, could be dealt with under the convention. Recently we were offered a "new" approach, presented as an important "concession", according to which criteria would be formulated parallel to the drawing up of lists. But this takes us nowhere. The question of criteria will arise whenever another key precursor is added to the list. Therefore criteria should be defined and agreed upon in advance.

The question of the key precursors that can be used to produce binary chemical weapons is of course a separate one. The Soviet delegation suggests that for the purposes of the convention such key precursors be referred to as key components of binary chemical systems, since not all key precursors are suitable for that role in view of the particular thermodynamic requirements of a binary system.

During the negotiations some delegations suggest totally different regimes to be adopted for the very same chemicals. While for protective purposes supertoxic lethal chemicals could be produced only at a small-scale specialized facility in quantities up to one tonne per year and subject to the most stringent international control, their production for other permitted purposes would be allowed anywhere and in unlimited quantities. A convention based on such proposals, while eliminating the present industrial base for chemical-weapons production, could end up establishing all the prerequisites for the creation of a new, more advanced and sophisticated one. We cannot accept such a double standard for ensuring the non-production of chemical weapons. This must not be allowed. The Soviet delegation believes that a study of Finland's proposal on possible versions of the small-scale facility could be of some use in dealing with this issue.

Proposals from other delegations aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions receive our careful consideration. This applies in particular to the proposals of France concerning the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals, classification of facilities and determination of their respective regimes, and solution of the binary weapons problem, as well as proposals by the delegation of China and by other delegations.

The elaboration of principles and arrangements for challenge inspection to clarify ambiguous situations has been and remains one of our most formidable tasks. No one is suggesting, as the United States delegation is trying to make it appear, that challenge inspection should not be conducted unless there is a proved violation of the convention.

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At least this is not our position. What we do believe is that challenge inspection requires a particular sense of responsibility and political realism on the part of States. It must be understood that compliance with the convention will be based primarily on the goodwill of the States parties to it, on their wish for a peaceful world less burdened by arms race, and on their desire to eliminate the very means of waging chemical war. It will also be based on the fact that States, which usually set a high value on their political prestige, will not allow it to be damaged through their own fault.

This is the only approach that can help us place challenge inspection in a proper perspective within the convention and correctly formulate the relevant provisions without eroding the very purpose of such inspection or undermining the sovereign rights of States. It should be well understood in Washington that efforts to make challenge inspection mandatory and automatic will only waste our time in working out the convention. Our response to such proposals is unambiguously negative.

In this connection I would like to make the following point of principle which does not concern only the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As is well known, the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament indicates that the form and the terms of verification provided for in any particular agreement depend on the purposes, the scope and the nature of that agreement.[5] Applied to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons which is now being drawn up, this obviously means that the form and the terms of verification must be such as to reliably ascertain whether the convention is being complied with, on the one hand, and not to go beyond its scope, on the other. Hence we cannot but object to forms of verification that could be used for purposes beyond those of the convention.

Prohibition of chemical weapons by no means requires such things as providing access to facilities which produce the types of weapons not affected by the agreement in question. It is therefore only natural that if we are to approach the task of banning chemical weapons seriously, verification procedures have to be drawn up that could not be abused to interfere in the activities of States not covered by the convention which bans one specific type of weapon of mass destruction.

We have repeatedly emphasized that general and complete verification can be discussed only at the stage of general and complete disarmament, whereas attempts to impose general and complete verification as part of a limited agreement banning one specific, although important, type of weapon of mass destruction—namely chemical weapons—is to raise artificial obstacles in the way of working out such an agreement.

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[5] For the Final Document, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411 ff.

In conclusion I would like to reiterate that the Soviet delegation stands ready to continue serious and constructive negotiations with a view to the earliest conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons. As is well known, we were among those who advanced the proposal to make a more rational use of our time for negotiations and we remain firmly committed to the Conference decision or recommendation at its previous session to hold an extended session of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons in the autumn of 1985.

For the USSR, the prohibition of chemical weapons has been and remains a priority task set out in the most important documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet Government. The Soviet delegation will do everything in its power to solve this task as rapidly as possible.

63. Note From the United States to the Cuban Interests Section of the Embassy of Czechoslovakia: 1981 Dengue Fever Epidemic in Cuba, April 5, 1985 [1]

The Department of State refers the Cuban Interests Section of the Embassy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to Note 1778 of the Ministry of External Relations of the Republic of Cuba which was presented to the United States Interests Section of the Embassy of Switzerland in Havana on December 4, 1984. The Department of State does not consider the Ministry's note an adequate response to its note of November 20.

The Department of State reiterates its vigorous protest of the charges made by officials of the Government of Cuba, on various occasions, that germs causing dengue fever were introduced into Cuba, by an agency of the United States Government. It is the view of the United States Government that the 1981 outbreak of dengue in Cuba was directly attributable to inadequate efforts to control the disease by the public health services in Cuba itself, and may have been related to Cuba's extensive involvement in the internal affairs of other countries, given the possibility that dengue germs were introduced into Cuba by persons returning from Africa or Southeast Asia. The U.S. Government categorically rejects claims made by Cuban officials that the United States was involved in any way in the episode.

The Cuban government's allegations are particularly repugnant given the fact that the United States Government, because of humanitarian considerations, made a major exception in 1981 to its trade policy to authorize, in an expeditious manner, an emergency shipment of pesticides to assist the Cuban Government in its belated efforts to control dengue fever. Moreover, it is well known that the U.S. Government provided valuable assistance to efforts to combat previous

[1] Department of State, Special Report No. 133, pp. 4–5.

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dengue epidemics in Cuba, including the 1977 epidemic. Dr. Pedro Mas, Assistant Director of Research in the National Institute of Epidemiology of Cuba's Ministry of Public Health, during a presentation to a 1978 seminar sponsored by the Pan American Health Organization in Jamaica, described the important role of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research in identifying the dengue-I virus.

The Department of State is forced to conclude that these repeated charges, made in the full knowledge of their falsehood, are hostile propaganda against the United States. A former Cuban health official publicly has stated that the Cuban government chose this explanation to divert attention from what it believed to be the likely carrier of dengue fever: Cuban personnel returning from abroad.

In reference to the arguments contained in the December 4 Note, the quotation from the testimony of the convicted terrorist Eduardo Arocena in no way supports the misinterpretation made by Cuban authorities. First, it is absolutely baseless to assert that the group described by Arocena as "ahead of" him—if it even existed and whatever it may have been—had any association with the United States Government. Similarly, the implication that Arocena himself had any association with the United States Government is baseless.

Furthermore, the Department notes the misleading mistranslation made in the Ministry's Note when it quotes from Arocena's testimony. According to the official transcript, Arocena referred to "the group that was ahead of me," which translates to "que estaba adelante de mi." The Foreign Ministry's Note, however, distorted Arocena's words by translating this phrase as "encabezado por mi," which means "headed by me." Arocena plainly was not in this instance testifying about his personal activities, but was referring to alleged activities of unnamed individuals about which he claimed to have some knowledge.

Finally, Arocena claimed that the group ahead of him was "to take certain germs and to introduce them into Cuba." He does not identify those germs as the dengue virus. Also, no information is available regarding the techniques purportedly used to "introduce them into Cuba." Since dengue viruses can only be transmitted by the bite of an infected mosquito, there are only two ways for the virus to be introduced into a previously dengue-free region: in an infected mosquito or in an infected human. The fact that Arocena states his belief that a group took into Cuba "certain germs" without referring to taking either mosquitos or infected humans makes it extremely doubtful that he was referring to an attempt to introduce dengue into Cuba.

The Department of State is surprised that vague and uncorroborated claims of indirect knowledge of undefined actions, coming from a disreputable source, would be used as the basis for such malicious charges by high Cuban government officials. The Department again notes that the United States Government prosecuted the Arocena case to conviction.

The article appearing in *Trabajadores* drew from articles appearing in *Prensa Latina*, an agency of the Government of Cuba. *Prensa Latina* has continued this disinformation campaign by reiterating these false and wholly unsupported allegations on several occasions.

In his comments at the Conference on Pediatrics on November 11, 1984, the President of Cuba stated that "At the time when this epidemic broke out in our country—as we found after thorough investigation—there were no sites of this serotype anywhere in the world." This is not true. In 1981, dengue-2 was isolated in health laboratories in essentially every appropriately equipped public health laboratory in Southeast Asia, including laboratories in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. The only reason that dengue-2 was not isolated in every country in that region is that several countries lacked the required diagnostic capability. It would be inconceivable that dengue would respect national borders in Southeast Asia, given the enormous flows of refugees throughout the region. The Department of State notes that numerous Cuban officials, potential carriers of the dengue virus, were present in that region at the time.

In the accompanying enclosure to its note of December 4, entitled "Data on the use of biological warfare and other forms of illegal action against Cuba," the Ministry of Foreign Relations claimed that "at the time the dengue epidemic occurred in Cuba, no African or Southeast Asian country with which we have relations had experienced any epidemic of the type-2 virus." This statement is contradicted by the facts. As noted above, dengue-2 viruses were circulating throughout Southeast Asia. Some countries in the region, such as Kampuchea, were experiencing epidemics of dengue hemorrhagic fever in 1981, but lacked diagnostic facilities to test for viruses. Although epidemics of dengue hemorrhagic fever were not observed in Africa, dengue-2 strains were regularly isolated in 1981 from mosquitos in Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and Upper Volta, and it is highly likely that dengue-2 was also present in other countries of Africa, but was not detected simply because appropriate studies were not done. The Department of State notes that prior to and since 1981 a substantial number of Cuban military and other personnel—potential carriers of the dengue virus—have traveled or been assigned to countries in Africa which may have dengue-2 viruses.

The President of Cuba also stated that the epidemic "occurred in a way that was really very unusual, very strange." The President fails to explain this statement. If, however, he is referring to the fact that the epidemic was first noted in several districts simultaneously, as was related by Dr. Kouri in his Calgary presentation, there is nothing at all strange about this. Most dengue infections, especially those among children, are not easily recognized as dengue. The symptoms and signs of dengue fever are non-specific, and early cases can be misdiagnosed. By the time severe cases are recognized, an epidemic of febrile disease may have already been underway for some time, with ample opportunity for wide geographic spread. In addition, soldiers and others re-

turning from Africa and Asia presumably returned to various parts of the island.

While the President of Cuba did not explicitly accuse a specific country in his November 11 speech, prior accusations such as those made by Dr. Gustavo Kouri in Calgary, Canada, in September 1984, and subsequent accusations repeated in *Prensa Latina* strongly suggest that this innuendo was directed against the United States. If, in fact, he was accusing a different country, the Department would appreciate further clarification.

The enclosure to the Ministry's December 4 Note includes the claim that "it was also proven that no Cuban or foreign individual coming from those areas, or from other areas, had been a carrier of the disease." This claim is scientifically unsupportable. The incubation period of dengue, that is the period from the time that an individual is bitten by an infected mosquito to the time that he becomes ill and virus circulates in his blood, is three to seven days. With air travel, it is possible for an individual to be infected in one country, travel to another, and not become ill or infectious until a week later. Immigration health checks are totally inadequate to detect infected persons during the asymptomatic incubation period. Imported cases of dengue are common occurrences throughout the world. A Cuban doctor in charge of health inspection in the port of Mariel during the mid-1970's publicly has stated that ships carrying Cuban troops returning from Africa were excluded from normal registration procedures, by order of Cuba's high command.

In the enclosure the claim is made that "outbreaks of virus No. 2 had not occurred in the Latin American and Caribbean Basin countries since 1979." Yet although the dengue-2 virus was not isolated from any country in the region during the year 1980, it had frequently been isolated from numerous countries in the region during the preceding decade and has been isolated from numerous countries in the region during the last three years.

In the enclosure the claim is made that "it is widely known that dengue No. 2 is one of those that has been receiving the greatest attention in the U.S. centers that are engaged in developing biological weapons." This claim is blatantly false. The U.S. Government has no such program. To the contrary, research efforts sponsored by the U.S. Government, as well as efforts sponsored by other countries and by the World Health Organization, focus on the eradication of dengue-2. This is because dengue-2 is the dengue serotype responsible for the greatest amount of human suffering; methods for prevention and treatment of dengue-2 infection are urgently required.

The evidence demonstrates that the Cuban government itself must accept responsibility for the 1981 outbreak of dengue in Cuba. The Cuban government failed to take the necessary measures for eradicating the carrier of dengue, the *aedes aegypti* mosquito, prior to the outbreak of 1981, despite specific warnings and recommendations made in

1980 by consultants from the Pan American Health Organization, and in 1977 by Cuba's own Institute of Tropical Medicine.

A Cuban campaign against this mosquito was cancelled by the Cuban government in 1967, leaving favorable ecological conditions for reproduction. Moreover, most of the provinces in Cuba lacked insecticides, trained personnel or equipment effectively to combat dengue in 1977 or 1981. For 18 months after the 1977 outbreak, dengue cases continued to be reported and the mosquito population was still high. Although another large scale epidemic began in early 1981, the Cuban government waited until mid-1981 to take action. Even after organized effort was initiated, Cuban personnel were given inadequate training, lacked adequate insecticide and detection equipment, and failed to report all dengue cases. A former official of the Ministry of Public Health has stated that President Castro himself admitted to a national seminar for leaders of the mosquito eradication program in July 1981 that too little attention had been given to the disease and that the epidemic was entirely the responsibility of the Cuban Communist Party and the Cuban government.

Cuba's own scientists and political leaders are presumably well aware of these facts and are knowingly attempting to blame the United States for events which were largely the result of policies of the Cuban government itself. Because Cuba's medical community apparently has been unable to analyze fully the dengue phenomena, a U.S. expert in dengue research has prepared a readily understandable scientific description of dengue fever and a rational analysis of the probable cause of the 1981 epidemic in Cuba. These papers are attached as annexes to this note.

The Department of State calls upon the Government of Cuba to retract its false accusations concerning a nonexistent U.S. role in the outbreak of dengue fever in Cuba and to desist from repeating such charges in the future.

64. Interview of Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev by *Pravda*, April 7, 1985 [1]

Question: Our newspaper is receiving many letters, both from Soviet people and from abroad, concerning international affairs. How would you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, characterize the present international situation?

Answer: I understand the increased interest that people have in international affairs. The broad popular masses in all continents strive actively to influence the destiny of the present world.

And this is not by chance. The world is full of complex problems—political, economic and social. There really do exist two opposing

[1] CD/587.

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social systems—socialism and capitalism. Dozens of new States with their own history, traditions and their own interests are active in the international arena. And this, too, is a reality.

In order to develop international relations in the present-day world one must take this into account, one must not ignore the interests of other States and still less try to deny them their right to choose their own road of development for themselves. In the broad sense, this is precisely the policy of peaceful coexistence under which each of the systems will prove by force of example, and not by force of arms, which of them is the better.

Another conclusion, which is just as urgent, is the necessity to end the arms race. The development of the international situation has reached a borderline at which the question arises: where do we go next, is it not time for those who shape the policy of States to stop, think and prevent the adoption of decisions that would push the world to nuclear catastrophe?

There is an acute need of international co-operation in developing dialogue, in searching for realistic solutions that would ease tension in the world and help close off the road of the arms race.

All States, big and small, should take part in this. Quite understandably, the nuclear Powers, and above all the Soviet Union and the United States of America, have a special role.

Our country has pursued and will pursue a vigorous and constructive foreign policy in the name of strengthening peace. This was confirmed at the recent plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee at which the Soviet State's foreign policy principles were outlined.

Question: A great deal is linked in the world with the state of Soviet-American relations. Have there appeared, in your opinion, possibilities of their changing for the better?

Answer: Relations between the USSR and the United States of America are an exceptionally important factor in international politics. But we are far from looking at the world only through the prism of these relations. We understand the weight of other countries in international affairs and take this into consideration when evaluating the general situation in the world.

Are there now any changes for the better in Soviet-American relations? There is no simple answer to this question. There is some ground for hope, but also some, and indeed much, ground for alarm.

New Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms have begun in Geneva. This is a positive fact.

Jointly with the United States we defined the subject and aims of the talks and, to put it briefly, defined them as follows: not to start an arms race in space, to stop it on Earth and to start a radical reduction of nuclear arms, with their total elimination as the ultimate aim.

Now it is necessary to carry out this accord. The talks are important. I say this first of all because the direction of the further development of Soviet-American relations, and world trends as a whole, is now

being decided. The choice is as follows: either an arms race in all directions, a growth of the danger of war, or else the strengthening of universal security, and a more durable peace for all.

There are some advances in other fields of Soviet-American relations, but very small ones. On the whole, relations remain tense.

In Washington they are banking on strength, and they do not conceal it. And they have set their sights on a superior strength that would subordinate the rest of the world to America. Diplomacy and talks are there virtually subordinated to missiles and bombers. For it is a fact that new strategic arms programmes are being pushed through Congress by, among others, the same people who are conducting the talks in Geneva on behalf of the United States.

Everybody has heard a lot about the "Star Wars" plans announced by the United States Administration. The terminology appears to be taken from science fiction, but the attempt is to use it as a screen to conceal the real and grave danger to our planet. I would describe as fantastic the arguments used to substantiate the militarization of outer space. They are talking about defence but preparing for attack; they are claiming a space shield, but forging a space sword; they are promising to eliminate nuclear arms, but in practice building up these arms and perfecting them. They are promising the world stability, but in reality striving to wreck the military balance.

Since people intuitively feel the danger of the "Star Wars" plans, the authors of these plans want to make them believe that they supposedly amount to nothing more than harmless research, which, moreover, allegedly holds out the promise of technological benefits. By using this bait the authors of these plans want to turn their allies too into accomplices in this dangerous project.

They even maintain that by creating space weapons it will be possible to arrive at the elimination of nuclear arms. This is a fraud. Just as the appearance of nuclear arms did not eliminate conventional types of arms and only generated an accelerated race in the manufacture of both nuclear and conventional arms, the creation of space arms will have only one result—the arms race will become even more intensive and encompass new spheres.

I have singled out the points which above all complicate Soviet-American relations, sometimes bringing them to the brink of acute tension. But it appears that there are people in the United States who regard such a state of affairs as normal and view confrontation as almost a natural state.

We do not think so. Confrontation is not an inherent defect in our relations. It is rather an anomaly. There is nothing inevitable about its continuation. We regard the improvement of Soviet-American relations not only as extremely necessary but also as possible. But, of course, one cannot do without reciprocity here.

Question: There is much interest in the question of the possibility of your meeting with the President of the United States. What are the prospects here?

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Answer: The question of such a meeting was dealt with in my correspondence with President Reagan. I may say that a positive attitude to such a meeting being held was expressed on both sides. Its time and place will be the subject of subsequent arrangement.

In the broader context, our correspondence dealt with finding joint ways of improving relations between the USSR and the United States and of making them more stable and constructive. I am convinced that a significant new impetus should be given to Soviet-American relations at a high political level. We propose to the Government of the United States to conduct matters in such a way that it would be clear to all, to our peoples and to other countries, that the political courses of the USSR and the United States are oriented not at hostility and confrontation but at the search for mutual understanding and peaceful development.

Question: From what you have said, Mikhail Sergeyevich, it follows that it is necessary to work on a broad front. But still, what do you regard as the main lever for achieving a breakthrough?

Answer: Intensive mutual efforts. And indeed efforts on a broad front. Mutual understanding of the need to facilitate the settlement of conflict situations in the world would have a beneficial influence on our own, as well as on international, relations. A great deal can be done in the development of bilateral ties between the USSR and the United States, to our mutual benefit.

Nevertheless, what you called the main lever lies in the sphere of security. What could a concrete beginning be here? If one has sat down to negotiate arms reductions, then one should at least refrain from increasing them further. That is why we propose that the USSR and the United States should introduce for the entire duration of the talks a moratorium on the development, including research, and on the testing and deployment of attack space weapons, and should freeze their strategic offensive arms.

At the same time, the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Europe and, correspondingly, the build-up of our counter-measures should cease.

The American leaders state that they are in favour of radical arms reductions. If that is so, it would be logical first to put a brake on the arms race and then immediately to go on to arms reductions.

We are for an honest dialogue. We are prepared once again to demonstrate our goodwill. Starting today, and I want to emphasize this, the Soviet Union is introducing a moratorium on the deployment of its intermediate-range missiles and suspending the implementation of other counter-measures in Europe. The duration of the moratorium is until November of this year. The decision we make after that depends on whether the United States follows our example: whether or not it stops the deployment of its intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

To sum up, I will say the following. There are possibilities of improving Soviet-American relations, of improving the general inter-

national situation. These possibilities should not be missed. They should be carried over into concrete policies and practical decisions.

65. British Working Paper on a Chemical Weapons Convention Submitted to the Conference on Disarmament: The Organs and Constitution of the Organization of Verification, April 11, 1985 [1]

This paper acknowledges and draws heavily upon the Canadian and Netherlands papers on the organization of verification (CD/313 and CD/445 respectively) and on the valuable proposals in the United States draft convention (CD/500).[2]

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The United Kingdom is committed to the achievement of an effective chemical weapons Convention which will provide satisfactory assurances of compliance. To achieve such assurances, it will be essential for the Convention to establish organs which are able to take rapid decisions relating to the implementation and operation of the Convention. All States Parties to the Convention should play an active part in this work.

2. The principal organs should come into being upon the establishment, under the Convention, of an International Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (hereafter referred to as "the Organization"). This Organization, having legal personality under international law, would be the body vested with the responsibility for implementing all aspects of the Convention. It will need to enjoy, in the territory of each Member State, such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary to enable it to carry out its functions. The Article establishing the Organization should also establish its seat.

3. Within the Organization it would be appropriate for responsibility to be shared between various organs. The Netherlands paper CD/445 proposed that there should be three principal organs:

(a) the *Consultative Committee;*
(b) the *Executive Council;* and
(c) the *Secretariat* responsible *inter alia* for the conduct of (i) routine inspection of declared chemical facilities (detailed proposals for which are contained in United Kingdom paper CD/575) [3] and (ii) immediate challenge inspections of declared and undeclared facilities and locations.

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[1] CD/589.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984,* pp. 269–299.
[3] Document 41.

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This proposal was subject to further valuable development in the United States draft convention (CD/500). Such a division of labour would not preclude the establishment of subsidiary bodies where appropriate to assist any of the three organs in the discharge of their responsibilities.

4. If the Organization is to be effective, it is essential that the responsibilities of the three principal organs should be clearly defined.

5. The Convention should therefore contain separate provisions on each of the organs, dealing with their composition, functions and main methods of working. There should also be a provision relating to the functions of the Director General of the Organization and his staff, their appointment, status and the main factors relating thereto, as well as a reference to the terms and conditions of their employment to be regulated by the Executive Council.

6. The Consultative Committee (consisting of all States Parties) would be the principal organ of the Organization. It would be able to review any questions or matters within the scope of the Convention or relating to the powers and purposes of the Organization and its main organs. It would also be empowered to make recommendations to the membership of the Organization and to take decisions upon any matter referred to it by the Executive Council. The Committee would meet annually or on special occasions in between, if circumstances so required.

7. The Executive Council, which would meet as often as may be necessary, would be endowed with day-to-day executive powers of decision.

8. In addition, to enable the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council to carry out their work, they would require the assistance of a Technical Secretariat, headed by a Director General.

9. This paper proposes that the Convention should enter into force when 30 States have ratified. The Executive Council should have upon entry into force a membership of 15 States, rising to 30 States upon the sixtieth ratification. Membership of the Executive Council would comprise two categories to enable there to be well balanced representation.

10. This paper also proposes that a Preparatory Commission shall be established immediately the Convention is opened for signature to make all necessary arrangements for the functioning of the Organization. The Commission would begin to work once the Convention is opened for signature and remain in existence until the Convention has entered into force and the Consultative Committee and Executive Council have met for the first time.

B. THE PRINCIPAL ORGANS: DETAILS

11. It is important that the division of tasks and responsibilities between the organs produces the most efficient and practical structure for carrying out the objectives of the Convention. There are a number of precedents and the United Kingdom has based its proposals on

these where relevant, in particular, where applicable, those provided by the IAEA.

(a) The Consultative Committee

12. The Consultative Committee would be established upon entry into force of the Convention. It would be the principal organ of the Organization. Its chairman would be the chairman of the Executive Council (see below).

13. Its membership would consist, as provided for in the United States draft treaty (CD/500), of representatives of all States Parties. It would meet in regular annual or bi-annual session, and in such special sessions as might be convened, for example by the Director General at the request of the Executive Council. The sessions would be held at the headquarters of the Organization unless otherwise agreed by the Consultative Committee.

14. The Consultative Committee would be empowered to review any questions or matters relevant to the Convention or relating to the powers and functions of any organs established under the Convention. In addition, it would foster the international exchange of scientific and technical information on the chemical industry as provided for in the Convention.

15. The Consultative Committee would in addition have the following specific responsibilities:

(a) election of members of the Executive Council in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention (see below);
(b) formal approval of States for membership of the Organization;
(c) final action against a member and on its privileges and rights of membership in the light of a violation of the provisions of the Convention, in accordance with the provisions to be laid down in the Convention;
(d) consideration of the annual report of the Executive Council;
(e) approval of the Organization's budget as recommended by the Executive Council;
(f) approval/taking note of any reports to other international organizations such as recommended by the Executive Council and forwarded by the Director-General;
(g) approval of any modification to the Convention in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention;
(h) approval of the appointment of the Director-General of the Organization by a two-thirds majority present and voting;
(i) review, of the operation of the Convention at five year or such other intervals agreed by a majority of the Parties.

The Consultative Committee would also have the authority to take decisions on any matter specifically referred to it by the Executive Council; and to propose matters for initial consideration by the Executive Council; and to request from the Executive Council reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Organization.

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16. In the discharge of its functions, the Consultative Committee would proceed by consensus where possible. If consensus were not possible, the Committee would take its decision by voting as follows:

financial matters, modifications to the Convention and suspension of a Member from the rights and privileges of membership } two-thirds majority

All other matters would be decided by simple majority.

(b) The Executive Council

17. Because of the composition of the Consultative Committee, and because it would meet less frequently than the Executive Council, day-to-day responsibility for the implementation of routine international inspection, and challenge inspection should devolve upon the latter, following reports from the Director-General. This would ensure there was no undue delay in decisions relating to the implementation and operation of the Convention.

18. Under the Convention the Executive Council would have delegated authority from the Consultative Committee, which would remain the principal organ, to carry out the day-to-day functions of the Organization. The Council should therefore be endowed with the necessary powers to enable the objectives of the Convention to be implemented in a timely and efficient manner. Its decisions would be implemented by the Secretariat of the Organization under the direction of the Director-General. The Executive Council would be established when the Convention entered into force upon the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification.

19. Upon such deposit the Executive Council would comprise 15 members. Upon deposit of the sixtieth ratification, as the workload of the Council developed, membership would rise to 30. Membership would be in two categories. In the first category members would be elected by the Consultative Committee annually with due regard to equitable (geographical) representation on the United Nations model according to the number of seats allocated. Members in this category in one term of office would not be eligible for re-election in the same category for the following term of office, save as necessary in the early years of the Convention in order to produce a quorum for the Executive Council.

20. Similarly, in the second category, the membership of the Executive Council would comprise, according to the number of seats allocated, those members of the Organization with the largest industrial chemical base, on the basis of criteria (e.g. output, number of declared plants, investment) to be established by the Director-General of the Organization, on the advice of a representative group of States members of the Preparatory Commission. The list of these members would be reviewed annually.

21. The election for the membership referred to in paragraph 19 above would take place at the regular annual session of the Consultative Committee for a term of two years, half of them being re-elected each year to maintain continuity. Membership of the Council under paragraph 20 above would be by designation each year by the outgoing Executive Council.

22. Each member of the Executive Council would have one vote; it would wherever possible proceed by consensus. In the event this were not possible the Council would take its decision on all substantive matters by a two-thirds majority, and by a simple majority on all procedural matters.

23. The Executive Council would meet at such times as it might determine; the meetings would take place at the headquarters of the Organization unless otherwise determined by the Council. The Council would elect a Chairman and other officers from amongst its members and, subject to the provisions of the Convention, would adopt its own rules of procedure. The Council would make reports as necessary, and at least annually, to the Consultative Committee concerning the affairs of the Organization. The Council would also prepare for submission to the Consultative Committee such reports as the Organization may be required to make to the United Nations, or to third countries.

24. The Executive Council's principal functions would be:

(a) supervision of the conduct of routine and challenge inspections, to be conducted by the Inspectorate Staff of the Organization;

(b) ensuring between sessions of the Consultative Committee the effective implementation of, and compliance with, the Convention;

(c) receiving requests from States Parties, including requests for challenge inspection, and acting upon them in accordance with the provisions of the Convention within [ ] days;

(d) taking immediate and appropriate action, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, in relation to the failure by a State Party to comply with its obligations under the Convention including possible action on a member's rights and privileges;

(e) requesting when necessary a special meeting of the Consultative Committee;

(f) referring unresolved compliance issues to the Consultative Committee within [ ] days with a recommendation for further action;

(g) overseeing the activities of subsidiary organs established under the Convention;

(h) establishing such committees and Working Groups as it deems necessary;

(i) recommending to the Consultative Committee approval of any modification to the Convention in accordance with the relevant procedures of the Convention.

25. The Executive Committee would hold its first meeting within 15 days following the entry into force of the Convention.

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(c) The Secretariat

26. The Secretariat, comprising the staff of the Organization would be headed by the Director-General. He would be appointed by the Executive Council, with the approval of the Consultative Committee for a term of [five] years, renewable for one further term of [five] years, but not thereafter.

27. The Director-General would be responsible for the appointment, organization and functioning of the Secretariat and would be under the authority of and subject to the control of the Executive Council, and ultimately the Consultative Committee. The Staff of the Secretariat would comprise qualified and widely experienced personnel with the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence and integrity to fulfil the objectives and functions of the Organization. Without sacrificing the high standards of competence required, due regard should be paid in their appointment to the contributions of States Parties to the Organization and to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible from all States Parties. The terms and conditions on which the staff would be appointed, remunerated and dismissed would be in accordance with regulations made by the Executive Council.

28. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General and the Secretariat would be forbidden to seek or receive instructions from any source external to the Organization. They should refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as officials of the Organization. The Convention should provide that members of the Secretariat would not disclose any industrial secret or other confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties. Each State Party would undertake to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General and the Secretariat and not seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.

29. The provisions of the Convention should be so drafted as to give adequate expression to the importance of the role of the Director-General and the Secretariat within the framework of the Convention. The Director-General would not only be entrusted, as head of the Secretariat, with the ordinary and everyday administration of the Organization. He would also be responsible, under the Convention, for bringing immediately to the attention of the Executive Council any matter which calls into question the compliance with the Convention of a State Party. It would be the Director-General to whom a State Party would first report its evidence of suspected non-compliance and the request for further investigation, possibly including a challenge inspection. The Director-General would also be responsible for forwarding the request for clarification to a party whose compliance had been called into question and for transmitting the conclusion of the Inspectorate following clarification of the matter. He would also inform the Executive Council of a failure by the State Party concerned to comply with the request for inspection. Lastly the Director-General

would assist the Chairman of the Executive Council in ensuring that the correct and necessary steps are taken to resolve any apparent violation of the provisions of the Convention.

30. These responsibilities would be spelled out in detailed provisions along the above lines in an integral Annex to the Convention.

31. The United Kingdom proposes that the international Inspectorate, responsible for carrying out random routine international on-site inspection of declared chemical facilities and for the conduct of challenge inspections would be part of the Secretariat's staff.

32. The United Kingdom would also propose that a special challenge inspection panel be formed within the Inspectorate. Designated by the Director-General, the Panel would comprise a sufficiently large pool of the most senior and experienced members of the international inspectorate, with due regard to equitable geographical distribution, with special and rotating standby responsibility for the conduct of sensitive and immediate inspections. Challenge inspections would be carried out by an appropriately composed *ad hoc* inspection team, and comprising at least seven inspectors and more, as necessary, according to the size of the challenged site. Inspectors from the challenging and challenged State would be excluded from participation in the inspection of a site in the latter country.

33. It would therefore be necessary for the Director-General after his appointment to designate a team of inspectors to constitute the special challenge inspection team. The inspectors would be selected for their high qualifications, wide experience, international integrity, good moral character and complete independence. It may be appropriate, as suggested in CD/445, to maintain a standing list of qualified experts who would be immediately available on a contingency basis without being full-time members of the staff of the Organization.

34. Only this team of inspectors, answerable directly to the Director-General of the Organization and through him to the Executive Council and ultimately the Consultative Committee would conduct challenge inspections. The team being part of the regular Inspectorate, should be organized in such a manner to enable them to carry out an inspection at very short notice. Membership of the challenge inspection team would not preclude the participation by members of the Inspectorate in routine on-site inspections.

35. To fulfil its tasks, the Director-General, the Secretariat and (as necessary) members of the Executive Council should enjoy in the territory of each State Party such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as necessary for the exercise of their functions. The legal capacity, privileges and immunities would be defined in an integral Annex to the Convention.

C. PREPARATORY COMMISSION

36. If the Organization and its organs are to begin work immediately upon entry into force of the Convention so that the provisions of the Convention relating to such important matters as initial stockpile dec-

larations and verification of non-production can be effected by the agreed deadlines (to be specified in the Convention), much preliminary work would need to be done between signature and ratification. This suggests to the United Kingdom the establishment of a Preparatory Commission to carry out this work.

37. The Preparatory Commission would come into existence on the first day the Convention is opened for signature. It should be composed of those States Parties who have signed the Convention. The Commission would remain in existence until the Convention had entered into force and thereafter until the Consultative Committee had convened and the Executive Council had met for the first time, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention.

38. The Preparatory Commission would need to elect its own officers, adopt its own rules of procedures, meet as often as necessary, determine its own place of meeting and establish such committees as it deemed necessary. The Commission would be completely separate from the Conference on Disarmament (CD) since its tasks will be sufficiently specialist to fall outside the scope of the CD. Its proceedings would be by consensus.

39. The Preparatory Commission should appoint an Executive Secretary and staff as necessary, who would exercise such powers and perform such duties as the Commission might determine. Other functions of the Preparatory Commission could be similar to those in *Annex I* of the IAEA Statute.[4]

D. CONCLUSION

40. The proposals contained above (based upon the approach contained in previous working papers and taking into account where appropriate the parallels in the IAEA Statute) represent, in the view of the United Kingdom, a practical way of establishing an effective and viable Organization with full responsibility for the implementation of the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention. The paper has attempted to strike a balance between the relevant organs, by ensuring on the one hand through the Consultative Committee the responsibility of all States Parties for the implementation of the Convention and, on the other, devolution of certain powers to the Executive Council to enable it to discharge the day-to-day responsibility for implementation and operation of the Convention when the Consultative Committee is not in session. This sharing of responsibility would enable all States Parties to play a full part in the operation of the Convention and thus make a direct contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security in this important field of arms control.

[4] TIAS 3873; 8 UST 1093; 276 UNTS 3.

66. Statement by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: Military and Nuclear Sanctions Against South Africa [Extracts], April 16, 1985 [1]

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It is important to recognize that our influence with South Africa does not derive from a client relationship. In fact, our military, political, and economic relations with South Africa are by design far less intimate than with many other states of similar political and economic importance. Indeed, significant restrictions are already in place that circumscribe our trade and cooperation in the military and nuclear areas, and impose a political stance that results in our clearly dissociating ourselves from apartheid.

For example, in an effort to eliminate apartheid, U.S. arms sales to South Africa have been embargoed since 1963, and in 1977 the United States joined the United Nations in imposing a further mandatory arms embargo on South Africa.[2] Our regulations are, in fact, more severe than the UN embargo and restrict U.S. exports to the South African military and police of items not covered in the UN embargo. In December of last year, the United States joined with other UN Security Council members in voting for an embargo on imports of arms and ammunition produced in South Africa.[3]

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Finally, other bills before you would impose a blanket prohibition on the export of nuclear equipment and technology. Such a prohibition would undermine our ability and leverage to broaden the application of international safeguards in countries that do not presently accept full-scope safeguards. Such a blanket prohibition on the export of all dual-use goods and nuclear equipment or technology to South Africa, as well as all other nonfull-scope safeguard states, would undercut our nonproliferation efforts, and would reduce our influence in such countries' nuclear programs.

All applications for exports of nuclear-related equipment or assistance are already thoroughly reviewed as to their proliferation implications and their effect on foreign policy. In the case of states that have not accepted full-scope safeguards, only limited nonsensitive assistance is permitted—and then only when it will advance our nonproliferation objectives. In the case of South Africa, our dialogue with that government on nonproliferation matters, coupled with a willingness to allow extremely limited, nonsensitive assistance to facilities in South

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[1] Department of State, Current Policy No. 686.
[2] For the UN embargo, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1977*, pp. 685–686, 863–865.
[3] Security Council Resolution 558 (1984).

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Africa that are under IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards, contributed to three important decisions by the South African Government last year:

First, to require IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear exports; [4]

Second, to export only according to the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines; [5] and

Third, to renew talks with the IAEA concerning placement of its semicommercial uranium enrichment plant under IAEA safeguards.

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67. Statement by the U.S. Alternate Representative (Barthelemy) to the Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons [Extract], April 18, 1985 [1]

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I would like to turn now to the important subject of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Indeed, its urgency was brought home to us again during our last plenary meeting. My delegation has already presented detailed views on this subject in a plenary statement on 28 March [2] and listened with interest to the recent statements from other delegations, in particular the statement delivered by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union on 4 April.[3] We welcome the stated Soviet interest in reaching mutually acceptable solutions. But we were disappointed that once again we did not hear new ideas for finding mutually acceptable solutions. We continue to be prepared promptly to give serious consideration to any such ideas.

Today I would like to comment on one particular substantive issue dealt with in Ambassador Issraelyan's statement and also to offer a procedural suggestion for making the negotiations more productive.

The substantive issue I want to raise is how best to ensure that toxic chemicals and precursors that pose a particular threat to the convention are not produced in the chemical industry. In particular, how can we best ensure that organophosphorus nerve gases and their key precursors are not manufactured under the guise of production for peaceful purposes?

Two approaches have been put forward—one by the Soviet Union; another by the United Kingdom, the United States and several other countries. Under the Soviet approach, production of super-toxic lethal chemicals or methylphosphorus compounds for all permitted purposes,

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1971,* pp. 218–244.
[5] *Ibid., 1978,* pp. 7–25.
[1] CD/PV.309, pp. 25–28.
[2] Document 56.
[3] Document 62.

including civilian use, would be limited to one small facility and a maximum aggregate amount of one ton per year. Under the approach we support, production facilities would be declared and inspected, and detailed information on the amount and uses of the chemicals would be reported.

It is our impression that both approaches stem from similar basic concerns. Both have stated their desire to ensure that production of the most dangerous types of chemical weapons does not occur in the chemical industry. Both sides want to ensure that States do not possess a production capability in excess of peaceful needs. In other words, both sides want to guard against development of a "break-out" capability: that is, one that would enable a State to withdraw from the convention and then rapidly begin producing enormous quantities of super-toxic lethal agents. Finally, both sides want to ensure that production facilities for super-toxic lethal chemicals for peaceful purposes are not used to produce currently unknown agents for chemical-weapons purposes.

Which approach is the most useful? To find out, we need to compare them to see which most effectively meets the three concerns I have just mentioned. We also need to take into account the burden each approach would pose on the chemical industry and economic development.

First of all, how effectively would the two approaches prevent illegal production of nerve gas in the chemical industry? Here, we see the Soviet approach as having two serious inadequacies. Facilities for production of the banned chemicals that exist before the convention comes into force are ignored. They would be subject neither to declaration nor inspection. Facilities for production of ethylphosphorus compounds are also ignored, even though most of them could easily produce either ethylphosphorus or methylphosphorus compounds for chemical weapons. As explained in document CD/CW/WP.51 both types of phosphorus chemicals are equally dangerous. The approach we support, on the other hand, deals effectively with both types of facilities through declaration and inspection.

Second, how effectively would the two approaches prevent development of a "break-out" capability? Here again, the Soviet approach has serious inadequacies in our view. Since pre-existing facilities and ethylphosphorus chemical facilities would be ignored, there would be no way to judge a State's break-out potential. The approach we support, however, deals more effectively with this problem through declaration and inspection of all relevant facilities. If a State declares more production capacity than others consider justified for peaceful purposes, the mechanism for dealing with compliance issues could be invoked to clarify the situation and to resolve any disputes that may arise.

Third, how effectively would the two approaches prevent production of unknown super-toxic lethal chemicals for chemical weapons purposes? We believe that the Soviet approach could actually encourage development of new agents since it ignores ethylphosphorus com-

pounds, which could easily be substituted for the banned methylphosphorus compounds. The data in document CD/CW/WP.51 clearly demonstrate that ethylphosphorus-based nerve gases are virtually as deadly as the existing agents based on methylphosphorus compounds. The British approach, which we support, has no such loophole. It covers all high-risk toxic chemicals and high-risk precursors.

Finally, how would the chemical industry be affected under the two approaches? In our judgement, the Soviet approach is seriously deficient. It would mean that production of a number of useful chemicals for peaceful purposes would have to be stopped. The economic damage would be significant, both in terms of existing production and of lost opportunities for improving human life. The monetary costs alone would probably be in the range of millions of dollars. We have heard it said here that methylphosphorus chemicals have "almost no peaceful uses" and that the United Kingdom's proposal would extend inspection to all chemical industries. But such a statement does not take into account the chemical industries in western countries, nor even the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons' own documents. For example, document CD/CW/CRP.90 makes clear there are plans to produce a methylphosphorus herbicide in industrial quantities in the Federal Republic of Germany. (Here it is worth noting that in the Soviet Union the preference is to use ethylphosphorus compounds instead. These would not be constrained by the Soviet proposal.) Document CD/CW/WP.86 substantiates our view that only a small number of chemical plants would be subject to inspection under the United Kingdom approach.

The production of super-toxic lethal chemicals, largely as drugs, is relatively small, but it is carried out by a number of companies. The super-toxic lethal chemicals which are of commercial interest are hardly suitable for chemical weapons purposes and pose no risk to the objectives of the convention. The question of production of large quantities of nerve gas for supposedly peaceful purposes does not arise. There is, in fact, a specific provision in our draft convention to prohibit it.[4]

In contrast to the Soviet approach, the approach we support would not stop existing peaceful chemical production activities and prevent economic development. Rather it would allow peaceful activities to continue, and to expand, but—and I emphasize this point—under the watchful eye of the international community. All relevant facilities would be declared and inspected.

It seems to us that the burden of proof must be on those who would impose limitations on peaceful chemical production. They must demonstrate that such interference is absolutely necessary. But we have not heard any persuasive argument why our approach would not be effective.

[4] For the U.S. draft convention, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 269–299.

In negotiating a convention the Conference must take into account that different States have different economic systems and different chemical industries. Perhaps the two different approaches in this area really reflect the differing economic systems in the Soviet Union and in western countries. The Soviet approach seems designed for a centrally-planned economy, in which all chemical production facilities are Government-owned and in which the chemicals in question have not yet been produced. It seems to ignore the reality of a market economy, where a number of different and highly competitive companies are involved and the types of chemicals in question are already in production.

How can a mutually-acceptable, compromise solution be found to this issue? A good place to start might be the approach outlined by the previous Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons in document CD/CW/WP.89. Under this approach, a State could choose between production at a single site or at multiple sites. Verification provisions would be equivalent, whichever approach were chosen. This approach tries to take into account the differences between centrally-planned and market economies. At the same time it preserves the strengths of the earlier approaches. In some areas the new approach may need to be strengthened, for example, to deal adequately with pre-existing production facilities for super-toxic lethal chemicals. But we believe this approach is promising and deserves serious consideration.

Let me put forward a procedural suggestion for making the negotiations more productive. As others will recall, my delegation has strongly supported the proposal to hold a six-weeks-long negotiating session in the fall. I would like to assure those who may be skeptical about the likelihood of productive work that, for its part, the United States delegation will do everything in its power to make such a session a fruitful one. In connection with the proposal, a question has arisen about how to report on the negotiations to the General Assembly. Should the report be a substantive or a purely technical one? How could a substantive report be forwarded in August if the negotiations are to continue in the fall?

The United States delegation believes that the General Assembly should receive a report which gives a full picture of the current stage of negotiations. And we believe that this is fully consistent with the proposal for a fall negotiating session. In our view the working text contained in annex I of last year's Report, CD/539,[5] should be updated whenever new language is agreed. In August there should then be no need to devote several weeks to drafting a special report. Instead the report could be composed of the usual descriptive section, the reports of the Working Group Chairmen, and the working text. Using this approach, the report could easily be updated whenever it was deemed necessary. In effect, we would have a kind of "rolling" report.

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 603–644.

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We hope that this suggestion may help to resolve the question of how to report to the General Assembly.

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68. Report by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to the CPSU Central Committee: United States and Arms Control [Extract], April 23, 1985 [1]

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Our readiness to improve relations with the United States is also known, for mutual benefit and without attempts to encroach upon the legitimate rights and interests of each other. There is no sort of fatal inevitability of confrontation between the two countries. If one is to interpret both the positive and negative experience accumulated by the history of Soviet-U.S. relations—both remote and recent history—it should be said that the most rational thing is to look for ways to smooth out relations, to build a bridge of cooperation, but to build it from both sides.

However, the already concluded first stage of the Geneva negotiations provides grounds for saying that Washington is not holding a course directed at accord with the Soviet Union. This is evident if only from the fact that it is altogether refusing to discuss the question of preventing the arms race from spreading into space at the same time as discussing the question of limiting and reducing nuclear weapons. In this way it is violating the accord reached in January on the interlinking of the three directions: [2] preventing the arms race in space; reducing nuclear strategic weapons; and reducing medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. A question arises: how to explain such a position? It is explained by the fact that certain U.S. circles still want to achieve a dominant position in the world, primarily in the military sphere. We have more than once drawn the attention of the U.S. side to the fact that these arrogant plans have no future. The Soviet Union and its friends and allies, indeed all other states that take a stance for peace and peaceful cooperation, do not recognize the right of any state or group of states to supremacy and or to impose their will on other countries and peoples.

The Soviet Union, for its part, has never posed itself such tasks, and will not. We would like to express the hope that the present U.S. attitude will be amended. This would open the possibility for achieving mutually acceptable accords. For our part, such readiness is evident. Evidence of this is the USSR proposal that both sides should

[1] Moscow *Pravda* in Russian, April 24, 1985, first edition, pp. 1–2; FBIS *Daily Report*, April 24, 1985, vol. III, pp. R17–R18.
[2] Document 3.

introduce for the entire period of the talks a moratorium on creating space weaponry, and a freeze on strategic nuclear arsenals. Continuing this line, the Soviet Union unilaterally announced a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles and on the buildup of other countermeasures in Europe.[3] All over the world this decision was assessed as important and constructive, and likely to promote the success of the talks.

I should like to remind you that this is not the only step of its kind. Since 1982 the unilateral commitment of the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons has been in operation,[4] and since 1983 the unilateral moratorium on being first to put antisatellite weapons into space has been in effect.[5] Not to one of these initiatives has the U.S. Government responded with a single gesture of goodwill. On the contrary, it has been doing everything to present the actions of the USSR, which are directed at a reduction of the war dangers and at reaching understandings, in a false light, and to provoke mistrust in them. In a word, everything is being done just to avoid positive steps in response.

One cannot help being surprised, too, at the haste with which the U.S. Administration replies with its standard and customary "no" to our proposals, which is obvious evidence of the United States' unwillingness to steer the matter toward reasonable results. I will say one thing: An arms race and talks on disarmament cannot be combined. That is clear, if one is not to fall into hypocrisy and aim to deceive public opinion. The Soviet Union will not facilitate such a course, and this should be known by all those who are now engaged in a political game and not in serious policy. We would not want a repetition of the sorry experience of the previous talks. For its part, the Soviet Union will persistently work in Geneva for concrete, mutually acceptable agreements that would make it possible not only to end the arms race but also advance the cause of disarmament. Now as never before, political will is needed for the sake of peace on earth, for the sake of a better tomorrow.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* p. 309.
[4] *Ibid., 1982,* p. 350.
[5] *Ibid., 1983,* p. 650.

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69. Communique of the Warsaw Pact Party and State Leaders [Extract], April 26, 1985 [1]

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The meeting participants examined the question of extending the term of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance concluded in Warsaw on 14 May 1955 [2] and signed a protocol on extending the treaty for the next 20 years with subsequent prolongation for a further 10 years. They also exchanged opinions on topical questions of European and world politics.

At the meeting, stress was laid on the great importance of the Warsaw Pact, which for 30 years has been reliably serving the development and strengthening of the member-states' all-around cooperation, the safeguarding of their sovereignty, security, and inviolability of borders, and the joint elaboration and implementation of their peace-loving foreign policy course, and which plays an outstanding role in the cause of preserving and strengthening peace in Europe and throughout the world.

The states represented at the meeting advocate the development of comprehensive, equal, and mutually advantageous international cooperation. They have never been supporters of the division of Europe and the world into opposing military blocs. Today, too, they advocate the simultaneous disbandment of their alliance and the North Atlantic bloc and, as a first step, their military organizations.

However, so long as the NATO military bloc exists and a threat to European and universal peace persists, the socialist states will strengthen their defensive alliance while simultaneously stepping up the struggle for disarmament and peace and the elimination [*peodoleniye*] of military blocs.

Their unanimous decision to extend the term of the Warsaw Pact is dictated by the need to ensure the reliable security of the allied countries and their close cooperation in international affairs. Proceeding from the level of the threat of war, the Warsaw Pact member-states will continue to take the necessary measures to maintain their collective defense capability at the requisite level. The Warsaw Pact member-states reiterate that they do not seek military superiority, but will not allow military superiority over themselves. They advocate the safeguarding of a balance [*ravnovesiye*] of forces at the lowest level.

Meeting on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II, the most destructive and bloody war in mankind's history, the meeting participants noted the great significance of the peace-loving peoples' victory over fascism. The victory exacted a high price: The

[1] Moscow *Pravda* in Russian, April 27, 1985, first ed., p. 1; FBIS *Daily Report*, April 29, 1985, vol. III, pp. BB4–BB5. The meeting took place in Warsaw.
[2] *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, pp. 1239–1242.

Soviet people, who made the decisive contribution to the routing of fascism, and the peoples of many other countries gave tens of millions of lives for its sake. The memory of those who fell and duty to present and future generations demand that the lessons of the war not be forgotten.

In the present international situation, it is more necessary than ever to pool the efforts of all peoples and states and all peace-loving forces, irrespective of their political orientation, to stop the world from sliding toward nuclear catastrophe.

The communist and workers parties, parliaments, and governments of the Warsaw Pact member-countries will continue to struggle to deflect the threat of nuclear war from the world, end the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race, on earth and prevent it in space, make the transition to disarmament, and resume the process of detente and cooperation in international relations. To these ends, the socialist countries represented at the meeting are prepared to develop peaceful dialogue with other states in a spirit of goodwill and trust and to build broad international cooperation in the interests of safeguarding universal peace and security.

The meeting took place in an atmosphere of friendship and full mutual understanding and confirmed its participants' unity of views on key questions of European and world politics.

It was agreed that a conference of the Warsaw Pact member-states Political Consultative Committee will be held in Sofia, as planned, in the fall of this year.

70. Address by the Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze): Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, May 1, 1985 [1]

On April 23, U.S. and Soviet negotiators completed their first round of talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva. On that same day, in his speech at the Central Committee plenum, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev criticized the United States for blocking progress in the negotiations. He alleged that we had refused to discuss the question of preventing an arms race in space. He charged us with violating the agreement reached in January by Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko to address the complex of issues in their interrelationship. Finally, he extolled the moratorium proposal introduced by the Soviets in the first round as providing a basis for progress.[2]

Mr. Gorbachev's claims are without merit. The U.S. approach to the negotiations is specifically designed to pursue all of the agreed objec-

[1] Department of State, Current Policy No. 698. The address was delivered before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.
[2] Document 68.

tives of the talks, including preventing an arms race in space. It is the Soviets who, by focusing their energies on an attempt to derail SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] research, are contradicting the January agreement to deal with all the issues in their interrelationship.[3] The Soviet moratorium proposal does not provide a useful basis for progress. And it is the Soviet approach as a whole that is blocking U.S. efforts to facilitate movement in the negotiations.

Let me review the results of the first round and explain the basis for these conclusions.

Background

As you remember, the Shultz–Gromyko agreement in January established the parameters of the negotiations. They agreed that the subject is the complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms—both strategic and intermediate range—to be considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The agreed objective is to seek effective agreements aimed at reducing strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arsenals, at strengthening strategic stability, and at preventing an arms race in space. The detailed work of the talks is being conducted in three negotiating groups addressing strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and defense and space arms.

U.S. Approach

The United States approached the first round of the negotiations with four primary objectives in mind.

- The first of these is to seek equitable and verifiable agreements leading to deep reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals. These are the weapons that exist today and which, thus, pose the most immediate threat to our mutual security.
- Our second goal is to resolve our concerns about the erosion of the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty [4] regime that has resulted from Soviet actions over the past decade and about Soviet noncompliance with that and other existing agreements. We are determined to seek corrective action where violations have occurred.
- Our third objective is to lay out the U.S. strategic concept and engage the Soviets in a general discussion of the offense-defense relationship. Specifically, we want to explain how, over the long term—should new defensive technologies prove feasible—we hope to make a transition from the current situation, in which deterrence rests on the ultimate threat of devastating retaliation, to one in which nuclear arms are greatly reduced and increasing reliance is placed on defenses which threaten no one. We intend, when the Soviets are ready to join us in doing so, to begin discussions with them on our ideas as to how our two sides might jointly manage such a transition.
- Our final objective is to impress upon the Soviets that our ultimate goal, as the President has repeatedly stated, is the elimina-

[3] Document 3.

[4] The text of the Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

tion of all nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has long stated this to be its goal as well. We have no illusions that our two sides can quickly or easily agree on the practical steps necessary to reach this goal, but its importance makes it imperative that we persist. Were nuclear weapons to be eliminated, we would have to devote particular attention to how, together with our allies, we might counter and diminish the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, through both arms improvements and arms control efforts.

At the beginning of the round, in meetings of the full delegations, the U.S. negotiators presented our assessment of the current strategic situation and our ideas on how we could pursue the agreed objectives of the talks. After 2 weeks, the delegations broke into the separate negotiating groups, and the detailed work began.

In the negotiating group on strategic offensive arms, the United States laid out its conceptual approach to achieving significant, equitable, and verifiable reductions in a manner that would improve stability. This approach includes substantial reductions in the number of warheads on, and the destructive capacity of, ballistic missiles, as well as limits on heavy bombers and the number of ALCMs [air-launched cruise missiles] they carry, below the levels set by SALT II [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks].[5] U.S. negotiators emphasized the broad authority they had been given by the President for working out means to reach that goal. They made it clear that it is the substantive outcome, more than the method of achieving it, that is of primary importance.

The U.S. side also stressed that the United States is not trying to dictate the character of the Soviet force structure. We recognize that there are substantial differences between our respective nuclear arsenals and have, therefore, urged the Soviets to explore with us possible tradeoffs between areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage and interest. An example of such a tradeoff would be a provision allowing a Soviet advantage in ballistic missile capability in return for a U.S. advantage in bomber capability.

In the negotiating group on intermediate-range nuclear forces, the United States reaffirmed its preference for the complete elimination of all U.S. and Soviet LRINF [longer range intermediate-range nuclear forces] missile systems. We reiterated our willingness to agree, as an interim measure, to reduce LRINF missiles to the lowest possible equal global limits on warheads. Finally, in order to take account of previously expressed Soviet concerns, we renewed our willingness to consider a commitment not to deploy in Europe all of the LRINF missiles to which we would be entitled under equal global ceilings, to apportion reductions to be made in LRINF missiles between Pershing IIs and GLCMs [ground-launched cruise missiles] in an appropriate manner,

[5] The SALT II Agreement may be found *ibid., 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

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and to discuss LRINF aircraft limitations. As in the strategic arms group, the U.S. negotiators emphasized their flexibility.

In the defense and space negotiating forum, we pointed out the instability that exists in the current strategic situation and the need for our two sides to address the problem. We stressed the importance we attach to reversing the erosion of the ABM Treaty regime. In that regard, we underlined the premium we place on treaty compliance in the arms control process and our concern about Soviet actions that violate the ABM Treaty and other existing agreements. Notable in this regard is their construction of a large phased-array ballistic missile tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk that, because of its interior location, orientation, and early warning capability, violates ABM Treaty constraints. We also explained to the Soviets our view on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces, the potential contribution of defensive forces to our mutual security, and how—if new defensive technologies prove feasible—we might manage a stable transition, over time, toward increased reliance on defenses.

In sum, the United States carried out its planned agenda in the first round. We explained our concerns created by the existing array of nuclear arsenals and put forth sound proposals to redress those problems. We outlined our vision of a safer and more stable future and explained our ideas on how such a future could be realized.

Soviet Approach

The Soviet approach to the first round contrasted sharply with ours. Where we sought deep reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, they proposed to freeze the current situation—with its existing imbalances—and address largely unspecified reductions later. Where we sought to explain our ideas on how increased reliance on defenses, should they prove feasible, might enhance strategic stability, they insisted on banning any new effort—even research—in the defense area.

The strategy underlying the Soviet approach seems clear. The Soviet Union is pleased with the current strategic situation. They possess substantial advantages in several key measures of strategic offensive nuclear power, especially in prompt counterforce capability. They hold a large advantage in the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces, particularly in longer range INF missile systems. Moreover, they have the only operational ABM system and have, until recently, enjoyed a virtual monopoly in research into advanced ballistic missile defense technologies. Finally, they have the only operational antisatellite system. They want to maintain this situation and, thus, are devoting their efforts to countering any change.

Their most important objective in this regard is to stop the U.S. SDI

research program, which threatens to find counters which would negate many of their advantages, both offensive and defensive. Similarly, they wish to abort our strategic modernization program and roll back NATO's INF deployments. To this end, they attack and, thereby, seek to undermine support for these programs by characterizing them as exacerbating the "arms race," all the while remaining silent on the strategic buildup of the Soviet Union.

The centerpiece, thus far, of the Soviet strategy is their moratorium proposal, tabled early in the round in Geneva and publicized 3 weeks later by General Secretary Gorbachev.[6]

With regard to offensive weapons, the Soviets propose a quantitative freeze on strategic arms and a moratorium on further deployments of "medium-range" missiles. These are the same old discredited proposals the Soviets surfaced in the past. They first raised a moratorium over 3 years ago in the INF negotiations, although, after supposedly invoking it on a unilateral basis in 1982, they continued construction of SS–20 bases already begun in the European U.S.S.R. and deployed new missiles at those bases. Interestingly enough, we see construction of SS–20 bases continuing again today, after Mr. Gorbachev's declaration of a new unilateral moratorium.

The Soviets subsequently proposed a moratorium in START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks]. As we noted on those occasions, a moratorium would lock in the advantages the Soviets have gained in both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms as a result of their deployment of many modern systems during a period in which the United States has exercised restraint. Negotiating it would divert considerable time and attention from the more important goal of achieving deep reductions and would also directly undercut the prospects for achieving reductions, instead giving the Soviets incentives to preserve their advantages by perpetuating the freeze.

With respect to strategic defense, the Soviets propose a comprehensive ban on research and development, as well as on testing and deployment, of what they call "space-strike arms."

It is difficult to see how one could effectively or verifiably ban research. The Soviets have, in the past, agreed with this view, not only at the time of the negotiation of the ABM Treaty but also in January in Geneva.

How could one decide what research would lead to "space-strike arms" and, thus, cross over the line into the restricted category, and what research would not? It would be impossible to monitor the actions and thoughts of all the scientists and technicians in the research institutes and laboratories in every country of both alliances.

Moreover, SDI research holds open the one possibility of providing the means for a move to a more defense-reliant relationship, one that would be more stable and reliable for both sides. It makes no sense to foreclose such a possibility. Furthermore, such research is a powerful deterrent to a Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty.

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[6] Document 64.

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The Soviets themselves have clearly seen the value of researching new defensive technologies. They have devoted considerable time and resources to such an effort. This includes high-energy lasers—for example, at the Sary Shagan test center—and particle-beam weapons.

Why, then, do the Soviets propose to ban such research? The answer is simple. The Soviets are ahead in research on and deployment potential for nuclear-armed, ground-based ABM interceptors, and they seek to preserve and enhance these advantages. At the same time, the Soviets fear that the West's superior technological base could give us an advantage in the more exotic defensive technologies, and they want to prevent this. At worst, a mutually observed ban would leave them where they are today. Moreover, given the unverifiability of a research ban and the closed nature of their scientific community compared to ours, they very well might be able unilaterally to continue research on advanced defensive systems on a clandestine basis. From Moscow's point of view, such a monopoly in the area of strategic defense research would certainly be the most desirable outcome.

As for development, testing, and deployment of so-called space-strike arms, most of this is already covered by provisions of existing treaties. The Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placing of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, in space.[7] The Limited Test Ban Treaty forbids the testing of nuclear arms in space.[8]

Additionally, all systems—whether nuclear or otherwise—which have a capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their warheads at any point in their trajectory are subject to the ABM Treaty. That agreement prohibits the deployment of ABM systems in space or on the earth, except for precisely limited, fixed, land-based systems. Its provisions also cover testing and engineering development of such systems or their major components.

It, thus, appears that the sole space activity that is not covered by existing agreements is that of a narrow class of antisatellite—or ASAT—systems. This class is restricted to non-nuclear systems capable of attacking satellites but not capable of countering strategic ballistic missiles or strategic ballistic missile warheads. Were they capable of the latter, they would be subject to terms of the ABM Treaty.

In essence, we are talking about the Soviet co-orbital interceptor—the world's only operational ASAT system—and the aircraft-launched miniature vehicle system now under development by the United States.

Banning ASAT-capable systems presents difficulties. Once an ASAT weapon, such as the Soviet co-orbital ASAT, has reached operational status, it is questionable that one could assure that all such systems had been destroyed. Even were we to find a way to ban the declared U.S. and Soviet ASAT systems, most satellites would still be vulnera-

[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967,* pp. 38–43.
[8] *Ibid., 1963,* pp. 291–293.

ble to attack, especially by nuclear weapons. The existing Soviet Galosh ABM interceptors deployed around Moscow are capable of attacking low-orbiting satellites, which pose much easier targets than do ballistic missile warheads. In fact, any ballistic missile capable of lofting a nuclear weapon to orbital altitudes has some inherent ASAT capability.

Thus, we concluded, after carefully studying the Soviet moratorium proposal in the aftermath of its presentation in Geneva, that it does not provide a useful basis for progress in the Geneva talks.

Soviet Allegations

In an attempt to buttress their position, the Soviets, during the first round, and Mr. Gorbachev, in his Central Committee plenum speech,[9] accused us of violating the Shultz–Gromyko agreement in two respects. First, they charged us with failing to honor the commitment to address the complex of space and nuclear issues in their interrelationship, based on their novel definition of that term. The Soviets asserted that progress on the issues in the two groups dealing with offensive arms would be impossible unless the United States agreed to the Soviet proposal to ban "space-strike arms" and that, by failing to accept that ban, the United States was denying the interrelationship.

This charge is, of course, without merit. The United States is addressing all issues in their interrelationship. In fact, as I explained earlier, the offense-defense relationship is one of the principle elements on which our position focuses. Rather, it is the Soviet approach which violates the interrelationship agreement by insisting that the space issue be considered in isolation and by setting resolution of that issue—on the basis of their demands—as a precondition to serious negotiation on the other issues.

The second Soviet charge is that, by failing to agree to their proposal for a "space-strike arms" ban, the United States is reneging on its commitment to prevent an arms race in space. This charge is also groundless; preventing an arms race in space is exactly what our strategic concept envisages. The term "arms race" connotes a runaway competition between two sides, with each piling weapon upon weapon in an unbridled manner. What we propose is just the opposite—a stable transition to greater reliance on defensive systems, should new technologies prove feasible, managed jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union. Defenses would be introduced at a measured pace, in conjunction with progressively stricter limitations and reductions in offensive nuclear arms. The result would be that the two sides would have far fewer weapons which would use space as a medium for delivering nuclear destruction. The approach we foresee would be designed to maintain at all times control over the mix of offensive and defensive systems on both sides and, thereby, increase the confidence of the sides in the effectiveness and stability of the deterrent balance.

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[9] Document 68.

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Steps Backward

Beyond pressing these baseless charges, pushing their moratorium proposal, and showing little interest in exploring U.S. proposals, the Soviets provided little of substance and few specifics during the round. Of the specifics that were offered, many represent steps backward from previous Soviet positions.

For example, in the START negotiations in 1983, the Soviets expressed willingness to consider permitting some deployment of air-launched cruise missiles. Their current position calls for a ban on all cruise missiles with range exceeding 600 kilometers, regardless of basing mode.

In the INF talks in 1983, the Soviets offered a freeze on SS–20 deployments in Asia; now they insist on having no constraints on these systems, which, due to their range and mobility, are capable of striking Europe in addition to threatening U.S. friends and allies in Asia. Similarly, in 1983, the Soviets showed considerable flexibility regarding the U.S. aircraft on which they would require limits; now they have returned to their earlier and far more strident demands.

In the January meeting in Geneva, Gromyko acknowledged that limits on strategic defense research would not be verifiable; the Soviets, nonetheless, now propose banning such research.

Also in the January meeting, Gromyko included the Moscow ABM system in the Soviet definition of "space-strike arms"; at the negotiating table, the Soviets specifically excluded that system from their definition and, thus from their proposed ban.

Finally, in the antisatellite talks of 1978–79, the Soviets acknowledged that neither limits on ASAT research nor a comprehensive ASAT ban would be verifiable; in Geneva, they called for a ban on such research and for a total ASAT ban—again, despite the lack of verifiability.

In sum, the Soviets took a predictably hard line in the first round. Their principal objectives were clearly to discredit the U.S. SDI research program and to put maximum pressure on it by holding progress in all other aspects of the negotiations hostage to U.S. acceptance of the Soviet proposal on "space-strike arms."

Gorbachev's Warsaw Speech

In his speech last Friday in Warsaw, Mr. Gorbachev stated that the Soviet Union has "already suggested that both sides reduce strategic offensive arms by one-quarter by way of an opening move." He also held out the possibility of deeper mutual cuts.[10]

Mr. Gorbachev was apparently referring to the Soviet proposal in the START negotiations of 1982–83. That proposal would have reduced strategic nuclear delivery vehicles by one-quarter from the initial level permitted under SALT II—from 2,400 to 1,800. However, the

[10] Moscow *Pravda* in Russian, April 28, 1985; FBIS *Daily Report*, April 29, 1985, vol. III, pp. BB7–BB9.

Soviets did not accompany it with a proposal for reductions in those measures of strategic capability which would, in fact, enhance strategic stability—the number of ballistic missile warheads and ballistic missile destructive capacity.

Contrary to the public impression created by Mr. Gorbachev, the Soviet Union has made no proposal for reductions in strategic forces in the new negotiations, nor has it even gone so far as to resubmit its old START proposal. In fact, during the first round, the Soviets refused to respond to efforts by U.S. negotiators to ascertain details of their position on this subject.

We would, of course, welcome and examine seriously any concrete Soviet proposals for substantial, balanced, and stabilizing reductions in strategic forces. As I said earlier, U.S. negotiators have broad authority to negotiate approaches that meet the interests and concerns of both sides. We encourage the Soviet Union to substantiate Mr. Gorbachev's claim by introducing a proposal in the next round at Geneva.

Future Prospects

The Soviet behavior in the first round was consistent with their historical approach to arms control negotiations. That strategy is to combine tough bargaining at the negotiating table with a hard-nosed public propaganda campaign designed to undercut support for U.S. and NATO positions and force unilateral concessions. Until they realize that their propaganda campaign is not working—that is, that U.S. concessions will not be made unilaterally—the Soviets will not be prepared to negotiate seriously.

Accordingly, in the near term, we can expect the Soviets to continue to protest publicly about the SDI program and alleged U.S. designs to accelerate the arms race, especially by spreading it into space. We can also expect them to sustain their efforts to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies, particularly by exploiting any perceived signs of weakening in allied unity on defense or arms control issues.

What we in the West must do to bring the Soviets to a more serious tack is, in parallel with our efforts at the negotiating table in Geneva, to demonstrate the political will and ability to maintain the necessary capabilities effectively to deter them. When the Soviets recognize that they will attain no exploitable military or political advantages from their military buildup and that unilateral concessions will not be forthcoming, they may then welcome a serious discussion of how we could take practical steps toward our agreed objectives of preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability.

When the Soviets are ready for such discussions, we believe those talks can be productive. Although the issues in Geneva are many and complex, we are convinced that we have formulated good proposals that provide a sound basis for mutually beneficial agreements. More-

over, the President has provided our negotiators unprecedented flexibility to explore various avenues toward the equitable outcomes we seek. Accordingly, despite our realization of the difficulties ahead, we are hopeful that, with patience and persistence, we can achieve a result that will benefit all mankind.

71. Statement by the Chairman of the Chemical Warfare Review Commission (Stoessel) Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services: Summary of the Findings and Conclusions of the Commission [Extract], May 1, 1985 [1]

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This Commission was directed by the Congress to review the overall adequacy of the chemical warfare posture of the United States. The Commission began by considering United States policy with respect to chemical weapons. That policy has three elements:

Arms control. The United States will actively pursue the achievement of a multilateral, verifiable ban on the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

Deterrence. Until such a ban is achieved and in effect, the United States will retain the capability to deter chemical attack by other powers.

No first use. The United States will never use chemical weapons except in retaliation for the use of chemical weapons against the United States or its allies.

The Commission found that the policy as stated continues to be appropriate.

The Commission was directed by the Congress to consider four specific questions: [2]

1. The relationship of chemical stockpile modernization by the United States with the ultimate goal of the United States of achieving a multilateral, comprehensive, and verifiable ban on chemical weapons;

2. The adequacy of the existing United States stockpile of unitary chemical weapons in providing a credible deterrent to use by the Soviet Union of chemical weapons against the United States and allied forces;

3. Whether the binary chemical modernization program proposed by the Department of Defense is adequate to support United States national security policy by posing a credible deterrent to chemical warfare; and

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[1] *Chemical Warfare Review Commission: Hearing. . . .*, pp. 7–8.

[2] These four questions were incorporated into the three tasks of Executive Order 12502, dated January 28, 1985. [Footnote in original.]. The Executive Order is printed as Document 9.

4. The ability of defensive measures alone to meet the Soviet chemical warfare threat and the adequacy of funding for current and projected defensive measure programs.

The following are the Commission's findings on each of the four points it was directed to address:

THE EFFECT OF MODERNIZATION ON ACHIEVING A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN

The Commission believes that modernization would likely increase the chances of achieving a multilateral, verifiable ban on chemical weapons. The Commission notes that in the 16 years since the unilateral renunciation by the U.S. of production of chemical munitions, the Soviet Union has not progressed toward acceptance of such a ban; on the contrary, it has continued its intensive program of production and research and development for chemical munitions.

ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING STOCKPILE TO DETER

The Commission has found that:

The existing U.S. store of chemical weapons dates from the 1940's through 1960's and is in deteriorating condition. The bulk of it is militarily useless; a small fraction of the stockpile has deterrent value. All of it is potentially hazardous to handle.

Soviet chemical warfare capability is sizeable and increasing.

A more credible U.S. chemical retaliatory capability is needed in order to prevent either quick defeat or early escalation to a nuclear exchange in the event chemical weapons are used by the adversary.

Failure to acquire an effective chemical retaliatory capability could leave the United States with only nuclear retaliation to deter chemical attack.

The current stockpile should be destroyed at an accelerated rate.

THE BINARY CHEMICAL PROGRAM

The Commission has found that:

The proposed binary program will provide an adequate deterrent capability to meet our present needs and is necessary because of the deteriorating condition of the current stockpile.

The great advantage of the proposed binary munitions is safety.

The projected binary munitions program will not produce a more lethal generation of weapons. It provides, rather, a safer, separate packaging of nonlethal chemicals that combine to form lethal agents only when launched. The agents which would be formed after launching are identical to the lethal agents already produced and stored in the U.S. stockpile.

Substitution of these safer binary weapons for existing U.S. munitions filled with lethal nerve agent will provide much greater safety for U.S. personnel and will simplify transport and handling. In addition, effective elimination of potential environmental hazards will be far easier and less expensive.

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DEFENSIVE MEASURES

The Commission has found that:

The expectation that protective measures alone can offset the advantages to the Soviets from a chemical attack is not realistic.

Even if defensive equipment works, it severely handicaps personnel who must wear it. Without a retaliatory capability, this leads to an overwhelming military advantage for the attacker armed with chemical weapons.

ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS

The Commission in the course of its deliberations has also arrived at these additional conclusions:

Deployment.—The Commission does not consider peacetime deployment of binary munitions in foreign countries to be essential, because of the safety and speed with which these munitions can be transported.

Research and Development.—The Commission believes that research and development efforts on both defensive items and detection equipment, as well as on retaliatory chemical agents and munitions, should be accelerated, both in order to deter the Soviet Union from using new agents and in order to develop countermeasures.

Intelligence.—The Commission believes that U.S. intelligence gathering and analysis regarding chemical warfare activities of the Soviet Union and other countries should be greatly improved.

72. Letter From the Israeli Resident Representative (Katz) to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Blix): Attacks on Nuclear Facilities, May 6, 1985 [1]

Following our conversation of 23 April 1985, I inquired of my authorities about statements reportedly made in Israel in the matter of attacks on nuclear facilities.

In response, I have been instructed to inform you unequivocally that no one but the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and their appointed representatives express the authorized policies of the Government on this issue.

I am instructed to reiterate the position of the Government of Israel which I brought to your attention in my letter of 21 August 1984, reproduced in Document GC(XXVIII)/720 of 30 August 1984.[2]

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated to Member States.

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[1] INFCIRC/324.

[2] The letter referred to here transmitted a statement of May 21, 1984 by the Director General of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission. See *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 419–420.

73. Message From President Reagan to the Ninth General Conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, May 7, 1985 [1]

I am honored to extend my personal greetings to the Ninth Ordinary Session of the General Conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, under the Treaty of Tlatelolco,[2] and to offer my best wishes for a successful and productive meeting.

The United States strongly supports the goals and objectives of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This is demonstrated by its adherence to Additional Protocols I and II. I am particularly proud that in 1981, my Administration took the steps necessary to complete United States adherence to Protocol I.[3] This action underscores the importance I attach to advancing arms control and to working with our Latin American neighbors to help create a stable environment and a more secure and peaceful future for the hemisphere.

Today, I congratulate the countries of Latin America which have fully adhered to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. You have contributed to the goal of creating the first nuclear weapons free zone in any populated region of the world. It is a tribute to the vision of Latin American statesmen that the Treaty has become one of the major cornerstones in mankind's efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

I hope this success story will continue to grow, and, in this regard, encourage those states which have not yet done so to bring the Treaty and its Protocols into full effect. By so doing, they will make a major contribution to peaceful regional cooperation and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

I send you my best wishes for a successful General Conference, and hope that it will strengthen this important Treaty and the course of arms control.

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[1] ACDA files. The conference was held in Mexico City.

[2] For the texts of the Treaty and its Protocols, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

[3] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 616–617.

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74. Statement by the ACDA Assistant Director for Nuclear and Weapons Control (Dunn) Before the Ninth General Conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, May 7, 1985 [1]

It is a privilege to represent the United States at this Ninth General Conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is one of the crucial foundations of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.[2] It represents an outstanding cooperative achievement among nations seeking to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, to promote the purely peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to lessen the threat of nuclear conflict.

My country is pleased to be associated with the Treaty of Tlatelolco and to have this opportunity to reiterate our strong support for the goals of a nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America. We also reaffirm our commitment to work toward the broader vision within the Treaty of an eventual world without nuclear weapons. Deep reductions in the existing nuclear arsenals are the first, and essential, step on that road. In our view, serious negotiations to that end are what is demanded if we are to control the threat of the military atom. We hope that with patience and persistence—as well as flexibility on both sides—the new talks in Geneva will make progress toward that goal.

The success of the Treaty of Tlatelolco is a tribute to the vision of Latin American statesmen who have dedicated themselves to the effort of creating a nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America. These efforts have been rewarded by the widespread recognition given the Treaty and its important role in helping to achieve our common goals of a safer and more peaceful world.

Unfortunately, the important goal of banning the acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons in all of Latin America is still unfulfilled. The United States encourages all the countries that are not yet party to the Treaty or its Protocols to review their positions and to take early and positive action to bring the Treaty fully into force. In completing adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the nations will make a unique and significant contribution to regional security and global peace—they will also help to strengthen the Treaty as a possible example for other areas of the world.

The United States is one of the nuclear weapons states that has specific obligations under Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty.

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[1] ACDA files. The conference was held in Mexico City. Before he delivered his statement, Ambassador Dunn read a message from President Reagan to the conference, printed *supra*.

[2] For the texts of the Treaty and its Protocols, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

In 1981, under Additional Protocol I, the United States undertook to apply the basic denuclearization provisions of the Treaty to those territories within the zone for which it is responsible.[3] As he said in his message, President Reagan is particularly proud that final adherence by the United States to Protocol I took place during his first administration.

The United States is also a party to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty. Under that Protocol, my country has agreed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries for which the Treaty is in force, to respect the denuclearized status of the zone, and not to contribute to acts involving violation of obligations of the parties.[4]

The United States strongly supports the goals and objectives of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and understands and takes most seriously its obligations under Additional Protocols I and II. The United States is, and intends to remain, in full compliance with its obligations under these two important Protocols. In that regard, the United States takes note of the remarks of the Secretary-General regarding the August 1984 report of the Puerto Rican Bar Association that have been used by the delegates of Nicaragua and Argentina.[5] Let me reiterate, my government is in full compliance with its obligations under Protocols I and II of the Treaty, and has no intention of violating our obligations.

I would further note that officials of my government have been in communication with the legally constituted officials of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Specifically, we have met with a representative of the Senate of Puerto Rico and sent a letter to that body in response to a resolution it has passed regarding U.S. compliance with Protocol I. My government would be happy to provide to OPANAL a copy of that response—and would have been prepared earlier to set the record straight had we been approached for our views.

As for the other points raised by the representative from Nicaragua, my government believes that the external and internal policies of Nicaragua are important not only to its closest neighbors, but also to the United States. This is why my government has supported, and continues to support, the Contadora negotiations—in which many countries of this room are involved. This is why my government has supported the call of important segments of Nicaraguan opinion for a dialogue under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church.

It has been the intransigence of the Nicaraguan authorities to external and internal calls for moderation that has led my government to suspend our trade relations.

As for U.S. naval maneuvers in the Central American region, these are in support of democratically-elected governments under attack by Nicaraguan-supported revolutionary groups.

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[3] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 616–617.
[4] *Ibid., 1971,* pp. 311–313.
[5] Cf. *Arms Control Today,* January 1985, pp. 4–5.

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We do not believe that this forum is the proper one to pursue this issue further. To do so would be a disservice to the important business which brings us here today. Let me return then to the business at hand.

The United States recognizes and takes into account in its nuclear export policy the various ways that the Treaty of Tlatelolco helps generate confidence that nuclear energy will be used only for peaceful purposes. The Treaty provides an internationally recognized commitment to nuclear non-proliferation objectives, including a framework for adequate safeguards and controls and the provision of certain information to OPANAL. In this way, the Treaty helps to make available to its parties the many peaceful benefits of the atom, in fields from medicine to nuclear power.

Finally, I want to congratulate the nations of Latin America for the fine example they are setting through their adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. They are collaborating in the field of nuclear non-proliferation while strengthening a framework for regional cooperation in nuclear energy. Although our mutual goal of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons requires an international commitment, regional approaches like the Treaty of Tlatelolco are a major contribution to the global peace and security that we all seek.

75. Address by President Reagan Before a Special Session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France [Extract], May 8, 1985 [1]

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From the creation of NATO in 1949 through the early 1970's, Soviet aggression was effectively deterred. The strength of Western economies, the vitality of our societies, the wisdom of our diplomacy all contributed to Soviet restraint; but certainly the decisive factor must have been the countervailing power—ultimately, military, and above all, nuclear power, which the West was capable of bringing to bear in the defense of its interests.

It was in the early 1970's that the United States lost that superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons, which had characterized the postwar era. In Europe the effect of this loss was not quickly perceptible, but seen globally, Soviet conduct changed markedly and dangerously. First in Angola in 1975, then when the West failed to respond, in Ethiopia, in South Yemen, in Kampuchea, and ultimately in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union began courting more risks and expanding its influence through the indirect and direct application

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, May 13, 1985, pp. 605–607.

of military power. Today we see similar Soviet efforts to profit from and stimulate regional conflicts in Central America.

Audience members. Boo-o-o!

The President. They haven't been there. I have.

The ineffectual Western response to Soviet adventurism of the late 1970's had many roots, not least the crisis of self-confidence within the American body politic wrought by the Vietnam experience. But just as Soviet decisionmaking in the earlier postwar era had taken place against a background of overwhelming American strategic power, so the decisions of the late seventies were taken in Moscow, as in Washington and throughout Europe, against a background of growing Soviet and stagnating Western nuclear strength.

One might draw the conclusion from these events that the West should reassert that nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union upon which our security and our strategy rested through the postwar era. That is not my view. We cannot and should not seek to build our peace and freedom perpetually upon the basis of expanding nuclear arsenals.

In the short run, we have no alternative but to compete with the Soviet Union in this field, not in the pursuit of superiority but merely of balance. It is thus essential that the United States maintain a modern and survivable nuclear capability in each leg of the strategic triad—sea, land, and airbased. It is similarly important that France and Britain maintain and modernize their independent strategic capabilities.

Now, the Soviet Union, however, does not share our view of what constitutes a stable nuclear balance. It has chosen instead to build nuclear forces clearly designed to strike first and thus disarm th adversary. The Soviet Union is now moving toward deployment of new mobile MIRV'ed missiles which have these capabilities plus the potential to avoid detection, monitoring, or arms control verification. In doing this the Soviet Union is undermining stability and the basis for mutual deterrence.

One can imagine several possible responses to the continued Soviet buildup of nuclear forces. On the one hand, we can ask the Soviet Union to reduce its offensive systems through equitable, verifiable arms control measures. We are pressing that case in Geneva. Thus far, however, we've heard nothing new from the other side.

A second possibility would be for the West to step up our current modernization effort to keep up with constantly accelerating Soviet deployments, not to regain superiority but merely to keep up with Soviet deployments. But is this really an acceptable alternative? Even if this course could be sustained by the West, it would produce a less stable strategic balance than the one we have today. Must we accept an endless process of nuclear arms competition? I don't think so. We need a better guarantee of peace than that.

And fortunately, there is a third possibility. It is to offset the continued Soviet offensive buildup in destabilizing weapons by devel-

oping defenses against these weapons. In 1983 I launched a new research program—the Strategic Defense Initiative.[2]

The state of modern technology may soon make possible, for the first time, the ability to use nonnuclear systems to defeat ballistic missiles. The Soviets themselves have long recognized the value of defensive systems and have invested heavily in them. Indeed, they have spent as much on defensive systems as they have on offensive systems for more than 20 years.

Now, this research program will take time. As we proceed with it, we will remain within existing treaty constraints. We will also consult in the closest possible fashion with our allies. And when the time for decisions on the possible production and deployment of such systems comes, we must and will discuss and negotiate these issues with the Soviet Union.

Both for the short- and long-term I'm confident that the West can maintain effective military deterrence. But surely we can aspire to more than maintaining a state of highly armed truce in international politics.

During the 1970's we went to great lengths to restrain unilaterally our strategic weapons programs out of the conviction that the Soviet Union would adhere to certain rules in its conduct—rules such as neither side seeking to gain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other. Those efforts of the early 1970's resulted in some improvements in Europe, the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement being the best example.[3] But the hopes for a broader and lasting moderation of the East-West competition foundered in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua.

The question before us today is whether we have learned from those mistakes, and can we undertake a stable and peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union based upon effective deterrence and the reduction of tensions. I believe we can. I believe we've learned that fruitful cooperation with the Soviet Union must be accompanied by successful competition in areas, particularly Third World areas where the Soviets are not yet prepared to act with restraint.

[At this point, some members of the audience walked out.]

You know, I've learned something useful. Maybe if I talk long enough in my own Congress, some of those will walk out.

But let me talk about the reflections which have molded our policy toward the Soviet Union. That policy embodies the following basic elements:

While we maintain deterrence to preserve the peace, the United States will make a steady, sustained effort to reduce tensions and solve problems in its relations with the Soviet Union.

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[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 199–201.
[3] 24 UST 283; TIAS 7551.

The United States is prepared to conclude fair, equitable, verifiable agreements for arms reduction, above all with regard to offensive nuclear weapons.

The United States will insist upon compliance with past agreements, both for their own sake and to strengthen confidence in the possibility of future accords.

The United States seeks no unilateral advantages and, of course, can accept none on the Soviet side.

The United States will proceed in full consultation with its allies, recognizing that our fates are intertwined and we must act in unity.

The United States does not seek to undermine or change the Soviet system nor to impinge upon the security of the Soviet Union. At the same time it will resist attempts by the Soviet Union to use or threaten force against others or to impose its system on others by force.

Ultimately, I hope the leaders of the Soviet Union will come to understand that they have nothing to gain from attempts to achieve military superiority or to spread their dominance by force but have much to gain from joining the West in mutual arms reduction and expanding cooperation.

I have directed the Secretary of State to engage with the Soviet Union on an extended agenda of problem solving. Yet even as we embark upon new efforts to sustain a productive dialog with the Soviet Union, we're reminded of the obstacles posed by our so fundamentally different concepts of humanity, of human rights, of the value of human life. The murder of Major Nicholson by a Soviet soldier in East Germany and the Soviet Union's refusal to accept responsibility for this act is only the latest reminder.

If we're to succeed in reducing East-West tensions, we must find means to ensure against the arbitrary use of lethal force in the future, whether against individuals like Major Nicholson or against groups such as the passengers on a jumbo jet.

It is for that reason that I would like to outline for you today what I believe would be a useful way to proceed. I propose that the United States and the Soviet Union take four practical steps.

First, that our two countries make a regular practice of exchanging military observers at military exercises and locations. We now follow this practice with many other nations, to the equal benefit of all parties.

Second, as I believe it is desirable for the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union to meet and tackle problems, I am also convinced that the military leaders of our nations could benefit from more contact. I therefore propose that we institute regular, high-level contacts between Soviet and American military leaders to develop better understanding and to prevent potential tragedies from occurring.

Third, I urge that the Conference on Disarmament in Europe act promptly and agree on the concrete confidence-building measures proposed by the NATO countries. The United States is prepared to

discuss the Soviet proposal on nonuse of force in the context of Soviet agreement to concrete confidence-building measures.

Fourth, I believe a permanent military-to-military communications link could serve a useful purpose in this important area of our relationship. It could be the channel for exchanging notifications and other information regarding routine military activities, thereby reducing the chances of misunderstanding and misinterpretation. And over time, it might evolve into a risk-reduction mechanism for rapid communication and exchange of data in times of crisis.

These proposals are not cure-alls for our current problems. They will not compensate for the deaths which have occurred. But as terrible as past events have been, it would be more tragic if we were to make no attempt to prevent even larger tragedies from occurring through lack of contact and communication.

We in the West have much to do, and we must do it together. We must remain unified in the face of attempts to divide us and strong in spite of attempts to weaken us. And we must remember that our unity and strength are not a mere impulse of like-minded allies, but the natural result of our shared love for liberty.

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76. Statement by the ACDA Deputy Assistant Director for Verification and Intelligence (Barker) Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Proposals To Ban Nuclear Testing, May 8, 1985 [1]

Good afternoon. I am happy to be here today to comment on behalf of the administration on House Joint Resolution 3.

This resolution, as you are aware, in its current form, calls for the President, at the earliest possible date, to request advice and consent for the Senate to ratification of the Threshold Test Ban [2] and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions [3] Treaties. The President is also invited to submit with these treaties a report on any plans he has to negotiate supplemental verification procedures or any understanding or reservation on the subject of verification that should be attached to the treaty.

Further, House Joint Resolution 3 calls for the President at the earliest possible date to propose to the Soviet Union the immediate resumption of negotiations toward conclusion of a verifiable, comprehensive test ban treaty.

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[1] *Proposals to Ban Nuclear Testing: Hearings and Markup Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science . . . on House Joint Resolution 3*, 99th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 73–76.

[2] For the text of this Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–227.

[3] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.

This resolution is unacceptable to the administration. Careful study led us for 4 years to conclude that the Threshold Test Ban Treaty in its current form is not effectively verifiable. Ratification of this Treaty before verification improvements can be negotiated with the Soviets is not in the national security interest of the United States.

Similarly, thorough evaluation has led the administration to reaffirm that a comprehensive test ban remains a long-term objective of the United States; an objective which we will seek to pursue within the context of broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions, the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent, expanded confidence-building measures, and improved verification capabilities. There is much to be accomplished with respect to each of these objectives. It is not yet time to undertake negotiation of a comprehensive test ban.

Let there be no doubt about this administration's commitment to effective arms reduction agreements and to the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We seek to achieve these goals while striving to strengthen and maintain the security and stability which the entire world desires. In this context, we are convinced that deep reductions in the offensive nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States must have our highest priority.

The recent return by the Soviets to the negotiating table they walked away from in 1983 has given us the opportunity to resume our effort in this regard. In seeking deep reductions, we will demand equality and require effective verification in any resulting treaty. These criteria are critical for strategic stability. We and the whole world must be convinced that agreements negotiated are agreements to be complied with.

Unfortunately, the Soviet record on compliance, rather than giving increased confidence in arms control, gives rise to grave concerns. As the President has said:

> Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future.[4]

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty offers an area where the Soviets can demonstrate that they take arms control seriously, that they too, recognize that the true benefits of arms control can only be achieved when all parties are secure and confident that the treaty terms are being complied with. The United States must stand by its standard of effective verification with respect to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Anything less would undermine our ability to demand effective verification in this and other treaty areas, as well as being a disservice to the objectives of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty itself.

There is almost universal acceptance in this country that true treaty verification cannot be based on trust. Yet the Threshold Test Ban

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[4] *Ibid., 1984,* pp. 33–34.

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Treaty, in the name of verification, offers only an exchange of data which, while appearing extensive, contains not a single meaningful element that can be independently validated by the United States. There is not ability for us to independently measure any of the important parameters upon which our estimates of Soviet yield are based.

Those who negotiated and signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, with today's hindsight, were optimistic. They believed that our understanding of the science of seismology was good enough for us to determine Soviet nuclear weapon test yields to an accuracy sufficient to protect U.S. security. They also expected that the Soviets would comply with the Treaty.

Since 1976, when the Soviet Union claimed that it would abide by the provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, two things have happened to change that earlier perspective. First, we have had to recognize that we cannot determine Soviet nuclear yields with the accuracy required for effective verification. Second, we have had to conclude that it is likely that the Soviets have violated their legal obligations with respect to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty cannot now be effectively verified. The Soviets are likely in violation of their legal obligation to limit test yields to 150 kilotons and below. Verification must be improved before the President could in good faith determine that this treaty is in the national security interest of our Nation and before he could thus seek the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification.

The administration has not been passive on this issue. In 1983 and again in 1984, we sought on a number of occasions to engage the U.S.S.R. in discussions on verification improvements for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. In addition, in his address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 24, 1984, President Reagan proposed an exchange of visits to allow Soviet experts to come to the U.S. nuclear test site and U.S. experts to go to the Soviet nuclear test site to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests.[5]

We recognize that any improvements to verification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty must be mutually arrived at between the United States and the Soviet Union. In other words, they must be negotiated. They cannot be dictated by the United States and imposed upon the Soviet Union. For this reason we have not approached the Soviets with a unilateral nonnegotiable demand. We have instead sought an honest exchange of technical views on how verification can be improved. Regrettably, the Soviets have thus far rejected all our proposals to meet and confer on verification improvements.

Today the Soviets may perceive a lack on unanimity, a lack of commitment, within the American Government on the issue of TTBT verification. They can have no doubt about the administration's posi-

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 689–693.

tion: Effective verification must precede ratification. But thus far the Soviets have not heard congressional endorsement and support for the administration position on the strengthening of verification measures. House Joint Resolution No. 3 does not now call upon the Soviets to join us in seeking verification improvements to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

Returning to the subject of the comprehensive test ban treaty, our problems with House Joint Resolution 3 are no less severe. We would all like to reduce and eventually eliminate our dependence upon nuclear arms. However, as the current discussion of the strategic defense initiative has highlighted, many Americans as well as American allies are seeking assurance that the U.S. nuclear deterrent will be effectively maintained until a better alternative is available. Today this requires nuclear testing.

As we modernize our nuclear deterrent to make it more survivable and better able to contribute to stability, we will require some new nuclear weapons to arm those new weapon systems. In the interest of stability we must also retain our confidence that our deterrent is reliable. And while the safety and security record of our nuclear forces is unparalleled, as technologies become available which can make them even more safe and secure, who would bear the burden of not incorporating these improvements into our nuclear weapons? Weapon modernization, confidence in the deterrent, and enhanced nuclear weapon safety and security are today all dependent upon nuclear testing. It is important, therefore, to understand that our reliance on a credible nuclear deterrent has an essential bearing on the time frame within which consideration can realistically be given to negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

As with the case of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, effective verification is also a necessary condition for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Today it does not exist. The United States has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on research to establish the basis for verifiable nuclear test limitations. This administration is continuing that search. As part of that effort we have actively supported multilateral involvement in nuclear test ban verification studies at the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

In sum, the ingredients are not yet available for comprehensive test ban negotiations. Further, we must not allow a search for a comprehensive test ban to become once again a diversion and surrogate for negotiations of deep and meaningful arms reductions. The signatories of the Non-proliferation Treaty sought in article VI of that Treaty the elimination of the discrimination that is manifest in the differentiation between nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states.[6] Elimination of that distinction can only be achieved with the elimination of nuclear weapons. Radical reductions in the number of offensive nuclear weapons should be the first step in that direction.

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[6] *Ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.

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Congressional support for U.S. efforts to achieve such reductions in the current Geneva negotiations have been substantial, and we believe such support is not lost on the Soviets. Clearly, when administration and Congress are seen working together, our chances for success with the Soviets are greatest.

It is therefore to be regretted that House Joint Resolution 3 is not supportive of these clearly and consistently stated administration objectives and priorities. Your support for our efforts to enhance verification would be most helpful and most welcome.

This completes my prepared remarks. I'd be happy to answer your questions.

77. Statement by the Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (Kerr) Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Proposals To Ban Nuclear Testing, May 8, 1985 [1]

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is a pleasure to have the opportunity to discuss the issues of arms control and test limitations with you. I hope that what I will say will assist in understanding this difficult and important subject.

Our laboratory, owned by the Department of Energy, has been run by the University of California since it began in 1943. The first nuclear and thermonuclear weapons were designed at Los Alamos, and today over two-thirds of the nuclear weapons currently in the U.S. stockpile were designed by our laboratory. We know the tremendous destructive power of these weapons, and we have long hoped that the world's leaders would find ways to reach effective arms control agreements.

We were also the pioneers of technical means of nuclear verification, including the ground-based VELA optical systems, followed later by the VELA satellites and their successors.[2] I also, however, bear the responsibility of personally certifying that the weapons we design will work and that they have appropriate safety features. That responsibility weighs heavily.

For three decades, bans or limitations on testing of nuclear weapons have been one of the most frequently and widely supported forms of nuclear arms control. Yet testing restraints constitute a highly technical approach to arms control, and they have often been advocated as an alternative to political approaches and agreements when this

[1] *Proposals to Ban Nuclear Testing: Hearings and Markup Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science . . . on House Joint Resolution 3*, 99th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 77–81.

[2] The VELA program is a series of tests and studies conducted by the Department of Defense, beginning in 1959, to establish a scientific basis for monitoring nuclear tests in all environments.

avenue appeared to be closed by controversy or concern over military and strategic problems.

Testing restraints in the past have raised questions about the credibility of our own deterrent [*and?*] about possible United States-Soviet asymmetry. It is not certain that they can significantly advance the cause of nuclear arms control or be a substitute for direct reductions of nuclear weapons. As long as we rely on nuclear weapons, we must test them. Our Nuclear Weapon Test Program is essential in designing, engineering, manufacturing, maintaining, and certifying weapons. Certification, simply put, is a guarantee from the nuclear weapons design laboratories that weapons will perform to specifications throughout their stockpile life, in peacetime and in war. Equally important, this certification is a promise that they will be safe and resistant to unauthorized attempts to use them by terrorists or others.

Nuclear tests are essential for determining the proper functioning of a nuclear explosive. Calculations do not suffice, and there is no way experimentally to simulate the total performance of a nuclear weapon. Therefore, without testing, no new designs ought to be put into stockpile. In the same vein, testing is necessary for undertaking desired risk-free improvements. Nuclear testing allows us to make weapons safer, to improve controls to prevent or deny unauthorized use, to improve design efficiency, and to reduce costs and special nuclear material requirements, and lastly to design weapons to reduce collateral damage. And it contributes significantly to our ability to study weapons effects, the knowledge of which is essential for responding to the threat posed by Soviet offensive and defensive nuclear systems.

Nuclear testing is essential for maintenance of the stockpile. In the early 1960's for example, we discovered evidence of serious deterioration in a major strategic system. It required testing to demonstrate whether the system would function. Nuclear weapons are affected significantly by aging and obsolescence. Over an extended period, some of the materials used in warheads deteriorate physically. Maintenance of the stockpile depends on regularly scheduled random sampling in which nuclear weapons are disassembled and inspected. If irregularities are found, they are referred to the experts at the weapon design laboratories for their judgment as to the severity of the problem and the necessary correction.

This may be done on the basis of past tests, but an additional test may be required if the weapon is to be retained in the active inventory. In such cases, without the test or tests required, certification of the weapon would be impossible.

The fact that we rarely conduct proof tests, that is, specific individual tests of a weapon pulled from the stockpile, is sometimes cited as evidence that testing is not necessary to maintain confidence in the reliability of the stockpile. This is incorrect. We do not conduct occasional proof tests, but we also use the continuing testing program to confirm the design choices made in the stockpiled weapons.

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Testing programs are essential in maintaining the nuclear weapons capability of the Nation. Without an Experimental Testing Program which challenges our nuclear weapon designers and tests their designs, we would lose our best designers, and those remaining would not be able to demonstrate the validity of their theories.

This was our experience under the testing moratorium from 1958 to 1961. Without an experimental testing program, we would expect the technical base of knowledge and experience required for developing and maintaining weapons to dissipate and disappear.

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty establishes a nuclear threshold by prohibiting tests with a yield exceeding 150 kilotons,[3] a provision the United States observed scrupulously. Within this limit, the laboratory is able to maintain the present stockpile and our nuclear design capability. Without testing over 150 kilotons, we can, within limits, undertake modifications of nuclear weapons to enhance safety, improve efficiency, reduce cost, and achieve other desired improvements. The laboratory can design and certify new weapons with high confidence if they are 150 kilotons or below, or with reduced confidence if they are not larger than the threshold by about a factor of two. The laboratory will not be able to design and develop high-yield weapons based on designs that depart significantly from those of the past.

Under the threshold test ban, there is a serious potential for Soviet violations which could create asymmetries with military significance. Even if the Soviets only conducted one or two high-yield tests every few years, it might be possible for them to develop new high yield weapons.

The data exchange provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty have not yet come into effect. Consequently, we do not know how valuable this geophysical data would be. But it is not obvious that the exchange of geophysical data upon ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty will reduce ambiguities about Soviet tests and increase confidence in Soviet compliance with the Treaty. For verification of the TTBT, we now depend upon remote teleseismic monitoring. This methodology includes random errors and systematic errors such as the seismic bias between the Nevada test site and the Shagan River test site. With remote teleseismic monitoring, we simply cannot know what the actual yields of underground tests are. We are forced to infer yields from the seismic signals resulting from a nuclear weapons test. We can only say with certain probability, but no certainty, that a given test did or did not exceed the 150-kiloton threshold.

It has on occasion been suggested that Los Alamos believes that the Soviets have violated the 150-kiloton limit, while our sister laboratory at Livermore disagrees. We have tried to analyze the seismic signals statistically, and we have concluded that the issue of Soviet compliance is unresolved and presently unresolvable given the nature of the data available to us. To resolve it, at Los Alamos and elsewhere, we

[3] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–227.

are exploring improved and new verification methodologies. An intrusive onsite verification technique called CORRTEX, which is a hydrodynamic shock measurement, has been developed and used by Los Alamos for measurement of nuclear test yields; providing a direct and much more accurate estimate of yield than any remote technique, it now appears especially promising. It could provide much improved confidence in Soviet compliance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and help resolve some of the major uncertainties and ambiguities in remote monitoring data.

The United States continues to observe the threshold provisions, and we believe we can perform our current responsibilities under its limitation. But in order to reduce concern about potential military disadvantages to the United States, we would urge improved verification. We would then have greater confidence that the Soviets were subject to symmetrical restrictions.

The desirability of entering into negotiations on a comprehensive test ban is a political question. I will primarily speak to the technical question of the effect of the CTB on the national security mission of the laboratory and the Department of Energy nuclear weapons complex.

A CTB would lead to loss of confidence in the reliability of our nuclear weapons and would result in substantial erosion of our capability to design, manufacture, and maintain nuclear weapons. A CTB would effectively preclude responsible and desirable modernization of the nuclear stockpile and prevent desirable risk-free improvements to enhance the safety, efficiency, economy, and extended reliability of our nuclear weapons.

We cannot be certain that a CTB would equally constrain the Soviets. Since we do not know the specifics of Soviet nuclear weapon design, we are simply unable to say whether they would be affected by a CTB in the same manner and to the same extent that we are.

I cannot share the view of those who argue that an effective, verifiable CTB is within our grasp. Even with monitors on Soviet soil and onsite inspections, verification of a CTB would involve considerable uncertainties. Verification concerns with a CTB involve a different range of yields than with a threshold test ban. In essence, the problem of verifying a CTB is detection of relatively small seismic events and the unequivocal identification of their source.

All experts agree that there is some lower limit below which nuclear tests in hard rock cannot be detected with remote seismic monitors. But it is possible to disguise tests of relatively large nuclear weapons by exploding a device inside a hollow underground cavity, for example. Most of the energy is not coupled into the earth and does not produce ground motion. Hiding tests in earthquakes or using shock-mitigating materials may confuse the issue of decoupling even further. A militarily significant nuclear test program could in this way be unrecognized by a remote teleseismic monitoring network.

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The limitations of current nuclear testing verification technologies are not viewed, however, with resignation. We are working to discover new and improved techniques. A verification method that senses ionospheric disturbances produced by nuclear explosions is being developed by Los Alamos and appears promising, and high-frequency seismic measurements may hold promise for increasing sensitivity to decoupled tests, although this means [*needs?*] to be demonstrated.

Against these costs and risks of the CTB, its proponents offer two asserted benefits, which are primarily political in nature. It is frequently claimed that a CTB will break the arms control logjam—that a carefully negotiated, binding, and fully verifiable CTB could be the breakthrough that would result in genuine arms control through reductions in nuclear arsenals. However, many of the same political and military concerns that have prevented significant nuclear arms reductions also stand in the way of agreeing to a CTB. To focus on a comprehensive test ban as the goal of arms control policy seems to me to work the wrong side of the problem.

It is also questionable whether a CTB would significantly improve the nonproliferation regime, as proponents claim. From a technical point of view, a comprehensive test ban has only a marginal effect on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Testing is not essential for designing and building the simple, first-generation fission devices that a would-be proliferator is likely to want at the beginning of a nuclear weapons program. Politically, a CTB is unlikely to have a significant long-term effect on the problem of proliferation and the strength of the nonproliferation regime. It is unlikely that the states interested in building nuclear weapons are driven primarily by the bad example of the major powers, and a CTB is not likely to prevent a country from deciding to develop nuclear weapons if it believes it can and should do so. Nor would it be likely to meet the goals of the nonnuclear weapon states by bringing about general and complete disarmament or ending the distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear weapon states.

The real unknown technical costs of the CTB, then, appear more compelling than anticipated political benefits. It is certain, however, that we must continue to test if we intend as a nation to rely upon nuclear forces in our defense posture, as we expect to do for the foreseeable future.

As a weapons laboratory director, I have the responsibility for overseeing the development of the nuclear weapons on which the United States relies for deterrence and defense. While I believe that the current national security role assigned Los Alamos National Laboratory could be performed under a threshold test ban treaty, conditions do not exist now that would allow me to give unqualified support for a comprehensive test ban. I understand, perhaps as well as anyone, the awesome and dreadful power of nuclear weapons, and I believe that priority should be given to efforts to control deployed warheads capable of inflicting harm. I share the hope that such talks will be successful.

78. Report by the Senate Committee on Armed Services: Agreement To Expand the Direct Communications Link With the Soviet Union, May 14, 1985 [1]

The Committee on Armed Services, to which was referred the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 108) authorizing the Secretary of Defense to provide to the Soviet Union, on a reimbursable basis, equipment and services necessary for an improved United States/Soviet Direct Communication Link for crisis control, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the joint resolution do pass.

PURPOSE

The purpose of the joint resolution is to authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide to the Soviet Union, on a reimbursable basis, equipment and services needed to implement the July 17, 1984 agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on expanding and improving the operation of the U.S./Soviet Direct-Communications Link, commonly known as the "Hotline." [2] The joint resolution also authorizes the Secretary of Defense to use any funds available to the Department of Defense (DoD) to procure the equipment and provide the services needed to implement this agreement, and it further directs that the funds received from the Soviet Union as payment for such equipment and services shall be credited to the appropriate DoD account.

BACKGROUND

In June 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in a Memorandum of Understanding to establish a Direct Communications Link (DCL) for use in time of emergency.[3] Each agreed to ensure prompt delivery to its head of government of any communications received over the DCL from the other head of government. The Memorandum of Understanding was negotiated and signed by the heads of the U.S. and Soviet delegations to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. The DCL was activated in August 1963.

Eight years later, the DCL was updated by a September 30, 1971 agreement negotiated by a special working group of the two SALT delegations and signed by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister.[4] This agreement provided for the addition of two satellite circuits to the DCL, one using the Soviet Molniya II satellite

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[1] *Hotline Upgrade* [To accompany S.J. Res. 108], May 14, 1985 (S.Rept. 99-49; 99th Cong., 1st sess.).
[2] For the text of the Agreement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 520-523.
[3] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 236-238.
[4] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 635-639.

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system and the other the U.S. INTELSAT system. Those two circuits became operational in January 1978.[5]

A second special working group of the two SALT delegations simultaneously negotiated a related Agreement on Measures To Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the U.S. and the USSR. Each side agreed to notify the other in advance of any planned missile launch extending beyond its national territory in the direction of the other, and for each to notify the other immediately in the event of certain situations that could create a risk of nuclear war. The parties agreed that they would use the DCL to transmit urgent information in situations requiring prompt clarification.[6]

In May 1983, President Reagan proposed to the Soviet Union three measures to improve the bilateral communications network between the two countries: the addition of a high-speed facsimile capability to the Hotline; the establishment of a Joint Military Communications Link (JMCL); and the establishment of high-speed data links between each government and its embassy in the other's capital.[7]

The Secretary of Defense had recommended those proposals to the President following a full and complete study of possible initiatives for enhancing international stability and reducing the risk of nuclear war. That examination, which involved all concerned U.S. Government agencies, was mandated by an amendment to the fiscal year 1983 DOD Authorization Act introduced by Senators Jackson, Nunn and Warner directing the Secretary to study a number of crisis control measures, including an improved Hotline. The Secretary of Defense transmitted his findings and recommendations in his April 1983 Report to the Congress on Direct Communications Links and Other Measures to Enhance Stability.[8]

U.S./Soviet negotiations on improving bilateral communications links opened in Moscow in August 1983. Subsequent rounds were held in Washington in January 1984, in Moscow in April 1984, and in Washington in July 1984. On July 17, 1984, President Reagan announced that an agreement had been reached.[9]

Under this agreement, a facsimile capability will be added to the Hotline, enabling each country for the first time to transmit and receive graphic materials. In addition, the planned improvements will allow the U.S. and Soviet heads of government to exchange messages more rapidly than they can with the existing teletype. The increase in the speed of communication and the ability to send pictures and maps could be especially critical in future crises.

The Direct Communications Link will now consist of: three circuits (two satellite circuits plus one wire telegraph circuit); one earth station in each country for each satellite circuit; terminals in each country

[5] *Ibid., 1978,* pp. 30–31.
[6] *Ibid., 1971,* pp. 634–635.
[7] *Ibid., 1983,* pp. 442–444.
[8] *Ibid.,* pp. 309–324.
[9] *Ibid., 1984,* pp. 523–524.

linked to the three circuits and equipped with teletype and facsimile equipment.

The agreement specifies that the U.S. Government will sell the Soviet Union at cost the equipment necessary to install and maintain the improved Hotline. This transaction, which is expected to cost less than $1 million, will include fascimile equipment, personal computer (PC) equipment, modem equipment, and microprocessor systems to ensure the privacy of these very sensitive communications. Most of this transaction will be completed in the initial sale of the specified equipment to the Soviet Union. However, sales of services and additional equipment, including consumable items, will recur periodically throughout the life of the improved Hotline.

COMMITTEE ACTION

S.J. Resolution 108 was introduced on April 4, 1985 by Senators Warner and Nunn and was referred to the Committee on Armed Services. During the Committee's business meeting of May 2, Senators Warner and Nunn presented testimony on the joint resolution. The Committee then approved S.J. Resolution 108 without objection by voice vote.

MAJOR ISSUES CONSIDERED BY THE COMMITTEE

Contribution to crisis stability

The Committee agrees with President Reagan that the July 17, 1984 agreement will make a "modest but positive" contribution toward improving crisis stability and decreasing the risk that a confrontation or conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union could ever occur as a result of accident, miscaculation or misinterpretation. In accordance with the principle of confidentiality concerning communications between heads of state, the precise number of times that the United States and the Soviet Union have used the system has not been disclosed. However, it is evident that the Hotline has proved invaluable in major crises, including the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. The addition of a facsimile capability and the increase in the speed of communication will further enhance the value of this communications link.

Need for new legislative authority

At the request of Senators Warner and Nunn, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense prepared a memo outlining the legal reasons why new legislation was needed to implement the July 1984 agreement. (Attachment 2) [10] The General Counsel determined that use of the Arms Export Control Act [11] as authority for providing the specified equipment to the Soviet Union would not appear to be either

[10] Included below.
[11] *Documents on Disarmament, 1976*, pp. 386–430.

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viable or appropriate. The memo also notes that use of the Secretary of Defense's contingency fund is intended to meet only "emergency or extraordinary expenses which cannot be anticipated or classified," whereas procurement by DoD of equipment needed to maintain the improved Hotline is expected to recur over the lifetime of the system.

Transfer of technology

On March 22, Senators Warner and Nunn wrote Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle to request his assessment of the technology transfer aspects of the proposed sale. In a March 25 reply, Assistant Secretary Perle advised the Senators that prior to deciding the final configuration of the proposed upgrade, "the Department of Defense examined each component proposed for that system in the context of applicable transfer of technology regulations." Assistant Secretary Perle stated that based on this review, DoD determined that "the sale of those components for this purpose is entirely consistent with current U.S. law and policy regarding trade with the Soviet Union." (Attachment 3) [12]

COST ESTIMATE

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, May 7, 1985.

Hon. BARRY GOLDWATER,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has reviewed S.J. Res. 108, a bill to provide to the Soviet Union, on a reimbursable basis, equipment and services necessary for an improved United States/Soviet Direct Communication Link for crisis control, as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Armed Services on May 2, 1985.

We expect that no cost to the federal, state, or local governments would be incurred as a result of enactment of this legislation.

Should the Committee so desire, we would be pleased to provide further details on the cost estimate.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

RUDOLPH G. PENNER.

REGULATORY IMPACT AND CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In accordance with rule XXVI, paragraphs 11(b) and 12 of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee concludes that there will

[12] Included below.

be no regulatory impact from the passage of this joint resolution. There will also be no repeal or amendment of existing law.

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[Attachment 2]

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

Washington, DC, April 3, 1985.

LEGAL MEMORANDUM

Subject: Sale of DCL Equipment to the USSR.

The U.S. Government proposes to sell DCL equipment to the Soviet Union. Attached is a memorandum outlining three alternative approaches to achieving the requisite legal authority for the proposed transaction.

The first approach (a security assistance sale) does not now appear to be viable because is it conditioned upon our obtaining from the Soviets certain non-retransfer and security assurances, and because use of the Arms Export Control Act as authority for providing equipment to the USSR would not appear to be appropriate.

The second approach (use of the Secretary's contingency fund authorized by 10 USC § 140) is feasible. The commitment of an amount from this fund sufficient to cover the cost of the equipment and services to be provided to the Soviets has been made. A disadvantage of this approach is that a limited amount is appropriated for the contingency fund. Therefore, to the extent the fund is used for DCL purposes, it will not be available for other critical needs. This disadvantage cannot be avoided by reprogramming other funds into the contingency fund. 10 USC § 140 limits the total amount that can be expended from the contingency fund in any year to the amount appropriated for this purpose in the DoD Appropriation Act.

Accordingly, the third approach (a Joint Resolution authorizing the use of any DoD funds) is strongly preferred. This approach would involve virtually no cost to the Treasury since the Soviet Union will reimburse the U.S. Moreover, the Joint Resolution would have the great advantage of permitting DoD to avoid depletion of the contingency fund. In addition, this approach is more appropriate for funding foreseeable expenditures that may well be necessary in the future to maintain the system, since the contingency fund is designed to meet only "emergency or extraordinary expenses which cannot be anticipated or classified."

CHAPMAN B. COX.

Attachment.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL,
Washington, DC, September 21, 1984.

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MEMORANDUM

Subject: Legal Authority for the Sale of DCL Equipment to the USSR (U).

You have requested the opinion of this office regarding the legal implications of various possible funding approaches for a US-Government sale of equipment and spare parts to the USSR in exchange for Soviet payment. The following approaches appear available to carry out such a transaction.

1. A security assistance sale. Although Section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) prohibits furnishing any assistance under the FAA to the USSR, that prohibition does not extend to transactions undertaken under other statutory authority such as the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). Section 3 of the AECA provides four conditions of eligibility for a country to purchase defense articles or defense services under the AECA:

(1) The President must find that the furnishing of defense articles (and defense services) to such country will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace;

(2) The country must have agreed not to transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or related training or other defense service so furnished to it to anyone not an officer, employee or agent of that country and not to use or permit the use of such defense article or related training or other defense service unless the consent of the President has first been obtained;

(3) The country shall have agreed that it will maintain the security of such article and will provide substantially the same degree of security protection afforded to such article by the United States Government;

(4) The country is otherwise eligible to purchase or lease defense articles or defense services.

Accordingly, in order for the United States Government to sell DCL equipment to the USSR as a security assistance sale, the President must sign a finding that the furnishing of DCL equipment to the USSR will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace. It is possible for such a finding to be limited to declaring a country eligible for just one sale. The USSR must commit to the non-retransfer and security assurances detailed in paragraphs (2) and (3) above.

The USSR must also be "otherwise eligible" to purchase this equipment. This requirement means that there must be no other statutory prohibition on such a sale (e.g., such a provision as the Congressional cutoff of sales to Chile) and that the proposed sale must fall within the scope of the Arms Export Control Act. The objectives of the AECA include encouraging regional arms control and disarmament agreements and discouraging arms races. The purposes for which sales under the AECA are authorized are limited to: internal security; legitimate self defense; permitting the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements of measures consistent with the

Charter of the United Nations, or otherwise to permit the recipient country to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security; and enabling foreign military forces in less developed friendly countries to construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to the social and economic development of such friendly countries. It would appear that participation in the DCL is a measure consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

In order to obtain the required Presidential Determination making a country eligible under the AECA, the Secretary of State prepares a Memorandum for the President justifying the proposed Determination. Copies of a Presidential Determination and the State Department's Justification Memorandum for that Determination are attached to this memorandum for your information.

2. Use of the Secretary of Defense's discretionary funds. 10 USC § 140 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide, within the limitation of appropriations made for the purpose, for any emergency or extraordinary expense which cannot be anticipated or classified. When it is so provided in such an appropriation, the funds may be spent on approval or authority of the Secretary for any purpose he deems proper. Expenditures made under this authority must be reported on a quarterly basis to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives. There is no provision for reimbursement in 10 USC § 140, since this authority was not originally designed for a purpose such as that under consideration. However, it would be possible, if sufficient funds remain in the appropriation, for the Secretary to direct that DCL equipment be purchased using those funds and provided to the USSR, although any reimbursement from the USSR for such equipment would have to be returned to Miscellaneous Receipts in the US Treasury.

3. A specific Congressional authorization. Instead of using either of the procedures described above, it would be possible to seek new law authorizing the United States to sell the requisite equipment to the USSR. This approach would allow the US to tailor the statutory authorization to the terms of the proposed sale, instead of having to tailor the sale to the statute, as in (1) above. It could also allow the US Government agency purchasing the equipment to be sold to the USSR to put the receipts from the sale back into its own appropriations, which would not be possible under (2) above. The drawback to this approach is the time required to obtain new law. Congress is due to adjourn on October 5, 1984 and probably will not reconvene until the new Congress is sworn in January, 1985. Your decision concerning adoption of this approach will therefore turn, in part, on the necessary schedule for the sale of this equipment to the USSR.

JOHN H. MCNEILL,
Assistant General Counsel (International).

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[Attachment 3]

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, DC, March 25, 1985.

In reply refer to: I–85/07907
Hon. SAM NUNN,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR NUNN: Thank you for your letter of March 22, 1985, requesting my comments on the legislation which you propose to introduce to facilitate the upgrade of the Direct Communications Link, which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to undertake in an Exchange of Notes, dated July 17, 1984.

As President Reagan indicated at the time of signature of this agreement, the upgrade of the Hotline by the addition of a facsimile capability is a modest, but positive step toward enhancing international stability and reducing the risk that accident, miscalculation or misinterpretation could lead to confrontation or conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The success of this initiative is due in no small measure to your continued support and advice. Your efforts now, to ensure the smooth and efficient implementation of the agreement, are welcomed by all who believe that it is critical that our leaders be able to communicate rapidly and comprehensively in the event of crisis. I heartily endorse your proposed legislation for this purpose.

I want as well to assure you that the sale of the facsimile system to the Soviet Union is consistent with U.S. technology transfer policies. Prior to the United States' proposing the configuration for the addition of a facsimile capablity to the Direct Communications Link, the Department of Defense examined each component proposed for that system in the context of applicable transfer of technology regulations. We determined that the sale of those components for this purpose is entirely consistent with current U.S. law and policy regarding trade with the USSR. Sale of the quantity of equipment necessary to maintain the reliability of the Soviet part of the Hotline requires COCOM approval, which the U.S. will seek.

I want to underscore for the Congress that there is a great deal of difference between selling the USSR equipment for the specific purpose of improving the Direct Communications Link and allowing the Soviet Union unfettered access to U.S. and Allied high technology products. We will continue to ensure that sales to the Soviet Union are closely scrutinized and seek to ensure that only those which are consistent with our COCOM obligations and strategic trade controls are permitted to go forward.

RICHARD PERLE.

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79. Report by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, May 14, 1985 [1]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 2456) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act [2] in order to increase the authorization of appropriations for the fiscal year 1985, to extend the authorization of appropriations for the fiscal years 1986 and 1987, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.

Purpose

The principal purpose of H.R. 2456 is to authorize additional appropriations for fiscal year 1985 and an annual appropriation for fiscal years 1986 and 1987 for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). The additional sum authorized for fiscal year 1985 is $1,867,000. The sum authorized for fiscal years 1986 and 1987 is $25,614,000 for each fiscal year, plus such additional amounts for each fiscal year as necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, foreign currency exchange rates, and other nondiscretionary costs. In addition, H.R. 2456 provides for an executive level upgrade of ACDA's Deputy Director and four Assistant Directors to make their positions conform to that of their counterparts in other agencies.

Committee Action

Draft legislation submitted by the executive branch on March 19, 1985, authorizing appropriations under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act was introduced by request by Hon. Dante B. Fascell, chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, for himself, and Hon. William S. Broomfield. The bills, H.R. 2044 and H.R. 2045, were referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 16, 1985.

Hearings on these measures were held by the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science on March 20, 1985. Testimony was received from Hon. Kenneth L. Adelman, Director of the Agency,[3] in support of the executive branch request of $1,867,000 for fiscal year 1985, $25,614,000 for fiscal year 1986, and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 1987. The executive branch request also contained a proposal to adjust the executive levels for the Deputy Directors and the four Assistant Directors. The subcommittee concentrated its hearing on the moneys requested for the Geneva negotia-

[1] *Arms Control and Disarmament Act Authorizations* [To accompany H.R. 2456], May 14, 1985 (H.Rept. 99–92; 99th Cong., 1st sess.).
[2] The original Act (P.L. 87–297; 75 Stat. 631) has been reprinted in *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 482 ff.
[3] Document 53.

tions, the adequacy of the Agency's operating budget in Washington, and the proposed management upgrades. The subcommittee also examined arms control policies and objectives of the executive branch.

On May 8, 1985, the subcommittee marked up a draft bill incorporating elements of H.R. 2044 and H.R. 2045 and by unanimous voice vote adopted the bill which: (1) Authorized the appropriation of the additional sum of $1,867,000 for fiscal year 1985; (2) authorized the appropriation of $25,614,000 for each of the fiscal years 1986 and 1987; and (3) provided for an executive level upgrade of five senior ACDA positions. The subcommittee agreed by unanimous vote to introduce the draft bill for consideration by the full committee. On May 9, 1985, Chairman Fascell, on behalf of himself, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Solarz, Mr. Studds, Mr. Barnes, Mr. Lantos, Mr. Berman, Mr. Udall, Mr. Broomfield, Mr. Leach, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Hude, and Mr. Dornan introduced H.R. 2456.

On May 14, 1985, the committee met in open session, a quorum being present, and by unanimous voice vote ordered H.R. 2456 favorably reported without amendment.

Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 1 of H.R. 2456 authorizes the additional appropriation of $1,867,000 for fiscal year 1985, and authorizes the appropriation of $25,614,000 for each of fiscal years 1986 and 1987, to carry out the purposes of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. It also authorizes for each fiscal year such additional amounts as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, other nondiscretionary costs, and to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates.

The amounts authorized are the same as those requested by the executive branch, except for fiscal year 1987. In keeping with its policy of ensuring fiscal responsibility, the committee authorized $25,614,000 for fiscal 1987 rather than an open-ended "such sums as may be necessary" request.

Section 2 of H.R. 2456 provides for comparability adjustments in five senior ACDA executive level positions to conform them with counterparts in other agencies. This provision is within the shared jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. The correspondence from the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service on this issue follows:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE,
Washington, DC, April 16, 1985.

Hon. DANTE B. FASCELL,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1985

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I understand that the Committee on Foreign Affairs has scheduled a meeting to consider the bill H.R. 2045 to authorize appropriations for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Section 2 of the bill proposes to raise the position of Deputy Director of the ACDA from level IV to level III of the Executive Schedule and the four positions of Assistant Director from level V to level IV.

As you know, matters relating to the Executive Schedule (5 U.S.C. 5311–5318) fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. However, since the proposed changes appear to be justified and in the interest of expediting the business of the House, the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service will not seek sequential referral of the bill and will interpose no objection to the consideration of the bill by the House provided such consideration will not imperil or in any other way affect the jurisdiction of this Committee as established by House Rule X, clause 1(o).

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

WILLIAM D. FORD,
Chairman.

BACKGROUND

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was created by the Congress in 1961 to coordinate U.S. arms control policy, to negotiate arms control agreements with other governments, to conduct and coordinate U.S. Government-sponsored research related to problems of arms control and disarmament, and to coordinate and disseminate public information on conventional arms control and disarmament matters. Subsequent changes in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act required that ACDA participate in U.S. Government decisions on arms transfers and on the export of nuclear materials and related technology. As required by Public Law 94[95]–141, ACDA plays a major role in the preparation of arms control impact statements (ACIS) submitted to the Congress which analyze the arms control policy implications of defense, nuclear weapons, and nonweapon technology programs which have an impact on arms control negotiations.[4]

COMMITTEE COMMENT

In approving the supplemental authorization for fiscal year 1985 and the executive branch request for fiscal year 1986, the committee does

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 708–709.

so with the full expectation that these moneys will be dedicated to ACDA's operating requirements in Washington as well as the Geneva arms control negotiations which resumed on March 12, 1985.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Congress as a whole have had a longstanding commitment to support personnel levels and an operating budget which will enable ACDA to effectively carry out its mandate of being the principal agency responsible for the formulation and management of U.S. arms control policies. The executive branch submission to the committee provides 184 full-time permanent positions for the Agency. While there is no magic figure with respect to personnel slots, the 184 positions are 15 less than in 1979 when there were no arms control negotiations on space defense issues. Even the White House indicated on August 10, 1983, that ACDA's staffing should be augmented to 235 full-time permanent positions. Unfortunately, this goal has yet to be achieved by the executive branch request as reflected in H.R. 2456. Given the substantial additional workload caused by the recently resumed comprehensive Geneva negotiations and ACDA's principal role to backstop those negotiations, the committee seriously questions the adequacy of 184 positions. The Committee on Foreign Affairs regards the adequate staffing of the Agency to be essential in carrying out its responsibilities and encourages the Director to review the adequacy of the current ceiling.

As a result of the committee's oversight hearings 2 years ago, it is encouraging to note that the Agency has reinstituted its independent computer capability. The committee remains concerned, however, that the number of personnel to manage and to analyze this capability, 50 percent less than its peak level, is insufficient to assure maximum utilization of this resumed computer capability. The committee strongly believes that the Office of Operations, whose analysis is an integral part of the backstopping effort by the Agency's work on the Geneva negotiations, should receive full and complete support for personnel and operational funds. The committee expects to be advised by the Director periodically to assure the effective and full utilization of this resumed computer capability.

The committee continues to be concerned about the adequacy of the external research budget and the extent to which ACDA is carrying out its statutory responsibility to coordinate all U.S. Government arms-control-related research. Furthermore, the external research budget has been reduced by more than 50 percent since fiscal year 1980. The increase in the fiscal year 1986 authorization should allow adequate funding for external research, especially with respect to verification-related research by the Bureau of Multilateral Affairs. Without adequate research on verification-related issues, the Geneva negotiations would be detrimentally affected. The committee encourages ACDA, through external contracts, to utilize the expertise of such national laboratories as Argonne, Los Alamos, Sandia, and Livermore to pursue specific verification-related research and treaty compliance assessments.

EXECUTIVE LEVEL UPGRADES

In supporting the executive branch request to upgrade from executive level IV to level III the position of the Deputy Director of the Agency and from executive level V to level IV the positions of the Assistant Directors, the committee believes that these positions should be comparable to those in the Departments of State and Defense. In taking this action, the committee reaffirms its longstanding position that ACDA should be the lead agency for the formulation and coordination of arms control policy.

In order for ACDA to fulfill its principal responsibility for the formulation and coordination of arms control policy and the preparation and management of arms control negotiations, it is essential that the Agency's executive level positions be comparable to their counterparts in other agencies. These changes will strengthen the status of ACDA within the executive branch and reinforce its decisionmaking in the interagency process.

The following table prepared by ACDA shows the comparison between ACDA and comparable levels elsewhere in the Government that results from the upgrade:

Requested ACDA	Present DOD	Present State	Present USIA	Present AID
Deputy Director III	Deputy Secretary II Under Secretary III	Deputy Secretary II Under Secretary III	Deputy Secretary III	Deputy Administrator III
Assistant Director IV	Assistant Secretary IV.	Assistant Secretary IV.	Associate Director IV	Assistant Administrator IV

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

Section 27 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act provides the Agency with two positions for special representative for negotiations. Traditionally, negotiators to strategic arms control talks have been appointed under this provision. However, the three new negotiators to the Geneva arms talks were not appointed under this section but pursuant to the Foreign Service Act.

During the subcommittee hearing on the Agency, the Director testified that this was an unusual procedure for the appointment of the three new negotiators and that this vehicle was used only in order to expedite the appointments. The memorandum of understanding between the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on this issue follows:

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY CONCERNING THE OFFICE OF ARMS REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA

1. The State Department had established the Office of Arms Reduction Negotiations in Geneva (a diplomatic mission) the personnel of which include Max Kampelman—as Head of Mission and John Tower and Maynard Glitman—all of whom will hold Ambassadorial appointments, and will report to the President and the Secretary of State.

2. Consistent with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's (ACDA) statutory authority, under the direction of the President and the Secretary of State, for management of United States participation in arms control negotiations, ACDA will manage the operating of these negotiations under the direction of the Secretary of State. For these purposes, all personnel of said office will be detailed and records of said office will be assigned to ACDA. The State Department will provide positions for the personnel of said office, and the State Department and ACDA will enter into reimbursable detail agreements for detailing said personnel to ACDA. ACDA will reimburse the State Department for all expenses in connection with said office, including salaries, transportation, housing, and allowances in Geneva, per diem, and similar expenses.

3. ACDA will also coordinate substantive backstopping for the negotiations.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN.
KENNETH W. DAM.

The committee recognizes that the executive branch needed to expedite the appointment of the new negotiators to the Geneva arms talks but seriously questions the desirability of making the appointments pursuant to the Foreign Service Act. The committee expects that future arms control negotiators should be appointed under the proper authority; that is, section 27 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. The committee reaffirms ACDA's statutory authority to formulate and manage U.S. arms control policies and in this respect the Agency should continue to be the principal agency responsible for backstopping arms control negotiations.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY OPERATIONS

In establishing ACDA in 1961, Congress sought to create a separate authority to coordinate U.S. arms control policy as well as to integrate arms control into U.S. national security policy. The major responsibilities of ACDA follow:

(1) International negotiations.—ACDA must prepare for and manage U.S. participation in international negotiations.

During 1983 in Geneva, the United States and the Soviet Union held five complete rounds of strategic arms reduction talks (START) and six complete rounds of intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations (INF). These talks were discontinued by the Soviet Union on November 22, 1983. On March 12, 1985, the United States and Soviet Union resumed a new set of negotiations divided into three panels dealing with defense and space weapons, strategic nuclear weapons, and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Consistent with the Agency's statutory responsibility, ACDA will be the lead agency for and will manage U.S. participation in these arms control negotiations.

ACDA has a primary role in coordinating interagency efforts in support of the comprehensive Geneva arms control talks and is en-

gaged on a continuous basis in preparing and analyzing specific arms control and verification proposals for these talks.

ACDA also has primary responsibility for supporting the U.S. component of the permanent U.S.-U.S.S.R. Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which meets at least twice a year to deal with matters related to the implementation of the ABM Treaty,[5] SALT Interim Agreement of 1972,[6] and the 1971 Agreement on Measures To Reduce the Risk of the Outbreak of Nuclear War.[7] During 1984 the SCC met in two regular sessions in Geneva. The SCC also considers compliance questions related to existing strategic arms agreements and any questions involving activities which may undermine the signed but unratified SALT II Treaty.[8]

The Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) between NATO and the Warsaw Pact are expected to continue through the foreseeable future. A new NATO initiative, which builds on the 1982 Western draft treaty, was tabled in Vienna in 1984.

ACDA is responsible for the guidance and staffing of U.S. delegations to the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva; the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee; the U.N. Disarmament Commission (UNDC); the U.N. Group of Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons Experts; and the NATO Disarmament Experts and the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). ACDA heads these various delegations which are actively discussing a variety of arms control issues, including chemical weapons, weapons in outer space, and other arms control measures.

The agency continued to play an important role in the interagency development of and implementation of U.S. policy on a variety of other arms control issues. ACDA provided the head of the U.S. delegation to the first review conference of the 1978 Environmental Modification Treaty [9] held in Geneva in September 1984. ACDA has also taken the lead for the United States in arranging a 1986 review conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Conference.[10] In addition, ACDA continues to play an important role in the development of policy regarding the control of nuclear testing.

(2) Nuclear nonproliferation.—ACDA will be the lead agency in the executive branch for the Third Review Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) [11] which is scheduled for September 1985.

The U.N.-sponsored Conference on the International Promotion of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy is scheduled to convene in 1986. It will discuss various issues regarding international commerce in nuclear energy which have important implications for nonproliferation policy.

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197–201.
[6] *Ibid.,* pp. 202–205.
[7] *Ibid., 1971,* pp. 634–635.
[8] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 189 ff.
[9] The text of the Treaty may be found *ibid., 1977,* pp. 322–326.
[10] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 133–138.
[11] *Ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.

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During fiscal years 1986 and 1987, ACDA will continue to confront major challenges to U.S. foreign policy and national security with respect to nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia, the Middle East, South Africa, and Latin America.

ACDA will continue working to strengthen the technical capability and credibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards program while at the same time trying to reduce the level of political controversy in the IAEA and to focus the Agency's attention on carrying out more effectively its technical, statutory mandate.

The growth in nuclear programs in Latin America will increase the importance of ACDA's efforts as the executive branch's leading participant in diplomatic efforts to promote full entry into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco,[12] and will continue to seek adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty by nonmember countries. Furthermore, ACDA will pursue its activities in improving safeguards and physical security for plutonium, in safeguarding advanced technologies, and in addressing nuclear technology transfers and safeguards problems in third countries. Cooperation among nuclear supplier countries will continue to be a high priority in ACDA's nonproliferation efforts.

(3) Conventional arms and technology transfers.—ACDA, as required by statute, is a key participant in the U.S. Government's conventional arms transfer decisionmaking process.

ACDA advises the executive branch on the extent to which proposed U.S. arms transfers will contribute to an arms race, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements. ACDA provides advice on the arms control implications of about 1,500 military equipment and commercial export license applications per year and, when requested by the Congress, prepares evaluations of arms control implications of particular proposed arms sales.

ACDA is also an active participant in the senior interagency group on the transfer of strategic technology which is responsible for the implementation of controls on U.S. exports of technology with both military and commercial applications (so-called dual-use technology).

The committee fully expects that the Agency will continue to be an active participant in the arms transfer management group and its subgroups which deal with U.S. arms transfer policy issues, technology transfer, and security assistance programs.

(4) Arms control impact statements (ACIS).—ACDA, as required by statute, has the primary responsibility for coordinating and developing annual analyses of the arms control implications of major weapons programs. The fiscal year 1986 ACIS submission included eight arms control impact statements covering 66 programs of the Defense and Energy Departments such as the Trident submarine, MX missile, and the B–1 bomber. In addition, for the first time a separate section on the

[12] *Ibid., 1967,* pp. 69–83.

strategic defense initiative (SDI) was also included.[13] The committee hopes these statements enhance both executive branch and congressional prospective on the impact of defense programs and on arms control policy.

(5) Public information.—ACDA is responsible for disseminating and coordinating public information on arms control issues. ACDA releases the annual report, "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers," which describes the size, trends, and distribution of global military expenditures and arms transfers. In addition, ACDA publishes documents such as the "Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements" and "Documents on Disarmament."

(6) Space policy issues.—ACDA participates in a variety of interagency groups involved in studying outer space arms control policy. Specifically, ACDA participates in the interagency review on the role of strategic defense and its relationship to arms control. The committee continues to believe that ACDA must devote increasing attention to outer space arms control issues and that the United States must pursue policies to avoid the militarization of space and extending the nuclear arms race into space.

(7) Administrative and other support.—The balance of ACDA's funds are used for administrative support liaison with other Government agencies and external research in support of ACDA's activities. The committee continues to believe that ACDA should dedicate more resources and personnel to external research projects on verification, outer space arms control, and chemical weapons arms control issues.

Required Reports Section

COST ESTIMATE

The committee estimate that, assuming the full appropriation of the amounts authorized in this bill, the total budgetary authority required to carry out the provisions of H.R. 2456 will be an additional $1,867,000 for fiscal year 1985, and $25,614,000 for fiscal years 1986 and 1987. The fiscal year allocation of the total cost is set forth in the Congressional Budget Office estimate below. The committee agrees with the projected cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office.

INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT

Enactment of H.R. 2456 will have no identifiable inflationary impact. In fact, the long-term effect of the authorization and appropriation of the funds requested could be to the economic benefit of the United States. The successful attainment of U.S. arms control objectives would create a climate in which the procurement of military weapons and equipment could be reduced, thereby contributing to the long-term security and economic interests of the United States.

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[13] See *Fiscal Year 1986 Arms Control Impact Statements* . . . (Jt. Com. prt.; 99th Cong., 1st sess.).

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STATEMENTS REQUIRED BY CLAUSE 2 (l) (3) OF HOUSE RULE XI

(a) Oversight findings and recommendations

As a result of the oversight activities of the committees listed under "committee action" earlier in this report, ongoing consultations between Members of Congress, staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and other appropriate executive branch officials, as well as attendance by Members of Congress and the staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to the arms control talks in Geneva, the committee recommends the adoption of the authorization contained in this legislation.

(b) Budget authority

The enactment of H.R. 2456 will create no new budget authority.

(c) Committee on Government Operations summary

No oversight findings and recommendations which relate to this measure have been received by the Committee on Government Operations under clause 4(c)(2) or rule X of the rules of the House.

(d) Congressional Budget Office cost estimate

MAY 14, 1985.

1. Bill No.: H.R. 2456.

2. Bill title: A bill to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authorization of appropriations for the fiscal year 1985, to extend the authorization of appropriations for the fiscal years 1986 and 1987, and for other purposes.

3. Bill status: As ordered reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 14, 1985.

4. Bill purpose: The bill amends the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to authorize supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1985, authorizes the appropriation of funds for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for fiscal years 1986 and 1987, and otherwise amends existing law.

5. Estimated cost to the Federal Government:

[By fiscal year, in thousands of dollars]

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Authorization level	23,789	25,614	25,614			
Less: Estimated existing appropriation	−19,468					
Net authorization	4,321	25,614	25,614			
Estimated outlays	3,673	19,915	25,276	6,045	538	102

Costs for this bill fall in budget function 150.

Basis for estimate: This estimate assumes enactment of this legislation by October 1, 1985 and subsequent appropriation of the authorized amounts. The authorization amounts are stated in the bill. Outlays for programs were estimated using historical outlay rates.

6. Estimated cost to State and local governments: None.

7. Estimate comparison: None.

8. Previous cost estimate: None.

9. Estimate prepared by: Lisa R. Brown.

10. Estimate approved by: C.G. Nuckols for James L. Blum, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

SECTION 49 OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

APPROPRIATION

Sec. 49. (a) To carry out the purposes of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated—

(1) for the fiscal year 1984, $20,888,000;

[(2) for the fiscal year 1985, $21,932,000; and

[(3) such additional amounts as may be necessary, for each such fiscal year, for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs, and offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates.]

(2) for the fiscal year 1985, $23,789,000;

(3) for the fiscal year 1986, $25,614,000;

(4) for the fiscal year 1987, $25,614,000; and

(5) such additional amounts as may be necessary, for each such fiscal year, for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs, and to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates.

Of the sums authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal years 1984 and 1985, not less than $200,000 shall be available in each such fiscal year only for the program for visiting scholars in the field of arms control and disarmament established under section 28 of this Act. Amounts appropriated under this subsection are authorized to remain available until expended.

TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE

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PART III—EMPLOYEES

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SUBPART D—PAY AND ALLOWANCES

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CHAPTER 53—PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS

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SUBCHAPTER II—EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE PAY RATES

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§ 5314. Positions at level III

Level III of the Executive Schedule applies to the following positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:

Solicitor General of the United States.

. . . . . .

Deputy Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

§ 5315. Positions at level IV

Level IV of the Executive Schedule applies to the following positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:

Deputy Administrator of General Services.

. . . . . .

[Deputy Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.]

. . . . . .

Assistant Directors, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (4).

§ 5316. Positions at level V

Level V of the Executive Schedule applies to the following positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:

Administrator, Agricultural Marketing Service, Department of Agriculture.

. . . . . .

[Assistant Directors, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (4).]

. . . . . .

80. Report by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, May 14, 1985 [1]

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which were referred the bills (S. 731, S. 732) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to authorize supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year 1985 and to authorize appropriations for the fiscal years 1986 and 1987, for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably an original bill and recommends that the bill do pass.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1985

The Committee on Foreign Relations, having under consideration an original bill to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to authorize supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year 1985 and to authorize appropriations for the fiscal years 1986 and 1987, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

PURPOSES OF THE BILL

The principal purposes of the bill are to authorize supplemental appropriations of $1,857,000 for the fiscal year 1985; and to authorize appropriations of $25,614,000 for each of the fiscal years 1986 and 1987 for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). In the case of the authorization for fiscal year 1985, the sum of $4,321,000 is

[1] *Arms Control and Disarmament Amendments of 1985* [To accompany S. 1132], May 19, 1985 (S. Rept. 99–51; 99th Cong., 1st sess.).

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authorized to be expended only in support of the arms control negotiations in Geneva. In the case of the authorization for fiscal years 1986 and 1987, in each year the sum of $6,146,000 is authorized to be expended only in support of the arms control negotiations in Geneva.

The bill also establishes a new Section 38, in the Arms Control Act of 1961 [2] as amended to require the Director of the Agency, to prepare an annual report, in coordination with the heads of other relevant agencies, on the adherence of the United States to obligations undertaken in arms control agreements with other nations and on any problems related to compliance by other nations with the provisions of bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements with the United States.

Committee Action

The following bills were referred to the Foreign Relations Committee and were considered, and consolidated into an original bill:

S. 731 to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to increase the authorization for fiscal year 1985, which was introduced by Senator Lugar on behalf of the executive branch on March 26, 1985;

S. 732 to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to extend the authorization for appropriations, and for the other purposes, which was introduced by Senator Lugar on behalf of the executive branch on March 26, 1985.

On April 2 the Committee met to mark-up the legislation listed above. ACDA was represented by Alison Fortier, Director, Office of Congressional Affairs; William Montgomery, Administrative Director, Office of Administration; and Lucas Fischer, Chief, Technology Division, Bureau of Strategic Programs.

In support of its 1985 supplemental request and its 1986 request, ACDA provided a breakdown of additional expenses needed to support reopened and expanded negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva. The new negotiations which opened March 6, 1985, in Geneva deal with strategic forces and intermediate-range forces in Europe. In addition, the negotiations include talks on space and defense weapons. Mr. Montgomery indicated that an additional 20 persons, for which ACDA would provide reimbursement to other departments and agencies, would be assigned to the delegation. An additional 10 persons would be employed by ACDA in Washington to back up the work of the delegation in Geneva. The ACDA paper indicates that $4,321,000 in additional funding would be needed in 1985, and that $6,146,000 would be needed in 1986. At the request of Senator Sarbanes, ACDA provided a more complete breakdown of anticipated spending. It shows funding under the original fiscal year 1985 appropriation, together with projected spending under the supplemental request. For fiscal year 1986 it shows ACDA's original request, includ-

[2] P.L. 87–297; 75 Stat. 631. See *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 482–495.

ed in the President's budget submission, together with its amended request in light of the Geneva negotiations. This more detailed breakdown follows:

SUMMARY OF THE FISCAL YEAR 1985 AND FISCAL YEAR 1986 GENEVA REQUIREMENTS

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1985 appropriation	Supplemental appropriation request	Total fiscal year 1985 request	Fiscal year 1986 authorization/ appropriation request	Budget amendment add-on	Revised fiscal year 1986 authorization/ appropriation request
Administrative support:						
Contractual Personnel Services	32		32	34		34
Continental Travel	75	45	120	83	100	183
Transportation	17		17	18		18
Rent and Utilities	907	475	1,382	986	300	1,286
Communications	33	10	43	38	20	58
Other Services	272	383	655	296	149	445
Supplies & Equipment	142	331	473	155	99	254
External research	310	150	460	275	260	535
SAS Geneva	140		140	140		140
Interpreters	500	32	532	500	465	965
Reimbursable salaries and benefits		536	536		1,056	1,056
ACDA support personnel	55	116	171	55	274	329
Travel and per diem	650	46	696	750	461	1,211
Computer support		150	150		250	250
Secure ADP and communications capability		1,625	1,625		2,214	2,214
Official residence expense		105	105		210	210
Permanent change of station		317	317		288	288
Totals	3,133	4,321	7,454	3,330	6,146	9,476

To spend $4,321,000 above the appropriated level would require a supplemental authorization for the fiscal year 1985 of $1,857,000. The requested authorization of $25,614,000 for the fiscal year 1986 would represent an increase of $3,682,000 over the 1985 authorization, or an

increase of $1,825,000 over the total authorization, assuming approval of the supplemental.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY FUNDING

[In thousands of dollars]

	Fiscal year				
	1984	1985	1985 supplemental	1986	1987
Authorization	20,888	21,932	[1]1,857	[1]25,614	[1]25,614
Total		[1]23,789			
Appropriated	18,628	19,468	[2]4,321	[2]25,614	
Total		[2]23,789			

[1]Indicates Committee recommendation.
[2]Administration request.

According to ACDA officials, the additional funds are needed to support the new negotiations in Geneva. Senator Dodd pointed out that in the last fiscal year in which major negotiations were conducted throughout the year (1983) the Agency spent approximately $16 million. The Senator contrasted that sum with the $23.8 million sought for fiscal year 1985 and the $25.6 million sought for fiscal year 1986. In response to a question by Senator Dodd, Mr. Montgomery indicated that the Agency had returned a little more than $1 million to the treasury in fiscal year 1984, when the strategic arms talks and intermediate-range nuclear force talks had been broken off, however, that most negotiations expenses are fixed. Senator Sarbanes noted that the substantial increases for ACDA stand in marked contrast to the situation on other budgets. Given the importance of the talks, as well as the need to maintain budgetary contraints, Senator Sarbanes suggested that the additional authorization sought for fiscal year 1985 and the total sought for fiscal year 1986 should be approved, but earmarked for spending only in support of the Geneva Talks. The Committee agreed. In addition, Senator Lugar suggested, rather than give an open-ended authorization for fiscal year 1987, the 1986 level should be straightlined for 1987. Senator Sarbanes suggested that earmarking for the negotiation also be continued in 1987. The Committee agreed.

S. 732 also requested upgrades in ACDA positions of Assistant Director from Executive Level V to IV and of Deputy Director from IV to III. The Committee denied the request.

The Committee also approved an amendment offered by Senator Pell requiring the Director of ACDA to prepare an annual report on U.S. adherence to arms control agreements, and on any problems of compliance by other parties to bilateral and multilateral agreements with the United States. The Director of ACDA should coordinate the preparation of these reports with the Secretary of State, Secretary of

Defense, Secretary of Energy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Committee understands that the scope of the reports goes beyond ACDA's direct responsibilities, and that sections will be drafted by the appropriate organizations. The annual report shall include, with respect to each adherence or compliance question addressed therein, a brief legal analysis of the obligations undertaken in the relevant agreements that bear on such questions. It is expected that these analyses will be fully coordinated among the involved departments and agencies. The Committee expects that the Director will take the lead in ensuring the provision to Congress of coordinated U.S. Government assessments of these important issues. The President shall submit the reports to Congress by January 31 of each year.

The Chairman proposed that S. 731 and S. 732 be combined as an original committee bill, and that it be reported favorably. The motion was approved by a vote of fifteen to one. Voting in the affirmative were Senators Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Murkowski, Trible, Evans, Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Cranston, Dodd, Eagleton, Kerry, and the Chairman. Voting in the negative was Senator Zorinsky.

Committee Comments

The Committee has repeatedly supported authorizations and appropriations for ACDA sufficient to ensure that there would be adequate funding to support various arms control negotiations. In fiscal year 1985, the Agency will be providing most of the funding for the strategic arms, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and space and defense weapons talks. In addition, the Agency is incurring costs in connection with Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) Talks in Vienna, the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) sessions in Geneva, and the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. After weighing all of these factors, the Committee believed it appropriate to accede to the Administration's request for the increase in funding to support the negotiation.

Nonetheless, while the Committee does not wish the Administration hindered in any efforts to achieve good solid arms control agreements, the Members concluded that it would be prudent to earmark the additional funds sought to be used specifically and solely in support of the new arms control negotiations. In a time of fiscal austerity and massive budget deficits, the Committee felt it appropriate to require that ACDA join other agencies and departments in exercising as much fiscal restraint as possible, while, at the same time, giving full support to the negotiations. Accordingly, the Committee decided to meet the full Administration request with the requirement that the additional funds be spent solely to support the negotiations in Geneva.

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In the past two years, amendments to defense bills have required reports on Soviet compliance with arms control agreements.[3] The Committee believes that problems of Soviet compliance are most important to U.S. security and to the success of future arms control efforts, and must be dealt with carefully and effectively. Therefore, the Pell amendment codifies the requirement to report on Soviet compliance problems, but it also expands the requirement to cover the activities of other nations. In addition, the report requires an assessment of damage, if any, to U.S. security and other interests, and recommendations as to any steps which should be considered to redress any damage, to U.S. national security and to reduce compliance problems. The Committee believes this essential for intelligent consideration of the compliance reports.

The amendment also requires information on policies and organization to ensure U.S. adherence to arms control agreements, identification of programs with a direct bearing on adherence and steps being taken to ensure adherence, a compilation of substantive questions raised by other nations regarding our adherence, together with an assessment of these issues and the need for any corrective action. In requiring reports on U.S. adherence, the Committee does not wish to imply that there are presently questions or problems regarding U.S. adherence to arms control agreements which require resolution. Rather, the Committee desires to have the government demonstrate publicly that the United States takes its treaty obligations seriously and imposes the same standards upon itself that it expects of other parties. Moreover, the Committee hopes that the new reports will be thorough and precise, but will be succinct, and not duplicate any present reporting requirements in order to enhance their value to the Congress and the public and in order not to constitute an onerous burden upon those responsible for their preparation.

Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 1. This Act may be cited as the "Arms Control and Disarmament Amendments Act of 1985."

Section 2. This section authorizes a supplemental authorization for ACDA of $1,857,000, for a total fiscal year 1985 authorization of $23,789,000. $4,321,000 is earmarked for use only in support of the Geneva Arms Control negotiations.

Section 3. This section authorizes appropriations of $25,614,000 for each of fiscal years 1986 and 1987. $6,146,000 is earmarked each year only for support of the Geneva negotiations.

Section 4. This section establishes a new Section 38 in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act requiring the Director to prepare an annual report, in coordination with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

[3] For this requirement in the Department of Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1985, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, p. 748.

and the Director of Central Intelligence, on the adherence of the United States to obligations undertaken in arms control agreements with other nations and on any problems related to compliance by other nations with the provisions of bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements with the United States. Reports are to be submitted in unclassified form, with classified annexes, as appropriate, by January 31 of each year.

Cost Estimate

In accordance with rule XXVI, paragraph 11(a) of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the following estimates of the cost of this original bill, prepared by the Congressional Budget Office:

Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

In accordance with rule XXVI, paragraph 11(b) of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has concluded that there is no regulatory impact from S.

Changes in Existing Law

In compliance with paragraph 12 of Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, May 14, 1985.

Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the attached cost estimate on the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1985, as ordered reported by Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on April 2, 1985.

Should the Committee so desire, we would be pleased to provide further details on the attached cost estimate.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

1. Bill number: Unassigned.

2. Bill title: Arms Control and Disarmaments Act of 1985.

3. Bill status: As ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on April 2, 1985.

4. Bill purpose: The bill amends the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to authorize supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1985, extends the authorization of appropriations for the Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency for the fiscal years 1986 and 1987 and otherwise amends existing law.

5. Estimated cost to the Federal Government:

[By fiscal year, in thousands of dollars]

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Authorization level	23,789	25,614	25,614			
Less: Estimated existing appropriation	−19,468					
Net authorization	4,321	25,614	25,614			
Estimated outlays	3,673	19,915	25,276	6,045	538	102

Costs for this bill fall in budget function 150.

Basis for estimates: This estimate assumes enactment of this legislation by October 1, 1985 and subsequent appropriation of the authorized amounts. The authorization amounts are stated in the bill. Outlays for programs were estimated using historical outlay rates.

6. Estimated cost to State and local governments: None.

7. Estimate comparison: None.

8. Previous cost estimate: None.

9. Estimate prepared by: Lisa R. Brown.

10. Estimate approved by: C.G. Nuckols (for James L. Blum, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis).

Changes in Existing Law

In compliance with paragraph 12 of Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended

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TITLE I—SHORT TITLE, PURPOSE, AND DEFINITIONS

Short Title

[Section 1. This Act may be cited as the "Arms Control and Disarmament Act".]

Section 1. This Act may be cited as the "Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1985".

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TITLE IV—GENERAL PROVISIONS

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APPROPRIATION

Sec. 49. (a) To carry out the purposes of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated—

[(1) for the fiscal year 1984, $20,888,000;
[(2) for the fiscal year 1985, $21,932,000; and]

(1) for the fiscal year 1985, $23,798,000, of which amount $4,321,000 shall be available only to pay necessary expenses incurred in connection with arms control negotiations with the Government of the Soviet Union on strategic arms reductions, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and space and defensive weapons; and

(2) for the fiscal year 1986, $25,614,000, and, for the fiscal year 1987, $25,614,000, of which amounts $6,146,000 shall be available in each fiscal year only to pay necessary expenses incurred in connection with arms control negotiations conducted with the Government of the Soviet Union on strategic arms reductions, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and space and defensive weapons; and

(3) such additional amounts as may be necessary, for each such fiscal year, for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs, and to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates.

Of the sums authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal years 1984 and 1985, not less than $200,000 shall be available in each such fiscal year only for the program for visiting scholars in the field of arms control and disarmament established under section 28 of this Act. Amounts appropriated under this subsection are authorized to remain available until expended.

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REPORTS ON ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS

Sec. 52. (a) The Congress determines that the achievement and maintenance of successful controls upon armaments requires official and public confidence that the parties are expected to adhere to their commitments and that the parties will be held accountable for failure to meet obligations. Without such confidence, existing arms control accords are eroded, and the prospects are jeopardized for new agreements which can place further controls on the competition in nuclear and conventional weapons and which can increase international stability. In accordance with this determination—

(1) the President shall submit, not later than January 31 of each year, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report prepared by the Director, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence, on the adherence of the United States to obligations undertaken in arms control agreements and on any problems related to compliance by other nations with the

provisions of bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements to which the United States is a party; and

(2) the section of the report dealing with United States adherence shall include information on the policies and organization of each relevant agency or department of the United States to ensure adherence, a description of national security programs with a direct bearing on adherence questions and of steps being taken to ensure adherence, and a compilation of any substantive questions raised during the previous year regarding United States adherence, together with an assessment of such issues and the need for any corrective action; and

(3) the section of the report dealing with problems of compliance by other nations shall include, in the case of each treaty or agreement about which compliance questions exist—

(A) a description of each significant issue raised and efforts made and contemplated with the other party to seek a resolution of the difficulty;

(B) an assessment of damage, if any, to United States security and other interests; and

(C) recommendations as to any steps which should be considered to redress any damage to United States national security and to reduce compliance problems.

(b) The report required by subsection (a) shall be provided in unclassified form, with classified annexes, as appropriate.

81. Letter From the Permanent Representative of Israel (Netanyahu) to the U.N. Secretary General: Attacks on Nuclear Facilities, May 15, 1985 [1]

I have the honour to refer to statements purportedly made in Israel on the matter of attacks on nuclear facilities.[2]

I have been instructed to inform you unequivocally that no one but the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and their appointed representatives express the authorized policies of the Government on this issue.

I have been further instructed to reiterate the position of the Government of Israel, which has been brought to your attention and reproduced in document A/39/349 of 16 July 1984.[3]

The same position has also been reiterated recently by the Permanent Representative of Israel to the International Atomic Energy Agency and reproduced on 8 May 1985 in document INFCIRC/324.[4]

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under item 29 of the preliminary list.

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[1] A/40/315.

[2] Cf. A/40/283, containing a letter from the Iraqi Permanent Representative forwarding a statement purportedly made by Ariel Sharon on Israel Radio on March 26, 1985.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 419–420.

[4] Document 72.

82. Letter From Four Senators to *The Washington Post*: Chemical Weapons, May 21, 1985 [1]

This week the Senate will again confront the issue of whether to modernize America's inventory of chemical weapons. We want everyone to be clear as to what the issue is, as well as to what it is not.

First, the issue is not whether America should or should not have chemical weapons. We already have them, and so do the Soviets. And until a treaty can be negotiated for a complete and verifiable ban on all chemical weaponry (an initiative we strongly support), we believe that few Americans would favor a policy of unilateral disarmament in this area.

Second, the issue is not whether to develop a "new type" of chemical weapon or a more lethal one. At present our chemical deterrent is either stored in bulk or deployed in what are called "unitary" munitions: shells in which the chemicals are already mixed and, therefore, highly toxic. But bulk-stored chemicals cannot be delivered and thus obviously are not a credible deterrent. For their part, unitary shells are inherently dangerous, since any accidents or leakage from them could easily result in a major catastrophe, not only for the military personnel handling these weapons but for nearby communities and civilian populations as well.

Fortunately, another kind of chemical shell is available. In the "binary" shell, the toxic elements are kept separate until the projectile is actually fired. And because the chemicals are harmless until they are mixed, leakage or damage to the shells does not present a hazard. The issue that Congress will soon be deciding is whether to keep our chemical deterrent in the old and increasingly dangerous unitary canisters or whether to put it in the new and safer binary shells.

Another common misconception is that by moving to binary munitions, America would be increasing its stockpile of chemical weapons. In fact, just the opposite is true. Under the Senate Armed Services Committee proposal, for every binary weapon added to our inventory, the equivalent of *four* unitary weapons will be destroyed. In other words, not only would we have a safer deterrent, but we would also *reduce* the size of our chemical stockpile by 75 percent in the bargain.

In the past, some have argued that possessing chemical weapons provides no real deterrence. We believe that history indicates otherwise. Since World War I—when the Allies produced and employed poison gas only after the Germans used it first and on a massive scale—instances in which warring nations have each possessed chemical weapons (World War II, Korea, Vietnam) have resulted in neither side's using it. But in cases where only the Soviets or their allies have possessed chemical weapons (Afghanistan, Southeast Asia), there is

[1] *The Washington Post*, May 21, 1985. The letter was signed by Senators John Glenn (D., OH), Barry Goldwater (R., AZ), Sam Nunn (D., GA), and John Warner (R., VA), all members of the Committee on Armed Services.

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strong evidence that they have indeed been used. If hostilities should ever break out in Europe, no one can say with certainty that the Soviets would use chemical weapons against the United States or its allies. But in our view, the gamble is simply not worth taking, especially since a quick escalation to nuclear weapons would likely result if we lost the bet.

A final argument often advanced against modernizing our chemical weapons is that doing so would seriously hinder our efforts to reach an agreement for their abolition. But this argument ignores the fact that the Soviets summarily dismissed the draft treaty the United States proposed at Geneva last year on this subject. It also ignores the fact that America's self-imposed, unilateral moratorium on chemical weapons production has now lasted for 16 years without any reciprocal action by the Soviet Union. And it ignores the historical truth that the Soviets negotiate seriously only when there is no advantage for them to do otherwise.

We are not suggesting that modernizing our chemical weapons would be a "bargaining chip." But it might well be a bargaining catalyst—and that alone would make the effort worthwhile.

We are keenly aware that the position we advocate entails a clear political risk for those who support it. But we also believe that our position is the right position from the standpoints of both safety and security.

83. Interview of ACDA Director Adelman by *The Washingtonian:* Command, Control, and Communication, June 1985 [1]

Q: Is Ford's argument that we don't have a reliable second-strike capability well founded? [2]

A: Looking at the fact that 75 percent of our strategic weapons are in survivable systems, namely in bombers and submarines, gives you reassurance that we do have a credible second-strike, retaliatory capability.

Q: But Ford's argument is about command and control, about our ability to make an organized response, with those in charge knowing what's going on and being able to issue orders. Is this a problem anyone is worrying about besides Daniel Ford?

A: Yes, like President Reagan. The first priority of the President's strategic modernization program—and probably the least widely appreciated—has been in augmenting command and control. Everyone was focused on hardware—the B–1, the MX, the Trident—rather than on command and control, and so the highest priority has gone into it.

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[1] *The Washingtonian,* July 1985, pp. 59–60. Reprinted with permission.
[2] Daniel Ford, author of *The Button: The Pentagon's Command and Control System—Does It Work?* New York: Simon and Schuster, c. 1985.

The problem Ford presents is a very crucial one, but others have addressed it so much better—Paul Bracken in *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces,* for example.

Q: Why is Bracken's book better?

A: He looks at the question of command and control in and of itself rather than from an ideological basis that the United States is opting for first-strike strategy.

Q: And are we?

A: No, not in any sense.

Q: What about the MX and the D–5? Ford says they're first-strike weapons.

A: First strike is a function of numbers as well as capability. An MX isn't a first-strike weapon unless you have enough of them for preemption—which we certainly don't. Exactly 50 of them have been approved by the Congress—and that with a lot of grunting and groaning. By way of comparison, the Soviets have 600 MX-sized missiles.

As for the D–5, that doesn't fit at all the classic definition of a first-strike weapon, which is that you have to use it right away or risk losing it. The D–5 is in the Trident submarine, where it isn't targetable or vulnerable to a Soviet hit. This isn't a use-it-or-lose-it weapon.

Q: But the MX and the D–5 are highly accurate weapons, as Ford says, and they do have tremendous destructive power.

A: They're much less destructive than weapons we're phasing out, like the Titan, for example, which has a nine-megaton warhead. Each warhead on the MX—and there are ten of them—is less than half a megaton. I don't think the public generally realizes it, but the tendency is toward lower yield. In our total arsenal today we have 75 percent less yield in terms of total megatons than we had in the 1960s.

In accuracy, we have made tremendous progress, and that's crucial in order to give the President options in a conflict. He has to have choices besides either doing nothing or retaliating massively and blindly, destroying the Soviet Union and—if the research on nuclear winter is right, and I think there is something to it—perhaps destroying life on earth.

Q: How does accuracy give the President options?

A: He could order a strike on military targets far from cities.

Q: So we're talking about some kind of limited nuclear warfare.

A: Yes. Now, there is a legitimate debate on whether there can be limited nuclear war. That is a very legitimate question, and the answer is that we don't know. Human beings have never been in a situation like that, and we don't know how they'd act. It may be that if, God forbid, there were any use of nuclear weapons, the two sides would be so alarmed that deterrence would work in spades. You can also make the argument that things would escalate immediately, that there can be no limited nuclear war. We can't know which view is correct, but I think any responsible government has to at least give the President ways to protect the interests of the United States without launching

all our nuclear weapons, blowing up the Soviet Union, and threatening life on earth.

To argue that you shouldn't have precision in your strategic capabilities, as Ford does, is to argue for a return to MAD—mutually assured destruction. Ford is saying that we shouldn't have the capability or be seen to have the capability of doing anything except wiping out millions. That's not a credible strategy, not a smart one, and I don't think it's responsible.

Q: So why would anyone support it?

A: Some people believe that we're better off with nuclear weapons that are impossible to use, that if we have a weapon that does anything less horrible than destroy the Soviet Union and possibly life on earth, we'll be too likely to use it. I find this a peculiar view because it says we're better off doing nothing—even in response to a Soviet first strike—and having no practical options.

Underlying this view there seems to be a suspicion that we are irresponsible, that the United States is the threat to stability. It's a notion that you can't give an American President the tools he might need because he might use them for some irresponsible activity

Q: There's another new book out on nuclear strategy, one by Sam Cohen. It's called *We Can Prevent World War III,* and its thesis is that a Soviet first strike is what we ought to be worrying about.

A: That's how we have to position ourselves in order to have deterrence work. We have to think of that possibility and structure ourselves accordingly. That's always been the premise.

And we have to structure ourselves to give the President options, too. The history of the strategic debate since Herman Kahn's book *Thinking About the Unthinkable* in the early 1960s has been one of looking at ways to do this. Administration after administration has looked for ways to give the President options. This means having more secure command and control, lower-yield weapons, more reliable weapons.

Q: Does it mean having MIRVed weapons [weapons with multiple warheads]?

A: It could or it could not. You could have it either way.

Q: One of Ford's objections to the MX and D–5 is that they have multiple warheads.

A: MIRVing is a legitimate subject when you're talking about land-based missiles. Big, heavily MIRVed missiles on land are valuable targets and vulnerable ones, and when you know how tempting they are to the other side, it encourages a use-them-or-lose-them attitude. Sea-based missiles, on the other hand, are invulnerable, so whether they're MIRVed or not isn't relevant to the question of stability.

Q: Will arms-control talks deal with MIRVing?

A: We're definitely moving in that direction. In SALT I and SALT II,[3] the limits were on launchers—which encourages more warheads

[3] These agreements are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197 ff, and *ibid., 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

per launcher. Now the focus is on limiting warheads—which will encourage de-MIRVing.

Ford sometimes gets his facts wrong, by the way. He says the Soviets proposed a ban on MIRVs in SALT I. In fact, the US came up with a ban on MIRVs in the SALT I proposal, and the Soviets would not negotiate seriously about it.

Q: Any other observations?

A: I think SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as "Star Wars"], which Ford does not talk about, is important to discuss if you're on the subject of "the button." If there were an unauthorized or unintentional launch from the Soviet Union, for example, SDI would give the President a second button, a defensive button he could use, instead of just a retaliatory button.

Q: What about the argument that SDI is destabilizing because it would permit us to launch a strike without fear of retaliation?

A: I don't give that weight because I don't see the United States as having a first-strike mission, and I don't think any US President would go for first strike. The idea that we would is part of a mindset that the big danger in the world is the United States. I don't agree with that, and I don't think history substantiates that view at all.

84. Address by Chinese Chairman Deng Xiaoping Before the Central Military Commission: Reduction of the Chinese Army [Extract], June 4, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

At an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China on 4 June 1985, Chairman Deng Xiaoping announced that the Chinese Government had decided to reduce the People's Liberation Army (PLA) by one million men.

Deng Xiaoping said that the danger of world war remained. The factors for war were likely to increase due to the ongoing arms race of the two superpowers. However, the people wanted peace and opposed war. The world forces for peace would grow more rapidly than the forces for war. He also said that the Chinese Government always held high the banner of opposing hegemonism and safeguarding world peace, pursued an independent foreign policy and resolutely stood by the forces for peace. As the forces for peace grew throughout the world, it was possible that a large-scale world war would not break out for a fairly long time to come and that the prospects for world peace were hopeful.

Deng Xiaoping stressed that China wanted to concentrate on its economic development so as to build itself into a strong and modern-

[1] A/40/411, June 25, 1985, Annex 1.

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ized socialist country. China needed a peaceful international environment and had been working hard to create and safeguard such an environment. Economic development represented our overall interest to which everything else should be subordinated.

85. Article in *Pravda* by the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces (Akhromeyev): Strategic Defense Initiative and the ABM Treaty [Extract], June 4, 1985 [1]

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The U.S. Administration's actions in creating a new class of weapons—space strike means—are incompatible with the principles forming the foundation of the ABM Treaty.[2] By proclaiming the "Strategic Defense Initiative" and embarking on the practical implementation of a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system with space-based elements, Washington is effectively working directly to undermine the Treaty.

Certain U.S. leaders, especially Pentagon figures (for instance, R. Perle and others), making no secret of the United States' ambitious intentions with regard to space, are openly calling for the rejection of the ABM Treaty. The U.S. Administration denies that the "star wars" plans are incompatible with the demands of this most important document. It is maneuvering and seeking loopholes in the formulas of the treaty itself in order to justify in the eyes of the public its actions to militarize space. This is being done in a whole series of directions.

The First Direction. The Washington leaders are arguing at length and even directly asserting that the work on a large-scale space ABM system implemented within the framework of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" is merely harmless technological research, the conduct of which, they claim, the ABM Treaty does not prevent. This thesis is widely propagandized by the U.S. mass media.

In reality, however, everything is different. The ABM Treaty (Article V) forbids the creation and testing of space-based ABM systems or components, that is, precisely the objective of the U.S. "harmless research." In practice the creation of specific models of strike space weapons and even the testing of some of them are in full swing in the United States. Lasers of various types, electromagnetic guns, interceptor missiles, and antisatellite systems are being developed in laboratories and at proving grounds. All this so-called "research work" is in contravention of the ABM Treaty.

The Second Direction. Representatives of the U.S. Administration, counting on the uninformed nature of the public at large, are claiming that the provisions of the ABM Treaty relate only to those ABM

[1] Moscow *Pravda* in Russian, June 4, 1985, first edition, p. 4; FBIS *Daily Report*, June 4, 1985, vol. III, pp. AA3–AA6.

[2] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

systems and components that existed at the time the treaty was signed. The means now being created and tested within the framework of the "Strategic Defense Initiative," they say, cannot be ranked as "ABM components" since they are not mentioned in Article II of the treaty.

The provisions of the treaty apply to any systems intended, as defined in Article II of the treaty, to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. Since the ABM components being created within the framework of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" are intended for precisely this purpose, that is, they are designed to replace the interceptor missiles mentioned in the treaty, all the provisions of the treaty fully apply to them, above all the ban on the creation, testing, and deployment of space-based ABM systems or components.

The Third Direction. The American authors of the "star wars" program are particularly zealous in propagandizing the thesis that the development of "exotic" anti-ballistic missile means (laser and beam weapons, and so forth) is not only not forbidden by the ABM Treaty but is even virtually encouraged by it. Thus P. Nitze, adviser to the President and the secretary of state on the Geneva talks, openly presents the creation of space-based ABM components based on other [*inoy*] [3] physical principles as an action permitted by the ABM Treaty. For greater cogency references are made to the agreed statement accompanying the treaty (Paragraph E) [as published], which says that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and containing components capable of substituting, in particular, for interceptor missiles are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion and agreement between the sides.

We are faced with a clear juggling of the facts. The aforementioned agreed statement regarding the treaty indeed does not rule out the possibility of the sides' acquiring anti-ballistic missile means "based on other physical principles," but only within the framework of the limitations envisaged by the treaty as a whole, in other words in the single authorized area. The large-scale ABM system with space-based elements that the United States is planning cannot be restricted to a single area. It is a territorial and even a global ABM system that is totally prohibited by the treaty. Therefore, the creation of laser, beam, and other such destructive components for that system is a direct violation of the treaty.

The Fourth Direction. Having embarked on a path leading to the destruction of the ABM Treaty, the U.S. leaders are trying to exploit the fact that the treaty itself envisages in principle the introduction of appropriate amendments to its text (Article XIV). Therefore, they are saying that the U.S. actions running counter to the treaty can somehow be legitimized, for instance, by revising this document and

[3] Brackets here and following are in source document.

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making amendments to it agreed with the Soviet side. They are making out that the Soviet Union too is no less interested in such amendments.

All this is merely an unworthy ploy aimed at reassuring public opinion. The U.S. side is well aware that by its actions it is not working toward making some additional clarifications to the sides' actions in the situations envisaged by the treaty, which, in fact, is what Article XIV is referring to. The United States is working toward changing the meaning of the treaty itself and emasculating it of its main content—the ban on the deployment of an ABM defense of the country's territory.

The Soviet Union, of course, will not countenance the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems being transformed into a cover for U.S. policy aimed at ensuring an arms race in the sphere of space antiballistic missile systems.

The Fifth Direction. Charges that the Soviet Union is violating the provisions of the treaty are malevolently interwoven in the U.S. Administration's general line of undermining the ABM Treaty. Washington wants to make out that the USSR is taking some actions running counter to the ABM Treaty, and if that is so, then the Soviet Union, it says, must reconcile itself to what the United States is doing in this sphere.

More often than not in this connection the U.S. side speculates on the question of the Soviet radar station under construction in the Krasnoyarsk region. The farfetched argument that is adduced is that this radar is a station for early warning of missile attack and therefore should, or so it is claimed, be sited not in the Krasnoyarsk region but on the periphery of the USSR's territory and oriented outward, as Article VI of the treaty, which relates to early warning radars, demands.

However, the point is that the radar under construction in the Krasnoyarsk region does not fall within the restrictions of Article VI of the ABM Treaty. It has nothing to do with a system for early warning of missile attack. This station is intended for tracking of targets in space and the U.S. side has been told this. The U.S. side's attempt to continue to lay this "charge" against the USSR signifies only one thing—justifying the course of undermining the ABM Treaty adopted by the United States itself.

The "accusations" leveled at the USSR, to wit, that it is testing air defense means for ABM purposes and, in this regard, that it is allegedly preparing to create an ABM system for the entire territory of the USSR, which is prohibited under the treaty, obviously serve the same purpose.

No preparation is taking place in the USSR for the creation of a territorial ABM system, and that also goes for one based on air defense means. No work is being done on air defense systems that would contravene the ABM Treaty.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared that the so-called "accusations" being made against it by the United States concerning noncompliance with the ABM Treaty are far fetched and at variance with reality. We advocate strict and absolute observance of this treaty and we consider it inadmissible to work toward its erosion, and still more to call into question the very prospect of its existence, as is being done by the United States, which has embarked on the path of the militarization of space.

Washington's maneuvering around the ABM Treaty, attempts to transfer the blame for undermining it to the USSR, and even to pose in the public eye as virtually the custodian of the provisions which it contains confirm that the ABM Treaty retains all its importance and significance and, as before, it is an obstacle on the path of the nuclear arms race, an obstacle which those militarist circles in the West who are trying to smash the existing strategic equilibrium in the world and achieve military superiority over the USSR, would like to eliminate.

The USSR, and the Soviet leadership has stated this most definitely on several occasions, does not seek military superiority, but it will not permit such superiority over it either on the earth or via space. The initiators of "star wars" should not forget, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, USSR defense minister, stressed in his replies to a TASS correspondent's questions, that "the creation of space strike weapons will turn out, and will inevitably turn out, to mean a reduction in security both of the United States itself and of its allies." [4]

The Soviet Union consistently and persistently advocates the ending of the arms race, and above all, the nuclear arms race. The straightforward way to this goal is to renounce provocative schemes of carrying the arms race over into space. If space strike arms are banned, and preparations for their creation are halted at the stage of scientific research work, broad opportunities will be opened up for a radical reduction of nuclear arms. The Soviet Union has already proposed a reduction of strategic offensive arms by one-fourth. Given the nonmilitarization of space, it is possible to carry out even more profound reductions. There is no other way of solving this issue. The sides' full implementation of all the provisions of the ABM Treaty is required to play an important role here.

The preservation and absolute implementation of the ABM Treaty is a guarantee for successful progression toward accords at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space armaments. As Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has stressed, the arms race and disarmament talks are incompatible. The Soviet Union will not promote such a course. For its part, the Soviet Union will persistently seek in Geneva specific, mutually acceptable agreements that would make it possible to put an end to the arms race and carry forward the cause of disarmament.

[4] FBIS *Daily Report*, vol. III, May 6, 1985, p. AA5.

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86. Communique of the North Atlantic Council, June 7, 1985 [1]

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Lisbon on 6th and 7th June 1985. Ministers agreed as follows:

1. We are a defensive Alliance dedicated to the preservation of peace and the protection of freedom.

2. Reaffirming the principles of last year's Washington Statement on East-West Relations, we remain determined to maintain both our political solidarity and the military strength necessary for our defence. On this basis, we seek genuine détente through constructive dialogue and broad co-operation with the Soviet Union and with each of the countries of Eastern Europe in all areas. We call on the new Soviet leadership to join us in seeking tangible improvements in East-West relations, which would permit us to build on areas of common interest. A positive Soviet response to the US approach at the US-Soviet negotiations recently opened in Geneva would contribute substantially towards that end.

3. We do not seek military superiority for ourselves. None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack.

But, faced with the continuing build-up and modernization of Soviet nuclear and conventional arms, we shall preserve credible deterrence through sufficient conventional and nuclear forces. The Allies participating in the military structure of the Alliance are making an effort to improve, in particular, their conventional capabilities.

Our strategy of deterrence has proved its value in safeguarding peace: it remains fully valid. Its purpose is to prevent war and to enable us to resist intimidation.

4. The security of the North American and European Allies is inseparable. The cohesion of the Alliance is sustained by continuous consultations on all matters affecting our common interests and security.

5. Deterrence and defence together with arms control and disarmament are integral parts of the security policy of the Alliance. We wish to strengthen the peace by establishing a stable military balance at the lowest possible level of forces.

6. In this spirit, we welcome the US-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on their strategic nuclear weapons, on their intermediate range nuclear weapons, and on defence and space systems. These negotiations are intended to work out between the two countries effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. We strongly support US efforts in all three areas of negotiation, and we call on the Soviet Union to adopt a positive approach.

[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 33, No. 3 (June 1985), pp. 28–29.

The Allies concerned reiterate their willingness to modify, halt, reverse, or dispense with Longer Range INF (LRINF) deployment as part of an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement. In the absence of such an agreement, they will continue to deploy LRINF missiles on schedule.

We will continue to consult closely on all of these issues.[2]

7. We are determined to achieve progress also on other aspects of arms control and disarmament and urge the Soviet Union to work with us for balanced and verifiable agreements. In particular:

—in the Vienna MBFR negotiations the participating Allies are seeking equal collective manpower levels through verifiable reductions in conventional forces in Europe and effective associated measures;

—in Stockholm (CDE) we are seeking agreement on militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable confidence and security building measures covering the whole of Europe to give new, concrete effect and expression to the existing duty of all participating states to refrain from the threat or use of force;

—in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament we seek in particular a world-wide comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons; we remain deeply concerned about the proliferation and use of such weapons.

8. We attach great importance to the full implementation by all participating states of all principles and provisions enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act [3] and to balanced progress in the CSCE process in all its aspects. The tenth anniversary of the Final Act in August 1985 should be commemorated by a meeting of the participating states at ministerial level. We would like to see the anniversary marked by substantial progress in the CSCE process, including meaningful results at the important Meeting on Human Rights in Ottawa. We also hope for a positive exchange of views at the Cultural Forum in Budapest in the autumn.

9. We strongly condemn terrorism and will continue to work to eliminate this threat to our citizens and to the democratic values we hold in common.

10. In the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty,[4] we remain fully committed to promoting the stability and well-being of our community of free nations, sharing common values. We consequently reaffirm the importance of special programmes, for less favoured partners.

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[2] Greece and Denmark reserve their positions on the INF part of this paragraph. [Footnote in original.]

[3] The arms control portion of the Final Act has been reprinted in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

[4] 63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964; 4 Bevans 828; 34 UNTS 243.

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11. The maintenance of a calm situation in and around Berlin, including unhindered traffic on all access routes, remains an essential element in East-West relations.

We support the efforts of the Federal Republic of Germany to achieve progress in inner-German relations which can make a significant contribution to the building of confidence in Europe and benefit the German people, particularly the Berliners.

12. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, now in its sixth year, violates fundamental principles of international law. We urge the Soviet Union to put an end to the suffering of the Afghan people, by withdrawing its troops and agreeing to a political solution restoring the independence and non-aligned status of Afghanistan.

Events in Poland underscore the continuing need for genuine dialogue between the various elements of society and for national reconciliation.

We, for our part, respect the sovereignty and independence of all states. We will remain vigilant and will consult on events outside the Treaty area which might threaten our common security.

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The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain reserves his government's position on the present Communiqué.

87. Statement by President Reagan on an Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint, June 10, 1985 [1]

In 1982, on the eve of the strategic arms reductions talks (START), I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement [2] or the unratified SALT II agreement [3] as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint.[4] Despite my serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, I took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START.

Since then the United States has not taken any actions which would undercut existing arms control agreements. The United States has fully kept its part of the bargain, however, the Soviets have not. They have failed to comply with several provisions of SALT II, and we have serious concerns regarding their compliance with the provisions of other accords.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 17, 1985, pp. 770–771.
[2] For the text of the Agreement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff.
[3] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.
[4] For the President's decision, see *ibid., 1982*, p. 332.

The pattern of Soviet violations, if left uncorrected, undercuts the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world. The United States will continue to pursue vigorously with the Soviet Union the resolution of our concerns over Soviet noncompliance. We cannot impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance.

We remain determined to pursue a productive dialog with the Soviet Union aimed at reducing the risk of war through the adoption of meaningful measures which improve security, stability, and predictability. Therefore, I have reached the judgment that, despite the Soviet record over the last years, it remains in our interest to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursue with renewed vigor our goal of real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals in the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. Obtaining such reductions remains my highest priority.

The U.S. cannot establish such a framework alone. It will require the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps to correct its noncompliance, resolve our other compliance concerns, and reverse its unparalleled and unwarranted military buildup. So far, the Soviet Union has not chosen to move in this direction. However, in the interest of ensuring that every opportunity to establish the secure, stable future we seek is fully explored, I am prepared to go the extra mile in seeking an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Therefore, to provide the Soviets the opportunity to join us in establishing such a framework which could support ongoing negotiations, I have decided that the United States will continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercises comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursues arms reduction agreements in the currently ongoing nuclear and space talks in Geneva.

As an integral part of this policy, we will also take those steps required to assure the national security of the United States and our allies which were made necessary by Soviet noncompliance. Appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to ensure our security, to provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their noncompliance, and to make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control obligations entail real costs.

Certain Soviet violations are, by their very nature, irreversible. Such is the case with respect to the Soviet Union's flight-testing and steps towards deployment of the SS–X–25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited by the unratified SALT II agreement. Since the noncompliance associated with the development of this missile cannot be corrected by the Soviet Union, the United States reserves the right to respond in a proportionate manner at the appropriate time. The Midgetman small ICBM program is particularly relevant in this regard.

Other Soviet activities involving noncompliance may be reversible and can be corrected by Soviet action. In these instances, we will

provide the Soviet Union additional time to take such required corrective action. As we monitor Soviet actions for evidence of the positive, concrete steps needed on their part to correct these activities, I have directed the Department of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment aimed at identifying specific actions which the United States could take to augment as necessary the U.S. strategic modernization program as a proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, those Soviet violations of existing arms agreements which the Soviets fail to correct.

To provide adequate time for the Soviets to demonstrate by their actions a commitment to join us in an interim framework of true mutual restraint, we will plan to deactivate and dismantle according to agreed procedures an existing Poseidon SSBN as the seventh U.S. Ohio-class submarine puts to sea later this year. However, the United States will keep open all programmatic options for handling such milestones as they occur in the future. As these later milestones are reached, I will assess the overall situation in light of Soviet actions correcting their noncompliance and promoting progress in Geneva and make a final determination of the U.S. course of action on a case-by-case basis.

I firmly believe that if we are to put the arms reduction process on a firm and lasting foundation and obtain real reductions, our focus must remain on making best use of the promise provided by the currently ongoing negotiations in Geneva. Our policy, involving the establishment of an interim framework for truly mutual restraint and proportionate U.S. response to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, is specifically designed to go the extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the opportunity to join us in this endeavor.

My hope is that if the Soviets will do so, we will be able jointly to make progress in framing equitable and verifiable agreements involving real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals in the Geneva negotiations. Such an achievement would not only provide the best and most permanent constraint on the growth of nuclear arsenals, but it would take a major step towards reducing the size of these arsenals and creating a safer future for all nations.

88. Message by President Reagan to the Congress Transmitting a Report on Compliance With Arms Control Agreements, June 10, 1985 [1]

To the Congress of the United States:

The attached classified report responds to a requirement in the FY–85 Department of Defense Authorization Act (Section 1110 of P.L. 98–525) requesting a report that:

(A) describes the implications of the United States Ship Alaska's sea trials, both with and without the concurrent dismantling of older launchers of missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, for the current United States no-undercut policy on strategic arms and United States security interests more generally;
(B) assesses possible Soviet political, military, and negotiating responses to the termination of the United States no-undercut policy;
(C) reviews and assesses Soviet activities with respect to existing strategic offensive arms agreements; and
(D) makes recommendations regarding the future of United States interim restraint policy.[2]

In accordance with our prior interim restraint policy, the United States has scrupulously lived within the SALT I and II agreements governing strategic offensive arms.[3] The United States has fully kept its part of the bargain. By contrast, we have found and reported to the Congress that the Soviet Union has violated major arms control obligations, as fully documented in comprehensive reports to the Congress on this subject in January 1984 [4] and February 1985.[5] Multiple Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty and of other agreements were fundamental considerations in assessing a future United States interim restraint policy.

The basic United States strategic goals remain unchanged. In the years ahead, the United States objective is a radical reduction in the levels and the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as on stabilization of the relationship between nuclear offensive and defensive arms, whether on earth or in space.

I firmly believe that if we are to put the arms reduction process on a firm and lasting foundation, our focus must remain on making best use of the promise provided by the current negotiations in Geneva. The policy outlined in my report, involving the establishment of an interim framework for truly mutual restraint and proportionate United States responses to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, is specifically

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 17, 1985, pp. 771–772. The President also issued a statement, *supra*.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 744–756.
[3] For the SALT I and II Agreements, see *ibid., 1972*, pp. 197 ff and *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff., respectively.
[4] *Ibid., 1984*, pp. 33–34 and 34–39.
[5] Document 12.

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designed to go the extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the opportunity to join us in this vital endeavor.

I believe that this policy, addressed in the classified report and the unclassified fact sheet,[6] both recognizes the recent views of the Congress and serves as a basis for bipartisan support.

89. White House Fact Sheet on Building an Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint, June 10, 1985 [1]

Introduction. In response to legislation in the FY 1985 Department of Defense Authorization Act,[2] the President today submitted a classified report to the Congress on building an interim framework of mutual restraint with regard to strategic arms. The following is an unclassified fact sheet based on the President's report.

Background of Our Current Policy. In 1982, on the eve of the strategic arms reduction talks, the President decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement [3] or the unratified SALT II agreement [4] as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint.[5] Despite serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I Agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II Agreement, the United States took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint on strategic forces conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START. Our assumptions in taking this action were threefold.

- First, we believed then, and continue to believe now, that mutual verifiable constraints on nuclear arsenals are important, especially as we try to move toward the goal of greatly reducing and eventually eliminating the nuclear threat, which the SALT agreements did not do. We saw the START negotiations as the path to the equitable and verifiable deep reductions in the size of nuclear arsenals that we seek. The United States was prepared to and has offered the Soviet Union the elements for such agreements in Geneva. However, we recognized that negotiating sound agreements takes time. Therefore, the United States made the commitment not to undercut existing agreements as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint as an *interim* policy to provide what we hoped would be a framework of mutual restraint as we pursued agreements that would put the arms control process on a better, more sound, long-term foundation and bring real reductions.

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[6] *Infra.*

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, August 1985, pp. 34–37. The President also issued a statement, Document 87.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 744–756.

[3] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197 ff.

[4] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[5] For the President's decision, see *ibid., 1982*, p. 332.

- Second, at the time, we hoped that the leaders of the Soviet Union would, indeed, show equal restraint.
- Third, we judged that this policy of interim restraint would not adversely affect our national security interests, provided that, with the Administration and the Congress working together, the United States undertook those steps necessary to counter the strategic advantages the Soviet Union had been building over the previous decade.

Unfortunately, in certain key respects, these assumptions have not stood the test of time.

U.S. Compliance. In accordance with U.S. interim restraint policy, the United States has not taken any actions which would undercut existing agreements. In fact, we have scrupulously lived within the SALT I and II agreements governing strategic offensive arms. For example, we have fully dismantled eight Polaris missile-carrying submarines as new Trident missile-carrying submarines have been deployed. In short, the United States has fully kept its part of the bargain.

Soviet Noncompliance. As detailed in two comprehensive presidential reports to the Congress, in January 1984 [6] and February 1985,[7] the Soviet Union has repeatedly violated its arms control obligations. While the Soviets have observed some provisions of existing arms control agreements, they have violated important elements of those agreements and associated political commitments.

- *SALT II.* With respect to the unratified SALT II agreement, these violations include the testing and deployment of a second new ICBM, the SS–X–25, and the encryption of telemetry during missile testing which impedes verification of agreements by national technical means. The Soviet Union has also probably violated this agreement regarding the prohibition on deploying SS–16 ICBMs. Serious concerns also remain unresolved with respect to other issues (e.g., the RV [reentry vehicle]-to-throw-weight ratio of the SS–X–25 demonstrated during testing).
- *Other Accords.* Additionally, the pattern of Soviet noncompliance with existing agreements extends well beyond SALT II. The Soviet Union is engaged in the construction of a large phased-array radar in central Siberia in violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. When added to other Soviet ABM-related activities, including concurrent testing of air defense and ABM components and the development of mobile ABM components, there is serious cause for concern about Soviet preparations for a prohibited territorial ABM defense. Such a development would have profound implications for the vital East-West balance. The Soviet Union has also engaged in significant violations of both the Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons [8] and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.[9] We also judge that it has violated

[6] *Ibid., 1984,* pp. 34–39.
[7] Documents 11 and 12.
[8] The text of the Protocol may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969.* pp. 764–765.
[9] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 133–138.

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both the Limited Test Ban Treaty [10] and the terms of the Helsinki Final Act.[11] It is also likely that the Soviets have violated the nuclear testing yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.[12]

- *SALT I.* Even with respect to SALT I, where we have found the Soviets have complied with the letter of the agreement, we have concerns about their compliance with the spirit of the agreement. For example, after dismantling *Yankee*-class nuclear ballistic missile carrying submarines to comply with SALT I constraints, they have already converted one such submarine into a submarine longer than the original and carrying modern, long-range, sea-launched cruise missiles. While not a violation of the letter of SALT I, the resulting submarine constitutes a threat to U.S. and allied security similar to the original *Yankee*-class submarine.

Implications of Soviet Noncompliance. These are very crucial issues, as effective arms control requires seriousness about compliance. The pattern of Soviet violations increasingly affects our national security and raises uncertainty about the forces the United States will require in the future. Just as significant as the military consequences of the violations themselves, this pattern of Soviet noncompliance raises fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process, concerns that—if not corrected—undercut the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world.

The U.S. Response to Date. The United States has consistently employed all appropriate diplomatic channels, including the U.S./Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), strongly to press the Soviet Union to explain and/or cease those activities which are of concern to us. In doing so, we have made it absolutely clear that we expect the Soviet Union to take positive steps to correct their noncompliance and to resolve our compliance concerns in order to maintain the integrity of existing agreements and to establish the positive environment necessary for the successful negotiation of new agreements.

Unfortunately, despite long and repeated U.S. efforts to resolve these issues, the Soviet Union has neither provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective action. Instead, Soviet violations have continued and expanded as the Soviets have continued to build their strategic forces. Consequently, the Soviet Union has not been, and is not now, exercising the equal restraint upon which our interim restraint policy has been conditioned. Such Soviet behavior is fundamentally inimical to the future of arms control and to the security of this country and that of our allies.

U.S. Proportionate Response in the Future. The United States will continue to pursue vigorously with the Soviet Union the resolution of our concerns over Soviet noncompliance. In this effort, we cannot impose

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[10] *Ibid., 1963,* pp. 291–293.
[11] *Ibid., 1975,* pp. 304–308 (arms control portion). For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin,* September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.
[12] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974,* pp. 225–229.

upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance and, in effect, unilateral disarmament. As a minimum, in the case of irreversible Soviet violations, we must make appropriate and proportionate responses that deny the military benefits of these violations to the Soviet Union. In the case of Soviet violations that the Soviets can correct, we should develop and keep available comparable proportionate responses that provide incentives to the Soviets to take positive steps to correct the situation and which provide a needed hedge against the military consequences of Soviet violations should the Soviet Union fail to take the necessary corrective actions.

In this context, the United States will develop and, as needed, implement appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance as necessary to ensure the security of the United States and its allies and to provide real incentives to the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps required to resolve our concerns.

Need for the U.S. Strategic Force Modernization Program. To ensure our fundamental national security and as a baseline for further U.S. action, the integrity and continuity of the U.S. strategic modernization program must be maintained. If the modernization of the ICBM leg of our strategic triad is not fully implemented, as called for in our comprehensive strategic modernization program and recommended by the Scowcroft commission,[13] we will have to reassess all aspects of our plans to meet our basic national security needs.

Fundamental U.S. Goals. While recognizing the seriousness of the problems cited above, we must not lose sight of basic U.S. goals which remain unchanged. During the next 10 years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the levels and the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between nuclear offensive and defensive arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. A world free of the threat of military aggression and free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective on which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

The Importance of Ongoing Negotiations. The best path to achieving these goals would be an agreement based on the far-reaching nuclear arms reduction proposal we have tabled at the strategic arms reduction talks in Geneva. The best approach to moving rapidly to a safer, more stable, and more secure world would surely be for both sides to make sharp reductions in their strategic offensive arsenals and, in particular, to eliminate large numbers of the most destabilizing weapons—strategic ballistic missiles—by agreeing to a verifiable aggregate ceiling of 5,000 warheads on the land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles of both sides.

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[13] *Ibid., 1984,* pp. 171–180.

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Unfortunately, the Soviet Union through the years has shown little real interest in restraining the growth of its nuclear arms—let alone in achieving meaningful reductions or in making progress toward a verifiable, equitable accord which requires such real reductions. To the contrary, in spite of the seriousness and flexibility demonstrated by our negotiators in Geneva in the new negotiations begun this year, the Soviet Union has actually regressed from negotiating positions it had previously taken and has adopted a largely intransigent posture which severely impedes progress. We, nevertheless, remain determined to pursue a productive dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at reducing the risk of war through the adoption of meaningful measures which improve security, stability, and predictability.

Establishing an Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint. It remains in the interest of the United States to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursue with renewed vigor our goal of real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals through the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. The United States cannot establish such a framework alone. It will require the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps called for above to correct their noncompliance, resolve our other compliance concerns, and reverse or substantially reduce their unparalleled and unwarranted military buildup. So far, the Soviet Union has not chosen to move in this direction. However, in the interest of ensuring that every opportunity to establish the secure, stable future we seek is fully explored, the President is prepared to go the extra mile in the direction of trying to establish an interim framework of true, mutual restraint.

Continued Restraint. Therefore, to provide the Soviet Union the opportunity to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint which would support ongoing negotiations, the President has decided that the United States will continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercises comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursues arms reductions agreements in the nuclear and space talks in Geneva. The United States will constantly review the implications of this interim policy on the long-term security interests of the United States and its allies. In doing so, we will consider Soviet actions to resolve our concerns with the pattern of Soviet noncompliance, continued growth in the strategic force structure of the Soviet Union, and Soviet seriousness in the ongoing negotiations.

Proportionate Response. As an integral part of the implementation of this policy, we must also take those steps required to assure the national security of the United States and our allies made necessary by Soviet noncompliance. Appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control arrangements entail real costs. Therefore, the United States will develop appropriate and proportionate responses, and it will take those actions necessary in response to, and as a hedge

against the military consequences of, uncorrected Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements.

Responding to Irreversible Soviet Violations. Certain Soviet violations are, by their very nature, irreversible. Such is the case with respect to the Soviet Union's flight testing and steps toward deployment of the SS–X–25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited by the unratified SALT II agreement. Since the noncompliance associated with the development of this missile cannot, at this point, be corrected by the Soviet Union, the United States, therefore, reserves the right to respond appropriately, and the United States will do so in a proportionate manner at the appropriate time. The Midgetman small ICBM program is particularly relevant in this regard.

Responding to Reversible Soviet Activities. Other Soviet activities involving noncompliance may be reversible and can be corrected by Soviet action. In these instances, we will go the extra mile and provide the Soviet Union additional time to take such required corrective action. As we monitor Soviet behavior for evidence of the positive, concrete steps needed on their part to correct these activities, the Department of Defense will conduct a comprehensive assessment aimed at identifying specific actions which the United States could take to accelerate or augment as necessary the U.S. strategic modernization program in proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, those Soviet violations of existing arms agreements which the Soviets fail to correct.

In addition to the development of appropriate and proportionate U.S. military responses in the face of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, this review will also consider the consequences of continued Soviet force growth as indicated in the most recent National Intelligence Estimate on this subject, the alterations to the ICBM portion of the U.S. strategic modernization program which have resulted from recent congressional action, and the issue of how the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles should appropriately be based. Soviet behavior during rounds II and III of the nuclear and space talks will also be taken fully into account.

Criteria for Response Options. In this context, as potential U.S. future actions are assessed, certain criteria will be used. The options will be designed as proportionate responses to specific instances of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, hedging against the military consequences of such Soviet noncompliance. They need not necessarily be equivalent types of actions. Rather, these options will attempt to deny the Soviets the potential benefits of their noncompliance and, to the extent possible, provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their noncompliant activity. In all cases, the primary focus will remain upon options that underwrite deterrence, enhance stability, and can be directly tied to the specific requirements of our national security. In this regard, the U.S. goal is not, per se, to build additional forces but to use these options to ensure our security in the face of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance and to provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their

noncompliance and join us in establishing a meaningful interim framework of mutual restraint.

Timing of the Department of Defense Review. The results of this review will be provided for the President's consideration by November 15, 1985. This will provide sufficient time for the President to consider U.S. options with respect to our policy as we approach the date at which the unratified SALT II Treaty would have expired on December 31, 1985, and subsequent milestones that would occur under a "no undercut" policy. It also provides sufficient time to consider U.S. programmatic options in direct response to instances of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, as needed, in submitting the FY 1987 defense program to the Congress in early 1986.

Seventh Trident SSBN. To provide adequate time for the Soviets to demonstrate by their actions a commitment to join us in an interim framework of true mutual restraint, the President has also directed that the Department of Defense should plan to deactivate and disassemble according to agreed procedures an existing Poseidon SSBN as the seventh U.S. *Ohio*-class submarine, the *USS Alaska,* puts to sea later this year. However, as a part of its report, the Department of Defense will review and evaluate the range of options available to the United States for handling similar milestones, including the sea trials of additional *Ohio*-class submarines and the deployment of the 121st U.S. ALCM [air-launched cruise missile]-carrying heavy bomber, in the future. The United States will keep open all future programmatic options for handling such milestones as they occur. As these later milestones are reached, the President will assess the overall situation and make a final determination of the U.S. course of action on a case-by-case basis in light of the overall situation and Soviet actions in meeting the conditions cited above.

Summary of Why This Course Was Chosen. The President firmly believes that if we are to put the arms reduction process on a firm, lasting foundation, our focus must remain on making best use of the promise provided by the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. The policy outlined above, involving the establishment of an interim framework for truly mutual restraint and proportionate U.S. response to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, is specifically designed to go the extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the opportunity to join us in this endeavor. Our hope is that if the Soviets will do so, we will jointly be able to make progress in framing equitable and verifiable agreements involving real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals in the ongoing Geneva negotiations. Such an achievement would not only provide the best and most permanent constraint on the growth of nuclear arsenals, but it would take a major step in the process of reducing the size of these arsenals and in moving us toward a more secure and stable world.

90. Letter From the Chairman of the Chemical Warfare Review Commission (Stoessel) to the President: Report of the Commission, June 11, 1985 [1]

The Chemical Warfare Review Commission established by the Congress [2] and appointed by you [3] has held an intensive series of meetings and field visits during the past three months. The Commission has concluded its review and our report is forwarded herewith.[4]

It has always been difficult to deal with chemical weapons issues. There is an almost universal revulsion felt on the part of all peoples towards these weapons. This revulsion, however, has not prevented the proliferation of these weapons and their authenticated use in several current conflicts. The Soviets have achieved, quantitatively and qualitatively, the world's greatest offensive chemical capability and fully integrated it into their military forces. At the same time, they have demonstrated an unwillingness to negotiate constructively on a verifiable chemical warfare ban. These developments mean that the restoration of a United States chemical deterrent cannot be ignored.

The Commission carried out an extensive review of every aspect of this complex subject, including the history and current status of efforts to achieve a ban on chemical weapons; the history of chemical warfare and of U.S. policy on chemical matters; the nature of modern chemical agents involved; the technology of both munitions and defensive measures; the demilitarization of obsolete and deteriorating munitions; the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat; and the design and development of binary munitions. We heard presentations by more than 75 persons representing a broad spectrum of opinion and many areas of expert knowledge. Commission members traveled to Europe, and spoke with U.S. commanders, men and women of our Armed Forces, and representatives of our allies. We have also viewed a portion of the current stockpile and other facilities in the United States.

In brief, we found that modernization of the U.S. chemical weapon stockpile would not impede and would more likely encourage negotiations for a multilateral, verifiable ban on chemical weapons; that only a small fraction of the current stockpile has deterrent value, while the bulk of it is militarily useless and should be destroyed; that the proposed binary program will provide an adequate capability to meet our present needs and is necessary; and that any expectation that protective measures alone can offset the advantages to the Soviets from a chemical attack is not realistic.

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[1] *Chemical Warfare Review Commission: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session*, pp. 36–37.

[2] *Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985*, Section 1511 (P.L. 98–525 Oct. 19, 1984; 98 Stat. 2626–2627; 10 USC 8851).

[3] See Document 9 and *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, March 18, 1985, pp. 290–291.

[4] *Infra*.

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Authorization of the binary program will soon be debated and voted on in Congress. We are conveying these findings and recommendations to you at this time, so that Congress may have the benefit of our review and thoughts on this matter.

91. Report of the Chemical Warfare Review Commission: Sources, Executive Summary, Introduction, and Summary of Findings and Recommendations, June 11, 1985 [1]

SOURCES

This Commission was appointed by the President of the United States early in March, 1985,[2] and began work immediately. In the subsequent months members of the Commission held both open hearings and closed sessions to receive classified data, and heard from a total of 77 witnesses. Public meetings were advertised in the *Federal Register*, and in addition the Commission on its own initiative contacted persons and groups known to have views on this subject and invited them to appear. Many did so. Witnesses included persons both opposed to and in favor of the binary weapons modernization program. No one seeking to appear before the Commission was turned away.

Members of the Commission also traveled to see at first hand the subject matter of this report. Members visited the U.S. Army Depot, at Pine Bluff, Arkansas; the U.S. Army Depot Activity, at Umatilla, Oregon; the U.S. Army Research Laboratories at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland; the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, at Lexington, Kentucky; the Tooele Army Depot, at Tooele, Utah; the Newport Army Ammunition Plant, at Newport, Indiana; the U.S. Army Depot at Pueblo, Colorado; Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; Spangdahlem Air Force Base, Germany; U.S. European Command Headquarters, Stuttgart, Germany; U.S. Army installations in Germany; and a storage site in Europe. Members met also with officials of several foreign countries and with a number of both senior and operating level U.S. Government officials, both military and civilian, from Cabinet level down. The Commission received intelligence briefings from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Members also reviewed selected items in the published literature on this subject, and both classified and unclassified government documents.

The report transmitted herewith is the product of the Commission's own effort. It was written, revised, and edited by the Commission

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[1] *Chemical Warfare Review Commission: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session*, pp. 43–48, 50–52, 120–122. The members of the Commission were Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Chairman; Philip J. Bakes, Jr., Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard E. Cavazos, Barber B. Conable, Jr., John N. Erlenborn, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., John G. Kester.

[2] See *supra*, n. 3.

members themselves in the course of numerous meetings, and reflects their own conclusions. All of the members put aside any previous opinions on the subject of chemical weapons and addressed the subject freshly and in far greater detail than they ever had before. All found the process instructive.

Approaching with humility a topic so wide-ranging, the Commission nevertheless is confident that it has considered the subject in depth, and that the conclusions reached here are sound.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

By the terms of its 1975 ratification [3] of the Geneva Protocol of 1925,[4] and by its policy since World War I, the United States is committed not to use chemical weapons except in retaliation for a chemical attack on U.S. or allied forces. For many years, until 1969, the United States produced and stockpiled chemical munitions as a deterrent to possible chemical attack by an adversary. Warfare with lethal chemicals did not take place on any significant scale in World War II, and has not taken place since World War I except in instances when the attacker possessed chemical weapons and the other force did not.

In 1969 the United States unilaterally ceased further manufacture of chemical weapons. Since that time the accumulated U.S. stock of chemical weapons has been maintained at storage sites in the United States and Europe. More than half of that stock consists of bulk mustard and nerve agent. Of the portion that has been manufactured into munitions, most is in artillery shells, rockets, and some bombs, and most of the munitions containing nerve agent appear still to be usable. However, only a small fraction of the total stock of chemical agent is in a munition form that has the characteristics suitable for employment on a modern battlefield.

During the years since the United States ceased producing chemical weapons in 1969, the Soviet Union has pressed forward a major program to augment its capability to wage chemical war. The Soviets have at least sixteen types of chemical munitions, containing nerve agents and other chemical agents as well. The Soviets also have a large, specially trained and equipped body of troops organized to assist units fighting in a chemically contaminated environment. There is substantial reason to believe that the Soviets are actively developing new chemical agents, toxins, and bacteriological agents as well, and have employed and experimented with some of these in Afghanistan. The Soviet stock of militarily effective chemical munitions, by the most conservative informed estimates, is several times larger than that of the United States.

The Administration has proposed addition of three chemical weapons to the U.S. arsenal. Each of these would produce nerve agents

[3] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 5–6, 6–7.
[4] The text of the Protocol may be found *ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.

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identical to those that are in existing U.S. chemical munitions. However, these proposed weapons all are of "binary" design, that is, they contain separate compartments of nonlethal chemicals which do not mix and react until after launching to form the nerve agent. Two of the three munitions proposed are ready for production. These are a 155 mm howitzer shell, and the 595-pound Bigeye aerial bomb. Also proposed is a battlefield rocket which still is under development, with range beyond that of front-line artillery.

The advantage of binary chemical munitions over existing unitary ones, which are filled with a highly lethal agent, is much greater safety in transportation and handling. In addition, the proposed bomb would deliver a long-lasting agent, capable of retaliating against rear-area military targets, a capability which existing U.S. chemical weapons lack.

After reviewing the nature and condition of the current U.S. chemical stockpile, available information on the Soviet threat, the views of U.S. allies, and the current modernization proposals, the Commission arrived at the following responses to the four questions posed by the Congress in the legislation that established this Commission: [5]

First, the Commission was asked to consider the possible relationship of modernizing the U.S. chemical stockpile to the current effort to negotiate a verifiable multilateral treaty barring chemical weapons. The Commission has concluded that modernization with binary munitions is more likely if anything to encourage those difficult negotiations than to impede them. In fact, if the United States continues to abstain unilaterally from production, the Soviet Union will have little incentive to negotiate, because it will enjoy all the benefits of a freeze without having to restrain its own production of chemical weapons.

Second, the Commission was asked to consider whether the existing U.S. stockpile of unitary chemical weapons provides an adequate deterrent to Soviet chemical attack.

The Commission believes that deterrence by maintaining a capability to retaliate in kind is a necessary and moral posture to prevent chemical warfare, and that it has a good likelihood of being effective. In particular, the Commission rejects the proposition that escalation to nuclear weapons is a credible or acceptable response to chemical attack.

The Commission has concluded that although the existing U.S. stockpile does provide a deterrent, the stockpile's utility and reliability are declining. Further, the existing munitions are flawed and incomplete in their ability to deter. A large portion of the artillery shells cannot be fired to current maximum ranges, and many are filled with persistent (long-lasting) chemical agents, when current military doctrine calls for use of nonpersistent agent in the front-line area. Even more importantly, there is no usable munition on hand for use against

[5] *Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1995,* Title XV, Sec. 1511 (98 Stat. 2626–2627, 10 USC 8851).

rear-area military targets that contains the persistent type of agent necessary for that mission. That is the most serious shortcoming in the U.S. retaliatory capability.

Third, the Commission was asked whether the Department of Defense's proposed binary chemical modernization program is adequate to provide a credible deterrent. The Commission's conclusion is that the modernization proposed is an essential first step, but that more effort is required, particularly to develop unmanned delivery systems for use against rear-area targets, and to conduct research on defenses against new Soviet chemical weapons.

Fourth, the Commission was asked whether defensive measures alone are an effective response to the Soviet chemical threat. The Commission's firm conclusion is that they are not. Protective clothing is at best a temporary defense against chemical attack, it is untried in actual battlefield conditions, and it cannot be depended upon to save the lives of all military personnel who are in jeopardy. Moreover, it is not available to civilians who are within range of chemical agents.

Protective garments even if effective are extremely uncomfortable and oppressive, and interfere seriously with the functioning of military units. Even if chemical weapons are used only against limited areas, if an attacker can force a defender to put on protective gear from expectation of such use, the military effectiveness of the encumbered personnel is cut by 50% or more. If the attacker, who knows the actual location of chemical attacks, is able to fight unencumbered against such personnel, he has a military advantage that is likely to be insuperable. Defensive measures, the Commission concluded, are necessary to try to save lives, and have improved as a result of large investments in recent years, but standing alone they cannot deter chemical attack.

In addition, the Commission recommends an accelerated program to destroy in an environmentally safe way the existing stockpile of obsolete chemical weapons, particularly a few obsolete types which have been found prone to leakage or are otherwise believed dangerous. The Commission also recommends an expanded research and development effort on both chemical weapons and defensive measures, and greater research into defenses against toxins and biological agents that the Soviets are developing. In that connection, more complete intelligence on Soviet activities is essential.

INTRODUCTION

Warfare employing lethal toxic chemicals is a subject abhorrent even to contemplate. This Commission, however, was established by the Congress and appointed by the President to do just that: to examine the threat of chemical warfare, and to recommend the most prudent course for this country to adopt in order to counteract it and prevent such barbarism from occurring.

Every member of the Commission subscribes without reservation to that objective: that chemical warfare should not happen. Nor did any of the dozens of witnesses who testified disagree. The sole question is

one of means. The need which the Commission has addressed is to determine what U.S. policies and actions will best prevent chemical warfare, while minimizing the risk of nuclear war and maintaining the overall defense posture of this country and our allies throughout the world.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has followed a policy of nuclear deterrence. During that same period of forty years, there has been no war among the great powers. The Commission believes that the policy of deterrence has been sound, successful and moral. It should continue to be United States policy to take the actions necessary to prevent nuclear or conventional war among great powers, while at the same time not yielding this country's vital interests.

Chemical weapons are an anomaly. They do not easily fit the common distinction between conventional and nuclear armaments. Chemical weapons are capable of causing mass and indiscriminate loss of human life. Militarily, if their use is not inhibited, they could swing the balance in a conventional war; or, alternatively, they could trigger the escalation of such warfare to a nuclear exchange. How to eliminate a temptation by an adversary to use chemical weapons, and at the same time to prevent them from either forcing surrender or precipitating nuclear war, is the central question this report addresses.

The Congress in 1984 directed this Commission to consider four specific points:

> "(1) the *relationship of chemical stockpile modernization* by the United States with the ultimate goal of the United States of achieving a multilateral, comprehensive, and verifiable *ban on chemical weapons;*
> "(2) the *adequacy of the existing United States* stockpile of unitary chemical weapons in providing a credible deterrent to use by the Soviet Union of chemical weapons against United States and allied forces;
> "(3) whether the *binary chemical modernization program* proposed by the Department of Defense is adequate to support United States national security policy by posing a credible deterrent to chemical warfare; and
> "(4) the ability of *defensive measures* alone to meet the Soviet chemical warfare threat and the adequacy of funding for current and projected defensive measure programs." (Emphasis supplied.) [6]

In the balance of this Report, after first reviewing briefly the characteristics and history of chemical weapons, we address each of those questions.

In its deliberations the Commission has become convinced of the gravity of the chemical warfare issue, and the wisdom of the Congress in bringing it to the forefront. For too many years, the very repulsiveness and seeming intractability of the chemical threat have tempted citizens, political leaders, and even military officers to ignore its existence and put it out of their minds. Such false comfort, the Commis-

[6] *Ibid.* Parentheses in source text.

sion believes, becomes more dangerous with each passing year. To persist in it would be irresponsible.

On the other hand, the Commission has concluded that, once faced, the chemical threat is well within this country's power to deal with. How best to do that, on analysis, is not mysterious at all, probably less so than most issues of military preparedness or public policy. The emotion generated by such an alien and indiscriminate form of warfare is understandable; but only by stripping away the emotion and looking at the facts can the best course of action be found. That is what the Commission has tried to do, and we hope that our effort will assist the Congress and the country in doing the same.

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

With respect to the four points it was directed to address, the Commission has concluded:

I. The Effect of Production on Achieving a Chemical Weapons Ban

1. There is no reason to believe that replacing existing U.S. chemical weapons with safer ones of binary design would make it more difficult to achieve a multilateral, verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

II. Adequacy of the Existing Stockpile To Deter

2. Modernization of the U.S. chemical weapons capability is needed.

3. The existing U.S. store of chemical weapons dates from the 1940's through 1960's and is in deteriorating condition. The bulk of it is of little military value, and much of it is militarily useless.

4. A small fraction of the stockpile has deterrent value. All of it, because the munitions as stored contain lethal chemical agents, is hazardous to handle.

5. Soviet chemical warfare capability is sizable, many times greater than that of the United States.

6. In order to prevent either quick defeat or early escalation to a nuclear exchange in time of war, a more complete U.S. chemical retaliatory capability is needed, particularly in order to be able to retaliate with persistent chemical agents against rear-area targets.

7. Failure to maintain an effective chemical retaliatory capability would leave the United States with nuclear retaliation as the principal threat to deter chemical attack.

8. The current stockpile should be replaced and destroyed at an accelerated rate.

III. The Binary Chemical Program

9. The proposed binary chemical program is a necessary step toward achieving an adequate U.S. chemical capability, but is not sufficient over the long run.

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10. The great advantages of the proposed binary munitions are safety, and ease of transport, storage, handling, and ultimate destruction.

11. New delivery systems for rear-area targets are necessary and development of them should be accelerated.

12. The projected binary munitions program will not produce a more lethal generation of weapons. It provides, rather, a separate packaging of safe chemicals that react to form lethal agents only if they are launched. The agents they form after launching are identical to the lethal agents already produced and stored in the U.S. stockpile.

13. Substitution of these safer binary weapons to replace the existing U.S. munitions that are filled with lethal nerve agent will provide much greater safety for U.S. personnel, simplify transport and handling, and eliminate environmental hazards associated with the current U.S. chemical munitions.

14. Research and development on other chemical weapons, particularly for intermediate-range and long-range targets, should receive greater attention and support.

IV. Defensive Measures

15. Defensive measures, although essential to preserve lives and military capability, are not dependable and may be overcome by new Soviet chemical warfare techniques.

16. The expectation that protective measures alone can off-set the advantages to the Soviets from a chemical attack is not realistic.

17. Even if defensive equipment succeeds in preserving life, it severely handicaps personnel who must wear it. Without a retaliatory capability, this leads to an overwhelming military advantage for the attacker armed with chemical weapons.

V. Additional Recommendations

1. *Deployment.* Because of the safety and speed with which binary munitions can be transported, the Commission does not consider their peacetime deployment on foreign territory to be essential, provided adequate planning for rapid deployment is developed.

2. *Research and Development.* The Commission recommends that research and development efforts on both protective and detection equipment, as well as on retaliatory chemical agents and munitions, be accelerated, both in order to deter the Soviet Union from using its own new agents and in order to develop countermeasures.

3. *Intelligence.* The Commission recommends that U.S. intelligence gathering and analysis regarding chemical warfare activities of the Soviet Union and other countries be greatly improved.

4. *Soviet biological warfare program.* The Commission recommends that every effort be made to monitor and seek defenses against apparent Soviet efforts to develop biological weapons, including Soviet weapons that may use new genetic engineering techniques.

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5. *Response to use of chemical weapons.* The Commission recommends that the United States devise and apply strict sanctions and penalties against countries that are using chemical weapons, and their suppliers.

6. *Exports.* The Commission recommends that the United States along with other countries implement an effective ban on exports of materials and equipment likely to be used to manufacture chemical weapons.

92. Statement by TASS on SALT II, June 11, 1985 [1]

On June 10 President Ronald Reagan of the United States made a statement about U.S. policy with regard to the existing strategic arms limitation treaties and agreements.[2] What the President said confirms in all obviousness that the U.S. Administration, having begun with undermining the Soviet-U.S. SALT-2 Treaty,[3] has decided to continue to steer matters towards destroying the treaty system which curbs the nuclear arms race.

It is known that lately the U.S. leadership was feverishly weighing options as to how to do away with the limitations set by the treaty. The option for the further observance of the provisions of the SALT-2 Treaty by the U.S. side was cast aside completely—it did not fit in any way into the administration's military-strategic plans. At the same time the U.S. side came to regard it as a risky affair to renounce the U.S. obligations directly and overtly considering the sentiments existing in the United States itself, among America's allies, and in the world as a whole. Hence the search for a formula which would obscure the true meaning of the decision taken by the White House.

As a result the U.S. side embarked upon the path of gradual crawling out of the treaty and discarding the treaty-envisaged limitations one after another. The intention is to cut off the Treaty's vitally important provisions as they become obstacles to the planned programmes for the creation and build-up of strategic arms.

Moreover, the very departure from the observance of the Treaty is being used as a pretext for a speeded-up realization of the programmes. The President directly stated that he ordered the Pentagon to broaden the programme for the modernization of the strategic forces of the United States. The U.S. Administration, proceeding along the lines of violating the Treaty, resorts to the long-tested device: it again started to level obviously far-fetched accusations at the other side.

It is being asserted, for example, that a second new type of ICBM—an SS-25 missile—has allegedly appeared in the Soviet Union. This is being maintained despite the fact that it is well-known to the Presi-

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[1] Moscow TASS in English, June 11, 1985; FBIS *Daily Report*, June 12, 1985, vol. II, pp. AA1–AA2.

[2] Document 87.

[3] The text of the SALT II Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

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dent that there exists no second new type of a Soviet strategic missile. The old missile SS–13, which is being modernized in strict accordance with the SALT–2 treaty, is being presented as a new missile. Allusions to the Soviet missile are being made in order to stipulate a "right" for the USA to violate one of the key provisions of the treaty and to create, along with the "MX" missile, yet another strategic missile—the "Midgetman". Juggling in this is seen already from the fact that the decision to create the missile had been taken by Washington—and the decision to this effect had been announced—long before inventions as to an SS–25 were launched into circulation. It is through such a spurious method that attempts are being made to justify in retrospect a pre-programmed violation of the treaty.

Behind the present decision of President Reagan to depart from the SALT–2 treaty, there is a long trail of most flagrant violations of international arms limitation agreements and accords by the United States. To begin with the fact that it was precisely the U.S. side that declined to ratify the SALT–2 treaty. It cast aside altogether the protocol which is an integral part of the treaty.[4]

It is appropriate to recall that under the protocol long-range cruise missiles were to be limited if not banned. Thereby a serious blow on the process of limiting and reducing arms was dealt. As a result, a new class of strategic arms has emerged, with thousands of them already existing now.

The deployment of new U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, the deployment which was undertaken with the aim of upsetting the strategic balance and achieving U.S. military superiority, became a direct circumvention of the SALT–2 treaty. The same goal is being also served by the "star wars" programme which envisages—simultaneously with a build-up of offensive strategic arms—the creation of attack space systems, of a so-called large-scale anti-missile defence system.

The U.S. President, declaring his administration's stand with regard to the SALT–2 treaty, warns that Washington in its disruptive work by no means stops at that. It leaves open a possibility for itself to proceed in the same direction. Thus, while saying that the USA intends to decommission one submarine "Poseidon" when yet another up-to-date nuclear submarine "Trident" enters service with the U.S. Navy, the President emphasizes that this is a single measure which does not mean that in future he will act in an analogous way. On the whole, the decision concerning the submarine "Poseidon" does not change the overall picture of the undermining by the United States of the positive that was created in the strategic arms limitation field through the efforts of the two sides. [sentence as received] [5]

It should be realized in Washington what consequences the stand taken by the White House with regard to the SALT–2 treaty will lead

[4] The Protocol may be found *ibid.*, pp. 198–199.
[5] Brackets in source text.

to. One should not be deluded that the U.S. side will be allowed to determine as it thinks fit which obligations should be observed and which should not. It is a dangerous misapprehension to expect that the other side will be adapting itself to such a line of the USA.

From all that the Soviet Union will draw appropriate conclusions being prompted by the interests of its security and the security of its allies.

93. Message From President Reagan to the Congress Transmitting the Report of the Chemical Warfare Review Commission, June 13, 1985 [1]

Section 1511 of Public Law 98–525, the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, required establishment of a bipartisan commission to "review the overall adequacy of the chemical warfare posture of the United States with particular emphasis on the question of whether the United States should produce binary chemical munitions."

Pursuant to this legislation, Executive Order 12502 established the Chemical Warfare Review Commission on January 28, 1985.[2] Eight distinguished citizens have served on the Commission. It met for two months and heard testimony from more than 75 persons in developing its report. The Commissioners have traveled to Europe to talk with our commanders and Allies there and to examine our defenses against chemical attack at first hand.

The Commission has now reached a consensus on the points it was asked to consider and has submitted its findings. I am conveying these in the attached report for the consideration of the Congress as it deliberates the question of this Nation's posture for deterrence of chemical warfare.[3]

The Commission has found that the United States must have a credible retaliatory capability to deter attack, that the present United States stockpile of agents and munitions does not constitute an effective retaliatory capability, and that the projected binary munitions program offers a much safer and more credible deterrent. Also, this program, far from impeding arms control, will provide an essential assist to our negotiating efforts.

The report of this distinguished Commission has strengthened my own very real concern for our country's chemical deterrence posture. I urge the Congress to authorize funding for the binary munitions program as expeditiously as possible.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 17, 1985, pp. 785–786.
[2] Document 9.
[3] For the report, see Document 91.

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94. Letter From the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations (Netanyahu) Addressed to the U.N. Secretary General: Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East, June 13, 1985 [1]

I have the honour to refer to your note DDA/12–85/ME of 27 March 1985 in which you inquired about my Government's views regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Israel has consistently supported resolutions at the United Nations aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In keeping with its policy, Israel once again joined the consensus on this issue during the thirty-ninth session in order to stress its whole-hearted support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Israel has reservations regarding the modalities envisaged in resolution 39/54 of 12 December 1984. It believes that the modalities that led to the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco [2] should serve as the most effective way to achieve a similar goal in the Middle East. Accordingly, Israel has always maintained and frequently proposed that:

1. The initiative for the establishment of such a zone should originate with the States in question;
2. The consultations necessary for reaching this objective should be carried out directly among them;
3. The negotiations between the States in the region should address themselves to the modalities for the establishment of the zone, the obligations and rights of the contracting States, the machinery and other procedures for ensuring the effective compliance by States with the obligations undertaken by them, as well as other means for averting proliferation, as agreed by the negotiating States.

Israel's vision of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East is consistent with the recommendations of various groups of distinguished experts from countries representing different political backgrounds. In this context, let me recall some of the most notable instances.

The group of experts from 21 nations who studied all the aspects of nuclear-weapon-free zones submitted a report in 1975 that was reproduced in document A/10027/Add.1. In paragraph 90 of this report, the experts listed several principles governing the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, one of them being "the initiative for the creation of

[1] A/40/383, June 18, 1985.

[2] I.e., the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. For the text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

a nuclear-weapon-free zone [which] should come from States within the region concerned, and participation must be voluntary".[3]

This principle also represents one of the basic ideas of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, known also as the Palme Commission. Paragraph 5.3 of its report, reproduced in document A/CN.10/38 of 8 April 1983[1982] stated explicitly:

> The Commission believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States in the region or subregion concerned, constitutes an important step towards non-proliferation, common security and disarmament.[4]

A similar approach was also advocated by the non-aligned countries. A working paper submitted by them under agenda item 4 of the 1983 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (A/CN.10/45) and reproduced in annex V of document A/38/42, stated:

> The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of agreements and/or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.[5]

It is thus generally recognized that within the purview of the regional approach to disarmament, there is considerable scope for regional initiatives and practical action through negotiations between the States of the region. These principles are also consistent with the regional measures that have been adopted so far, particularly the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Resolution 39/54, though designed to attain the same aim of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, omits mention of the direct negotiating process between the States of the region without which such an arrangement is unlikely to come about. Therefore, our serious reservations of past years remain in force as to the ways and means proposed in resolution 39/54 for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under item 52 of the preliminary list.

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[3] *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones in All its Aspects.* Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. New York: United Nations, 1976 (Sales No. E. 76. I. 7).

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982,* p. 252.

[5] *General Assembly Official Records: Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement* No. 42, p. 41.

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95. Program of Work Adopted by the Conference on Disarmament for the Summer 1985 Session, June 13, 1985 [1]

In compliance with rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure,[2] the Conference on Disarmament adopts the following programme of work for the second part of its 1985 session:

11–14 June	Statements in plenary meetings. Consideration of the programme of work, as well as of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda and other organizational questions which will continue to be considered beyond 14 June.
17–28 June	Nuclear test ban. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
1–5 July	Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
8–12 July	Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
15–26 July	Chemical weapons.
29 July–2 August	Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
5–9 August	New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
12–30 August	Reports of *ad hoc* subsidiary bodies; organizational questions; consideration and adoption of the Annual Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Conference will continue consideration of its improved and effective functioning.

The Conference will continue its consultations in pursuance of paragraphs 19 and 20 of its report (CD/540) with a view to taking a

[1] CD/595.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, p. 64.

positive decision at its 1985 annual session with regard to expansion of its membership by not more than four States having in mind that candidates for membership should be nominated, two by the Group of 21, one by the Socialist Group, and one by the Western Group, so as to maintain balance in the membership of the Conference.

Meetings of subsidiary bodies will be convened after consultations between the President of the Conference and the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies, according to the circumstances and needs of those bodies.

The *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will meet from 15 to 19 July 1985.

In adopting its programme of work, the Conference has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.[3]

96. Press Release by the U.S. Component of the Standing Consultative Commission: Common Understanding to the Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union on Measures To Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, June 14, 1985 [1]

The United States and the Soviet Union reached agreement on a Common Understanding to the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971,[2] during this session of the Standing Consultative Commission.

The United States and the Soviet Union entered into the Agreement on Measures in 1971 with the mutual objectives of helping to avert the outbreak of nuclear war and strengthening international peace and security. The United States and the Soviet Union, acknowledging that these goals are as relevant now as they were when they entered into the Agreement on Measures some thirteen years ago, and bearing in mind the need for continued efforts in this regard, determined that it would be useful to the sides to consider certain additional questions regarding this Agreement. For that reason, they undertook to consult within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, as provided for in Article 7 of the Agreement on Measures.

Today, the U.S. and Soviet Commissioners of the Standing Consultative Commission signed a Common Understanding regarding the use of immediate notifications in connection with the Agreement on Measures. This Common Understanding in no way changes or ex-

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 64–65.

[1] ACDA Arms Control Bulletin, June 14, 1985.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 634–635.

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pands the Agreement on Measures; it merely records the parties' understanding of their obligations under it.[3]

97. Press Release by the U.S. Component of the Standing Consultative Commission: Common Understandings Signed During the Commission's Twenty-eighth Session, June 14, 1985[4]

The U.S.-USSR Standing Consultative Commission met at the U.S. Mission in Geneva today, completing the Commission's first session of 1985, the twenty-eighth since its establishment. The U.S. and Soviet Commissioners agreed that the next session of the Commission would begin in the fall of this year in Geneva.

The Standing Consultative Commission was established by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union of December 21, 1972,[5] for the purpose of promoting implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, both of May 26, 1972,[6] and of the Agreement on Measures To Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, which was signed on September 30, 1971.[7]

In the context of those general objectives, during this session the parties signed a Common Understanding intended to further enhance the viability of the ABM Treaty, as well as a Common Understanding regarding the use of immediate notifications in connection with the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.[8]

98. Letter From the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington to *The Washington Post:* Relations With India, June 14, 1985[1]

On June 8, the Indian press quoted Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi as saying in an interview with a French weekly that India would be

[3] The Common Understanding has not been published.
[4] ACDA Arms Control Bulletin, June 14, 1985.
[5] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 868–869.
[6] *Ibid.,* pp. 197–201, 202–205.
[7] *Ibid., 1971,* pp. 634–635.
[8] The Common Understandings have not been published.
[1] *The Washington Post,* June 14, 1985. The letter was signed by M.I. Butt, Minister of Information.

ready to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty[2] "if Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons." We were pleased by this statement, as it marked a positive new development in India's nuclear policy. However, our pleasure proved to be short-lived. The next day Mr. Gandhi categorically ruled out India's signing the NPT "because it is biased."

The campaign against Pakistan's nuclear program has been intensified by India since its prime minister's visit to Moscow and in statements made on the eve of his visit to Washington.

India maintains that its nuclear program—the 1974 explosion notwithstanding—is a peaceful one and Pakistan's is not. In that case, India should have no problem in responding positively to the various proposals made by Pakistan that would banish the specter of nuclear arms from the South Asian subcontinent.

In 1974, the year India exploded its nuclear bomb, Pakistan proposed at the United Nations the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in South Asia.[3] This resolution has repeatedly been adopted by the General Assembly by overwhelming majorities. In 1984 it received 100 votes with only India, Bhutan and Mauritius opposing.[4]

In 1978, the president of Pakistan proposed to the prime minister of India that India and Pakistan accept international inspection of all their facilities or, if this was not acceptable, that they reciprocally inspect each other's nuclear facilities; that Pakistan and India sign the nonproliferation treaty; that in the meanwhile Pakistan and India jointly, with other countries of South Asia, renounce the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons; and that India support Pakistan's efforts in the United Nations for the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in South Asia.

These proposals have been repeated on a number of occasions. To date there has been no response.

Pakistan has also proposed bilateral talks for determining a mutually acceptable ratio of forces and level of armaments. India has not yet responded.

In 1981, Pakistan invited India to sign a no-war pact. India made a counterproposal for a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation. Negotiations have taken place, in an on-again, off-again manner.

Pakistan's initiatives reflect its desire to ease tensions, create mutual confidence and strengthen cooperation in the region.

Pakistan has not manufactured a nuclear device, not even a "peaceful" bomb like its neighbor. It has no intention of doing so either.

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[2] For the text of the treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[3] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 648–655.
[4] General Assembly Resolution 39/55. The United States voted in favor of the resolution.

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99. Statement by the French Representative (Jessel) to the Conference on Disarmament: Sixtieth Anniversary of the Geneva Protocol, June 18, 1985 [1]

In a future statement I intend to confirm once again the great importance which my Government attaches to the Conference's work, and our hope to see it make an effective contribution to the negotiation of multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements.

My purpose today is more limited. Among the tasks for which we are gathered here, my Government attaches priority to the negotiation of a convention on the prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons, as well as on their destruction. It is our hope that the summer part of our session will see some progress in this direction.

In this connection, it is symbolically significant that one of our first meetings falls within a day of the sixtieth anniversary of the Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare.[2]

My country's attachment to the 1925 Protocol stems, of course, from the conditions in which the Protocol came into being, which led France to agree to act as a depository Power. It also stems from its conviction that the prohibition of use laid down in the Protocol remains an effective translation of the entire international community's desire to maintain that prohibition.

We are all convinced that this prohibition should also apply to the production of such weapons, and particularly of chemical weapons. On the occasion of this sixtieth anniversary the French Government therefore wishes to confirm that for its part it will spare no effort to contribute to attaining that objective.

The 1925 Protocol does not provide for any verification procedure to establish possible violations; France and a number of other countries therefore sponsored resolution 37/98 D whose purpose is to establish provisional procedures of that kind, pending the conclusion of the negotiation of a permanent convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons, with a view to prompt and impartial fact-finding in case of alleged use.

The support given to this initiative shows the extent to which the international community is concerned to preserve the permanent authority of the Geneva Protocol.

The action of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in relation to the conflict between Iraq and Iran—action that is in keeping with the spirit of resolution 37/98 D—uses the same methods, serves the same purposes and has the same perspective.

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[1] CD/PV.313, pp. 6–7.

[2] For the text of the Protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

Finally, needless to say France is concerned at the recent information suggesting that chemical weapons have once again been used in 1985 in the conflict between Iraq and Iran. I should like to recall that on many occasions my country has stressed the serious risks which the continuation of this conflict carries for the Gulf region, for the entire Middle East, and for international peace and stability.

To conclude, and particularly on this sixtieth anniversary of the 1925 Protocol, my country wishes once again to register its attachment to the Protocol and reaffirm its condemnation of any use, anywhere in the world, of toxic agents of warfare prohibited by the Protocol, as well as its rejection of any undermining of the existing prohibitions and of anything that might lead to the use of such weapons becoming commonplace in modern conflicts.

100. Statement by President Reagan on Compliance With Arms Control Agreements, June 19, 1985 [1]

In 1982, on the eve of the strategic arms reductions talks (START), I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint.[2] Despite my serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, I took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START.

Since then the United States has not taken any actions which would undercut existing arms control agreements. The United States has fully kept its part of the bargain, however, the Soviets have not. They have failed to comply with several provisions of SALT II, and we have serious concerns regarding their compliance with the provisions of other accords.

The pattern of Soviet violations, if left uncorrected, undercuts the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world. The United States will continue to pursue vigorously with the Soviet Union the resolution of our concerns over Soviet noncompliance. We cannot impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance.

We remain determined to pursue a productive dialog with the Soviet Union aimed at reducing the risk of war through the adoption of meaningful measures which improve security, stability, and predictability. Therefore, I have reached the judgment that, despite the Soviet record over the last years, it remains in our interest to establish an

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 17, 1985, pp. 770–771.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, p. 332. For the SALT I Agreement, see *ibid., 1972*, pp. 197 ff., and for the SALT II Agreement, *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

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interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursue with renewed vigor our goal of real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals in the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. Obtaining such reductions remains my highest priority.

The U.S. cannot establish such a framework alone. It will require the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps to correct its noncompliance, resolve our other compliance concerns, and reverse its unparalleled and unwarranted military buildup. So far, the Soviet Union has not chosen to move in this direction. However, in the interest of ensuring that every opportunity to establish the secure, stable future we seek is fully explored, I am prepared to go the extra mile in seeking an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Therefore, to provide the Soviets the opportunity to join us in establishing such a framework which could support ongoing negotiations, I have decided that the United States will continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercises comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursues arms reduction agreements in the currently ongoing nuclear and space talks in Geneva.

As an integral part of this policy, we will also take those steps required to assure the national security of the United States and our allies which were made necessary by Soviet noncompliance. Appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to ensure our security, to provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their noncompliance, and to make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control obligations entail real costs.

Certain Soviet violations are, by their very nature, irreversible. Such is the case with respect to the Soviet Union's flight-testing and steps towards deployment of the SS–X–25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited by the unratified SALT II agreement. Since the noncompliance associated with the development of this missile cannot be corrected by the Soviet Union, the United States reserves the right to respond in a proportionate manner at the appropriate time. The Midgetman small ICBM program is particularly relevant in this regard.

Other Soviet activities involving noncompliance may be reversible and can be corrected by Soviet action. In these instances, we will provide the Soviet Union additional time to take such required corrective action. As we monitor Soviet actions for evidence of the positive, concrete steps needed on their part to correct these activities, I have directed the Department of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment aimed at identifying specific actions which the United States could take to augment as necessary the U.S. strategic modernization program as a proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, those Soviet violations of existing arms agreements which the Soviets fail to correct.

To provide adequate time for the Soviets to demonstrate by their actions a commitment to join us in an interim framework of true mutual restraint, we will plan to deactivate and dismantle according to

agreed procedures an existing Poseidon SSBN as the seventh U.S. Ohio-class submarine puts to sea later this year. However, the United States will keep open all programmatic options for handling such milestones as they occur in the future. As these later milestones are reached, I will assess the overall situation in light of Soviet actions correcting their noncompliance and promoting progress in Geneva and make a final determination of the U.S. course of action on a case-by-case basis.

I firmly believe that if we are to put the arms reduction process on a firm and lasting foundation and obtain real reductions, our focus must remain on making best use of the promise provided by the currently ongoing negotiations in Geneva. Our policy, involving the establishment of an interim framework for truly mutual restraint and proportionate U.S. response to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, is specifically designed to go the extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the opportunity to join us in this endeavor.

My hope is that if the Soviets will do so, we will be able jointly to make progress in framing equitable and verifiable agreements involving real reductions in the size of exisiting nuclear arsenals in the Geneva negotiations. Such an achievement would not only provide the best and the most permanent constraint on the growth of nuclear arsenals, but it would take a major step towards reducing the size of these arsenals and creating a safer future for all nations.

101. Statement by the Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany (Wegener) to the Conference on Disarmament: Chemical-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe, June 25, 1985 [1]

In the first statement of this morning, Ambassador Rose, my distinguished neighbour, has among many other important things, laid out before us and spoken again of the project of a zone free of chemical weapons in parts of Europe. He has alluded to a recent joint memorandum by two parties—two political parties—including the State Party of the German Democratic Republic.[2]

Several colleagues have inquired of me the significance of this memorandum and that is why I thought I should take the opportunity, briefly, to give my government's perspective of it. You know that I have often spoken about the idea of establishing a zone free of chemical weapons as a Government delegate. The present framework agreement of which mention was made by Ambassador Rose does not stem from governments, it stems from political parties. On the part of the Federal Republic of Germany it has been agreed upon by the

[1] CD/PV.315, pp. 23–24.
[2] Not printed here.

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Social Democratic Party, one of our political parties, presently in opposition. It is thus a minority view; but it purports to help towards the elimination of chemical weapons. That is an important purpose and that is why the memorandum merits thorough examination. That examination is taking place at the moment. It will be conducted under three major criteria: the first criteria is: will it help military security? The second one is: will it help with the verification of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban? and the third criteria is: will it promote or rather hinder the negotiation and conclusion of the world-wide chemical weapons ban, the negotiation of which we are engaged in?

Now, some preliminary insights are already quite certain as part of this examination. My Government believes that such a zone project will not help military security because it leaves the arsenals untouched; they would only be removed East to join other important arsenals, especially the immense arsenals of chemical weapons held by the Soviet Union, where, as we all know, the production of such weapons still continues unabated. Nor does the framework agreement envisage the destruction of production facilities that might exist in the potential zone.

The second criteria is verification. Does the project help verification? My Government is of the opinion that it aggravates the verification problems, since only one more intricate verification problem is added to the well-known difficult verification issues we deal with: guaranteeing that the weapons are not brought back: a zone agreement would require the verification of access.

On the third point: would a free zone negotiation hinder or rather promote a world-wide agreement, so paramount to all of the negotiators here? I fear that it would hinder such an agreement because important negotiating resources would be diverted to a partial venture while the global venture is of such significance, especially in the view of third-world countries. We are all aware of the fact that chemical weapons have, in all recent cases of which we hear, been applied outside of the potential zone. This is why my Government is of the opinion that the examination of this proposal, of this minority view, which will be examined in good faith, will probably confirm its negative position on the general idea of a very restricted chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe.

Mr. President, I would be remiss if I did not, having the floor, convey to you and my colleagues how much my delegation was impressed with the important statement we have heard from our distinguished colleague from Brazil. He has injected some welcome, positive, fresh ideas into a process which we have seen in stagnation for some time; and while I cannot comment in substance, as he has requested, at this juncture, I would certainly like you to convey to him that I will see to it that the comments of my delegation will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

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102. Address by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev: Nuclear and Space Arms Talks [Extract], June 26, 1985 [1]

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The question of all questions today is that of halting the arms race which has gripped the world and proceeding to reduce the stockpiles of armaments. In principle, we do not need nuclear or other armaments in order to build normal relations with the capitalist world, provided, of course, that it will abandon its aggressive intentions against the USSR and the other socialist countries.

We are prepared to compete with capitalism in the sphere of peaceful and creative activity alone. For that reason, we favour the development of a political dialogue and interaction with the capitalist countries and the broad development of mutually advantageous commercial, economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations, and we are ready to develop these relations on a stable long-term basis. But they must be honest and truly mutually advantageous relations, without any discrimination. For example, any attempts to use trade as a means of interfering in our internal affairs will be hopeless. We do not need that kind of trade. We can get along quite well without it.

We are prepared to reach agreement not only on the cessation of the arms race but also on the most far-reaching arms reductions, all the way to general and complete disarmament. Today, as you know, we are engaged in negotiations with the United States at Geneva. The task of the negotiations, as the Soviet leadership understands it, is to halt the arms race on earth and prevent it from spreading to outer space. We have entered into the negotiations in order to make these goals a reality. But, from all indications, that is just what the United States Administration and the military-industrial complex it serves do not want. Arriving at serious agreements is evidently not part of their plans. They are continuing to implement a gigantic programme for the stepped-up production of ever newer weapons of mass destruction in the hope of attaining superiority over the socialist countries and imposing their own will on those countries.

The United States side at Geneva not only has not made any serious proposals for rolling back the arms race but is, on the contrary, taking steps which make such a roll-back impossible. I have in mind the so-called "Star Wars" programme, the production of space strike weapons. Any talk about their supposedly "defensive" nature is, of course, merely a fairy-tale for the credulous. The intention is to try to paralyse the strategic armaments of the Soviet Union and enable the United States to launch a nuclear strike against our country with impunity.

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[1] A/40/460*, July 9, 1985, pp. 3–4, in English; original in Russian. The speech was delivered before the metalworkers in Dnepropetrovsk.

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This is the crux of the matter, and we cannot ignore it. The Soviet Union, if it is confronted by a real threat from outer space, will find a way of effectively counteracting it—I say most definitely: let no one have any doubt of that. In the meantime, one thing is clear: the United States programme for the militarization of outer space now stands as a blank wall blocking the way to the achievement of suitable agreements at Geneva.

The United States Administration bears a heavy responsibility to mankind for its militaristic policies. It may be added that if it should decide to take a more reasonable position, consideration could be given to a mutually acceptable agreement on far-reaching and truly radical reductions in the nuclear-weapon stockpiles of both sides. That would open the way to the complete elimination of such weapons and to the removal of the threat of nuclear war, a goal which all the peoples of the earth dream about.

But if our negotiating partners at Geneva continue their present line—marking time at the meetings of the delegations, avoiding the solution of the problems which the meetings were set up to solve, and using that time to step up their own military programmes, in space, on land and on the sea—then, of course, we shall have to reassess the entire situation. We simply cannot permit once again the use of negotiations to distract us and to cover up military preparations whose purpose is to gain strategic superiority for the United States and advance its pursuit of world domination. In our actions to oppose these intentions, I am convinced, we shall have the support of truly peace-loving forces throughout the world and we have the support of the Soviet people.

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103. Statement by the U.S. Representative (Lowitz) to the Conference on Disarmament: Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament, and Comprehensive Test Ban, June 27, 1985 [1]

Today I will briefly address the first two items on our agenda. I regret that recent statements in this body necessitate my saying what I have to say on the issue of nuclear arms control and disarmament, and I shall speak to this matter first.

During our plenary meeting on 20 June, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, made a statement which, in a number of particulars, does violence to the facts. My delegation regrets this polemical approach to the work of the Conference. Ambassador Issraelyan's statement accuses the United States of

[1] CD/PV.316, pp. 9–13.

having pursued a course intended to establish "military superiority" over the Soviet Union and its allies. It accuses the United States of blocking progress both at past and current arms control negotiations. It even accuses the United States of pursuing "a destructive policy" towards most disarmament agreements now in force.[2]

By contrast, the historical record of the Soviet Union is presented as one full of initiatives, moratoriums, and concessions that are frustrated by American military build-ups. But we have been told nothing by the Soviet delegation about their development or possession of any—I repeat any—modern weaponry which might have motivated counter-balancing efforts by the United States. This is how to stand history on its head.

An impartial observer of the military balance over the past decade and a half would be reminded of a number of facts. He would note that the Soviet Union has modernized over 800 of its 1,400 ICBM silos since 1972, and installed in these silos ICBMs less than six years old. He would note that the Soviet Union has deployed 18 ballistic missile submarines with 300 nuclear armed missiles within the last eight years. And he would note that the Soviet Union has added to its status as a military Power by greatly expanding its naval forces. Thus, throughout this period, although the Soviet Union continuously spoke of "existing parity", it simultaneously continued to deploy modernized forces far more rapidly than the West.

When one listens to statements by the Soviet delegation, it is easy to forget that they rarely refer to any weapon system possessed by the Soviet Union. They may occasionally speak of undefined future "countermeasures", but of SS–17s, SS–18s and SS–19s, or of the cost of such weapons, not a word. They seek to focus the attention of this Conference on weapons contemplated or under development by the United States, but let me remind this Conference that at present the United States arsenal contains no MX or Midgetman Missiles, no "space strike weapons", not a single anti-ballistic missile, no dedicated anti-satellite weapons, and not a single binary chemical munition. It is no wonder that the Soviet Union spins out moratorium proposals like flax. It has dozens of new-generation missiles, bombers, submarines and other systems. It can afford to stop deployment. These proposals cost nothing, but they are hardly realistic. For example, General Secretary Gorbachev's moratorium proposal of last April would lock in the existing imbalance of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Clearly, such proposals are designed for their cosmetic appeal and not as a basis for serious negotiations.

In the view of my delegation, Ambassador Issraelyan's statement has sketched an unrecognizable history of arms control efforts of the last few years. The impartial observer has the record before him and can judge for himself. Serious arms control requires more than feverish advocacy of new agreements. It requires a proper respect for and

[2] See CD/PV.314, pp. 10–16.

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observance of those agreements already binding under international law. Moreover, it requires that interim restraint in the face of treaty violations not be characterized as "arbitrarily" deciding which obligations should be observed and which not. Mr. President, my delegation appeals once again for an end to these fruitless polemics and cosmetic statements so that we can get on with the substantive work before this Conference.

I now want to make a few remarks about the first item on our agenda, that of a nuclear test ban. In our plenary sessions over the past three weeks a number of speakers have already commented on the significant contribution made to the work of our Conference by Norway in sponsoring a very useful workshop on seismology in Oslo from 4 to 7 June. Today, we have listened with great interest to the statement by the distinguished representative of Norway, Mr. Bjorn Kristvik, who has reported on his country's conclusions concerning the results of the workshop, and introduced a working paper summarizing the Norwegian technical contributions made on that occasion.[3] We are also grateful for the three Working Papers which Norway has introduced dealing with various aspects of the negotiations on a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons.[4] To return to the subject of the Oslo seismic workshop, I am tempted to describe the events in which I participated, and the hospitality accorded to me and all those who attended, as earthshaking; I will settle for describing them as outstanding.

A number of different interpretations have been offered of what the briefings, the demonstrations, and the inspection of the field installations of some of the latest seismic and data processing equipment represent for the work of our Conference. Some delegations present at the workshop have apparently concluded that no more technical work needs to be carried out before a fully elaborated seismic monitoring system, which would provide data—on a global basis—for the detection, location, and identification of underground seismic events could be set in place on an operational basis. They argue that the present technical capability in seismic detection is sufficient for effective monitoring of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

In the view of my delegation, however, it is more appropriate—more accurate—to conclude that a considerable amount of work on the vital matter of verification of and compliance with a nuclear test ban remains to be carried out. For example, the important issue of the identification of low-magnitude events—the ability, in other words, of discriminating between earthquakes and explosions—which is being addressed at the Norwegian research facilities and elsewhere is clearly not completely resolved. Beyond this question are other issues such as how to ensure that large chemical explosions are not in fact nuclear explosions, or an occasion for masking a nuclear explosion. Nor is the

[3] CD/599.
[4] CD/311, CD/396, CD/397.

need yet fully met to ensure that other techniques for evading a nuclear test ban were not being employed. Such techniques include hiding an explosion signal in an earthquake signal and decoupling the signal by means of a large cavity.

In support of efforts to resolve these issues, my Government has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in the development of the sciences and technologies that comprise seismic detection, location and identification, and data processing and exchange. In support of these efforts, my Government has endorsed, and continues to endorse strongly, the important work being carried out by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts under the auspices of our Conference. Their recent technical test, and the report the *Ad Hoc* Group is preparing will certainly contribute to our understanding of ways to collect, analyse and disseminate data from an international, global network of seismic observatories.

And, in support of these efforts, my delegation is prepared, now, to continue in a subsidiary body the serious and detailed examination of the issues of verification of and compliance with a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions, as well as of other issues related to such an agreement. We are prepared to do so under the provisions of the draft mandate contained in CD/521, of which my delegation is a sponsor.

In this regard, my delegation has listened very carefully to the remarks on the subject of a nuclear test ban made by the distinguished representative of Brazil, Ambassador de Souza E Silva, at our previous plenary meeting.[5] And we have carefully examined the proposal which the delegation of Brazil has made in CD/602 with regard to a mandate for the establishment of a subsidiary body under agenda item one. Ambassador de Souza E Silva made a very thoughtful statement, as always, and he has raised a number of serious issues. I want to make four observations concerning them.

First, Ambassador de Souza E Silva called attention to the magnitude of the nuclear test programme of the Soviet Union and to its unrelenting build-up of nuclear arsenals. It is not unreasonable for us to suppose that the scope of the Soviet Union's testing programme is related to its continuing strategic force modernization.

Second, my delegation has not agreed that the work of the Conference under the auspices of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban was fully completed at the end of the 1983 session of the Conference. On the contrary, my delegation's position was then—as it continues to be—that a full and thorough discussion of all of the issues involved with verification of and compliance with a comprehensive test ban had not been completed, and that more work on these matters was required. This view was reflected in the conclusions of the 1983 report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, CD/412,[6] and in the

[5] CD/PV.315, pp. 16–20.

[6] Extracts of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group may be found in *Documents on Disarmament 1983*, pp. 631–639.

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United States plenary statement of 30 August of that year, as contained in CD/PV.238, page 15.[7]

It was, thus, in a spirit of compromise that my delegation agreed to the proposal contained in CD/521, supported by a group of western delegations, made first in 1984 and repeated in 1985, to expand the mandate of such a subsidiary body to deal with all issues of relevance to a comprehensive test ban. In an effort to accommodate the views of other delegations, and in the hope that further work will be carried out on the nuclear test ban agenda item, my delegation was and continues to be willing to agree to this expanded mandate despite the failure of the Conference to complete its work under the previous mandate. My delegation continues to believe that this proposed mandate is the appropriate one on which the Conference should base its work, and my delegation continues to be prepared to begin work promptly in an *Ad Hoc* committee, with an appropriate programme of work which would provide a clear framework for the substantive examination which we are prepared to undertake.

Third, I believe that Ambassador de Souza E Silva misunderstood my remarks of 5 March,[8] which he described as representing a "significant shift in the American position" regarding a nuclear test ban, and regarding its place in the larger context of our efforts to achieve nuclear arms control and disarmament. The position of the United States on this question remains that set forth consistently by the present Administration—that a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions remains a long-term objective in the context of broad, deep, and verifiable reductions of nuclear arms, expanded confidence-building measures, maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent, and improved verification capabilities.

Fourth, I reject the assertion that the United States, as one of the original parties to the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty,[9] is refusing to implement its obligations under that agreement. This is not the first time that my delegation has had, respectfully, to dissent from this kind of allegation. On 16 September 1982, my predecessor, Ambassador Fields, responded in some detail on this matter, and I refer my colleagues to his remarks, as they appear in CD/PV.187.[10] Let me simply say again that the United States abides by its legal commitments, and that it will continue to do so. My delegation will not associate itself with any statement, explicit or implicit, to the effect that United States actions are inconsistent with its obligations under the Limited Test Ban Treaty or the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[11]

In conclusion I want to stress that the best way, in our view, to make progress toward the ultimate goal of a comprehensive test ban is

[7] See *ibid.*, pp. 773–774.
[8] Document 40.
[9] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[10] *Ibid., 1982*, pp. 686–687.
[11] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

to establish the *Ad Hoc* committee under agenda item 1, and to resume and expand the work in that body that was left unfinished in 1983.

104. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Conference on Disarmament: Weapons of Mass Destruction [Extract], July 4, 1985 [1]

In today's statement the Soviet delegation would like to explain its approach to item 7 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". This item consists of two interrelated questions, which, however, differ both in their nature and in the degree to which they have been considered in the Conference on Disarmament. Let me first touch upon the problem of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. It is well known that this question was proposed by the Soviet Union for discussion in international forums as early as 1975, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on the question at the initiative of the Soviet Union.[2]

This proposal of the Soviet Union was aimed at preventing a qualitative arms race and banning the use of new scientific achievements to the detriment of mankind. The 10 years which have passed since then have convincingly demonstrated the danger of the spread of the arms race in qualitative terms.

For the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, in other words, for a qualitative arms race, the United States currently allocates vast sums, the equivalent of five times the "Manhattan" project, which led to the development of the atomic bomb, or two and a half "Apollo" projects. These huge funds are intended to achieve a new major breakthrough in military technology—a breakthrough in all directions: defensive as well as offensive weapons, nuclear and conventional, space and laser-beam, kinetic and all others. It will be a race towards new, unexplored perils which will many times exceed the danger of military nuclear technology, even though mankind has not yet been able to cope with the latter. Obviously, such dangerous developments should be stopped and reversed. We are convinced that the conclusion of an international agreement, based on the accommodation of mutual interests, for the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction would be an effective step towards this goal.

I am confident that this approach of ours is fully substantiated and justified; it is supported by the Final Document of the first special

[1] CD/PV.318, pp. 7–9.

[2] For the Soviet proposal, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, p. 495; for the General Assembly Resolution, see *ibid.*, pp. 798–803.

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session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which contains an appeal to continue efforts to prohibit such types of weapons of mass destruction.[3] This item has been on the Conference's agenda from the very beginning of its work with its present composition in 1979.

However, there has hitherto been no tangible progress towards the solution of the problem. For many years, substantial differences in approach by various groups of States have been a stumbling block at the Conference. Some of them favour a radical solution to this problem by a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, as well as separate agreements banning specific new types of such weapons. Meanwhile, other States oppose this approach and advocate negotiations on agreements to ban potential new types of weapons of mass destruction only on a case-by-case basis as such weapons are identified.

Both of these viewpoints have been reflected in United Nations General Assembly resolutions. In particular, the latest General Assembly resolution has stressed that special agreements could be concluded with regard to particular types of weapons of mass destruction, which can be identified, and that the consideration of this question should be on a continuing basis.[4] At the same time, many States advocated the participation of scientists in the work to prohibit new types of weapons of mass destruction and the setting up for this purpose of, for example, an *ad hoc* group of scientific experts to promote concrete measures to prevent such types of weapons from being included in the arsenals of States.

The Soviet delegation has thoroughly analysed the current situation with regard to the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Reaffirming our previous position on that question, we are submitting today a new proposal for the consideration of the Conference on Disarmament. This proposal takes into account the views expressed on this problem by other States, including the Western countries. Specifically, we propose that all States members of the Conference on Disarmament should pledge—through a joint declaration or unilateral declarations—immediately following the identification of any new type of weapon of mass destruction to start negotiations on its prohibition, with the simultaneous introduction of a moratorium on its practical development. A group of qualified experts, meeting on periodical basis, should be entrusted with the task of detecting and identifying new types of weapons of mass destruction. This group would keep these matters under continuing supervision and, if necessary, make recommendations on issues requiring concrete negotiations.

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[3] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 426.

[4] General Assembly Resolution 39/62 of December 12, 1984. The United States voted against it.

We believe that this approach should dispel the doubts of those who do not consider it possible to make progress in prohibiting new types of weapons of mass destruction. An obligation undertaken by States to start negotiations in order to prohibit any new types of weapons of mass destruction that are identified, and to introduce a moratorium on their practical development, would be, in our view, a serious guarantee that mankind will never have to face new types of weapons of mass destruction. As to the establishment of a group of qualified experts to identify new types of weapons of mass destruction, within or outside the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, this should not cause considerable difficulties either, given the existing experience of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Seismic Experts. We hope that our new proposal will be considered on its merits by other delegations, and provide a basis for making headway on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

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105. Working Paper Submitted to the Conference on Disarmament by a Group of Socialist States: Arms Race in Outer Space, July 5, 1985 [1]

1. The world has recently come to an extremely dangerous frontier: the arms race, which has reached unprecedented dimensions, is not only intensifying but also threatening to spread to outer space. The danger that space will become the springboard for aggression and war is increasingly real. Programmes are being carried out to develop space weapons that are intended to destroy objects in space and attack targets on Earth from space. These activities, which stem from calculations on achieving military superiority, are likely to make an arms race in space irreversible and seriously destabilize the situation, and they heighten the threat of nuclear war. The onset of an arms race in outer space will undermine the prospects for arms limitation and reduction as a whole. The militarization of space, if it cannot be halted, will swallow up enormous material and intellectual resources, thereby doing great damage to the peaceful development of mankind and the solution of pressing global problems, and create insurmountable obstacles to international co-operation in the peaceful use of outer space.

2. It is necessary to prevent this fatal course of events, and not to allow space to be turned into a source of military danger. The exclusion of space from the sphere of the arms race must be a strict norm in the policy of States, and a universally recognized international obligation.

[1] CD/607.

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3. The socialist States consider that strike weapons of any kind—conventional, nuclear, laser, particle-beam or any other form—whether in manned or unmanned systems should not be introduced into or stationed in space. Space weapons should not be developed, tested or deployed either for anti-missile defence, or as anti-satellite systems, or for use against targets on Earth or in the air. Such systems which have already been developed should be destroyed. In other words, the socialist States propose that agreement should be reached on the prohibition and elimination of an entire class of weapons, namely, attack space systems, including space-based anti-missile systems and anti-satellite systems.

4. Strict compliance with the indefinite 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems between the USSR and the United States is of particular significance for the prevention of the militarization of space.[2]

The socialist States attach great importance to the absolute and strict implementation of multilateral agreements limiting the use of space for military purposes. These include the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1967,[3] and the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 1963.[4]

5. Given present developments, urgent measures must be taken to prevent an arms race in outer space. These measures may be worked out and adopted through both bilateral and multilateral negotiations. The socialist States consider that bilateral and multilateral negotiations complement each other.

6. The socialist States express satisfaction at the fact that the Conference on Disarmament was able to take the decision to set up an *Ad Hoc* committee on item 5 of its agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".[5] They are ready to co-operate with the other States members in the implementation of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's mandate.

7. In the view of the socialist States, in carrying out its mandate the *Ad Hoc* committee should as a first step at this stage concentrate on examining the following issues:

(a) Political, military, economic and other consequences of the extension of the arms race into outer space.

(b) Significance of existing international agreements relating to the limitation of military activity in outer space for the prevention of an arms race in space.

(c) Proposals by States members of the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Under this point, consideration should be given in particular to the proposals of the USSR on the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the station-

[2] The Treaty is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[3] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 38–43.
[4] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[5] Document 15.

ing of weapons of any kind in outer space (1981),[6] the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth (1983) [7] and on the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind.[8]

8. The socialist States express the hope that the successful fulfilment of its mandate by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space will enable the Conference on Disarmament rapidly to embark upon negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, for the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, as it was recommended to do by the United Nations General Assembly.[9] Only the guaranteed prevention of the militarization of space will make it possible to use space for creative rather than destructive purposes, and open the way for uniting the efforts of all States for the peaceful use of outer space.

106. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to the Union of Concerned Scientists: Limits on Outer Space Weapons, July 6, 1985 [1]

In reply to the letter sent by you on behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists containing an appeal for the prohibition of space weapons, I wish to say that I feel profound respect for the opinions of eminent scientists who recognize more clearly than many others the dangerous consequences for mankind which the spread of the arms race to outer space and the transformation of outer space into an arena of military rivalry would entail.

The Union of Concerned Scientists rightly demands that a clear and irreversible political decision should be taken to prevent the militarization of outer space and leave it free for peaceful co-operation. The problem truly calls for a bold approach. Yesterday's yardsticks, narrow ideas about one-sided benefits and advantages—illusory in any case—will not do here. Now, as never before, what is needed is a far-sighted policy based on an understanding of realities and of the dangers we shall inevitably encounter tomorrow if those who can and must take the only right decision shirk their responsibility today.

On behalf of the Soviet leadership I should like to state in all certainty that the Soviet Union will not be the first to take weapons into outer space. We shall make every effort to persuade other countries too, and above all the United States of America, not to take such

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[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 334–336.
[7] *Ibid., 1983*, pp. 684–686.
[8] Document 141.
[9] General Assembly Resolution 39/59 of December 12, 1984. Adopted by a vote of 150–0–1, with the United States abstaining.
[1] CD/611.

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a fatal step, which would inevitably increase the threat of nuclear war and spur on an uncontrolled arms race in all directions.

With this goal in view, the Soviet Union, as you must surely know, has submitted a radical proposal in the United Nations—a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth.[2] If the United States of America joined the overwhelming majority of States which have supported this initiative, the question of weapons in space could be closed once and for all.

At the Soviet Union-United States negotiations on nuclear and space arms in Geneva we are endeavouring to reach agreement on a complete ban on the development, testing and deployment of strike systems in outer space. Such a ban would not only make it possible to preserve outer space for peaceful development, exploration and scientific discovery but also to embark upon a process of radical reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons.

More than once, we have also taken unilateral action intended to give the United States a good example. The moratorium placed by the Soviet Union on the stationing of anti-satellite weapons in outer space has now been in force for two years,[3] and will remain in force for as long as other States act in the same way. Our proposal that both parties should completely cease work on the development of new anti-satellite systems and that the systems which the USSR and the United States of America already possess, including those whose testing has not been completed, should be destroyed lies on the table in Washington. The actions of the United States side will very shortly show what solution the United States Administration is going to prefer.

Strategic stability and confidence would undoubtedly be strengthened if the United States of America together with the USSR agreed to reaffirm in binding form its commitment to the regime of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,[4] which is of unlimited duration. The Soviet Union is not developing any space strike weapons, a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system or the basis for such a system; it is abiding strictly by its obligations under the Treaty both as a whole and in its several parts; and it is unswervingly observing the spirit and the letter of that most important document. We invite the United States leadership to join us in this matter and to renounce the plans being nurtured for the militarization of outer space, plans which will inevitably lead to the scrapping of that document, the key link in the entire process of nuclear arms limitation.

The USSR is proceeding from the belief that a practical solution of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space and terminating it on Earth is possible provided both sides have the political will and a sincere desire to strive for that historic goal. The Soviet Union has that desire and that will.

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[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 684–686.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 650.
[4] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–201.

I wish the Union of Concerned Scientists and all its members success in their noble activities in the cause of peace and progress.

107. British Working Paper Submitted to the Conference on Disarmament on Seismic Monitoring for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban: Conclusions [Extract], July 9, 1985 [1]

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57. On the basis of data currently available, it is estimated that a properly designed and deployed global network of seismic stations would achieve a detection threshold of m_b4 and an identification threshold of $m_b4.5$ throughout the world. With such a network it might be thought that any nuclear test with yield above a few tens of kilotons would be discovered. However, militarily significant testing can be conducted at yields beneath this level. Furthermore, this assessment of the detection and identification threshold must be treated with caution. It rests on data which are highly selective and it represents a considerable extrapolation from results obtained on essentially a research basis. Confidence would be enhanced if valid data were widely available from nuclear explosions in areas away from the very few existing nuclear testing sites, e.g. from areas which are potentially difficult to monitor, and from explosions carried out under conditions which might make verification less effective. Beyond the need to acquire more basic data on the effect of test conditions and monitoring efficiency, there is a requirement for experimental experience on the implementation and operation of a monitoring teleseismic network to demonstrate that the performance estimated from research programmes can be achieved in practice. Given the severe security implications of a test ban, it would be unrealistic to expect States to subscribe to a Comprehensive Treaty unless there can be a high assurance that estimated verification performances would be achieved, and that they would effectively preclude the possibility of clandestine testing at militarily significant levels.

58. At least for the present, it appears that monitoring at teleseismic ranges by itself would be insufficiently effective to permit a test ban to be brought into force. Paragraphs 48 to 55 describe how the shortcomings of teleseismic monitoring might be made good, at least to some extent, by the addition of monitoring at regional ranges. It is, as yet, too early to estimate how effective regional monitoring might prove to be; the outcome of current research programmes has to be awaited and it should then become clear whether a politically, techni-

[1] CD/610, p. 16.

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cally and economically acceptable basis for regional seismic verification networks can be devised.

108. Joint Statement by the United States and Australia [Extract], July 15, 1985 [4]

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Both sides stressed the importance of the ANZUS Treaty and of continued cooperation between the two countries on defense and other matters under the alliance. They reaffirmed their expressed views on the essentiality of port and airfield access to the continuing effectiveness of the alliance. Both sides expressed the hope that an early return to the full range of trilateral cooperative activities might be possible.

Among other matters discussed were recent developments in United States-Soviet Union relations, as well as in Northeast and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, southern Africa, the South Pacific and Central America.

The two sides also exchanged detailed views on arms control and disarmament, stressing the need for deep verifiable reductions in existing nuclear forces. In this regard, they emphasized the necessity of strict compliance with all arms control agreements, and noted President Reagan's policy of reciprocal restraint on the SALT [strategic arms limitation talks] treaties.[5] Other issues discussed were the Non-Proliferation Treaty [6] review conference, nuclear test ban issues, the United States SDI [strategic defense initiative] program and the need for an effective global ban on chemical weapons.

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109. White House Statement on the Second Round of the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, July 16, 1985 [1]

The United States and the Soviet Union completed today the second round of nuclear and space talks in Geneva. The primary U.S. goal

[4] *Department of State Bulletin*, September 1985, p. 31. The statement was occasioned by a meeting in Canberra of delegations led by Secretary of State Shultz and Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Hayden.

[5] The SALT treaties may be found, respectively, in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff. and *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[6] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–462. The review conference took place in September. See Document 179.

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, July 22, 1985, p. 907. The statement was made by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President.

remains significant, equitable, and verifiable reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals. The United States entered the second round of the nuclear and space talks with specific, detailed proposals on the table to achieve this goal and was prepared to make progress with the Soviet Union in each of the three negotiating areas.

In the area of strategic nuclear offensive arms, the U.S. delegation has flexibility in pursuing the significant reductions that we seek and is prepared to negotiate a number of specific, alternative paths that could lead to such reductions.

With respect to intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), our ultimate goal remains the elimination of the entire class of nuclear weapons carried on land-based INF missiles. Towards this end, the U.S. delegation also has flexibility and is authorized to pursue an interim agreement resulting in equal U.S. and Soviet global limits at the lowest possible level.

We were equally prepared and remain prepared for detailed exchanges in the area of defense and space.

During the second round, regrettably, the Soviet position has remained entrenched, with no movement in their formal positions. The Soviet delegation repeated their moratoria proposals while continuing to precondition progress—or even detailed discussion—of offensive nuclear reductions on acceptance of their demands for unilateral U.S. concessions involving unrealistic and unverifiable constraints on research in the defense and space area.

Late in this round the Soviets surfaced some concepts which could involve possible reductions in existing strategic offensive nuclear arsenals. However, the method of aggregation proposed in these concepts seems designed to favor preservation of the Soviet Union's primary area of advantage, that is in prompt, hard target kill capability, the most worrisome element in the current strategic equation. Efforts by the U.S. delegation to elicit Soviet answers to our questions about these concepts, with regard to issues such as numbers, ceilings, and rates of possible reduction have thus far essentially gone unanswered. In this regard, we are disappointed that the Soviet Union has been unable to deal in concrete terms and with hard numbers, even framed as overall negotiating goals. And, while the U.S. immediately probed the Soviet concepts, the Soviets unfortunately have refused to engage in discussion of the U.S. proposals.

In sum, we are about where we had expected to be given that we are ending only the second round of negotiations of such complexity and importance. We hope that the Soviet Union will be more forthcoming during the next round of negotiations.

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110. Statement by the Leader of the Soviet Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (Karpov): Second Round of the Talks, July 16, 1985 [1]

The USSR delegation is consistently pursuing a line aimed at preventing the arms race in space and at halting it on earth. For the attainment of these ends, the Soviet side has put forward specific proposals, the implementation of which would lead to a radical reduction in nuclear weapons, both strategic and medium-range, and to a strengthening of strategic stability.

We are proposing a full ban on offensive space weapons in space, thereby eliminating the threat to security in general which is being endangered by the American "star wars" program, and preserving space for utilization of peaceful aims in the interest of all mankind.

Such a solution of [word indistinct] [2] space weapons would open the possibility of profound reductions of strategic weapons, starting a chain reaction. The specific level of possible reductions is determined by taking account of how the question of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe is decided, since the deployment there of American first strike missiles is acquiring strategic significance for the USSR. Our proposal also provides for a ban on the creation of new forms and types of strategic weapons, i.e., a halt to the arms race in that area.

On medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, the Soviet side has also proposed a reduction on equal terms to the lowest possible level. The Soviet Union is ready to have in Europe only such a number of medium-range missiles as would be equivalent, if one counts warheads, to similar weapons belonging to U.S. NATO allies, Britain and France. The USSR is also in favor of ridding Europe of nuclear weapons altogether, both medium-range and tactical. It must be said that the United States has not in any way reacted to the unilateral moratorium announced by the Soviet Union in April on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe.[3] They reject a moratorium on a bilateral basis. The deployment of American missiles is continuing, and this cannot but provoke legitimate alarm among the Europeans. They are well aware that it was precisely the start of deployment of American missiles in Europe which broke up in 1983 the talks on medium-range nuclear weapons, and sharply aggravated the international situation.

As for the direct results of the round in question, the evaluation of the state of affairs at the talks provided by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in his speech in Dnepropetrovsk on 26 June this year is fully applicable.[4] The meetings with the American side following this

[1] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, July 16, 1985; FBIS *Daily Report*, July 17, 1985, vol. III, p. AA1.
[2] Brackets in source document.
[3] Document 64.
[4] Document 102.

only confirmed the rightness of that evaluation. There has been no movement at the talks, and this is the fault of the American side.

111. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Conference on Disarmament: Binary Chemical Weapons, July 18, 1985 [1]

Mr. President, in today's statement I would like to address the present state of the multilateral negotiations on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

I would recall that these talks have been under way since 1980 when the Committee on Disarmament decided to establish an *Ad Hoc* Working Group. In past years we have achieved a certain amount of progress, and although such progress could have been considerably greater, nevertheless, at least until now, there has been movement in the direction we are seeking, namely, the elaboration of a draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. I am not going to refer now to the difficulties which stood in our way and hampered our progress, or to what caused those difficulties. The purpose of my statement today is to analyse the state of affairs at the negotiations and to assess a new obstacle our talks are currently facing.

I have in mind the recent decision by the House of Representatives which, following the decision by the Senate of the United States Congress, has approved the appropriation of funds for the production of binary chemical weapons. And although this production is to start in 1987 and the decision contains some reservations, this does not change the substance of the matter: the United States is practically ready to add a new type of weapon—binary nerve gas—to its military arsenal.

It is highly significant that it is planned to deploy these weapons above all on the territory of West European countries. As in the case of the new United States nuclear missiles (Pershing-2 and long-range land-based cruise missiles), this decision also clearly reveals Washington's calculation to ward off a possible retaliatory strike from its territory and to divert it against its allies. Thus, binary weapons would become one more source of a sinister danger to the densely-populated countries of Western Europe.

However, this is not an aspect directly related to our negotiations. The Soviet delegation wishes to stress the negative effect which the practical creation and deployment of binary chemical weapons can have on our negotiations.

Even before the adoption of the above-mentioned decisions by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States Con-

[1] CD/PV.322, pp. 10–14.

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gress on appropriations for the production of binary chemical weapons, the Soviet delegation was proceeding on the understanding that the convention under consideration should contain provisions prohibiting the development of such weapons. It is well known from the records of disarmament negotiations that it is far simpler to prevent the development of a new type of weapon than to try to remove it from arsenals after it has been developed. This applies to binary weapons to an even greater degree, above all, because of the additional difficulties which can arise in singling out components of binary weapons from the vast, diversified area of commercial activities and the determination of the régime for key components and verification of compliance with that régime.

What is the basic difference between binary and non-binary chemical systems? Above all, it is that in order to produce components of binary weapons it is not absolutely necessary to create facilities specially designed for the purpose, whereas this is necessary for non-binary weapons. By their properties, the components of binary weapons can be produced at all usual commercial facilities of the chemical industry. That is the first basic difference between binary and unitary weapons.

Furthermore, key components and key precursors, are by no means the same from the standpoint of their military importance, in spite of the fact that according to their level of toxicity they could belong to the same category of chemicals. To produce the final product, i.e., supertoxic lethal chemicals, at least one more technological stage of production in industry is needed. But a key component is by no means a semiproduct in the technological chain of the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals that is one or more technological processes away from the stage of munition-filling; it is a part of a munition that is completely ready for use.

Industrial facilities are not required to produce the final product from the key component. The production process will be carried out during the delivery of the munition to the target, and at the point of use in combat the supertoxic lethal chemical, for instance YX nerve gas, would be released from the munition, as if the latter contained that chemical and not its precursor.

Thus, both supertoxic lethal chemicals and key components whose reaction with other components would produce this supertoxic lethal chemical at the moment of combat use, are chemicals of one and the same type, the same category. That is why the same requirements should apply to both supertoxic lethal chemicals and key components, both from the point of view of prohibition and limitations and from the point of view of the verification of how the prohibition and limitations are complied with. In this connection a whole number of additional complex questions can arise, which we will have to resolve taking due account of the United States decision to produce binary weapons.

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If, within the framework of the convention which is being elaborated now, we were to ban binary weapons on the same basis as other types of chemical weapons, then, bearing in mind the above-mentioned specific features of binary weapons, the convention would contain very significant loopholes.

We have been told that binary weapons can be banned by the provisions on the verification of key precursors, which would be included into the convention. In other words, the same régime is proposed for the limitation and verification of both key components and key precursors, which would differ from the régime for supertoxic lethal chemicals. We agree with this as far as key precursors are concerned, for key precursors of such chemicals can be used in peaceful industry too. This softer régime for key precursors would also be justified with regard to the interests of the commercial chemical industry as well as the purposes of the convention because, as I have already said, key precursors by themselves cannot directly serve destructive purposes. To process them into supertoxic lethal chemicals would require an entire industrial cycle or cycles. And it is precisely this stage—and as far as we understand there is a broad understanding in this regard—that should be controlled in an especially strict manner.

Actually, there are several chemicals that can be simultaneously key components and key precursors. Naturally, any key component can be used as a key precursor in commercial industry. The whole question is whether it is appropriate to do so. However, by no means all key precursors can be key components. Therefore, key components belong to a more dangerous category of chemicals than key precursors.

What will happen if key components are equated with key precursors? There would be a possibility that key components would be directly used to fill binary munitions, and the régime designed for key precursors would not prevent the circumvention of the provisions of the convention. These components of binary weapons can be produced in commercial industry both deliberately, which would certainly represent a violation of the convention, and also—if relevant limitations are not introduced—not deliberately, because at commercial facilities some chemicals can be produced for peaceful purposes and, if desired, easily be switched over to the production of binary weapons. It would also mean that under the conditions for the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles the States with the technology for the production of binary weapons would have considerable military advantages because they would have a certain industrial base, in the form of commercial facilities, for developing chemical munitions.

That is why the TASS statement published on 10 July this year, which has been circulated as a Working Paper of the Conference on Disarmament, under symbol CD/615, of 17 July 1985, stresses that the Soviet Union firmly condemns the plans for the production and deployment of binary weapons and that the United States project to begin production of binary chemical weapons must necessarily arouse

serious alarm and indignation. The United States Government bears full responsibility for all consequences of this step. It is the direct duty of peoples not to allow this planned new crime against peace and mankind.

The Soviet Union consistently advocates the radical solution of the question of the prohibition and elimination of all types of chemical weapons, and reiterates its readiness actively to co-operate with all States to accomplish this task. This is also stressed in the above-mentioned TASS statement.

We have thought it necessary to explain our position on the binary problem in detail in the hope that other delegations will also consider most seriously the new situation that has arisen in the negotiations. For there remain some delegations which seek to brush aside the problem of binary weapons. Unless it is solved, there can be no effective chemical-weapon ban.

Needless to say, in the negotiations there are many other complicated issues, chief among which may be said to be the question of verification. The Soviet Union has already demonstrated considerable flexibility on this question, having agreed to systematic on-site inspections of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and of permitted production at special facilities. With regard to other types of activities to be prohibited, we also admit the use of international procedures, in particular on-site inspections on a voluntary basis. The combination of national forms of verification with international procedures provides, in our view, the basis on which the problem of verification could be resolved.

The Soviet side seeks the earliest possible conclusion of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. We proceed from the understanding that its conclusion may be preceded by steps to prohibit chemical weapons at the regional level. In this connection I would like to recall the proposal of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty to the NATO States to rid Europe of chemical weapons, which was submitted in January 1984.[2]

Partial measures at the regional level for the limitation, reduction and destruction of chemical weapons would involve a smaller number of States than the global measures, and it would be easier to co-ordinate and implement them. At the same time these regional measures leading to the elimination of the entire class of weapons of mass destruction would certainly strengthen European security, contribute to the lessening of the military threat, the strengthening of mutual confidence and the improvement of the political atmosphere as a whole.

In this context I would like to mention the initiative of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany which also propose to resolve the problem of chemical weapons at a

[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 9–11.

regional level, involving three States. This positive initiative is designed to rid the European continent of chemical weapons.

The implementation of such partial measures would contribute to the efforts undertaken on a global scale aimed at the speeding up of the conclusion of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which remains a final goal of the Warsaw Treaty member States.

The Soviet delegation, for its part, is ready to speed up the elaboration of a draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and the implementation of the relevant United Nations General Assembly decisions which express the will of mankind as a whole.

We believe, that it is high time to begin, according to the *Ad Hoc* Committee's mandate to draft provisions of the Convention. There is a good foundation for this work in the form of the Annex to the 1984 Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons.[3] We are ready actively to participate in this process both within the framework of existing Working Groups and in the course of any multilateral and bilateral consultations. In our view, the fixing of agreements already reached would substantially facilitate further progress on other questions which remain unresolved.

112. Memorandum for the President From ACDA Director Adelman: Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement for the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, July 19, 1985 [1]

Pursuant to Section 123a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,[2] I am submitting to you an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement [3] on the agreement for cooperation between the United States and China.[4] This statement addresses the background (Part I), the statutory requirements (Parts II), and the nonproliferation policy issues (Part III) as they relate to the agreement.

China has recently taken major and welcome steps in adopting policies that advance non-proliferation objectives. The prospect of peaceful nuclear cooperation with the United States and others played an important role in encouraging China to adopt these policies. China understands that U.S. cooperation under the agreement is contingent upon China's implementation of these policies in a manner fully consistent with those basic non-proliferation practices and standards that were discussed and clarified during the negotiations with China.

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[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 603–644.
[1] ACDA files and House Doc. 99–86, p. 22.
[2] U.S.C. 2153(a).
[3] *Infra.*
[4] For the Agreement, see Document 118.

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I have concluded that the agreement meets all statutory requirements, and I have reached a favorable assessment of the adequacy of the provisions in the agreement to ensure that any assistance furnished under it will not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive purpose. The agreement substantially benefits U.S. non-proliferation objectives, and it will provide a good opportunity for continuing consultations with China on non-proliferation issues. In light of all the above, I recommend that it be approved.

113. ACDA Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement for Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, July 19, 1985 [1]

This Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement relates to the proposed Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. This agreement for cooperation (which, together with its accompanying Agreed Minute, is hereinafter called the "proposed Agreement") is concurrently being submitted to the President for his authorization for execution.[2]

Section 123 a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended ("Atomic Energy Act"), provides that a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement shall address the "adequacy of safeguards and other control mechanisms and the peaceful use assurances contained in the agreement for cooperation to ensure that any assistance furnished thereunder will not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive purpose." [3] This assessment statement addresses the background on the nuclear program and policies of China (Part I); the nature and scope of cooperation contemplated in the proposed Agreement (Part II A), and how the applicable substantive requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) [4] and the Atomic Energy Act are met by the proposed Agreement (Part II B); other non-proliferation policy issues pertinent to this agreement (Part III); and the assessment, conclusions, views and recommendations of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Part V).[5] Part II B responds to the requirements for a Proliferation Assessment Statement in Section 123a. of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended by both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and, more recently, by the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985.[6]

[1] ACDA files and House Doc. 99–86, pp. 23–48.
[2] For the agreement, see Document 118.
[3] 42 U.S.C. 2153(a).
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164. (P.L. 95–242, 92 Stat. 120–152).
[5] *Supra* and this Document.
[6] P.L. 99–64, sec. 301(a)(1).

I. BACKGROUND

A. China's Civil Nuclear Program

China has recently begun to develop a civilian nuclear energy program and has ambitious plans for the installation of substantial nuclear electric power capacity by the year 2000. China hopes to double total energy output and efficiency of energy use by that time. The construction of nuclear power plants in energy-poor areas would help China reach those goals.

China sees its nuclear power program as a necessary part of its development and modernization efforts. China is faced with severe electric power shortages. This has not only limited the amount of electricity available for household consumption, but it has also adversely affected industrial production. Future industrial and economic growth will require increased electric power.

China has relied primarily on coal-generated electricity, especially in the northern and central portions of the country which possess rich fossil fuel deposits. In 1984, China's coal production increased 8% over 1983 to 772 million metric tons. However, the growing demands for coal from a spreading industrial base have begun to tax the transportation sector's infrastructure, particularly the railroads. As a result, coal-generated energy has become increasingly costly.

Petroleum usage as a percentage of total energy production has fallen. The output of petroleum has remained flat since 1978 and now accounts for 21% of the national energy supply, down from 24% in 1978. China has continued to export crude oil and some petroleum products in order to acquire badly needed foreign currency. It is estimated that oil and petroleum products constitute some 25% of current export earnings. Growing internal demands for oil may force China to reconsider its oil export policy.

Hydroelectric power also provides energy in China. However, the large dams required to expand China's present hydroelectric power supplies are regarded as costly to construct and often result in the loss of valuable agricultural land.

Because of these perceived energy requirements and conditions, the nuclear power alternative has gained acceptance in China. The Chinese leadership will consider the cost and benefits of foreign technological assistance necessary to build modern nuclear power plants and the longstanding traditions of Chinese self-reliance. Thus, China's nuclear power program most likely will be a two-track effort: some foreign plants will eventually be constructed, and an indigenous effort at reactor construction and fuel fabrication will be advanced.

It is estimated that China possesses sufficient uranium deposits to maintain a modest civil nuclear program. Specific and detailed information on uranium deposits is presently unavailable, largely because China has yet to explore fully the regions where uranium is likely to be found.

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China's technological base for peaceful nuclear activities is primarily an outgrowth of its cooperation with the Soviet Union in the 1950's. During that time, hundreds of Chinese engineers and technicians were trained at Soviet universities and research facilities. The Soviets also provided the research reactor for the Beijing Institute of Atomic Energy (BIAE).

Three main centers of nuclear power research are located in Beijing, Shanghai, and Sichuan. Beijing has two nuclear research facilities—BIAE and one at Qinghua University. BIAE has a heavy water research reactor furnished by the Soviet Union in 1958 and is focused largely on the development of heavy water reactor technology. The Nuclear Energy Institute of Qinghua University is the primary facility for training nuclear engineers in China.

The primary research facility near Shanghai is the Shanghai Nuclear Physics Institute (SNPI). It cooperates closely with the 728 Reactor Research and Design Institute described below. Both groups are working on the design of a light water nuclear power reactor similar to those used in the United States. The 728 Institute maintains a small research reactor to study control rod design, power distribution, and hydraulics.

The Southwest Reactor Engineering Research and Design Center (SWERC) is located in Chengdu, Sichuan Province. Like the facilities near Shanghai, SWERC is involved in research on nuclear power reactors. In addition, a large research and test reactor is operated at Ziajiang. In February 1981, China announced that the reactor had gone into high power operation; it is used to produce radioactive isotopes for oil exploration and medical uses.

China has announced plans to build at least ten nuclear power plants with a total generating capacity of 10,000 megawatts by the year 2000. PRC officials have stated that many of these projects will import foreign equipment and engineering services.

Chinese officials at various levels have announced plans for reactors in at least a dozen locations, from Hainan Island in the south to the Liaoning Peninsula in the north. However, it appears that only three projects are likely to be started in the near future:

Qinshan, Zhejiang ("728 Project"). This 300-megawatt, "Chinese-designed" power plant has been advertised as the prototype for China's indigenous nuclear industry. Two major reactor components—the pressure vessel and the cooling pumps—are to be supplied by Japan and West Germany, respectively. The Chinese press reported that construction began January 25, 1985, with the laying of the plant's cornerstone. The press account reported that all roads, water, and electricity lines for the plant were completed by the end of 1984, ahead of schedule.

Daya Bay, Guangdong. A joint venture company was formed January 18, 1985, for the purpose of constructing this power plant with twin 900 MW pressurized water reactors. Named the "Guangdong Nuclear Power Joint Venture Company", the company is owned 75% by the

Guangdong Nuclear Power Investment Company (a PRC corporation) and 25% by the Hong Kong Nuclear Investment Company (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hong Kong Power and Light). Years of negotiations have not yet resulted in any final contracts between the Chinese and the likely suppliers of equipment and services for the Daya Bay project.

Sunan ("Southern Jiangsu" or "East China"), Jiangyin County, Jiangsu. The Chinese press has announced the establishment of the "Dongnan Nuclear Power Development Company", responsible for constructing this plant on the southern bank of the Yangtze River, north of Shanghai. It will hold twin 1000 MW pressurized water reactors. Earlier this year, requests for quotation for construction of the Sunan Project were issued to France and West Germany. In the absence of an agreement for cooperation, U.S. companies were not invited to bid.

The Chinese have had commercial consultations on the supply of nuclear power-related equipment with France, the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Italy, Belgium, and Japan. Belgium, the FRG, and the U.K. have agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation with China. China has also concluded such agreements with Argentina and Brazil that could lead to reciprocal supply arrangements.

The proposed Agreement is the culmination of over four years of U.S.-China talks. Six rounds of intensive negotiations were held, both in Washington and Beijing, prior to initialling of the proposed Agreement on April 30, 1984, by Ambassador Kennedy and Commissioner Jia during President Reagan's visit to China.

Prior to seeking formal Presidential approval, it became necessary to engage in further discussions with China for the purpose of clarifying matters related to implementation of China's nuclear policies. These discussions took place through diplomatic channels and during visits of senior U.S. officials to Beijing. The discussions concluded successfully on June 27, 1985. With a resolution of these additional questions, it was then appropriate to proceed with obtaining Presidential authority to sign the proposed Agreement.

B. Non-Proliferation Policy

China's non-proliferation policy and statements have evolved since the end of the Cultural Revolution. With the rise of the post-Mao leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China has moved toward more responsible and active participation on disarmament issues in general, and most recently on non-proliferation in particular.

During the 1960's and 1970's, China's declaratory posture argued that the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries would diminish the power of the United States and the Soviet Union, and rejected the view that an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon states would enhance the risk of nuclear war. Chinese declarations even postulated that the introduction of nuclear weapons to nations in

the Third World could increase the opportunity of revolution. During the negotiations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,[7] and subsequently, China has criticized the Treaty as discriminatory. But at the same time, China's actions were more restrained than its declaratory policy.

In the early 1980's, the possibility of Chinese involvement in international nuclear commerce became a reality. This development presented a serious problem. China had assumed no international legal obligation nor had it adopted a policy to require International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards or other controls on its nuclear exports. Also, its broader posture on non-proliferation continued to raise concerns about whether China would avoid actions that could help another country acquire nuclear explosives.

Recently, China has taken a series of positive non-proliferation steps, moving to accept those basic non-proliferation practices and norms common to all suppliers. During the January 1984 visit to Washington of Premier Zhao, he stated that China does not "engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries to develop nuclear weapons." [8]

On May 15, 1984, in an address to the Sixth National People's Congress, Zhao repeated that China does not "engage in such proliferation by helping other countries to develop nuclear weapons." [9] This statement to the People's Congress and its subsequent endorsement by the Congress is the Chinese Government's highest vehicle for the pronouncement of public policy.

China's position on nuclear non-proliferation was most recently stated publicly by Vice Premier Li Peng in January 1985. According to an interview published in Beijing, he said China has no intention, now or in the future, to help non-nuclear nations develop nuclear weapons. He also said that China's present and future nuclear cooperation with other countries would be confined exclusively to peaceful purposes.[10]

Discussions have been held with the Chinese, since the proposed Agreement was initialled last year, in order to clarify implementation of certain aspects of its non-proliferation policy. These discussions made clear that the two governments have a common understanding of the essential steps needed to implement these policies, consistent with their mutual commitment to non-proliferation. Thus, we can expect that China's policy of not assisting non-nuclear-weapon states to acquire nuclear explosives will be implemented in a manner consistent with the basic non-proliferation practices common to the United States and other suppliers.

These discussions also provided the Chinese with a more complete description of U.S. policies and laws that form the basis for peaceful nuclear cooperation with a country like China. Finally, these consulta-

[7] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[8] *Ibid., 1984*, p. 8.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 410.
[10] Document 7.

tions also permitted discussion of China's intentions regarding IAEA safeguards on its civil nuclear program.

On January 1, 1984, China joined the IAEA. Chinese officials said during the course of negotiations on the proposed Agreement and in the ensuing discussions that, as a member of the IAEA, China would require IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states. This policy was formally implemented in late 1984 when the China-Brazil civil nuclear cooperation agreement incorporated a reciprocal IAEA safeguards requirement for items transferred under the agreement.

II. COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

As shown below, the proposed Agreement meets all applicable requirements of the NNPA and the Atomic Energy Act.

Section 123 a. of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended by Section 401 of the NNPA, requires new or amended agreements for cooperation to include the terms, conditions, duration, nature and scope of the cooperation.

The *nature and scope* of the cooperation authorized by the proposed Agreement is described in Section A below.

The *duration* of the proposed Agreement is 30 years from its entry into force. Notwithstanding the suspension, termination or expiration of the proposed Agreement for any reason, certain specified articles will (as discussed below) continue in effect as long as any material, equipment or components subject to those articles remain subject to the People's Republic of China's right to exercise jurisdiction or to direct disposition elsewhere.

The most pertinent *terms and conditions* of the cooperation are discussed in Sections B, C, F and G of this Part below.

A. Nature and Scope of Cooperation

(1) Permitted Cooperation

Article 2 sets forth in general terms the scope of the cooperation envisaged, and paragraph 3 thereof sets forth a procedure with respect to such cooperation as follows:

> 3. Material, facilities and components will be regarded as having been transferred pursuant to this agreement only upon receipt of confirmation by the supplier party, from the appropriate Government authority of the recipient party, that such material, facilities or components will be subject to this agreement and that the proposed recipient of such material, facilities or components, if other than the recipient party, is an authorized person.

Nuclear material and equipment which under U.S. law may be exported only under an agreement for cooperation are so designated in the licensing process, and confirmation that such items will be subject to the relevant agreement takes place at that time. The purpose of the above-quoted provision is to ensure that such nuclear exports are

subject to the proposed Agreement and in addition to provide a procedure for bringing under the proposed Agreement other nuclear exports which the parties agree should be so transferred pursuant to the proposed Agreement.

Article 4 sets forth in more specific terms the scope of cooperation covered by the proposed Agreement. Article 4(1) states that the only special nuclear material to be transferred will be low enriched uranium ("LEU") (i.e., uranium enriched to less than 20% in the isotope 235) except as provided in subparagraph 4 of Article 4.

Article 4(4) authorizes the transfer of small amounts of special nuclear material for use as samples, standards, detectors, targets and other purposes as the parties may agree.

(2) Types of Cooperation Not Authorized

The proposed Agreement excludes the transfer of sensitive facilities and technologies. Article 2(4) provides that sensitive nuclear technology, sensitive nuclear facilities or major critical components "will require additional provisions as an amendment to this agreement." This constitutes a preclusion of such transfers under this proposed Agreement. The law does not require such a prohibition; but if such cooperation is authorized, the law requires that certain criteria be met in the Agreement. If such transfers were to be contemplated at any time in the future, additional control mechanisms would need to be obtained either in an amendment to the proposed Agreement or in a new agreement. The term "sensitive nuclear technology" is defined at Article 1(17), "Sensitive nuclear facilities" at Article 1(14) and "major critical components" at Article 1(16).

B. Specific Requirements for a New Agreement for Cooperation

Section 123a. of the Atomic Energy Act provides that a new agreement for cooperation shall include nine specific requirements. These are quoted below, together with an explanation of how they are satisfied by the proposed Agreement.

(1) Safeguards and their Durability

Subparagraph (1) of Section 123a. requires:

> A guaranty by the cooperating party that safeguards as set forth in the agreement for cooperation will be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant thereto, and with respect to all special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party, irrespective of the duration of other provisions in the agreement or whether the agreement is terminated or suspended for any reason.

(2) Scope of Safeguards

Subparagraph (2) of Section 123a. provides:

> In the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, a requirement, as a condition of continued United States nuclear supply under the agreement for cooperation, that IAEA safeguards be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere;

Since China is a nuclear weapon state, the requirement for IAEA safeguards set forth in subparagraph 2 of Section 123a. is not applicable.

Subparagraph 1 mandates that whatever safeguards are set forth in the agreement for cooperation shall apply to the items specified in that subparagraph as long as those items remain under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party. Paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the proposed Agreement states:

> 2. Notwithstanding the suspension, termination or expiration of this agreement or any cooperation hereunder for any reason, the provisions of articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 shall continue in effect so long as any material, facility or components subject to these articles remain in the territory of the party concerned or any material, facility or components subject to these articles remain subject to that party's right to exercise jurisdiction or to direct disposition elsewhere.

Article 5 deals with retransfers, reprocessing, enrichment, alteration and no use for military purposes. This article is examined in detail in the analysis of subparagraphs 3, 5, 7, and 8 of 123 a. Article 6 deals with physical security and is examined under the analysis of subparagraph 6 of 123 a.

Article 7 states in pertinent part:

> If either Party at any time following entry into force of this agreement does not comply with the provisions of this agreement, the Parties shall promptly hold consultations on the problem, it being understood that the other Party shall have the right to cease further cooperation under this agreement.

Finally, Article 8 states:

> 1. The parties shall consult at the request of either party regarding the implementation of this agreement, the development of further cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and other matters of mutual concern.
>
> 2. The parties recognize that this cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is between two nuclear-weapon states and that bilateral safeguards are not required. In order to exchange experience, strengthen technical cooperation between the parties, ensure that the provisions of this agreement are effectively carried out, and enhance a stable, reliable, and predictable nuclear cooperation relationship, in connection with transfers of material, facilities and components under this agreement the parties will use diplomatic channels to establish mutually acceptable arrangements for ex-

changes of information and visits to material, facilities and components subject to this agreement.

3. The parties shall exchange views and information on the establishment and operation of their respective national accounting and control systems for source and special nuclear material subject to this agreement.

Thus, Article 10 of the proposed agreement would apply U.S. rights regarding retransfer, storage, reprocessing, enrichment, alteration, physical security, exchanges of information and visits and the Chinese guaranty against military or explosive use irrespective of the duration of other provisions in the agreement or whether the agreement is terminated or suspended for any reason.

The right set forth in Article 8 for the United States to conduct visits to material, facilities and components subject to the proposed Agreement is an important means of assuring that the provisions of the proposed Agreement are carried out, in particular, the Chinese guaranty against military or explosive use. Indeed, Article 8 specifically states that one of the purposes of visits is to ensure that the provisions of the proposed Agreement are effectively carried out. Moreover, Article 8 states that visits shall be arranged "in connection with transfers" of items under the proposed Agreement. Mutually acceptable arrangements on visits will be established before exports under the proposed Agreement are approved. Also valuable for the purpose of assuring that the provisions of the proposed Agreement are carried out are those provisions calling for frequent consultations and for exchanges of information on national accounting and control systems. The requirements of subparagraph 1 of Section 123 a.(1) are satisfied by the proposed Agreement.

(3) No Military or Explosive Use

Subparagraph (3) of Section 123 a. requires:

> . . . a guaranty by the cooperating party that no nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology to be transferred pursuant to such agreement, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of any nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology transferred pursuant to such agreement, will be used for any nuclear explosive device, or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any other military purpose;

Article 5 meets this requirement wherein China guarantees that:

> Material, facilities or components transferred pursuant to this agreement and material used in or produced through the use of any material, facility or components so transferred shall not be used for any nuclear explosive device, for research specifically on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any military purpose.

There is no reference to sensitive nuclear technology because, as noted above, Article 2(4) of the proposed Agreement provides that an amendment is required before sensitive nuclear technology could be transferred under the proposed Agreement.

During the negotiations, China sought assurance that the Agreement did not affect its right, as a nuclear weapon state, to conduct nuclear explosive activities using materials, facilities, components, and technology that are not subject to the proposed Agreement. The Agreed Minute provided such assurance as follows:

> The parties agree that the interpretation and implementation of article 5(3) shall not involve any nuclear activities and related research and development carried out by either party, as a nuclear weapon state, through the use of material, facilities, components and technology not subject to the agreement.

(4) Right of Return

Subparagraph (4) of Section 123 a. requires:

> except in the case of those agreements for cooperation . . . with nuclear weapon states, a stipulation that the United States shall have the right to require the return of any nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant thereto and any special nuclear material produced through the use thereof if the cooperating party detonates a nuclear explosive device or terminates or abrogates an agreement providing for IAEA safeguards;

Since China is a nuclear weapon state, the requirement for a right of return as set forth in subparagraph (4) of Section 123 a. is not applicable. Article 7, however, makes clear that the United States has the right to cease further cooperation if China does not comply with the provisions of the Agreement.

(5) Retransfer

Suparagraph (5) of Section 123 a. requires:

> a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material or any Restricted Data transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation and . . . . any production or utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation or any special nuclear material produced through the use of any such facility or through the use of any material transferred pursuant to the agreement, will not be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party without the consent of the United States;

Section 109 of the Atomic Energy Act requires that recipient nations also agree to obtain U.S. approval before retransferring any components, items and substances exported from the United States which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has found to be "significant for nuclear explosive purposes." The NRC has identified a series of such components, items and substances in regulations contained in 10 CFR Part 110 which are subject to this retransfer requirement.

Article 5(1) of the proposed Agreement satisfies both retransfer criteria of the Atomic Energy Act by providing that material, facilities, or components or special nuclear material transferred pursuant to the proposed Agreement and special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or facilities, "shall not be retransferred to unauthorized persons or, unless the parties agree, beyond its territory.

(6) Physical Security

Subparagraph (6) of Section 123 a. requires:

> a guaranty by the cooperating party that adequate physical security will be maintained with respect to any nuclear material transferred pursuant to such agreement and with respect to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material, production facility, or utilization facility transferred pursuant to such agreement;

Article 6(1) of the proposed Agreement meets this requirement by providing a guaranty that

> 1. Each party shall maintain adequate physical security with respect to any material, facility or components transferred pursuant to this agreement and with respect to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material or facility so transferred.

With respect to the meaning of "adequate," Section 127(3) of the Atomic Energy Act, as added to the law by Section 305 of the NNPA, provides that physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if they provide a level of protection equivalent to that required by regulations promulgated by the NRC establishing levels of physical security (see NNPA Section 304(d) and 10 CFR 110.43).

The balance of Article 6 and Annex II to the proposed Agreement contain implementing provisions, such as a description of the levels of physical security contemplated and measures to be taken. These provisions are consistent with the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers published by the IAEA in February 1978 [11] and the above-mentioned NRC regulations.

Article 6(3) permits the United States to consult with China concerning the adequacy of physical security measures in China, and, in accordance with Article 6(4), the Chinese authorities responsible for physical security will be made known to the United States. These provisions will facilitate cooperation between the United States and China on physical security matters of mutual interest, and will also enhance U.S. ability to be assured as to the level of physical protection being maintained.

(7) Reprocessing, Enrichment or other Alteration

Subparagraph (7) of Section 123 a. requires:

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[11] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 7–26.

> . . . a guaranty by the cooperating party that no material transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation and no material used in or produced through the use of any material, production facility, or utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation will be reprocessed, enriched or (in the case of plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 235, or other nuclear materials which have been irradiated) otherwise altered in form or content without the prior approval of the United States;

This criterion contains several restrictions. First, U.S. approval must be obtained prior to any reprocessing material supplied under a new or amended agreement or of any material produced from such material or produced or used in a production or utilization facility so supplied (e.g., a reactor). Second, such approval must be obtained for enrichment, after export, of any uranium supplied under a new or an amended agreement. Third, such approval must be obtained for any alteration of weapons usable material or irradiated nuclear material which has either been supplied under a new or an amended agreement or produced from such material or used in any such equipment so supplied.

Paragraph 2 of Article 5 of the proposed Agreement states:

> Neither party has any plans to enrich to twenty percent or greater, reprocess, or alter in form or content material transferred pursuant to this agreement or material used in or produced through the use of any material. Neither party has any plans to change locations for storage of plutonium, uranium 233 (except as contained in irradiated fuel elements), or high enriched uranium transferred pursuant to this agreement or used in or produced through the use of any material or facility so transferred. In the event that a party would like at some future time to undertake such activities, the parties will promptly hold consultations to agree on a mutually acceptable arrangement. The parties undertake the obligation to consider such activities favorably, and agree to provide pertinent information on the plans during the consultations. Inasmuch as any such activities will be solely for peaceful purposes and will be in accordance with the provisions of this agreement, the parties will consult immediately and will seek agreement within six months on long-term arrangements for such activities. In the spirit of cooperation the parties agree not to act within that period of time. If such an arrangement is not agreed upon within that period of time, the parties will promptly consult for the purpose of agreeing on measures which they consider to be consistent with the provisions of the agreement in order to undertake such activities on an interim basis. The parties agree to refrain from actions which either party believes would prejudge the long-term arrangements for undertaking such activities or adversely affect cooperation under this agreement. The parties agree that the consultations referred to above will be carried out promptly and mutual agreement reached in a manner to avoid hampering, delay or undue interference in their respective nuclear

> programs. Neither party will seek to gain commercial advantage. Nothing in this article shall be used by either party to inhibit the legitimate development and exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with this agreement.

The first sentence in Article 5(2) states neither party intends to engage in any of the activities specified in Section 123 a. (7). Should China in the future desire to undertake reprocessing, enrichment or other alteration, consultations will be held to establish long-term arrangements for such activities and the United States has agreed to "consider such activities favorably." No reprocessing, enrichment or alteration will be conducted during the period that such consultations are underway. If no long-term arrangements are agreed within six months of the initiation of consultations, the parties will consult on measures that would allow such activities on an interim basis. China agrees to refrain from any reprocessing, enrichment or alteration if the United States believes such activities "would prejudge the long-term arrangements for undertaking such activities or adversely affect cooperation" under the proposed Agreement. Although set forth in two stages, the text of Article 5(2) clearly precludes, for the first phase, any reprocessing, enrichment or alteration while seeking to establish long-term arrangements for such activities. During the second phase when the United States and China are seeking to make interim arrangements, the Chinese cannot undertake reprocessing, enrichment or alteration if the United States objects on grounds that such activity "would prejudge the long-term arrangements or adversely affect cooperation." Article 5(2) satisfies the criterion of subsection 7 of Section 123 a.

(8) Storage

Subparagraph (8) of Section 123 a. requires:

> . . . a guaranty by the cooperating party that no plutonium, no uranium 233, and no uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 235, transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, or recovered from any source or special nuclear material so transferred or from any source or special nuclear material used in any production facility or utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, will be stored in any facility that has not been approved in advance by the United States;

The proposed Agreement authorizes retransfer of only small quantities of plutonium, uranium 233 or uranium enriched to greater than 20 percent in the isotope 235.

Article 4, paragraph 1 provides:

> . . . Any special nuclear material to be transferred under this agreement shall be low enriched uranium except as provided in paragraph 4 of this article.

Paragraph 4 of Article 4 states:

> 4. Small quantities of special nuclear material may be transferred for use as samples, standards, detectors, targets, radiation sources and for such other purposes as the parties may agree.

Special nuclear material is defined in subparagraph (7) of Article 1 as follows:

> (i) plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched in the isotope 235, or (ii) any other material so designated by agreement of the parties.

The proposed Agreement addresses any change in storage location for such small quantities of uranium 233, uranium enriched greater than 20 percent in the isotope 235 or plutonium in same manner as it addresses reprocessing, enrichment or other alteration. (All these subjects are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Article 5 of the proposed Agreement which is set forth on page II–8 of this Assessment Statement.) As with reprocessing, enrichment, or other alteration, China has agreed not to undertake any change in storage location while the Parties are seeking to establish long-term arrangements for such storage. During the second phase while the Parties are seeking interim arrangements, the Chinese cannot change the location for storage of the specified materials if the United States objects. Thus, U.S. approval for any change in storage locations for these materials is guaranteed.

The proposed Agreement contains a phrase excluding plutonium or uranium 233 in irradiated fuel elements from the approval requirements for changes in storage locations. This follows the approach set forth in other agreements for cooperation that the United States has entered into with other countries. This exclusion is consistent with the storage criterion in the Atomic Energy Act because it is designed to cover material directly usable in nuclear explosives. (Senate Report 95–467, pp. 22, 52–53.)

The proposed Agreement does not deal with initial storage locations, only changes in storage locations after the listed materials have been received. Normal practice with respect to the exports of the small quantities of the material specified in section 123(a)(7) includes specifying the storage location for such materials. Thus, at all times, storage locations will be approved by the United States.

(9) Sensitive Nuclear Technology

Subparagraph (9) of Section 123 a. requires:

> . . . a guaranty by the cooperating party that any special nuclear material, production facility, or utilization facility produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the cooperating party by or through the use of any sensitive nuclear technology transferred pursuant to such agreement for cooperation will be subject to all the requirements specified in this subsection.

Article 2(4) of the proposed Agreement provides that an amendment shall be required for any transfer of sensitive nuclear technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, or major critical components. Since the

guaranty required by this criterion relates only to material or facilities produced or constructed through the use of sensitive nuclear technology transferred under the proposed Agreement, it is inapplicable to the proposed Agreement unless and until it is amended to provide for the transfer of such technology.

C. NNPA Section 402—Additional Requirements

Section 402(a) contains additional enrichment controls quoted and discussed below.

> Except as specifically provided in any agreement for cooperation, no source or special nuclear material hereafter exported from the United States may be enriched after export without the prior approval of the United States for such enrichment;

Article 5(2) of the proposed Agreement, which deals with this restriction, is discussed above. By limiting the need to obtain U.S. consent to enrichment of twenty percent or greater in the isotope 235, the United States is approving enrichment up to twenty percent of material subject to the proposed Agreement.

Section 402(a) further requires that:

> [N]o source or special nuclear material shall be exported for the purpose of enrichment or reactor fueling to any nation or group of nations which has, after the date of enactment of this Act, entered into a new or amended agreement for cooperation with the United States, except pursuant to such agreement.

As applied to the present case, this provision means that after entry into force of the proposed Agreement, no U.S. source or special nuclear material can be exported to China for enrichment or reactor fueling except pursuant to the proposed Agreement. This will foreclose transfers of source material for such purposes outside an agreement for cooperation, which would otherwise be possible under Section 64 of the Atomic Energy Act.

Section 402(b) of the NNPA provides that:

> In addition to other requirements of law, no major critical component of any uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel reprocessing, or heavy water production facility shall be exported under any agreement for cooperation . . . unless such agreement for cooperation specifically designates such components as items to be exported pursuant to the agreement for cooperation.

Article 2(4) of the proposed Agreement provides that there may be no transfer under the proposed Agreement of a "sensitive nuclear facility"—defined in Article 2(14) to include uranium enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production facilities as well as facilities for the fabrication of nuclear fuel containing plutonium—or "major critical components" as defined in Article 2(16), unless the proposed Agreement is amended.

D. NNPA Section 307—Conduct Resulting in Termination of Nuclear Exports

Section 307 added Section 129 to the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits nuclear exports to nations which engage in certain proscribed activities. The activities in Section 129 are those which are directly related to weapons acquisition or which could have a weapons-related motivation. Based on available information, it is believed that a finding under Section 129 that would preclude nuclear exports to China under the proposed Agreement is not warranted.

E. NNPA Section 309—Components, Items and Substances

Section 309 of the NNPA amended Section 109 of the Atomic Energy Act to authorize the NRC to determine that certain component parts, items and substances, because of their significance for nuclear explosive purposes, should be subject to its licensing authority. For such licenses, the NRC must find that the following criteria or their equivalent are met:

> (1) IAEA safeguards as required by Article III(2) of the [NPT] will be applied with respect to such component, substance, or item; (2) no such component, substance, or item will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device; and (3) no such component, substance or item will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior consent of the United States is obtained for such retransfer.

The NRC promulgated regulations on May 19, 1978 (10 CFR Part 110) which identified certain reactor components and two substances—heavy water and nuclear graphite (moderator materials)—the export of which would be subject to these criteria. In the case of China, the first criterion is met because Article III(2) of the NPT only requires IAEA safeguards on exports to non-nuclear weapon states. The second criterion (no explosive use) is met by the language in Article 5(3). The third criterion (retransfer) can be met by having components and moderator material identified as being exported under the proposed Agreement, in which case Article 5(1) would apply. (The Atomic Energy Act does not require that such exports be transferred under an agreement for cooperation; however, they may be so transferred.)

III. OTHER NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES

Any decision by the United States to engage in nuclear cooperation with another nation can raise a number of nonproliferation policy issues in addition to questions about the legal rights, guarantees, and safeguards contained in the applicable agreement for cooperation. These issues will vary from case to case. They could involve, for example, the scope of the cooperation envisaged under such an agreement, the precedential implications of particular provisions of such an agreement, the degree to which extending nuclear cooperation may

foster other non-proliferation interests, or the general role of the state concerned in non-proliferation efforts. This part of the assessment statement addresses those policy issues which relate to the proposed Agreement.

A. China's Non-Proliferation Policy

The central policy issue concerns the relationship of the proposed Agreement to China's non-proliferation policy. As outlined in Part I, over the recent past China has come to accept the most critical norms and practices at the heart of efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries. China joined the IAEA, stated that it would require safeguards on its exports to non-nuclear weapon states, and committed itself not to help other countries acquire nuclear explosives. Those positive and welcome steps went hand-in-hand with China's interest and activities in obtaining foreign assistance for its civil nuclear program.

During the talks, the U.S. made clear that a shared understanding on non-proliferation was essential to provide a framework for assistance to China's peaceful nuclear program. Discussions with other countries, including the United States, on nuclear cooperation also provided an opportunity for substantial exchanges on non-proliferation issues, practices, and norms. These exchanges elevated the political importance of this issue, and created a better understanding by the PRC of the significance of certain non-proliferation principles and practices.

As a nuclear-weapon state, China has demonstrated that it has the technological and scientific ability to build a nuclear bomb and the capability of producing weapons-usable fissile material. Until recently, it had announced no policies against assisting another state to acquire nuclear explosives. China is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which contains obligations not to assist non-nuclear-weapon states in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosives. Thus, the potential for great harm to global non-proliferation efforts and barriers has been present.

Since January 1984 China made a series of statements stressing that its policy is not to assist others to acquire nuclear weapons.[12]

Discussions with China that have taken place since the initialling of the proposed Agreement have contributed significantly to a shared understanding with China on what it means not to assist other countries to acquire nuclear explosives, and in facilitating China's steps to put all these new policies into place.

Thus, ACDA believes that the statements of policy by senior Chinese officials, as clarified by these discussions, represent a clear commitment not to assist a non-nuclear-weapon state in the acquisition of nuclear explosives. On the basis of the discussions with the PRC, the United States can expect that China's policy of not assisting a non-nuclear-weapon state to acquire nuclear explosives will be implement-

[12] See Section B of Part I.

ed in a manner consistent with those basic non-proliferation practices common to the United States and other major suppliers.

This commitment applies to all future Chinese assistance. Moreover, the Chinese are fully aware of the importance of their non-proliferation policies to future U.S.-China nuclear relations. They know that should we find out about any action inconsistent with these basic non-proliferation measures, including requiring IAEA safeguards on nuclear exports, we would not go forward with exports until the matter were resolved satisfactorily.

In joining the IAEA, China will be able to participate in implementing the basic principles of that Agency which include efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives. China's presence in that international forum also will bring it into contact with other countries that support a strong non-proliferation and safeguards regime.

Because U.S.-China peaceful nuclear cooperation must rest on shared principles of non-proliferation, it will be important for the United States to consult regularly with China on non-proliferation issues. We will also pay close attention to China's actions in this area. The United States has made clear to China that U.S.-Chinese nuclear cooperation rests on strict adherence to these principles and common basic practices.

The proposed Agreement will provide a basis for further consultations between the United States and China on non-proliferation. These consultations can strengthen the mutual commitment to shared non-proliferation principles and establish a framework for cooperation in this area. Over time, such consultations may lead to further improvements in China's non-proliferation policies.

The United States has been cautious in cooperating with countries that are not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, given the importance of the Treaty in promoting non-proliferation. No such cooperation should be concluded in the absence of significant non-proliferation benefits. ACDA believes that the proposed Agreement meets this test.

In summary, as a country outside the non-proliferation regime, China posed a serious potential risk to international non-proliferation efforts. China has now declared its opposition to proliferation and taken concrete steps toward global non-proliferation norms and practices. Along with the discussions with other countries, the prospect of the proposed Agreement played an important role in bringing about this evolving attitude on the part of China.

B. Consultations and Visits

As noted in Part II, the proposed Agreement meets all of the requirements of U.S. law, including a pledge that material and equipment subject to the agreement will not be used for nuclear explosives or any military purpose. The provisions of the proposed Agreement which relate to the ability of the United States to verify this assurance are unique and recognize that China is a nuclear-weapon state.

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The United States is not obligated, either by domestic law or by the nuclear export provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to condition nuclear exports to nuclear-weapon states on the acceptance of IAEA safeguards. Even so, the United States did seek Chinese acceptance of IAEA safeguards on U.S. supply under the agreement, but the Chinese adamantly refused—as they have to date with other nuclear-weapon states. (The Chinese reportedly did agree to IAEA safeguards on any "sensitive" assistance they receive from the U.K. The U.S.-China agreement does not permit cooperation in those areas defined as "sensitive nuclear technology" under U.S. law, nor in other "sensitive" areas such as exports of significant quantities of highly enriched uranium or plutonium.)

Acceptance of IAEA safeguards by nuclear-weapon states can serve to minimize discrimination against non-nuclear-weapon states, and thus can help to sustain broad political support for international non-proliferation institutions such as the IAEA safeguards system. For that reason, the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union have all voluntarily permitted the IAEA to apply its safeguards on at least some of their respective civil nuclear facilities. As noted above, it appears China has agreed in principle to accept IAEA safeguards on imports from certain non-nuclear-weapon states. As a practical matter, however, there are no such safeguards yet applied in China.

Article 8 of the agreement provides for "mutually acceptable arrangements for exchanges of information and visits" in connection with transfers under the agreement. These arrangements will be established through diplomatic channels prior to the licensing by the United States of nuclear exports under the agreement, and will include provision for exchanges of information and visits by U.S. personnel to relevant sites in China where U.S. material or equipment subject to the agreement is located. The United States and China will also exchange views and information on their respective national accounting and control systems for nuclear material subject to the agreement.

The scope of cooperation permitted by the proposed Agreement also is important when considering provisions related to verification. Cooperation under the agreement is limited to reactors, their major components, and low enriched uranium fuel. As noted previously, it does not authorize the export of more than gram quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, nor does it authorize the export of sensitive facilities capable of producing such material. A separate agreement—including Congressional review—would be necessary to authorize the transfer of such items. Moreover, as described below, mutually agreed arrangements for reprocessing are provided in the agreement.

As a nuclear-weapon state, China has nuclear facilities dedicated to the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Any effort by China to divert material from a civil facility for military purposes would result in the termination of any U.S. assistance to China's civil nuclear program, and in all probability that of other foreign suppliers

as well. Both factors reduce any incentive for China to divert material or equipment from its civil program.

Given these circumstances, ACDA believes that the provisions of the proposed Agreement are adequate to provide confidence against the misuse of any items subject to the proposed Agreement. ACDA has considerable experience in designing systems aimed at deterring the diversion of any nuclear material from peaceful to military uses, and expects to participate actively with other relevant agencies in establishing the mutually acceptable arrangements in connection with proposed exports under the agreement.

C. Consent Rights

As noted in Part II, ACDA believes that the relevant provision in the proposed Agreement (Article 5, paragraph 2) satisfies the statutory requirement of U.S. consent rights over certain fuel cycle activities, including reprocessing. The Chinese have stated that they have no plan to undertake reprocessing of spent fuel from power reactors for at least fifteen years. In fact, there is no existing facility in China capable of reprocessing such fuel.

Should China desire to undertake any of these activities, the United States and China will attempt to reach agreement within six months on long-term arrangements to govern the conditions for such activity. These long-term arrangements could take many forms.

In particular, ACDA believes that in connection with any future discussions on long-term arrangements and the possible exercise of the United States consent rights over reprocessing, it will be important to ensure that the procedures called for under Article 8 are adequate to help verify that any separated plutonium is being used consistent with the provisions of the agreement. Any procedures for information exchange and visits previously agreed for the transfer of reactors and low enriched uranium fuel may not be sufficient for separated plutonium. However, the provisions of the proposed Agreement are fully adequate to ensure that such arrangements are agreed before any reprocessing takes place. ACDA fully supports the outcome on consent rights; it solved the last major obstacle in the negotiations prior to the April 1984 initialling, and preserved the significant non-proliferation benefits of the proposed Agreement.

D. Summary

The proposed Agreement is unique in comparison to other agreements for cooperation concluded since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. It is the first such agreement with a nuclear-weapon state since the passage of that Act. Further, China had only recently accepted the basic norms and practices of non-proliferation. An appreciation of this context is essential in making a balanced judgment on the non-proliferation benefits of the proposed Agreement.

China's desire to obtain foreign assistance for its civil nuclear program provided an opportunity for substantial discussions with the

United States and other suppliers on the major features of the non-proliferation regime. Moreover, the prospect of assistance was a major incentive for considerable evolution of China's position on non-proliferation.

China has joined the IAEA, and stated that it will require IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports. China has committed itself not to assist other countries to acquire nuclear explosives. And the United States can expect that China's policy of not assisting a non-nuclear-weapon state to acquire nuclear explosives will be implemented in a manner consistent with those basic non-proliferation practices common to the United States and other major suppliers. The Chinese are also fully aware that their continued support for and effective implementation of these basic practices is a *sine qua non* for U.S. nuclear cooperation under the proposed Agreement.

Entry into force of the proposed Agreement would contribute importantly to the ability of the United States to continue working with China in non-proliferation. The agreement not only recognizes the evolution in China's non-proliferation policies, but also provides a framework for continued exchanges in this area.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the analysis in this assessment statement and all pertinent information of which he is aware, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has:

- concluded that the proposed Agreement meets all of the substantive requirements in the Atomic Energy Act and the NNPA applicable for new or amended agreements for cooperation.
- reached a favorable net assessment of the adequacy of the provisions of the proposed Agreement to ensure that any assistance furnished thereunder will not be used to further any military or nuclear explosive purpose.
- concluded that execution of the proposed Agreement would advance the non-proliferation program, policy, and objectives of the United States; and
- joined in the recommendation of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy that the President determine that the performance of the proposed Agreement will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security, and that the President approve and authorize the execution of the proposed Agreement.

114. Memorandum for the President From ACDA Director Adelman: Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, July 19, 1985 [1]

The subject agreement is unique among agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation concluded since the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.[2] It is the first such agreement with a nuclear-weapon state; and it is with a country that has not, until recently, supported non-proliferation measures. Although the agreement was initialled in April 1984, we needed to clarify certain matters related to implementation of China's nuclear policies. Those discussions concluded successfully last month.

A major threat to our non-proliferation objectives is the potential for "maverick" suppliers to undercut the safeguards and other controls established through international cooperation and consensus. In the past, China's policies were a cause for concern because it neither adhered to that consensus nor accepted other non-proliferation norms.

Over the past two years, however, the Chinese Government has announced a policy (1) that it will not assist other countries to acquire nuclear explosives, and reaffirmed that policy on several occasions, (2) joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and (3) adopted supply policies such as requiring IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states.

In their totality, these actions by China are of historic significance in the international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. China's actions will help buttress the critical non-proliferation norms established over the past 25 years. The prospect of peaceful nuclear cooperation and the related discussions with the United States and other suppliers significantly encouraged these steps and increased our opportunities to address non-proliferation issues with China. The agreement itself will facilitate continued dialogue and understanding on non-proliferation matters. In the context of China's evolving non-proliferation posture, the agreement is beneficial and in the United States' interest.

A few of the major provisions in the agreement were subject to long and difficult negotiations. We have had detailed discussions on what it means in practice not to assist other countries to acquire nuclear explosives. The policy statements by senior Chinese officials, as clarified in our discussions, represent a clear commitment not to assist any non-nuclear-weapon state in the acquisition of nuclear explosives and we understand that China's policy will be implemented in a manner consistent with those basic non-proliferation practices common to the United States and other major suppliers. The agreement rests on that

[1] ACDA files and House Doc. 99–86, pp. 57–58.

[2] For the Act, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164. For the text of the Agreement, see Document 118.

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foundation. The Chinese know that peaceful nuclear cooperation with the United States would be precluded by actions inconsistent with the non-proliferation measures that were discussed and clarified during the negotiations with China.

The United States sought China's acceptance of IAEA safeguards on U.S. supply under the agreement, but they adamantly refused to accept that condition. They have taken similar positions with other nuclear-weapon states, even though they have agreed in principle to accept safeguards on material from non-nuclear-weapon states. As a nuclear-weapon state, IAEA safeguards are not required under U.S. law for cooperation.

The agreement does provide, however, for "mutually acceptable arrangements" in connection with transfers under the agreement in order to ensure that its provisions are effectively carried out. Those arrangements, to be established prior to approval of U.S. exports, will include exchanges of information and visits by U.S. Government personnel to relevant sites in China where material or equipment subject to the agreement will be stored or used. The agreement also notes that neither party contemplates reprocessing material provided under the agreement or produced through equipment provided. Should plans change in this regard, the agreement requires that arrangements or measures satisfactory to both sides be in place to assure that any separated material will be used only for purposes consistent with the agreement. Meanwhile reprocessing of U.S. origin material cannot take place without U.S. consent. In all cases, it will be important to ensure that the specific arrangements provide adequate confidence that any material or equipment subject to the agreement will be used only for purposes consistent with the agreement.

In my view, the proposed Agreement meets all the applicable requirements of the Atomic Energy Act [3] and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and its entry into force will substantially benefit U.S. non-proliferation objectives. Therefore, I recommend that you (1) determine that its performance will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security, and (2) approve and authorize execution of the agreement.

[3] 42 U.S.C. 2153.

115. Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the Twentieth Session of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts To Consider International Cooperative Measures To Detect and Identify Seismic Events, July 19, 1985 [1]

1. The *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts To Consider International Co-operative Measures To Detect and Identify Seismic Events, initially established in pursuance of the decision taken by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 22 July 1976,[2] held its twentieth formal session from 15 to 19 July 1985 in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden. This was the twelfth session of the Group convened under its new mandate by the decision of the Committee on Disarmament at its 48th meeting on 7 August 1979.[3]

2. The *Ad Hoc* Group continues to be open to all Member States of the Conference on Disarmament as well as upon request to non-Member States. Accordingly, scientific experts and representatives of the following Member States of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the session: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

3. At their request and on the basis of previous invitations by the Committee on Disarmament, scientific experts from the following non-Member States of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the session: Denmark, Finland, New Zealand and Norway.

4. Under the current mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Group, information on national investigations related to the work of the Group has been presented by experts from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States of America.

5. During its tenth session, the *Ad Hoc* Group agreed to establish five study groups in order to achieve an appropriate compilation, summarization and assessment of the experience acquired through national investigations and co-operative studies in areas relevant to its work. These open-ended study groups each deal with a specific issue, and are each headed by a convenor and a co-convenor, as follows:

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[1] CD/616.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1976*, pp. 484–485.
[3] CD/PV 48, p. 11.

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1. Seismological stations and station networks: Dr. Basham (Canada), Dr. Schneider (German Democratic Republic)
2. Data to be regularly exchanged (Level I data): Dr. Harjes (Germany, Federal Republic of), Dr. Fiedler (Czechoslovakia)
3. Format and procedures for the exchange of Level I data through WMO/GTS: Dr. McGregor (Australia), Dr. Mori (Japan)
4. Format and procedures for the exchange of Level II data: Dr. Husebye (Norway), Dr. Christoskov (Bulgaria)
5. Procedures to be used at international data centres: Dr. Johansson (Sweden), Dr. Alewine (United States of America).

6. During its eighteenth session, the *Ad Hoc* Group worked out and agreed on detailed procedures and time schedule for a technical test concerning the exchange and analysis of Level I data using the WMO/GTS (document CD/534). This technical test was the first one conducted making regular use of the WMO/GTS. It further developed procedures for the use of the WMO/GTS for seismic data exchange, and procedures related to the use of the WMO/GTS at envisaged international data centres. The purposes of this technical test were:

—to develop and test procedures (with the WMO) for the regular transmission of Level I data from temporary national facilities to experimental international data centres (EIDCs). These were established during the technical test to provide the services of both the national facilities and the IDCs first envisaged in CCD/558;
—to transmit bulletins from EIDCs to participating temporary national facilities using the WMO/GTS;
—to test procedures for retransmission of Level I data messages over the WMO/GTS;
—to provide an opportunity for testing procedures for extracting Level I parameters at seismic stations;
—to develop and test procedures for transmission of Level I parameters to temporary national facilities;
—to test proposed procedures at EIDCs for receipt and archiving of Level I data and for compilation and distribution over the WMO/GTS of event bulletins and parameters using Level I data.

7. The technical test covered seismic Level I data for the period from 00.00 Universal Co-ordinated Time (UTC) 15 October to 24.00 UTC 14 December 1984. The preparation and transmission of event bulletins from EIDCs continued until 15 January 1985. The time period from 15 October to 26 October 1984 was designated as a preparatory phase to establish reliable communications.

8. In all, 76 seismograph stations in 36 countries contributed seismic Level I data to the technical test. For organizational and technical reasons, however, not all of these countries provided and received data for the entire time period.

9. Experimental international data centres were operated throughout the time period of the test at Moscow, Stockholm and Washington.

10. The technical test was co-ordinated overall by Dr. Peter McGregor, Australia, who carried out this important task with great skill and dedication.

11. During the technical test the *Ad Hoc* Group has enjoyed an excellent co-operation with the WMO as well as with the national meteorological and seismological institutions in participating countries.

12. The *Ad Hoc* Group reviewed a draft report to the Conference on Disarmament on the results of the test. This draft report had been compiled by the Group's Scientific Secretary based on contributions from Study Group Convenors. A number of national investigations containing results of comprehensive analyses of the large volumes of data generated during the technical test formed the basis for this material. In reviewing the draft, the Group conducted preliminary discussions on the technical results of the test and how they related to the stated objectives.

13. The *Ad Hoc* Group agreed that the objectives of the technical test were successfully fulfilled. The technical test has provided extremely valuable experience and technical information, previously unavailable, on the topics given in paragraph 6.

14. The *Ad Hoc* Group also discussed the schedule for its further work. It envisages submitting its report to the Conference on Disarmament on the technical test during the first part of the 1986 session, on the understanding that a complete draft be distributed to the members of the *Ad Hoc* Group by 1 December 1985.

15. The *Ad Hoc* Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 10 to 21 March 1986, in Geneva.

116. Memorandum for the President From the Deputy Secretary of State (Whitehead) and Secretary of Energy Herrington: Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, July 20, 1985 [1]

A proposed new agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), including an accompanying agreed minute which is an integral part of the agreement, is at attachment 3.[2] A summary of the basic provisions of the proposed agreement is at attachment 4.[3]

The agreement was negotiated by the Department of State, with the technical assistance and concurrence of the Department of Energy and in consultation with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

[1] ACDA files and House Doc. 99–86, pp. 49–56.
[2] Document 118.
[3] Included below at end of document.

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(ACDA), whose views and recommendations are at attachment 5.[4] The Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement concerning the agreement is being submitted to you directly by the Director of ACDA.[5]

The agreement was initialed in Beijing on April 30, 1984. While recent amendments to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act would permit you to transmit the agreement to Congress for "consultations" before the agreement had been signed, we recommend that you approve the agreement, authorize it for signature, determine that it will promote, and not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security and have the agreement signed before it is transmitted to Congress. If you approve our recommendation, the agreement will be signed and then transmitted to Congress for 90 days of continuous session. If you agree with our conclusion that the agreement meets all the applicable requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,[6] as amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978,[7] it may be transmitted to Congress without an exemption of any of those requirements. An agreement without exemptions may be brought into force after 90 days of continuous session unless, during that time, there has been enacted a joint resolution of disapproval (which would require presentation to you for signature or veto).

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) contains requirements for new or amended agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation. In our judgment, the proposed agreement meets all the requirements applicable to such agreements with nuclear-weapon states. It is the first peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with a Communist country and the only such agreement applicable solely to another nuclear-weapon state (the U.K. and France are covered by U.S. agreements with EURATOM).

China intends to make nuclear power one of its major energy sources by the year 2000. China has announced plans to build, by that year, nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 10,000 MWE. In the first stage of development, the PRC plans to build a Chinese-designed, 300 MWE reactor at Qinshan, Zhejiang (near Shanghai). China also plans on the construction of two much larger reactor projects: the twin 1000 MWE "Sunan" plant, to be built in Southern Jiangsu Province; and the Daya Bay, Guangdong plant, to include twin 900 MWE reactors. China is negotiating with a number of countries for assistance to its program, but it is clear that China regards U.S. nuclear equipment and technology very highly and would like to be able to buy such equipment and technology from the United States.

The purpose of the agreement is to permit such peaceful nuclear cooperation to take place between the United States and the PRC. It has a term of 30 years, subject to extension by the parties in accordance with their respective requirements, and provides for the transfer

[4] Document 114.
[5] See Document 112.
[6] 42 U.S.C. 2153.
[7] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164.

of facilities (including reactors), components and material (including fuel) for both nuclear research and power purposes. The agreement does not provide for any transfer of sensitive nuclear technology, sensitive nuclear facilities or major critical components.

The agreement contains provisions which satisfy the requirements of section 123 a. of the Atomic Energy Act as they apply to nuclear-weapon states. Paragraph (1) of section 123 a. requires that safeguards "as set forth in the agreement" will be maintained for the life of items subject to the agreement, irrespective of the duration of the agreement itself. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [8] and section 127 (1) of the Atomic Energy Act, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are only required as a condition for nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states. Therefore, IAEA safeguards are not provided for in the agreement. Article 8 (2), however, provides for arrangements for exchanges of information and visits by U.S. Government officials to material, facilities and components subject to the agreement. Mutually acceptable arrangements on such visits and information exchange will be established prior to the approval of any U.S. exports under the agreement. This provision, together with article 10 (2), which provides that this provision and others continue for the life of the items to which they apply, meets the requirement of section 123 (a) (1).

Legally required provisions precluding retransfers without U.S. consent and precluding any military or explosive use are contained in article 5 (1) and (3). The required provisions on the physical protection of items subject to the agreement are in article 6. Paragraphs (2) and (4) of section 123 (a) of the Atomic Energy Act, pertaining to IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities and a right of return of items in certain circumstances, do not by their terms apply to agreements with nuclear-weapon states, and consequently are not reflected in the U.S.-PRC agreement.

Subsections 123 (a) (7) and (8) of the Atomic Energy Act require that the U.S. have prior approval rights with regard to reprocessing, enrichment, alteration in form and content and (for weapons-usable material) storage of material subject to the agreement. These requirements are met in article 5 (2) of the agreement, although the text of this provision is different from the formulations in previous agreements. The effect of the provision is that none of these activities may be undertaken unilaterally; prior approval of the United States is required.

In accordance with section 407 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, the agreement contains a provision relating to identification of environmental implications and protection of the international environmental aspects of activities under the agreement, and in related matters of health and safety.

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[8] The Treaty text may be found *ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

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The proposed agreement will, in our view, further the non-proliferation and other foreign policy interests of the United States. During the period of our negotiations, China took several important steps which clarify its non-proliferation and nuclear export policies and practices. Chinese Premier Zhao made important statements of China's non-proliferation policy which make clear that China will not contribute to proliferation. The Premier's statements were subsequently endorsed by the National People's Congress, thereby giving them official status. In conjunction with China's membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency effective January 1, 1984, China said that it will require safeguards on its future nuclear export commitments to non-nuclear weapon states and is implementing that policy.[9]

Entry into force of this agreement will provide a framework for a continuation of our discussions on non-proliferation matters with the Chinese. It also will have a significant, positive impact on overall U.S.-China relations, and thus will promote important U.S. foreign policy interests. It will also provide U.S. companies an opportunity to participate in another aspect of China's energy program with possibly substantial economic benefit.

We believe the proposed agreement, including the agreed minute, meets all statutory requirements. It will also serve United States non-proliferation and other foreign policy interests. Therefore, pursuant to section 123 (b) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, we recommend that you determine that performance of the agreement will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security, approve the agreement, and authorize its execution.

ACDA Director Adelman concurs in this recommendation. His views are at attachment 5.

Recommendation

That you sign the determination, approval and authorization at attachment 1 and the transmittals to the Congress at attachment 2. (The transmittals will be held until the agreement itself is signed.)

Attachments

1. Draft Determination, Approval and Authorization
2. Draft Transmittals to the Congress
3. Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, including Agreed Minute
4. Summary of Basic Provisions
5. Views and Recommendations of Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

[9] *Ibid., 1984*, pp. 693–694.

United States—People's Republic of China Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Summary of Basic Provisions

Article 1 and Annex I contain definitions.

Article 2 sets forth the scope of cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The parties state their intent to cooperate in this area in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. Information, technology, material, facilities and components may be transferred under the agreement directly between the parties or through authorized persons, and shall be subject to the terms of the agreement and to such additional terms and conditions as may be agreed by the parties. Material, facilities and components will be regarded as having been transferred pursuant to the agreement only upon confirmation by the recipient party that such item or items are to be subject to the terms of the agreement. Sensitive nuclear technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, and major critical components cannot be transferred under the agreement; their transfer would require additional provisions as an amendment to the agreement. Each party will implement the agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Article 3 provides for the transfer of information in a variety of fields involving the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These fields include research, development and use of reactors and nuclear fuel fabrication technology, the use of material and physical and biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry, nuclear fuel cycle research, including waste management techniques, health, safety, and environmental research and development, assessing the role nuclear power may play in international energy plans, and codes, regulations and standards for the nuclear energy industry. The agreement limits transfers of information and technology to that which the parties are permitted to transfer, thus excluding the transfer of restricted data, since special procedures under section 144 of the Atomic Energy Act must be followed to authorize such transfers.

Article 4 provides the basic enabling framework for the transfer of material, facilities and components. Except for small quantities of special nuclear material for use as samples, standards, detectors, targets, radiation sources and such other agreed purposes, the agreement limit authorized transfers of special nuclear material to low-enriched uranium. Low-enriched uranium may be transferred for use as fuel in reactors and reactor experiments, for conversion or fabrication, or for such other purposes as may be agreed by the parties. The quantity of nuclear material transferred shall not at any time be in excess of the quantity necessary for reactors or reactor experiments, and such other purposes as may be agreed by the parties.

Article 5 requires the parties' agreement for the retransfer of any material, facilities, components or special nuclear material transferred

pursuant to the agreement and any special nuclear material produced through the use of any such material or facilities.

This article also specifies that neither party has any plans to enrich to 20 percent or greater, reprocess, or alter in form or content material transferred pursuant to the agreement or material used in or produced through the use of any material or facility so transferred. In addition, neither party has any plans to change locations for storage of plutonium, uranium 233 (except as contained in irradiated fuel elements), or high-enriched uranium transferred pursuant to the agreement or used in or produced through the use of any material or facility so transferred. If plans change, the parties will consult immediately and seek agreement within six months on long-term arrangements for such activities. The parties undertake to consider the activities favorably, and agree to provide pertinent information on their plans. Each party agrees not to act during this period. If a long-term arrangement is not agreed, the parties will promptly consult for the purpose of agreeing on an interim arrangement. Both parties agree to refrain from actions which either party believes would prejudge the long-term arrangement or adversely affect cooperation under the agreement. In essence, consequently, none of the activities referred to in this paragraph may be undertaken unilaterally; prior approval of the other party is required.

Finally, article 5 precludes the use of material, facilities or components transferred pursuant to the agreement and material used in or produced through the use of any material, facility or component so transferred for any nuclear explosive device, for research specifically on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any military purpose. The agreed minute makes clear that this obligation does not involve any nuclear activities and related research and development carried out by either party, as a nuclear weapon state, through the use of material, facilities, components and technology not subject to the agreement.

Article 6 requires that each party maintain adequate physical security measures, in accordance with the levels of protection set forth in Annex II, with respect to any material, facility or components transferred pursuant to the agreement and with respect to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material or facility so transferred. The measures applied shall, as a minimum, be comparable to the recommendations set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.1, "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material," or in any revision of that document agreed to by the parties. The Annex describes physical security levels applicable with respect to the use, storage, and transport of nuclear materials classified as categories I (requiring the most stringent levels of protection), II, and III. The parties agree to consult at the request of either party regarding the adequacy of physical security measures, and agree to identify those agencies and authorities responsible for ensuring that levels of physical security are adequately met and having responsibility for coordi-

nating response and recovery operations in the event of unauthorized use or handling of materials subject to the article.

Article 7 accords each party the right to cease cooperation if the other party does not comply with the provisions of the agreement. Each party undertakes to endeavor to avoid taking actions that would affect cooperation under the agreement.

Article 8 provides that parties shall consult at the request of either party regarding the implementation of the agreement, the development of further peaceful nuclear cooperation, and other matters of mutual concern. It is recognized that since the parties are both nuclear-weapon states, bilateral safeguards are not required. However, in order to exchange experience, strengthen technical cooperation between the parties, ensure that the provisions of the agreement are effectively carried out, and enhance a stable, reliable and predictable nuclear cooperation relationship, in connection with transfers under the agreement the parties will use diplomatic channels to establish mutually acceptable arrangements for exchanges of information and visits to material, facilities and components subject to the agreement. The parties also agree to exchange views and information on the establishment and operation of their respective national accounting and control systems for source and special nuclear material subject to the agreement.

Article 9 provides that the parties shall consult to identify the international environmental implications arising from activities under the agreement, and shall cooperate in protecting the international environment from radioactive, chemical or thermal contamination arising from such activities and in related matters of health and safety.

Article 10 establishes a thirty-year term for the agreement which may be extended by agreement of the parties in accordance with their respective applicable procedures. In the event of suspension, termination or expiration of the agreement or of cooperation thereunder for any reason, articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 shall continue in effect so long as any material, facility or components subject to these articles remains in the territory of the party concerned or any material, facility or components subject to these articles remain subject to that party's right to exercise jurisdiction or direct disposition elsewhere.

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117. Memorandum From President Reagan to Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Energy Herrington: Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, July 23, 1985 [10]

I have considered the proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,[11] along with the views, recommendations, and statements of the interested agencies.

I have determined that the performance of the agreement will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. Pursuant to Section 123 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2153 (b)), I hereby approve the proposed agreement and authorize you to arrange for its execution.

118. Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, July 23, 1985 [1]

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China,

Desiring to establish extensive cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit,

Noting that such cooperation is one between two nuclear weapon states,

Affirming their support of the objectives of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),[2]

Affirming their intention to carry out such cooperation on a stable, reliable and predictable basis,

Mindful that peaceful nuclear activities must be undertaken with a view to protecting the international environment from radioactive, chemical and thermal contamination,

Have agreed as follows:

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[10] ACDA files and House Doc. 99–86, p. 21.
[11] *Infra.*
[1] ACDA files and House Doc. 99–86, pp. 3–20.
[2] TIAS 3873; 8 UST 1093; 276 UNTS 3.

Article 1

Definitions

For the purposes of this agreement:

(1) "parties" means the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China;

(2) "authorized person" means any individual or any entity under the jurisdiction of either party and authorized by that party to receive, possess, use, or transfer material, facilities or components;

(3) "person" means any individual or any entity subject to the jurisdiction of either party but does not include the parties to this agreement;

(4) "peaceful purposes" include the use of information, technology, material, facilities and components in such fields as research, power generation, medicine, agriculture and industry but do not include use in, research specifically on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or any military purpose;

(5) "material" means source material, special nuclear material or byproduct material, radioisotopes other than byproduct material, moderator material, or any other such substance so designated by agreement of the parties;

(6) "source material" means (i) uranium, thorium, or any other material so designated by agreement of the parties, or (ii) ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the parties may agree from time to time;

(7) "special nuclear material" means (i) plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched in the isotope 235, or (ii) any other material so designated by agreement of the parties;

(8) "byproduct material" means any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special nuclear material;

(9) "moderator material" means heavy water, or graphite or beryllium of a purity suitable for use in a reactor to slow down high velocity neutrons and increase the likelihood of further fission, or any other such material so designated by agreement of the parties;

(10) "high enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to twenty percent or greater in the isotope 235;

(11) "low enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to less than twenty percent in the isotope 235;

(12) "facility" means any reactor, other than one designed or used primarily for the formation of plutonium or uranium 233, or any other item so designated by agreement of the parties;

(13) "reactor" is defined in Annex I, which may be modified by mutual consent of the parties.

(14) "sensitive nuclear facility" means any plant designed or used primarily for uranium enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel, heavy water production or fabrication of nuclear fuel containing plutonium;

(15) "component" means a component part of a facility or other item, so designated by agreement of the parties;

(16) "major critical component" means any part or group of parts essential to the operation of a sensitive nuclear facility;

(17) "sensitive nuclear technology" means any information (including information incorporated in a facility or an important component) which is not in the public domain and which is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of any sensitive nuclear facility, or such other information so designated by agreement of the parties.

Article 2

Scope of Cooperation

1. The parties shall cooperate in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Each party shall implement this agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The parties recognize, with respect to the observance of this agreement, the principle of international law that provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.

2. Transfers of information, technology, material, facilities and components under this agreement may be undertaken directly between the parties or through authorized persons. Such cooperation shall be subject to this agreement and to such additional terms and conditions as may be agreed by the parties.

3. Material, facilities and components will be regarded as having been transferred pursuant to this agreement only upon receipt of confirmation by the supplier party, from the appropriate Government authority of the recipient party, that such material, facilities or components will be subject to this agreement and that the proposed recipient of such material, facilities or components, if other than the recipient party, is an authorized person.

4. Any transfer of sensitive nuclear technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, or major critical components will, subject to the principles of this agreement, require additional provisions as an amendment to this agreement.

Article 3

Transfer of Information and Technology

Information and technology concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes may be transferred. Transfers of such information and technology shall be that which the parties are permitted to transfer and may be accomplished through various means, including reports, data banks, computer programs, conferences, visits and assignments of persons to facilities. Fields which may be covered include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

(1) research, development, experiment, design, construction, operation, maintenance and use and retirement of reactors and nuclear fuel fabrication technology;

(2) the use of material in physical and biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry;

(3) nuclear fuel cycle research, development and industrial application to meet civil nuclear needs, including multilateral approaches to guaranteeing nuclear fuel supply and appropriate techniques for management of nuclear wastes;

(4) health, safety, environment, and research and development related to the foregoing;

(5) assessing the role nuclear power may play in international energy plans;

(6) codes, regulations and standards for the nuclear energy industry; and

(7) such other fields as may be agreed by the parties.

Article 4

Transfer of Material, Facilities and Components

1. Material, facilities and components may be transferred pursuant to this agreement for applications consistent with this agreement. Any special nuclear material to be transferred under this agreement shall be low enriched uranium except as provided in paragraph 4 of this article.

2. Low enriched uranium may be transferred for use as fuel in reactors and reactor experiments, for conversion or fabrication, or for such other purposes as may be agreed by the parties.

3. The quantity of special nuclear material transferred under this agreement shall be the quantity which the parties agree is necessary for any of the following purposes: the loading of reactors or use in reactor experiments, the efficient and continuous operation of such reactors or conduct of such reactor experiments, and the accomplishment of such other purposes as may be agreed by the parties.

4. Small quantities of special nuclear material may be transferred for use as samples, standards, detectors, targets, radiation sources and for such other purposes as the parties may agree.

Article 5

Retransfers, Storage, Reprocessing, Enrichment, Alteration, and No Use for Military Purposes

1. Material, facilities, components or special nuclear material transferred pursuant to this agreement and any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or facilities may be retransferred by the recipient party, except that any such material, facility, components or special nuclear material shall not be retransferred to unauthorized persons or, unless the parties agree, beyond its territory.

2. Neither party has any plans to enrich to twenty percent or greater, reprocess, or alter in form or content material transferred pursuant to this agreement or material used in or produced through the use of any material or facility so transferred. Neither party has any plans to change locations for storage of plutonium, uranium 233

(except as contained in irradiated fuel elements), or high enriched uranium transferred pursuant to this agreement or used in or produced through the use of any material or facility so transferred. In the event that a party would like at some future time to undertake such activities, the parties will promptly hold consultations to agree on a mutually acceptable arrangement. The parties undertake the obligation to consider such activities favorably, and agree to provide pertinent information on the plans during the consultations. Inasmuch as any such activities will be solely for peaceful purposes and will be in accordance with the provisions of this agreement, the parties will consult immediately and will seek agreement within six months on long-term arrangements for such activities. In the spirit of cooperation the parties agree not to act within that period of time. If such an arrangement is not agreed upon within that period of time, the parties will promptly consult for the purpose of agreeing on measures which they consider to be consistent with the provisions of the agreement in order to undertake such activities on an interim basis. The parties agree to refrain from actions which either party believes would prejudge the long-term arrangements for undertaking such activities or adversely affect cooperation under this agreement. The parties agree that the consultations referred to above will be carried out promptly and mutual agreement reached in a manner to avoid hampering, delay or undue interference in their respective nuclear programs. Neither party will seek to gain commercial advantage. Nothing in this article shall be used by either party to inhibit the legitimate development and exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with this agreement.

3. Material, facilities or components transferred pursuant to this agreement and material used in or produced through the use of any material, facility or components so transferred shall not be used for any nuclear explosive device, for research specifically on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any military purpose.

Article 6

Physical Security

1. Each party shall maintain adequate physical security with respect to any material, facility or components transferred pursuant to this agreement and with respect to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material or facility so transferred.

2. The parties agree to the levels for the application of physical security set forth in Annex II, which levels may be modified by mutual consent of the parties. The parties shall maintain adequate physical security measures in accordance with such levels. These measures, as minimum protection measures, shall be comparable to the recommendations set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Revision 1 entitled "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material", or in any revision of that document agreed to by the parties.

3. The parties shall consult at the request of either party regarding the adequacy of physical security measures maintained pursuant to this article.

4. Each party shall identify those agencies or authorities responsible for ensuring that levels of physical security are adequately met and having responsibility for coordinating response and recovery operations in the event of unauthorized use or handling of material subject to this article. Each party shall also designate points of contact within its national authorities to cooperate on matters of out-of-country transportation and other physical security matters of mutual concern.

Article 7

Cessation of Cooperation

1. Each party shall endeavor to avoid taking any actions that affect cooperation under this agreement. If either party at any time following entry into force of this agreement does not comply with the provisions of this agreement, the parties shall promptly hold consultations on the problem, it being understood that the other party shall have the rights to cease further cooperation under this agreement.

2. If either party decides to cease further cooperation under this agreement, the parties shall make appropriate arrangements as may be required.

Article 8

Consultations

1. The parties shall consult at the request of either party regarding the implementation of this agreement, the development of further cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and other matters of mutual concern.

2. The parties recognize that this cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is between two nuclear-weapon states and that bilateral safeguards are not required. In order to exchange experience, strengthen technical cooperation between the parties, ensure that the provisions of this agreement are effectively carried out, and enhance a stable, reliable, and predictable nuclear cooperation relationship, in connection with transfers of material, facilities and components under this agreement the parties will use diplomatic channels to establish mutually acceptable arrangements for exchanges of information and visits to material, facilities and components subject to this agreement.

3. The parties shall exchange views and information on the establishment and operation of their respective national accounting and control systems for source and special nuclear material subject to this agreement.

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Article 9

Environmental Protection

The parties shall consult, with regard to activities under this agreement, to identify the international environmental implications arising from such activities and shall cooperate in protecting the international environment from radioactive, chemical or thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear cooperation under this agreement and in related matters of health and safety.

Article 10

Entry Into Force and Duration

1. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of mutual notifications of the completion of legal procedures by the parties and shall remain in force for a period of thirty years. This term may be extended by agreement of the parties in accordance with their respective applicable procedures.

2. Notwithstanding the suspension, termination or expiration of this agreement or any cooperation hereunder for any reason, the provisions of articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 shall continue in effect so long as any material, facility or components subject to these articles remain in the territory of the party concerned or any material, facility or components subject to these articles remain subject to that party's right to exercise jurisdiction or to direct disposition elsewhere.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this agreement.

DONE at Washington this 23rd day of July, 1985, in English and Chinese, both equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
John S. Herrington

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
Li Peng

ANNEX I

DEFINITION OF REACTOR

"Reactor" means:

1. any apparatus, other than a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, in which a self-sustaining fission chain reaction is maintained by utilizing uranium, plutonium or thorium, or any combination thereof; or

2. any of the following major parts of an apparatus described in paragraph 1:

(1) a pressure vessel designed to contain the core;
(2) primary coolant pumps;
(3) fuel charging or discharging machines;
(4) control rods.

A "reactor" does not include the steam turbine generator portion of a nuclear power plant.

ANNEX II

Pursuant to paragraph 2 of article 6, the agreed levels of physical security to be ensured by the competent national authorities in the use, storage and transportation of the materials listed in the attached table shall as a minimum include protection characteristics as below.

Category III

Use and storage within an area to which access is controlled.

Transportation under special precautions including prior arrangements among sender, recipient and carrier, and prior agreement between entities subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of supplier and recipient States, respectively, in case of international transport specifying time, place and procedures for transferring transport responsibility.

Category II

Use and storage within a protected area to which access is controlled, i.e., an area under constant surveillance by guards or electronic devices, surrounded by a physical barrier with a limited number of points of entry under appropriate control, or any area with an equivalent level of physical protection.

Transportation under special precautions including prior arrangements among sender, recipient and carrier, and prior agreement between entities subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of supplier and recipient States, respectively, in case of international transport, specifying time, place and procedures for transferring transport responsibility.

Category I

Material in this category shall be protected with highly reliable systems against unauthorized uses as follows:

Use and storage within a highly protected area, i.e., a protected area as defined for category II above, to which, in addition, access is restricted to persons whose trustworthiness has been determined, and which is under surveillance by guards who are in close communication with appropriate response forces. Specific measures taken in this context should have as their objective the detection and prevention of any assault, unauthorized access or unauthorized removal of material.

Transportation under special precautions as identified above for transportation of categories II and III materials and, in addition, under constant surveillance by escorts and under conditions which assure close communication with appropriate response forces.

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TABLE: CATEGORIZATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL [a]

Material	Form	Category I	Category II	Category III
1. Plutonium [a,f]	Unirradiated [b]	2 kg or more	Less than 2 kg but more than 500 g	500 g or less [c]
2. Uranium-235 [d]	Unirradiated [b]			
	—uranium enriched to 20% ^{235}U or more.	5 kg or more	Less than 5 kg but more than 1 kg	1 kg or less [c]
	—uranium enriched to 10% ^{235}U but less than 20%.	—	10 kg or more	Less than 10 kg [c]
	—uranium enriched above natural, but less than 10% ^{235}U.	—	—	10 kg or more
3. Uranium-233	Unirradiated [b]	2 kg or more	Less than 2 kg but more than 500 g	500 g or less [c]

[a] All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238.

[b] Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 100 rads/hour at one meter unshielded.

[c] Less than a radiologically significant quantity should be exempted.

[d] Natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium and quantities of uranium enriched to less than 10% not falling in Category III should be protected in accordance with prudent management practice.

[e] Irradiated fuel should be protected as Category I, II or III nuclear material depending on the category of the fresh fuel. However, fuel which by virtue of its original fissile material content is included as Category I or II before irradiation should only be reduced one Category level, while the radiation level from the fuel exceeds 100 rads/h at one meter unshielded.

[f] The State's competent authority should determine if there is a credible threat to disperse plutonium malevolently. The State should then apply physical protection requirements for Category I, II or III of nuclear material, as it deems appropriate and without regard to the plutonium quantity specified under each Category herein, to the plutonium isotopes in those quantities and forms determined by the State to fall within the scope of the credible dispersal threat.

AGREED MINUTE

During the negotiation of the Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy signed today, the following understanding, which shall be an integral part of the agreement, was reached.

The parties agree that the interpretation and implementation of article 5(3) shall not involve any nuclear activities and related research and development carried out by either party, as a nuclear weapon state, through the use of material, facilities, components and technology not subject to the agreement.

119. White House Fact Sheet on the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, July 23, 1985 [1]

—The agreement provides the legal framework for the sale of U.S. nuclear reactors, components, nuclear materials and technology to the PRC. The agreement also provides for exchange of information and technology in various aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle including cooperation in health, safety and the environmental implications of the peaceful use of nuclear power. The agreement also calls for exchange of information, regular consultations and visits. It does not provide for the transfer of any sensitive nuclear technology or facilities such as reprocessing and enrichment plants.

—The agreement is not a commitment to supply nuclear reactors or materials. Rather it is a framework agreement which specifies the guarantees and controls under which supply may take place. Actual sale of reactors, components, and technology is a commercial matter that would be negotiated between the U.S. companies and the PRC. Individual nuclear exports must be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission after the agreement has gone into effect.

—The agreement contains the provisions which are required for agreements with nuclear weapons states by Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.[2] Among these are included guarantees by the cooperating partner that:

> No nuclear materials or equipment subject to the agreement will be used for any nuclear explosive device, or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or for any other military purpose. No nuclear material or equipment subject to the agreement will be transferred beyond the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party without the agreement of the United States.

[1] ACDA files. The Agreement is printed *supra*.
[2] 42 U.S.C. 2153 (b).

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Adequate physical security will be maintained with respect to any nuclear material subject to the agreement. No materials subject to the agreement will be enriched, reprocessed, altered in form or content or (in the case of weapons-useable materials) stored without the prior agreement of the U.S.

—Before any such agreement may be signed, the Atomic Energy Act requires that the proposed agreement will be submitted to the President by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy and will be accompanied by the views and recommendations of the two Secretaries, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Director of ACDA will also provide the President a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement.[3] The President then authorizes signature of the agreement. This has all been done. Once signed, it will be forwarded to the Congress where it must lie for 90 days of continuous session before it may enter into effect.

—During the period of negotiations, China has joined the International Atomic Energy Agency and has clarified its nuclear export and non-proliferation policies. During the visit to Washington of Premier Zhao Ziyang in January 1984, he said: "We do not engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons." [4]

—Senior Chinese officials confirmed to us that this statement applies to all nuclear explosive devices. Premier Zhao repeated his statement before the Sixth National People's Congress (NPC) in Beijing in May of 1984.[5] The NPC endorsed the statement, giving it the effect of a directive to all organs of the Chinese Government.

—In September of 1984 China made public its decision to require the application of IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon states.[6]

—In January of this year, Chinese Vice Premier Li Peng made an official press statement which elaborated on China's non-proliferation policy. He said: "I wish to reiterate that China has no intention, either at present or in the future, to help non-nuclear countries develop nuclear weapons. China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency last year and was appointed a board-member country. We will maintain good relations of cooperation with the agency and abide by its stipulations. We have conducted cooperation or negotiations on nuclear energy with France, the FRG, the United States, Brazil, Pakistan and Japan. China's nuclear cooperation with other countries, either at present or in the future, is confined to peaceful purposes alone." [7]

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[3] The statement appears in Document 113.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, p. 8.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 410.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 693–694.
[7] Document 7.

120. Japanese Working Paper Submitted to the Conference on Disarmament: Application of Remote Verification Technology to Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention, July 23, 1985 [1]

Introduction

Success in the chemical weapons convention negotiations is to a major degree dependent on the resolution of the problems concerning verification, and many proposals to this end have been made by the member States of the Conference on Disarmament.

Among these various proposals, one of the most promising as a verification technology for chemical weapons facilities is RECOVER (Remote Continual Verification) technology (CD/271),[2] which technology was originally developed for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States Government as a global data collection system for the safeguard of nuclear material. A "second generation" system now being developed in Japan will permit a safe, economic and reliable transmittal of digital data to a central monitoring organization from various sensors placed at facilities, and would thus appear suitable for application to verifying the inactive status of chemical weapons facilities and the situation of chemical weapons stockpiles, elimination processes etc.

An outline of the Safeguards Remote Verification Technology now being developed in Japan is given below, together with an examination of its possible application to a chemical weapons verification system.

1. Safeguards Remote Verification Technology

Development status

RECOVER technology was first developed in 1981 by the United States as a prototype system utilizing the telephone network, while further research was taken up by Japan. At present, an advanced system utilizing the domestic telephone network and another system utilizing satellite communications are being developed, which development is to be completed in 1985.

The first generation technology had various limitations, such as the low reliability of the hardware and the ability only to transmit "on-off" data from the sensors, etc. In contrast, the advanced type now being developed has increased the reliability of the hardware so that it will be maintenance-free for a period of about one year, and will also be able to transmit still images and alpha-numerical data, as well as being able to respond to remote commands from a monitoring centre to play back information recorded by closed-circuit television cameras at facilities and transmit the necessary information to said organization.

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[1] CD/619.

[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 213–214.

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The technology has thus become more practical as a verification system. Furthermore, with the addition of satellite telecommunication hardware costing about Y13,000,000 (approximately $52,000), it would be possible to link up the (inter)national monitoring organization with facilities located in remote areas where telephone network access would be difficult. A system concept illustration of Safeguards Remote Verification as is being developed in Japan is shown in Figure 1.[3] (Figure 2 shows the technology as applied on board a ship).[4]

System characteristics

The system characteristics of this technology as an automatic remote monitoring system is as follows:

(a) Communication means . . . ordinary public telephone lines, including satellite circuits, may be used for data traffic of up to approximately 2,400 bits per second, as is the normal case (special lines may be used for traffic of greater data intensity).

(b) Automated operation . . . the system is designed to be tamper-resistant and, with the use of high-reliability hardware, should require maintenance only about once a year; thus reducing the frequency of mandatory visits by inspectors.

(c) Protection of transmitted information . . . information to be transmitted is scrambled by a combination of a random factor and a code key, and the accuracy of the transmitted information is assured by various parity checks.

(d) Transmittable information . . . "on-off" data, analogous information, still images and alpha-numerical data.

(e) Application . . . transmission of information to a monitoring centre of a facility where inspectors are permanently stationed or to a (inter)national monitoring organization.

A brief description of the hardware being developed as Safeguards Remote Verification Technology is given in Table 1.[5]

2. *Application of Safeguards Remote Verification Technology to a chemical weapons verification system*

In examining possible application of Safeguards Remote Verification Technology to a chemical weapons verification system, it is necessary first to clarify in detail what is the exact demand on verification, whether it would suffice to detect abnormalities at the facility monitored or whether more substantial information is required, as well as the overall system of on-site inspection within which framework this technology would be applied.

However, for the purposes of this section, such real-life considerations will be put to one side and possible application of this technology will be shown in an exemplar manner. The demand on verification is understood to be as follows:

[3] Not printed here.
[4] Not printed here.
[5] Not printed here.

(a) as regards chemical weapons stockpile facilities and former production facilities to be destroyed at a future date, verification of their inactive status;

as to elimination facilities and permitted production facilities, monitoring of their activities;

as to the transshipment of chemical weapons, the monitoring of possible container abnormalities both prior to and after completion of transshipment.

(b) communications between the facilities and monitoring organization will be conducted by means of an existing communications network.

Possible applications

Given the understanding above, exemplar application of Safeguards Remote Verification Technology to various facilities for chemical weapons stockpiling, producing, eliminating etc., would be as shown in Table 2.[6]

The estimation of cost was made on the basis of the cost of a complete verification system comprising of:

—for facilities, whose size was understood to be on a scale similar to that of the facilities discussed at the chemical weapons verification workshop at the Tooele Army Depot in November 1983, sensors, on-site multi-plexers, network control units and satellite communication systems;
—for transshipment containers, a complete set of optical fibre seals.

In this estimation the cost of verification hardware for the various facilities were as follows:

—stockpile facilities Y38,000,000 (approximately $152,000)
—permitted production facilities Y75,000,000 ($300,000)
—former production facilities Y46,000,000 ($184,000)
—elimination facilities Y75,000,000 ($300,000)

(It need not be stressed that these figures are in any case just illustrative and the real cost will vary according to the scale of the facility, its configuration, etc.).

Conclusions

The RECOVER system, which was developed for safeguarding nuclear material has, in the course of development of such "second generation" technology as the addition of remote control capability, improved reliability and the utilization of satellite communication, become a more practical system of Safeguards-related technology and the economic aspect, such as the cost of various hardware, is improving rapidly. It is recommended that the Conference on Disarmament give due consideration to a possible application of this and related technology to the verification of a chemical weapons convention, thus

[6] Not printed here.

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greatly advancing its work in the field of verification technology for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

121. Statement by the U.S. Representative (Lowitz) to the Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, July 23, 1985 [1]

Mr. President, we are entering the last weeks of the chemical weapons negotiations during this session, and I believe it is important at this time for my delegation to make a brief intervention on this question. The Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, in his address to the Conference on Disarmament in February, reaffirmed the primary importance the United States places on these negotiations.[2] The first priority of the United States remains the prompt negotiation of a comprehensive, verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Unfortunately, thus far this year we have made little concrete progress toward that goal.

In adopting a negotiating mandate for the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, the Conference on Disarmament has recognized the importance and urgency of concluding a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. This mandate is a concrete expression of the universal revulsion for these terrible weapons, and of the strong desire on the part of peoples around the world to be rid of them forever. The United States fully supports this objective and is committed to making every effort to conclude our negotiations at the earliest possible moment.

My Government is particularly concerned about the lack of progress in these negotiations in view of the continuing spread of chemical weapons to States that had not previously possessed them. This proliferation not only threatens stability in key areas of the world, but also makes the completion of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention more difficult to achieve. The more States that have such weapons, we fear, the more difficult it will be to achieve world-wide agreement to ban them totally.

A second factor lending urgency to our task is the spreading use of chemical weapons. The United States has taken the lead in condemning chemical weapons use wherever it has occurred—in South-east Asia, Afghanistan and, most recently, against Iran. Despite the preponderance of evidence presented concerning these instances of use, many nations have questioned the reliability of such evidence without seeking to examine the facts closely, and, unfortunately, few have been impelled to condemn either the use of chemical weapons or the tortoise-like pace of the negotiations here in the Conference.

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[1] CD/PV.323, pp. 7–10.
[2] Document 21.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use of chemical weapons constitutes an undertaking of vital importance for humanity.[3] It embodies the mutual commitment of nations to refrain from using chemical weapons. It is, accordingly, all the more regrettable that this agreement has recently been honoured in the breach. Moreover, the Geneva Protocol does not prevent the acquisition, production, stockpiling or transfer of chemical weapons. In terms of international law, it is not illegal to acquire chemical weapons. To combat most effectively the further spread of chemical weapons, and to preclude the possibility of their use, we must make their acquisition and retention illegal. The definitive way to accomplish this objective is through a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. This is a key factor in the desire of the United States to conclude such a convention here at the Conference on Disarmament without delay.

The lamentable situation with regard to the use of chemical weapons also underlines the need for the convention to contain a mechanism rapidly and unequivocally to determine the facts whenever and wherever a violation is suspected. Unfortunately, the delegation of the Soviet Union has repeatedly refused to address the general wish of other delegations for reliable verification of provisions in the chemical weapons ban, and it has repeatedly criticized as "not serious" the detailed United States proposals for verification of compliance. It has not, however, been forthcoming with concrete alternatives that address the need to establish mutual confidence that States are, in fact, in compliance with the convention. My delegation encourages all delegations to make specific and concrete proposals, so that we may have a firm and rational basis for resolving our different views. The United States draft convention in CD/500 is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, but its provisions do respond to the need for reliable verification.[4] We are prepared to consider any alternatives that provide for an equal or greater degree of effectiveness. We cannot accept less.

The United States delegation has made more than a few efforts to stimulate the negotiating process. Most recently, in our intervention on 28 March, we set forth three proposals to accelerate the work of the Committee.

The first was to put this work on a more rational basis by scheduling a negotiating session in the autumn. As I said then, if there is no negotiating session, there can be no progress between August and February. I can add that it appears to my delegation that those who have hesitated in approving an extended schedule for the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons are precisely those who could be most threatened by the further spread and use of chemical weapons, and are among those who should be most interested in completing the negotiations as soon as possible.

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[3] For the text of the Protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.
[4] The draft convention appears *ibid., 1984*, pp. 269 ff.

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Our second suggestion was that the Committee should focus on issues that would be key to progress. The Committee is attempting to address the declaration of chemical weapons stocks in Working Group "B", and although some progress has been made, we have not yet resolved the important issue of the timing of declarations. On the equally important issue of chemical weapons production facilities, progress has been stalled because in Working Group "A", inexplicably, the group of socialist States has refused even to agree that the definition of a chemical weapons production facility would include facilities devoted solely to making chemicals which were used solely for chemical weapons. The issue of ensuring that chemical weapons are not produced under the guise of commercial chemical production is likewise bogged down in Working Group "A".

In Working Group "C", we look forward to an examination of the issue of challenge inspection. This is certainly one of the key issues of the negotiations, and we should give it the full discussion it deserves. A discussion of the principles underlying the important concept of challenge inspection and of the necessity for States rapidly to satisfy concerns about compliance with the convention is a clear necessity to further our negotiations.

My last suggestion for accelerating work was related to delegations' willingness to negotiate. I note with sadness that the delegation of the Soviet Union has remained virtually silent in many of the sessions of the Working Groups. This silence has done nothing to further our progress, and it raises serious questions whether the Soviet Union, despite its claims, is interested in a chemical weapons convention. In addition, while it criticizes our verification proposals, the Soviet delegation has not introduced a concrete proposal on this subject in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons since the United States tabled its draft convention last year.

As I said in beginning my statement, the priority United States objective is the negotiation of an effective, verifiable ban on chemical weapons without further delay. Unfortunately, however, in addition to the difficulties we have experienced in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, there may be external obstacles to our negotiations. The current imbalance in chemical weapons capabilities between the United States and the Soviet Union may well be such an obstacle.

The long discussions that have occurred in our Executive branch and in the Congress of the United States over the past 5 years are ample evidence of my Government's reluctance to resume production of chemical weapons. But during the past 16 years—during, that is, a 16-year unilateral moratorium on United States chemical weapons production—the Soviet Union has continued to produce its own chemical weapons and to expand the chemical weapons potential of its large deployed chemical warfare forces.

This year's debate in the United States Congress once again underscores that it is the clear preference of the Administration, the Congress and the American people to ban rather than to build chemical

weapons. If we can achieve a convention here promptly, the United States will build no binary chemical weapons. And, in any event, the United States binary programme is not an obstacle to concluding our negotiations.

Let me further illustrate this point. In the statement made by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 18 July, an attempt is made to explore alleged differences in the positions of the United States and the USSR on the treatment of binary chemical weapons in the convention.[5] The simple fact is that the Soviet Union and the United States have expressed essential agreement on how to treat these weapons in the convention. The Soviet Union seeks to destroy them along with super-toxic lethal weapons. So does the United States. The Soviet Union would unequivocally ban the production of the key precursors of binary weapons as it would super-toxic lethal weapons. So would the United States. There is no essential disagreement. By portraying an area of essential agreement as one of disagreement, however, the Soviet statement appears to sow confusion regarding a problem already solved. In our view, it would be better to work together to solve our remaining problems rather than trying to create new ones.

The 18 July statement of the Soviet delegation contained other unfounded allegations and inflammatory assertions to which my delegation has already responded. I regret that it was necessary to do so, and I firmly hope that future statements by the Soviet Union and its socialist colleagues will not require further interventions by my delegation.

In spite of the meagre results achieved so far this year, there remains sufficient time for constructive work during the remaining weeks of this session. I urge all delegations to join in serious negotiations. Let us together find ways to bring our work closer to a successful conclusion.

In this regard, the Conference should adopt a single text for negotiating the chemical weapons convention. There is a good foundation for this work in the form of the annex to the 1984 report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, CD/539.[6] Such a negotiating text, which would encapsulate agreements already reached, would ensure that such progress as we make is carried forward to future negotiating sessions.

We have a unique opportunity at this point in history, the opportunity to eliminate chemical weapons from the face of the Earth. History will not judge us kindly if we fail to seize that opportunity. The United States delegation is committed to the prompt conclusion of a comprehensive, verifiable chemical weapons convention and is prepared to demonstrate its commitment. We hope that other delegations are prepared to join us.

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[5] Document 111.
[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 603–644. The annex begins on p. 606.

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122. Message From President Reagan to the Congress Transmitting the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, July 24, 1985 [1]

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to sections 123(b) and 123(d) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2153(b), (d)), the text of the proposed agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, with accompanying annexes and agreed minute.[2] The proposed agreement is accompanied by my written determination, approval, and authorization,[3] and the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency concerning the agreement.[4] The joint memorandum submitted to me by the Secretaries of State and Energy, which includes a summary analysis of the provisions of the agreement,[5] and the views of the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [6] are also enclosed.

The proposed agreement with the People's Republic of China has been negotiated in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which sets forth certain requirements for new agreements for cooperation with other countries.[7]

It is the first peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with a Communist country and the only such agreement with another nuclear-weapon state (the United Kingdom and France are covered by U.S. agreements with EURATOM).

During the last several years, the People's Republic of China has developed ambitious plans for the installation of a substantial number of nuclear power stations. The proposed agreement reflects the desire of the Government of the United States and the Government of the People's Republic of China to establish a framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation. During the period of our negotiations and discussions, China took several important steps that clarify its non-proliferation and nuclear export policies. Premier Zhao has made important statements of China's non-proliferation policy that make clear that China will not contribute to proliferation. Those statements have been endorsed by the National People's Congress, thereby giving them official status. Based on our talks with the Chinese, we can expect that China's policy of not assisting a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire nuclear explosives will be implemented in a manner consistent with the basic non-proliferation practices common to the United

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, July 29, 1985, pp. 930–931.
[2] Document 118.
[3] Document 117.
[4] Documents 112 and 113.
[5] Document 116.
[6] Document 114.
[7] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164.

States and other suppliers. Further, in conjunction with China's membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency, effective January 1, 1984, China has said that it will require IAEA safeguards on its future nuclear export commitments to non-nuclear weapons states.[8]

This agreement will have a significant, positive impact on overall U.S.-China relations. It will provide the United States and its companies an opportunity to participate in another aspect of China's energy programs, with possibly substantial economic benefit. The proposed agreement will, in my view, further the non-proliferation and other foreign policy interests of the United States.

I have considered the views and recommendations of the interested agencies in reviewing the proposed agreement and have determined that its performance will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. Accordingly, I have approved the agreement and authorized its execution.

I have also found that this agreement meets all applicable requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, for agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation and therefore I am transmitting it to the Congress without exempting it from any requirement contained in section 123(a) of that Act. This transmission shall constitute a submittal for purposes of both section 123(b) and 123(d) of the Atomic Energy Act. The Administration is prepared to begin immediately the consultations with the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees as provided in section 123(b). Upon completion of the 30 day continuous session period provided in section 123(b), the 60 day continuous session period provided for in section 123(d) shall commence.

123. Statement by the ACDA Assistant Director for Nuclear and Weapons Control (Dunn) Before Subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Reprocessing and Use of Plutonium in Civil Nuclear Programs, July 25, 1985 [1]

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on ACDA's role in formulating and implementing the President's policies on use of plutonium as a civilian nuclear fuel.

This Administration's policy begins from a recognition of two facts: First, we fully recognize plutonium is a dangerous, weapons-usable material. Its acquisition, or acquisition of high enriched uranium, is one of the essential steps for a country seeking nuclear explosives.

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[8] *Ibid., 1984,* pp. 693–694.

[1] ACDA files. The statement was made before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on International Economic Policy and Trade.

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Second, the United States cannot prevent some countries with advanced nuclear power programs from beginning to use plutonium as a civilian nuclear fuel. We lack sufficient controls, and to attempt to do so would undermine needed cooperation on other non-proliferation issues.

Based on these two facts our policy has sought to work with advanced nuclear countries to achieve the tightest conditions and procedures for use of civil plutonium. We also have taken steps to limit its use where demanded by non-proliferation. Let me sketch parts of this dual approach, and ACDA's role.

As of 1985, approximately 45,000 kilograms of plutonium are contained in the spent fuel discharged annually from the world's existing commercial power reactors, and this figure is expected to double in the next 15 years. The plans for the disposition of this plutonium vary from country to country and are based on national policies and commercial activities involving nuclear waste disposal, energy security, economics, and national security.

At present, many industrialized countries with advanced nuclear power programs have included the reprocessing of spent fuel, either domestically or abroad, as part of their fuel cycle. In the United Kingdom, France, and Japan, decisions were made more than a decade ago to reprocess and use the separated plutonium as a fuel for breeder and advanced thermal reactors. As a result, large inventories of separated plutonium are already beginning to build.

For the past several years, ACDA has expended some of its external research funds to obtain up-to-date information on foreign fuel cycle facilities, services and materials. This data indicated that separated plutonium owned by these industrialized countries, including those in EURATOM and Japan, will likely exceed 200,000 kilograms by the turn of the century. Given the high costs for storing this material and the high priority given by these countries to reducing their dependence on imported oil and coal, they have begun to take steps to use this plutonium as a fuel in their commercial power reactors. In particular, with breeder programs not expanding, their plans are firming up for its use in existing thermal reactors.

Our estimates also reveal that most of the separated plutonium arising in the next 5–10 years will be of U.S. origin. However, nearly 70% of this material will be subject to the U.S.-EURATOM countries without our prior consent. Only the remaining 30% of this plutonium will require U.S. approval for use in countries outside EURATOM. In addition, enough non-U.S. origin material will be available in the same 5–10 year period from the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and the Federal Republic of Germany to replace all U.S. origin material, if necessary, to keep plutonium fuel demonstration programs on track.

Over the longer-term, supplies of non-U.S. material will dominate the market. We estimate that of the 235,000 kg. of light water reactor plutonium already contracted to be reprocessed by the year 2000, approximately 30% is derived from U.S. origin material, 55% is not,

and the origin of 15% is still unclear. Let me repeat: of the more than 235,000 kg. of plutonium likely to be available between now and the year 2000, only 30% is known to be of U.S. origin. An understanding of this fact is essential to design a sound strategy for reducing risks of plutonium use.

Even were it desirable on other grounds, the United States does not and will not have the leverage to force these states to renounce the civil use of plutonium. Past efforts in the late 1970s to pressure our close trading partners not to reprocess spent fuel and use plutonium led only to bitter disputes which hindered needed cooperation on non-proliferation. Moreover, both the European countries and Japan have very advanced nuclear programs, effective security systems for protecting nuclear material, and firm commitments to non-proliferation.

Instead, we must work cooperatively with these trading partners in Europe and Japan to develop and implement effective controls, safeguards, and physical protection measures to insure that such plutonium use occurs without significant increase in proliferation risk. We are also working to strengthen the existing consensus on restraint in transfers of reprocessing technology and to build a new consensus restricting retransfers of plutonium fuels outside of these advanced countries. U.S. consent rights that do exist now can be used to serve these ends, to influence not whether but how some plutonium is used.

Let me elaborate briefly. At present, separated plutonium under safeguards is used or stored at relatively small facilities in EURATOM, Japan and India. Consequently, in these facilities effective measures to protect, safeguard and control its use can be applied and are.

However, as plutonium use expands, progress needs to be continued in improving such measures. For example, improved safeguards need to be implemented to accommodate the large throughputs and inventories and the remote handling of plutonium which will be characteristic of the next generation of reprocessing and mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants. Physical protection measures also will need to be strengthened to protect the increased number of shipments and facilities storing large quantities of separated plutonium. In addition, administrative arrangements need to be put in place to monitor the increased transfers of plutonium subject to controls of several states.

In support of these steps, ACDA has taken the lead, working closely with the Departments of State and Energy, to initiate technical discussions with our major nuclear trading partners such as Japan, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom on safeguards issues pertinent to the use of plutonium. More than a dozen meetings have taken place since 1982.

These meetings have examined safeguards approaches for large reprocessing plants and mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants, coordination of national technical assistance programs for developing IAEA safeguards equipment, and the implementation of safeguards in the respective countries. They have included useful visits to facilities which use or store plutonium. As part of these meetings, the U.S. and Japan

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also agreed on the outlines of a technical approach for reprocessing plant safeguards. This approach later was discussed with the IAEA and with other countries with advanced nuclear programs.

ACDA experts also routinely provide technical assistance to the IAEA on safeguards and physical protection issues. For example, Dr. Frank Houck of the Nuclear Safeguards and Technology Division of ACDA serves as the U.S. representative on the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI). This group advises the Director General on such topics as safeguards approaches, effectiveness evaluation criteria, manpower utilization, etc. In addition, ACDA experts assist the IAEA on improving evaluation criteria which are used for drafting the annual Safeguards Implementation Report and strengthening the IAEA quality assurance program for improving safeguards implementation.

ACDA also has been deeply involved in the development and implementation of technical and institutional measures to improve the physical protection of plutonium and other nuclear materials. We fully support the efforts of the Department of State to speed the ratification of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.[2] ACDA's experts have contributed to the design of tighter procedures for shipment and transport of nuclear materials during international transport through bilateral consultations and exchanges. In particular, working closely with technical bodies in Japan, ACDA funded development of the so-called TRANSEAVER system, which remotely monitors the status and location of nuclear materials during shipment on high seas. Once fully developed and tested, this system would provide prompt warning of diversion of such a shipment.

In this regard, the United States has also strongly supported, however, reliance on air shipment of plutonium and other sensitive materials. U.S. laboratories are working with their Japanese counterparts to develop shipping casks suitable for air transport.

ACDA's efforts are only one part of U.S. efforts. Through this overall endeavor, we can establish effective procedures to assure that increased use of plutonium in stable regions will not significantly add to the risk of proliferation.

In addition, a cooperative approach towards advanced nuclear activities in Europe and Japan has and will make it easier to obtain the help of others on essential non-proliferation issues, whether heading off particular nuclear exports to countries of concern, upgrading generic nuclear exports to countries of concern, upgrading generic nuclear export and technology controls, or strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[3]

Nevertheless, there are situations in which the United States would oppose use of plutonium. A country may lack adequate non-proliferation credentials; or may not have an advanced nuclear program which

[2] For the text of the Convention, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, pp. 129–138.
[3] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

would warrant such use. In turn, the presence of separated plutonium in some countries in regions of tension may add to regional political instability or pose an unacceptable proliferation risk.

In such circumstances, the Reagan Administration's approach is to try where practicable to persuade these countries that their security interests are best served by steering clear of the use of separated plutonium and the indigenous development of plutonium technologies. We have sought to make clear, as in our discussions with South Korea and Taiwan, that the development of alternative, non-sensitive technologies will still permit these countries' nuclear power programs to evolve efficiently and smoothly.

In this regard, the bilateral cooperation called for under Section 223 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act [4] can play an important role in supporting development of non-sensitive technologies for storing and disposal of spent fuel without reprocessing. Such cooperation can instill confidence that there are viable technical alternatives to reprocessing to solve the waste managment problem, as exemplified by the approaches of the United States and Sweden. Moreover, while issues besides economics could be overriding for countries with very advanced nuclear power programs to pursue the reprocessing alternative, most recent studies indicate that the direct disposal of spent fuel would probably be significantly less costly than closing the fuel cycle with reprocessing included.

Finally, let me add lest there be any doubt on this point, the Administration is prepared to exercise its legal rights and political influence to head off plutonium use where the non-proliferation situation demands.

124. Address by Peruvian President García Pérez: Proposal on Regional Disarmament [Extract], July 28, 1985 [1]

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I proclaim the need for a regional agreement to reduce expenditure on armaments and freeze the acquisition thereof, in conformity with the spirit of the Declaration of Ayacucho signed in 1974,[2] believing, as in the case of indebtedness, that it is essential to proceed from words and good intentions to action and example. In keeping with this principle, I hereby announce to the peoples of the world our decision to reduce substantially all purchases of war materiél, beginning with a

[4] P.L. 97–425, signed by the President, January 7, 1983.

[1] CD/631.

[2] The text of the Declaration may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 819–822.

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cut in the number of Mirage aircraft, we are at present negotiating to purchase.

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125. White House Statement on Nuclear Weapon Testing, July 29, 1985 [1]

President Reagan's central arms control objective, and the objective declared in the U.S.-Soviet joint statement issued in Geneva last January, is to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. We, therefore, have proposed at the bargaining table in the nuclear and space talks in Geneva radical reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals, beginning with the most destabilizing ballistic missiles. We believe such radical reductions, coupled with possible future strategic defenses for both sides, are the most promising avenues to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. We regret that the Soviet Union to date has been unwilling to negotiate in concrete and detailed terms to achieve such reductions in Geneva. In this respect not only have they failed to address our desire for deep reductions and enhanced stability, but they have not been willing to present specific numerical levels supporting their own approach.

While we believe the most direct path is through equitable, verifiable reductions, we also believe that verifiable limitations on nuclear testing can play a useful, though more modest role. For that reason, President Reagan, in his speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 24, 1984, proposed that the Soviet Union and the U.S. exchange visits of experts to measure directly at nuclear test sites the yields of nuclear weapons tests.[2] The President views this proposal as a means to increase confidence in verifiable limits on underground testing. To date, the Soviet Union has refused to agree to this practical and fair-minded approach.

As a demonstration of our seriousness, the President has extended to the Soviet leadership our invitation for a Soviet team to observe and to measure a nuclear test at our Nevada test site. This offer, which is unconditional, is a unilateral step which clearly demonstrates the U.S. intention to go the extra mile. The Soviet experts are invited to bring any instrumentation devices that the Soviet Union deems necessary to measure the yield of this test. This U.S. initiative demonstrates our commitment to achieving verifiable limitations in nuclear testing.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, August 5, 1985, p. 942. The statement was read to reporters by Larry M. Speakes, Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, p. 692.

We would welcome Soviet interest in joining us in developing and putting into place truly verifiable and durable limits on nuclear testing. We believe the President's initiative is the most practical approach to begin addressing this serious problem. We reiterate there are no conditions to this far-reaching offer, and we look forward to a positive and timely Soviet response.

126. Statement by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev: Nuclear Weapon Test Moratorium, July 29, 1985 [1]

The continuing nuclear-arms race is fraught with an immense danger to the future of world civilization. It is aggravating international tension and increasing the risk of war, while diverting enormous intellectual and material resources from constructive purposes.

From the very start of the nuclear age, the Soviet Union has waged a consistent and vigorous struggle for an end to the build-up of nuclear arsenals, the curbing of military rivalry and the strengthening of trust and peaceful co-operation among States. It is this aim that governs all of the wide-ranging activities of the USSR within the United Nations and at multilateral and bilateral negotiations on the limitation and reduction of armaments. The Soviet Union does not seek military superiority; it is in favour of maintaining a balance of military forces at the lowest possible level.

We are convinced that the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests would be a major contribution to the strengthening of strategic stability and of peace on earth. It is, after all, no secret that new and even more dangerous forms and types of weapons of mass destruction are developed and improved in the course of such tests.

In the interests of creating favourable conditions for the conclusion of an international treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the USSR has repeatedly proposed that the nuclear-weapon States should agree on a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, starting from a mutually agreed date. Unfortunately, it has not yet been possible to take this important step.

In an effort to help end the dangerous competition in the build-up of nuclear arsenals and wishing to set a good example, the Soviet Union has decided that it will unilaterally discontinue all nuclear explosions, starting from 6 August 1985. We call on the Government of the United States to cease its nuclear explosions starting from the same date, which is observed throughout the world as the anniversary of the Hiroshima tragedy. Our moratorium is declared until 1 January 1986. It will, however, remain in effect beyond that date if the United States, for its part, refrains from setting off nuclear explosions.

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[1] A/40/522.

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It is beyond doubt that a mutual moratorium on all nuclear explosions on the part of the USSR and the United States would also set a good example for other nuclear-weapon States.

The Soviet Union trusts that the United States will respond positively to this initiative and halt its nuclear explosions.

This would meet the aspirations and hopes of all peoples.

127. Report by a TASS Correspondent on the U.S. Invitation To Observe a Nuclear Weapon Test, July 29, 1985 [2]

The White House announced with much pomp today that the Reagan administration has offered the Soviet Union to send its representatives to be present at a new nuclear weapon test at the range in the American state of Nevada. On describing this proposal as "far reaching" the assistant White House press secretary, Speakes, contended that it supposedly demonstrated the administration's striving to achieve verifiable limitations on nuclear weapon tests.[3]

It does not take a deep analysis of the American "initiative", however, to realise that it does not contain any novelty and pursues the sole aim of diverting the public's attention from the Administration's reluctance to reach agreement on cardinally important questions of limiting the arms race, and in particular on the question of limiting and banning nuclear weapon tests.

By again inviting the Soviet Union to exchange "observers" at nuclear weapon tests the American Administration suggests actually only to register nuclear blasts and thus to legalise them. At the same time it has stubbornly resisted and continues to resist steps towards banning nuclear weapon tests. This is illustrated, for instance, by the unilateral suspension by the United States of the talks with the USSR and Britain on the conclusion of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.[4]

128. Lima Declaration of Latin American States: Arms Race, Military Expenditures, and Confidence-Building Measures [Extracts], July 29, 1985 [1]

The Heads of State of Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Panama and Uruguay, and the Special Representatives of

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[2] Moscow TASS in English, July 29, 1985; FBIS *Daily Report*, July 30, 1985, vol. III, p. A1. The report was made from Washington by TASS correspondent Aleksandr Lyutiy.

[3] Document 125.

[4] The trilateral talks on a comprehensive test ban took place in 1977–1980. See *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, p. xxvi

[1] A/40/544, pp. 2–3.

Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela, meeting in the city of Lima with Constitutional President Dr. Alan García to celebrate with the Peruvian people the democratic transfer of power in Peru, which marks a new step forward in the process of consolidating democracy in Latin America:

. . . . . .

They condemn the growing arms race in conventional and nuclear weapons as a threat to international peace and security and a further obstacle to development.

They consider that the balanced reduction of military expenditures and the allocation of greater resources for the social and economic development of their countries would be a positive and timely step, and they agree to promote the adoption of further confidence-building measures in the region, especially between neighbouring countries.

. . . . . .

129. Address by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at the Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [Extracts], July 30, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

We point this out also because we will soon mark the 40th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That tragedy left a deep scar in human memory. The interests of all the countries and peoples demand that such actions should never be repeated. Obviously, if nuclear weapons were actually used today, the consequences would be catastrophic for the whole of mankind.

The Soviet Union has strongly advocated the prohibition of nuclear weapons ever since their appearance. Throughout these years our country has been consistently and energetically struggling against the stockpiling of nuclear arsenals and for an end to rivalry in the development of increasingly advanced systems of these weapons.

The treaty on banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in space, and under water [2] became an important step in that direction, but for a nuclear test ban to be truly effective, we are convinced, it should be complete and universal.

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[1] *Pravda* in Russian, July 31, 1985, first edition, pp. 4–5; FBIS *Daily Report*, July 31, 1985, vol. III, pp. CC1–CC6.

[2] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.

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It is perfectly obvious that a moratorium on all nuclear blasts would contribute to providing auspicious conditions for the comprehensive solution of this problem. The Soviet Union has on more than one occasion offered the nuclear powers to take such a measure beginning with a definite agreed-upon date. However, there has been no positive response to our proposals.

Seeking to contribute towards ending the dangerous rivalry in the buildup of nuclear arms arsenals, the Soviet Union has taken another bold step and decided to terminate unilaterally all nuclear explosions beginning on August 6 this year. This new major initiative of the USSR, prompted by concern for the destinies of the whole of mankind, was announced yesterday by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.[3]

The moratorium, in effect until January 1, 1986, will remain in effect beyond that date if the United States also refrains from conducting nuclear explosions.

The Soviet Union expects the United States to respond positively to our initiative and to stop its nuclear explosions. A joint moratorium by the USSR and the United States would set a good example for the other states possessing nuclear weapons as well.

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New U.S. first-strike nuclear missiles began and continue to be deployed in Western Europe contrary to the interests of the peoples. Every component of the U.S. strategic offensive nuclear potential is being intensively built up. NATO is going ahead with a long-term program to develop ultramodern conventional weapons, which approximate nuclear weapons in their effects, and has embraced an aggressive doctrine for their use. The development of advanced types of chemical weapons, including binary weapons, which are planned to be deployed particularly on the European Continent, is in full swing in the USA.

Washington is going to call into question the time-tested treaties, those limiting both strategic offensive armaments[4] and anti-missile defense systems.[5] In other words, they are about to dump the capital that has been accumulated with so much effort in curbing and restricting the arms race.

The U.S. Administration is seeking to carry through by all means its "star wars" plans. There are designs to involve allies in that dangerous venture. The implementation of these plans is fraught with grave adverse consequences for security in Europe and all over the world.

The peoples are expecting a good deal from the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons. The failure so far to make real progress at

[3] Document 126.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 189 ff.
[5] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 197 ff.

those talks cannot help but disappoint them. We are motivated at the Geneva talks by the firm desire to reach accords. The desire is manifest in well-substantiated constructive proposals both in Geneva and elsewhere.

However, what we are faced with is that, contrary to the joint accord on the subject and goals of the talks, there is unwillingness to discuss and resolve in a business-like manner problems of concern to the world; namely, ways to prevent an arms race in space, to terminate it on earth, and to limit nuclear weapons and move toward their radical reduction and eventual complete elimination.

The Soviet Union has stated more than once at the most prestigious level that it is prepared to effect sizeable reductions in both strategic and medium-range nuclear systems. What is needed for this is restraint from opening up another area of the arms race, space. Our concrete proposals and our unilateral measures of restraint and goodwill in the context of the Geneva talks are known both in America and in Europe. What is needed is only reciprocity, a constructive response from the United States, and this, regrettably, is not yet forthcoming.

The efforts to break the stalemate at the Vienna talks on mutual reductions in armed forces and armaments in Central Europe have so far been in vain. We are hearing incessantly in Vienna: Give us figures. The USSR and its allies do supply figures—but they are not to the liking of their partners. Clearly, the point is not figures. Our partners just have no wish to reach accords.

Many countries think that progress at the Stockholm conference could be more dynamic. Some ground has already been covered to ensure such progress. It is time to move without delay to the formulation of initial accords on major mutually complementary confidence-building measures in both the political and military fields. The socialist countries tabled at the conference well-balanced proposals relevant to both fields. But, naturally, a constructive contribution is needed from all the other states participating in the conference.

I defined only some most topical issues whose solution would facilitate the termination of the arms race and the consolidation of European and international security.

Meetings will be held shortly between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and President François Mitterrand of France and United States President Ronald Reagan. The significance of the top-level meetings by far exceeds, of course, the framework of bilateral relations. The Soviet leadership proceeds from the promise that they should bring about a softening in the present dangerous tension in the world and a turn for the better in European and world affairs.

I would like to stress once again that the Soviet Union favors accords on a fair and equitable basis, which would help all to advance towards the desired objective of the total elimination of the nuclear

war menace and the consolidation of the foundations of universal peace.

One more thing should be made clear: If someone hopes to conduct talks with the Soviet Union "from the position of strength," let him abandon these illusions. In the face of the acceleration of military preparations by the NATO Bloc, the Soviet Union and its allies will be able to ensure their security, to safeguard their legitimate rights and interests. Any attempts to upset the existing military balance and gain unilateral advantages will continue to meet effective counteraction from our part.

It is our firm belief, however, that confrontation, either in the military, political, or economic spheres, is not the road that Europe should take.

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130. Statement by ACDA Director Adelman Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, July 31, 1985 [1]

I am pleased to appear before this distinguished committee today to discuss the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and China—the first agreement with a nuclear-weapon state since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.[2]

Before addressing how this agreement advances important nonproliferation interests, I should place it into the broad picture of enhanced U.S.-Chinese consultations on arms control. This type of consultation followed on the heels of the President's April 1984 visit to China. Soon thereafter, in the summer of 1984, I led a delegation of American officials to Beijing to concentrate on arms control. The Chinese reciprocated by having their arms control experts come here just last month.

Nonproliferation has been a key topic in these discussions with the Chinese. I explained to the Chinese that nonproliferation is one of the highest U.S. priorities as well as the one area of arms control which has been perhaps the most successful. This agreement continues that record.

This committee has, of course, already received ACDA's Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement on the agreement, which we provided to the President prior to his approval of the agreement.[3] The

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[1] Department of State, Current Policy No. 729, pp. 1–2.

[2] For the text of the Act, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164. For the Agreement, see Document 118.

[3] Document 112.

prime question before you now—as before the President on July 23—is: "Does this new agreement contribute to U.S. nonproliferation efforts?" I believe the answer is a resounding "yes." Why? Because our agreement with China helps ensure that they are part of the nonproliferation solution rather than part of the problem.

China's Nonproliferation Policy

During the 1960s and 1970s, China rejected nonproliferation norms. They actually portrayed proliferation in a favorable light by openly declaring that the spread of nuclear weapons around the globe would diminish the power of the United States and the Soviet Union and enhance the opportunities for revolution. China denied that a world of more nuclear-weapon states would enhance the risk of nuclear war.

China also undertook no international legal obligations and had no policy to require safeguards and other controls on its nuclear exports. This naturally quickened our concerns about Chinese actions that could help other countries acquire nuclear explosives. Clearly, herein lay the potential for great harm to global nonproliferation efforts in both word and deed. And, needless to tell this committee, words are exceedingly important in this realm. They affect the strength of the international norms and standards upon which nonproliferation ultimately rests.

Against this background, the United States opened talks on peaceful nuclear cooperation with China—first in 1981 and then more intensively in 1983—with ACDA participating in all stages of the negotiations.

After 2 years of negotiations, an agreement was initialed during President Reagan's visit to China. It then became necessary to engage in further discussions with China to clarify matters related to implementation of its nuclear policies. We did not want to proceed until we were completely satisfied. We were willing to wait as long as need be. These discussions concluded successfully at the end of June.

Over these past 2 years, the Chinese Government has taken a number of important nonproliferation steps.

First, it made a pledge that it does "not engage in nuclear proliferation" nor does it "help other countries develop nuclear weapons." The substance of this pledge has been reaffirmed several times by Chinese officials both abroad and within China.[4] In fact, China's sixth National People's Congress made this policy a directive to all agencies of that large and complex government. As such, it constitutes a historic and positive change in China's policies. It helps bolster rather than break down those critical norms and standards that comprise the nonproliferation regime.

Second, in January 1984, China joined the over 100 members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which plays such a critical role in international nonproliferation efforts. This was a necessary

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984,* pp. 8, 410, 694.

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step in China's evolution toward acceptance of the basic norms of nuclear supply.

Third, China adopted a policy of requiring IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states.[5] This, too, was a big plus. Not only could a supplier that did not accept this basic norm directly contribute to spreading uncontrolled nuclear equipment and material to potential nuclear-weapon states; it could also undermine the consensus of supplier countries that has been painstakingly constructed over the past decade.

Fourth, during our hours and hours of discussions, the Chinese have made it clear that they will implement their policies in a manner consistent with the basic nonproliferation practices we and others support so vigorously.

In the short span of 2 years, China has embraced nonproliferation policies and practices, which it had eschewed so vociferously for a quarter of a century. This clearly is a turnabout of historic significance in our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Chinese are to be applauded for such a change of course.

We can take a measure of pride in this as well. For I believe that the lengthy discussions by the United States and other supplier nations with China, combined with the prospect of agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation, contributed heavily to these Chinese actions.

Protecting U.S. Interests

We will, of course, watch Chinese practices closely to satisfy ourselves that China's actions are consistent with its words, with our expectations, and with our policies and laws. The Chinese know that. They know that nuclear cooperation with us rests on their strict adherence to basic nonproliferation practices discussed and clarified at such great length. The agreement before you rests on that foundation. It could rest on no other.

As presented in ACDA's Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement, all statutory requirements for such agreements have been fully met. Two issues that were subject to protracted negotiations are worth mentioning.

- The agreement before you contains a provision for "mutually acceptable arrangements for exchanges of information and visits" in connection with transfers under its terms. This was done to help ensure that all the agreement's provisions will be scrupulously honored. The specifics of visits and information exchanges will be worked out with the Chinese before any licenses are issued for nuclear exports. They will permit visits by U.S. personnel to sites in China wherever our material or equipment, subject to this agreement, is located.
- The second issue concerns the right of prior approval over reprocessing of spent fuel subject to the agreement. The agreement

[5] See *ibid.*, pp. 693–694.

notes that neither party contemplates reprocessing such material. In fact, activities of this kind are not likely to become an issue in China for at least 15 years. While the language dealing with this issue does differ from that in other agreements, it is clear that China cannot reprocess without U.S. approval.

Other aspects of our assessment statement can be fully explained in response to your questions. Let me just add now that U.S. interests are fully protected. This agreement includes many written guarantees and controls to ensure that material, equipment, or technology supplied by the United States will not be misused.

If they are misused, or if China's nonproliferation policies do not live up to their pledges and to our expectations, we have clear recourse. We hope and expect that this agreement will lead to significant peaceful nuclear commerce with China—otherwise the President would not have sent it to you—but the agreement is only an umbrella agreement. That is, it permits, but does not require, the export of any nuclear items. Thus, if Chinese behavior ever became inconsistent with our understandings, we would suspend the licensing of exports. The Chinese know that.

Conclusion

China's recent nonproliferation steps are and will be critical to our mission of bolstering vital nonproliferation norms and standards. Our long talks with the Chinese, as well as the prospects of civil nuclear cooperation with the United States and other suppliers, contributed to these major improvements in China's nonproliferation policies. Further, as I said, the agreement will enhance our efforts to cooperate to strengthen nonproliferation norms and actions.

Thus, I believe this agreement is fully in U.S. national interests. I trust that, after a thorough consideration of all the issues, you and the whole Congress will agree.

131. Statement by the Ambassador at Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs (Kennedy) Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, July 31, 1985 [1]

I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak to you today on the proposed agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear

[1] Department of State, Current Policy No. 729, pp. 2-..

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energy. This agreement was signed in Washington on July 23.[2] We believe this agreement is important to the interests of both countries and supportive of our shared nonproliferation objectives.

The agreement establishes the basis for cooperation in a variety of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. It provides the basis for export of nuclear reactors, fuel, components, and the exchange of technology including cooperation in health, safety, and the environmental implications of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The agreement is not, however, a commitment to supply. Rather, it provides the legal framework within which nuclear cooperation may take place. Once the agreement enters into force, nuclear reactors, components, and nuclear fuel may be exported under licenses issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in accordance with existing law and regulations.

The agreement permits nuclear cooperation between the United States and China exclusively in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It contains reciprocal commitments by the United States and China that nuclear facilities and materials subject to the agreement will not be used for any nuclear explosive or military purpose. This guarantee, as well as other assurances and controls in the agreement, will help preserve the distinction between the civil and military use of nuclear energy. It is also important to stress that cooperation under the agreement is limited to nonsensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. It expressly excludes the transfer of any sensitive nuclear technology such as enrichment or reprocessing. Nor does it in any way require that technology of strategic or military significance be transferred.

Provisions of the Agreement

I would now like to turn to a brief examination of the specific provisions of the agreement we have signed with the People's Republic of China. The text of the agreement and supporting documents developed during its review within the executive branch have been transmitted to the Congress by the President. The text, in most respects, does not differ significantly from new and renegotiated agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation which we have concluded with other countries since enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978[3] and which have been before Congress for review. The agreement with China fully meets all the requirements specified in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, for nuclear cooperation agreements with nuclear-weapon states.[4]

Specifically, section 123 requires that such agreements contain several guarantees by the cooperating partner.

The first guarantee is that no nuclear materials or equipment subject to the agreement will be used for any nuclear explosive device, for

[2] Document 118.
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164.
[4] 42 U.S.C. 2153.

research on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any other military purpose. This requirement is met by article 5, paragraph 3, of the proposed agreement with the P.R.C.

The second guarantee required is that no nuclear material or equipment subject to the agreement will be transferred beyond the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party without the agreement of the United States. This requirement is met by article 5, paragraph 1, of the agreement.

The third guarantee required is that adequate physical security will be maintained with respect to any nuclear material subject to the agreement. This requirement is met by article 6 of the agreement.

The fourth guarantee required is that no nuclear material subject to the agreement will be enriched, reprocessed, altered in form or content, or (in the case of weapons-usable materials) stored without the prior agreement of the United States. This requirement is met by article 5, paragraph 2, of the agreement.

The Chinese understood U.S. legal requirements, said they had no plans to undertake the activities in question, and were concerned that, in the event of possible future Chinese changes of plans, the United States would give a timely response. While the language that was negotiated is different from that appearing in other agreements, it provides that China may not engage in any of the specified activities without the agreement of the United States. If long-term arrangements are not agreed, it makes clear that each side will refrain from such activities if either side objects—i.e., until there is mutual agreement between the United States and the P.R.C. Both the United States and the P.R.C. understand this.

All of these guarantees are reciprocal in nature and would apply to Chinese exports to the United States. They are, in substance, identical to those in all our other post-1978 agreements. Unlike the other agreements concluded since 1978, however, this one is with a single nuclear-weapon state, as such states are defined in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).[5] This agreement does not provide for International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in the P.R.C. on nuclear material, equipment, or facilities subject to the agreement since they are not required for nuclear-weapon states by either the Atomic Energy Act or the NPT. But neither does the agreement foreclose such safeguards, were China to undertake a voluntary offer with the IAEA as the other nuclear-weapon states have done.

The agreement contains provisions for consultations, exchanges of information, and visits to the sites of materials, facilities, and components subject to the agreement. The agreement also provides for exchanges of views and information on each country's national accounting and control systems and consultations on physical protection measures. The purpose of these exchanges of visits and information is

[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

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to ensure that the provisions of the agreement are effectively and openly carried out, including the provision that cooperation will be for exclusively peaceful purposes. Those provisions have the duration envisaged in Section 123(a)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act.

Benefits of the Agreement

There are very substantial benefits to be derived from this agreement. The agreement will lay the groundwork for strengthening economic ties between the United States and China and create new opportunities for U.S. companies to participate in China's expanding energy sector. China has begun the development of a major nuclear power program to meet its growing energy needs. The Chinese view nuclear energy as playing a key role in China's industrial development and modernization program. U.S. firms are already involved in other energy projects in China to develop coal, oil, and other energy resources, and we believe that participating in a diversified and well-balanced energy program in China is supportive of U.S. interests.

A most important benefit of peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and China is the opportunity it provides for both countries to work together to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives. President Reagan has declared that the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is a fundamental national security and foreign policy objective of the United States. This consideration was at the top of our agenda during our talks with the Chinese and will remain the paramount concern of the United States. Clearly, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must rest on a foundation of shared views and principles on the necessity of deterring the threat of nuclear proliferation.

Since negotiations began on the proposed agreement, China made significant new statements of its nonproliferation policy which show that China is opposed to the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries. On January 10, 1984, at the White House, Premier Zhao stated:

> China does not advocate nor encourage proliferation. We do not engage in proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons.[6]

Premier Zhao reiterated this statement in February in Beijing and at the sixth National People's Congress in May.[7] The Premier's speech to the National People's Congress is the closest equivalent in China to a presidential "State of the Union" address. The statement was endorsed by the National People's Congress and published as official policy.

In January 1985, the official Chinese press published a statement by Vice Premier Li Peng that China has no present or future intention to help non-nuclear-weapon states develop nuclear weapons and that

[6] *Ibid., 1984*, p. 8.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 420.

China's present or future cooperation with other countries is confined to peaceful purposes.[8] The Chinese have made clear to us that when they say that they will not assist other countries to develop nuclear weapons, this also applies to all nuclear explosives. This is a basic Chinese policy which we believe will guide China's nuclear cooperation in the future.

China has also taken important steps to participate in international nonproliferation efforts. It joined the International Atomic Energy Agency in January 1984 and has stated that it requires the application of IAEA safeguards to nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states.[9] In adopting this policy, China is acting in accordance with existing international norms for nuclear trade.

As China undertakes nuclear cooperation with other countries and moves into international nuclear affairs, it is vital that we have a bilateral forum which allows us to work closely with China to maintain and strengthen the international nonproliferation regime. The agreement itself establishes a formal framework for consultations enabling regular exchanges of views and information on matters of mutual interest, including means to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives.

Our contacts with the Chinese have already demonstrated that they appreciate the importance we attach to nonproliferation. We are satisfied that the policies they have adopted are consistent with our own basic views. Formalizing our ties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through an agreement for cooperation will provide a means to advance our shared objectives.

We believe the agreement serves the national security and nonproliferation interests of the United States. We believe it deserves the full support of the Congress.

132. Soviet Pamphlet Entitled *"Star Wars" Delusions and Dangers*: Introduction and Conclusion [Extracts], August 1985 [1]

We live in a complicated and uneasy world. Nothing is more important these days than to ward off the threat of nuclear war hanging over mankind, to stop the arms race on Earth, and to prevent its spreading to outer space.

The senselessness and danger of any further build-up of armaments, nuclear armaments above all, is obvious to every sensible person: such quantities of arms have been stockpiled that all living things on Earth can be annihilated many times over. Yet in its chase after the chimera of military superiority, the Washington leadership believes—and says

[8] Document 7.
[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 693–694.
[1] Pp. 5–7, 53–56.

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so publicly—that the United States has too few arms. More and more new nuclear and conventional weapon systems are being put into service as a result. Colossal funds are being spent. For what purpose? Only to "guarantee" the destruction of others, it would appear, and of themselves.

Modern science and technology make it possible to develop new types of weapons no less dangerous than nuclear arms, based on other physical principles and deployable in outer space. The reference is to laser, particle beam, superhigh-frequency, radio-frequency and other weapons whose destructiveness cannot be even theoretically estimated at present. Yet this is the type of weapon on which the United States has based its so-called strategic defense initiative.

At present, the world is at a crossroads. Washington's plans of militarizing outer space have created additional dangers to the security of nations and a critical situation in international relations. If the world fails to prevent these plans from being carried out, the arms race will enter a qualitatively new phase, and uncontrollable processes will arise in the field of armaments, greatly increasing the risk of a nuclear war breaking out. The international situation has reached a point that prompts the question of where to go from here? It is, indeed, high time for those who shape the policy of states to stop and think, and rule out any decisions that would push the world toward nuclear catastrophe.

It is plain common sense that in the circumstances the only way out is to freeze the nuclear arsenals of the sides, to stop preparations for the development of strike weapons deployable in outer space, and, on this basis, go over at once to reducing the existing stockpiles of armaments.

The peaceloving nations pin great hopes on the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space arms in Geneva. In accordance with the agreement reached on January 8, 1985 by USSR Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Member of the CC CPSU Political Bureau and First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and US Secretary of State George Shultz,[2] the subject of the negotiations is a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and medium-range, with all the questions to be considered and resolved in their interrelationship.

It is of fundamental importance that the objective of the negotiations, as recorded in the joint Soviet-American statement, is to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. In the final analysis, this must lead to the complete destruction of nuclear weapons everywhere.

Progress in the Geneva negotiations and their results will depend above all on whether or not both sides rigidly abide by all parts of the agreement reached on the subject and objectives of the negotiations.

[2] Document 3.

The Soviet Union, for its part, has done and will continue to do everything it can for the aforesaid agreement to be carried into effect.

Regrettably, this cannot be said so far of the position of the US Administration. In their public statements, its members gloss over or pervert the central element of the agreement reached in January on considering and resolving all questions at the negotiations as a complex, in their interrelationship. They do not mince words in saying that the US plans for the military use of outer space will be carried on irrespective of the results of the Geneva negotiations. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said he ruled out "the possibility of giving up a strategic defense either in the research stage or . . . in the deployable stage". This can mean only one thing: the scheme is to develop and deploy space strike weapons, an entirely new kind of weapons, with a simultaneous large-scale build-up and improvement of the offensive nuclear capability.

The US strategic forces are fielding qualitatively new weapon systems with Stealth technologies, which are highly accurate, are armed with maneuverable, independently targetable nuclear warheads, and can covertly attack their targets. In combination with the forward-based US PERSHING II and cruise missiles, they make up the components of a military potential that is obviously designed for a "disarming" first strike.

To justify their policy of militarizing outer space, the US leaders resort to outright deceit, portraying their "Star Wars" plans as "defensive", "humane", and so on, and falsely accusing the Soviet Union of having long since begun to militarize outer space, so that, ostensibly, the United States has no other choice but to "catch up" with it.

These inventions do not stand up to the facts. This pamphlet shows the true aims of the US "Star Wars" plan and demonstrates the substance of the Soviet and US approaches to the use of outer space; it contains an estimate of the calamitous consequences for all nations of the US President's "strategic defense initiative", which is being carried forward in the setting of a further build-up of US strategic offensive arms. The pamphlet also contains a rendering of the Soviet program of measures that must be taken if the arms race is to be prevented in outer space and stopped on Earth.

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CONCLUSION

The precipitous development of space technology, the opportunity for using outer space extensively for military purposes, coupled with the stubborn drive to that end by the United States, have made averting the militarization of outer space the most urgent task of our time. The development of space strike weapons, if they are not banned, may grow into a strongly destabilizing factor, a catalyst of what would in effect be an uncontrollable arms race.

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Washington's dangerous space militarization plans affect the vital interests of all mankind. And all peaceloving states must raise their voice against this new danger before it is too late, before an irreversible situation is created under cover of soothing reassurances.

The Soviet Union is calling for a permanent ban on the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth, and also from the Earth against space objects. No weapons of any kind, whether conventional, nuclear, laser, particle beam, or any other, should ever be put into orbit and stationed in outer space on manned or unmanned systems. No space strike weapons should be developed, tested or deployed either for anti-missile defense or anti-satellite purposes, or yet for use against targets on Earth or in the air. The already existing weapons of that kind should be destroyed.

If the entire family of space strike weapons is banned, the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to the most radical reductions of nuclear weapon systems (strategic and medium-range) on a basis of mutuality, not short of their complete destruction, and, of course, with strict adherence to the principle of equality and equal security. Nowadays, the problem of limiting and reducing nuclear arms cannot be resolved in isolation from the prohibition of space strike weapons. The questions of space and nuclear arms are organically linked, and must be considered and resolved at the negotiations as one complex. And of crucial, priority significance here is solving the space strike weapons question. Their development is wholly contrary to the provisions of the ABM Treaty of 1972 [5] and also to the agreement jointly reached by the USA and the USSR in January 1985 on the subject of objectives of the negotiations. To raise a hand against the ABM Treaty means opening the gates to an unbridled arms race and leading matters up to the disruption of existing treaties and to the refusal to conclude any in future.

Firm action must be taken to preserve the ABM Treaty. Today, its fate depends on whether or not the Reagan Administration gives up its "Star Wars" plan. Unless the ABM Treaty is saved and militarization of outer space is banned, nuclear arms negotiations will become senseless and will hold no promise.

If the United States were to begin militarizing outer space, upsetting the existing military-strategic equilibrium, the Soviet Union would have no choice but to take countermeasures and restore the strategic parity. These measures might concern both defensive and offensive arms. "The Soviet Union," as Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Sokolov, Defense Minister of the USSR, said, "would pick the modes of action that best meet the interests of its defense capability, and not those which the people in Washington might urge it to take. . . . Our measures will be commensurate with the threat that may be created for the Soviet Union and its allies." [6]

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[5] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[6] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVII, No. 18 (May 29, 1985) [variant translation].

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Washington has invented a heap of "arguments"—albeit false, but "arguments" all the same—to justify its "Star Wars" plan. But there is one question on which it could find nothing to say. Nor can it say anything because anything that sounds in the least credible will inevitably overturn the entire propaganda structure artificially erected around the "strategic initiative".

The question is natural: how does the USA intend to abide by the Geneva understanding of January 8, 1985, on preventing an arms race in outer space, and what exactly will it do in that respect? So far, the world has heard nothing from Washington on this score. Yet it will eventually have to say something.

Readers have had the opportunity to acquaint themselves with objective assessments of the scale of the arms race that is now under way and of that which will be set in motion if the militarization of outer space is allowed to begin. And one needs no political foresight or special expertise to see the size of the danger to mankind presented by the US military plans in outer space.

This is the time when everyone must take a stand with regard to President Reagan's "Star Wars" program. No one can afford to stay on the sidelines, to be a neutral bystander, for the question is one of war and peace and, therefore, of life and death.

The following questions can help decide what stand to take:

Aren't there enough weapons piled up, and will people be better off (and safer) if beside the nuclear sword a far more terrifying space sword is raised over the world?

Is it really possible to arrive at the destruction of nuclear weapons by building up their stockpile, as suggested by the United States?

Will other countries gain anything if the USA drags them into the venture it has called a "strategic defense initiative"?

Will the colossal costs of the venture really provide for the security of the American people and the peoples of Western Europe?

Aren't those authoritative scientists, including American ones, right in saying that a "leak-proof" anti-missile defense is impossible to create?

Those who take an unprejudiced view of the facts cited in this pamphlet will agree that the course of events could be reversed if tangible success were achieved at the Soviet-American negotiations on space and nuclear arms in Geneva.

The United States must right its attitude at the negotiations.

That would offer an opportunity for reaching mutually acceptable accords.

The Soviet Union is ready to go its part of the way.

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133. Message From President Reagan to the Congress Transmitting an Amendment to the Agreement With France Regarding Nuclear Cooperation, August 1, 1985 [1]

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to Sections 123 b. and 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2153 (b), (d)), the text of an amendment modifying the 1961 defense nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and France to provide for cooperation on the safety and security of nuclear activities and installations for mutual defense purposes.[2] I am also including a copy of my written approval, authorization, and determination concerning that agreement, as amended. A copy of the joint unclassified letter submitted to me by the Secretaries of Energy and Defense, which provides a summary position on the amendment, is also enclosed. A classified letter and attachments are being transmitted directly to the appropriate congressional committees.

The amendment focuses our cooperation on the safety and security of each nation's nuclear activities and installations. It does not allow transfer of nuclear components or weapons, or special nuclear materials, or source material and, therefore, fully complies with the international agreements in matters of non-proliferation and does not alter other mutual cooperation agreements that exist between the two countries in the field of defense.

I have concluded that the cooperation authorized by the amendment is in the United States' interest and have determined that performance of the amended agreement will promote and not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security. Accordingly, I have approved the amendment and authorized its execution.

I have also found that the amendment meets all applicable requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, for agreements for defense nuclear cooperation; and therefore, I am transmitting it to the Congress without exempting it from any requirement contained in Section 123 a. of the Atomic Energy Act. The transmission shall constitute submittal for the purposes of Sections 123 b. and 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act. The 30-day continuous session period specified in Section 123 b. shall begin immediately. Upon completion of this period, the 60-day continuous session period provided for in Section 123 d. shall commence.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, August 5, 1985, p. 954.
[2] 12 UST 1423, TIAS 4867, 433 UNTS 29.

134. Working Paper Submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament: Verification of the Nonproduction of Chemical Warfare Agents by Means of Inspections in Civilian Chemical Industry, August 1, 1985 [1]

I. General aspects

Under a convention prohibiting chemical weapons, the branches of the civilian chemical industry relevant to the verification of non-production would be subjected to systematic international inspections. The scope of surveillance would depend to a large extent on the substances selected and their significance for civilian purposes, and on the intensity of the actual inspection procedures. The inspections can apply in the industrial sector both to producers, manufacturing industries, and end users.

This paper surveys the range of substances involved and the scope of surveillance and outlines the industrial sector that would have to be covered. After the entry into force of a convention those substances would be selected products of chemicals factories which would be subject to regular inspections to prevent their possible misuse for the manufacture of chemical weapons.

II. Scope of substances

1. General

The choice of substances for non-production inspections may cover products usable exclusively for chemical warfare (single-purpose agents), characteristic key precursors for their production, and substances that are of both military and civilian significance (dual-purpose agents).

However, in order to ensure adequate verification whilst keeping inspections within reasonable limits, generally recognized criteria are needed for the selection of substances and their incorporation in the various inspection procedures.

2. Criteria for the selection of substances

One objective basis for the selection of substances are the toxicity criteria for supertoxic lethal, other lethal and other harmful chemicals as defined by the Conference on Disarmament for the purposes of a convention banning chemical weapons. Another should be the assessment of the potential military threat posed by a chemical substance.

The proposed convention should contain a definition of the term "key precursors". In the opinion of the Federal Republic of Germany the precursors in the final technical reaction stage of the production of supertoxic lethal weapons which are characteristic for the toxicity of the end-product should be defined as key precursors. The final techni-

[1] CD/627.

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cal reaction stage would be determined by the intermediate product which can still be subjected to quantitative inspections in the manufacturing process. This definition is already contained in working paper CD/439 on the transfer problem submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1984.[2]

This definition encompasses only key precursors that are particularly harmful. The key precursors thus defined are generally only used to a very limited extent for civilian purposes. Given the small number of producers, the scope of the inspections will be kept within reasonable limits.

Notwithstanding this general rule, other precursors could be treated as key precursors if, within the meaning of the convention, they constituted a risk and if the competent body under the convention reaches agreement on this point.

The designated key precursors would be listed and annexed to the convention. No consensus has so far been reached in the Conference on Disarmament on the contents of such a list. Several proposals concerning the chemical products to be included in the list have already been submitted.

3. Supertoxic lethal chemicals and key precursors

The supertoxic lethal chemicals that could be used for chemical warfare have at the present time little civilian significance. They are therefore not produced on an industrial scale for such purposes. Under special convention provisions which would be based on the proposals already worked out in the Conference on Disarmament, their manufacture would be permitted in limited quantities for protective purposes but in a declared, separate facility for this purpose. Consequently, an explicit ban on toxic chemicals and key precursors which are of significance for the production of chemical weapons but for which there is no civilian demand at the present time would appear to suggest itself. Such a ban should be included explicitly in a list and ought to cover any quantities in excess of a production of one metric ton per annum. Should the banned substances acquire a civilian significance justifying their production, on an industrial scale, the competent body under the Convention would have to be notified of the envisaged production. The manufacture and use of such substances would have to be subject to systematic inspections.

The systematic international verification of non-production should consist of an exchange of data as well as on-site inspections on a random basis in companies determined by lot and should be limited to the key precursors for the manufacture of supertoxic lethal chemicals within the meaning of the definition given above because with regard to these substances there is a danger of the convention being circumvented.

[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 100–103.

Pinacolyl alcohol, for example, might be included in the list in application of the exception-from-the-rule principle. It is of little general use for permitted purposes. If, therefore, it were manufactured in large quantities it would be justifiable to require proof that it is actually being produced for permitted purposes.

In addition to the systematic monitoring of key precursors including on-site inspections, an exchange of data concerning the production and use of certain selected precursors should take place in order to make inspections of particularly dangerous supertoxic lethal chemicals as effective as possible. This might be applied, for instance, to esters of phosphorous acid, which are used on a large scale for civilian purposes or can be produced analogously to esters of phosphoric acid, and similarly to phosphorus trichloride and phosphorus oxychloride as well as the B-substituted derivatives of N, N-dialkylamino ethanes for the production of VX and analogous substances, some of which are used for many different permitted purposes.

Difficulty arises with regard to the question whether the key precursors of mustard gas should be included in systematic non-production verification procedures. A restriction to the key precursor thiodiglykol would be insufficient since there are other modern manufacturing processes without this compound as intermediate product. Really effective monitoring of key precursors of mustard gas would therefore also have to be extended to substances which are produced in large quantities as basic substances by the chemcial industry and used for many different purposes. Such comprehensive monitoring would hardly be practicable. It would seem expedient, therefore, to concentrate on an exchange of data regarding thiodiglykol and sulphur chlorides which make for a relatively simple technical process in the production of mustard gas.

In addition, producer countries could agree on export controls if it were established that a country were importing key products for the manufacture of mustard gas.

4. Other lethal substances and precursors

In the Conference on Disarmament other potentially dual-purpose lethal chemicals as well as selected precursors for the production of chemical weapons have been proposed as substances which should fall under non-production verification. Contracting States would only be required to report statistical data.

The proposed substances, which themselves can also be used as chemical weapons, are precursors of a number of civilian products. Every year they are produced in the thousands of tons. This applies principally to hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, and phosgene. Their potential threat must today be seen in a different light in view of the availability of much more effective chemical and other weapons.

It is therefore doubtful whether it makes sense to include these products in an exchange of data. In so far as their inclusion is envis-

aged, one should take into account when collecting data concerning their production and use the fact that these chemicals are mass produced.

III. Scope of inspections

1. General

The intensity of inspection procedures must be such as to ensure to an adequate degree of certainty that compliance with the contractual undertaking not to produce chemical weapons is systematically and internationally verifiable.

Legitimate interests of the chemical industry can be protected if on-site inspections are carried out without the disclosure of secret technological and industrial information. This could be achieved by the restrictive selection of substances and the application of inspection procedures oriented to the toxicity and potential threat of the substances.

2. Verification of non-production of key precursors

Verification of the non-production of chemical weapons starts from the physical conditions for the production of such weapons. The supertoxic lethal chemicals produced for chemical warfare differ from those used for civilian purposes in that they have a much higher level of toxicity. For their production, therefore, more has to be invested in safety, which is evident in the physical characteristics of the facility. The absence of the safety precautions necessary for the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals becomes obvious upon viewing the premises and is therefore clear proof that such substances are not being produced in the facility.

In the case of less toxic key precursors manufactured for civilian purposes, which have a lower level of toxicity, the absence of extensive safety precautions is not in itself sufficient evidence that they are not being used for the production of chemical weapons. Consequently, the monitoring of these chemicals must also take other criteria into account and be more comprehensive.

Inspections in the production facility should concentrate on the quantity of key precursor produced or, where the processing is continuous, on the output of finished products. The object of the inspection is not the chemical factory as such, only the one relevant and precisely defined substance.

The actual test should take place in the crucial reaction phase. It should begin at the stage in the overall production process immediately preceding the emergence of the key precursor and cover only this phase.

Inspections of key precursors should be conducted on the basis of annual statistical data and on-site inspections if the total annual quantity produced exceeds one metric ton.

To ensure that the manufacturers of key precursors in question receive equal treatment, on-site inspections should be carried out on a

random basis. Companies should be determined by lot, with the competent body under the convention fixing every year the percentage of all firms to be subjected to inspections.

The installation of additional measuring instruments by the inspecting agencies to monitor the quantities produced does not appear necessary and would moreover be impracticable.

The inspection, consisting of statistical data, the review of plant records, interviews, viewing of facility areas, as well as sampling and analysis, must ensure reliable verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. However, they should not provide an overall survey of the production process and hence insights into a firm's own manufacturing processes.

3. Inspections relating to the manufacture of key precursors

The systematic verification of non-production in the chemical industry should serve to confirm that quantities of key precursors that are declared to be intended for permitted purposes are actually used as stated in the information given. Such inspections must therefore be sufficiently accurate and reliable. This is relatively simple in the case of key precursors which, as intermediates, are directly and completely further processed in the same facility. The procedure becomes even more straight forward where the key precursor goes through a continuous and automatic reaction process without being isolated. This will mostly be the case with substances that are produced in large quantities for a finished product for which there is a consistently high demand.

Key precursors with a wide range of uses are sold to other domestic firms or exported for further processing more often than those the use of which as intermediates applies to only a few finished products. The supply of such key precursors to manufacturers makes inspection procedures more difficult and costly. In order to ensure their effectiveness they would have to be extended to the facilities of manufacturers both at home and abroad.

In order to limit the number of companies affected, only those who receive quantities of key precursors in excess of one metric ton per year should fall within the scope of inspections. On the one hand, fixing a much higher limit would include the risk of companies' spreading the processing among several plants to keep below the limit. Moreover, it might give rise to unjustified mistrust where a key precursor which is used for a large variety of products actually is processed in many smaller factories. This is true in the case of substances used for the production of pharmaceuticals, for instance.

The need to include further processing in procedures designed to verify non-production again shows that a restrictive approach has to be adopted when determining key precursors. The proposal for limiting key precursors to such supertoxic lethal chemicals will minimize inspections of manufacturing companies because there are narrow

qualitative and quantitative limits on the use of the substances in question for permitted purposes.

4. Inspection relating to the production of other lethal chemicals and precursors

As regards the monitoring of the non-manufacture of other lethal chemicals and precursors for the production of chemical weapons, various proposals have been submitted recommending an inspection procedure which would be restricted to the annual reporting of statistical data.

As these are mostly chemicals that are not only manufactured in large quantities but are also used for a variety of civilian purposes, the cost of ensuring a—as far as possible complete—record would be considerable. In order to achieve this, data on the manufactured, processed, imported and exported quantities of every selected substance would have to be officially recorded. It is unknown to us whether and to what extent countries are at present able to maintain such comprehensive records or authorized under their respective data protection legislation to transfer said data to an international inspectorate.

Careful thought has yet to be given to the collection and evaluation of the data. The proposals submitted to date do not clearly indicate how the international body can determine from the total data submitted whether a State has violated the convention. Moreover, the collection of comprehensive data must not lead to the disclosure of information about relationships with buyers in a manner and to an extent that might impair national economic interests.

IV. Summary

It is intended that the verification of non-production of chemical weapons should take the form of systematic international surveillance of specific sectors of the chemical industry, covering a list of selected substances to be annexed to a convention.

A convention banning chemical weapons will have to contain guidelines for determining the scope of such substances.

The guidelines for supertoxic lethal chemicals and their key precursors suggested in this paper limit the scope to such substances and specific precursors as would be listed in an annex to the convention.

The scope of the inspections must be such as to meet the verification requirements of the proposed convention, but also allow for the legitimate national economic interests of the chemical industry affected.

Surveillance should be limited to two measures, namely random on-site inspections based on the drawing of lots together with annual statistical reports on a scale yet to be agreed.

If the further processing of key precursors within the meaning of the above definition were to take place outside the production facility monitoring of the manufacture of these products would not be sufficient. In this case it would be necessary to extend inspections to domestic and foreign processors who have received them. The number

of producers and manufacturing companies who would thus be subject to non-production inspections would be relatively small.

135. News Conference Remarks by President Reagan: Nuclear Weapons Test Moratorium [Extract], August 5, 1985 [1]

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Q. On a related point, why won't you go along with Gorbachev's suggestion for a joint moratorium on nuclear testing? [2]

Mr. Speakes. Can we make this the last question?

The President. All right. That's the last question, all right. But I'm delighted to answer that one, too.

The Soviet Union is ahead of us in the development and the modernization of nuclear weapons. They have just finished their tests, or they even have a couple left they might try to sneak in before the 6th, which was their opening date. But they had finished their tests on their 24's and 25's, the 18, which is comparable to our MX. And we have not yet begun the testing and certainly haven't completed it in some of our weapons of that same type to keep pace with them.

So, their suggestion for a mutual—first of all, for a single moratorium for several months—they finished their tests; they don't have any more to do. The asking us to make it mutual meant that we would then not be able to catch up with them. And we've had an example of that back in the Kennedy era, and this had to do with the testing with regard to ABM's and so forth. And we were begging for a treaty, and the Soviet Union kept refusing. And they'd completed the tests, and then the Congress passed a go-ahead for us. And the Soviets immediately said to President Kennedy, "Oh, yes, we're willing to talk now about a moratorium on testing."

So, this is why we said to them: "Look, we still have our tests to do, same ones that you've been doing. You're welcome to send somebody over and watch all our tests."

And I would like to add also that after that limited moratorium, which was supposed to end around December or something, if they want to make that a permanent moratorium or if they want to agree with us and have bilateral inspection of each other's testing, we're willing to do that.

Q. You said watch all our tests?

Q. You would go for a total moratorium, permanent moratorium on all underground tests? All tests?

Q. At the end of the year?

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, August 12, 1985, pp. 965–966.
[2] Document 126.

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The President. Once when—well, I don't know whether we'd be able to complete ours by that time or not—when we've completed ours and they're not doing any more———

Q. Well, they say we've———

The President. ———yes, that would be fine.

Q. ———completed ours in Nevada.

The President. What?

Q. I understand our tests have been completed.

The President. Oh, no. We're still talking about a Midgetman to match their 24 or 25. And we haven't even come to that stage yet.

Q. When might that be? Within a year or———

The President. I don't know. I don't know. But, in the meantime, let's get back down to real facts. In Geneva is where the decision should be made and not with moratoriums of that kind. Let's get down to the business, once and for all, of reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, hopefully leading toward a total elimination of them. Then there wouldn't be any need for testing.

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136. Statement by President Reagan on the 40th Anniversary of the Bombing of Hiroshima, August 6, 1985 [1]

This week millions around the world will mark the 40th anniversary of the first and only uses of nuclear weapons—events that brought to an end a long and terrible war. The war over, an unprecedented friendship between the free peoples and democratic governments of the United States and Japan was born. Thus, as we reflect on the meaning of the events of 40 years ago, we and the people of Japan can take pride in having demonstrated that, even between former enemies in warfare, lasting reconciliation is possible.

We must never forget what nuclear weapons wrought upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, yet we must also remain mindful that our maintenance of a strong nuclear deterrent has for four decades ensured the security of the United States and the freedom of our allies in Asia and Europe. In Europe, these years represent the longest period of peace since the early 19th century.

Peace has not made us complacent, for we are continually seeking ways to reduce still further the risks of war. As I have often stated, "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." This anniversary is, therefore, a time not only for reflection but for action.

The United States will take every reasonable step to build a more peaceful world. Just last week I extended to the Soviet leadership an invitation to send a team of Soviet experts to our Nevada test site to

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, August 12, 1985, p. 968.

observe and measure the yield of an American nuclear test. My offer involved no preconditions; the Soviet experts were invited to bring with them any instrumentation devices that they deemed necessary to measure the yield of the test. Our objective was straightforward: to set in train a process that, regarding limitations on nuclear testing, could markedly increase confidence and cooperation between our nations.

It is my hope that the Soviet leadership will accept this invitation in the spirit of good will in which it has been tendered. I would also urge the leadership of the Soviet Union to work with us to achieve deep, verifiable, and equitable reductions in nuclear arsenals; to resolve questions relating to compliance with existing arms control agreements; and to establish a constructive dialog on ways to reduce the risk of accidental war.

We must also be vigilant in our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation—and here all nations must share the burden. Those who would profit from the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to trouble parts of the globe pose a threat to world peace. Action must be taken, and we encourage all nations to join us in requiring comprehensive safeguards as a condition of nuclear export.

We look forward to the third review session of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,[2] which will begin this month. The United States, the Soviet Union, and all the nations of the world must work to ensure that the atom is never again used as a weapon of war, but as an instrument of peace.

137. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, August 6, 1985 [1]

PREAMBLE

The Parties to this Treaty,

United in their commitment to a world at peace;

Gravely concerned that the continuing nuclear arms race presents the risk of nuclear war which would have devastating consequences for all people;

Convinced that all countries have an obligation to make every effort to achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the terror which they hold for humankind and the threat which they pose to life on earth;

Believing that regional arms control measures can contribute to global efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race and promote the national security of each country in the region and the common security of all;

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[2] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[1] CD/633 and Corr. 2. The Treaty was endorsed by the Heads of Government of the South Pacific Forum at its meeting in Rarotonga in the Cook Islands. The Protocols were subsequently revised and opened for signature on December 1.

Determined to ensure, so far as lies within their power, that the bounty and beauty of the land and sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their peoples and their descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace;

Reaffirming the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in contributing to world security; [2]

Noting, in particular, that Article VII of the NPT recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;

Noting that the prohibitions of emplantation and emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof contained in the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof apply in the South Pacific; [3]

Noting also that the prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere or under water, including territorial waters or high seas, contained in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water applies in the South Pacific; [4]

Determined to keep the region free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter;

Guided by the decision of the Fifteenth South Pacific Forum at Tuvalu that a nuclear free zone should be established in the region at the earliest possible opportunity in accordance with the principles set out in the communiqué of that meeting;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Usage of Terms

For the purposes of this Treaty and its Protocols:

(a) "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone" means that areas described in Annex 1 as illustrated by the map attached to that Annex;

(b) "territory" means internal waters, territorial sea and archipelagic waters, the seabed and subsoil beneath, the land territory and the airspace above them;

(c) "nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it;

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[2] The text of the Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[3] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 7–11.
[4] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.

(d) "stationing" means emplantation, emplacement, transportation on land or inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment.

ARTICLE 2

Application of the Treaty

1. Except where otherwise specified, this Treaty and its Protocols shall apply to territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.
2. Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to freedom of the seas.

ARTICLE 3

Renunciation of Nuclear Explosive Devices

Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere inside or outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;
(b) not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device;
(c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any State.

ARTICLE 4

Peaceful Nuclear Activities

Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to:

(i) any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to the safeguards required by Article III.1 of the NPT, or
(ii) any nuclear-weapon State unless subject to applicable safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Any such provision shall be in accordance with strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful non-explosive use;
(b) to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the NPT and IAEA safeguards system.

ARTICLE 5

Prevention of Stationing of Nuclear Explosive Devices

1. Each Party undertakes to prevent in its territory the stationing of any nuclear explosive device.

2. Each Party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage of straits.

ARTICLE 6

Prevention of Testing of Nuclear Explosive Devices

Each Party undertakes:

(a) to prevent in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device;

(b) not to take any action to assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device by any State.

ARTICLE 7

Prevention of Dumping

1. Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to dump radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;

(b) to prevent the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone in its territorial sea;

(c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping by anyone of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;

(d) to support the conclusion as soon as possible of the proposed Convention relating to the protection of the natural resources and environment of the South Pacific region and its Protocol for the prevention of pollution of the South Pacific region by dumping, with the aim of precluding dumping at sea of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone anywhere in the region.

2. Paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of this Article shall not apply to areas of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone in respect of which such a Convention and Protocol have entered into force.

ARTICLE 8

Control System

1. The Parties hereby establish a control system for the purpose of verifying compliance with their obligations under this Treaty.

2. The control system shall comprise:

(a) reports and exchange of information as provided for in Article 9;

(b) consultations as provided for in Article 10 and Annex 4 (1);

(c) the application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by the IAEA as provided for in Annex 2;

(d) a complaints procedure as provided for in Annex 4.

ARTICLE 9

Reports and Exchanges of Information

1. Each Party shall report to the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (the Director) as soon as possible any significant event within its jurisdiction affecting the implementation of this Treaty. The Director shall circulate such reports promptly to all Parties.
2. The Parties shall endeavour to keep each other informed on matters arising under or in relation to this Treaty. They may exchange information by communicating it to the Director, who shall circulate it to all Parties.
3. The Director shall report annually to the South Pacific Forum on the status of this Treaty and matters arising under or in relation to it, incorporating reports and communications made under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and matters arising under Article 8(2)(d) and 10 and Annex 2(4).

ARTICLE 10

Consultations and Review

Without prejudice to the conduct of consultations among Parties by other means, the Director, at the request of any Party, shall convene a meeting of the Consultative Committee established by Annex 3 for consultation and co-operation on any matter arising in relation to this Treaty or for reviewing its operation.

ARTICLE 11

Amendment

The Consultative Committee shall consider proposals for amendment of the provisions of this Treaty proposed by any Party and circulated by the Director to all Parties not less than three months prior to the convening of the Consultative Committee for this purpose. Any proposal agreed upon by consensus by the Consultative Committee shall be communicated to the Director who shall circulate it for acceptance to all Parties. An amendment shall enter into force thirty days after receipt by the depositary of acceptances from all Parties.

ARTICLE 12

Signature and Ratification

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature by any Member of the South Pacific Forum.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Director who is hereby designated depositary of this Treaty and its Protocols.

3. If a Member of the South Pacific Forum whose territory is outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone becomes a Party to this Treaty, Annex 1 shall be deemed to be amended so far as is required to enclose at least the territory of that Party within the boundaries of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The delineation of any area added pursuant to this paragraph shall be approved by the South Pacific Forum.

ARTICLE 13

Withdrawal

1. This Treaty is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that in the event of a violation by any Party of a provision of this Treaty essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty or of the spirit of the Treaty, every other Party shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty.
2. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice twelve months in advance to the Director who shall circulate such notice to all other Parties.

ARTICLE 14

Reservations

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 15

Entry into Force

1. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification.
2. For a signatory which ratifies this Treaty after the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification, the Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE 16

Depositary Functions

The depositary shall register this Treaty and its Protocols pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and shall transmit certified copies of the Treaty and its Protocols to all Members of the South Pacific Forum and all States eligible to become Party to the Protocols to the Treaty and shall notify them of signatures and ratifications of the Treaty and its Protocols.

In Witness Whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Treaty.

Done at Rarotonga, this sixth day of August, One thousand nine hundred and eighty-five, in a single original in the English language.

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ANNEX 1

SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE

A. The area bounded by a line:

(1) commencing at the point of intersection of the Equator by the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea;
(2) running thence northerly along that maritime boundary to its intersection by the outer limit of the exclusive economic zone of Papua New Guinea;
(3) thence generally north-easterly, easterly and south-easterly along that outer limit to its intersection by the Equator;
(4) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 163 degrees East;
(5) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 3 degrees North;
(6) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 171 degrees East;
(7) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 4 degrees North;
(8) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 180 degrees East;
(9) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator;
(10) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 165 degrees West;
(11) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 5 degrees 30 minutes North;
(12) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 154 degrees West;
(13) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator;
(14) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 115 degrees West;
(15) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 60 degrees South;
(16) thence west along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 115 degrees East;
(17) thence north along that meridian to its southernmost intersection by the outer limit of the territorial sea of Australia;
(18) thence generally northerly and easterly along the outer limit of the territorial sea of Australia to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 136 degrees 45 minutes East;
(19) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10 degrees 50 minutes South, Longitude 139 degrees 12 minutes East;
(20) thence north-easterly along the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to where it joins the land border between those two countries;
(21) thence generally northerly along that land border to where it joins the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, on the northern coastline of Papua New Guinea; and

(22) thence generally northerly along that boundary to the point of commencement.

B. The areas within the outer limits of the territorial seas of all Australian islands lying westward of the area described in paragraph A and north of Latitude 60 degrees South, provided that any such areas shall cease to be part of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone upon receipt by the depositary of written notice from the Government of Australia stating that the areas have become subject to another treaty having an object and purpose substantially the same as that of this Treaty.

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ANNEX 2

IAEA SAFEGUARDS

1. The safeguards referred to in Article 8 shall in respect of each Party be applied by the IAEA as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with the IAEA on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. The agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be, or shall be equivalent in its scope and effect to, an agreement required in connection with the NPT on the basis of the material reproduced in document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) of the IAEA.[5] Each Party shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that such an agreement is in force for it not later than 18 months after the date of entry into force for that Party of this Treaty.

3. For the purposes of this Treaty, the safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 shall have as their purpose the verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear explosive devices.

4. Each Party agrees upon the request of any other Party to transmit to that Party and to the Director for the information of all Parties a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by the IAEA on its inspection activities in the territory of the Party concerned, and to advise the Director promptly of any subsequent findings of the Board of Governors of the IAEA in relation to those conclusions for the information of all Parties.

ANNEX 3

CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

1. There is hereby established a Consultative Committee which shall be convened by the Director from time to time pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 and Annex 4 (2). The Consultative Committee shall be constituted of representatives of the Parties, each Party being entitled to appoint one representative who may be accompanied by advisers. Unless otherwise agreed, the Consultative Committee shall be chaired at any given meeting by the representative of the Party which last hosted the meeting of Heads of Government of Members of the South Pacific Forum. A quorum shall be constituted by representatives of half the Parties. Subject to the provisions of Article 11, decisions of the Consultative Committee shall be taken by consensus or, failing consensus, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. The Consultative Committee shall adopt such other rules of procedure as it sees fit.

2. The costs of the Consultative Committee, including the costs of special inspections pursuant to Annex 4, shall be borne by the South

[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 218–244.

Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation. It may seek special funding should this be required.

ANNEX 4

COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE

1. A Party which considers that there are grounds for a complaint that another Party is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty shall, before bringing such a complaint to the Director, bring the subject matter of the complaint to the attention of the Party complained of and shall allow the latter reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation and to resolve the matter.

2. If the matter is not so resolved, the complainant Party may bring the complaint to the Director with a request that the Consultative Committee be convened to consider it. Complaints shall be supported by an account of evidence of breach of obligations known to the complainant Party. Upon receipt of a complaint the Director shall convene the Consultative Committee as quickly as possible to consider it.

3. The Consultative Committee, taking account of efforts made under paragraph 1, shall afford the Party complained of a reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation of the matter.

4. If, after considering any explanation given to it by the representatives of the Party complained of, the Consultative Committee decides that there is sufficient substance in the complaint to warrant a special inspection in the territory of that Party or elsewhere, the Consultative Committee shall direct that such special inspection be made as quickly as possible by a special inspection team of three suitably qualified special inspectors appointed by the Consultative Committee in consultation with the complained of and complainant Parties, provided that no national of either Party shall serve on the special inspection team. If so requested by the Party complained of, the special inspection team shall be accompanied by representatives of that Party. Neither the right of consultation on the appointment of special inspectors, nor the right to accompany special inspectors, shall delay the work of the special inspection team.

5. In making a special inspection, special inspectors shall be subject to the direction only of the Consultative Committee and shall comply with such directives concerning tasks, objectives, confidentiality and procedures as may be decided upon by it. Directives shall take account of the legitimate interests of the Party complained of in complying with its other international obligations and commitments and shall not duplicate safeguards procedures to be undertaken by the IAEA pursuant to agreements referred to in Annex 2 (1). The special inspectors shall discharge their duties with due respect for the laws of the Party complained of.

6. Each Party shall give to special inspectors full and free access to all information and places within its territory which may be relevant to

enable the special inspectors to implement the directives given to them by the Consultative Committee.

7. The Party complained of shall take all appropriate steps to facilitate the special inspection, and shall grant to special inspectors privileges and immunities necessary for the performance of their functions, including inviolability for all papers and documents and immunity from arrest, detention and legal process for acts done and words spoken and written, for the purpose of the special inspection.

8. The special inspectors shall report in writing as quickly as possible to the Consultative Committee, outlining their activities, setting out relevant facts and information as ascertained by them, with supporting evidence and documentation as appropriate, and stating their conclusions. The Consultative Committee shall report fully to all Members of the South Pacific Forum, giving its decision as to whether the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty.

9. If the Consultative Committee has decided that the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty, or that the above provisions have not been complied with, or at any time at the request of either the complainant or complained of Party, the Parties shall meet promptly at a meeting of the South Pacific Forum.

PROTOCOL 1

The Parties to this Protocol,

Noting the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty)

Have Agreed as follows:

Article 1

Each Party undertakes to apply, in respect of the territories for which it is internationally responsible situated within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, the prohibitions contained in Articles 3, 5 and 6, in so far as they relate to the manufacture, stationing and testing of any nuclear explosive device within those territories, and the safeguards specified in Article 8 (2)(c) and Annex 2 of the Treaty.

Article 2

Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligations under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty.

Article 3

This Protocol shall be open for signature by France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 4

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

ARTICLE 5

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

DONE at , this day of One thousand nine hundred and eighty- , in a single original in the English language.

PROTOCOL 2

The Parties to this Protocol
Noting the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty)
Have Agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes not to contribute to any act which constitutes a violation of the Treaty or its Protocols by Parties to them.

ARTICLE 2

Each Party further undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against:

(a) Parties to the Treaty; or
(b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible.

ARTICLE 3

Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligations under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty or by the extension of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 4

This Protocol shall be open for signature by France, the People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 5

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

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ARTICLE 6

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

DONE at , this day of One thousand nine hundred and eighty- , in a single original in the English language.

PROTOCOL 3

The Parties to this Protocol
Noting the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty)
Have Agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

ARTICLE 2

Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty or by the extension of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

This Protocol shall be open for signature by France, the People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 4

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

ARTICLE 5

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

DONE at , this day of One thousand nine hundred and eighty- , in a single original in the English language.

138. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985: Arms Transfers and Nuclear Facilities [Extracts], August 8, 1985 [1]

99 STAT. 198

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22 USC 2765.

SEC. 113. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL VOLUME OF ARMS TRAFFIC.

Section 25 of the Arms Export Control Act is amended—

(1) in subsection (a) by striking out "No later than February 1" and inserting in lieu thereof "Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, no later than February 1"; and

(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(d) The information required by subsection (a)(4) of this section shall be transmitted to the Congress no later than April 1 of each year.".

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99 STAT. 206

22 USC 2751 note.

SEC. 129. CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS.

(a) NEGOTIATIONS.—At the earliest possible date, the President should, in consultation with the United States allies, initiate discussions with the Soviet Union and France aimed at beginning multilateral negotiations to limit and control the transfer of conventional arms to less developed countries.

(b) REPORT.—Within one year after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report which specifies steps being taken to fulfill the requirements of subsection (a) and which examines and analyzes the United States policies concerning the export of the conventional arms, especially sophisticated weapons, and possible approaches to developing multilateral limitations on conventional arms sales. This report shall examine and analyze—

(1) the lessons of earlier efforts to negotiate restraints on the export of conventional arms;

[1] P.L. 99–83, Sections 113, 129, 207.

(2) the evolution of supplier practices and policies;

(3) the evolution of recipient country attitudes regarding conventional arms transfers;

(4) the effect upon regional stability and security of conventional arms transfers by the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies;

(5) the relationship between arms imports and the external debt of recipient countries, the allocation of their internal resources, and their economic well-being;

(6) the relationship between arms exports by Western European countries and the needs of those countries to support their domestic military procurement programs;

(7) the prospects for engaging the Soviet Union in serious discussions concerning arms transfers, both globally and as they relate to regional security problems;

(8) possible measures by the United States and Western European suppliers to control levels of sophisticated weapons sales, both regionally and globally; and

(9) the timing and phasing of international conventional arms control negotiations.

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99 STAT. 213

SEC. 207. RESTRICTION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

International agreements.

21 UST 483

22 UST 762

Funds authorized to be appropriated to carry out chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for fiscal year 1986 or fiscal year 1987 may not be used to finance the construction of, the operation or maintenance of, or the supplying of fuel for, any nuclear facility in a foreign country unless the President certifies to the Congress that such country is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [2] or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the "Treaty of Tlatelolco"),[3] cooperates fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and pursues non-

[2] The text of the Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[3] The treaty and its protocols are printed *ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

proliferation policies consistent with those of the United States.

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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 960 (H.R. 1555):
HOUSE REPORTS: No. 99–39 accompanying H.R. 1555 (Comm. on Foreign Affairs) and No. 99–237 (Comm. of Conference).
SENATE REPORT No. 99–34 (Comm. on Foreign Relations).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 131 (1985):
May 14, 15, considered and passed Senate.
May 16, July 9–11, H.R. 1555 considered and passed House; S. 960, amended, passed in lieu.
July 30, Senate agreed to conference report.
July 31, House agreed to conference report.
WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 21, No. 32 (1985): Aug. 8, 1985, Presidential statement.

139. Authorization for an Improved U.S.-Soviet Direct Communications Link, August 8, 1985 [1]

99 STAT. 286

JOINT RESOLUTION

Authorizing the Secretary of Defense to provide to the Soviet Union, on a reimbursable basis, equipment and services necessary for an improved United States/Soviet Direct Communications Link for crisis control.

Aug. 8, 1985 [S.J. Res. 108]

96 Stat. 756.

Whereas section 1123(a) of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1983 (Public Law 97–252), directed the Secretary of Defense "to conduct a full and complete study and evaluation of possible initiatives for improving the containment and control of the use of nuclear weapons, particularly during crises";

Whereas the Congress directed that the same study should address several specific measures for building confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union, including an improved Direct Communications Link for crisis control;

Whereas the Secretary of Defense responded to that congressional mandate with a report entitled "Report to

[1] P.L. 99–85; 99 Stat. 286.

the Congress on Direct Communications Links and Other Measures to Enhance Stability" in which the Secretary proposed several improvements to existing United States-Soviet mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of crises, including the addition of a facsimile capability to the United States/Soviet Union Direct Communications Link; [2]

Whereas the President of the United States presented the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense to the Government of the Soviet Union in May 1983;

Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union commenced negotiations on bilateral communications improvements in August 1983, and on July 17, 1984, concluded the Exchange of Notes Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Direct Communications Link Upgrade in which the two governments agreed to add a facsimile capability to the Direct Communications Link; [3]

Whereas the Congress endorses that agreement and remains committed to all possible measures to facilitate the resolution of international crises and to limit the danger of conflict;

Whereas the Secretary of Defense is responsible for the installation, maintenance, and operation of the Direct Communications Link equipment for the United States; and

Whereas the Exchange of Notes Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Direct Communications Link Upgrade provides that the United States Government will provide to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at cost, the equipment and services necessary for the Soviet Union part of the improved Direct Communications Link: Now, therefore, be it

10 USC 133 note.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of Defense may provide to the Soviet Union, as provided in the Exchange of Notes Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Direct Communications Link Upgrade, concluded on July 17, 1984, such equipment and services as may be necessary to upgrade or maintain the Soviet Union

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1983,* pp. 309–324.
[3] *Ibid., 1984,* pp. 520 ff.

99 STAT. 289.
14 UST 825.

part of the Direct Communications Link agreed to in the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union signed June 20, 1963.[4] The Secretary shall provide such equipment and services to the Soviet Union at the cost thereof to the United States.

10 USC 133 note.

SEC. 2. (a) The Secretary of Defense may use any funds available to the Department of Defense for the procurement of the equipment and providing the services referred to in the first section.

(b) Funds received from the Soviet Union as payment for such equipment and services shall be credited to the appropriate account of Department of Defense.

Approved August 8, 1985.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S.J. Res. 108:

HOUSE REPORT No. 99–156 (Comm. on Armed Services).

SENATE REPORT No. 99–49 (Comm. on Armed Services).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 131 (1985): May 16, considered and passed Senate. July 29, considered and passed House.

140. News Interview of Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev: Nuclear Weapons Test Moratorium, August 11, 1985 [1]

Question: How would you rate the reaction in the world to the new Soviet initiative, the introduction of a moratorium on nuclear explosions? [2]

Answer: If you mean the mood of the public at large, I think there is every reason to say that the new initiative by the Soviet Union, which has unilaterally halted all nuclear explosions and has called upon the United States to join in that action, has been welcomed in the world. In many countries, including the United States, eminent statesmen, politicians and public figures are expressing support for the idea of a moratorium on nuclear weapon testing, for the following of the Soviet Union's example by the other nuclear Powers. Our proposal concerns a specific, tangible measure. People see in it a hope for the slowing and later the halting of the nuclear arms race.

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[4] *Ibid., 1963,* pp. 236–238.
[1] CD/638. The interview was published by TASS on August 14.
[2] See Document 126.

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I know that our initiative is not to everyone's liking. Those in the West who have linked their policy to the further acceleration of the arms race, who are deriving considerable profits from this, do not want an end to nuclear testing. They are opposing a moratorium because they do not want the nuclear-weapon assembly lines to come to a stop. They cling to vain illusions of somehow attaining military supremacy. At the same time, they are spreading nonsense about the Soviet Union's policy, including the moratorium we have declared on nuclear explosions.

On our part, the step was sincere and open. We opted for a moratorium because we are deeply convinced that practical measures must be taken to halt the accumulation and the further improvement of nuclear weapons. We were not in any way striving to put the American administration in a difficult position. The United States President was informed in advance of our action by a letter in which we suggested to the Americans that they should act in the same way. I should have liked the American leadership to respond positively to that appeal. The public statements by officials in Washington concerning the moratorium give the impression that the main concern there now is, unfortunately, to find the smartest way of evading such a response. It would be no mistake to say that the world expects a different attitude.

Question: President Reagan said recently that the United States cannot place a moratorium on nuclear testing because it needs to complete its nuclear programme. He claimed in doing so that the Soviet Union had completed an intensive series of nuclear explosions and could afford a breathing space.[3] Is that true?

Answer: The Soviet leadership reviewed this issue carefully and comprehensively before taking its decision on the unilateral halting of nuclear explosions. It was not at all easy for us to take the step we did. To introduce a unilateral moratorium, we had to break off a programme of tests without having completed it.

During the course of this year prior to the declaration of the moratorium, there were virtually as many nuclear explosions in the USSR as in the United States. If we take all the nuclear tests that have been conducted to date, there have been far more in the United States than in the USSR. They are aware of this in the White House.

But, in deciding on a unilateral moratorium, the Soviet Union was guided not by arithmetic, but by fundamental political considerations, by a desire to contribute to the halting of the nuclear arms race and to encourage the United States and the other nuclear weapon countries to do the same. Our goal is the complete and general cessation of nuclear weapon tests and not any kind of breathing space between explosions.

It is being said that the introduction of a moratorium on nuclear explosions is not in the United States interests. But a moratorium is an important step towards the halting of the further improvement of lethal nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the longer there are no tests, the

[3] Document 135.

quicker will be the process of "aging" of the weapons in stockpiles. And finally, a moratorium creates the most favourable conditions for the achievement of agreement on the halting of nuclear testing, for progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons in general.

The question then arises what is there in this that is against the interests of the United States, of the American people? The only ones such a course does not suit are those who rely on the pressure of force, who nurture plans for the continual creation of new types of nuclear weapons on Earth, who have set their minds on the unleashing of an arms race in space. But what has that to do with the genuine interests of the strengthening of peace and international security to which Washington has repeatedly declared it aspires?

They try to explain away their unwillingness to halt nuclear testing by saying that the United States suffers from a nuclear-weapons "gap". That is just an excuse. They have talked in the past of a bomber gap and then a missile gap. But each time it was a deliberate deception, as Washington itself later admitted. In other words, talk of "gaps" begins when they are striving to achieve military supremacy, when there is no real desire to solve the issues of arms limitation. And yet it is just those issues on which the decisions must be taken by the political authorities and not on the basis of contrived myths about a "Soviet threat", but on the basis of the actual situation, of the genuine interests of national security, of the interests of international security.

Question: How do you see the problem of verification in the context of the proposal to halt nuclear explosions?

Answer: The existing scientific and technical capability here, in the United States and in other countries provides the necessary degree of certainty that a nuclear explosion, even a low-yield one, will be detected, will become known. Those who affirm the contrary know that is not how things are.

Unilateral steps to halt nuclear explosions cannot, of course, totally resolve the problem of the complete and general cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. For that problem to be settled once and for all there must be an international agreement. In addition to the relevant obligations, it should also contain an appropriate system of measures—both national and international—for verification. Briefly, we are for the monitoring of the cessation of nuclear explosions, but we are against the replacement of a halt to testing by the continuation of tests in the presence of observers.

It must be remembered that the problem of the complete and general cessation of nuclear-weapon tests is far from new. Some years ago it was examined at length in the course of tripartite talks between the USSR, the United States and Britain at which verification issues too were discussed in the most detailed fashion. On many points the parties were close to mutual understanding. But the United States broke off the talks and broke them off because the restrictions that had been worked out were an obstacle to the Pentagon's plans.

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We have proposed to the United States several times that the talks should be resumed. Today, too, we are appealing to them for the same thing, so as completely to end nuclear-weapon tests. The holding of such talks, the achievement at them of results would be much easier in a situation in which the USSR and the United States were not conducting nuclear tests. The United States, however, does not want to return to the negotiating table. And that means that the United States does not want either an end to nuclear testing or a reliable verification system. No other conclusion can be drawn.

It is sometimes said that the question of the halting of nuclear-weapon tests should be examined at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Well, we're willing to discuss it there too. But in Geneva the United States and other Western countries have long been sabotaging the holding of such talks. Consequently, the question is not where to consider the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. It is important to examine this problem seriously and without delay, including at the forthcoming Soviet-American meeting.

Question: In your opinion, can we still count on a positive settlement of the nuclear-test issue?

Answer: I think so. Although the United States present attitude to our proposal does not inspire optimism, I should still not like to give up hope. And this is why. The responsibility incumbent on the Soviet Union and the United States is too great to evade the resolution of the major security issues.

What we are proposing is a genuine possibility of halting the further build-up of nuclear arsenals, of really starting to resolve the task of reducing and, ultimately, eliminating them.

141. Soviet Proposal Submitted to the U.N. General Assembly: Main Lines and Principles of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Exploitation of Outer Space Under Conditions of its Nonmilitarization, August 15, 1985 [1]

The breakthrough into outer space and the transition to the practical utilization of that limitless expanse constitute one of mankind's most outstanding scientific and technical achievements.

During the period, short on a historical scale, that has elapsed since the Soviet Union launched the world's first artificial earth satellite in 1957 and since the VOSTOK spacecraft, manned by Yuri Gagarin, our planet's first cosmonaut, rose into orbit in 1961, a giant leap has been made in the peaceful exploitation of outer space.

[1] A/40/192. The proposal was annexed to a letter to the Secretary-General from Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze requesting inclusion in the agenda of the 40th U.N. General Assembly of an item with the above title. A draft resolution was attached as an appendix (printed *infra*).

Mankind has begun essentially to make circumterrestrial space habitable. There are now hundreds of satellites in orbit, and space stations in which crews of scientific and technical specialists, including some international crews, alternate and work for months at a time, are operating on a permanent basis. Interplanetary scientific stations are exploring the depths of the solar system. Space vehicles are being used for the systematic study of the Moon, Venus and Mars. Mankind's horizons in space are becoming ever broader and more majestic.

However, there is today a growing possibility that outer space may become a source of terrible military danger. Plans now being proclaimed and activities now being undertaken are aimed at developing and deploying space strike weapons to destroy objects in space and to launch attacks from space against objects in the atmosphere and on Earth, including the creation of a large-scale anti-missile system with space-based components.

The implementation of plans to militarize outer space would bring a sharp increase in the nuclear threat and would deprive the peoples of the world of any hope for the coming of a day when nuclear weapons will disappear from the face of the Earth. Moreover, the arms race would take on a radically new and even more dangerous dimension in all its aspects. Into its fires would be cast additional vast resources that could be used for the peaceful development of mankind and the solution of its urgent problems.

Militarization would strike the entire field of space activity like a severe and incurable disease and would raise insurmountable obstacles to the development of international co-operation in the peaceful exploitation of outer space.

The peoples and Governments of all countries must recognize the magnitude of the problem confronting mankind and the full measure of their historic responsibility for its solution.

We have arrived at a point in the development of civilization at which either the age of large-scale exploitation and utilization of outer space for man's benefit will begin or outer space will become a source of deadly danger to man.

The Soviet Union is resolutely opposed to competition in weapons of any kind, including space weapons. The efforts it is making today to prevent the militarization of outer space are a continuation of its consistent and purposeful policy aimed at making sure that outer space is used for the benefit of mankind. As early as 1958, when it blazed the first trails in outer space, the USSR introduced in the United Nations a proposal on banning the use of cosmic space for military purposes.[2]

Although a radical solution of the problem of keeping space nonmilitarized proved impossible at that time, the 1960s and 1970s saw the conclusion of important treaties which substantially limited the possibility of its military use. These were the multilateral treaties on

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 973 ff.

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the prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (1963) [3] and on principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies (1967),[4] the Soviet-United States treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems (1972) [5] and a number of other agreements.

Those documents created favourable conditions for the first steps in organizing mutually beneficial co-operation between States in outer space. Even today, if a reliable barrier could be set up to prevent the placement of weapons in space, States would have an opportunity to combine their efforts and resources in making sure that the results of the space activities of all States will be used not for destruction but for creation, for the well-being of all the peoples living on our planet.

The USSR is in favour of such co-operation. It appeals to all countries and peoples with a proposal to do everything they can in order to prevent an arms race in outer space and work together for its peaceful investigation and exploitation to the advantage of all mankind.

First. The non-militarization of space—that is to say, abstention on the part of States from the production of space strike weapons (including research), their testing and their deployment—and the joining of forces by States in peaceful space activity would promote the spread of mutual understanding and co-operation between them and the effective utilization of mankind's material and intellectual resources. This would give a new impetus to the development of science and technology and would open truly limitless prospects for the utilization of space achievements to promote the economic and social progress of the world's peoples and to solve the global problems confronting mankind, including such urgent problems as the elimination of hunger and disease and the overcoming of the economic backwardness of developing countries, including assistance to those countries.

Global peaceful co-operation in space research would be set up and developed on an increasing scale, from the exchange of scientific and technical information and simple forms of co-operation to the combining of States' capacities to solve the large-scale problems involved in the exploitation of outer space.

If that is done, it will be in mankind's power to achieve even such a long-term goal as the industrialization of circumterrestrial space, merging space complexes designed for various purposes with the terrestrial economies of States, and the operation of orbital factories set up to produce new materials and industrial goods under conditions of high vacuum and weightlessness. The inexhaustible storehouses of space, including the resources of celestial bodies and the energy of the Sun, would be placed at the service of mankind.

[3] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[4] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 38–43.
[5] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–201.

Second. International co-operation in the peaceful use of outer space, as the USSR sees it, could be carried out along the following fundamental lines:

1. Basic scientific research in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and the launching of interplanetary spacecraft for those purposes.

2. The application of the results of space research and experiments and the utilization of space technology, *inter alia,* in such fields as biology, medicine, materials science, weather forecasting, study of climate and the natural environment, global satellite communications systems and solution of the problems involved in remote-sensing of the earth to obtain data for geology, agriculture and exploitation of the seas and oceans, and assistance in searching for, locating and rescuing victims of sea and air disasters.

3. The creation and utilization of space technology, including large international orbital scientific stations and manned spacecraft of various types.

Third. The peaceful exploitation of outer space must be carried out with scrupulous regard for previously concluded treaties aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, as well as on the basis of the following general principles arising out of the Charter of the United Nations:

Refraining from the use or threat of force and settling disputes solely by peaceful means;

Equality of rights, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States;

Conscientious co-operation, mutual assistance and due regard for the interests of other States.

Fourth. For the organizing and implementation of co-operation between States, it would be possible to set up a world space organization dealing with international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization.

Such an organization would have the following duties:

(a) To ensure, under conditions of mutual advantage, the access of all States on a non-discriminatory basis to the results of scientific and technical achievements connected with the study and peaceful exploitation of outer space;

(b) To carry out international projects connected with the uniting of efforts and resources for the scientific investigation of outer space and the utilization of space technology;

(c) To provide assistance of every kind to developing countries in gaining access to the exploration and use of outer space and in using the practical results of such activity to speed the economic and social development of those countries, according to their needs and without any conditions limiting their sovereignty;

(d) To co-ordinate on an international scale the activities of other international organizations in connection with the peaceful utilization of outer space;

(e) To help, where necessary, in monitoring the observance of agreements which have already been concluded or will be concluded, with a view to preventing an arms race in space.

Fifth. The USSR proposes the convening of a representative international conference, with the participation, among others, of the States with major space capabilities, in order to consider in all its aspects the question of international co-operation in the peaceful exploitation of space under conditions of its non-militarization and the harmonization of the main lines and principles of such co-operation.

That conference would also consider the question of establishing a world space organization dealing with international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, bearing in mind that the practical establishment of such an organization will be possible only when agreements effectively ensuring the non-militarization of space have been reached.

The peaceful exploitation of space, as people already know from experience, can yield many benefits for the development and improvement of life on earth. The Soviet Union is convinced that outer space, the common property of mankind, must be placed at the service not of war, but of peace and security and of the economic and social progress of all peoples. The road to that goal leads through the collective efforts of all States on our planet.

In a spirit of goodwill and with a recognition of its responsibility for the fate of our planet, the Soviet Union appeals to all countries and peoples to set about solving this historic problem. Endeavouring to make its contribution to the common cause, it puts forward for consideration by the United Nations the present proposals concerning the main lines and principles of international co-operation in the peaceful exploitation and utilization of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization.

142. Soviet Draft Resolution Submitted to the U.N. General Assembly: International Cooperation in the Peaceful Exploitation of Outer Space Under Conditions of its Nonmilitarization, August 15, 1985 [1]

The General Assembly,

Determined to ensure that the exploitation and use of outer space will be an area of broad, equitable and mutually beneficial international co-operation under conditions of peace,

[1] A/40/192. The draft resolution was appended to the proposal submitted on the same day (printed *supra*). On October 9, the Soviet Union submitted it to the First Committee as draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.1. On November 19, it submitted a revised version which it subsequently withdrew. See Document 245.

Recognizing the urgent need to prevent, before it is too late, an arms race in outer space, which would lead to a sharp intensification of the danger of nuclear war, undermine the prospects for limiting and reducing armaments in general and create insurmountable barriers to the development of international co-operation in the peaceful exploitation of outer space,

Guided by a desire to ensure that the exploration and use of outer space will most effectively serve the scientific, technical, economic and social progress of all peoples and the solution of the global problems facing mankind, including the tasks of development and of overcoming economic backwardness,

1. *Calls upon* all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to do everything possible for the adoption of effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, thereby creating conditions for broad international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes;

2. *Expresses its conviction* that, under conditions in which the non-militarization of outer space is effectively ensured, a major practical step in the peaceful exploitation of space and the development of international co-operation in that field would be the setting up of a world space organization to harmonize, co-ordinate and unite the efforts of States in respect of peaceful space activities, including the provision of assistance in that field to developing countries, and also to facilitate the necessary monitoring of compliance with agreements which have already been concluded or will be concluded with a view to preventing an arms race in outer space;

3. *Decides* to convene not later than 1987 an international conference with the participation of States with major space capabilities and of other interested countries to consider in all its aspects the question of international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization and the harmonization of the main lines and principles of such co-operation. The conference would also consider the question of setting up a world space organization, bearing in mind that the practical establishment of such an organization will be possible when agreements which effectively ensure the non-militarization of outer space have been reached;

4. *Establishes* an open-ended preparatory committee with the participation of States with major space capabilities for the purpose of convening the international conference;

5. *Requests* the preparatory committee to submit a report on the work carried out and appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-first session;

6. *Invites* all States to communicate to the Secretary-General not later than 1 March 1986, for transmittal to the preparatory committee, any views and suggestions with regard to the convening of the international conference;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-first session an item entitled "International co-operation in the non-militarization and peaceful exploitation of outer space".

143. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987: Title VII, Arms Control and Disarmament [Extract], August 16, 1985 [1]

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SEC. 701. SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1985.

Section 49(a)(1) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2589(a)(1)) is amended to read as follows:

"(1) for the fiscal year 1985, $23,789,000, of which amount $4,321,000 shall be available only to pay necessary expenses incurred in connection with arms control negotiations with the Government of the Soviet Union on strategic arms reductions, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and space and defensive weapons;".

SEC. 702. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1986 AND 1987.

Section 49(a)(2) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2589(a)(2)) is amended to read as follows:

"(2) for the fiscal year 1986, $25,614,000, and for the fiscal year 1987, $25,614,000, of which amounts $6,146,000 shall be available in each fiscal year only to pay necessary expenses incurred in connection with arms control negotiations conducted with the Government of the Soviet Union on strategic arms reductions, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and space and defensive weapons; and".

SEC. 703. REPORTS ON ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2551 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

22 USC 2592.

"SEC. 52. REPORTS ON ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS.

Report.

"The Congress determines that the achievement and maintenance of successful controls upon armaments requires official and public confidence that the parties are

[1] P.L. 99–93, sec. 701–708; 99 Stat. 444–448, 457. The original Arms Control and Disarmament Act may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 482–495.

expected to adhere to their commitments and that the parties will be held accountable for failure to meet obligations. Without such confidence, existing arms control accords are eroded, and the prospects are jeopardized for new agreements which can place further controls on the competition in nuclear and conventional weapons and which can increase international stability. In accordance with this determination—

President of U.S. International agreements.

"(1) the President shall submit, not later than January 31 of each year, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report prepared by the Director, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence, on the adherence of the United States to obligations undertaken in arms control agreements and on any problems related to compliance by other nations with the provisions of bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements to which the United States is a party;

P.L. 99-93 Sec. 704

Defense and national security.

"(2) the section of the report dealing with United States adherence shall include information on the policies and organization of each relevant agency or department of the United States to ensure adherence, a description of national security programs with a direct bearing on adherence questions and of steps being taken to ensure adherence, and a compilation of any substantive questions raised during the previous year regarding United States adherence, together with an assessment of such issues and the need for any corrective action; and

International agreements.

"(3) the section of the report dealing with problems of compliance by other nations shall include, in the case of each treaty or agreement about which compliance questions exist—

"(A) a description of each significant issue raised and efforts made and contemplated with the other party to seek a resolution of the difficulty;

Defense and national security.

"(B) an assessment of damage, if any, to United States security and other interests; and

"(C) recommendations as to any steps which should be considered to redress any damage to United

States national security and to reduce compliance problems.

The report required by this section shall be provided in unclassified form, with classified annexes, as appropriate.".

SEC. 704. PAY FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND ASSISTANT DIRECTORS.

(a) AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 5.—Title 5 of the United States Code, is amended—

(1) in section 5314, by adding at the end thereof the following: "Deputy Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.";

(2) in section 5315—

(A) by striking out

"Deputy Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency."; and

(B) by adding at the end thereof the following:

P.L. 99-93 Sec. 704

"Assistant Directors, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (4).";

5 USC 5316.

and

(3) in section 5316, by striking out

"Assistant Directors, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (4).".

2 USC 651

(b) COMPLIANCE WITH BUDGET ACT—Any new spending authority (within the meaning of section 401 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974) which is provided under the amendments made by this section shall be effective for any fiscal year only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts.

SEC. 705. NEW BUILDING IN GENEVA FOR THE USE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATING TEAMS.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) the United States is party to vital talks on arms control in Geneva, Switzerland;

(2) these talks include negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate range nuclear weapons, space and defense systems, a bilateral United States-Soviet forum, called the Standing Consultative Commission, and a multilateral forum, called the Conference on Disarmament;

(3) the United States delegations to these talks occupy buildings and spaces insufficiently secure, modernized, or large enough to permit those delegations to conduct their work efficiently;

(4) the United States delegations to the strategic, intermediate and space and defense talks in particular occupy space in the Botanic Building that is also occupied by offices of numerous other, non-United

States organizations, and shares common walls and parking facilities with these delegations;

(5) arms control negotiations require sophisticated security facilities, telecommunications equipment, simultaneous translation capabilities and other specialized services; and

(6) the Soviet Union, for its part, has made available for its negotiating team a modern, secure, well-equipped building dedicated for the use of its arms control negotiating teams.

Report.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) in order to facilitate the effective work of the United States arms control negotiating teams, and to provide for them a dedicated structure capable of supporting their vital tasks on a permanent basis, the Secretary of State should submit to the Congress a report on the feasibility, cost, location, and requirements of a structure to house the United States arms control negotiating teams in Geneva;

(2) this report should be submitted as soon as possible; and

(3) this matter should be included in the consideration of the 1985 supplemental appropriation process.

SEC. 706. STUDY OF MEASURES TO ENHANCE CRISIS STABILITY AND CONTROL.

Defense and national security.

(a) STUDY.—The Secretary of State and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shall conduct a detailed and complete study and evaluation of additional measures which both enhance the security of the United States and reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons use by contributing to crisis stability or crisis control capabilities, including specific consideration of the following measures:

Communications and telecommunications.

(1) Increased redundancy of direct communications link circuits, including the creation of new survivable circuits and terminals, located outside the national capitals which have access to the command and control system of the country in which they are located.

Communications and telecommunications.

(2) Establishment of redundant, survivable direct communications links between and among all nuclear-armed states.

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Communications and telecommunications.

(3) Conclusion of an agreement creating "non-target" sanctuaries only for certain direct communications link circuits to enhance survivability of communications.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

(4) Creation in advance of standard operating procedures for communicating, and possibly cooperating, with the Soviet Union and other states in the event of nuclear attacks by third parties on either the United States or Soviet Union.

23 UST 1168.

(5) Addition to the Incidents At Sea agreement of a prohibition on the "locking on" of fire control radars on ships and planes of the other side, an agreement on the separation of naval forces during specified periods of crisis, and other such measures relevant to the Incidents At Sea agreement.[2]

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

(6) Placement by the United States and the Soviet Union of unmanned launch sensors in the land-based missile fields of both countries.

(7) Establishment of anti-submarine operations free zones designed to enhance the security of ballistic missile submarines.

P.L. 99-93 Sec. 707

(8) Installation of permissive action links aboard the ballistic missile submarines of the United States, which might possibly be activated or deactivated at various levels of alert, and encouragement of the Soviet Union to do the same.

(9) Establishment of training programs for National Command Authority officials to familiarize them with alert procedures, communications capabilities, nuclear weapons release authority procedures, and the crisis control and stability implications thereof.

(10) Include in standard operating procedure the relocation in a crisis of a National Command Authority official outside Washington, D.C. to a secure location with access to the strategic command and control system, and announce the institution of this procedure to relevant foreign governments.

(b) REPORT.—The Secretary of State and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shall submit a report of the study and evaluation under subsection (a) to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Armed Serv-

[2] TIAS 7379, 23 UST 1168, 852 UNTS 151; TIAS 7624, 24 UST 1063.

ices and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives by January 1, 1986. Such report should be available in both a classified, if necessary, and unclassified format.

SEC. 707. POLICY TOWARD BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) chemical weapons are among the most terrible weapons in today's military arsenals;

(2) it is the objective of the United States to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare through a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons;

International agreements.

(3) the United States is vigorously pursuing a multilateral agreement to ban chemical weapons;

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

(4) the negotiation of a verifiable, bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union would be a significant step toward achieving a worldwide ban on chemical weapons;

(5) bilateral discussions relating to a ban on chemical weapons took place in July and August of 1984 between the United States and Soviet delegations to the Conference on Disarmament; and

(6) such endeavors could serve the security interests of humankind.

President of U.S.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress that the President—

(1) should be commended for his efforts to negotiate a multilateral agreement banning chemical weapons;

(2) should continue to pursue vigorously such an agreement; and

(3) should seek the continuation and development of bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

SEC. 708. POLICY REGARDING A JOINT STUDY BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WINTER.

President of U.S.

It is the sense of the Congress that the President should propose to the Government of the Soviet Union during any arms control talks held with such Government that—

(1) the United States and the Soviet Union should jointly study the atmospheric, climatic, environmental, and biological consequences of nuclear explosions, sometimes known as "nuclear winter", and the impact that nuclear winter would have on the national security of both nations;

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(2) such a joint study should include the sharing and exchange of information and findings on the nuclear winter phenomena and make recommendations on possible joint research projects that would benefit both nations; and

(3) at an appropriate time the other nuclear weapon states (the United Kingdom, France, and the People's Republic of China) should be involved in the study.

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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 2068 (H.R. 1931) (S. 1003):

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 99–40 accompanying H.R. 1931 (Comm. on Foreign Affairs) and No. 99–240 (Comm. of Conference).

SENATE REPORT No. 99–39 accompanying S. 1003 (Comm. on Foreign Relations).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 131 (1985):

May 2, 8, 9, considered and passed House.

June 6, 7, 10, 11, S. 1003 considered in Senate; H.R. 2068, amended, passed in lieu.

July 31, Senate agreed to conference report.

Aug. 1, House agreed to conference report.

144. Report to the Conference on Disarmament by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Program of Disarmament [Extracts], August 16, 1985 [1]

I. *Organization of Work and Documents*

1. In accordance with the provisions of its mandate, as adopted by the Conference on Disarmament at its 245th plenary meeting, on 28 February 1984, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament resumed its work on 7 March 1985 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Alfonso García Robles (Mexico). Miss Aida Luisa Levin, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, served as the Committee's Secretary.

2. The *Ad Hoc* Committee held 25 meetings between 7 March and 15 August 1985.

3. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee:

[1] CD/634, pp. 1–3.

Bangladesh, Burundi, Cameroon, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain and Turkey.

. . . . . .

II. *Substantive Work During the 1985 Session*

5. In pursuing the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the *Ad Hoc* Committee took as the basis of its work the text annexed to the 1983 report of the previous *ad hoc* Working Group to the Committee on Disarmament (CD/415), which was an integral part of the Committee's report to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly (CD/421).

6. The *Ad Hoc* Committee concentrated its work on the resolution of various outstanding questions. Contact Groups, open to all interested delegations, were established to elaborate pending texts in chapter V, "Measures and stages of implementation". A Contact Group was also set up to deal with paragraph 6 of the Introduction and paragraph 5 of chapter VI, "Machinery and Procedures". In addition, consultations were held among concerned delegations with a view to reconciling differences on certain points.

7. The *Ad Hoc* Committee had an initial discussion of the draft of the Introduction, which had been prepared by the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in his capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament during that session, and which had not yet been considered. Different views of a preliminary nature were expressed in the course of the discussion and, therefore, no conclusion was reached. As noted above, paragraph 6 was considered in a Contact Group in conjunction with paragraph 5 of the chapter on Machinery and Procedures.

8. Intensive efforts were made in the Contact Groups and in consultations among concerned delegations, to reach agreement on the text of the respective paragraphs of the Programme. In some cases, it was possible to arrive at agreed texts. In others, the relevant texts reflect points of difference or remain pending. The results of the work are contained in the annex to this report.[2] It was understood that delegations could not take final positions until agreement was reached on outstanding points of difficulty and until the document was complete.

III. *Conclusion*

9. Early in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, the Chairman suggested the desirability of concluding the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament during the 1985 session so that the Conference might be in a position to submit the Programme to the General Assembly on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the

[2] Not printed here.

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United Nations. However, in view of the fact that during the 1985 session, despite intensive efforts, only modest progress was achieved, the prospects for realizing that objective do not seem very encouraging. If, unfortunately, that ultimately turned out to be so, it seems imperative that the work on the elaboration of the Programme be resumed at the beginning of the 1986 session with the firm intention of discharging the Committee's mandate and enabling the Conference to submit a complete draft of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the General Assembly "not later than at its forty-first session".

145. Lomé Declaration Adopted by the OAU Regional Conference on Security, Disarmament, and Development in Africa, August 16, 1985 [1]

1. The Conference recognizes the close interrelationship and interdependence between the objectives of security, disarmament and development, not only in Africa but world-wide, and expresses its conviction that their realization is essential for durable peace and security everywhere in the world.

2. The Conference considers peace and security as the highest priority objective of independent African States and the foundation for socio-economic development. The Conference affirms its conviction in the legitimate right of every State to security and self-defence and stresses the position that the progressive reduction of arms must be to enhance peace and security through the minimum level of armaments and armed forces.

3. The Conference stresses that the concept of security in the region must go beyond military security and the prevention of armed conflicts to encompass a sustained commitment by States of the region to African, national, bilateral and multilateral programmes of socio-economic development, justice, equity and human dignity.

4. The objective of disarmament efforts in the region should take into account existing realities in other regions and avoid placing Africa in a real or perceived permanent security disadvantage. There should be a collaborative effort that eliminates inter-State arms competition in the region, fosters the peaceful settlement of disputes and enhances a united approach in dealing with threats to the region's peace and security.

5. The Conference recognizes that Africa's military expenditures are relatively low compared to those of other regions of the world, taking into consideration particularly the multiple threats and the permanent aggression of the racist South African régime. At the same time the

[1] U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs. *Conference on Security, Disarmament, and Development in Africa: Meeting of Experts*, pp. 113–117.

Conference takes note that *vis-à-vis* the current situation, security requirements of African States impose extremely heavy burdens at the detriment of the social and economic development of African States.

6. The Conference considers that an improved international climate, especially in the relations among the major Powers, in particular the two super-Powers, as well as in the relations between North and South, would enhance the prospects for security, disarmament and development in Africa, and the world as a whole. The Conference takes note of recent signs towards relaxation of tension in great power relations, as reflected in the seemingly widening scope of contacts and negotiations between the two super-Powers. The Conference, however, calls for a more sustained process of negotiations among the major Powers, especially between the two super-Powers, in the disarmament field since the continued possession of nuclear weapons and the continuing nuclear and conventional arms race constitute a constant destabilizing factor for all regions and the greatest danger to human survival.

7. The Conference, recognizing the universality of the objectives of security, disarmament and development, emphasizes the urgency and indispensability of international co-operation in efforts towards their attainment. In this connection, the Conference believes that despite inadequate progress, the United Nations remains the appropriate forum for global common endeavours towards a new world order free from war and want, more just and equitable, and hence, more peaceful.

8. The Conference, at the same time, underlines the importance of regional efforts at peace-keeping and conflict resolution among States in accordance with the principles of the OAU charter. Some efforts aimed at building confidence, promoting friendly relations and co-operation and finding solutions to local disputes among the States of the regions concerned can play a vital role in enhancing the objectives of security, disarmament and development in the region.

9. The Conference considers that closer co-operation between the United Nations and regional and interregional organizations will allow for more effective utilization of the wide international experience, capabilities and resources of the United Nations to the service of regional efforts. In this connection, the Conference welcomes the existing co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and attaches much importance to the continuing expansion of such co-operation to cover also activities and programmes in security-related fields.

10. The Conference reaffirms that Africa is currently confronted by a critical socio-economic situation which has developed in part because of natural conditions such as drought, cyclones and desertification and is being aggravated by conditions and instances of instability and conflict in the region. While taking note with appreciation and commending efforts deployed by the OAU Heads of State and Government and assistance provided regionally and from other countries

and regions as well as international organizations, to alleviate the immediate problems of famine, the Conference recognizes the primary responsibility of African States for long-term rehabilitation and development in the countries concerned and in the region as a whole.

11. The Conference considers that it is the existence of insecurity that compels African States to divert their meagre resources to meet the burdens of military expenditures for the purpose of maintaining internal stability and the defence of their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

12. The Conference views the minority *apartheid* régime and its policies in South Africa as one of the main causes for insecurity, aggression, economic destabilization and an arms race in Africa. The régime thus threatens regional as well as international peace and security, especially since achieving a nuclear weapon capability, and it continues to expand its overall military establishment. The Conference expresses its conviction that the elimination of the *apartheid* system in South Africa and the attainment of immediate independence by Namibia in accordance with the pertinent resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity would greatly reduce the climate of tension and conflict in southern Africa and enhance the prospects for disarmament, development, security and peaceful co-operation throughout Africa.

13. The Conference expresses deep concern over the active collaboration between the South African racist régime, Israel and some Western Powers in the establishment and continued development of the South African nuclear weapon capability. The Conference views such collaboration as worsening the already explosive situation in the region and firmly condemns it.

14. The Conference emphasizes the importance of the need for concrete action to promote peace, security and disarmament in Africa with a view to reinforcing durable conditions and structures for inter-African development and co-operation in the region. The Conference is convinced that declarations on peace, security and co-operation and African regional agreements of non-aggression and assistance on matters of defence should be supported with more concrete and practical measures without delay and re-activate consideration of the Draft Convention on the Denuclearization of Africa or consider an appropriate legal instrument that would define Africa as a nuclear-free zone.

15. The Conference expresses its firm conviction that only through arrangements and mechanisms that mitigate inter-African tensions can the region maintain a credible and positive role in a world confronted by the deadly East/West rivalry that African States cannot control but whose outcome could decisively affect the destinies of African States as well.

16. As the Conference has taken place on the fortieth anniversaries of the use of the first atomic weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the end of the Second World War and the birth of the United Nations, the Conference views this gathering as an especially solemn and aus-

picious opportunity for Africa to join the rest of the world in an urgent recommitment and rededication to the principles and objectives enshrined both in the Charter of the United Nations and the charter of the Organization of African Unity. It calls on all States to replace despair with hope, to end fear and want, to build bridges of friendship, peaceful coexistence and co-operation in a world free from nuclear weapons and "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

146. Program of Action Adopted by the OAU Regional Conference on Security, Disarmament, and Development in Africa, August 16, 1985 [1]

The Conference on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa,

Recalling that the fundamental objective of African States since their accession to independence has always been the quest for peace as a practical course of action that would allow them to devote their energies and resources fully to the urgent task of improving the well-being of their peoples,

Reaffirming the continuing validity and urgent need for firm recommitment to the concrete implementation of the purposes of the Organization of African Unity as provided in article II of the OAU charter, as follows:

(a) To promote the unity and solidarity of African States;
(b) To co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
(c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
(d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
(e) To promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Considering that this first high-level regional political gathering on security, disarmament and development in Africa has provided a valuable opportunity for OAU Member States to reflect collectively on three of the most critical issues affecting Africa's present and future aspirations and strategies for peace and progress,

Bearing in mind its Lomé Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa,[2]

Adopts this Programme of Action for Peace, Security and Co-operation in Africa by which the Conference, as a matter of priority:

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[1] U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs. *Conference on Security, Disarmament, and Development in Africa: Meeting of Experts*, pp. 117–122.
[2] *Supra*.

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1. Calls for a continuous and sustained process of diplomatic contact and negotiation within the framework of OAU towards arriving at politically binding commitments fostering regional peace, security and co-operation within the context of a future Conference on Security and Co-operation in Africa;

2. Calls urgently upon African States, individually, bilaterally, sub-regionally and regionally, to implement measures aimed at realizing internal and inter-State peace, security, co-operation and solidarity in the region;

3. Calls upon African States to keep OAU informed of decisions or agreements reached by them bilaterally or subregionally relating to defence or military co-operation with a view to facilitating its co-ordinating role in regional defence, in accordance with the OAU charter;

4. Calls for intensified co-operation with and assistance from the United Nations towards the realization of concrete and effective measures initiated by African States themselves to ensure peace and security in the region;

5. Calls upon the Secretary General of OAU, with the assistance and co-operation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, to elaborate and submit to the 44th OAU Council of Ministers, concrete proposals which could serve as a basis for discussions and negotiations among Member States on the following:

(a) Possibilities and arrangements for defence co-operation and co-ordination at the subregional and regional levels;
(b) Possibilities and arrangements for the reduction of military expenses by Member States at the subregional and regional levels;
(c) Possibilities and arrangements for preventing arms transfers to mercenary forces and other non-governmental groups in independent African States;
(d) Concrete measures for the implementation of the OAU Declaration of 1964 on the Denuclearization of Africa and the re-activation of the Draft Convention on the Denuclearization of Africa or the drafting of an appropriate legal instrument that would define Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

6. Calls upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to create as soon as possible a United Nations regional centre in Africa for peace and disarmament, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/63 J which envisages the establishment of a regional organ under the World Disarmament Campaign Programme of the United Nations and OAU resolution AHG/Res.138 (XXI) of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity requesting that such a centre be established in Africa;

7. Welcomes with appreciation the offer of the Government of Togo to host the proposed United Nations regional centre for peace and disarmament and to provide the United Nations at no cost with office space for the centre;

8. Stresses the utmost importance of the proposed centre to serve as a focal point for promoting co-ordination and harmonization of research, study, documentation and information activities in the interrelated fields of peace, security, disarmament and development, in co-operation with the institutions of the United Nations especially the United Institute for Training and Research, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the United Nations University;

9. Calls upon African scientists, researchers and institutions to submit to the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government through the OAU Secretary-General within one year, views and suggestions on the possible establishment of a subregional or regional programme for nuclear research for peaceful purposes in Africa;

10. Calls upon all States, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other agencies or institutions in all States to terminate any form of collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field until that régime opens up all its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards and inspections and abandons its policies of aggression, internal oppression and *apartheid*;

11. Calls upon all States, institutions and the international community as a whole to terminate all purchases of uranium from the racist régime of South Africa until that régime ends its illegal occupation of Namibia and abandons *apartheid*;

12. Calls upon the United Nations Security Council to assume its responsibilities under the United Nations Charter with regard to the maintenance of peace and security and to take the necessary measures to deter the racist régime of South Africa in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter from its breaches of and threats to international peace and security;

13. Calls upon the Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council in general, and the two super-Powers in particular, to assume their responsibilities under the Charter with regard to international security, and take effective action to stop South Africa's expanding military and nuclear programmes and activities;

14. Calls for concrete implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/151 G on the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, initiated by a group of African countries and adopted at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly by consensus, as a matter of highest priority;

15. Calls for the strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations for effective action in the field of disarmament, which, *inter alia*, should enable the world organization to render adequate assistance and co-operation with regional organizations especially OAU in the fields of security, disarmament and development;

16. Supports the convening, in 1986, of an International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, as agreed to by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 39/160;

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17. Recommends to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity to designate 15 August, the date of the adoption of the Lomé Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa, as an African Day of Peace and Disarmament.

147. White House Statement on Antisatellite Weapon Testing, August 20, 1985 [1]

The President today submitted to the Congress, in accordance with the 1985 Department of Defense Authorization Act, the certification required by the Congress prior to a test against an object in space of the nonnuclear miniature vehicle antisatellite (ASAT) system which is now in development.[2] The miniature vehicle is launched from an F–15 aircraft. In the certification, the President attests to the Congress that:

—The United States is endeavoring in good faith to negotiate with the Soviet Union a mutual and verifiable agreement with the strictest possible limitations on antisatellite weapons consistent with the national security interests of the United States;

—Pending agreement on such strict limitations, testing against objects in space of the F–15-launched miniature homing vehicle ASAT warhead is necessary to avert clear and irrevocable harm to the national security;

—Such testing would not constitute an irreversible step that would gravely impair prospects for negotiations on antisatellite weapons;

—Such testing is fully consistent with the rights and obligations of the United States under the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty,[3] as those rights and obligations exist at the time of testing.

The Soviet Union has for many years had the world's only operational antisatellite system. There is also a growing threat from present and prospective Soviet satellites which are designed to support directly the U.S.S.R.'s terrestrial forces. The United States must develop its own ASAT capability in order to deter Soviet threats to U.S. and allied space systems and, within such limits imposed by international law, to deny any adversary advantages arising from the offensive use of space-based systems which could undermine deterrence. Systematic, continued testing is necessary for us to be able to proceed with ASAT development and finally to validate operational capability, in order to restore the necessary military balance in this area.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, August 26, 1985, pp. 991–992. The statement was made by the principal deputy press secretary to the President.

[2] P.L. 98–525, Sec. 205.

[3] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

A number of serious problems, including definitional and monitoring difficulties plus the need to counter existing Soviet targeting satellites, contribute to the conclusion that a comprehensive ban on development, testing, deployment, and use of all means of countering satellites is not verifiable or in our national security interest. Moreover, no arrangements or agreements beyond those already governing military activities in outer space have been found to date that are judged to be in the overall interest of the United States and its allies and that meet the congressionally mandated requirements of verifiability and consistency with the national security. We will continue to study possible ASAT limitations in good faith to see whether such limitations are consistent with the national security interests of the United States.

The United States is presently engaged in negotiations with the Soviet Union at Geneva on nuclear arms reductions, defense and space issues. We believe that ASAT testing can constitute an incentive to the Soviet Union to reach agreements on a wide range of issues.

148. Swedish Working Paper Submitted to the Conference on Disarmament: A Comprehensive Approach for Elaborating Regimes for Chemicals in a Future Chemical Weapons Convention, August 20, 1985 [1]

For the purpose of the Convention the relevant chemicals have in CD/539 been divided into five categories, i.e. super-toxic lethal, other lethal and other harmful chemicals, key precursors including key components for binary and multicomponent chemical systems for chemical weapons, and, precursors.[2] This has proved to be a very useful categorization. However, attempts to apply one and the same set of measures to all relevant chemicals in each one of the five categories have failed.

There is now a growing recognition that the diversity within a category and the different purposes for which these chemicals are produced need to be taken into account when elaborating the measures to be applied in order not to hamper the development of the peaceful chemical industry while at the same time ensuring that chemicals are not produced for chemical weapons purposes. There is also concern that one and the same chemical might be subject to qualitatively different measures depending on the purpose of its production and that this might create "loopholes" in the Convention. Time has therefore come to refine the concepts somewhat and to look for alternative ways of structuring the relationship between the categories of chemicals and the measures to be applied to them.

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[1] CD/632.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 603 ff.

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This paper suggests an alternative approach for the elaboration of régimes of measures to be applied to the different chemicals involved. This approach allows for bringing together chemicals from different categories under one and the same régime, as well as for applying different régimes to different chemicals within one and the same category. This could be achieved through a regrouping of the chemicals without in any way changing the definitions and the five categories already agreed upon.

Such a regrouping also opens the way for a comprehensive way of dealing with the chemicals, so that one and the same chemical would be subject to the same régime in all parts of the Convention (i.e. as regards declarations, elimination, permitted production and verification).

The philosophy of the approach is simple. Based on existing definitions the chemicals are arranged in three groups. To each group a régime for the declarations, elimination, production and verification is devised. Régime I is the most stringent and demanding one and applies to all Group I-chemicals. Régime II is also stringent but somewhat less burdensome and applies to all the Group II-chemicals. Régime III is the least stringent of the three and applies to the Group III-chemicals.

The three Groups and some main elements in their respective Régimes are described below. The main purpose of this paper is to outline the basic approach, not to suggest solutions for each and every detailed problem. The arrangement of the chemicals into groups is made irrespective of which procedures will eventually be agreed upon for establishing lists or otherwise identifying individual chemicals within the categories. Furthermore, this working paper deals only with chemicals and the means of their production. Munitions and other devices are not covered. It is understood, however, that declarations and elimination of existing munitions and other devices should follow Régime I when applicable.

GROUP I CHEMICALS—RÉGIME I

Group I Chemicals

1. Super-toxic lethal chemicals developed, produced or stockpiled for chemical weapons purposes. Examples: Tabun, Soman, Sarin, VX.
2. Super-toxic lethal chemicals which are found to be presumptive chemical weapons. Examples: Amiton, skin penetrating carbamates.
3. Other lethal and harmful chemicals developed, produced or stockpiled only for chemical weapons purposes: Examples: Adamsite, BZ.
4. Key precursors with no or very limited use for permitted purposes. Key components of binary and/or multicomponent chemical weapons. Examples: DF, QL, pinacolylalcohol.

Régime I

Declarations. All stocks of Group I chemicals should be declared: aggregate quantities of each compound within 30 days and detailed

composition and location of each stock to be eliminated before the commencement of each elimination period. All facilities for production of Group I chemicals should also be declared and the declarations should contain information about the facilities, locations and production capacities as well as the compounds produced.

Elimination. All stocks of Group I chemicals should be eliminated through destruction. Exceptions to this rule should be very few. One such exception would be a provision allowing for Group I chemicals to be retained for protective and possibly other permitted purposes. Facilities for production of Group I chemicals should also be completely destroyed.

Production of Group I chemicals should be prohibited, the exceptions being very few and limited. Such production for protective and possibly other permitted purposes (e.g. pharmaceutical) should take place at a single small-scale production facility. The annual aggregate amount of Group I chemicals produced, retained or acquired through transfer or possessed at any one time should be limited to 1 ton.

Furthermore extremely limited production in laboratory quantities (grams/year) could be envisaged in laboratories approved by the State Party. Transfer of Group I chemicals should be prohibited except for limited quantities to other State Parties. The Consultative Committee should be notified in advance of all such transfers.

The *verification* measures applied to the Group I chemicals and the facilities for their production should be the most stringent under the Convention. International inspectors should be present during elimination processes. Permitted production should be carefully monitored and subject to systematic international on-site inspection.

GROUP II CHEMICALS—RÉGIME II

Group II Chemicals

1. Super-toxic lethal chemicals (other than those in Group I) which are presently developed, produced or stockpiled only for permitted purposes but which warrant special attention to ensure that they are not developed, produced or stockpiled for chemical weapons purposes in the future. Example: Strophantin (a glycocide for heart ailments).
2. Key precursors (other than those in Group I) used for permitted purposes but which have also been produced for chemical weapons purposes. Example: thiodiglycol.

Régime II

Declarations of Group II chemicals should encompass all key precursors in chemical weapons stocks as under Régime I, as well as stocks for permitted purposes and aggregate annual production of each of the Group II chemicals stating also their respective end uses. Facilities for production of Group II chemicals should be declared as under Régime I if production has been for chemical weapons purposes (key precursors) or if the production exceeds certain quantities.

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Elimination. Key precursors in chemical weapons stockpiles should be eliminated either through destruction or through diversion to permitted purposes. Facilities having produced key precursors for chemical weapons purposes should be eliminated through destruction or dismantling if the total production capacity exceeds what is consistent with production for permitted purposes.

Production of Group II chemicals should take place at a single small-scale facility or at other especially approved facilities. The possibility of limiting production to a certain amount annually or at any one time could also be considered, in which case provisions for granting exceptions in specific cases might prove needed.

To ensure that these chemicals are not developed into new types of chemical weapons or produced for chemical weapons purposes the *verification* needs to be stringent. Data reporting as well as systematic international on-site inspection is envisaged. If a chemical is found to be a presumptive chemical weapon it should immediately be moved to Group I and be subject to measures under Régime I.

GROUP III CHEMICALS—RÉGIME III

Group III Chemicals

1. Other lethal chemicals used for permitted purposes but which have also been produced for chemical weapons purposes. Examples: phosgene, hydrogen cyanide.
2. Other harmful chemicals used for permitted purposes, but which have also been produced for chemical weapons purposes. Example: phosgeneoxime.
3. Precursors. Examples: phosphorus oxychloride, phosphorus trichloride.

Régime III

Declarations of Group III chemicals should encompass all the chemicals in chemical weapons stocks, as under Régime I as well as stocks for permitted purposes and aggregate annual production of each of the Group III chemicals, stating also their respective end uses. Facilities for production of Group III chemicals should be declared as under Régime I if the production has been for chemical weapons purposes or exceeds certain quantities, stating the aggregate capacity for each compound as well as the locations of the facilities.

Elimination. The elimination of the Group III chemicals in chemical weapon stocks could be carried out through destruction or diversion for permitted purposes. Elimination of facilities having produced these chemicals for chemical weapons purposes shall take place through destruction or dismantling if the total production capacity exceeds what is consistent with production for permitted purposes.

Production. No limitations in amount or place of production is envisaged.

Verification. The verification measures applicable under Régime III would comprise data-reporting on each individual chemical and systematic international on-site inspection.

Chemicals and their régimes in a future chemical convention

	GROUP I	GROUP II	GROUP III
GROUPS OF CHEMICALS	Super-toxic lethal chemicals developed, produced or stockpiled for chemical weapons purposes	Super-toxic lethal chemicals presently developed, produced or stockpiled only for permitted purposes but whose future development and production warrants special attention	Other lethal and harmful chemicals used for permitted purposes but which have also been produced for chemical weapons purposes
	Super-toxic lethal chemicals found to be presumptive chemical weapons	Key precursors used for permitted purpose but which have also been produced for chemical weapons purposes	Precursors
	Other lethal and harmful chemicals developed, produced or stockpiled only for chemical weapons purposes		
	Key precursors with no or very limited use for permitted purposes, key components for binary and/or multicomponent chemical weapons		
	RÉGIME I	**RÉGIME II**	**RÉGIME III**
DECLARATIONS —of chemicals in chemical weapons stocks.	Aggregate quantity of each compound within 30 days Detailed declarations at each stock before each elimination period	Key precursors: As Régime I	As Régime I

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Chemicals and their régimes in a future chemical convention—Continued

—of stocks for permitted purposes/ annual production.	Aggregate quantity of each compound within 30 days	Aggregate quantity within 30 days and then aggregate annual production	As Régime II
—of production facilities for chemical weapons purposes.	—compounds —location of facilities —facilities' production capacity	As Régime I	As Régime I
—of production facilities for chemical weapons purposes.	—compounds —location of facilities —facilities' production capacity	As Régime I if production exceeds certain quantities	If production exceeds certain quantities: Aggregate capacity and locations
verification of declarations.	To be elaborated	To be elaborated	To be elaborated
ELIMINATION			
—of chemicals in chemical weapons stocks.	Destruction Exceptions: maximum 1 ton annually may be retained for protective purposes	Destruction or diversion of the key precursors	Destruction or diversion
—of chemical weapons production facilities.	Destruction	Destruction or dismantling if capacity not consistent with production for permitted purposes	As Régime II
Verification of elimination			
—of chemical weapons	Permanent presence of international inspectors during the elimination process	Data reporting, systematic international on-site inspection	
—of chemical weapons production facilities.	To be elaborated	To be elaborated	To be elaborated

Chemicals and their régimes in a future chemical convention—Continued

PRODUCTION			
—for protective purposes.	No production. Exceptions: Aggregate annual quantity 1 ton (including the amounts otherwise acquired), at a small-scale facility	Production at a small-scale facility or requisition from industry	Requisition from industry
—for other permitted purposes.	At a laboratory scale grams/year	Single small-scale or especially approved facilities. Possibly quantity-limits	No limitations
—transfer.....	To States Parties in limited quantities	To be elaborated	To be elaborated
Verification			
—of production.....	Monitoring and systematic international on-site inspection	Data reporting systematic international on-site inspection	Data reporting, systematic international on-site inspection
—of non-production.	Challenge	Challenge	Challenge

149. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Conference on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, August 20, 1985 [1]

Mr. President, our statement today is devoted to a problem that rightly occupies first place in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, the problem of the halting of nuclear weapon tests. Today this problem is truly at the centre of international life. In its solution people see a real practical step towards the halting of the arms race, towards nuclear disarmament.

An open and sincere position, a specific, tangible measure—that is how large areas of international opinion are describing the new peace initiative by the Soviet Union, which two weeks ago unilaterally discontinued nuclear explosions. In many of the world's countries, statesmen and public figures are welcoming our initiative and persistently expressing support for a moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing,

[1] CD/FV.331, pp. 16–19.

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for the following of the Soviet Union's good initiative by the other nuclear Powers.

We note with satisfaction that the Soviet Government's decision has also had a positive echo among many delegations here, at the Conference on Disarmament. We wish to express our profound gratitude to the distinguished heads of the delegations of Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Pakistan, Burma and others who have officially expressed great appreciation for this step by the Soviet Union.

International public opinion has also assessed at its true worth the fact that the USSR was not in any way striving to put the United States in a difficult position. No, the moratorium was perfectly capable of becoming a joint bilateral action if the United States had taken up the Soviet initiative. After all, the United States President was informed in advance of that initiative by a letter in which it was suggested to the Americans that they should act in the same way. However, I should like to hope that the negative reaction expressed by the United States official representatives is not their last word. There is still a possibility of maintaining the moratorium in force beyond 1 January if the United States, for its part, also refrains from setting off nuclear explosions.

I would not wish, Sir, to make an historical review of all the Soviet Union's efforts aimed at securing any comprehensive nuclear-test ban. That would take too long. We are sure that the distinguished representatives are well acquainted with the history of the past few decades, decades during which the Soviet Union has been, as it still is, upholding with exceptional consistency the cause of the discontinuance of nuclear testing because of its firm belief that that is the surest, simplest and most practical way to curb the nuclear arms race. I think that even those who, for ideological or political reasons, do not share our way of looking at things cannot dispute this incontrovertible fact.

As long ago as 1955 the USSR advocated the discontinuance of nuclear testing as a priority, independent measure, with no linkage with other disarmament issues.[2] We have unfailingly been following this, our fundamental course ever since.

The moratorium declared on 6 August [3] represents our new contribution towards the achievement of this general goal and I can assure you, gentlemen, that we shall not slacken our efforts in the future either in our struggle for the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests and, in consequence, the beginning of the process of curtailing the nuclear arms race. I stress, our goal is not any kind of breathing space between explosions, but the halting for all time of all test explosions of nuclear weapons.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, p. 571.

[3] It was announced July 29, printed in Document 126, to be effective August 6.

Consequently, when here, within this chamber, some Western representatives try to cast aspersions on the Soviet Union's clear position, that is so unconvincing as hardly to warrant serious consideration.

They say, for example, that the moratorium does not lend itself to verification. Well, then, let us see whether the opponents of the moratorium have the slightest grounds for expressing doubt concerning the unwavering observance by the Soviet Union of the obligation it has solemnly taken upon itself.

They assert that the problem of monitoring nuclear tests is always "super complicated". For several decades now the saboteurs of the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests have looked to this argument as their "friend in need". But it has long since failed them. The scientific and technical facilities that exist in the United States give them the necessary degree of certainty that a nuclear explosion, even a low-yield one, will be detected and they are well aware of this in the United States. Just recently, the *International Herald Tribune* wrote that the United States system for detecting nuclear explosions includes seismic observatories in 35 countries. The article states, in particular, the authoritative opinion of a famous American seismologist, Jack Evernden, to the effect that, using this widespread network of seismic stations, and particularly a new array in Norway, the United States can detect all Soviet tests, "even fully decoupled ones". The Soviet Union, too, has adequate means for detecting nuclear explosions.

They declare, without a moment's hesitation, that the Soviet stance is one of "propaganda", while the West's proposals are "practical". But what is the real situation? In practice, it is the Soviet Union that has discontinued all nuclear explosions until 1 January of next year and is willing to prolong that moratorium. The USSR is willing in practice, immediately, at any moment to sit down at the negotiating table with a view to concluding as soon as possible a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests for all time, and it is not laying down any preconditions for that. It is willing to conduct the negotiations in any forum that would be acceptable to the other side, whether in the context of trilateral talks or in multilateral talks at the Conference on Disarmament, or simultaneously in both those forums. The USSR has in practice introduced for consideration by the Conference on Disarmament the basic provisions of a treaty in this field.[4] Together with other socialist countries, it has submitted for decision by the Conference on Disarmament a mandate for an appropriate *ad hoc* committee that provides for the holding of practical negotiations. The Soviet Union also supports the mandate for such an *ad hoc* committee that has been submitted by a group of non-aligned and neutral States.

What, in practice, is the position at the Conference on Disarmament of western delegations? One of the representatives expressed disagreement here with the words of M.S. Gorbachev to the effect that "in

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 123–127.

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Geneva, the United States and other western countries have long been sabotaging the holding of such talks",[5] i.e. talks about the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. In this connection it is, I think, sufficient to recall the mere fact that, in the past two years alone, western delegations have frustrated five times the achievement of agreement on the commencement of talks in the relevant subsidiary organs for the purpose of elaborating an agreement, namely: at the 255th meeting, on 3 April 1984; at the 276th meeting, on 26 July 1984 (twice); and at the 301st meeting, on 21 March 1985 (twice).

Although all in all the situation does not, unfortunately, give grounds for great hope, the Soviet delegation would none the less like to conclude its statement today on an optimistic note.

In the course of this year, the Conference on Disarmament has given no small attention to the question of a nuclear-weapon test ban. Many delegations, including the Soviet delegation, have spoken on this matter several times. From the multiplicity of views that were expressed in the course of the discussion a number of conclusions may be drawn. The chief among them is that the problem of banning nuclear tests must be resolved and resolved without delay. A radical solution of the question would be the banning of nuclear tests by all persons and in all places, for only such a solution would place any serious obstacle in the way of the creation, development and perfecting of new types and systems of nuclear weapons and so slow down, and ultimately bring to nothing the nuclear arms race.

Another important conclusion to which many representatives came in their statements—and one with which we fully agree—is that the building material for the elaboration of a treaty is already to hand. It is the draft basic provisions for a nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty which the Soviet Union introduced in 1982 [1983] and in which account is taken of the degree of agreement attained in the course of the trilateral talks; it is the draft treaty on a nuclear-test ban introduced by the delegation of Sweden.[6] It is, finally, the constructive views and proposals expressed by many States concerning the specific content of a nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty, including the issues of verification of such a treaty.

And one further important conclusion present in the statements of most delegates is that the reason why there is no treaty is not that there is no basis for its elaboration or that there are any supposedly insuperable difficulties in devising verification measures, but the absence of political will on the part of certain Powers fundamentally to resolve the problem of banning tests.

The Soviet declaration of a unilateral moratorium provides the Conference on Disarmament with a most powerful impulse to commence

[5] Document 140.
[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 468–478.

business-like, to-the-point negotiations with a view to prohibiting nuclear tests by all persons everywhere.

The problem of restraining the arms race, of preventing nuclear war and of disarmament is so serious that humanity has no right to permit the endless postponement of its solution. As M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in his recent answers to questions from a TASS correspondent, "the responsibility incumbent on the Soviet Union and the United States is too great to evade the resolution of the major security issues".

"What we are proposing", the Soviet leader stated, "is a genuine possibility of halting the further build-up of nuclear arsenals, of really starting to resolve the task of reducing and, ultimately, eliminating them".[7]

In view of the widespread interest which, as demonstrated in particular by today's meeting and that of 15 August, Mr. Gorbachev's answers to the questions from the TASS correspondent have aroused in the Conference on Disarmament, the Soviet delegation has requested the secretariat to circulate those answers as an official document of the Conference.

150. Statement by the British Representative (Edis) to the Conference on Disarmament: The Hague Conference of 1899 [Extract], August 20, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

It is quite common for speakers in our Conference to end with a literary allusion or quotation. I shall not attempt to follow them on this occasion. But I should like to finish by sharing with delegations a description of an earlier disarmament conference that took place nearly 100 years ago, at The Hague in 1899.

There are some remarkable echoes in the proceedings of that conference with our work here. There was, for example, a proposal for a freeze on the number of battleships or dreadnaughts, which I suppose one can consider the ICBMs of their time. The proposal came from Great Britain, which had an existing superiority in this category of weapons, but was strongly opposed by Germany and a number of other countries.

At that time, too, there was a new development in technology on the military horizon which was causing deep concern. This was the use of the lower atmosphere for military purposes—by the launching of projectiles or explosives from hot-air balloons. And here I quote from Barbara Tuchman's book, *The Proud Tower*:

[7] Document 140.
[1] CD/PV.331, p. 23.

Here was something, almost untried, that almost everyone was willing to ban, especially the Russians, for whom the prospect of adding a new dimension to warfare was altogether too much. As the Russian delegate, Colonel Jilinsky, almost plaintively put it, "In the opinion of the Russian Government, the various means of injuring the enemy now in use are sufficient." As regards air warfare, most of the delegates were willing to agree and a permanent prohibition was voted. The committee congratulated itself. Then suddenly, at the next meeting, the US delegate, Captain Crozier, having had serious second thoughts after consultation with another US delegate, Captain Mahan, raised an objection. They were proposing to ban forever, he said, a weapon of which they had no experience. New developments and inventions might soon make airships dirigible, enabling them to be steered by motor power over the area of battle and to take part at a critical moment with possibly decisive effect, thus in the long run sparing lives and shortening the conflict. Would it be in the humanitarian interest to prevent such a development? Instead of permanent prohibition, Captain Crozier proposed a five-year ban at the end of which period they would have a better idea of the capabilities of airships. This time impressed, the delegates agreed.

Mr. President, it may not be so easy for the eloquence of delegates to convince others of their views at our Conference. But at least this account may do something to give perspective to our work here, and remind us that others before us have grappled with problems of a not entirely dissimilar nature.

151. Report to the Conference on Disarmament by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons [Extracts], August 22, 1985 [1]

I. Introduction

1. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament at its 299th plenary meeting held on 14 March 1985, as contained in document CD/577, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons was re-established, for the duration of the 1985 session, with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The Conference further decided that the *Ad Hoc* Committee would report to it on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1985 session.

II. Organization of Work and Documentation

2. At its 306th plenary meeting on 4 April 1985, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia as

[1] CD/635.*

Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Mr. Victor Slipchenko, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

3. The *Ad Hoc* Committee held 16 meetings from 19 April to 16 August 1985. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations.

4. At their request, the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee: Finland, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland.

5. In carrying out its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Committee took into account paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.[2] It also took into consideration the relevant recommendations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in particular those adopted in connection with the Second Disarmament Decade in 1980.[3] In addition to various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject at its previous sessions, the *Ad Hoc* Committee took into account in particular resolution 39/151 J of the General Assembly of 17 December 1984. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of that resolution read as follows:

> 1. *Takes note* of that part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament that deals with the question of radiological weapons, in particular the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons and its recommendation that, in view of the fact that the Committee's mandate was not fulfilled, the Conference on Disarmament should re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons at the beginning of its 1985 session; [4]
>
> 2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on the subject with a view to a prompt conclusion of its work, taking into account all proposals presented to the Conference to this end, the result of which should be submitted to the General Assembly at its fortieth session;

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III. Work During the 1985 Session

7. At its second meeting, on 14 June, the *Ad Hoc* Committee decided, at the suggestion of the Chairman, to proceed on the basis of a "unitary" approach to the two major questions before it, i.e. the prohibition of radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense and the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. Accordingly, it agreed to allocate equal time for the consideration of both questions without, however, procedurally dividing the work of the Committee into two

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 426.
[3] General Assembly Resolution 35/46, of December 3, 1980.
[4] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, p. 578.

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separate "tracks" or giving priority to either of them. It further agreed that this decision was without prejudice to: the final positions of delegations on a treaty or treaties as such; the "link" between the above two questions; delegations' positions on the appropriate manner of dealing with them.

8. At its third meeting, on 18 June, the *Ad Hoc* Committee adopted the following programme of work for its 1985 session:

Within the questions of the prohibition of radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense and the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, the following problems should be discussed without prejudging the final position of delegations as regards the "link" between the two aspects of the issue:

—Definitions and Criteria
—Scope
—Peaceful uses
—Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
—Compliance and verification.

9. The Chairman submitted a number of suggestions for draft treaty elements which provided the basis for discussion during the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and resulted in the compilation of draft provisions, undertaken by the Chairman, to reflect the state of deliberations on the two major questions before the *Ad Hoc* Committee. This compilation is contained in the Annex to this report. It is understood that the Annex is not binding on any delegation. Furthermore, the issue of compliance and verification was only briefly touched upon.

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

10. It was recognized that the work accomplished by the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1985 made a further contribution to the solution of the issues entrusted to it. It is therefore recommended that the Conference on Disarmament should re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons at the beginning of its 1986 session and that the Annex to this report be considered as a basis for further work.

ANNEX

SCOPE

1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes never under any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, otherwise acquire or possess, transfer or use radiological weapons.

[2. Each State Party to this Treaty also undertakes never under any circumstances to employ deliberately, by its dissemination, any radioactive material, not defined as a radiological weapon in Article . . . of this Treaty, to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material.]

[3. Each State Party further undertakes never under any circumstances to release or disseminate radioactive material causing destruction, damage or injury, by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material, by attacking nuclear facilities as they are defined in Article . . . of this Treaty.]

[3. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes never under any circumstances to attack nuclear facilities.]

[3. *[bis]* This prohibition against attack shall not apply to nuclear facilities giving regular significant and direct support to military operations in time of war if such attack is the only feasible way of terminating such support and providing that such attacks do not lead to the release of radioactivity.]

[4. The provisions of this Treaty shall not apply to nuclear explosive devices or to radioactive material produced by them.]

5. Each State Party to this Treaty also undertakes not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any person, State, group of States, or international organization to engage in any of the activities which the States Parties to the Treaty have undertaken not to engage in under the provisions of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article.

DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Treaty:

(a) the term "radiological weapon" means:

(i) Any device, including any weapon or equipment, specifically designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material:

(ii) Any radioactive material specifically [prepared] [designed] for employment, by its dissemination, to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material.

[(b) The term "nuclear facilities" means nuclear facilities [for peaceful purposes] on land which are:

(i) nuclear reactors;

(ii) intermediate spent fuel storages; [facilities for transport and storage of nuclear fuel];

(iii) reprocessing plants;

(iv) waste deposits and

(v) enrichment facilities.]]

[[and which are under IAEA safeguards] [and which in accordance with Annex . . . are included in a Register maintained by the Depositary. Annex . . . constitutes an integral part of the Treaty.]] [5]

PEACEFUL USES

[1. Nothing in this Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all States Parties to apply and develop their

[5] In this context, CD/RW/WP.67 contains Chairman's suggestions for draft elements of an Annex relating to Article II (b). [Footnote in source document.]

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programmes for the [peaceful] uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development [as well as for the use of sources of radiation from radioactive decay for peaceful purposes] [consistent with the need to prevent the [vertical, horizontal and geographic] proliferation of nuclear weapons] [in all its aspects], [with the need to achieve measures of nuclear disarmament] [with the overriding need of nuclear disarmament measures], and in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs [consistent with the provisions of the present Treaty].]

[2. Each State Party undertakes [to contribute] [to promote] [to the fullest possible extent to the strengthening of international] co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy [radioactive materials] taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries.]

[3. Each State Party undertakes to contribute to the fullest possible extent to the development of adequate measures of protection for all States against the harmful effects of radiation.]

CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

[1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake to pursue urgently negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the conclusion of effective measures to prevent the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the achievement of nuclear disarmament.]

[2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from existing rules of international law applicable in armed conflict or limiting or detracting from obligations assumed by the States Parties under any other international agreement. Nor shall it be interpreted as in any way affecting existing international law relating to nuclear weapons or detracting from obligations to prevent the use or threat of use of such weapons and the achievement of nuclear disarmament.]

152. Report to the Conference on Disarmament by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Effective International Arrangements To Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, August 22, 1985 [1]

I. *Introduction*

1. At its 326th plenary meeting, on 1 August 1985, the Conference on Disarmament decided to re-establish for the remainder of its 1985 session, an *Ad Hoc* committee to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Conference further decided that the *Ad Hoc* committee

[1] CD/640.

would report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1985 session (document CD/628).

II. *Organization of Work and Documents*

2. Also at its 326th plenary meeting, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan) as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Mr. M. Cassandra, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary to the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

3. The *Ad Hoc* Committee held 3 meetings between 12 and 22 August 1985.

4. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee during the 1985 session: Austria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Finland, Greece, Norway, Senegal and Spain.

5. The Committee had before it the documents of previous sessions related to the item.[2]

III. *Substantive Work*

6. Owing to the time constraint imposed by the late establishment of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, the Chairman held informal consultations with delegations with a view to determining the most efficacious manner to address the item during the remaining part of the session. As a result of his informal consultations, the Chairman concluded that the positions espoused by the nuclear-weapon States during previous years had not changed. However, an overwhelming number of delegations, including those of the nuclear-weapon States, stressed the importance of the agenda item and their readiness to engage in a substantive dialogue on the issue. Those delegations believed that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons was the most effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. They believed that until nuclear disarmament was achieved on a universal basis, it was imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter. Those delegations reaffirmed the need to find a

[2] The list of documents of previous sessions up to and including the 1982 session is contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament, in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/285). The list of documents submitted to the 1983 session is contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group to the Committee on Disarmament (CD/417). The list of documents submitted to the 1984 session is contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to the Conference on Disarmament (CD/536 and Corr.1). [Footnote in source document. The lists of documents referred to are not included here.]

An extract of CD/285 is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 264–268; and of CD/417 *ibid., 1983*, pp. 730–736.

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common approach, acceptable to all, which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

7. During the course of consultations, several delegations observed that in their view in the absence of a nuclear disarmament process, no useful purpose could be served by a substantive consideration of the item and that the most effective assurance of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In addition, some delegations recalled the statements of the Group of 21, contained in documents CD/280 and CD/407 and said that until the nuclear-weapon States were ready to change their positions, there would be no prospects of reaching agreements on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that further negotiations in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on this item were unlikely to be fruitful so long as the nuclear-weapon States do not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement. Other delegations said that in their view the earlier re-establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the subject might have permitted some progress.

IV. *Conclusions and Recommendations*

8. Against the afore-mentioned background the *Ad Hoc* Committee recommends to the Conference on Disarmament that ways and means should continue to be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in its work in carrying out negotiations on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The *Ad Hoc* Committee generally agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should keep this item under active consideration at the 1986 session taking into account the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee as well as present and future relevant recommendations of the General Assembly.

153. Statement by the Brazilian Representative (de Souza e Silva) to the Conference on Disarmament: Nuclear Free Zones [Extract], August 22, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

As is well known, Brazil has actively promoted and supported the establishment of the first, and so far the only, international agreement that explicitly prohibits nuclear weapons in an inhabited region of the world, namely Latin America. Brazil participated fully in the negotia-

[1] CD/PV.332, pp. 26–27.

tion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,[2] which we have signed and ratified, and which we pledged to observe strictly until the necessary conditions for its entry into force are fulfilled. Moreover, no doubts have ever arisen concerning our compliance with the purposes and provisions of the Treaty.

Brazil considers that such zones may become useful instruments for curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in its horizontal, vertical and geographic aspects, provided that they are respected not only by the countries of the region themselves but also, and particularly, by the nuclear-weapon Powers.

When I refer to geographic proliferation, it is because we should bear in mind the ominous practice of the nuclear Powers in later years, of increasingly disseminating their atomic arsenals on the territories of their allies and of some friends, and into the airspace and in international and territorial waters all over the world as well. This practice has been pursued and implemented regardless of the security interests of the countries concerned, and even without their knowledge.

The geographic spread of those arsenals, combined with defence programmes in outer space being developed by the super-Powers, might suggest the idea that if such weapons are ever to be used, they might be used by proxy or, in any event, be launched from bases conveniently located outside the territories of the super-Powers themselves. Thus, theatre nuclear exchanges become thinkable anywhere in the world, and would no longer be confined to the region that is now saturated with such weapons and that has been so far considered as the only possible scenario for their use.

Against such dire prospects, nuclear-weapon-free zones can provide some measure of containment to the geographic dissemination of atomic arsenals. It is imperative that all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, work together to achieve the desired effectiveness of such zones, wherever they already exist or are in the process of establishment, as is the case of the South Pacific. Compliance by the nuclear-weapon Powers with the objectives of the zones is therefore an indispensable element of their non-proliferation value.

Accordingly, I welcome the statement made this morning by the distinguished Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. P. Schori. Speaking on the basic purpose of the proposed Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone, which is to improve the security of the Nordic States, Mr. Schori said, and I quote, "the States included in such a zone should undertake to keep their territories absolutely free of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States should undertake fully to respect the nuclear-weapon-free States of the zone." [3]

In this regard, Brazil has consistently held the view that adequate and effective verification procedures are essential to achieve confi-

[2] For the text of the Treaty and its Protocols, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

[3] CD/PV.332, p. 9.

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dence that the agreements are being complied with by all parties concerned, thus strengthening the régime instituted by the zone. We have stated this opinion in this Conference and in the General Assembly of the United Nations, and most recently at the ninth session of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), held in Mexico City.

Agreements aimed at establishing denuclearized zones might profit by taking into account the Latin American experience. In our continent it has not been possible to determine with any degree of certainty whether the Powers that possess nuclear weapons have or have not introduced them in the zone of application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This situation persists in view of the increasing geographic proliferation and of the policies of the nuclear-weapon Powers regarding the whereabouts of their weapons, coupled with the absence of verification procedures that would ascertain their compliance with the commitments they accepted in the Protocols annexed to the Treaty. I would like to quote, in this connection, the very pertinent observation made this morning, on the subject of verification, by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Lowitz: "If a nation is to rely on arms control agreements rather than unilateral actions for its security, this requires assurance that other nations are abiding by their commitments." [4]

Unilateral statements of compliance, of a general character, that cannot be verified, are simply not sufficient to generate confidence and promote the objectives of any treaty in the field of disarmament and security. As the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves have so frequently contended, unilateral statements of compliance amount to self-verification.

The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament states that "the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons." [5] This clearly indicates that the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be conducive to the adoption of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament, and that the creation of such zones cannot in any way be interpreted as condoning or legitimizing the possession of nuclear weapons by any country outside the zone.

I am confident that such principles are in the forefront of the endeavours of the countries of the South Pacific Forum.

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 422.

154. Report to the Conference on Disarmament by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons [Extracts], August 23, 1985 [1]

I. *Introduction*

1. At its 289th plenary meeting on 7 February 1985, the Conference on Disarmament adopted the following decision on the re-establishment of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons (CD/551):

> The Conference on Disarmament, keeping in mind that the negotiations of a Convention should proceed with a view to its final elaboration at the earliest possible date, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolutions 38/187/B and 39/65 C, and in discharging its responsibility to conduct as a priority task the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and to ensure the preparation of the convention, decides to re-establish, in accordance with its rules of procedure, for the duration of its 1985 session, the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting, taking into account all existing proposals and drafts as well as future initiatives with a view to giving the Conference a possibility to achieve an agreement as soon as possible. This agreement, if possible, or a Report on the progress of the negotiations, should be recorded in the report which this *Ad Hoc* Committee will submit to the Conference at the end of the second part of its 1985 session.

II. *Organization of Work and Documentation*

2. In accordance with the decision mentioned above (CD/551), Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski of Poland was appointed Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs, continued to serve as Secretary of the Committee.

3. The *Ad Hoc* Committee held 12 meetings from 27 February to 19 August 1985. The *Ad Hoc* Committee benefited from the inclusion in delegations of national experts. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations.

4. At its 310th plenary meeting on 23 April 1985 of the Conference on Disarmament, the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee reported on the progress of its work.

5. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee: Austria, Burundi, Denmark, Finland, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Por-

[1] CD/636*, pp. 1–2, 5–7.

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tugal, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United Republic of Cameroon.

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III. *Substantive Work During the 1985 Session*

8. In accordance with its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Committee continued the negotiation and further elaboration of the Convention, utilizing Annex I and Annex II of CD/539 [2] as well as other existing and new proposals presented by delegations. To this effect, it retained the basic structure that was established by the Committee in 1984, and accepted the Chairman's proposal to set up three Working Groups which dealt with specific aspects of the Convention as follows:

(a) Working Group A: Scope, Definitions, Non-Production, Permitted Activities (Chairman: Mr. Petar Poptchev, Bulgaria)
(b) Working Group B: Elimination of Stocks and Production Facilities (Chairman: Mrs. Elisabet Bonnier, Sweden)
(c) Working Group C: Compliance (Chairman: Mr. Frank Elbe, Federal Republic of Germany)

In addition, the prohibition of use of chemical weapons and the problem of herbicides were considered at Open-ended Consultations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Noegroho Wisnoemoerti (Indonesia).

9. In accordance with the outline for the organization of work during the 1985 session (CD/CW/WP.98) and on the basis of the results achieved in the Working Groups, at the Open-ended Consultations as well as in some cases on proposals put forward by the Chairman, preliminary formulations of provisions of the future Convention were assembled in Appendix I,[3] following the preliminary structure of the Convention.

The reports of the Working Groups and of the Chairman of the Open-ended Consultations constitute Appendix II.[4]

IV. *Conclusions and Recommendations*

10. Appendix I reflects the present stage of negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention; however the draft texts contained therein do not bind delegations who retain the right to revert to these texts.

11. The *Ad Hoc* Committee recommends to the Conference on Disarmament:

(a) that Appendix I be used as a basis for further negotiation and drafting of the Convention;
(b) that the reports of the Working Groups and of the Chairman of the Open-ended Consultations as contained in Appendix II, including

[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 603–644. Annex II is not included.
[3] Not printed here.
[4] Not printed here.

the proposed draft formulations, together with other relevant existing and future documents of the Conference be equally utilized in the further elaboration of the Convention;

(c) that the *Ad Hoc* Committee resume its work under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski (Poland) and under its present mandate, for a session of limited duration during the period 13–31 January 1986; that the work cover issues under Articles IV, VI, including the relevant parts of Article II, and Article IX; furthermore that informal consultations be undertaken on these issues by the Chairman in the meantime in preparation for the resumed session and that the Committee present to the Conference on Disarmament a report on its work during that period;

(d) that the *Ad Hoc* Committee be re-established before the end of the second week of the 1986 session with its 1985 mandate, and that Ambassador R.I.T. Cromartie (United Kingdom) be appointed as its Chairman.

155. Report to the Conference on Disarmament by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space [Extracts], August 26, 1985 [1]

I. *Introduction*

1. At its 304th plenary meeting on 29 March 1985, the Conference on Disarmament adopted the following decision:

In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an *Ad Hoc* Committee under item 5 of its agenda entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

The Conference requests the *Ad Hoc* Committee, in discharging that responsibility, to examine, as a first step at this stage, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1985 session.

II. *Organization of Work and Documents*

2. At its 314th plenary meeting on 20 June 1985, the Conference on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Saad Alfarargi (Egypt) as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Miss Aida Luisa Levin, United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, served as the Committee's Secretary.

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[1] CD/641, pp.1, 4–17.

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3. The *Ad Hoc* Committee held 20 meetings between 24 June and 26 August 1985.

4. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway and Spain.

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III. *Substantive Work During the 1985 Session*

6. Following an initial exchange of views, the *Ad Hoc* Committee, at its sixth meeting, adopted a programme of work for the 1985 session (CD/OS/WP.5) containing the following points:

(a) Consideration of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

(b) existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

(c) proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In order to give equal treatment to those subjects, the Committee further decided to allocate three meetings to each.

7. In accordance with the programme of work, delegations exchanged views regarding issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

8. Some delegations stressed that outer space was the common heritage of mankind and that, consequently, the exploration and exploitation of outer space should be preserved for exclusively peaceful purposes to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all countries. Some of the above delegations noted that up to the present, outer space had been an area free of weapons but that there was a growing threat of the emergence of "active" space systems, mainly for anti-ballistic and anti-satellite warfare. In their view, such developments posed an imminent risk that the military competition between the two major nuclear-weapon States would extend into outer space. All the above delegations expressed concern at the extensive use of outer space for military purposes that was already taking place. They pointed out that the majority of space objects now in orbit, while not meant as weapons or as weapons platforms, served military functions and constituted integral parts of weapons systems on earth and of strategic doctrines associated with the use of nuclear weapons.

9. Some delegations emphasized that the development of new space weapon systems will lead to an acceleration of the arms race, both horizontally and vertically, at the cost of existing legislation relating to outer space, arms limitation agreements and the disarmament process as a whole; amplify prevailing military asymmetries between the two

major space Powers and their allies, on the one hand, and the non-aligned and neutral States, on the other; and will lead to the introduction of new weapon technologies into regions not directly concerned with either of the two major space Powers, further undermining their security.

10. There was also criticism by some delegations concerning the use of reconnaissance and surveillance satellites by space Powers to monitor strategically-vital information about countries that have no way of controlling or having access to such information. Furthermore, the attention of the Committee was drawn to the fact that there had been instances where satellites had been used in support of military operations against developing countries. In this view, that situation, which had important implications for the security of most countries, did not reflect recognition of the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, as stated in the preamble of the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.[2]

11. Delegations of the group of socialist countries fully shared the view that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and that, consequently, its exploration and use should be preserved for exclusively peaceful purposes in order to promote scientific, economic and social development of all countries. They noted that up to the present, outer space has been an area free of weapons and that urgent measures have to be taken in order to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space.

12. The same delegations emphasized that there was increasing concern at the threat of the spread of the arms race to outer space. In their view, this threat stemmed from the programme known as the "Strategic Defence Initiative", which is not a research programme as it is stated but aimed at the development and deployment in space of a new class of armament—attack space weapons.

13. These delegations elaborated on the adverse political, military, economic and other consequences that, in their opinion, an arms race in space would have. These consequences included destabilization of the strategic situation; increased threat of the outbreak of nuclear war; acceleration of the arms race in all directions and growth of nuclear arsenals; undermining of existing treaties and of the prospects for arms limitation and reduction, and increase of military tension; vast unproductive expenditures; damage to the peaceful use of space and obstacles to international co-operation in the peaceful use of space.

14. Some other delegations shared the view that outer space was the common heritage of mankind and that, consequently, the exploration and use of outer space should be preserved for exclusively peaceful purposes to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all countries. They also shared the genuine concerns expressed on

[2] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 38–43.

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the part of many countries on the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They noted, however, that outer space is presently not, in fact, an area free of weapons. They stressed that the first task of the *Ad Hoc* Committee was to clarify ambiguities surrounding the existing legal régimes in outer space in terms of what was permitted, what was prohibited, what grey areas might exist and what gaps required attention. They pointed out that there was no agreement on the meaning of such basic terms as "peaceful purposes" or "militarization". It was noted that many activities in space, while of a military character, served a variety of functions that contributed to stability and to monitoring the implementation of disarmament agreements. In that context, these delegations mentioned the problem of the protection of satellites and pointed out that there were differing views regarding the protection already afforded by the existing legal régime, whether that protection needed to be strengthened and, if so, what scope it should be given. In their view, the consideration of proposals for additional measures to prevent an arms race in outer space presupposes that the Committee reaches a prior common understanding of what is permitted and what is prohibited.

15. With respect to the question of whether there was a threat of an arms race in outer space, one delegation noted that it believed that outer space should only be used for peaceful purposes and to that end it was engaged in bilateral negotiations. It was ready in the *Ad Hoc* Committee to discuss issues relating to outer space in a manner consistent with, and complementary to, the bilateral negotiations. It stressed that the Strategic Defence Initiative was only a research programme that was consistent with all international obligations of its country, including existing treaties. It pointed out that one country possessed currently operational capabilities in this area and, for many years, had been conducting research into advanced technologies for strategic defence.

16. One delegation answered that its country had not been conducting research into advanced technologies for strategic defence.

17. Some delegations stressed that the ambiguities surrounding the existing legal régime could only be resolved or clarified in the process of elaboration of new agreements, as none other than States Parties to existing treaties had the competence to interpret those legal instruments. Those delegations believed that as far as the international community was concerned, the calling into question of the meaning of the terms in international instruments by States Parties themselves, placed these instruments in jeopardy. Therefore, these delegations emphasized that reference to ambiguities in existing legal instruments would be devoid of meaning and even have the effect of diverting attention if made outside the framework of negotiations of further agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space. In this context they expressed the need to engage in the preliminary task of clarifying ambiguities surrounding weaponization of outer space and the "state of art" in space weapons within the context of negotia-

tion. In particular, the need to reach agreement on the meaning of such basic terms as "peaceful purposes", "militarization", or "weapons of mass destruction", especially since recent developments in weapon technology have blurred the traditionally accepted interpretation of those terms among the space powers.

18. All delegations welcomed the initiation of bilateral negotiations on space and nuclear arms and recognized their importance. At the same time, they stressed the importance of, and need for, a multilateral approach to issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

19. Many delegations considered that the two negotiating parties should bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake and, accordingly, should keep the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament duly informed of the progress of their negotiations, without prejudice to the progress of the negotiations. These delegations further believed that bilateral negotiations do not in any way diminish the urgent need to initiate multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

20. With respect to existing agreements, multilateral as well as bilateral, relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the Group of Socialist delegations emphasized that there exists already an international legal régime which places certain limitations on various arms and military activities in outer space. In their view, however, all the agreements are not sufficient to put an effective barrier against the extension of the arms race into space, as they leave open certain channels, such as the development and deployment in outer space of weapons or systems of weapons not defined as weapons of mass destruction, or the deployment of certain weapons-systems to be used against objects in space, or used from space against objects on Earth. They have concluded, therefore that concrete measures are needed urgently to prevent such developments as they would entail dangerously destabilizing consequences.

21. Some delegations answered that there already exists a substantial body of law—both customary and treaty law—that is applicable to activities in space. Adherence to this body of law provides assurance that outer space will only be used for peaceful purposes.

22. With respect to the legal régime applicable to outer space, it was stressed that, as affirmed in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, activities in the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. In this connection, some delegations noted the relevance of the provisions of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter concerning the non-use of force.

23. Some delegations considered that those provisions constituted a central element of the legal régime in outer space. They noted that the prohibition of the use of force was subject to Article 51 of the

Charter, which recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence in case of armed attack. They expressed the view that Article 2 (4) of the Charter already afforded protection to space objects and that, therefore, this should be taken into account when considering the need for additional measures for the protection of satellites against the use of force.

24. Other delegations, while recognizing the importance of the general principle on the non-use of force, as laid down in the United Nations Charter, noted that it did not preclude the militarization of outer space, as evidenced by the conclusion of international agreements specifically relating to outer space, *inter alia*, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. It was also noted that Article 2 (4) did not prohibit the development, testing and deployment of strike space weapons. Furthermore, in regard to the reference to Article 51 of the Charter, they reiterated that this Article could not be invoked to justify the use or threat of use of force from outer space.

25. In the consideration of existing agreements, delegations discussed a number of multilateral and bilateral instruments, *inter alia*, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963),[3] the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967), the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975),[4] the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1977),[5] the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979) [6] and the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (1972).[7] In this connection, reference was made to documents CD/OS/WP.6 and CD/OS/WP.7.

26. Considerable attention focused on the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the significance of the Treaty was generally underlined. At the same time, various delegations stated that the Treaty contained terms that lent themselves to different interpretations. In addition, a number of delegations believed that, because of its limited scope, the Treaty was not sufficient to prevent an arms race in outer space. They pointed out that, while the Treaty, together with the Moon Treaty, provided for the complete demilitarization of the Moon and other celestial bodies, as well as for their orbits and trajectories, as far as the orbit around the Earth was concerned, it only prohibited the placement there of any object carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, or the stationing of such weapons in outer space in any other manner. In their view, therefore, there was a

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[4] 28 UST 695, TIAS 8480.
[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1977*, pp. 322–326.
[6] General Assembly Resolution 34/68, reprinted *ibid., 1979*, pp. 736–745.
[7] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–201.

risk that the Treaty could be considered by some to leave open a number of options for the military use of outer space. This, however, in the judgement of these delegations, would run counter to the spirit of the Treaty, since its Preamble sets down that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes. Two delegations held that the arms control régime applicable to outer space was far more comprehensive than the arms control régime on Earth. In this view, the Outer Space Treaty, together with the Partial Test Ban Treaty which, *inter alia*, prohibited nuclear explosions in outer space, had the effect of making outer space a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

27. Various delegations referred to the 1975 Registration Convention requiring States of registry to furnish to the Secretary-General of the United Nations information concerning space objects, including their general function. Those delegations felt that this Convention, if adequately implemented, could serve as a valuable confidence-building measure in that it would give greater transparency to outer space activities.

28. Some delegations held that the examination of the existing legal régime undertaken by the *Ad Hoc* Committee had confirmed the need to clarify ambiguities and arrive at consensus interpretations of what was permitted and what was prohibited. Many delegations held that the work of the Committee would be most successful if it proceeded by undertaking a complete examination of the present legal régime aimed at a common understanding of that régime. Other delegations believed that the discussion had shown that the existing body of international law applicable to outer space contained many loopholes to prevent effectively an arms race in outer space. Therefore, they believed that it was imperative to commence negotiations immediately with a view to arriving at agreement or agreements that will prevent such an arms race in outer space. Many other delegations pointed out that the Committee should instead direct its work towards practical measures preventing an arms race in outer space in all its aspects as recommended by United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/59.

29. A number of views and proposals were brought to the attention of the Committee (CD/274,[8] CD/476,[9] A/39/243, CD/607;[10] CD/357,[11] CD/PV.263, CD/540, para. 109; CD/540, para. 110; CD/579;[12] CD/PV.252, CD/PV.301, CD/OS/WP.8; CD/PV.279; CD/PV.318; CD/PV.325).

30. Stressing the need to block all channels for the extension of the arms race into outer space, delegations of the group of socialist countries drew attention to the draft treaties on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, submitted in 1981, contained in document CD/274, and on the prohibition of the use of

[8] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 334–336.
[9] Identical with A/38/194, reprinted *ibid., 1983*, pp. 684–689.
[10] Document 105.
[11] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 209–213.
[12] Document 51.

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force in outer space and from space against the Earth, submitted in 1983, contained in document CD/476, and to the proposal on the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind, submitted in 1984.[13] They also referred to their proposal, which called for an agreement on the prohibition and elimination of an entire class of weapons, namely, attack space systems of any kind—conventional, nuclear, laser, particle-beam or any other form—whether manned or unmanned. Such space systems should not be developed, tested or deployed, either for anti-missile defence or as anti-satellite systems, or for use against targets on Earth or in the air and systems that had already been developed should be destroyed. In their view, all these proposals provided a constructive basis for working out an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In their opinion, which was shared by other delegations, a first step in that direction would be for other States to join in the unilateral moratorium already declared by one State on the launching of anti-satellite weapons in outer space, which would be in force as long as other States acted in the same way. These delegations were of the view that the 1983 draft treaty submitted to the Conference in document CD/476 was a good basis for conducting negotiations on the problem under consideration.

31. In connection with the latter proposal, some delegations observed that the text concerned had serious deficiencies, *inter alia*, because of its unequal approach, the imprecision of its definitions, and its lack of effective verification proposals.

32. Some other delegations rejected those assertions and pointed out that, if such preliminary observations had any ground at all, they could be considered in the course of the negotiations with a view to elaborating a generally agreed comprehensive agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space.

33. Various delegations referred to suggestions or proposals concerning the prohibition of anti-satellite systems and the protection of satellites. The view was expressed that the main task should be to negotiate an international treaty banning all space weapons, including weapons directed against targets in space. Such a ban should cover the development, testing and deployment of ASAT weapons on Earth, in the atmosphere and in outer space and should include the destruction of existing ASAT systems. Furthermore, in this view, damage, disturbance and harmful interference in the normal functioning of permitted space objects should be forbidden in international agreements in order to strengthen the Outer Space Treaty and confirm the International Telecommunications Convention.[14]

34. Some delegations noted that there were a number of questions that would have to be addressed in the consideration of a ban on ASAT systems, *inter alia*, the definition of anti-satellite weapons, the

[13] A/39/243. Reprinted in *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 730–731.
[14] 28 UST 2495, TIAS 8572.

problem of dual-purpose spacecraft and the problems posed by the fact that ABM and ASAT technologies shared common elements. It was suggested that, taking into account the need to assure the verifiability of eventual treaty commitments, the first objective should be to prohibit untested anti-satellite systems, i.e., systems capable of hitting satellites in high orbit. The desirability of a ban on such systems was stressed on the grounds that high altitude satellites performed a number of stabilizing functions. The view was expressed that an agreement banning the development, testing and deployment of high-altitude ASAT systems should be regarded as a first step towards more comprehensive agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space.

35. Various delegations noted that bilateral agreements, such as the 1972 ABM Treaty and the two SALT agreements,[15] provided protection for satellites of the parties that served as national technical means of verification and suggested the desirability of multilateralizing that immunity to cover the satellites of third countries.

36. On this question, the view was also expressed that the Conference on Disarmament should, in its exploration of issues relevant to arms control in outer space, consider the possibility of the protection from attack of all satellites which contributed to the preservation of strategic stability and which were instrumental in monitoring arms control and disarmament agreements. Furthermore, this same protection should be extended to the ground stations essential for the operation of those satellites.

37. One delegation, recalling that nuclear-weapon States had used military satellites in support of military actions against developing countries, held that this was a major consideration to be taken into account in connection with the question of the protection of satellites. It further stated that international peace and security could not be allowed to depend on such concepts as strategic stability for they lay at the heart of the action/reaction process that perpetuated the nuclear arms race and with it the danger of the annihilation of mankind.

38. In connection with the statement in the paragraph above, some delegations pointed out that strategic stability is an objectively important factor in maintaining and strengthening peace and international security, and that they continued to strive to maintain military balance at the lowest possible level.

39. Other delegations added that the concept of strategic stability and the means of its implementation employed by their countries were fully consistent with the obligations of all States to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

40. Some delegations were of the opinion that all aspects of the arms race in outer space should be dealt with in order to achieve a

[15] The ABM Treaty is also known as a "SALT Agreement." The three Agreements may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff., and *1979*, pp. 189 ff.

comprehensive régime to prevent an arms race in outer space. In their view, the principles of demilitarization should be extended to encompass outer space as a whole.

41. Various delegations held that verifiability was a fundamental criterion that should be applied in the consideration of proposals relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They pointed out that, as discussed in document CD/OS/WP.7, in the case of most existing agreements, for example, the ENMOD Convention and the Outer Space Treaty, verification provisions were limited. They suggested that, at the present stage of technical development, some sort of international direct inspection should be applied, including on-site inspection, whenever feasible. Some delegations believed that consideration should be given to the establishment of an international agency to verify compliance so that all Parties may have access to the results of verification. In that connection, a number of delegations referred to the proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency. Many delegations supporting the proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency, pointed out that it would, *inter alia*, overcome the credibility gap that besets the existing national technical means of verification. They, however, held that an imposition of verifiability as a fundamental criterion would have the effect of creating an insurmountable obstacle to all attempts at negotiating agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space. They alluded in this context to the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Other delegations noted in the same context that one relevant paragraph of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament (paragraph 31) states that "Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed".[16]

42. Some delegations, noting the inadequacy of the information furnished to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the 1975 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, suggested the need to consider ways and means of improving the implementation and, as appropriate, augmenting the provisions of the Convention so that the international community may have detailed information on the nature and purposes of space activities. They

[16] The Final Document appears *ibid., 1978*, pp. 411 ff.

believed that this would be a valuable confidence-building measure and would facilitate verification.

43. Some delegations also mentioned suggestions concerning the possibility of developing, as a confidence-building measure, "rules of the road" for space objects.

44. Some delegations believed that, in view of the advanced technology involved in the exploration and use of outer space, and the fact that only a few States were in a position to benefit therefrom, it was necessary in the consideration of proposals to contemplate ways and means of strengthening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, so that all States would have access to all areas of space technology without discrimination to promote their economic and social development according to their needs, interests and priorities. It was also suggested that surveillance and reconnaissance activities by satellite should be entrusted to an international body that could set up data banks from which any country would be able to obtain information relevant to its needs. Such a body could also be used to provide advance information on crisis situations, so as to enhance the crisis management role of the United Nations.

45. Some delegations, outlining their general approach to the consideration of proposals relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, stated that, in their view, a proposal should meet three criteria. First, the proposal should apply equally to all parties. Second, it should be verifiable. Third, there was the question whether the proposal, even if it applied equally and was verifiable, would, if implemented, enhance stability and security. These delegations were of the opinion that all of the proposals on this subject must meet those criteria.

46. Some delegations questioned the validity of the notion of stability put forward by nuclear-weapon States and their allies as a criterion to assess the need for and desirability of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. In their view, it was an integral element of strategic concepts and doctrines that reflected the narrow security perceptions of the two alliances *vis-à-vis* each other. These delegations believed that questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be considered in a much broader perspective taking full account of the concerns and interests of non-aligned and neutral countries.

47. In connection with this statement, some delegations recalled that their position concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space takes fully into account the interests of all countries and peoples and had nothing to do with the "narrow security perceptions" mentioned above.

48. Other delegations reiterated that the criteria used by them in implementing their efforts for the prevention of an arms race in outer space were as follows:

- that outer space is the common heritage of all mankind;

—that the exploration and use of outer space should be preserved for exclusively peaceful purposes in order to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all countries.

Furthermore, in their view, none of their strategic concepts or doctrines were at variance with these criteria.

49. In the opinion of many delegations, the consideration of the proposals put forward before the *Ad Hoc* Committee had shown that there were areas of agreement on a number of major aspects of the problem and that, consequently, there was a good basis for pursuing the elaboration of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space. Many other delegations were of the view that the discussion, while useful, had been general and preliminary in nature. Some pointed out that for future discussions proposals should be elaborated and refined.

50. A number of delegations emphasized the need for the space powers to demonstrate the necessary political will, not only to avoid further militarization of outer space, but also to recognize that the pursuit of their interests in this sphere cannot take precedence over the interests of the international community.

51. Various delegations believed that, in view of the complexity and technical nature of the subject, the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee would benefit greatly from the participation of experts. Accordingly, they suggested that at an early stage during the next session consideration should be given to ways and means of organizing that participation.

* * *

52. Many delegations stressed that they had accepted the mandate because it expressly indicated that there would be a first exploratory stage and that "as a first step at this stage", it would be necessary to examine, "through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space".[17] In their view, it was clear from the explicit reference in the last line in the mandate, that the stage referred to must end at the same time as the 1985 session of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and that next year negotiations should begin with a view to the "conclusion of an agreement or agreements", as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space, as specifically stated in resolution 39/59 approved by 150 votes in favour and none against.

53. Other delegations stressed that in their view, the accepted mandate was a relevant and realistic one that permitted a considerable amount of concrete work which would not interfere, undercut or in any way prejudge the bilateral negotiations under way between the United States of America and the USSR on this issue. Furthermore,

[17] Document 61.

those delegations made clear their hope that the mandate would not expire at the end of the 1985 session should the Committee not have completed the kind of exploratory work envisaged by those delegations in the mandate.

54. Delegations of the socialist countries, fully sharing the opinion expressed in paragraph 52 above, upheld the view that the Conference on Disarmament should re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee at the beginning of its 1986 session with an appropriate mandate enabling it to start negotiations on concrete practical measures urgently needed to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space, as recommended by the relevant resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. Furthermore, the group of socialist countries proposed that Ambassador L. Bayart (Mongolia) be appointed as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for its 1986 session.

55. Other delegations, taking note of the above-mentioned proposal of the socialist countries, stated that further consultations would be necessary in order to examine this matter.

IV. *Conclusion*

56. The *Ad Hoc* Committee had a wide-ranging discussion that contributed to clarifying the complexity of a number of problems and to a better understanding of positions. The importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space was recognized by the Committee and, consequently, all efforts should be made to assure that substantive work on the agenda item entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" will continue at the next session of the Conference.

156. Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the Conference on Disarmament: Nuclear Free Zones, August 27, 1985 [1]

It will very shortly be 20 years since, on 21 February 1967, I had the privilege of submitting to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, "for the information of the representatives of member States", as I then said, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America which had been opened for signature one week before in the Mexican Foreign Ministry situated in the historic quarter of Mexico City that bears the Aztec name of Tlatelolco.[2] Thanks to this Treaty, there was to come into existence the first nuclear-weapon-free zone covering densely populated areas.

[1] CD/PV.333, pp. 26–29.

[2] The texts of the Treaty and its Protocols may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

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The event I have just recalled and the fact that, pursuant to article 26 of the Treaty, the Government of Mexico has the honour to serve as the depository of that instrument, explain adequately the profound satisfaction with which we received the happy news that, on 6 August 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the explosion of the first nuclear bomb over Hiroshima, there was opened for signature at Rarotonga, in the Cook Islands, the international instrument that bears the title of "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty" and that it had already been signed by eight Heads of Government, those of Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Niue, Western Samoa and Tuvalu.[3]

This satisfaction has been confirmed by the thorough examination that we have been able to make of the complete text of the Treaty, including its four Annexes and three Protocols, which, as requested by the representative of Australia to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Richard Butler, and the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Brett Thomas Lineham, has been reproduced and circulated in document CD/633.

Indeed, this examination brought us to the conclusion not only that the two years of persistent effort by the Latin American States that comprised the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, known by the acronym COPREDAL, made possible the successful outcome of the elaboration of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but also that many of the lessons deriving from the experience acquired during that period can be of use in facilitating the arduous task of the States from other regions which, as those of the South Pacific have just done, wish to contribute towards nuclear disarmament through the effective process of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

As an illustration of what I have just said, and without that diminishing in any way the merit of the work by the South Pacific Forum, I should like to mention a few concrete examples:

Firstly, I feel that I must stress how positive and extremely encouraging for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones is the fact that, like the Latin American States, the States of the South Pacific concluded that it was not an indispensable prerequisite for the establishment of such a zone that all the States situated therein should form part of it from the outset;

The South Pacific Treaty includes in its first article a definition of what is meant by a "nuclear weapon" that corresponds in essence to the definition contained in Article 5 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and, like that Treaty, specifies that the means of transport or delivery of the explosive device is not covered by the definition "if separable from and not an indivisible part of it";

[3] See Document 137.

The two Treaties coincide—article 30 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and article 13 of the South Pacific Treaty—in declaring that they are "of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely", although both of them provide for the possibility of denunciation by any of their Parties in the cases specified in the two articles I have cited;

Both Treaties are categorical in declaring—article 27 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and article 14 of the South Pacific Treaty—that they "shall not be subject to reservations";

When the two instruments of which I am speaking were being drawn up, similar conclusions were reached concerning maritime or aerial transit by foreign ships or aircraft. The only difference is that, where the South Pacific is concerned, the conclusion is stated in article 5, paragraph 2 of the Treaty and that, where Tlatelolco is concerned, it was not included in the Treaty but in a declaration by the Preparatory Commission indicating that, as regards this matter,

> it shall be understood that there shall apply the relevant principles and rules of international law, according to which it is for the territorial State, in the free exercise of its sovereignty, to grant or refuse such transit in each particular instance, subject to a request on the part of the interested State for permission to effect such transit, unless otherwise agreed in a treaty between those States;

Finally, both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the South Pacific Treaty contain provisions that establish a control system of remarkable efficiency. The relevant provisions are to be found, as regards Tlatelolco, in Articles 12 to 18 of the Treaty and, in connection with the South Pacific, in Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Treaty as supplemented by the provisions of Annex 2, IAEA safeguards, and of Annex 4, which bears the title "Complaints Procedure".

The comparison and analysis of these provisions permits a conclusion similar to that which U Thant, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, expressed at the opening ceremony, held on 2 September 1969, of the first session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), when, after declaring that the Treaty of Tlatelolco was unique because it covered "an important inhabited part of the Earth", he added that:

> it is also unique because the Agency that is being established at this session will have the advantage of possessing a permanent and effective control system with a series of novel features. In addition to applying the system of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the régime established by the Committee contains provisions concerning special reports and investigations and, in the event of suspicion, special inspections. This Treaty includes a series of aspects of the system known as the 'verification by challenge', which is one of the new concepts that arouse the most hope in the complicated question of verification and control.

As regards the three Protocols of the South Pacific Treaty, Protocols 1 and 2 correspond in their general lines and their respective objectives to the two Additional Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Protocol 3 to the new Treaty is intended solely to record the undertaking of the States that are Parties to it "not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone". In the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, there is no Protocol of this kind, for it would have been redundant since, in Additional Protocol II, the nuclear-weapon States undertake on becoming Parties to that Protocol "not to contribute in any way in the territories to which the Treaty applies . . . to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of Article 1 of the Treaty", in which the testing of all nuclear weapons is strictly prohibited.

It is really a pity that the Conference on Disarmament, which has been termed the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field, should have been incapable of negotiating a single draft treaty or convention in the years that have elapsed since the holding of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament at which, in 1978, its membership and functions were decided.

Something similar happened with the bilateral negotiations between the two super-powers when, after signing the SALT II Treaty in 1979,[3] one of them refused to ratify it; and with what are known as the trilateral negotiations on the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing, which have now been suspended for five years through the action of the same super-power.

If, then, it would seem for the moment that the only attainable nuclear disarmament measures are those that are being implemented—paradoxical though that may be—by the non-nuclear-weapon States, we must, both here and in the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,[4] which opens this afternoon, and, above all, at the fortieth regular session of the United Nations General Assembly, give our firm and unequivocal support to treaties such as that which the 14 States members of the South Pacific Forum have just made a reality.

Let us hope that, to the nuclear-weapon-free zone that has been created and that established in Tlatelolco almost 20 years ago, there will be added at a not-too-distant date those other three zones of the same nature that have been appearing year after year in the agenda of the General Assembly: Africa, the Middle East and Southern Asia. The Nordic countries and the Balkans represent two other regions where there has also been frequent discussion of the possibility and advisability of adopting a similar status. If those five projects were converted into reality and the nuclear-weapon-free zones envisaged in them were added to the two that already exist, a giant step would, we feel,

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[4] For the final declaration of this review conference, see Document 178. For the text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

have been taken towards the realization of the ultimate objective outlined in the final document approved by consensus in 1978, and unanimously and categorically reaffirmed in 1982 of attaining "a world entirely free of nuclear weapons through the process of establishing" in various parts of the Earth zones free from these terrible instruments of mass destruction.[5]

157. Message From President Reagan to the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, August 28, 1985 [1]

It gives me great pleasure to address this message to the delegates to the third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference—an event that also commemorates the 15th anniversary of that Treaty.[2] The Nonproliferation Treaty is a historic accomplishment. It is a critical cornerstone in our common effort to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, while providing an essential framework for parties to reap the benefits of the peaceful atom. By reducing the dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons and the risks of nuclear war, it contributes to the security and safety of all nations and all peoples.

My central arms control objective has been to reduce substantially and ultimately to eliminate nuclear weapons and rid the world of the nuclear threat. Toward that end, the United States has proposed in Geneva radical reductions in the number of existing nuclear weapons. This, I believe, is the most direct and best course to pursue if we are to eliminate the danger of nuclear war.

At the same time, I believe that verifiable limitations on nuclear testing can play a useful, although more modest, role. For this reason, on July 29, I reiterated my desire to get a process going which will enable the United States and the Soviet Union to establish the basis for effectively verifying limits on underground testing.[3] We have invited the Soviet Union to send observers, with any instrumentation devices they wish to bring, to measure a nuclear test at our site. This invitation has no conditions.

Yet another critical objective of the United States is to build a stable, more cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. Of the shared interests between our two countries, avoiding war and reducing the level of arms are among the greatest. As I have said before, cooperation begins with communication, and I look forward to meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev this November.

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[5] *Ibid., 1978,* p. 422; *ibid., 1982,* pp. 421–425.

[1] *Department of State Bulletin,* November 1985, p. 35. The message was read to the conference by ACDA Director Adelman in his statement of the same date.

[2] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968,* pp. 461–465

[3] Document 125.

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All parties to the NPT now share the responsibility of taking stock, of looking in a fair and balanced way at how well the treaty's vital goals are being met, and of considering how we might do even better.

As the operation of this important Treaty is reviewed, the conference should also celebrate the fact that it is a tremendous success. The United States remains firmly committed to the objectives embodied in this treaty and to its vision of a more stable and secure world for all nations.

158. Statement by ACDA Director Adelman to the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, August 28, 1985 [1]

Forty years ago, the world witnessed the birth of a new kind of weapon of unprecedented and until-then unimaginable destructiveness. Since then all nations and all peoples of the world have had to face the promise and the peril of the atom.

Over the next 4 weeks, the distinguished delegates gathered here have the solemn responsibility to discuss the most important subject of our era—the nuclear challenge. Together we will evaluate the contribution to meeting that challenge made by the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.[2] President Reagan has set forth my country's thoughts on the tasks ahead, which I would like to share with you.

[Here Ambassador Adelman read the President's message, printed *supra*.]

As President Reagan says, it is incumbent upon us once again to take stock of the NPT. This task is especially useful now, as we are more than halfway between its entry-into-force and 1995 when the subject of extending the Treaty must be addressed.

Surely there is a diversity of views on how to meet the nuclear challenge, which will be reflected in this hall over the coming month. Indeed, there should be.

As free people, we Americans understand and accept the importance of a diversity of views. This conference's concrete outcome—whether there is a final declaration or what type it may be—is far less important than our holding an honest and balanced review—with, as I say, its panoply of opinion. There is no question in my mind that such a review will reveal that we all share a great stake in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and that it serves the security interests of all countries.

Why? Because it has made our world safer. No treaty can be asked to do more. As one of our Founding Fathers, John Jay, stated in the

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, November 1985, pp. 35–38.
[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

Federalist Papers, "Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first." [3]

The treaty was designed to serve three purposes:

- To stop the spread of nuclear weapons;
- To help member nations acquire peaceful nuclear capabilities; and
- Lead to further progress in comprehensive arms control and disarmament measures.

How has it done with these three goals?

Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

Best, surely, on the first goal, the central element of the Treaty which benefits all nations. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, it was feared that there could be no stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. A special committee of the U.S. National Planning Association, for example, predicted in 1958 that "by 1970, most nations with appreciable military strength will have in their arsenals nuclear weapons—strategic, tactical, or both." [4] Similar concerns partly led to a 1961 UN General Assembly resolution, sponsored by Ireland, which called attention to the dangers of proliferation and the need to stop it.[5] President John F. Kennedy, just 2 years later, warned of a world which, by 1975, would have 15–20 nations with nuclear weapons.[6]

Such a fearful expectation could have resulted in diplomatic fatalism and political stagnation. But it did not. World leaders were wise enough to take positive actions to head off the looming danger. The result was the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And since its entry into force in 1970, the Treaty has truly played a crucial role in stopping the bomb's spread. Who then would have believed that in the ensuing 15 years, only one additional country—India—would detonate a nuclear explosive device? Very few persons, but it turned out so.

As a result, today all of us are more secure. In part, this is due to the Treaty's wide adherence, the readiness of more than 125 countries to renounce the acquisition of nuclear explosives and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities.[7] These moves have helped check both the domestic pressures and international concerns that can, and otherwise might have, triggered pursuit of nuclear weapons. The Treaty's nonproliferation and safeguards provisions have likewise served as a foundation for sound nuclear supply policies.

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[3] "The Federalist No. 3," *The Federalist* [The Modern Library] (New York: Random House, n.d.), p. 13.

[4] NPA Special Project Committee on Security Through Arms Control, *1970 Without Arms Control: Implications of Modern Weapons Technology* (Planning pamphlet No. 104, Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1958), p. 42.

[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, p. 694.

[6] *Ibid., 1963*, p. 113.

[7] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 218–244.

Even more important, with its continually growing membership—16 more countries have joined since the last review conference—the Treaty reflects an increasingly universal norm of nonproliferation. A world of many nuclear powers is avoidable and must be avoided. For a state to embark on the path to these weapons would be met with international concern, not acquiescence. To acquire them would be met with international condemnation, not praise. These norms, valued at the time of the NPT's creation, have been reinforced every year since.

All countries have an interest in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. We in the United States know that a world of many nuclear powers would threaten our security and that of our allies. But the spread of nuclear weapons would equally—if not even more so—threaten the neighbors of a new weapons state and would sooner or later undermine the security of the new owners themselves. Indeed, longstanding suspicions and tensions would be heightened; the risk of conflict increased. The result would be less security for each of us and consequently for all of us.

This simple fact, as I have said, is widely recognized. It underlies the cooperation among us to maintain and strengthen the NPT and other defenses against the bomb's spread. It is reflected in the efforts of many of us—East and West, aligned and nonaligned—to convince more countries to join the Treaty. Indeed, it is demonstrated by each of our country's adherence to this Treaty, making it the most widely accepted arms control treaty ever.

But pledges of commitment to the Treaty are not enough. We need to match our words with actions. The United States has done so, as documented in the information we have provided to the preparatory committee.

First, since the 1980 review, we have tightened further our export procedures to make it even less likely that any U.S. exports would contribute to the risk of further proliferation. We have also worked with other NPT suppliers to upgrade the so-called trigger lists,[8] created to help parties meet their obligations under Article III.

Second, we have urged all nuclear suppliers to agree to require comprehensive, or full-scope, safeguards on all of a non-nuclear-weapons state's peaceful nuclear activities as a condition for significant new supply commitments. Parties to the NPT already accept such comprehensive or full-scope safeguards on their peaceful activities; to require acceptance by nonparties as condition of supply would equalize the treatment of the two. Further, the job of the IAEA would be made easier and greater assurance provided of a country's peaceful intentions in the nuclear field. We continue to believe that all suppliers should adopt this approach.

Third, also since the last review conference, the safeguards agreement that permits routine inspections of U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities has

[8] IAEA, INFCIRC/209 and amendments.

been implemented.[9] The IAEA now has the right to apply safeguards at more than 230 of our private and government-owned nuclear facilities. We welcome inspections at those facilities selected by the IAEA as a means to demonstrate U.S. support for effective safeguards, and will continue to do so. We urge others to do likewise. We are pleased by the recent conclusion of a Soviet voluntary safeguards agreement with the IAEA,[10] and we hope that the Soviets will make additional types and numbers of facilities eligible for safeguards. We hope that China, too, will accept IAEA safeguards on some of its nuclear facilities.

Fourth, the United States in 1981 ratified Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which creates a nuclear-weapons free zone in Latin America.[11] By this act, we have pledged not to store or deploy nuclear weapons in U.S. territories in the zone. We had earlier ratified Protocol II of this Treaty, thereby committing the United States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the Tlatelolco Treaty. A few weeks ago, another regional initiative was announced: a draft nuclear-free zone for the South Pacific.[12] We are ready to study this new draft treaty with interest and an open mind.

So the NPT has been a great success in meeting the first goal of halting the spread of nuclear weapons. And in the words of one of Parkinson's famous laws, the success of a policy can be measured by the catastrophes that do not happen. The proliferation so widely expected in past decades—that catastrophe—just has not happened.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

What about the second goal of the Treaty—to foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy? Here the picture is very good.

From the early days of the Atoms for Peace program, the United States has helped other countries gain the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy—to meet their needs in power, in medicine and health care, in science, in industry, and in agriculture. We believed then, as we believe now, that all NPT countries, especially developing countries, have a legitimate right to pursue these peaceful uses, and that NPT parties should receive special benefits.

During the lifetime of the Treaty, peaceful nuclear cooperation among NPT parties has steadily expanded. The nonproliferation commitments of the parties to the Treaty have provided confidence that peaceful nuclear assistance and exports would not be misused to produce nuclear explosives. This confidence has made it possible for nuclear supply to take place.

The historical record bears out a growth in assistance to parties. During the past 15 years, tens of thousands of students from develop-

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[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1977,* pp. 738–775.
[10] Document 26.
[11] The Treaty and its Protocols are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1967,* pp. 69–83.
[12] Document 137.

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ing countries were trained in nuclear and related sciences, and that number continues steadily growing. Nearly 20 developing member states now have research reactors. And since 1980, the IAEA has provided nearly $150 million in technical assistance, more than doubling the funding of the preceding decade, the great bulk going to NPT parties.

Partly as a result, the Republic of Korea now generates a significant part of its electricity from nuclear energy. Mexico, the Philippines, and Egypt are moving to build nuclear power plants. Still others may follow in the years ahead.

Here too, the United States has greatly helped, as a few examples of our activities since 1980 clearly show:

- Virtually all U.S. nuclear export financing—totaling more than $1 billion—has been given to NPT parties.
- Special training arrangements have been set up to foster technology transfer only with parties to the NPT or the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
- We have granted hundreds of fellowships for technical training under the IAEA nearly exclusively to NPT parties.
- All U.S. extra budgetary funding of technical assistance projects not funded by the IAEA has gone to NPT parties.
- We have modified our regulations to make it easier to license exports to NPT parties.
- We have pledged nearly $22 million to the IAEA's technical assistance program.

In essence, on this second goal of the NPT, we have taken many concrete measures and devoted considerable resources to promote peaceful nuclear programs of real utility to developing countries. As always, still more can be done. We will continue to work with others to help ensure that all of us together take full advantage of the atom's peaceful promise.

Halting the Arms Race

The third—but by no means last—goal of the Nonproliferation Treaty is expressed by Article VI's call for "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race. . . ." The United States has undertaken a vast panoply of arms control negotiations to this very end. We have met, and will continue to meet, our obligations under Article VI. Nonetheless we fully share the sentiments felt throughout this room and sure to be voiced in this hall that the results of those negotiations have been disappointing.

This goal of substantial arms control exists quite independently of the NPT, although it is clearly reinforced by it. No other nation, or even set of nations, has more motivation for real steps to stop and reverse nuclear competition than we do. No other nation or set of nations has a greater desire for progress under Article VI.

I would go even further: No nation or set of nations desires progress in arms control more than the United States of America. Preventing nuclear war and moving toward the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons are President Reagan's top priorities. As he has said so often, nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought.

Many of you will point out over the coming month how slender has been progress toward the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons since the treaty entered into force. We can only agree with the thrust of that sentiment, though perhaps not with the explanations.

Still we should not ignore the fact that some progress has been made. The Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty set limits on the deployment of missile defenses; the SALT Treaties limited, but unfortunately did not reduce, the growth of strategic offensive forces.[13]

No one can deny that there simply are too many nuclear weapons in the world today. No one can deny that we need to get on with the most urgent task of reducing and eventually eliminating those weapons. No one can deny that what is needed now are options not words.

The United States is totally committed to the task. We are not only negotiating intensely and flexibly, but we have acted on our own and with our allies to reduce nuclear weapons. Since the NPT was negotiated in the 1960s, the United States has unilaterally reduced its total nuclear arsenal by one-fourth. Since the NPT was negotiated, we have, again on our own, reduced the total destructive power in our nuclear arsenal by well over one half. And since the last review conference, the United States, along with its NATO allies, withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe and subsequently decided in 1983 to pull out another 1,400.

Since the last review conference, and again here today, the United States has proposed that the Soviet Union send observers, with any instrumentation devices they wish to bring, to measure one of our nuclear tests. If the Soviets agree, which we hope, this can begin a process to help effectively verify limits on underground nuclear testing.

For our part, we remain committed to a complete ban on nuclear testing as a long term goal. But we do not agree it should be the next step in our efforts to reduce the nuclear threat. A nuclear test ban would not reduce the number of nuclear weapons. And our most urgent task must be deep reductions of those existing nuclear arsenals.

For that reason, since the last review conference, the United States has tabled first in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks, and now in the Geneva nuclear and space talks, far-reaching proposals to reduce radically the number of strategic ballistic missiles, their warheads, and their destructive potential. It is these systems that pose the gravest threat today. Other U.S. proposals would eliminate a whole category of

[13] The ABM Treaty and the other SALT Agreements are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff., and *1979*, pp. 189 ff.

nuclear weapons—so-called intermediate-range nuclear forces. Our goal is action on arms control: negotiating concrete agreements which are effective, verifiable, and equal in treatment of both sides.

In just a few weeks, in this city, the next round of the nuclear and space talks will resume. We know that the stakes are high. We remain convinced that agreements can be reached which would strengthen stability and serve all countries' security. We stand ready to make the commitments necessary to produce such agreements.

Conclusion

So now, 15 years after the Treaty's entry into force, what is the record of achievement in pursuit of its three goals? A high score is warranted on the first goal of halting the spread of nuclear weapons; a clearly positive rating on advancing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; but despite on-going negotiations, less progress than wanted in reaching sound arms control accords. What is the overall assessment? On balance, has the NPT successfully served the interests of its parties?

Before reaching that final evaluation, let us look back again over the four decades since the dawn of the atomic age. Since then nuclear weapons, thankfully, have not been considered just megapowerful conventional arms. They have not been used in over four decades.

At the same time, the four decades of nuclear peace have seen four decades of countless smaller wars, costing hundreds of thousands of lives. The list of countries—nuclear and non-nuclear—involved in such conflicts would run many pages. Just think for a moment of the consequences to all of our citizens and to the world if nuclear weapons had been used in any of these conflicts.

Herein lies the ultimate overall evaluation of the Nonproliferation Treaty. It has served very well as a cornerstone of the success that we have enjoyed thus far in preventing that further spread of nuclear weapons. It equally has provided and continues to provide a moral and political imperative for the existing nuclear-weapons states to negotiate additional measures to reduce and eventually eliminate the threat of nuclear war. Both aspects serve the security of each and every country represented in this hall and are in the interest of those nonmembers as well. Nor should we forget the Treaty's contribution to making available the benefits of the peaceful atom.

Therefore, in the view of the United States, and taken as a whole, the NPT has been very successful. Without it, the world would quite simply be a much more dangerous place. This is an essential point that we all must never lose sight of even if we are disappointed with progress in one particular area or another.

Over the coming weeks here, let us recognize the successes of the treaty while we acknowledge where greater progress still is needed. The United States will present its views frankly and will listen to your views intently.

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Most importantly, let us rededicate ourselves to the treaty's principles and goals. They were sound when the treaty was born. They remain sound today. We will stand with you in this rededication. We will stand with you too in making our actions implement those principles in the future. And we will stand with you in building on the treaty's successes. This, the world expects of us. We can afford to do no less.

159. Interview of Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev by *Time* Magazine: U.S.-Soviet Relations [Extracts], August 28, 1985 [1]

Q. How would you characterize U.S.-Soviet relations at this juncture, and what are the primary events that are defining that relationship?

A. Had you asked me this question some two months ago, I would have said that the situation in our relations was becoming somewhat better and that some hopes of positive shifts were appearing. To my deep regret, I could not say that today.

The truth should be faced squarely. Despite the negotiations that have begun in Geneva and the agreement to hold a summit meeting, relations between our two countries are continuing to deteriorate, the arms race is intensifying, and the war threat is not subsiding. What is the matter? Why is all this happening? My colleagues and I are quite exacting and self-critical when it comes to our own activities not only in this country but also outside of it, and we are asking ourselves again and again if [the decline in relations] [2] is somehow connected with our actions. But what is there that we can reproach ourselves with in this context? In this critical situation Moscow is trying to practice restraint in its pronouncements about the U.S.; it is not resorting to anti-American campaigns, nor is it fomenting hatred for your country. We believe it very important that even in times of political aggravation the feeling of traditional respect harbored by the Soviet people for the American people should not be injured, and as far as I can judge, that feeling is largely a mutual one.

And is it bad that when the disarmament negotiations have resumed and preparations are under way for a first summit meeting in six years, we are persistently seeking ways to break the vicious circle and bring the process of arms limitation out of the dead end? That is precisely the objective of our moratorium on nuclear explosions and of our proposal to the U.S. to join it and to resume the negotiations on a complete ban on nuclear tests as well as of the proposals regarding

[1] *Time*, September 9, 1985, pp. 23–29. Copyright 1985 Time Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission from *Time*. The answers to the first set of questions were provided in writing.

[2] These and following brackets are in source document.

peaceful cooperation and the prevention of an arms race in space. We are convinced that we should look for a way out of the current difficult situation together.

It is hard therefore to understand why our proposals have provoked such outspoken displeasure on the part of responsible U.S. statesmen. Attempts have been made to portray them as nothing but pure propaganda. Anyone even slightly familiar with the matter would easily see that behind our proposals there are most serious intentions and not just an attempt to influence public opinion. All real efforts to limit nuclear weapons began with a ban on tests—just recall the 1963 Treaty that was a first major step in that direction.[3] A complete end to nuclear tests would halt the nuclear arms race in the most dangerous area, that of qualitative improvement, and it would also seriously contribute to maintaining and strengthening the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

If all that we are doing is indeed viewed as mere propaganda, why not respond to it according to the principle of "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth"? We have stopped nuclear explosions. Then you Americans could take revenge by doing likewise. You could deal us yet another propaganda blow, say, by suspending the development of one of your new strategic missiles. And we would respond with the same kind of "propaganda." And so on and so forth. Would anyone be harmed by competition in such "propaganda"? Of course, it could not be a substitute for a comprehensive arms-limitation agreement, but it would be a significant step leading to such an agreement.

The U.S. Administration has regrettably taken a different road. In response to our moratorium, it defiantly hastened to set off yet another nuclear explosion, as if to spite everyone. And to our proposals concerning a peaceful space, it responded with a decision to conduct a first operational test of an antisatellite weapon. As if that were not enough, it has also launched another "campaign of hatred" against the U.S.S.R.

What kind of impression does all this make? On the one hand, that of some kind of confusion and uncertainty in Washington. The only way I can explain this is anxiety lest our initiatives should wreck the version of the Soviet Union being the "focus of evil" and the source of universal danger, which in fact underlies the entire arms race policy. On the other hand, there is an impression of a shortage of responsibility for the destinies of the world. And this, frankly speaking, gives rise again and again to the question whether it is at all possible in such an atmosphere to conduct business in a normal way and to build rational relations between countries.

You asked me what is the primary thing that defines Soviet-American relations. I think it is the immutable fact that whether we like one another or not, we can either survive or perish only together. The

[3] I.e., the Limited Test Ban Treaty. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.

principal question that we must answer is whether we are at last ready to recognize that there is no other way to live with each other and whether we are prepared to switch our mentality and our mode of acting from a warlike to a peaceful track. As you say, live and let live. We call it peaceful coexistence. As for the Soviet Union, we answer that question in the affirmative.

Q. What do you think will be the results of your Geneva meeting with President Reagan in November? What specific actions should the U.S. and the Soviet Union take to improve relations?

A. Its outcome, after all, will depend to a great extent upon what is taking place now. Everyone would probably agree that the political atmosphere for talks takes shape well in advance. Neither the President nor I will be able to ignore the mood in our respective countries or that of our allies. In other words, actions today largely determine the "scenario" for our November discussions.

I will not hide from you my disappointment and concern about what is happening now. We cannot but be troubled by the approach that, as I see it, has begun to emerge in Washington. That is a scenario of pressure, of attempts to drive us into a corner, to ascribe to us, as so many times in the past, every mortal sin—from unleashing an arms race to "aggression" in the Middle East, from violations of human rights to some scheming or other even in South Africa. This is not a state policy, it is a feverish search for "forces of evil."

We are prepared to have a meaningful and businesslike talk. We can also present claims: we have something to say about the U.S. being responsible for the nuclear arms race, and about its conduct in various regions of the world, and support to those who in effect engage in terrorism, and about violations of human rights in America itself, as well as in many countries close to it. But here is what I am thinking about: Is it worthwhile for the sake of that to set up a summit meeting? Abusive words are no help in a good cause.

But there is every indication that the other side is now preparing for something quite different. It looks as if the stage is being set for a bout between some kind of political "supergladiators" with the only thought in mind being how best to deal a deft blow at the opponent and score an extra point in this "bout." What is striking about this is both the form and the content of some statements. The recent "lecture" of Mr. [Robert] McFarlane [the President's National Security Adviser] is a case in point. It contains not only the full "set of accusations" we are going to be charged with in Geneva but also what I would call a very specific interpretation of the upcoming negotiations. It appears that even the slightest headway depends exclusively upon concessions by the Soviet Union, concessions on all questions—on armaments, on regional problems and even on our own domestic affairs.

If all this is meant seriously, then manifestly Washington is preparing not for the event we have agreed upon. The summit meeting is designed for negotiations, for negotiations on the basis of equality and

not for signing an act of someone's capitulation. This is all the more true since we have not lost a war to the U.S., or even a battle, and we owe it absolutely nothing. Nor for that matter, does the U.S. owe us.

But if the bellicose outcries are not meant seriously, then they are all the more inappropriate. Why flex muscles needlessly? Why stage noisy shows and transfer the methods of domestic political struggles to the relations between two nuclear powers? In them the language of strength is useless and dangerous. There is still time before the summit meeting, and quite a lot can be done for it to be constructive and useful. But this, as you will understand, depends on both sides.

Q. What is your view of the Strategic Defense Initiative [Star Wars] research program in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations?

A. We cannot take in earnest the assertions that the SDI would guarantee invulnerability from nuclear weapons, thus leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. In the opinion of our experts (and to my knowledge, of many of yours), this is a sheer fantasy. However, even on a much more modest scale, in which the Strategic Defense Initiative can be implemented as an antimissile defense system of limited capabilities, the SDI is very dangerous. This project will, no doubt, whip up the arms race in all areas, which means that the threat of war will increase. That is why this project is bad for us and for you and for everybody in general.

From the same point of view we approach what is called the SDI research program. First of all, we do not consider it to be a research program. In our view, it is the first stage of the project to develop a new ABM system prohibited under the Treaty of 1972.[4] Just think of the scale of it alone—$70 billion to be earmarked for the next few years. That is an incredible amount for pure research, as emphasized even by U.S. scientists as well. The point is that in today's prices those appropriations are more than four times the cost of the Manhattan Project [the program for development of the atom bomb] and more than double the cost of the Apollo program that provided for the development of space research for a whole decade—up to the landing of man on the moon. That this is far from being a pure research program is also confirmed by other facts, including tests scheduled for space strike weapons systems.

That is why the entire SDI program and its so-called research component are a new and even more dangerous round of the arms race. It is necessary to prevent an arms race in space. We are confident that such an agreement is possible and verifiable. (I have to point out that we trust the Americans no more than they trust us, and that is why we are interested in reliable verification of any agreement as much as they are.)

Without such an agreement it will not be possible to reach an agreement on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons either. The interrelationship between defensive and offensive arms is so obvi-

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197–201.

ous as to require no proof. Thus, if the present U.S. position on space weapons is its last word, the Geneva negotiations will lose all sense.

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Yet I would not wish to end [these written answers] on a negative note. I should like to convey to the readers of your magazine wishes of good endeavor, happiness and a peaceful future. On behalf of the Soviet leadership and the Soviet people, I would like once again to tell all Americans the most important thing they should know: war will not come from the Soviet Union. We will never start war.

The General Secretary formally passed his answers to Time's *written questions, signed by him, across the table. "I'm giving this to you in a green folder," said Gorbachev. "Not even a hint of the export of revolution." He then began the spoken interview with an opening statement.*

I have a great many requests for various speeches, statements and interviews, but let me just say why—and I took counsel with my colleagues in the Soviet leadership on this—we decided to respond to the request put in by *Time*.

First of all, when I first saw the way your questions were formulated, I felt—maybe I'm mistaken, and if I am, correct me—that the questions themselves reflected concern about the state of Soviet-American relations. Unfortunately, that is something that we don't hear all that often in our contact and conversations with representatives of U.S. political or other circles. I felt that that in itself was very important if the questions themselves reflected concern. There is another reason of no less importance. And that is connected with our assessment of the situation in the world. That situation today is highly complex, very tense. I would even go so far as to say it is explosive. And as we see it, the situation in the world has a tendency toward deterioration. I do not want to set out our views as to the source of this present situation. I believe that you yourselves understand, and you are familiar with the situation as it stands today. So therefore I believe that it would be best of all to try and give a response to the question of where we stand, in what kind of a world we're living, at what stage we are in world development.

I would not like to overdramatize the situation in my response to this major question on which a great deal depends. So I believe that if we were to touch upon the question of leaders of two such great nations as the U.S. and the Soviet Union, then surely in all of their way of thinking, in their analyses, in the practical conclusions that they draw therefrom, their starting point should be an awareness of the tremendous responsibility that rests upon them as leaders of two such nations.

It is in that spirit that I would like to try to answer the question that I myself formulated just a short while ago. Today it is a reality that the development of science and technology has reached a level where the broad-scale introduction of new achievements, particularly

in the military field, can lead to an entirely new situation and an entirely new phase in the arms race [Star Wars].

I endeavored in my replies to your [written] questions to be very sincere and very frank in the hope that this will not be treated as "one more propaganda exercise by Moscow." I endeavored to say that at present, even today, it is very hard indeed to reach accord, to come to terms. There are so many accretions, so many exacerbations, such a lack of confidence, that it is even hard to begin moving toward each other. But if we were to come in the future to this new phase, and to open up a new stage in the military sphere, then surely the question is: Could we really deal with these matters? Would not there be a temptation on one or the other side to believe, "At last we have overtaken our partner. Is is not time then to seek to achieve superiority and to untie our hands in the field of foreign policy?"

Given the present exacerbated state of relations between our two countries and the present aggravations in the world at large, we must admit that today, thus far, there do exist certain restraints on the actions of either side. There is strategic parity. That is, after all, the foundation of equal security. There are also still in effect such treaties as the ABM Treaty, the SALT II provisions,[5] the Non-proliferation Treaty,[6] the banning of nuclear weapons tests in three environments. To this day, so far, they are in operation. But even today, attempts are being made to remove these restraints or at least to raise the question of overturning the treaties, of abrogating them.

So when opportunities appear to take the path of creating and developing absolutely new types of arms, well then, of course, a new era will come about. We must give thought to this. So if the situation were to arise, if somebody were to give in to these illusions—and they can be nothing but illusions, because history shows that if one side has plans, the other side has counterplans; if one side wants to take some measures, the other side takes countermeasures; if there is a poison, there is an antidote—that is the lesson of history. So the question is: Where do we go from here?

And this brings me to the second point, my second reason why I decided to give this interview. That reason is that time is passing, and it might be too late. The train might have already left the station. If we are realists—and we hope we all are, we all want to live, none of us wants to be destroyed—then we must muster the political will and the wisdom and stop this process, and begin the process of eliminating weaponry, and the process of improving, invigorating relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S.

Perhaps we have too high an opinion of ourselves, but we feel that we are realists, both in terms of our policies and in terms of our practical actions. We believe that we do not simply limit ourselves to appeals, mere appeals for disarmament and improvement in relations. We act likewise.

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[5] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.
[6] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

We want to show our intentions and we also want to show by our actions what steps we are counting on the American side to take. Yet all our attempts to somehow escape this present bad situation in Soviet-American relations, attempts to somehow lead matters toward ending the arms race, toward relaxing tensions, toward disarmament—all these attempts come up against a negative position of the U.S. Administration. We keep hearing one and the same answer: "No, no, no. It's propaganda, propaganda, propaganda." Surely the most responsible people in the land cannot, should not, conduct themselves in that way in respect to their opposite numbers.

This reminds me—maybe it's a little out of place, but it reminds me of a story, a true story. For quite a few years there was one Minister of Finance in the Russian Federation government. His name was Ivan Ivanovich. He was rather old and would doze off at the meetings of the Council of Ministers. Whenever you would wake him up, no matter what you asked him about, he would always say, "No money, there's no money." We would hope that the American Administration has not given us its final word.

We hope that our understanding of these matters and of the direction in which we want things to move will, through your magazine, be brought to the attention of the U.S. public. This is the view of the Soviet leadership, so when I say these things it is a responsible statement.

We must not allow things to go so far as confrontation between our two countries. This is a reflection of the interest of our two peoples and of the politicians who represent them. It is after all the people of the two countries who put the politicians into the positions they hold today. So it is in our interests to express those wishes in practical ways. We must seek ways to put an end to the arms race, to seek disarmament, to switch Soviet-American relations onto a normal track. Surely, God on high has not refused to give us enough wisdom to find ways to bring us an improvement in our relations, an improvement in relations between the two great nations on earth, nations on whom depends the very destiny of civilization. We for our part are ready to take that role.

What I said is particularly acute and topical because we get information about the political atmosphere in Washington, and that information disconcerts and disappoints us. [*Reading from papers in front of him.*] Here are some of the reports we've heard emanating from Washington just this last week. In one report the White House intimates that there can be no agreements with the Soviet Union on limitation of U.S. strategic programs, and the most that can be expected is agreement on a kind of agenda for the future. That agenda is to be considered over a period of many years, if not decades. Meanwhile and parallel with such a discussion, new types of arms would be developed, including space systems.

Now that is not some kind of information cooked up by any Soviet correspondent in Washington. That information is based on what is

written by the American media. Or here is a report about some statements made by [U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Michael] Armacost and [U.S. Strategic Weapons Negotiator John] Tower in interviews. Some other statements. We can discern that some of these statements are actually designed to make the product look better, or designed to hide the actual true meaning behind the words. But the main thrust of what they want to say is that it is essential to do everything possible to ward off, even to prevent, the slightest opportunity of reaching any accord with the Soviets on space-weapons bans or on the ban on nuclear testing. Now from these pronouncements made by Tower it appears that nothing depends on whatever the Soviet Union does at the talks in Geneva or in the military field. The U.S. will still go on developing antisatellite systems. It will go on developing space weapons systems. So here you see how certain people in the U.S. are driving nails into this structure of our relationship, then cutting off the heads. So the Soviets must use their teeth to pull them out.

So how are we to react to this kind of thing? We must all of us do all we can to end this present negative process in our bilateral relations, and proceed toward ending the arms race, and proceed seriously toward disarmament. I do believe it is in the best interests of the Soviet Union and the U.S. After all, there have been countless attempts in the past to bring us to our knees, to bring us to the point of utter exhaustion. But all such attempts have been in the past, and will be in the future, doomed to utter failure. We have never accused the U.S. of being an "evil empire." We understand what the U.S. is, what the American people are, and the role they are playing and will play in the world. We are certainly in favor of beginning a new phase in Soviet-American relations. But let me repeat that perhaps if a new phase appears, a phase still worse than the present one, this goal will be all the harder to achieve, if it is possible at all. Then a process might be launched that would be simply impossible even to conceive of today. That is why we are calling upon the U.S. to reach an accord with us on the basis of equal security, to reach an accord first and foremost on all three components, the most dangerous strategic offensive arms, medium-range arms and space weapons.

Q. You have spoken just now about "certain people" in Washington who seem to you to be trying to undermine the progress of U.S.-Soviet relations, but President Reagan himself has said on a number of occasions that there is no hostility toward the Soviet Union, that he is not seeking unilateral advantage or superiority over the Soviet Union. How do you take these assurances from the President? Do you accept them? More broadly, what are your impressions so far of President Reagan?

A. Let me just say at least that our attention certainly was drawn to certain positive elements contained in some of the President's remarks. We note some of his public statements in 1983 and 1984—I recall one speech I think was made at the United Nations—so we do duly

respond to those positive elements when we see them. One of those statements was that war was inadmissible, that nuclear war was not winnable, and of course we gave our attention to the statement. Then we also paid due attention to his statement that the U.S. was not seeking superiority over the Soviet Union. These are very positive elements, and we believe that we could and should find positive elements in other spheres as well. They could all give us opportunities to cast a responsible glance at the state of our relations and especially toward the future and to find a basis to overcome the present negative phase in the state of relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S.

That is indeed why we agreed to hold the forthcoming summit meeting in the first place. We did so because we felt that we could do a lot by trying to meet each other halfway. That, again, is why we have reacted so sharply to some of the statements being made these days in connection with the summit. So we see that there are some who want to generate a situation to persuade the U.S. and the American public that, as [Columnist] Mary McGrory put it, even if the only thing to come out of the summit was an agreement to exchange ballet troupes, then even so people would be gleeful and happy.

We for our part have very serious intentions in respect to the summit. We are making very serious preparations for that meeting, and we shall be prepared to submit some very serious proposals, regardless of what some of Reagan's advisers to the right or to the left—if I am correct he does not have any advisers on the left—regardless of what any of his advisers try to sell to him. If we did not believe in the possibility of bringing about an improvement in our relations, we never would have agreed to have the Geneva summit in the first place. That is our considered position.

About my impression of President Reagan, I have not had a chance to meet him or talk to him or see him in person, so it is hard for me to give you any human impressions, but politically of course I can say what my impression is. I regard him as President of the U.S., a man elected to his high office by the American people, and therefore our attitude toward President Reagan is prompted by our feeling of respect for the people of the U.S. We are therefore prepared to do business with him and to treat him with the respect that is befitting him.

Q. You said that you wished to reach accords in three areas, including space weapons. Yet from much of the commentary that one reads coming from the Soviet Union, there seems to be really no room for any agreements on space weapons because the only thing you want with regard to them is to stop them, to stop all research even in the narrowest and almost academic sense.

A. If there is no ban on the militarization of space, if an arms race in space is not prevented, nothing else will work. That is our firm position and it is based on our assessment, an assessment that we regard as being highly responsible, an assessment that takes into account not only our own interests but the interests of the U.S. as well. We are prepared to negotiate, but not about space weapons or about

what specific types of space weapons could be deployed into space. We are prepared to negotiate on preventing an arms race in space.

In Geneva the Soviet Union proposed a ban on the development, including research, testing and deployment, of space strike weapons. Therefore, as we see, our proposed ban would embrace all stages in the birth of this new kind of arms.

Research is something we regard as part of the overall program for the development of space weapons. When, therefore, we see tens of billions of dollars being earmarked for such research, it is clear to us what the design is of the authors of such research and what is behind the specific policy pursued with regard to outer space.

Now, when the question comes up about research, and the question of banning research, what we have in mind is not research in fundamental science. Such research concerning space is going on and it will continue. What we mean is the designing stage, when certain orders are given, contracts are signed, for specific elements of the systems. And when they start building models or mockups or test samples, when they hold field tests, now that is something—when it goes over to the designing stage—that is something that can be verified. So we believe that process is verifiable. So if money is appropriated for such research, then that research has to culminate in the designing of mockups, models that are elements of the system, and that can be verified through national technical means of verification. There will have to be field tests of various components. After all, if we can now, from our artificial earth satellites, read the numbers on automobiles down on earth, surely we can recognize these things when they come to that stage. So therefore we can say flatly verification is proper.

But the main thing is that if all this work on space weaponry were to stop at this stage, then no one would have any more interest in going over to the next stage in the process of designing and developing, because nobody would think of appropriating any more money for these purposes if it were known that money could not subsequently be used. But on the other hand, if billions and billions of dollars had already been spent on research, then nobody is going to stop because all that money had been invested in SDI. And so then, once space weapons are deployed, once they are in space, then nobody could control that process. And that is what I mean when I say that we would come to an unpredictable phase in relations. And of course you have to bear in mind that the other side is not going to be dozing all this time. That is something you may be very sure of.

When they talk about the purely scientific research nature of the SDI at this stage, they do so to somehow conceal that what is under way today is the whole process of developing space-weapons systems. The very fact that the U.S. is now planning to test a second-generation anti-satellite system is fraught with the most serious consequences. We will surely react. This test, in effect a test of a second-generation ASAT system, means in fact testing an element of a space-based ABM.

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This we are witnessing against the background of a negative response to our proposal for the U.S. to join the moratorium on nuclear explosions. The U.S. does not want to join that moratorium for one simple reason, among others: the U.S. needs nuclear testing to provide the nuclear element for space lasers. It has to be used to produce an X-ray laser effect. All these are elements in the space-based antiballistic missile defense. Think then what would happen if the whole thing goes full steam ahead. We believe America should give honest thought to these matters before proceeding further.

I guess that somebody in the U.S. must have thought they would be able to forge ahead of the Soviet Union, to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union through these programs. That is something that would never succeed: come what may, we will find an accurate response to any challenge. But if that transpires, it will mean the burial of all negotiations, and when we might return to the negotiating table, nobody can say.

All this may of course suit the U.S. military-industrial complex, but we, on our part, have no intention of working for the U.S. military-industrial complex. Our proposals, we firmly believe, are in the best interests not only of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, but equally in the best interests of the American people and the U.S.

That is why our proposals cause the most irritation on the part of the military-industrial complex in the U.S. We notice that by the behavior of some in the U.S. Administration. There are some there that can certainly be regarded as representatives of the U.S. military-industrial complex. We can feel their presence.

But we do have a large reserve of constructive ideas, and will continue to invite the U.S. Administration to take a different approach. If a different approach is taken by the U.S. Administration, that will open up tremendous possibilities in the field of strategic arms, medium-range arms, in the entire area of armaments. It will open wide an avenue for a broad-based process for improving relations between our two countries.

I was recently in the town of Dnepropetrovsk, and in the street there a worker asked me, "Now what is all this Star Wars that people are talking about, this new idea that Reagan is proposing, Star Wars? Aren't you afraid the U.S. might trick us in the talks?" And I said, "No, have no fear. We will not allow that to happen. We will not allow ourselves to be tricked."

But if the other side displays readiness to seek solutions to these problems, we will be equally prepared, come what may, to leave no stone unturned to seek accommodation. I firmly believe our position is humane. It is not selfish, it meets the interests of the U.S. as it does the interests of the Soviet Union and indeed all nations. Surely the U.S. has areas where it can invest money. We know that you have your own problems; perhaps we are less familiar with your problems than we are with ours, but we certainly do know that you have some

problems. And we know that you have an area where you can invest money.

Q. The events of recent weeks, such as the U.S. announcement of the ASAT test and the spy dust charges, could hardly have been helpful in terms of preparations for the summit meeting. Is this type of thing seriously damaging?

A. As far as preparations for the upcoming meeting, let me assure you that we certainly attach tremendous importance to it. We have high hopes and serious hopes about the outcome, even though we do hear from the other side that they are taking a much more modest view of the meeting. They are not giving it that much significance, and we hear words to the effect that it is going to be an introductory meeting, only an agenda for the future, things to that effect. Well, we believe that to travel all the way to Geneva just to get acquainted, just to look at the beauties of Lake Geneva, the beauty of Swiss mountains, that is not adequate to the leaders of two such great nations. It is an expensive luxury. We will do all in our power to make the summit meeting instrumental in improving relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S.

Q. In an article to be released this weekend in *Foreign Affairs* magazine, former President Nixon says that an agreement reducing arms, but not linked to restraints on political conduct, would not contribute to peace. In effect he is saying that the first priority of a summit should not be arms control, but potential flash points and pressure points between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Do you share that view?

A. It is interesting for me to hear what President Nixon is doing these days. As for the topics that we are going to take up in our discussions with President Reagan, we are working on that right now. We are in contact with the State Department, the White House, and this is an ongoing process. I would not like at this point to go into any of the details of this preparatory work.

Your mentioning Nixon certainly gives me some associations and some memories of a different kind. After all, it was in a very difficult period of our relationship that we managed to find, with Nixon when he was President, the solutions to some very important issues. I recall still further back in 1961 the meeting between Khrushchev and President Kennedy in Vienna. That was a very difficult time as well. There was the Caribbean crisis, yet in 1963 we saw the partial Test-Ban Treaty. Even though that was again a time of crisis, the two sides and their leaders had enough wisdom and the boldness to take some very important decisions. History is very interesting in that way, when you attempt to draw lessons from it.

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160. Statement by the Chairman of the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission (Nazare Alves) Before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies: Brazilian Nuclear Policy [Extracts], August 29, 1985 [1]

. . . The IAEA has two basic functions—development and control. The emphasis on control could be detrimental to development objectives. For Brazil, adherence to the IAEA opened promises of access to indispensable technology and Brazil has never objected to a system of nondiscriminatory safeguards that assures peaceful use of materials, equipment and information received. What would be utterly unacceptable is a system that hindered economic or social development. Brazil considers inadmissible any obstacle to the free use of peaceful nuclear technology, with the exception of standard, universal and nondiscriminatory safeguards.

. . . Fulfillment of the guarantee to NPT signatory developing countries of access to nuclear technology from industrial countries under Art. 4 has been an enormous frustration. . . . Brazil from the beginning took a position against the regime established by the NPT, seeing as unacceptable the discrepancies that the Treaty establishes between the obligations and responsibilities of military nuclear countries and of the remaining countries.[2]

. . . Brazil signed and ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty; [3] however, with its policy of not accepting discriminatory measures, it qualified its entry into force, in accordance with Article 28, to fulfillment of by all parties, without exception from their obligations. [*sic*]

. . . India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974 prompted a surge of pressures for new controls on nuclear facilities and materials. . . . This led to creation of the London Club and a paradox between the rules of that group and Article 4 of the NPT on interchange of material, equipment, etc. Also, the concept of technological information requiring safeguards was introduced, not only for installations where the information was applied, but also for subsequent generations in which derived knowledge or procedures would be applied. The definition of relevant technological information as that not available to the public shows the desire of industrial countries to maintain the secrecy of their nuclear activities—scientific, technical and industrial. Nuclear supplier countries maintain strict secrecy, even on applications for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to the point of not even employing commercial patents. As a consequence, supplier nations stopped furnishing, for example, uranium enriched to more than 20, making it difficult to operate research reactors and restricting the

[1] ACDA files.

[2] The Non-Proliferation Treaty to which he refers is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[3] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

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production of radioisotopes. These limitations are also applied to NPT signatory countries.

. . . One might think there exists a conflict between commercial interests and proliferation concerns, since no state wishes to be disadvantaged compared to its competitors, unilaterally reducing its exports or adding extra conditions. Because of this, the principal exporting countries meet frequently to adopt a common nuclear export policy which reduces the probability of proliferation without risking anyone's export position. This export policy of countries possessing nuclear technology produced changes in the philosophy and the methodology of safeguards applied by the IAEA. The new philosophy became a part of the safeguards agreement signed by Brazil, West Germany and the IAEA, where a system of control was established that exceeds the requirements of the NPT. In addition, this system includes safeguards, not only for installations, materials, and equipment, but also on the transfer of technology.

. . . In the chain reaction of restrictive mechanisms that have always affected Brazil's nuclear policy unfavorably, IAEA studies began on international plutonium storage, spent fuel management, and rules for supply assurance. This escalation of controls is not solely politically motivated to maintain the nuclear oligarchy. They also have economic and social motivations to impose obstacles and delay to autonomy in advanced technology. This technology is necessary for economic development and modern industrialization not to mention applications in health and agriculture.

. . . Brazil has maintained a clear, coherent and constant position in favor of disarmament and nonproliferation. For this reason, it supports the adoption of universally accepted safeguard measures. But it cannot accept the imposition of discriminatory and inhibiting mechanisms on its technological development in the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy. As a consequence, Brazil respects its joint commitments to the IAEA, whose credibility is indispensable for the universal benefits arising from peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

161. Statement by the Canadian Representative (Beesley) to the Conference on Disarmament: Conference Procedures, August 30, 1985 [1]

In my statement today, I will address briefly the question of possible improvements in the procedures and processes of the Conference on Disarmament which might enable us all to concentrate more time and energy in the future to substantive issues, and less on procedures. In so doing I am not speaking as Western Co-ordinator.

[1] CD/PV.335, pp. 10–11.

On 4 April this year I noted the extent to which the Conference on Disarmament becomes mired in procedural discussions. Since then other delegations have made similar comments, most recently the delegations of Brazil and Venezuela. No one suggests that even a wholly perfect process would necessarily achieve a breakthrough in any of the negotiations going on in the Conference, but it does seem increasingly clear that the procedural gridlock which arises repeatedly in the Conference reflects, to some degree, our own agreed procedures.

An article which will be published shortly in the United Nations periodical *Disarmament* reads in part as follows:

Some of the procedural problems of the Conference on Disarmament are:

(a) the rigid application to procedure as well as substance of its rule of decision by consensus, applied in practice as a rule of unanimity, permitting the veto by any delegation of procedural decisions such as mandates of subsidiary bodies and other similar issues;

(b) the Presidency of the Conference changes each month, thereby greatly adding to the difficulties inherent in the important role of the President in attempting to direct debate, co-ordinate consultations and structure negotiations;

(c) the subsidiary organs of the Conference, with only very few and occasional exceptions, must be established anew at the opening of each spring session, resulting in sometimes lengthy negotiations not always leading to the re-establishment of a pre-existing subsidiary organ;

(d) the Chairmanships of subsidiary organs (both *ad hoc* committees and working groups) if and when they are established, change each year in almost every case, thus greatly adding to the problems of the Chairmen in charge of negotiations on complex technical and controversial issues;

(e) on procedural questions (and sometimes on substance) the Conference on Disarmament emulates other United Nations organs through its institutionalization of 'group dynamics', pursuant to which the 'Western' and 'Socialist' and 'Group of 21' (with only China as the exception) all speak through single spokesmen or co-ordinators, who themselves change at least once each year, thus virtually ensuring the least common denominator approach to many questions;

I would now add to these points, another, namely:

(f) the report writing exercise appears to have become gradually more cumbersome and time consuming every year, to the point where the Conference spends a disproportionate amount of time to produce a report which may well confuse its intended readers rather than present a clear and factual record of the work done during the session.

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The article already mentioned goes on to say:

> The question arises whether any radical changes in the procedures of the Conference on Disarmament can be made in the light of its history, owing its origin, as it does, to the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament.

I offer these observations in a constructive spirit and certainly as no intentional criticism of any delegation or any group of delegations. I suggest that we all might usefully reflect on these questions during the intersessional period, particularly their cumulative effect on our work which can give rise to the wholly false impression that we may at times be more concerned with process than progress. Let us leave with some optimism for the future based, however, on a determination to do better.

162. TASS Statement on U.S. Antisatellite Weapon Testing, September 4, 1985 [1]

The intent to hold shortly tests of the ASAT anti-satellite system aiming it at a real target in outer space has been officially announced in Washington. This decision of the American Administration is nothing but an action directly leading to the commencement of the deployment of a new class of dangerous armaments—strike space weapons.

Washington is taking yet another step to escalate the arms race and spread it to outer space. And this step is being taken despite the fact that the Soviet Union's unilateral commitment not to place anti-satellite systems in space has been in force for already two years.

This step is being made by the American Administration in conditions when the far-reaching Soviet proposal on the full prohibition of strike space weapons, including anti-satellite sytems, and the liquidation of the existing such systems, is lying on the negotiating table in Geneva.

In other words, to our restraint in practical actions, to our constructive proposals at the talks, the American side is responding with a demonstration of its unwillingness to reach agreements, to display mutual restraint.

In an attempt to delude the public at large and its own legislative bodies the American Administration contends that at the Geneva talks it supposedly is pressing for strict limitations on anti-satellite weapons.

In reality both at the Geneva talks and during the course of the exchange through diplomatic channels the United States has flatly refused and continues doing so to study any whatsoever measures of banning and limiting anti-satellite weapons and presents matters in

[1] Moscow TASS in English, September 4, 1985; FBIS *Daily Report*, September 5, 1985, vol. III, p. AA1.

such a way as though it is impossible to solve this task. Thereby it deliberately creates an artificial impasse in this question.

There is nothing chance in this stand taken by the United States. It obviously counts not only on acquiring weapons for anti-satellite warfare in the near future but also on developing, under the guise of testing anti-satellite systems, anti-missile systems of air and other basing that are prohibited by the ABM Treaty.[2] This shows once again Washington's genuine attitude to the talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva. This shows the absence of readiness and desire on its part to reach agreements on real steps to prevent an arms race in outer space and to stop it on earth.

Late in August the Soviet side again called on the American Administration to weigh the inevitable negative consequences of its planned tests of anti-satellite arms for political and military stability in the world and the prospects of the Geneva talks. In this call the United States Administration was warned once again that the unilateral Soviet moratorium on anti-satellite systems can remain in force only for as long as other countries, including the United States, act likewise.

TASS is authorised to state that if the United States holds tests of anti-satellite weapons against a target in outer space the Soviet Union will consider itself free of its unilateral commitment not to place anti-satellite systems in space. The entire responsibility for the further development of events will rest entirely on the American side.

163. Declaration of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries: Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy [Extract], September 7, 1985 [1]

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The Ministers, recalling the decisions of the non-aligned countries, stressed the exceptional importance of international co-operation among the non-aligned and other developing countries in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This co-operation is of special significance in fields where these countries can achieve a greater degree of self-sufficiency.

The Ministers affirmed the inalienable right of all states to apply and develop their programmes for peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All states should have unhindered access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials on a non-discriminatory basis for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. They de-

[2] The Treaty is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[1] ACDA files. The conference was held in Rwanda, September 4–7.

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plored the pressures and threats against developing countries aimed at preventing them from pursuing their programmes for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

They also expressed their concern in this respect regarding the obstacles which the developed countries place in the way of transfer of technologies related to the peaceful uses of atomic energy by fixing conditions which are incompatible with the sovereignty of the developing countries. Each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing fuel cycle policies or international agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Ministers also stressed the need for observance of the principles of non-discrimination and free access to nuclear technology and reaffirmed the right of each country to develop programmes for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with their own freely determined priorities and needs.

In this connection, the meeting reiterated that non-proliferation should not be made a pretext for preventing states from exercising their full rights to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes geared to economic and social development in accordance with their priorities, interests and needs, determined in a sovereign manner.

The Ministers expressed their satisfaction at the progress in the preparations for the United Nations Conference for the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for social and economic development, in the interest of developing countries and the international community as a whole. They expressed their satisfaction at the results of the work of the preparatory committee of the conference and underlined the necessity for continuing detailed preparations, with the active participation of all countries, in order to fully realize the goals of the conference. Proceeding from the positions of the seventh summit of non-aligned countries, the participants in the conference reaffirmed their conviction that the results of the conference should contribute to free and unhampered access on a just and non-discriminatory basis to nuclear technology, equipment and materials needed for the development of national programmes of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

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164. Statement by President Reagan on the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, September 9, 1985 [1]

On September 10th the Conference on Disarmament in Europe will reconvene in Stockholm for its seventh session. The Stockholm Con-

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, September 16, 1985, pp. 1057–1058.

ference can contribute importantly to creating a more stable and secure Europe and to improving the East-West relationship. The coming months will determine whether the Conference will be successful in fulfilling its great potential as an instrument for enhancing peace in Europe.

The issues before the Stockholm Conference are important and complex. They directly affect the vital security interests of the participants—the U.S., Canada, plus 33 European nations. If these issues are to be resolved and a meaningful agreement achieved in time for the review meeting next year of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), serious and detailed negotiations on concrete confidence-building measures must begin very soon.

Towards this end, the members of the Atlantic alliance worked together in Stockholm to put forward six specific proposals which meet the mandate of the Conference to enact practical, concrete, militarily significant measures to reduce the risk of military confrontation and surprise attack in Europe.[2] These Western proposals go well beyond the modest confidence-building measures enacted in Helsinki 10 years ago.[3] They are aimed at increasing openness in relations among all the participating states, reducing the suspicion and mistrust which divide East from West, and lowering the risk of conflict arising from miscalculation, misunderstanding, or misinterpretation.

In preparing for this new round, the United States delegation has consulted closely with our allies to explore how best to advance the work of the Conference. The alliance remains flexible and open to constructive ideas from others. We are in close contact with the other participating states and look forward to continuing this substantive dialog in the upcoming round.

The U.S. delegation to the Stockholm Conference continues to have the full support of my administration in its efforts to achieve an agreement which will promote the security of all.

165. Executive Order 12532 Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving South Africa [Extract], September 9, 1985 [1]

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Section 1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following transactions are prohibited effective October 11, 1985:

[2] For these NATO proposals, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 42–44.

[3] The arms control portions of the Final Act of the conference are included in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the complete text of the Final Act, see *Department of State Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

[1] Department of State, Current Policy No. 735, pp. 2–3.

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(a) The making or approval of any loans by financial institutions in the United States to the Government of South Africa or to entities owned or controlled by that Government. This prohibition shall enter into force on November 11, 1985. It shall not apply to (i) any loan or extension of credit for any educational, housing, or health facility which is available to all persons on a nondiscriminatory basis and which is located in a geographic area accessible to all population groups without any legal or administrative restriction; or (ii) any loan or extension of credit for which an agreement is entered into before the date of this Order.

The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out this subsection. The initial rules and regulations shall be issued within sixty days. The Secretary of the Treasury may, in consultation with the Secretary of State, permit exceptions to this prohibition only if the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the loan or extension of credit will improve the welfare or expand the economic opportunities of persons in South Africa disadvantaged by the apartheid system, provided that no exception may be made for any apartheid enforcing entity.

(b) All exports of computers, computer software, or goods or technology intended to service computers to or for use by any of the following entities of the Government of South Africa:

(1) The military;

(2) The police;

(3) The prison system;

(4) The national security agencies;

(5) ARMSCOR [Arms Corporation of South Africa] and its subsidiaries or the weapons research activities of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research;

(6) The administering authorities for the black passbook and similar controls;

(7) Any apartheid enforcing agency;

(8) Any local or regional government or "homeland" entity which performs any function of any entity described in paragraphs (1) through (7).

The Secretary of Commerce is hereby authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out this subsection and to implement a system of end use verification to ensure that any computers exported directly or indirectly to South Africa will not be used by any entity set forth in this subsection.

(c)(1) Issuance of any license for the export to South Africa of goods or technology which are to be used in a nuclear production or utilization facility, or which, in the judgment of the Secretary of State, are likely to be diverted for use in such a facility; any authorization to engage, directly or indirectly, in the production of any special nuclear material in South Africa; any license for the export to South Africa of component parts or other items or substances especially relevant from the standpoint of export control because of their significance for nuclear explosive purposes; and any approval of retransfers to South Africa of any goods, technology, special nuclear material, components, items or substances described in this section. The Secretaries of State,

Energy, Commerce, and Treasury are hereby authorized to take such actions as may be necessary to carry out this subsection.

(2) Nothing in this section shall preclude assistance for International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or IAEA programs generally available to its member states, or for technical programs for the purpose of reducing proliferation risks, such as for reducing the use of highly enriched uranium and activities envisaged by Section 223 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 10203) or for exports which the Secretary of State determines are necessary for humanitarian reasons to protect the public health and safety.

(d) The import into the United States of any arms, ammunition, or military vehicles produced in South Africa or of any manufacturing data for such articles. The Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense are hereby authorized to take such actions as may be necessary to carry out this subsection.

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166. Statement by the U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament (Lowitz) Before a Special Panel of the House Committee on Armed Services: U.S. Activities in the Conference [Extract], September 10, 1985 [1]

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Issue of Chemical Weapons

Of the broad spectrum of items on its agenda at the present time, the one of most importance, in my view, is that of chemical weapons. The clear objectives of the Administration in this area are to negotiate promptly a comprehensive ban on these weapons that have such terrible effects, as well as to seek to prevent their further proliferation, and, so long as a comprehensive ban is not in place, to maintain an adequate retaliatory capability to deter their use by the Soviet Union.

The work of the CD on chemical weapons is carried out largely in a subsidiary body—the chemical weapons *ad hoc* committee—which has the task of developing a convention. As you know, the United States introduced a complete draft of such a convention when Vice President Bush appeared before the conference in April 1984.[2] At the urging of our delegation, the chemical weapons committee has now produced, for the first time, a comprehensive text—albeit one containing many

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, November 1985, pp. 30–31. Ambassador Lowitz spoke before the Special Panel on Arms Control and Disarmament of the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee.

[2] For the draft convention, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 269–299. For Vice President Bush's address, see *ibid.*, pp. 299–307.

bracketed portions and incomplete sections—which the committee has agreed will serve as the basis of its further work.

In an effort to continue the chemical weapons negotiations on a timely basis, the CD has agreed that informal consultations within the framework of the chemical weapons committee will be held this fall for 3 weeks, as well as a formal committee session in January, before the CD begins its 1986 session in February.

In reviewing the chemical weapons negotiations this past year, I see a modest amount of progress, although largely of a procedural character. It is regrettable that the negotiations continue to move much too slowly. It is regrettable that the continuing spread and use of chemical weapons has not yet imparted a greater sense of urgency to the CD's work.

I mentioned the Administration's position concerning our need to maintain an adequate retaliatory chemical weapons capability to serve as a deterrent to the use of these weapons by the Soviet Union. In addition, as I review this session's negotiations, it appears that immediately following the House of Representatives vote to authorize the production of binary chemical weapons, the Soviet Union reacted in a polemical fashion and for a few weeks adopted a stance of silent withdrawal from active negotiations. Then I believe the Soviet Union assessed the situation and concluded that, since U.S. resumption of chemical weapons production might well become a reality, it was in their interest to participate in the negotiations rather than to remain silent. The Soviet delegation then resumed negotiating and the modest progress achieved in the committee occurred largely in the closing weeks of this year's session with the active participation of the Soviet delegation. This seems to indicate that U.S. resumption of chemical weapons production may provide some incentive to the Soviet Union to become serious about a chemical weapons convention.

I must caution against making too much of the largely procedural progress made by the chemical weapons committee during 1985. The comprehensive ban that we seek, of necessity, will be a complex agreement, as it must ensure both the destruction of existing chemical weapons stockpiles and that new stocks are not illegally produced in the peaceful chemical industry. The negotiation of such a ban is perforce a complex and lengthy undertaking. At present, on the most important substantive issues—verification in particular—there continues to be little agreement. While we search for mutually acceptable solutions, we continue to view as essential the need for mandatory, short-notice challenge inspection provisions—that would apply to any government-owned or -controlled facility—to complement the more routine types of verification of such matters as the destruction of stockpiles and the nonproduction of chemical weapons in the chemical industry. On the other hand, we have made clear in Geneva that it is the level of verification required to satisfy security concerns, not necessarily our specific language, that is important.

Let me add that the delegation, of course, maintains close contacts with many other delegations in the CD on these negotiations as well as on other matters. We have had a bilateral dialogue on the chemical weapons issue with the delegation of the Soviet Union, and I should be pleased to expand on those discussions in closed session.

Other Agenda Issues

Let me discuss with you very briefly two other agenda items which have received a considerable degree of attention in the conference.

The first is that of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Clearly, a primary focus on this important matter is the bilateral nuclear and space talks which are to resume shortly in Geneva. However, we recognize that many states have an interest in the outer space environment. This year the CD carried out an initial examination of outer space issues relevant in a multilateral arms control context. The United States fully participated in these activities, but thus far we do not see the possibility of identifying any particular subject as appropriate for beginning a multilateral negotiation. I expect the question of outer space to continue as a major issue in the CD.

The second item is that of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. We have made it clear in Geneva that our position continues to be that a complete cessation of nuclear explosions is a long-term objective of the United States. We have stressed that the achievement of deep reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States is a more meaningful approach to nuclear arms control and should take precedence. At the CD, we have continued to support the need for substantive work on a range of test ban issues, including the scope of an eventual ban, and verification and compliance. In particular, we have endorsed, and supported with significant financial and technical resources, the group of experts in seismology and data processing that has been developing ways of exchanging seismic data on a global basis for verification of a comprehensive test ban.

On balance, I believe that the Conference on Disarmament had a year of modest success, particularly in the area of the chemical weapons negotiations. We attempted, and I believe succeeded, in making clear the U.S. positions on the issues dealt with in the CD and maintained unified positions with our allies. I am looking forward to the resumption of formal work in the Conference in February.

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167. Statement by the U.S. Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (Blackwill) Before the Arms Control Panel of the House Committee on Armed Services: Current Status of the Talks [Extract], September 10, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

The current Western proposal in Vienna calls for a single, comprehensive treaty, to be preceded by prior agreement between the two sides on the number of all ground combat and combat support forces in the area of reductions. The West is willing to set aside initially the issue of ground combat service support forces and air force personnel, where we believe much of the East-West data discrepancy may exist. The proposal, which was originally tabled in 1982 and modified in April of last year, also calls for staged reductions—i.e., beginning with U.S. and Soviet reductions, followed by those of the other MBFR participants—to eventual common ceilings of 700,000 ground forces and 900,000 combined ground and air force personnel for each side in the reductions area. The Western proposal also contains a set of interrelated "associated measures," including provisions for onsite inspection, which are aimed at strengthening confidence and stability without unduly restricting normal peacetime activities.

The current Eastern position is based on a proposal tabled by the Warsaw Pact in February of this year. It calls for a limited, initial agreement focusing on U.S. and Soviet reductions only and a freeze on the forces of both alliances, deferring negotiations on further reductions. The proposal for Soviet reductions of 20,000 troops in return for U.S. reductions of 13,000 falls 10,000 Soviet troops short of the NATO position on initial U.S.-Soviet reductions. Moreover, the provision for a general freeze would contractualize the existing conventional military imbalance and provide a disincentive for the Warsaw Pact to negotiate seriously any further reductions.

The latest Eastern position also demands reductions and a freeze on armaments, a move I believe clearly is aimed at derailing NATO conventional modernization efforts. The February, Eastern proposal, however, makes no move to meet Western verification requirements and, indeed, arguably represents a hardening of the Eastern position. The East's proposed freeze, for example, would be without numbers and would be verified by a combination of NTM and "political goodwill." As for the data issue, the East proposes to "resolve" this problem simply by dismissing it entirely.

I should stress that our NATO allies attach great political and military importance to MBFR. It is the one East-West arms control forum in which they are able to participate actively. As are our allies,

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, November 1985, pp. 32–33.

the Reagan Administration is currently concluding a review of the Vienna negotiations and how to conduct them in the months ahead. No conclusions have yet been reached, and we will be consulting and coordinating closely with our NATO friends.

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168. Statement by ACDA Director Adelman Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Antisatellite Arms Control, September 11, 1985 [1]

It is a pleasure to appear before the House Foreign Affairs Committee to discuss antisatellite (ASAT) arms control. I believe that the most significant recent event in this area was the President's certification, as required by the Department of Defense 1985 authorization act.[2] Thus I would like, in my testimony, to focus today both on the progress of the negotiations in Geneva and that certification and its implications for arms control. First, however, I would like to review Administration thinking on space arms control.

Background

For 25 years, the United States has stationed satellites in space for peaceful purposes, including support of national security and arms control. Launch detection satellites provide immediate warning of a ballistic missile attack. Communication and navigational satellites support the command and control of U.S. and allied military forces. Other satellites provide U.S. national technical means (NTM) to assist in verification of compliance with existing arms control agreements.

The United States has been a contributor and party to several major international agreements that govern space activities, including the UN Charter, Outer Space Treaty,[3] Limited Test Ban Treaty,[4] and Antiballistic Missile Treaty.[5] At U.S. initiative, bilateral talks with the Soviet Union on ASAT arms control were held during 1978–79. The United States supported the recent formation of an *ad hoc* committee to discuss space arms control in the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, November 1985, pp. 26–29. The statement was made before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science.
[2] P.L. 98–525, Sec. 205.
[3] For the text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 38–43.
[4] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[5] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–201.

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U.S. Policy

U.S. national space policy was articulated by President Reagan on July 4, 1982,[6] and reaffirmed in his March 31, 1984, report to Congress on U.S. policy and ASAT arms control: "The United States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapon systems, should those measures be compatible with United States national security." [7]

Guided by these criteria, the United States has studied a range of possible options for space arms control. Factors which complicate ASAT arms control include significant difficulties of verification, diverse sources of threats to U.S. and allied satellites, and threats to U.S. and allied terrestrial forces posed by Soviet targeting and reconnaissance satellites.

Depending on the scope and effectiveness of an agreement, a verifiable space arms control agreement, if complied with, might limit specialized threats to satellites and constrain future threats to such key satellites as those for early warning. Limitations on specialized threats to satellites, together with satellite survivability measures, could help preserve and enhance stability. Agreements could also raise the political threshold for attacks on space objects and meet some international concerns about unconstrained military activity in space.

On November 22, 1984, the United States and U.S.S.R. agreed to enter new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the full range of issues concerning nuclear and space arms.[8] The January 7–8 meeting between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Shultz began this process by reaching an understanding as to the subject and objectives of the negotiations.[9]

It was agreed that the objective of the negotiations is to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. The negotiations are being conducted by a delegation from each side divided into three groups, one of which is addressing defense and space issues.

Arms Control Issues

The 1978–79 ASAT arms control talks revealed major U.S.-Soviet differences, and subsequent study has brought space arms control issues into sharper focus. Space arms control involves difficulties.

Verification. Verification problems are aggravated for space systems because satellites that serve U.S. and allied security are few in number; cheating, even on a small scale, could pose a disproportionate risk. For example, a ban on all ASAT systems would require elimination of the

[6] *Ibid., 1982*, p. 418.
[7] *Ibid., 1984*, p. 205.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 834.
[9] Document 3.

current Soviet ASAT interceptor system, but no satisfactory means has been found to effectively verify Soviet compliance with such an undertaking. The Soviet interceptor is relatively small and launched by a booster and launch pad used for other space missions. We do not know how many interceptors have been manufactured, and the U.S.S.R. could maintain a covert supply.

Breakout. Among the criteria which must be used in evaluating the implications for national security of any potential arms control measure is that of "breakout." This is the risk that a nation could gain unilateral advantage if the agreement ceased to remain in force for any reason—for example, through sudden abrogation—and obtain a head start in building or deploying a type of weapon which had been banned or severely limited. The importance of certain critical U.S. satellites, which are limited in numbers, could create an incentive for the Soviets to maintain a breakout capability.

Definition. Defining a space weapon for arms control purposes is very difficult. Space weapons could include coorbital and direct ascent interceptors (i.e. modified ballistic and ABM missiles), directed energy weapons, active electronic and countermeasures, and weapons which could be carried on manned space complexes The problem is compounded because non-weapon space systems, including civil systems, may have characteristics difficult to distinguish from those of weapons. Furthermore, many systems not designed to be ASAT weapons have inherent (or residual) ASAT capabilities.

Disclosure of Information. Information regarding certain U.S. space systems that are associated with national security is among the most sensitive information within the government. Measures with the objective of enhancing verification of an ASAT arms control agreement that required any form of access to U.S. space systems could create an unacceptable risk of compromising the protection of that information.

Vulnerability of Satellite Support Systems. ASAT arms control would not ensure survivability of other elements in a space system. Ground stations, launch facilities, and communications links may, in some cases, be more vulnerable than the satellites themselves.

Soviet Non-Weapon Military Space Threat. Certain current and projected Soviet space systems, although not weapons, are designed to support Soviet terrestrial forces in the event of a crisis or conflict. These satellites are designed to provide radar and electronically derived targeting intelligence to Soviet weapon platforms for attacking U.S. and allied surface fleets and land forces. In response to this threat and as a counter to the Soviet ASAT, the United States has been developing the miniature vehicle (MV) system. The purposes of this system are to deter threats to U.S. and allied space systems by having the capability to respond in kind to a Soviet ASAT attack and to help deter conventional and nuclear conflict by placing at risk Soviet satellites which support hostile military forces.

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Soviet and U.S. ASAT Systems

Current Soviet ASAT capabilities include an interceptor system which is the only operational ASAT system in the world; in addition, they include ground-based test lasers with probable ASAT capabilities, possibly the nuclear-armed GALOSH ABM interceptors, which might need only software changes to be used in an ASAT role, and the technological capability to conduct electronic warfare against space systems. There have been more than a dozen tests of the interceptor system, which we consider operational, including testing during a Soviet strategic forces exercise in 1982.

A Soviet high-altitude orbital interceptor capability is a possible threat, but we have no direct evidence of such a program by the Soviets, and we may not obtain such evidence before testing. Other techniques for accomplishing this objective may appear preferable to the Soviets. For example, they could also use their developing electronic warfare capabilities against high-altitude satellites. We cannot now say which, if any, such high-altitude capabilities may be, or have been, developed by the U.S.S.R.

Continuing, or possible future, Soviet efforts that could produce ASAT systems include developments in directed energy weapons. We have indications that the Soviets are continuing development of ground-based lasers for ASAT applications. In addition, we believe the Soviets are conducting research and development in the area of space-based laser ASAT systems. We have, as yet, no evidence of Soviet programs to develop ASAT weapons based on particle beam technology.

The U.S. ASAT system presently under development consists of an MV non-nuclear warhead mounted on a two-stage short-range attack missile (SRAM)/Altair booster. This is carried aloft and launched from a specially modified F–15 aircraft. The MV will be capable of attacking satellites in low altitude orbits. The system is currently undergoing testing. It is to be deployed at one air force base on each coast of the United States.

The United States conducted the second test of the MV on November 13, 1984. No target was involved; the object was to demonstrate sensor ability to acquire and track an infrared source. Following the President's recent certification to Congress, the United States plans to conduct a test of the MV against a space object this month. The United States has no plans to extend the altitude capability of the MV ASAT system to place high altitude satellites at risk. We are, however, continuing to review ways in which U.S. ASAT capability could be improved. The U.S. ASAT program is being conducted in a manner fully consistent with all U.S. obligations, including the ABM and Outer Space Treaties.

The Strategic Defense Initiative and ASAT

President Reagan's speech of March 23, 1983, established the direction for what we now call the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).[10] New technologies are becoming available that justify a major research effort in ballistic missile defense. The SDI research program is also a prudent hedge against Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty. (The Soviet Union currently is upgrading its operational ABM system at Moscow and is pursuing aggressive research and development programs in both traditional ABM systems and in advanced ABM technologies such as high energy lasers.)

The U.S. SDI is a program for research on a broad range of technologies which have potential for defense of both the United States and our allies.

The purpose is to explore possible means by which deterrence could be enhanced. The United States has made no decision to develop or deploy an ABM system. The SDI program is structured to support informed decisions by the early 1990s on whether to develop and deploy advanced defensive systems.

Research under the SDI will be consistent with all current U.S. treaty obligations, including the ABM Treaty. The SDI complements U.S. policy calling for significant reductions in offensive nuclear armaments. This is because defenses whose effectiveness could be maintained at less cost than needed to proliferate offenses have potential for reducing the value of ballistic missile forces and thus increasing the likelihood of negotiated reductions. Both the SDI and our ASAT program aim at enhancing deterrence and strengthening strategic stability, but in different ways. Many of the technologies involved in the SDI research and the ASAT program are related. However, the ASAT program is a near-term effort to develop an ASAT weapon intended to redress a specific military imbalance as discussed above, and it has no ABM capability. The SDI, on the other hand, is a long-term research program. The U.S. position on ASAT arms control should neither prejudge the results of SDI research nor preclude the research itself.

Progress in the Negotiations

In the defense and space negotiations, the U.S. approach has focused on the need to address the instability that exists in the current strategic situation; the United States has stressed the importance of reversing the erosion of the ABM Treaty regime and correcting other Soviet actions that violate existing arms control agreements. The United States has explained its view of the relationship between offensive and defensive forces, the potential contribution of defensive forces to our mutual security, and how—if new defensive technologies prove feasible—the sides might manage to stable transition over time toward increased reliance on defenses. [*sic*]

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[10] An excerpt of the speech may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 199–201.

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The Soviet Union, in an effort to stop the U.S. SDI research program, has proposed and continues to demand a comprehensive ban on research, development, testing, and deployment of what they call "space-strike arms." They have made U.S. acceptance of such a ban a precondition for progress—or even detailed discussion—on offensive nuclear arms reductions but have not addressed verification problems. The United States has responded that research is permitted under the ABM Treaty and that a ban on SDI research is unacceptable as it would be neither verifiable nor desirable and that such preconditions will only delay getting down to the kind of discussions that can lead to progress toward reductions in nuclear arsenals.

The President's Certification

On August 20 the President, as required by Congress, certified to Congress as follows:

- The United States is endeavoring in good faith to negotiate with the Soviet Union a mutual and verifiable agreement with the strictest possible limitations on ASAT weapons consistent with the national security interests of the United States.
- Pending agreement on such strict limitations, testing against objects in space of the F–15 launched miniature homing vehicle ASAT warhead by the United States is necessary to avert clear and irrevocable harm to the national security.
- Such testing would not constitute an irreversible step that would gravely impair prospects for negotiations on ASAT weapons.
- Such testing is fully consistent with the rights and obligations of the United States under the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 as those rights and obligations exist at the time of such testing.[11]

I would like to review the reasoning behind this certification.

Endeavoring to Negotiate the Strictest Possible Limitations. As you know, the United States is presently involved in negotiations at Geneva on a whole range of nuclear and space issues, including preventing an arms race in space.

We have been unable, to date, to identify a specific ASAT proposal which meets the requirements identified by the Congress in 1984—that any agreement be verifiable and consistent with U.S. national security. We are seriously exploring with the U.S.S.R. arms control arrangements intended to prevent an arms race in space. We will continue to study possible ASAT limitations in good faith to see whether such limitations are consistent with the national security interests of the United States, and we will continue to explore with the Soviets their proposals and the problems associated with them. We are, therefore, acting in conformity with the first certification requirement.

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[11] Document 147.

Necessity of MV Testing. The primary purposes of a U.S. ASAT capability are to deter threats to space systems of the United States and its allies and, within such limits imposed by international law, to deny any adversary advantages arising from the offensive use of space-based systems which could undermine deterrence.

The U.S.S.R. has the world's only operational ASAT system with an effective capability to seek and destroy critical U.S. space systems in near-Earth orbit. In addition, since space systems are vulnerable to a broad range of threats from direct attack to electronic warfare to nuclear effects, the Soviet Union could have developed—without our knowledge—a variety of other means to attack our satellites.

There is also a growing threat posed by present and prospective Soviet satellites which, while not weapons themselves, are designed to support directly the U.S.S.R.'s terrestrial forces in the event of conflict. These include ocean reconnaissance satellites which use radar and electronic intelligence in efforts to provide targeting data for use in attacking U.S. and allied surface fleets. They also include photographic and electronic intelligence satellites which provide targeting data and other information useful in supporting Soviet land forces. These Soviet space assets constitute a clear threat to our national security and that of our allies.

The United States must take the steps necessary to avert a situation in which the Soviet Union has full freedom to conduct effective attacks on our space systems knowing that their space objects, including those that provide targeting data, are not vulnerable to U.S. attack. The resultant instability from this asymmetry creates a risk of irrevocable harm to the United States. U.S. development of a credible ASAT system is a necessary integral part of the steps needed to avert this situation. Therefore, testing of the MV against objects in space by the United States is necessary to avert clear and irrevocable harm to the national security of the United States and its allies.

Impact on the Negotiations. The ASAT testing which we intend to undertake follows by more than a decade the initiation by the U.S.S.R. of its testing of a coorbital ASAT system which has for some time been the world's only operational ASAT system. The Soviets, moreover, as noted above, have tested and, in some cases deployed, other systems which have inherent ASAT capabilities. The existence of such Soviet capabilities and their testing effectively preclude the possibility that testing by the United States of its MV ASAT will constitute an irreversible step.

In addition, we believe that testing can constitute an incentive to the Soviet Union to reach agreements on a wide range of issues and thus would not impair prospects for a successful conclusion to the negotiations now underway.

Compatibility with the ABM Treaty. The testing against objects in space of the U.S. F–15 MV ASAT system will not give the system the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in

flight trajectory and will not constitute a test in an ABM mode. Therefore, such testing is not prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

Space arms control is a difficult area; I hope these remarks have helped clarify Administration thinking on it.

169. Executive Branch Legal Memorandum on Issues Relating to the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, September 12, 1985 [1]

A number of questions have been raised as to whether the proposed Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy [2] meets the requirements set forth in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended ("AEA").[3] In particular, it has been asserted that the agreement does not meet the requirements of paragraph (a) (1) of this section, concerning safeguards, or the requirements of paragraph (a) (7) of this section, concerning reprocessing and other fuel cycle activities. Acting upon the unanimous advice of the Secretaries of State and Energy [4] and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,[5] the President concluded that these requirements of law had been met. This memorandum sets forth in detail the reasoning behind that conclusion. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission also concluded that these statutory requirements had been met.

Safeguards

Section 123(a)(1) of the AEA, as amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 ("NNPA"),[6] specifies that the proposed agreement for cooperation must contain:

> a guaranty by the cooperating party that safeguards as set forth in the agreement for cooperation will be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant thereto, and with respect to all special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party, irrespective of the duration of other provisions in the agreement or whether the agreement is terminated or suspended for any reason. . . .

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[1] *Nuclear Energy Cooperation With China: Hearing Before the Special Subcommittee on U.S.-Pacific Rim Trade of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives.* . . . pp. 125–149.
[2] Document 118.
[3] 42 U.S.C. 2153.
[4] Document 116.
[5] Document 112.
[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164.

Article 8 of the agreement contains the following provisions:

> 2. The parties recognize that this cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is between two nuclear weapon states and that bilateral safeguards are not required. In order to exchange experience, strengthen technical cooperation between the parties, ensure that the provisions of this agreement are effectively carried out, and enhance a stable, reliable, and predictable nuclear cooperation relationship, in connection with transfers of material, facilities and components under this agreement, the parties will use diplomatic channels to establish mutually acceptable arrangements for exchanges of information and visits to material, facilities and components subject to the agreement.
> 3. The parties shall exchange views and information on the establishment and operation of their respective national accounting and control systems for source and special nuclear material subject to this agreement.

Paragraph 2 of article 10 provides:

> 2. Notwithstanding the suspension, termination or expiration of this agreement, or any cooperation hereunder for any reason, the provisions of Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 shall continue in effect so long as any material, facility, or components subject to these articles remain in the territory of the party concerned or any material, facility or components subject to these articles remain subject to the party's right to exercise jurisdiction or to direct disposition elsewhere.

The AEA requires that safeguards "as set forth in the agreement" be maintained for the life of items subject to the agreement, irrespective of the duration of the agreement itself. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [7] and section 127(1) of the AEA, 42 U.S.C. 2156(1), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are only required as a condition for nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon states. Therefore, IAEA safeguards are not provided for in this agreement with a nuclear-weapon state. Article 8(2), however, provides for arrangements for exchanges of information and visits by U.S. Government officials to material, facilities and components subject to the agreement. The article provides that mutually acceptable arrangements for such visits and information exchanges are to be established "in connection with transfers"; consequently, these arrangements will be a prerequisite for the approval by the U.S. of any exports under the agreement. The U.S. has assumed no obligation to approve exports and need not do so until it is satisfied that appropriate arrangements are in place. Article 8(2), together with article 10(2), which provides that certain provisions, including this one, shall continue for the life of the items to which they apply, meets the requirement of section 123(a)(1).

It has been argued, however, that the "safeguards" required by section 123(a)(1) are those equivalent to the safeguards of the IAEA, as

[7] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–468.

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provided for in the safeguards agreement between the United States and the IAEA.[8] Thus, it is asserted that an agreement for cooperation must contain the basic features of material accountancy, containment and surveillance of nuclear material and inspections, and that while each feature of the proposed agreement need not track the U.S. agreement with the IAEA, an agreement not containing those basic elements does not meet the requirement of section 123(a)(1). Consequently, it is asserted that the proposed agreement for cooperation with China does not meet this requirement of U.S. law. This assertion, however, is incorrect. The interpretation of section 123(a)(1) on which it is based is neither supported by the text of the law nor the practice of the United States in its agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation since enactment of the AEA in 1954.

The text of the statute on its face clearly does not require either IAEA safeguards or safeguards having equivalent characteristics. No specific safeguards system is mandated by section 123(a)(1). The section requires only that "safeguards as set forth in the agreement for cooperation" have a specified duration. The fact that IAEA or equivalent safeguards are not required is also seen by comparing section 123(a)(1) with sections 123(a)(2) and 127(1) (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)(2), 2156(1)), each of which specifically requires "IAEA safeguards". Other provisions of the AEA and NNPA make specific reference to "IAEA safeguards".[9] These provisions make clear that where Congress intended a section in the law specifically to require IAEA safeguards, it so provided. Similarly, where the equivalent of IAEA safeguards could satisfy a provision of law, Congress so specified. Section 126(a)(2) allows the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in making export licensing determinations, to find that "the criteria in section 127 of this Act or their equivalent . . . are met," 42 U.S.C. 2155(a)(2). In sharp distinction to providing that agreements for cooperation must contain a requirement for IAEA safeguards or their equivalent, section 123(a)(1) only requires "safeguards as set forth in the agreement."

Prior to its amendment by the NNPA in 1978, the AEA required that agreements for cooperation include "a guarantee by the cooperating party that security safeguards and standards as set forth in the agreement for cooperation will be maintained." [10] The practice under this provision since 1954 makes clear that safeguards "as set forth in the agreement" varied widely from no safeguards at all, to safeguards primarily implemented by the cooperating party, to elaborate bilateral safeguards provisions with detailed U.S. inspection rights.

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[8] Agreement Between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, Nov. 18, 1977—U.S.T.—, T.I.A.S. No. 9889. [Footnote in original.] The text of the Agreement may also be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1977*, pp. 738–775.

[9] 22 U.S.C. 3241, 3281(a)(1)(D), 42 U.S.C. 2139(b)(1), 2153b(a)(2), 2157(a)(1), 2158(1)(C). [Footnote in original.]

[10] Section 123(a)(2), P.L. 83–703, 68 Stat. 919. [Footnote in original.]

Three agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation concluded under the language of the 1954 Act contained no safeguards at all in the sense of inspection rights or material accountancy. The agreement for cooperation with the United Kingdom merely contained the following provision:

> All classified material, equipment, devices and classified information exchanged under this Agreement shall be safeguarded with applicable security arrangements between the Commission and the Authority.[11]

The agreement with Canada merely provided that:

> The security safeguards and standards prescribed by the security arrangements by the Commission and the Atomic Energy Agency Control Board of Canada in effect on June 15, 1955, will be maintained with respect to all classified information and materials, including equipment and devices exchanged under this Agreement.[12]

The agreement with Belgium contained a similar provision.[13]

A whole series of other agreements had different "safeguards" provisions. Articles VI and VII(A) of the U.S. agreement with Greece may be taken as an example:

> *Article VI*
>
> A. The Government of the Kingdom of Greece agrees to maintain such safeguards as are necessary to assure that the uranium enriched in the isotope U–235 leased from the Commission shall be used solely for the purposes agreed in accordance with this Agreement and to assure the safekeeping of this material
>
> B. The Government of the Kingdom of Greece agrees to maintain such safeguards as are necessary to assure that all other reactor materials, including equipment and devices, purchased in the United States under this Agreement by the Government of the Kingdom of Greece or authorized persons under its jurisdiction shall be used solely for the design, construction, and operation of research reactors which the Government of the Kingdom of Greece decides to construct and operate and for research in connection therewith, except as may otherwise be agreed.
>
> C. In regard to research reactors constructed pursuant to this Agreement the Government of the Kingdom of Greece agrees to maintain records relating to power levels of operation and burn-up of reactor fuels and to make annual reports to the Commission

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[11] Article IX(A), Agreement for Cooperation on the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy Between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 15, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 2709, T.I.A.S. No. 3321. [Footnote in original.]

[12] Article XII(A), Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy Between the United States and Canada, June 15, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 2595, T.I.A.S. No. 3304. [Footnote in original.]

[13] Article XI(A), Agreement for Cooperation Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy Between the United States and Belgium, June 15, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 2551, T.I.A.S. No. 3301. [Footnote in original.]

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on these subjects. If the Commission requests, the Government of the Kingdom of Greece will permit Commission representatives to observe from time to time the condition and use of any leased material and to observe the performance of the reactor in which the material is used.

Article VII

Guaranties Prescribed by the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954

The Government of the Kingdom of Greece guarantees that:

A. Safeguards provided in Article VI shall be maintained.

* * * [14]

These provisions show that the primary responsiblity for the maintenance of safeguards was given not to an international agency or to the United States, but to Greece, the recipient government. If the AEC requested, Greece agreed to permit Commission representatives "to observe from time to time the condition and use" of leased material. These provisions, including safeguards maintained by the recipient and occasional visits by the United States, are characterized as "safeguards" in Article VII(A). Similar provisions were included in agreements with Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lebanon, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam and West Berlin.[15] In each of these agreements, the provisions in question are called "safeguards" in the agreement itself.

Other agreements concluded during the same period contained what would now be considered more traditional bilateral safeguards provisions. Thus, for example, the 1956 agreement for cooperation between the United States and France contained traditional bilateral safeguards provisions including design review, records requirements and inspection rights.[16] In Article XI(A) these provisions are also called "safe-

[14] Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Greece Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, August 4, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 2635, T.I.A.S. No. 3310. [Footnote in original.]

[15] Background Material for the Review of the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the United States, Report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, Vol. 2, Joint Committee print, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., October 1960, at 432–34; article VIII, IX(a), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Indonesia Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, June 8, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2024, T.I.A.S. No. 4557; article VIII, IX(a), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Panama Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, June 24, 1959, 14 U.S.T. 876, T.I.A.S. No. 5370. See, e.g., article VI, VII(A), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Israel Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, July 12, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 2641, T.I.A.S. No. 3311. [Footnote in original.]

[16] Article X(A), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and France Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, June 19, 1956, 7 U.S.T. 3097, T.I.A.S. No. 3689. [Footnote in original.]

guards".[17] By 1960, there were 13 agreements in effect with this type of safeguards provision.[18]

From the foregoing it is evident that the clause "as set forth in the agreement" was interpreted to give U.S. negotiators broad discretion to vary the safeguards provisions in agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation as was deemed appropriate to the circumstances. Some agreements had no safeguards in the sense of material accountancy and inspection. Some had recipient-applied safeguards, and others had bilateral U.S. safeguards. All were included in U.S. agreements for cooperation in satisfaction of the same paragraph of the AEA and all were referred to as "safeguards" in a generic sense.

There is no evidence in the history of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act to suggest that Congress intended in any way to limit the discretion of the negotiators or to assign a special meaning to "safeguards".

When the AEA was amended in 1978 by the NNPA, the clause "security safeguards and standards" was replaced by the shorter reference "safeguards". This simplification was due to the fact that the term"safeguards" had become accepted for reference to the provisions adopted since 1954 in fulfillment of the requirement of the 1954 act. There is no indication in the legislative history that this change was intended to be substantive. The Senate report on the NNPA merely indicates, in referring to the preexisting text: "The existing provision simply requires that 'security safeguards and standards as set forth in the agreement will be maintained.' " The report does not focus on the change in language to the word "safeguards", but rather on the addition of the requirement that safeguards be maintained "so long as the items remain under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party, irrespective of the duration of other provisions in the agreement or whether the agreement is terminated or suspended for any reason."[19] Further, the crucial point is that the modifying phrase "as set forth in the agreement" was retained, bringing with it the historical flexibility

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[17] Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and France Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, June 19, 1956, 7 U.S.T. 3097, T.I.A.S. No. 3689. [Footnote in original.]

[18] Background Material for the Review of International Atomic Policies and Programs of the United States, Report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, Vol. 2, Joint Committee print, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., October 1960, at 466. [Footnote in original.]

[19] Senate Report No. 95–467, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., October 3, 1977, at 21–22. The Senate report relates to the final version of the bill subsequently enacted as the NNPA. The House Report in describing all the changes being made to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, focuses on the new requirement for the duration of safeguards and says "this is one of the significant additions to section 123." In describing the new provision, the House Report indicates that it pertains to "safeguards required under the agreement." In describing the purpose of the change, the House Report indicates that it will ensure the continuation of IAEA safeguards even if the U.S. terminates exports or the agreement expires. House Report No. 95–587, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., August 5, 1977, at 11–12. The reference to IAEA safeguards is merely illustrative and does not alter the fact that the plain statutory language is more general. The focus of the Congress was on ensuring the perpetuity of safeguards, not on redefining the meaning of "safeguards" in section 123(a)(1). [Footnote in original.]

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that had been available to vary the "safeguards" provisions as appropriate for each agreement.

The language of the proposed agreement for cooperation between the United States and China is similar to the language of the agreement for cooperation with Greece quoted above and other similar agreements in the sense that the Greek agreement depended on the cooperating party to account for the material provided by the United States and envisaged visits by United States officials from time to time. The language in the proposed U.S.-China agreement goes far beyond that in the agreements the U.S. had with the U.K., Canada and Belgium, which had no requirements for material accounting, containment and surveillance or inspections. Each of those agreements were sufficient for the purposes of U.S. law and the proposed agreement with China clearly meets the provisions of U.S. law as well. None of these provisions is equivalent to IAEA safeguards and none is equivalent to fall-back bilateral safeguards found in current agreements with non-nuclear-weapon states. Such equivalency is clearly not required, as has been demonstrated by the foregoing review of the statutory text and the U.S. practice in the field.

The proposed agreement with China contains provisions that assure that nuclear material, facilities and components supplied by the United States will not be misused. In addition to articles 8(2) and 5(2), which are discussed in this memorandum, there are commitments that these items will not be used for any military or explosive purpose, will not be retransferred without U.S. consent, and will be subject to agreed levels of physical security. All these provisions will continue in effect as long as the item in question remains in China, even if the agreement itself expires. Moreover, the agreement expressly excludes cooperation in sensitive technologies, nor does it in any way require that technology of military or strategic significance be transferred. While it provides a framework for potential U.S. nuclear export, it does not commit the U.S. to export any item. Taken together, these provisions establish a regime for nuclear cooperation that is suitably stringent and appropriate for reciprocal dealing with a nuclear-weapon state.

Reprocessing and Other Fuel Cycle Activities

Section 123(a) (7) and (8) of the AEA, as amended by the NNPA, 42 U.S.C. 2153(a) (7) and (8), require than an agreement for cooperation include:

> (7) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 b., or 144 c., a guaranty by the cooperating party that no material transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation and no material used in or produced through the use of any material, production facility, or utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation will be reprocessed, enriched or (in the case of plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 235, or other nuclear materials which have been irradiated) other-

wise altered in form or content without the prior approval of the United States;
(8) except in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 b., or 144 c., a guaranty by the cooperating party that no plutonium, no uranium 233, and no uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 235, transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, or recovered from any source or special nuclear material so transferred or from any source or special nuclear material used in any production facility or utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation, will be stored in any facility that has not been approved in advance by the United States. . . .

In compliance with these provisions, the proposed agreement between the United States and China contains the following provisions in article 5(2):

Neither party has any plans to enrich to twenty percent or greater, reprocess, or alter in form or content material transferred pursuant to this agreement or material used in or produced through the use of any material or facility so transferred. Neither party has any plans to change locations for storage of plutonium, uranium 233 (except as contained in irradiated fuel elements), or high enriched uranium transferred pursuant to this agreement or used in or produced through the use of any material or facility so transferred. In the event that a party would like at some future time to undertake such activities, the parties will promptly hold consultations to agree on a mutually acceptable arrangement. The parties undertake the obligation to consider such activities favorably, and agree to provide pertinent information on the plans during the consultations. Inasmuch as any such activities will be solely for peaceful purposes and will be in accordance with the provisions of this agreement, the parties will consult immediately and will seek agreement within six months on long-term arrangements for such activities. In the spirit of cooperation the parties agree not to act within that period of time. If such an arrangement is not agreed upon within that period of time, the parties will promptly consult for the purpose of agreeing on measures which they consider to be consistent with the provisions of the agreement in order to undertake such activities on an interim basis. The parties agree to refrain from actions which either party believes would prejudge the long-term arrangements for undertaking such activities or adversely affect cooperation under this agreement. The parties agree that the consultations referred to above will be carried out promptly and mutual agreement reached in a manner to avoid hampering, delay or undue interference in their respective nuclear programs. Neither party will seek to gain commercial advantage. Nothing in this article shall be used by either party to inhibit the legitimate development and exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with this agreement.

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Under this provision, reprocessing, enrichment, alteration in form or content and (for weapons usable material) storage of materials subject to the agreement cannot be undertaken without the prior agreement of the United States. When one party wishes to undertake any of these activities, the parties undertake to consult immediately for the purpose of "agree[ing] on a mutually acceptable" long-term arrangement; since such an arrangement cannot be concluded before the U.S. agrees, the U.S. has a right of prior approval with respect to the long-term arrangement. The U.S. and China will try to reach agreement in six months; during that time, they agree that neither party will undertake any of the activities in question. Thus, during this period, none of these activities can take place without U.S. prior approval. If agreement is not reached on long-term arrangements within the six-month period, the parties will promptly consult "for the purpose of agreeing on measures . . . [to permit these] activities on an interim basis." The activities may not be undertaken without the interim measures and those measures must be agreed to by both parties. Until there has been such agreement, the parties are obligated to "refrain from actions which either party believes would prejudge the long-term arrangements or adversely affect cooperation under the agreement." There can be no doubt that if China proceeded without the agreement of the United States, this would adversely affect cooperation under the agreement. Thus, after the initial six-month period, the fuel cycle activities in question still cannot occur without agreement on interim "measures", and the U.S. has a right to withhold its agreement to any activity that is proposed.

It was clearly understood by both parties that such activities could not occur without U.S. agreement. During the negotiations, both China and the U.S. recognized that the issue of implementing these consent rights would not arise in any practical sense for substantially more than a decade. The Chinese, however, were concerned that the standard formulation of the consent right provision originally proposed by the U.S. would give the U.S. the ability to control the evolution of the future domestic Chinese nuclear program by mere failure to respond to any approval request they might make. The resulting text obviates that risk.

In sum, none of the activities may be undertaken, at any time, unless the United States first agrees—the United States is assured the right to approve or disapprove before any of the specified activities is undertaken. The AEA requires that the United States Government have the right to approve of these activities before any of them is undertaken. That is precisely what article 5(2) provides for, thus satisfying the requirements of U.S. law.

Questions have been raised, however, as to whether article 5(2) is sufficiently clear and unambiguous to meet the U.S. legal requirements and about language which relates to the manner in which the parties will implement article 5(2).

Paragraphs (7) and (8) of section 123(a) do not dictate the precise language that must be used in an agreement. That language is subject to negotiation. What counts is that the substantive requirements of the law are met. The language of article 5(2) ensures that the United States may exercise an approval right before the activity in question is carried out. The obligation to "seek agreement . . . on long-term arrangements" is not an obligation to agree. Similarly, the prohibition on unilateral actions which "prejudge the long-term arrangements . . . or adversely affect cooperation" assures that China may not conduct any of the activities in question until and unless the U.S. has given its consent. The U.S. is given discretion to decide what interim activity would "adversely affect cooperation"—no agreement is required on this point, and our decisions are thus not subject to argument; this phrase is sufficiently broad to include any non-proliferation or national security concern that the U.S. believes could adversely affect cooperation. Together, these provisions establish a framework of prior U.S. approvals which is what the law requires. Since the agreement text ensures that the activities in question may not be undertaken without the prior approval of the United States, it is sufficient to meet the requirement of law, even though the language is not the same as in previous agreements.

In pre-1978 agreements, a variety of different formulae were used to establish a U.S. reprocessing consent right, and all were recognized by Congress as meeting the export requirement established by the NNPA in section 127(5), 42 U.S.C. 2156(5), for a prohibition on reprocessing "unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained." For example, some agreements required that reprocessing be performed in facilities of the cooperating party only upon a joint determination of the parties that the provisions of the article pertaining to safeguards could be effectively applied, or in other facilities as mutually agreed between the parties.[20] Another group of agreements required that any such reprocessing be performed at the discretion of the AEC in either AEC facilities or facilities acceptable to the AEC on terms and conditions to be later agreed.[21] Yet another group of agreements provided

[20] Article IX(E), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Argentina Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, June 25, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 2587, T.I.A.S. No. 6721; article VIII(F), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Brazil Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, July 17, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 2477, T.I.A.S. No. 7439; article VIII(F), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Finland Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, April 8, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 1368, T.I.A.S. No. 6896; article II(E), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and India Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, August 8, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1484, T.I.A.S. No. 5446; article VIII(C), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Japan Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, February 26, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 5214, T.I.A.S. No. 6517, amended, 23 U.S.T. 275, T.I.A.S. No. 7306, and 23 U.S.T. 2323, T.I.A.S. No. 7758. [Footnote in original.]

[21] See, e.g., article VIII(H), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Norway Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic energy, May 4, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 531, T.I.A.S. No. 6260, amended, 21 U.S.T. 817, T.I.A.S. No. 6849; article IX(F), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and the Philippines Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, June 13, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 5389, T.I.A.S. No. 6522. [Footnote in original.]

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that the reprocessing could be performed in facilities acceptable to both parties upon a joint determination of the parties that the safeguards provisions of the agreement could be effectively applied.[22] The Senate report on the NNPA recognized that "although the actual language in our existing agreements for cooperation varies, and seldom corresponds precisely to the language of these criteria, it is our understanding that each of these basic requirements and rights are contained [except in the U.S. cooperation agreements with the IAEA and EURATOM]." [23] Thus, Congress recognized that agreement language does not have to be the same as the U.S. statutory language, but rather has to carry forward its substance. Exports have been licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission based on the findings by it and the Executive Branch that various formulations in preexisting agreements all met the statutory requirement for a consent right.

Undeniably, the Congress wanted the U.S. reprocessing approval right to be unqualified and set forth in the agreement unambiguously.[24] However, it is also clear that the Congress recognized that the provisions in question had to be negotiated with foreign governments and that the language would neither always follow the statutory language nor always be the same. Moreover, in terms of legal sufficiency, the Congress, the Executive Branch and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have found consent rights to exist in cases where some might argue they are less than clear and unqualified. To be sure, the language in the China agreement is different from that in other agreements. However, since the substantive effect of the provision that has been negotiated is to ensure that the activities in question cannot be carried out unless the United States approves in advance, the requirements in section 123(a) (7) and (8) are met.

The foregoing conclusion is not altered by the language in article 5(2) relating to the manner in which decisions on reprocessing and other fuel cycle activities are reached. Article 5(2) provides that the parties "undertake the obligation to consider such activities favorably." This in no way mandates the result of that consideration. It merely recognizes that the United States and China have no predisposition to prevent all reprocessing, alteration, enrichment, and storage. The text makes clear that pertinent information on the proposed activities will be provided and that the parties will consult for the purpose of agreeing on the arrangements. The United States has the ultimate ability to decide whether or not to agree. The Executive Branch of the United States Government is bound to follow the legal

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[22] See, e.g., article IX(C), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Austria Concerning Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, July 11, 1969, 21 U.S.T. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 6815, amended, 25 U.S.T. 2337, T.I.A.S. No. 7912; article VIII(C), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Spain Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, March 20, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 1063, T.I.A.S. No. 7841. [Footnote in original.]

[23] Senate Report 95–467, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., October 3, 1977, at 16. [Footnote in original.]

[24] House Report 95–587, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., August 5, 1977, at 14. [Footnote in original.]

standards in the AEA and NNPA and policy applicable at the time of a request in deciding on whether or not it is in a position to agree.

Article 5(2) further provides that consultations on long term and interim arrangements will be "carried out promptly and mutual agreement reached in a manner to avoid hampering, delay, or undue interference in their respective nuclear programs." This does not compel the United States to agree to any proposed particular arrangement. Obviously, the United States has no intention of interfering in the Chinese domestic civil nuclear program. The clause recognizes that the United States would have no say with regard to matters not subject to the agreement for cooperation. It is based on an IAEA document,[25] and has appeared in a variety of formulations in most of our peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements since 1978.[26] The clause does not undercut the explicit requirements for agreement on arrangements (whether long-term or interim) and does not release either party from its obligation not to act unilaterally.

Article 5(2) contains a further clause indicating that neither party will seek to gain commercial advantage. This clause was included to make clear that the United States would not refuse to agree, for example, to enrichment, reprocessing, or storage in China for the purpose of gaining commercial advantages for companies that were engaging in that activity in the U.S. and competing for international business. Rather, the U.S. includes consent rights in nuclear cooperation agreements for non-proliferation and national security purposes and that is how they would be administered. The clause in no way undercuts the U.S. prior approval right. Further, it should be noted that such a clause has been included in a U.S. agreement for cooperation subsequent to the NNPA and has not evoked any criticism.[27]

The last sentence in paragraph 2 of article 5 provides that nothing in the article shall be used to inhibit the legitimate development and exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the agreement.[28] This provision cannot be construed to require

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[25] See paragraph 4, the Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153 (corrected), June 1972, at 2. Similar language is included in IAEA safeguards agreements. [Footnote in original.]

[26] See articles 7(5), 9(6), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Egypt Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, June 29, 1981,—U.S.T.—, T.I.A.S. No. 10208; articles 7(5), 9(7), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Peru Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, June 26, 1980,—U.S.T.—, T.I.A.S. No. 10300; articles 7(5), 9(7), Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Morocco Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, May 30, 1980,—U.S.T.—, T.I.A.S. No. 10018. In Congressional consideration of post-1978 agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation, no question has ever been raised about the inclusion of this clause. [Footnote in original.]

[27] See paragraph 12, Agreed Minute, Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Egypt Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, June 29, 1981,—U.S.T.—, T.I.A.S. No. 10208. [Footnote in original.]

[28] In article IV(1) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the United States recognized the right of states to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with appropriate non-proliferation undertakings. July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839. [Footnote in original.]

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that the United States agree to any particular proposed Chinese nuclear activity. The phrase "in accordance with this agreement" makes clear that the agreement's explicit requirements for agreement on long-term arrangements or interim measures apply and that neither party is released from its obligation not to act unilaterally. Instead, the sentence indicates that the intention of each party is not to administer the article with the purpose of inhibiting the other's domestic development and exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The U.S. would be expected to administer the provision for the purpose of promoting its non-proliferation and security objectives.

Conclusion

In summary, therefore, the objections that have been raised to the proposed peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and China relating to its legal sufficiency under section 123(a) of the Atomic Energy Act are without merit. The agreement has been carefully reviewed by all concerned agencies and all have concluded that the agreement meets all requirements of law.

170. Letter From General Secretary Honecker of the German Democratic Republic to Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany: Establishment of a Chemical-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Europe, September 12, 1985 [1]

Desiring to fulfil its responsiblility for peace and relaxation of tensions in Central Europe and to meet the security interests of its own people and indeed of all European peoples, the Government of the German Democratic Republic proposes to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to make a joint contribution to disarmament and arms limitation.

The question of prohibiting and eliminating chemical weapons has long been a subject of international discussion. The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty as well as other States have made proposals to this end.

The Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have held consultations on this question and decided to present the following to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany:

The Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic hold the view that practical pos-

[1] A/C.1/40/2, Annex I. Czechoslovakian Prime Minister Štrougal sent a similar letter to Chancellor Kohl on the same day (Annex II). A letter dated September 25, 1985, addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from representatives of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic transmitted a joint text of the two letters, noting that it was sent September 13, 1985.

sibilities do exist for the elimination of chemical weapons, particularly for the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe. This could be a way to arrive at the removal of the chemical weapon stocks existing in the region and to ensure that no new, extremely perilous types of such weapons, notably binary weapons, will be deployed on European soil. This has also been reflected in the talks between the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany on the establishment of a zone free of chemical weapons, which climaxed in the presentation of the political initiative known to you.

Next to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons are the most dangerous means of mass destruction. It is a matter of utmost urgency to prohibit and completely eliminate them. What is needed are resolute efforts both on a global and regional scale. The Governments of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia take a consistent stand for a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. Moreover, they are convinced that regional agreements on the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones would be concrete steps towards confidence-building and towards a world-wide ban on these weapons. In this light the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia are prepared to conclude an agreement with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which would result in the elimination of chemical weapons on the territories of these countries that are situated right along the dividing line between the two military-political alliances.

In making this proposal they, neighbours of the Federal Republic of Germany, want to encourage, in Central Europe, arms reductions as concrete action to safeguard peace and security.

We strongly believe that the proposal submitted by the two Governments can lead to a corresponding agreement. Such an accord would be important in strengthening security in Europe and would add to the joint efforts which aim to free Europe of the risks of the use of chemical weapons.

The Governments of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia invite the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to enter into negotiations on the establishment of a zone free of chemical weapons, which should comprise the territories of these three States, to begin with. In these negotiations the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia are ready to put forward their ideas on the problems involved. It is their understanding that the Federal Republic of Germany for its part will submit specific proposals and reflections of its own, and that the agreement on the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone should be open to all other interested States for accession.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic hopes for a positive response from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and suggests to open negotiations on the matter. The necessary arrangements could be made through diplomatic channels.

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171. Statement by President Reagan on the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, September 13, 1985 [1]

I met today with my senior negotiators to the nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva—Ambassadors Max Kampelman, John Tower, and Maynard Glitman. I gave them my instructions for the third round of the negotiations, which begins on September 19, and discussed with them the prospects for progress in this round.

I reiterated to Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower, and Glitman my strong desire to move with renewed effort to reduce nuclear arms. Achieving real reductions in both strategic and intermediate nuclear forces is our overriding objective in Geneva. We have placed a number of positive and far-reaching proposals on the table for significant and verifiable reductions. Our negotiators have unprecedented authority for give and take in trying to reach these objectives. There is no reason why a serious reduction process cannot begin promptly, as these nuclear arms exist today and are of considerable concern to both sides. At the same time, I have emphasized my desire to strengthen the dialog with the Soviets in Geneva on the full range of issues involving defense and space arms.

I am hopeful that we may indeed be able to move forward in this round. Soviet leaders have recently given public indications that they may be considering significant nuclear reductions, and we have encouraged them to translate this expression into concrete proposals at the negotiating table in Geneva. Now is the time for them to spell out their intentions; now is the time for both sides to move forward. Concrete Soviet proposals would get the talks moving and would make a positive contribution to the intensified U.S.-Soviet dialog which has been underway in recent months.

I am looking forward to my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in November. Arms control will, of course, be one of the important parts of our agenda at that meeting, and progress at the negotiating table in Geneva in this round would provide a positive, additional stimulus to a productive discussion in November.

As I have stressed before, my administration is committed to bringing down dramatically the levels of nuclear arms through equitable and verifiable agreements. We have made serious proposals, we are patient, and we are ready for serious give and take. With a comparable Soviet attitude, much can be accomplished and soon.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, September 16, 1985, p. 1074.

172. News Conference Remarks by President Reagan: Strategic Defense Initiative, Antisatellite Weapons Testing, and Nuclear and Space Arms Talks [Extracts], September 17, 1985 [1]

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Strategic Defense Initiative

Q. Mr. President, as you head toward the summit, one of the big questions is whether you would be willing to explore the possibility of a tradeoff on the space weapons or big cuts in the Soviet arsenal. And I'd like to follow up.

The President. Helen, no, we're talking about the Strategic Defense Initiative now. I'm sorry that anyone ever used the appellation Star Wars for it because it isn't that. It is purely to see if we can find a defensive weapon so that we can get rid of the idea that our deterrence should be the threat of retaliation, whether from the Russians toward us or us toward them, of the slaughter of millions of people by way of nuclear weapons. And rather than that kind of negotiation, I think at this summit meeting what we should take up is the matter of turning toward defensive weapons as an alternative to this just plain naked nuclear threat of each side saying we can blow up the other. And I would hope that if such a weapon proves practical, that then we can realistically eliminate these horrible offensive weapons—nuclear weapons—entirely.

And I also have to point out that with regard to whether that would be a bargaining chip—which I don't see it as that at all—is the fact that the Soviet Union is already ahead of us in this same kind of research. They have been doing it much longer than us, seeking a defensive weapon also.

Q. And you're really saying, then, that you are not going to negotiate and that you really want to test just to see if it's practical. But aren't you really paving the way toward a militarization of the heavens, because the Soviets are bound to build up a weapon—offensive to counter the Star Wars.

The President. No, the strategic defense that we're seeking is something that can, just as an antiaircraft gun once could protect you against bombers, could be used against these offensive weapons—the missiles. And it doesn't mean no negotiation at all. As a matter of fact, the side that has not been negotiating—with all of our months and months of meetings in Geneva and the arms talks—is the Soviet Union.

We have offered at least six versions of a possible reduction and six different ways to enlist their interest in negotiating with us in a

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, September 23, 1985, pp. 1101–1103, 1106.

reduction of warheads. They have come back with nothing. They simply won't discuss it or negotiate.

But the original idea of weapons in space dealt with the thought that, in addition to the present missiles that we have, that somebody would place weapons of that kind in orbit in space with the ability to call them down on any target wherever they wanted to in the world, and we agreed.

This isn't anything of what we're talking about. We're talking about a weapon that won't kill people; it'll kill weapons. And, as I say, they have been exploring this, but there's a great deal of room for negotiation. The room would be if and when such a weapon does prove feasible, then prior to any deployment, to sit down with the other nations of the world and say, "Here. Now, isn't this an answer?"

I don't see it as being something that we would add to our arsenal to increase our ability over them. I see it as the time then that you could say, "Isn't this the answer to any of us having nuclear weapons?"

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Antisatellite Weapons Testing

Q. Mr. President, the United States has just had its first successful test of an antisatellite weapons system. We showed the Soviet Union that we could do it. Would this not be an ideal time to stop further ASAT tests and negotiate a ban on such weapons?

The President. Well, here again, this is going to take a lot of verification if you're going to try to do that, because, here again, we were playing catch-up. They already have deployed an antisatellite missile. They can knock down and have knocked down satellites that have been sent up in their testing, and they've completed all of that testing. And this was our test, and I don't know whether others are necessary to complete the thing, but we couldn't stand by and allow them to have a monopoly on the ability to shoot down satellites when we are so dependent on them for communication, even weather and so forth.

Gary [Gary Schuster, *Detroit News*]?

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Q. Mr. President, thank you. You sent the arms negotiators back to Geneva for the start of the third round of talks that begin in 2 days. Did you send them with any new proposals?

The President. No, because they have a great flexibility, and I sent them back with the same thing that we sent them in in the first place, and that is that we are to be flexible. We know that there is a difference in the Soviet Union's—the emphasis they place on various weapons systems. They have all the same ones we do—airborne, submarine launched, and so forth. Theirs is a little different strategy

than ours. So, we said that we proposed a number of warheads as an opener for discussion, that we would reduce to a certain number. As I said earlier, we have presented at least six different ways in which that could be done, and we have made it plain that we're willing to meet whatever are their specific problems with regard to their mix of weapons, that we would find ways to accommodate the differences between us in our strategies.

And so far they have not made a single comment or proposed a different number. They have just been there. And I don't know how much more flexible we can be, but we're there waiting for them to say, well, that number's wrong; let's try another number, or make a proposal of their own. And in spite of the language that's been used in some of the international broadcasts recently by leaders in the Kremlin, none of those proposals, nothing of that kind has ever come to the table for negotiations.

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Strategic Defense Initiative

Q. Mr. President, why couldn't all the weapons and all the technology that are currently under rubric of the Strategic Defense Initiative be used offensively as well as defensively and thereby defeat your rationale for a strategic defense? Why couldn't lasers and electronic beam weapons be used offensively and defeat the purpose of the program?

The President. Well, I'm sure there must have been some research in things of that kind, but we're definitely seeking a defensive weapon. And one of the things that I believe should be taken up at the summit is to make it plain that we're both willing to look at certainly a mix and see if we can't place more dependence on defensive weapons, rather than on destructive weapons that could wipe out populations.

Q. But, sir, isn't it fair to assume that the Russians, out of their own sense of military security, are bound to consider the possibility that weapons developed under SDI could be used offensively as well as defensively?

The President. Well, I'm not a scientist enough to know about what that would take to make them that way. That isn't what we are researching on or what we're trying to accomplish. And at the moment I have to say the United States--in spite of some of the misinformation that has been spread around—the United States is still well behind the Soviet Union in literally every kind of offensive weapon, both conventional and in the strategic weapons. And we think that we have enough of a deterrent, however, that the retaliation would be more than anyone would want to accept. So, for 40 years we've maintained the peace, but we've got more years to go, and this threat hangs over all of us worldwide, and some day there may come along a

madman in the world someplace—everybody knows how to make them anymore—that could make use of these.

It's like when we met in 1925, after the horror of World War I, and in Geneva decided against poison gas any more as a weapon in war. And we went through World War II and down to the defeat of our enemies without anyone using it, because they knew that everyone had it. But they also knew something else. We outlawed poison gas in 1925,[2] but everybody kept their gas masks. I think of this weapon as kind of the gas mask.

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173. Report by U.N. Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar: Study on the Naval Arms Race [Extract], September 17, 1985 [1]

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

308. In carrying out a comprehensive study, as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 38/188 G, the Group of Experts has had to cover a broad compass. In essence, this report is an overview of a very wide and complex subject from which several significant conclusions of a general nature may be drawn.

309. It is useful to recall that some 71 percent of the earth's surface is sea and over two-thirds of the world's human population live within 300 kilometres of a sea coast. The importance of the sea, its uses and resources, to the human race cannot be over-emphasized. A major proportion of the world's international trade goes by sea; fisheries provide a vital source of protein to many hundreds of millions of people; an increasing amount of the world's energy supplies are derived from sea areas; and as technology develops and expands so, too, will the means of further developing the mineral resources of the seabed and the sea itself. The world's oceans have already played an important role in human exploration and development, and it can be expected that the role they will play in the future will be of even greater significance to mankind.

310. The specific value of the sea to an individual State varies widely from country to country according to geographical situation, extent of development, maritime outlook, economic dependence or independence and many other factors. Some States accord great importance to their sea lines of communication and marine industries and

[2] The President is referring here to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. For the text of the Protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

[1] A/40/535, pp. 87–91.

consequently will go to great lengths to protect them, both politically and if necessary militarily. To others, the seas often represent a challenging opportunity for the fulfilment of some of their basic aspirations for economic advancement. To many, the seas can also represent a potential source of threat to their national security and territorial integrity.

311. Into this picture, the advent of the Convention on the Law of the Sea [2] has introduced a series of major and interconnected new elements. Large areas of what have been parts of the high seas will now become subject to the specific legal régime of the exclusive economic zone in which coastal States will enjoy full economic rights while recognizing important freedoms of the high seas. The provision by which coastal States may extend their territorial sea up to a breadth of 12 miles; the new concept of "transit passage"; the introduction of "archipelagic waters"; the definition of "the continental shelf"; the provisions of the Convention concerning the development of the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction—all these are new factors. Although some of these aspects have not yet received acceptance by all States, without doubt the implementation of the Convention on the Law of the Sea will have far-reaching effects on the international conduct of maritime affairs.

312. In addition to these factors and of particular relevance to the present study, there is the use of the seas by the navies of the world. The majority of the world's States possess naval forces, albeit of widely differing capabilities. The existence of such forces in the exercise of sovereign rights is legitimate and recognized by the Group; however, there are sometimes conflicts of interest between naval activities and non-military uses of the sea, just as there are conflicts between latent security threats and the freedom of navigation. Naval activities should take account, *inter alia*, of the legitimate interests of coastal States, and it is important that such activities should be compatible with the provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.

313. Naval presence and activities are not new, but recent years have witnessed several fundamental technological developments which have had major effects on the international maritime situation. The most important of these changes, in a technical sense, has been the development of nuclear energy. In its uses for ship propulsion, particularly in submarines, and for nuclear warheads it has multiplied the capabilities of naval vessels and the weapons they carry. In specific form, these are represented by the nuclear-armed ICBMs deployed on board the nuclear-powered submarines of five States. As stated earlier in this report, some 40 per cent of the combined United States and Soviet potential totals of strategic missiles are sea-borne. Together

[2] *The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea With Index and Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea* (U.N. publication, Sales No. E. 83. V. 5).

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with the strategic nuclear warheads distributed among the navies of the other three nuclear-weapon States, a significant proportion of the world's strategic nuclear capability is at sea, by far the largest part of it on board United States and Soviet SSBNs.

314. The threat to international security represented by these weapons, and the continuing development of improved SLBMs with enhanced guidance and greater accuracy, make even more urgent the need for successful bilateral and multilateral negotiations leading to effective measures of nuclear disarmament.

315. In addition to strategic nuclear forces, there are large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons at sea. This fact, coupled with ever-diminishing warning time within which a prospective target must react, imparts a particularly dangerous dimension to the arms race at sea. Whereas strategic missiles are carried by submarines of specific design and purpose, tactical nuclear weapons may be on board a wide variety of ships, submarines, aircraft or helicopters of the navies of the five nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, in the near future the situation will be made more complex by the arrival in operational service of versatile, comparatively inexpensive, highly accurate, sea-launched cruise missiles. These missiles, able to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads for use against naval or shore targets, will greatly complicate the difficulties of verification and therefore also the difficulties of negotiating effective measures of disarmament.

316. The proliferation of nuclear weapons at sea, particularly the aspect of the geographical dispersion of such weapons, will give rise to mounting concern, particularly among many non-nuclear-weapon States which in being States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [3] or otherwise have declared their intentions not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons themselves yet find that such policies have not stemmed the widening circles of nuclear-weapon deployments.

317. Rapid technological innovation and development, particularly in missiles and electronics, have greatly enhanced the war-fighting capabilities of navies, as described in some detail in chapter III. The navies of the United States and the Soviet Union in this respect are much more powerful than the navies of other States and have the capacity, not possessed by other navies, for prolonged operations in all the oceans of the world. At the same time, however, there are many asymmetries between the two navies, and between the naval forces of their allies, which do not render meaningful any efforts to make direct comparisons. These asymmetries include differing concepts of sea power, different geographical factors, different peacetime and wartime tasks, differing naval compositions in the nature of the vessels and aircraft that make up the respective fleets, and different policies towards national security within which the individual navies discharge their responsibilities. To an extent these asymmetries are also present

[3] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

in some of the world's coastal navies which, by means of technological advance, are in the process of acquiring a small but potent ability to carry out naval actions close to their own shores.

318. In discharging its mandate to assist the Secretary-General in carrying out a comprehensive study, the Group of Experts has endeavoured to present a survey of naval strengths and activities as they exist against a backcloth of the maritime situation as a whole. Navies have their legitimate parts to play in the exercise by States of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. However, the development of naval capabilities to carry out such duties has, in the geopolitical circumstances since 1945, become a competitive accumulation and qualitative refinement of arms with a momentum of its own. It is this aspect, as described earlier in this report, which constitutes the naval arms race. In turn, this is itself part of the general arms race described by the General Assembly in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session in 1978 [4] and which consumes unproductively so much of the world's human, financial and material resources.

319. Naval strength, which by some is seen as an essential guarantor of the protection of vital economic, political or security interests, is sometimes seen by others as a source of threat to international security or a means of potential intervention or interference in the internal affairs of States. The latter perceptions are particularly true for States that do not have strong naval forces of their own. In this context, as has been described in chapter VI, certain naval practices are considered to be inimical to the maintenance of international security and to be incompatible with the rights of those who have interests in the peaceful uses of the sea and the peaceful development and exploitation of its resources.

320. In the context of naval activities, the security régime at sea is based on three pillars of international law: the general restrictions on the use of force, customary law of the sea, and arms control and disarmament treaties agreed between States. The entry into force of the Convention on the Law of the Sea will give strong additional support to this structure. To give further support, the rules on the non-use of force should be strengthened; existing arms restrictions should be carefully maintained and new measures negotiated; and the early entry into force and full implementation of the Convention on the Law of the Sea should be encouraged.

321. As this century approaches its close, the need for improved and more effective internationally accepted ocean management policies will become ever more apparent. In no way must the widened national responsibilities that will be introduced by the entry into force of the Convention on the Law of the Sea be misused as justification for the expansion and utilization of naval force. Yet within a framework of improved international security, there is much that might be done by naval ships and aircraft to assist in the peaceful uses of the sea for the

[4] The text of the Final Document may be found *ibid., 1978*, pp. 411 ff.

benefit of humanity. There is also much that could be done by the experienced maritime States to assist in promoting such endeavours.

322. There are thus two basic objectives for action. The first is the achievement by negotiation of (a) effective measures of nuclear disarmament at sea in order to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved and (b) measures to achieve security and stability at significantly lower levels of conventional naval arms and armed forces. This objective is within the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process of achieving general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. It follows, therefore, that measures of naval arms limitation and reduction—both nuclear and conventional—must be considered in the overall context of halting and reversing the arms race in general, but this should not be an excuse for failing to address the resolution of specific problems of naval disarmament, or the agreement of measures of confidence-building in the naval environment, or negotiation of mutually acceptable measures to limit the transfers of certain naval arms or specific technologies. In these contexts, for instance, consideration should be given to making multilateral the existing bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas,[5] to continuing negotiations in good faith on further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed in accordance with article V of the Sea-Bed Treaty; [6] to giving full effect to the nuclear-weapon-free régime of the Antarctic Treaty [7] by applying it to the seas within its area of application (south of 60° south), and to modernizing the laws of sea warfare.

323. Chapter VII of the present report reflects a large number of measures that have been suggested in various recent publications, papers and governmental statements. The Group recommends that the measures should be given close attention with a view to discussion and negotiation as appropriate. As, however, their acceptability and priority will probably vary according to political judgments, the Group expresses no opinion other than to urge that the proposals involving measures of nuclear-weapon limitation and disarmament should be given priority.

324. The second objective should be the investigation of possible ways in which naval organization, capabilities and experience might make positive contributions to the establishment of improved and more effective ocean management policies for the peaceful uses of the world's seas in the years ahead, so that future generations may use to best advantage the resources of the sea for the benefit of all mankind. In the sense that security is not a narrow concept confined solely to the military situation but has a broader meaning embracing economic

[5] 23 UST 1168, TIAS 7379, 852 UNTS 151.
[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 7–11.
[7] *Ibid., 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550–1556.

and social development, there is much that might be achieved in the improvement of policies of ocean management which, in turn, could contribute to the promotion of social progress and to better standards of life in larger freedom.

325. It has been said that without development there will be no peace, and without peace there will be no development. Security in the maritime environment is therefore not just military in nature but includes such other facets as food security, resource security, job security and ocean management security. It has significant legal, political, military, organizational and practical implications. As described in earlier paragraphs, international discussion and co-operation are already in hand in several important technical fields in the form of such endeavours as the work of IMO and the establishment of the Strategy for Fisheries Management and Development through FAO. There are also some notable regional initiatives such as the recent Conference on Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-operation in the Indian Ocean held at Colombo from 15 to 20 July 1985 and the OAU Conference for Security and Co-operation in Africa in conformity with the Plan of Action of Lagos, held at Addis Ababa from 18 to 20 July 1985. The view has been expressed in the Group of Experts, however, that there may be considerable merit in holding, at an appropriate time, a global conference on the theme of "Security in the Maritime Environment" as a means of bringing together the disparate threads of these complex issues and determining what further steps might be taken by the international community.

326. With these two objectives in mind, the Group has in this study addressed a wide range of sensitive, complicated and often interrelated topics. Many issues deserve greater attention in the appropriate forums within and outside the United Nations, globally and—where appropriate—regionally and subregionally. It is the Group's hope that the considerations expressed in this report will be of assistance in such discussions.

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174. Statement by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy (Wagner) Before a Special Panel of the House Committee on Armed Services: Effects of a Nuclear Test Ban on National Security and Arms Control [Extracts], September 18, 1985 [1]

Madam Chairman and members of the panel, it is my pleasure to appear before you to discuss the Department of Defense's perceptions

[1] *Review of Arms Control and Disarmament Activities, 99th Congress, 1st Session: Hearings Before the Special Panel on Arms Control and Disarmament of the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee. . . .* [H.A.S.C. No. 99–18], pp. 75–81.

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of this country's nuclear weapons test program in the context of various treaties which could impact that program. I will particularly focus on the impact of a total ban on testing. Much of what I have to say today will be flavored by prior technical experience. Before being appointed to my present position in the Department of Defense, I was the associate director for testing at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and before that I was responsible for a major part of that laboratory's design program. But my thoughts go beyond that experience, specifically, there has been a growing confirmation on my part that if we, as a society, elect to remain free and at peace, we have no other alternative available to us at this but to maintain the effectiveness of our strategic and tactical nuclear deterrent. True, we are now undertaking research to examine the possibility of moving away from a deterrence posture based on the threat of nuclear retaliation toward a posture based on strategic defense. That course is being carefully investigated, and we hope it will eventually lead us to a world described by President Reagan as one secure from the menace of nuclear weapons—but we are not there yet. Until such time as we are, we must be exceedingly cautious that our actions, even our best intended actions, do not adversely impact our nuclear deterrent *vis-a-vis* the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union.

In looking at this issue, let me first review how nuclear testing fits into our national security posture and why, because of the need for caution, we must carefully scrutinize any ban on nuclear testing.

As it has for the last four decades, the security of the United States and its allies today depends upon our maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. Nuclear testing assures the credibility of this deterrent, permitting us to modernize in response to new challenges, and to maintain the reliability of those weapons already stockpiled. I should add that we have had to sustain this deterrence in the face of the unprecedented and unilateral Soviet buildup of nuclear weapons particularly over the last fifteen years.

Testing is indispensable to the nuclear weapons development process. It is the means by which we insure that the warheads and weapon systems are safe and secure, that they are reliable and effective, that they could, if required, perform their military missions with as little collateral damage as possible and, perhaps most important for the stability of deterrence, that the weapons systems themselves are survivable. Let me treat each of these contributions briefly in turn.

In the democracies, there is, and must always be, a special relationship of trust between our people and those who are responsible for developing and maintaining these weapons. To honor this trust, we must insure that nuclear weapons are safe, secure, and controlled. With us, this is not a matter of cost trade-offs or of stopping at some point deemed "safe enough." Rather, nuclear weapon safety must be absolute. As the requirements of deterrence change, and as the characteristics of the systems of which nuclear warheads are a part change, this requirement for safety remains immutable, but the highest stand-

ards of safety and security cannot be assured without nuclear testing. While reasons of classification preclude my being more specific in an open forum, a substantial portion of our testing program since 1962 had gone toward enhancing the safety and security of nuclear weapons. The fact is that many of the most effective safety features which we have incorporated into our nuclear weapons today probably would not be there had we not been able to test.

As to weapon effectiveness, one aspect—certainty in the reliability of the warheads—warrants some elaboration. Testing is vital for establishing and maintaining confidence in the operability and reliability of nuclear weapons, just as realistic testing is essential for aircraft, radars, or any other complicated equipment. Few thinking persons would suggest that we build a strategic bomber which we would not fly until the Klaxon sounded. Yet, a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) would preclude the testing of the nuclear weapon that bomber and its crew might be called on to deliver. I hope the proponents of a CTBT realize the import of this inconsistency. Of course, some would contend that we could determine the operational parameters of nuclear weapons through computer simulations and component testing. The same could be said for bombers, but hard experience—recent hard experience—has shown us that calculations do not suffice; and even though we have made enormous strides in simulation testing, the fact remains that there is no way to experimentally simulate the total performance of a nuclear weapon. This observation is especially the case for us where dimensional and weight constraints and our concerns for safety and security have forced us to employ more complex and sophisticated designs. Thus, nuclear testing contributes directly to our confidence in the reliability and operability of our nuclear deterrent. Confidence, in turn, goes to the very heart of stability.

Similarly, a substantial fraction of our development effort has sought to reduce the potential for collateral damage—that is, damage not needed to secure deterrence. Reducing potential collateral damage, if deterrence were to fail, is not only a moral imperative; it also has a direct relationship to deterrence. A deterrent posture would be less credible in a crisis situation if an adversary thought we might not retaliate because of the consequences of excessive destruction. Nuclear testing is vital to this line of development as well. Indeed, nuclear testing was an important tool which permitted us to reduce the total megatonnage of our stockpile by over three-fourths since 1960.

With regard to survivability, it is a central tenet of our understanding of deterrence that nuclear weapons systems must not present easy targets for enemy attack, otherwise they would create incentives, particularly in a crisis situation when deterrence would be most stressed, for the enemy to capitalize on such vulnerabilities. Nuclear testing contributes to survivability—and crisis stability—in two ways. The first is by developing warheads with characteristics which allow the systems of which they are a part to be more survivable. For example, if the warhead can be made smaller the entire delivery system can be

made smaller and, therefore, rendered more difficult to locate, more easily hardened, or given extended range. The other way in which nuclear testing contributes to survivability is by exploring the complex effects of nuclear weapons so as to insure that our systems and their basing modes do not have unanticipated or hidden flaws. Although these system-hardening and effects tests are not much discussed and constitute a minor portion of our total test program, they are absolutely essential for survivability and, thus, are vital for deterrence.

Therefore, it is by its contributions to safety, effectiveness, collateral damage reductions, and survivability that nuclear testing is essential to our national security interest. As long as we are obliged to rely on retaliatory nuclear capabilities to secure deterrence, nuclear testing and a strong deterrent posture will remain inseparable. Consequently, even if verification were not a concern—and it is—under present circumstances, a total test ban would not serve our national security interests.

Not only would a CTBT be contrary to national security interests, a total ban on the testing of nuclear weapons at this time would not serve the interest of arms control. As I have indicated, a comprehensive test ban would degrade the security of the United States and, thus, international stability. Without nuclear testing, the credibility of our nuclear deterrent would erode, as would our confidence in the reliability of the nuclear stockpile and in our nuclear technology base. This latter aspect would include a diminution of the expertise of nuclear weapon designers and engineers. While we cannot predict or measure the exact rate of this erosion, we are certain that it would occur.

It is sometimes wrongly argued that, absent testing to maintain confidence in reliability, nuclear weapons systems would lose their utility and would, in some undefined way, wither away. This belief may make a nice theory, but in the real world what would happen is that both sides would compensate for worst-case estimates of unreliability by using higher yields and deploying more warheads. Indeed, such pressures could be damaging to arms control efforts to reduce force levels—efforts that are much more important than any putative benefits of a test ban. Moreover, any decreased warhead reliability would carry us in the wrong direction as far as stability is concerned. Relying on uncertainty to accomplish nuclear disarmament, and especially on symmetry or uncertainty, is literally rolling dice for the future of the world.

A comprehensive test ban treaty, therefore, at best would be only an indirect, ineffective approach to achieve reductions and eventual elimination of United States and Soviet nuclear weapons. At its worst, such a treaty would be destabilizing and would increase the very forces which have historically caused arms building—insecurity and doubts as to the effectiveness of extant weapon systems.

Potential erosion of nuclear capability would not necessarily occur symmetrically, and we would not even be able to gauge any resulting disparity. In contrast, given our open society, the Soviets would prob-

ably come to know about problems we might have. Furthermore, since the Soviets are believed to be more conservative in their designs than the United States, the Soviet stockpile could be more durable in a no-test environment. Certainly their missile throw-weight advantage would enable them to fall back on heavier, even more conservative designs, which generally should be more reliable and durable during a complete ban on testing.

Of course, asymmetries disadvantageous to the United States could also develop if the Soviet Union covertly violated the test ban. While we cannot predict future Soviet behavior, the Soviet record of non-compliance with arms control agreements increases our concern in this regard. The Soviet Union certainly would be tempted to do whatever it deemed necessary to maintain the reliability of its nuclear forces, arms control obligations notwithstanding.

At a time when the temptation to violate a CTBT could be the strongest, the United States would not be able to verify compliance effectively because of the limitations in the capabilities of our national technical means. This would be true particularly if the Soviets (or others) actively took steps to evade surveillance. The Soviet Union could conduct clandestine tests to maintain the credibility of their nuclear forces, design some new nuclear weapons, and maintain the skills of their weapons designers. In our own experience, we have seen that even one low-yield test could mean the difference between having a reliable weapon in the stockpile and not having that weapon.

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Of course, these covert methods are hypotheses although the Soviets have already at least experimented with partially decoupled tests. But one fact is certain, the nature of the Soviet system would permit the Soviet Union to keep its most skilled technical people in the weapons program and to keep their skills finely tuned—possibly through clandestine testing. In addition, their centralized economy would facilitate efforts to maintain a vigorous nuclear weapons program. By contrast, as we learned during the 1958–61 moratorium on nuclear testing, U.S. weapon designers, engineers, and testing personnel will leave the weapons program for more challenging fields. The loss of these people, who would comprise the corporate body of U.S. test experience, will prevent the United States from promptly resuming nuclear testing in the face of a Soviet breakout. Perhaps more serious, correcting stockpile problems which will surely occur will be precluded, leading to an erosion in our confidence in our nuclear deterrent stockpile.

Proponents of a test ban often argue that, with adequate verification, the Soviets would also be forced to give up technical improvements. But an important reason why a further extension of the test ban regime at this time would not be in the U.S. national interest is that we almost certainly rely considerably more on nuclear warhead

design for achievement of our national security objectives than does the Soviet Union. Let me amplify on this point, because I believe it is important.

The United States relies on a great variety of technologies to achieve our national security objectives. These include such things as missile guidance accuracy, submarine quieting, satellite surveillance, communications, and many more. Of course, the technology of nuclear warhead design would be included also. A similar list exists for the Soviet Union, also including the technology of nuclear warhead design. But it is obvious that for various reasons the United States and the Soviet Union put different emphasis on these technologies, and I believe the United States relies more on the contributions of warhead technology than does the Soviet Union.

For example, the United States has standards of safety for our nuclear weapons which are almost certainly higher than those required by the Soviet Union. We have, and no doubt the Soviets also have, highly effective means to preclude a nuclear explosion in any accident involving a nuclear weapon. But for us, there is a great deal more to nuclear warhead safety than preventing accidental explosions. We go to great lengths in warhead design to preclude even dispersal of radioactive material in an accident. The hazard from such dispersal would be moderate but, by the standards of our society, totally unacceptable. Similarly, we stringently limit the already low levels of radiation emitted by the warhead to ensure minimum possible radiation exposure to troops maintaining and transporting the weapons in peacetime. By contrast, everything we know about safety practices in the Soviet Union, and there is a lot of evidence, says that they would simply not be concerned about such things, and would not feel compelled to develop warhead designs incorporating those features.

Similar asymmetry exists with regard to the security and control of nuclear warheads. The United States and, no doubt, the Soviets as well, have highly effective means to prevent unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons by those who have legitimate custody of the weapons. But partly because of the open nature of democratic societies, we go to even greater lengths to build features into our warheads to protect against actions of outsiders—including terrorists. In contrast, the Soviets almost certainly can rely much more on their rigid controls over their populace, and on controls external to the warheads, rather than having to rely on features of the warhead design itself.

A striking asymmetry is also evident in the extent to which the two nations need to maximize the yields for a given warhead weight, or to miniaturize the warheads at a given yield. For decades now the Soviet Union has had an extensive program to harden and disperse its national security assets, including not only its weapons and military forces, but its military-related industries and its leadership as well. We have only recently come to understand the remarkable extent of this program. In contrast, most locations in the United States which the Soviets might target are soft—with the exception of our missile silos

and a few other sites—and the locations of these facilities are well known to the Soviets. Since they have not achieved nearly the same delivery accuracies as ours, and since their missile throwweight is much greater, the Soviet Union almost certainly does not need to optimize the yield-to-weight ratio of its warheads to the same extent that the United States does—even for the smaller warheads that are now entering their inventory.

In a classified discussion I could add many other examples of how differences in the strategic objectives, delivery systems, and political perspectives of our two societies have led us to rely more heavily on advanced warhead designs. However, one final point relating to asymmetries is that, on the average, our warheads must now be much older than those in the Soviet stockpile. This observation is basically due to how our two stockpiles evolved. The Soviets began large quantity production later than the United States and, in the last decade, they have had a much more aggressive system modernization program than we have had. Together these facts mean that their stockpile surely contains more recent technology and hardware than does ours. In turn, a more current arsenal would be an advantage to them with regard to unreliability which might creep into static untested stockpiles due to aging.

All of this means, then, that even if effectively verified, a comprehensive test ban would not be in the national security interests of the United States. To whatever extent Soviet proposals for further limitation of nuclear testing may be serious and genuine, rather than only political or propaganda purposes, it is because of these asymmetries in the needs of the two nations that further limitations of testing would be advantageous to the Soviet Union.

Because of these potential asymmetries and uncertainties, a comprehensive test ban would increase the very instabilities in the strategic balance that we are trying to eliminate, partly through arms control. This eventually is the reason we believe that negotiations on direct arms reductions are the most important item on the arms control agenda. Only carefully planned, programmed, and verifiable arms reductions offer the possibility of increased stability and reduced risks of nuclear war. Indirect means are potentially disastrous.

President Reagan has consistently advocated, and is now pursuing in the negotiations in Geneva, deep reductions in the levels of nuclear weapons in the world. It is this administration's view that deterrence can and should be maintained with much smaller numbers of weapons on both sides, provided those reductions are equitable, verifiable, and contribute to stability. Secretary Gorbachev has also mentioned the possibility that the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States could be reduced. To date, these proposals, made to the press and various U.S. delegations, have not been forthcoming at Geneva.

But we believe that the President's persistence in this area could start a process leading eventually to less reliance on those factors

which nuclear testing contributes to deterrence. It must be said, however, that when and if that time comes and the test-ban regime can be safely extended, requirements for certainty of compliance may be even more stringent, because at lower force levels, evasive testing could provide greater leverage.

As the ultimate guarantor of Western security, the United States must be concerned with both the security dimension of test bans and the verification dimension. We are working on many fronts, in bilateral and multilateral fora, to create security conditions under which an expansion of the test-ban regime would enhance rather than diminish stability. We trust that everyone genuinely interested in stable security at lower levels of all armaments will support the President's efforts.

Now I would like to speak about a CTBT in the context of our efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear arms since it is frequently asserted—I believe wrongly so—that a total test ban is essential to our nonproliferation objectives. However, when this assertion has been subjected to the same critical analysis as other arguments supportive of a test ban, it too goes wanting.

Frankly, it is difficult to see how a nuclear test ban could guarantee that the non-nuclear weapon states would foreswear the acquisition of nuclear weapons. A given country's quest to become a nuclear weapon state is governed by two principal factors. First, the country must have a desire to develop a nuclear explosive capability. Second, once having decided to develop a nuclear option, the country must have access to technologies and materials necessary for the fabrication of a nuclear device. The first factor is likely to represent a complex mixture of external threats, irrational phobias, national pride, and perhaps even outright scientific curiosity. In any case, in a frenzied world, splintered by contrived and ancient animosities, impetus for the first factor seldom goes wanting. But, nuclear testing by the United States or the Soviet Union, for that matter, adds little or nothing to either factor.

Ironically, a nuclear test ban in some ways could actually encourage proliferation. For example, if a nation now under the protection of U.S. nuclear guarantees lost confidence in U.S. nuclear capability, it might well decide that its security interests required the acquisition of an indigenous nuclear force.

Moreover, we need to remember that a potential proliferator, who chooses to be bound by a test ban, could still produce unsophisticated nuclear weapons without testing. Such an untested weapon could have a significant military impact in regional conflicts even though there would be some uncertainty in the yield and performance of such a weapon. It is worth noting that even in 1945 when nuclear technology was still in its infancy, the United States did not need a preliminary test of the first nuclear weapon used in war.

I will now devote some discussion to the still unratified Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties. In 1976, the United States and the Soviet Union each stated its intention to observe the

150-kiloton threshold set by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) [2] and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET),[3] and on several occasions since then, reaffirmed that commitment. Neither side has expressed an intention not to ratify the twin accords. Therefore, each side has an obligation under international law to observe the 150-kiloton threshold. The United States has done so; it is likely that the Soviet Union has not.

Several Soviet tests since 1976 had yields estimated by the United States to be above 150 kilotons. However, large uncertainties in our estimates have prevented us from determining conclusively whether the Soviet Union is, in fact, violating the 150-kiloton limit. As stated by the President in his January 1984 [4] and February 1985 [5] reports to Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, while available evidence remains ambiguous and we have been unable to reach a definite conclusion, available evidence indicates that a number of Soviet nuclear tests likely exceeded the TTBT 150-kiloton threshold.

Unfortunately, the United States cannot, at present, effectively verify the TTBT and the PNET because of these large uncertainties in our capability to estimate Soviet nuclear test yields. Although the TTBT protocol calls for data exchanges upon ratification, intended to reduce these uncertainties, the exchanges are not considered to be an effective aid to verification, because the data are too limited and no provision is included for their independent validation.

The provisions of the PNET protocol do provide for direct on-site yield measurements, and these provisions are often called precedent-setting. In reality they are essentially meaningless. Measurements of Soviet peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) by U.S. personnel would require Soviet approval for any explosion with a planned aggregate yield exceeding 100 kilotons but not exceeding 150 kilotons. Direct measurements become mandatory only for a group of simultaneous explosions with a planned aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons up to the limit of 1500 kilotons. Since Soviet agreement to mandatory on-site inspections (OSIs) in this instance is so contrary to their traditional opposition to mandatory OSIs, it is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union ever forsaw a need for PNEs with yields over 150 kilotons so the provisions for OSIs will likely never be exercised. In fact, according to current yield estimates, it is unlikely that any Soviet PNEs since 1976 had yields high enough to have required mandatory yield measurements by U.S. personnel even if the Treaty had been ratified.

As I indicated, our experience in attempting to verify Soviet compliance with the 150-kiloton threshold of the TTBT using seismic methods has offered a pointed illustration of the limitations inherent in the

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[2] For the text of the Treaty and its Protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–229.
[3] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.
[4] *Ibid., 1984*, pp. 33–39.
[5] Document 12.

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seismic technique. These difficulties have convinced us that seismic methods, while important, must be augmented by nonseismic methods to verify compliance with test bans in general.

One factor which limits the usefulness of seismic methods is that seismic data on any one test have such large associated uncertainties that compliance judgments must be based on statistical analyses of seismic data and other information accumulated from tests over months, even years. Thus, today, seismic data lacks the specificity and immediacy which are so important in the real-world process of forming, and then acting on, judgments about compliance. For this reason, better means for verifying compliance with the TTBT must be found.

We have invited the Soviets on several occasions to work with us to achieve such improvements, but to date, they have not accepted any of our invitations. In this regard, the President made a proposal in the United Nations on September 24, 1984, for the two sides to find a way to exchange experts at one another's test sites to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests.[6] In addition, on July 29, 1985, we invited the Soviets to come to our test site, bring any equipment they deemed necessary to verify nuclear test yields, and make the measurements necessary to determine the yield of one of our tests.[7] However, they have reacted negatively to these proposals. This response is unfortunate since direct yield measurements would have significantly lower uncertainties for both parties.

Looking further into the future, this need for statistical interpretation of seismic data, which undercuts its utility in TTBT verification, may also be a weakness that is a more general concern. While it is true that the particular problems which will be associated with possible future test-ban regimes cannot be fully anticipated, we do know some of them, and it is clear that greatly improved verification methods will be essential. We have not yet arrived at the requisite point of capability and understanding. Therefore, it is important to continue to improve our research base from which to derive improved verification techniques, both seismic and direct, for the current TTBT and a possible test-ban regime in the future.

In conclusion, while the world we face is complex and rapidly changing, the ultimate goal of American defense remains constant: To preserve the peace and maintain our freedoms. To achieve those goals, our nuclear arsenal must be of adequate strength and dependability to dissuade the Soviet Union from attacking our Nation and its allies. The cost of aggression must always exceed the benefits the aggressor seeks to accomplish. Because our arsenal and resolve have been adequate for 40 years, the tremendous military potential of the Soviet Union has been held in virtual check—no nuclear weapons have been fired in anger, and we are still a free people. By any measure, deterrence has been successful. Thus, we must carefully evaluate any action

[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, p. 692.
[7] Document 125.

which could undercut this demonstrated success. For the reasons I have stated, we feel that a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons is one such action which could lead to greater instabilities and would, therefore, not serve the interests of deterrence or of world peace. The peace sought so genuinely and earnestly by the proponents of a CTBT would be more in jeopardy, not less.

That concludes my formal testimony, and I would be happy to answer questions.

175. Statement by the Assistant Director, Geophysical Science Division, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Alewine) Before a Special Panel of the House Committee on Armed Services: Verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban, September 18, 1985 [1]

I would like to begin by thanking you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the status of Department of Defense research and development activities to improve national capabilities to detect, identify, and determine characteristics of foreign nuclear explosions. Within the DoD, the responsibility for these research and development activities has been assigned to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). DARPA's charter includes responsibility for basic research and development to solve fundamental problems of nuclear test monitoring, as well as providing scientific support to U.S. arms control activities. The objective of these latter activities is (1) to develop improved methods for monitoring current nuclear test limitation agreements; (2) to develop new technical verification options for consideration by U.S. policymakers in future agreements; and (3) to provide technical support for ongoing negotiations such as was the case in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty [2] and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty [3] in the mid-1970's, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations in 1977 through 1980. More recently, DARPA has been providing technical support and expertise for the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in their discussions and activities related to nuclear test issues.

My statement today concerns the status of technology for verifying compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty. The principal scientific tools for monitoring nuclear test ban treaties are seismic networks, surveillance satellites, sampling of radioactive debris and on-site inspections and measurements. The DoD has conducted research into all of these

[1] *Review of Arms Control and Disarmament Activities, 99th Congress, 1st Session: Hearings Before the Special Panel on Arms Control and Disarmament of the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee. . . .* [H.A.S.C. No. 99–18], pp. 99–109.

[2] For the text of the Treaty and its Protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–229.

[3] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.

areas, but today I will confine my remarks to our program in seismic monitoring.

In recent years, the emphasis of verification research has been on improving the capability to detect and identify underground nuclear tests and on determining their yields. Currently, seismological methods are the primary means for the detection of such tests and the determination of yield. Other remote sensing means are likely to play a critical role by providing corroborating evidence of a treaty violation. Therefore, it will be necessary to verify compliance in all environments: that is, in the atmosphere, in space, and in the oceans. Unlike underground nuclear tests, there is the additional problem of unambiguously attributing a detected nuclear explosion to the responsible nation.

A key point that I would like to leave with you today is that the verification of any nuclear test limitation agreement must be based on solid technical grounds. From a monitoring perspective, it is especially important that this technical foundation be established either before or concurrent with consideration of such agreements. Developing the foundations for verification technology *ex post facto* can lead to serious difficulties.

As a case in point, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty was negotiated with the Soviet Union in 1974 and set a 150-kiloton limit on the maximum size of underground nuclear explosions. Some provisions were made in the protocols of the treaty for the exchange of geophysical data and yields of two calibration explosions to aid in the monitoring of this treaty. Since the only practical way to estimate the yield of Soviet underground nuclear tests at that time were seismological techniques, it fell to this method to serve as the primary monitoring tool. Prior to this time, U.S. policy was aimed at seeking a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and, therefore, research on developing the methodology to achieve the level of yield accuracy required was a relatively neglected area. As a result, the research base was insufficient to anticipate the yield estimation problems which subsequently have arisen with monitoring this treaty.

As a result of an intensive research effort, the technology and scientific basis for monitoring the Threshold Test Ban Treaty has advanced considerably since the time the treaty was negotiated. Our understanding about the processes which affect yield estimation has increased and additional measurement techniques have been developed which can be used for on-site verification of the yields. Improvements to our monitoring techniques have been made and are continuing. However, these unilateral improvements to the current methods are inherently limited by the lack of sufficiently complete and reliable geophysical and other information concerning the Soviet nuclear test sites. If the uncertainties in our yield estimates are to be significantly reduced, more direct information is needed than is currently available, or is specified for exchange in the current treaty protocols.

The Soviets and others have suggested that adequate verification of this treaty will result from the exchange of the data called for when the treaty is ratified. Unfortunately, these data will be of limited use unless they can be independently verified. Even if these data were verified, they would not provide the required yield accuracies for other large tests.

In the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) talks of 1977 through 1980, the discussions focused on three verification measures which would be placed into operation to supplement the national technical means of each country. These were:

—a network of seismic stations and arrays in the U.S., the U.K., and in the Soviet Union, specifically designed for treaty monitoring purposes;
—a system of International Seismic Data Exchange which would draw upon the work of the Conference on Disarmament; and,
—a provision for limited on-site inspections.

Since the CTBT talks were suspended, research has continued to develop the technology base in each of these three general areas. Most of the recent efforts in on-site inspection technology have been undertaken by the Department of Energy national laboratories and will not be discussed in this statement.

In a comprehensive or very low yield test ban situation, as we shall see, there would be inherent risks in relying on seismological techniques to provide definitive evidence of a concealed underground nuclear explosion. It must be emphasized that seismological methods, by themselves, may not be able to provide sufficiently conclusive evidence of a carefully concealed nuclear test. However, the seismological data can be used very effectively to quickly detect and locate suspicious events so that other verification methods can be focused on them.

The fundamental technical basis for monitoring underground nuclear explosions has not changed dramatically over the past decade. The concepts underlying the detection and identification of explosions and the techniques which can be used to attempt to evade detection and identification remain generally as they were described in some detail in the mid-1970's. However, there have been some important changes in capability resulting from steady progress in our research program in geophysics and explosion seismology. We now have a more complete understanding of the nature of explosions and earthquakes as sources of seismic signals, as well as the effect of the earth's structure on the propagation of these signals.

Most of the research emphasis before 1980 was on methods for detecting, identifying, and characterizing explosions from seismic signals collected at long ranges. These are primarily the signals which we can record with existing national technical means (NTM) based on seismic stations outside the USSR. With agreement in principle to establish seismic stations on U.S., U.K., and Soviet territory, research

has been redirected toward methods based on the use of data collected at regional distances (that is less than 2,000 km) from events of interest. Signals from these shorter distances turn out to be much more complicated than those from the longer ranges, but they can be exploited for the detection of much smaller events. It is these complicated signals that we must use from stations inside the Soviet Union under a nuclear test ban treaty. One of the key topics for research is development of robust techniques to identify explosion-like events using these regional signals. Since the character of these signals depends on each specific region, this research is handicapped by the lack of adequate data from the Soviet Union.

The most dramatic improvements in seismic monitoring capability have been in two major areas: (1) data collection capabilities, that is, improved seismic instrumentation, electronics, and high dynamic range digital data recording; and (2) development and implementation of automated and more powerful data processing techniques. In reviewing this progress, a highlight is the development of ultra-sensitive seismometers with extremely great resolution and low noise electronics.

The shift to high quality digital data collection has made it possible to automate much of the data processing, and therefore to handle the large volumes of data that will be required with consistent procedures. The capability for automated processing and data analysis is still at a relatively early stage of development, but is being improved and demonstrated at a DARPA research facility in Arlington, Va.

This promising new technology is being exploited as quickly as possible. The improved sensors have been incorporated by the Department of Energy into engineering prototypes of seismic stations which could be used inside the Soviet Union or elsewhere. A network of these stations have been deployed in the U.S. and Canada for test and evaluation purposes. The digital data from these stations are broadcast directly by satellite to the DARPA Center, where they are used to test the automated data handling methods under development. The ability to handle the data from a network of stations inside the Soviet Union is reasonably advanced. In addition, this development is providing a thorough evaluation of the prototype seismic sensor systems.

Under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) work has continued on the development of methods for "International Seismic Data Exchange." The concept is to collect, organize, and make available seismic data voluntarily submitted by existing seismic stations at many locations around the world. These data could be used by countries that do not possess sophisticated National Technical Means to monitor for major treaty infractions, and they could supplement U.S. monitoring systems in certain remote areas. With the support of the DOD research program, the U.S. has been very active in the development, specification, and testing of procedures that could be used for these purposes. We have undertaken a number of technical initiatives within the CD to improve the overall global monitoring

capabilities and to introduce advanced technical methods into the proposed international system. With the firm backing of the U.S., the CD undertook last fall a two-month test of elements of the proposed system. Altogether, more than 37 countries took part, contributing data from almost 80 globally distributed seismic stations. Prototypes of International Data Centers were established in Washington, Stockholm, and Moscow to receive and analyze data from the network and to distribute the results to all participants. The Washington International Data Center used the facilities of the DARPA research center and made extensive use of the automated data acquisition and processing methods developed for monitoring purposes. An evaluation of this test is now underway by the CD, but it is clear that a number of deficiencies must be corrected and the overall technology upgraded before such a system can play a meaningful role in a nuclear test ban situation.

During this international data exchange experiment, a number of nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union, French Polynesia, and the U.S. were detected and reported by participating stations, and locations and magnitudes were determined by the Washington and Stockholm data centers. However, the Soviet Union limited its participation to a single seismic station and, contrary to the agreed procedures, withheld data from all Soviet nuclear tests. Such actions reinforce the long-held U.S. position that any verification arrangement for seismic installations inside the Soviet Union must have the provision for direct access to the data produced by those stations.

It has been known for some time that special measures might have to be employed to achieve effective monitoring in the Kurile-Kamchatka area of the Soviet Union. This is an area of concentrated military activities, as well as high seismic activity, and thus an area where evasion must be considered a possibility. One promising approach for improving the monitoring capabilities in this area was to implant seismic sensors deep beneath the sea bed in international waters in the northwest Pacific. The technology in instrumentation, marine engineering, and deep sea drilling has only recently been developed to a point where such a challenging project could be undertaken. An experiment was successfully conducted, using the drill ship *Glomar Challenger* to implant the sensors and recording systems, to demonstrate that effective monitoring data could be obtained from carefully chosen sites in the deep ocean. The results of this experiment open large new areas of the world, previously considered inaccessible, to installation of high quality monitoring stations.

A highly promising development in the research program has been the design and testing of a prototype advanced seismic array. This new array, called Noress, offers the potential of providing much greater sensitivity for signal detection than any existing station. It also provides valuable information to help locate events. The superiority of such installations for the detection and identification of low-magnitude events in a test ban context is evident. After several years of

design and experimentation in cooperation with scientists in Norway, the prototype Noress array began operation in a research mode earlier this year in southern Norway, an area which is thought to be geologically similar to the western part of the USSR. This seismic research station, which is the most advanced in the world, has been specially designed to detect and locate signals of higher frequency which propagate in the regional distance range. Initial indications are that Noress can achieve about an order of magnitude improvement in signal detection capabilities in the regional range of interest. A very preliminary analysis indicates that the regional array has a detection threshold in the 2.5 to 3.0 magnitude range for certain regional paths extending into the Soviet Union. A full evaluation and exploitation of these results is underway.

Within the past decade, the research program has included a major effort to maintain and improve the global seismic monitoring capabilities and to provide a high quality data base for research and technique development. Eighteen advanced seismic observatories have been installed around the globe and other existing stations equipped with improved digital equipment. In addition, we have supported several international cooperative efforts to improve the available global data base for research purposes, including efforts with Australia and the People's Republic of China.

One major objective of the research efforts discussed thus far has been to reduce the threshold for signal detection to as low a level as possible. This is the area in which the research program has been most successful. For example, if the verification objective is to detect all nuclear tests as small as one kiloton or more, it now appears that a detection threshold of about magnitude 2.5 is required. At the present time, we have insufficient information about the geophysical characteristics of the Soviet Union to determine with any certainty the exact number and placement of seismic monitoring installations which would be necessary to achieve such a monitoring goal. Only rough estimates, based on imprecise assumptions, can be made.

In any case, a requirement for monitoring large portions of the entire Soviet Union at this level would be a formidable task in data processing and analysis because of the very large number of natural events of this size which occur. At the present time in our research program, the capability developed to detect small events has far exceeded our capability to differentiate small, or muffled, nuclear explosions from natural seismic events. This is especially true, when only the complex data from regional distances are available. It has been estimated that, based on the technology available today, at least 1,000 natural seismic events per year at the one kiloton monitoring level would require special attention and analysis. With the current capability to discriminate between nuclear explosions and earthquakes, a significant fraction could not be confidently identified as non-nuclear. Some of these would actually be earthquakes that have seismic char-

acteristics that do not easily distinguish themselves from explosions, and some would be chemical explosions.

Chemical explosions pose an especially difficult problem for a low yield nuclear test ban treaty. A large number of them are routinely conducted for civil and engineering purposes. In fact, there are occasional chemical explosions with yields of several kilotons or more. Current seismic verification capabilities are not adequate to distinguish between chemical and low yield nuclear explosions, or to provide the assurance that a *bona fide* chemical explosion is not disguising a nuclear test. Barring some unforeseen technical breakthrough, some alternative provisions will be required to deal with this problem.

A signatory to a nuclear test ban who is determined to conduct clandestine nuclear tests could attempt to do so in any environment—in space, in the atmosphere, in the ocean, or underground. The safest way to attempt clandestine underground testing is to design the test to produce seismic signals which are below the detection capability of the monitoring network. The most effective way to reduce seismic signals is to conduct the nuclear explosion in a large underground cavity (cavity decoupling). Large cavities, which can be used to reduce the signals of militarily significant yields, are not uncommon and can be constructed most easily in areas of underground salt deposits. Such areas are quite extensive in the Soviet Union. Cavities of the volume required for such tests exist, although all may not have the optimum shape for decoupling. In the United States they are used for storing petroleum reserves. Foiling such an evasion attempt requires a very sensitive monitoring network which is reliably deployed. This threat is the primary reason for the need for high quality stations and arrays inside the Soviet Union.

The U.S. has long recognized the threat imposed by the cavity decoupling method and has fully taken this into account in our monitoring capability estimates. However, it must be said that the current understanding of the seismic effects of cavity decoupling is incomplete and is based on a relatively sparse set of experiments. Inconsistencies remain between actual experience and theoretical possibilities. A full-scale feasibility test of this concept was conducted a number of years ago using a small nuclear explosion, and data from this experiment have been supplemented with laboratory and numerical models and other theoretical work.

There are indications from this experience and from theory that the cavity decoupling evasion method loses its effectiveness at frequencies higher than those now normally used for signal detection. Thus, if these high frequencies can propagate efficiently over certain paths, it may be possible to reduce the effectiveness of this evasion scheme in some circumstances. Several years ago, we discovered through our research program that seismic energy does propagate very efficiently across the western portion of the Soviet Union, at least when the signals do not cross major geological boundaries. Stations deployed inside the Soviet Union could presumably take advantage of this. We

are now collecting and evaluating such high frequency data from events originating in the Soviet Union to determine the propagation characteristics of very high frequency signals such as might leak out of a cavity-decoupled explosion. Much is left to be learned about this.

It is known that the Soviets have conducted a number of nuclear tests in areas where cavity decoupling is possible. They certainly have information on the propagation of high frequency energy in these regions. Such information, if available to the U.S. research program, would greatly reduce our uncertainties about the effectiveness of this evasion possibility and contribute to a better understanding of our verification capabilities.

A substantial number of high quality stations and arrays within the Soviet Union is necessary for effective counter evasion. Without these stations, evasion of the nuclear test ban would be relatively easy and with decoupling could involve explosions with fairly large yields, i.e., more stations and arrays, evasion would not be impossible, but it would be much more difficult, complex, and expensive, especially for yields greater than a few kilotons.

One should bear in mind that no realistic seismic verification system will be able to monitor a zero yield test ban with 100% certainty. We also must realize that seismic evidence by itself cannot provide all of the stringent data that will be required to ensure compliance. Other methods must supplement this system. A realistic goal for our research program has been to provide the technology to deter cheating by maintaining a high probability of detecting and identifying nuclear tests of militarily significant yields. It is important that any verification measure be viable and contribute to confidence building by minimizing the number of natural earthquakes and man-made non-nuclear events (for example chemical explosions) that could be mistaken for nuclear explosions.

A comprehensive test ban would be, from a monitoring point of view, a low-yield threshold treaty with a vague and undefined threshold. Consideration of an explicitly defined low-yield threshold test ban rather than a comprehensive test ban presents a different set of verification problems. As we have found out in monitoring the current 150-kiloton limitation on testing, the precise determination of yield is a very complex undertaking which requires considerable information about the geophysical conditions near the explosion site. As the yield limit becomes smaller, the range of possible variation in emitted seismic signals grows larger. Direct determination of yield by measuring the hydrodynamic shock front can provide a relatively precise yield estimate for underground tests. This method could also provide a seismic calibration for small geophysically homogeneous sites and thus reduce the uncertainties of the seismically determined yield estimates of other tests. Such measures were discussed in the PNET negotiations and more recently by President Reagan as a means for improving the verification of the current 150-kiloton limit on testing.

In summary, the Department of Defense has been conducting a vigorous research and development program to improve nuclear test ban verification capabilities. Significant improvements to our monitoring capabilities have been made through the research and development effort and they are continuing. Technology is being developed and improved both for existing monitoring resources and for potential systems whose installation in the Soviet Union must be negotiated. If successfully negotiated, the installation of a number of high quality tamper-resistant seismic stations and arrays in the Soviet Union would significantly lower the verification threshold of a nuclear test ban treaty. The amount of improvement depends on the number and siting of the installations, on the actual geophysical conditions within the USSR, and other factors. At the present time, the research efforts are handicapped by the lack of adequate geophysical and seismological data from key regions in Eurasia. Any action to make such data available would provide a major contribution to the effort to improve our seismic monitoring capabilities.

As technical experts, it is our role to realistically portray the capability and limitations to monitor compliance with proposed nuclear test limitation agreements. This is crucial for assessing the risks. There are problems detecting and, especially, identifying underground nuclear tests, particularly if they are carefully designed for evasion. Until these problems are solved, they will present a degree of risk. The potential for deliberate evasion must be balanced with stringent verification measures to reduce these risks, which should not be understated. These are the key problems to which our research efforts are directed.

Any consideration of a nuclear test ban proposal must carefully weigh the inherent limitations imposed on the monitoring capabilities. However, the final decision must rest on the determination of whether or not such a proposal is in our national interest. Mr. Perle and Dr. Wagner have already spoken to this issue.

176. Statement by Brazilian President Sarney to a Commission Appointed To Evaluate Brazil's Nuclear Program: Brazilian Nuclear Policy, September 19, 1985 [1]

Brazil wants to be definitely committed to development, social peace, and progress. Upon taking up duties as members of this Commission, formed by distinguished representatives of the various segments in our society, I reaffirm the unbreakable commitment of our country to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

We want nuclear energy for health, agriculture, and industrial use, in light of the present economic and social situation and of the neces-

[1] ACDA files.

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sity to maintain the rhythm of our development. And, it is the duty of the national community as a whole, to take part in this debate in order that, through democratic decisionmaking, we can choose the proper use of this energy.

It is also the duty of the Commission to identify the gaps and occasional errors in the normative and executive role of the Government, which is under its exclusive jurisdiction, as well as to the participation of the universities, research centers and contracting companies which generate and absorb scientific and technological knowledge.

Brazil is a co-signatory with the Federal Republic of Germany and the International Atomic Energy Agency of the safeguards agreement which guarantees the exclusive peaceful nature of the activities contained in the agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the Tlatelolco Treaty.[2] [Brazil] cannot withdraw from the commitments it has undertaken with peace and the use, which I must repeat, peaceful use of nuclear energy. I also stress that we shall not haphazardly enter into nuclear policy that is not totally safe. The indispensable safety of installations and equipment must correspond to our concern with the populations and the environment, preventing them from any risk or accident.

177. Statement by the Deputy Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory (Thorn) Before a Special Panel of the House Committee on Armed Services: Lessons of the 1958–1961 Nuclear Test Moratorium [Extract], September 20, 1985 [1]

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On August 22, 1958, President Eisenhower announced that the United States was prepared to begin negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty agreement which would suspend nuclear tests, and establish an international control system for detecting violations of the testing suspension. In order to move these negotiations along, Eisenhower declared that once they began, the United States would be willing to do no further testing of nuclear weapons for 1 year, with the possibility of extension if circumstances justified to do so, if the Soviets also refrained from nuclear testing.[2]

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[2] I.e., The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. For the text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.

[1] *Review of Arms Control and Disarmament Activities, 99th Congress, 1st Session: Hearings Before the Special Panel on Arms Control and Disarmament of the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee. . . .* (H.A.S.C. No. 99–18), pp. 220–225.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 1111–1112.

On the basis of this proposal, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom began negotiations in Geneva on October 31, 1958, and observed a moratorium on testing from 1958 to 1961. This was the first major postwar agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union directly affecting nuclear armaments, but it was not embodied in a written agreement and involved no agreed verification measures.

In December 1959, President Eisenhower indicated that the United States would no longer be bound by the moratorium, since the Geneva testing negotiations had stalemated. But, he said, the United States would give advanced notice if it intended to resume testing.[3] Then, on September 1, 1961, the Soviet Union, without previous warning, resumed nuclear tests in the atmosphere. They immediately carried out a series of over 40 tests, which could only have been possible after lengthy preparations. The United States responded with an underground weapon test series, and began preparations for atmospheric tests.

In early 1962, President Kennedy, reflecting on the experience of the moratorium, a policy not committed to paper and containing no verification measures, said that in the future the United States would only consider written agreements which provided for an adequate inspection system in regard to preparations as well as testing. He emphasized that "this must be a fully effective treaty. We know enough now about broken negotiations, secret preparations and the advantages gained from a long-test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium."[4]

In my view, Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy must have known they were taking a calculated risk in adhering to the moratorium. What they said during this period certainly suggests such knowledge. The Eisenhower administration had received advice from Norris Bradbury of Los Alamos and Edward Teller of Livermore, who agreed that a temporary moratorium would not seriously damage the nuclear weapons program. However, both men also agreed that if the suspension of tests lasted much beyond 2 years, the implications for the weapons program would indeed be serious, and worsen with time.

Looking back, it is by no means clear that Bradbury and others in management at Los Alamos initially believed that the United States would agree to a moratorium and we did not make the preparations for a suspension of tests that Livermore did. Los Alamos was officially informed in July 1958 that it should prepare for a moratorium in the near future.

With a moratorium in sight, some additional tests were conducted in the Hardtack I test series in the Pacific between April and August 1958. In addition, we developed and fired a large series, Hardtack II at the Nevada test site during September and October 1958, finishing

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 1590–1591.
[4] *Ibid., 1962*, p. 74.

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somewhat frantically on October 30, the day before the moratorium went into effect. We did little else in preparation at Los Alamos.

Actually, a great many at the laboratory, including the director, believed a moratorium might be a good thing. As you might imagine, the reasons were varied. A great many were moved by the hope that finally, after over 10 years of United States efforts to get an agreement with the Russians on controlling nuclear weapons, a treaty was in sight. But for others, there was a belief that between working on Rover—an expanding program to develop a nuclear propelled rocket—and compiling and analyzing the large volume of test data at hand, our time could be very well spent in the event of a moratorium.

Still, others thought that the laboratory should be engaged in more theoretical pursuits. Bradbury himself believed that Los Alamos had let itself get too bogged down in the mass production of weapons designs, and wanted to ease up on that aspect of lab work a bit and to do more general research.

Our calculation of risks and benefits was affected by our overconfidence, perhaps one could say arrogance, in the state of our knowledge of the weapon R&D Program and weapon tests before and leading up to the moratorium. Looking back, this is astounding. The moratorium came at a time of rapid change and improvement in our nuclear weapons. The moratorium would amply demonstrate that there was much that we did not know and that we totally failed to recognize that ignorance at the time.

Nonetheless, not only did we then judge that a moratorium of limited duration was an acceptable risk, and advise the political authorities of that assessment, but we later made decisions about the extension of the moratorium in ignorance of the problems that would be revealed only when testing resumed.

Even after the nuclear testing moratorium came into effect, the United States continued to require the development of new nuclear weapons for its stockpile. Under the moratorium, the United States agreed only to stop nuclear testing, and the Government believed it was vital to our security to develop and introduce new weapon systems.

Because of this situation, we at Los Alamos were under pressure from outside and from ourselves to continue to develop and certify weapons for the stockpile that could not be tested, or at least fully tested. In terms of new designs, this led us to be more conservative than customary. It also created tension within the laboratory between those who believed the designs could be certified without nuclear tests, and those who disagreed.

Ultimately, we did certify some weapons that had not been tested, in the belief that our understanding and design codes were satisfactory. In some cases, the weapons proved out in testing after the moratorium, in others they did not. The key point here is that we went ahead and made these decisions, under the pressures of the time

and our excessive belief in our theoretical understanding and design codes.

Looking back, we can see how wrong we could be when we relied on theories and models that we could not empirically demonstrate. I can only say now, with the benefit of considerable hindsight, that such reliance was—and probably would again be—an almost irresistible temptation in the absence of periodic nuclear tests to prove out our theories and validate our design calculations.

One example of the technical problems we encountered will have to suffice here—that of a weapon redesigned under the moratorium at Los Alamos that did not justify our confidence. This was the W–52 warhead for the Sergeant tactical ballistic missile. The warhead had been tested before the moratorium, but in 1959, we had two fatal accidents at Los Alamos involving detonations of large pieces of the high explosive used in this warhead. We decided that the high explosive posed an unacceptable risk in the size pieces required for this design.

I should note here that we validate the design of explosive components very extensively through local nonnuclear experiments before any nuclear tests are involved, and in this case we proceeded to do so with a safer replacement for the high explosive. Because of the moratorium, we were unusually thorough in the way we approached the problem, and by the time we were finished, there was no doubt in the minds of the designers involved that we had produced a safer design whose nuclear performance would be entirely adequate. Production was restarted with the new high explosive design, and the weapons were delivered to the military.

When the moratorium ended, we did not place a high priority on testing this warhead, and it began to enter the stockpile in 1962 without benefit of a nuclear test. When the weapon was finally tested in 1963, it failed catastrophically. After a redesign, confirmed by a nuclear test, the inoperable weapons were replaced.

In addition to illustrating the point that weapon development without complete nuclear testing led us to some serious mistakes, the W–52 experience also indicates the sort of problem that can arise from trying to modestly redesign existing weapons. In some cases, our understanding of weapon designs or of the materials used in the weapons is not complete enough to allow us to make such decisions without testing the new design, but we cannot always identify those cases.

EFFECTS OF MORATORIUM

Certainly the problems that we discovered with the W–52 and many other nuclear weapons after the moratorium were serious issues, with serious implications for the defense and security of the United States. Yet, in my view, even more troubling and potentially more dangerous for later years were the effects of the moratorium on the laboratory's

ability to continue to carry out its mission of nuclear weapon design, testing, and oversight of the weapon stockpile.

These problems were less severe than they might have been, only because the moratorium ended before we lost a lot of people or too much vital experience and capabilities. Because Los Alamos was at that time carrying out the Rover program, research on controlled nuclear fusion, and development of fission power reactors, many people were able to move into these areas from the weapon program.

Also from the many weapon tests carried out in the past, including the extensive test series in 1958, there was a large store of test data available for analysis and synthesis by the people who remained. Despite these facts, there were morale problems at the laboratory as the moratorium progressed, and had it lasted very much longer serious harm would have been done to our weapons capabilities.

We experienced two kinds of problems with maintaining our weapons design capability. The first was that, without tests, some of the designers—especially those involved in thermonuclear design—had little to do. Those who moved into the nuclear rocket program, the controlled fusion program, and the nuclear fission energy program, found that many interesting and challenging problems existed there.

Others in different areas of weapons work were able to use this hiatus to improve their theoretical understanding and improve or normalize their computerized design models, based on their analysis of data from previous nuclear tests. But as the moratorium stretched on, some people lost interest in the weapons program and accepted jobs elsewhere.

Another thing that happened was that many of the weapons people became engrossed in their new jobs, became committed to carrying out new projects, and later did not choose or were not available to return to the weapons program. Overall, there was a trickle of valuable people leaving the weapons program and the lab. This trickle soon threatened to become a torrent.

The second problem we experienced with the design operation was a tendency to become over reliant on design codes and theories. Those of us who had been in the weapons design and testing business knew, however, that design codes can never be more than an imperfect model of the current state of physics knowledge, which is itself incomplete and imperfect.

My view now, reinforced by the experience of the moratorium, is that we should only properly use design codes to interpolate between known experimental data points—that is, nuclear tests. Still, without tests to confirm our calculations, we had no choice but to rely on the codes, and inevitably there was a tendency to place too much confidence in them.

We also experienced problems with our nuclear testing capability. Our test division did assume responsibility for the Rover Program, and this kept many of the test personnel employed in interesting work.

Others worked on nuclear test detection programs associated with the possibility of underground or deep space nuclear tests.

Still others worked on nonnuclear hydrodynamic tests which continued. But the atmospheric testing capability eroded rapidly, and the joint task force responsible for carrying it out was dismantled. In general, our ability to resume nuclear weapons testing rapidly in the event of an end to the moratorium eroded, and when the moratorium ended we resumed testing only with difficulty, cost and delay.

I have given you my recollections of the problems Los Alamos encountered during the moratorium. I want to emphasize that these deleterious effects on the laboratory, which were quite severe, might have been much greater if the moratorium had lasted only 1 or 2 more years. This to my mind shows the difference between the technical risks and costs of a moratorium of short and finite duration, as compared with an unlimited test ban, on the ability of the national laboratories to carry out their responsibility for nuclear weapons research and development.

The effects of a moratorium of finite duration would, of course, be somewhat different today. Los Alamos is now larger and more diversified, so the scientific and technical base of the laboratory might be better able to absorb weapons people during a limited moratorium. And we have certainly improved and refined our theoretical understanding and calculational tools for weapons design. Furthermore, the changes being made in new designs, and the number of designs being developed, at least in conventional nuclear weapons, are not presently as large as they were in 1958. It also takes much longer for a design to move through development, testing, production, and into the stockpile today. For these reasons, the immediate effects of a short moratorium on the stockpile might not be as severe as those discovered after 1958 to 1961.

Other effects on the laboratory could be as bad or worse, however. If a problem were detected with a stockpiled weapon, for example, we would again be unable to determine its seriousness or validate proposed solutions with nuclear tests.

Such problems still do occur, and with a relatively small number of designs in the stockpile, usually intended to remain there for many years, a problem with a single design could have a serious impact on our nuclear deterrent. This problem is worsened, in my view, by the unforgiving nature of current nuclear weapon designs.

Today's designs are more complex, and more subject to problems because they are designed with the smallest tolerances possible in order to optimize the performance of the total weapon package.

For example, new designs are as reliable as military requirements stipulate, but we cannot make them more reliable without making sacrifices in some other military requirement, such as system weight. The requirements for testing are greater under these circumstances, and we must assume that we will be able to test these weapons if problems occur.

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Despite this fact, the risk that we would come to rely too much on theory, codes, and nonnuclear tests during a moratorium is probably even greater today. Fewer of our designers remember the chastening experience of the moratorium, and in the years that followed, and because our calculational tools are more elaborate and refined, it is easier to believe that they truly simulate nature.

Thus, we could again be led seriously astray without the ability to validate our calculations and designs from time to time. As time went by, we would probably be tempted to develop, certify, and stockpile untested weapons again. We also would gradually lose some of the personnel, skills, and knowledge needed for weapons research, development, and testing if the moratorium were of long duration, simply because the people would gravitate toward work where they could test their theories and where active development continued.

In the event of a comprehensive test ban of unlimited duration, I expect our ability to develop new weapons would disappear. Eventually, even our ability to retain confidence in existing weapons would atrophy and disappear.

I do not see how the U.S. could remain secure without these weapons unless we had by then managed to fundamentally transform our relations with other nations. We might, however, under a comprehensive test ban, develop a strong and wholly misplaced confidence in our ability to develop and rely on nuclear weapons without testing. If we still relied on those weapons for our security, that could be the worst situation of all.

178. Statement by the Manager, Nevada Operations Office, Department of Energy (Clark) Before a Special Panel of the House Committee on Armed Services: Effects of a Cessation of Nuclear Testing [Extracts], September 20, 1985 [1]

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As Manager of DOE's Nevada operations, I am responsible for the conduct of all U.S. nuclear weapons tests. This involves the control of testing activities on the Nevada Test Site in the interest of public health and safety, as well as the operations themselves and maintenance of our testing capabilities. So long as the U.S. plans any testing in the foreseeable future, I am also responsible for the stewardship of that unique set of capabilities represented by the test site, its facilities, equipment, and perhaps most important, skilled people.

[1] *Review of Arms Control and Disarmament Activities, 99th Congress, 1st Session: Hearings Before the Special Panel on Arms Control and Disarmament of the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee* . . . [H.A.S.C. No. 99–81], pp. 243–246.

NTS is, in fact, a large outdoor engineering test laboratory to which the laboratories and DNA can bring those essential experiments they can't do at home.

In that regard, the test program is not a "program" unto itself—it is an integral and essential part of the weapons research and development program.

Finally, I am responsible for maintenance of DOE's assets for atmospheric test readiness about which I will speak in a few minutes.

Since nuclear testing began, there have been two significant events which are relevant to the CTB question. First, there was the 1958 to 1961 test moratorium, which Dr. Thorn has spoken of from personal knowledge.[2] Second, since the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, we have been obligated to maintain a capability to resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere—one of the four safeguards established in conjunction with ratification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.[3] Both of these experiences provide insight to what might be expected in maintaining a "readiness" capability in the event of a CTB. In preparing this testimony, I have relied on an as yet unpublished classified draft manuscript prepared for the most part by the late Dr. William E. Ogle.

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Before and immediately after the moratorium, the test organization was quite unlike that which exists today. It was much more "ad hoc" in nature; testing was conducted on a "campaign" basis—generally 6 months at the Pacific Proving Ground, then 6 months at NTS. In calendar year 1958, after conducting 38 tests overseas, April through August, the United States returned to Nevada, where it conducted 37 tests in the 48 days between September 12 and October 30. That was a pretty active time.

Twenty-nine of those were atmospheric tests; the remaining tests were conducted in tunnels or in unstemmed vertical shafts. There were about 3,000 people involved in the NTS Program. Immediately following the establishment of the moratorium, employment levels were reduced by about 60 to 70 percent. Fortunately, other research and development projects such as the Rover and Pluto Programs, to develop space nuclear propulsion engines, provided challenging work for many of the scientists, engineers, and technicians.

I want to emphasize at this point that to retain quality people during an extended moratorium or test ban, it is vitally important that they have challenging, meaningful work; even then, once they are involved in another project, it is likely that their specialized talents would be lost to the weapons test program.

In many cases, we have invested many man-years of effort in training and developing those specialized skills which are essential to

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[2] *Supra.*

[3] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.

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weapon testing. It would be extremely difficult to reconstitute this special body of knowledge within a reasonable time period.

As far as test readiness during the moratorium was concerned, very few activities continued. The test organization (JTF–7) deteriorated quickly and was disestablished just a few months before the moratorium came to an end. At NTS there was some tunnel re-entry work, some tunnel preparation for possible future testing and a minor amount of utility and facility contruction was accomplished. Practically all technical effort was stopped. Some planning was done for possible testing under the labels of Plowshare and Vela Uniform.

As might be expected, when we returned to testing in 1961, the problem was attracting well-qualified people. A second problem in returning to testing was the acquisition on a timely basis of all of the state-of-the-art equipment needed to conduct the program. Although serious contingency planning appears to have begun early in 1961 as the Geneva test ban talks deteriorated, the Soviets broke out of the moratorium on September 1, 1961, and the United States was able to fire a 2-kiloton tunnel shot—which vented—on September 15; but it was not until late April 1962 that the United States was able to conduct its first atmospheric test in the Pacific.

That was an intermediate yield shot, fired in a rain cloud, they were unable to see the fireball and thus didn't get very much useful data out of it.

By the time the United States fired its first 2-kiloton test, the Soviets had fired 10 or 11 in the atmosphere, totaling about 9 megatons. Before the United States fired its first atmospheric shot, the Soviets had fired about 50, including the infamous 58 megaton shot on October 30, 1961.

My conclusions from a review of that bit of history are that, one, a capability for testing deteriorates very rapidly—the moratorium was in place for only 34 months; two, a restart, from decision time to a really meaningful test series will take a painfully long time; and three, despite constraints related to availability of specialized equipment and supplies, retention of qualified people—not only scientists, but technicians with specialized skills—not only test operations people, but weapon designers—is certain to be the greatest challenge, and probably a nearly insurmountable one if testing is not done for any extended period.

I would now like to discuss the second experience we have had—safeguard C or atmospheric nuclear test readiness. When the Limited Test Ban Treaty was ratified, four safeguards were established by Presidential directive. Safeguard C required that the United States maintain a capability to return promptly to atmospheric testing.

Early in its history, safeguard C was heavily funded—over $100 million was invested in fiscal year 1965 to modify diagnostic, drop, and sampler aircraft, and to upgrade and equip facilities at Johnston Atoll and in Hawaii.

During the first few years, this capability was exercised on such projects as monitoring foreign nuclear tests, making sun eclipse observations, studying the aurora borealis (northern lights) and conducting barium injection experiments and atmospheric weapons test dry runs.

Within a very few years, however, as budget pressures increased and as the likelihood of resumption of testing in the atmosphere diminished, the readiness program rapidly lost its momentum and support. Moreover, the safeguard C mandate was modified to delete the term "promptly" which accelerated the deterioration of the readiness capability.

Even strong supporters of the safeguards, such as the late Senator Henry M. Jackson, eventually turned their attention to more pressing matters, and in the competition for funding safeguard C progressively lost ground. Many of the physical assets became obsolete from a technological point of view and even the continued availability of real estate assets, such as Johnston Atoll, have come into question.

Most important of all, attrition took its toll of these individuals with relevant experience and the Nation's atmospheric testing cadre has, today, all but vanished.

Today, the assets of safeguard C are very limited. The NC–135 diagnostic aircraft have been taken out of service or are dedicated to other uses, the sampler aircraft have been mothballed and it is doubtful they could ever be resurrected. The photographic equipment and cloud sampling equipment is stored in New Mexico but, for the most part, would have to be replaced with modern technology. Even Johnston Atoll has utility only as a logistics base. Some scientific facilities have been maintained in a mothball status and would largely have to be rehabilitated or replaced entirely to satisfy current technological requirements.

Time, technology, politics, and budgets have all served to overtake the atmospheric test readiness program. All of this has occurred even though—some might say "partly because"—there has been an aggressive underground test program.

Let me turn now to what NTS might be like under a CTB. There are more than 6,000 people on the Nevada Operations test rolls. They are located not only at the NTS, but in Las Vegas, San Ramon, Los Alamos, and Albuquerque, and near Boston, MA.

They are involved in an extremely wide range of activities including very technical, high-speed measurements and diagnostics, large hole drilling, construction, health, physics, communications, meteorology, geology, hydrology, and so on. I feel that specific decisions would have to be made as to the disposition of resources and assets, which would provide some reasonable assurance that they could be mobilized in the event any such treaty or moratorium were abrogated.

Depending upon what assumptions were to be made about the nature of the CTB, one could imagine a reduction of the work force from its current level of about 6,000 to around 2,500 or so. In the past, we have examined the types of work which could constructively

occupy a work force of this size. Nonnuclear SDI comes to mind as an example. Even so, endeavors of that sort might salvage some scientific and technical people, but would not enable us to keep many of our highly specialized craftsmen, such as those who can prepare gas-blocked diagnostic cable.

In summary, I believe the experience after the 1958 to 1961 moratorium found America's testing community was technically agonizing, operationally painful, and economically very costly. Similarly, the atmospheric readiness program has revealed that such a capability can be retained for only a relatively short time. Even at that, we have had many scientists and engineers, technicians available from the underground program who could have been reassigned to support an atmospheric program if it had been reactivated.

A proposed CTB would have no activities such as the underground test program to provide meaningful, challenging work and to continue technological developments. It is evident to me that the sustained maintenance of a testing capability, in the absence of some level of full-scale testing, is to say the least, an unrealistic expectation.

This concludes my testimony. I would be pleased to answer any questions.

179. Final Declaration by the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, September 21, 1985 [1]

THE STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH MET IN GENEVA FROM 27 AUGUST TO 21 SEPTEMBER 1985 TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY SOLEMNLY DECLARE:

—their conviction that the Treaty is essential to international peace and security,

—their continued support for the objectives of the Treaty which are:

—the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

—the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and a Treaty on general and complete disarmament;

—the promotion of co-operation between States Parties in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

—the reaffirmation of their firm commitment to the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty,

—their determination to enhance the implementation of the Treaty and to further strengthen its authority.

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[1] A/C.1/40/9, Annex I. The declaration was transmitted to the First Committee of the 40th U.N. General Assembly by Ambassador Garcia Robles, the Mexican Representative. The text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1–3

The Conference noted the concerns and convictions expressed in preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 and agreed that they remain valid. The States Party to the Treaty remain resolved in their belief in the need to avoid the devastation that a nuclear war would bring. The Conference remains convinced that any proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of a nuclear war.

The Conference agreed that the strict observance of the terms of Articles I and II remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security, including to the peace and security of non-Parties.

The Conference acknowledged the declarations by nuclear-weapons States Party to the Treaty that they had fulfilled their obligations under Article I. The Conference further acknowledged the declarations that non-nuclear-weapons States Party to the Treaty had fulfilled their obligations under Article II. The Conference was of the view therefore that one of the primary objectives of the Treaty had been achieved in the period under review.

The Conference also expressed deep concern that the national nuclear programmes of some States non-Party to the Treaty may lead them to obtain a nuclear weapon capability. States Party to the Treaty stated that any further detonation of a nuclear explosive device by any non-nuclear-weapon State would constitute a most serious breach of the non-proliferation objective.

The Conference noted the great and serious concerns expressed about the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel. The Conference further noted the calls on all States for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear facilities, resources or devices to South Africa and Israel and to stop all exploitation of Namibian uranium, natural or enriched, until the attainment of Namibian independence.

Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5

1. The Conference affirms its determination to strengthen further the barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices to additional States. The spread of nuclear explosive capabilities would add immeasurably to regional and international tensions and suspicions. It would increase the risk of nuclear war and lessen the security of all States. The Parties remain convinced that universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the best way to strengthen the barriers against proliferation and they urge all States not party to the Treaty to accede to it. The Treaty and the régime of non-proliferation it supports play a central role in promoting regional and international peace and security, *inter alia*, by helping to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives. The non-proliferation and

safeguards commitments in the Treaty are essential also for peaceful nuclear commerce and co-operation.

2. The Conference expresses the conviction that IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings and assist States in demonstrating this compliance. They thereby promote further confidence among States and, being a fundamental element of the Treaty, help to strengthen their collective security. IAEA safeguards play a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Unsafeguarded nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States pose serious proliferation dangers.

3. The Conference declares that the commitment to non-proliferation by nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty pursuant to Article I, by non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty pursuant to Article II, and by the acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities within non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty pursuant to Article III is a major contribution by those States to regional and international security. The Conference notes with satisfaction that the commitments in Articles I–III have been met and have greatly helped prevent the spread of nuclear explosives.

4. The Conference therefore specifically urges all non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty to make an international legally-binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, both current and future, to verify that commitment. The Conference further urges all States in their international nuclear co-operation and in their nuclear export policies and, specifically as a necessary basis for the transfer of relevant nuclear supplies to non-nuclear-weapon States, to take effective steps towards achieving such a commitment to non-proliferation and acceptance of such safeguards by those States. The Conference expresses its view that accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the best way to achieve that objective.

5. The Conference expresses its satisfaction that four of the five nuclear-weapon States have voluntarily concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA, covering all or part of their peaceful nuclear activities. The Conference regards those agreements as further strengthening the non-proliferation régime and increasing the authority of IAEA and the effectiveness of its safeguards system. The Conference calls on the nuclear-weapon States to continue to co-operate fully with the IAEA in the implementation of these agreements and calls on IAEA to take full advantage of this co-operation. The Conference urges the People's Republic of China similarly to conclude a safeguards agreement with IAEA. The Conference recommends the continued pursuit of the principle of universal application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States. To this end, the Conference recognizes the value of voluntary offers and recommends further evaluation of the economic and practical possibility of

extending application of safeguards to additional civil facilities in the nuclear-weapon States as and when IAEA resources permit and consideration of separation of the civil and military facilities in the nuclear-weapon States. Such an extending of safeguards will enable the further development and application of an effective régime in both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

6. The Conference also affirms the great value to the non-proliferation régime of commitments by the nuclear-weapon States that nuclear supplies provided for peaceful use will not be used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive purposes. Safeguards in nuclear-weapon States pursuant to their safeguards agreements with IAEA can verify observance of those commitments.

7. The Conference notes with satisfaction the adherence of further Parties to the Treaty and the conclusion of further safeguards agreements in compliance with the undertaking of the Treaty and recommends that:

(a) The non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty that have not concluded the agreements required under Article III (4) conclude such agreements with IAEA as soon as possible;

(b) The Director-General of IAEA intensify his initiative of submitting to States concerned draft agreements to facilitate the conclusion of corresponding safeguards agreements, and that Parties to the Treaty, in particular Depositary Parties, should actively support these initiatives;

(c) All States Party to the Treaty make strenuous individual and collective efforts to make the Treaty truly universal.

8. The Conference notes with satisfaction that IAEA in carrying out its safeguards activities has not detected any diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material to the production of nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices or to purposes unknown.

9. The Conference notes that IAEA safeguards activities have not hampered the economic, scientific or technological development of the Parties to the Treaty, or international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities and it urges that this situation be maintained.

10. The Conference commends IAEA on its implementation of safeguards pursuant to this Treaty and urges it to continue to ensure the maximum technical and cost effectiveness and efficiency of its operations, while maintaining consistency with the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities.

11. The Conference notes with satisfaction the improvement of IAEA safeguards which has enabled it to continue to apply safeguards effectively during a period of rapid growth in the number of safeguarded facilities. It also notes that IAEA safeguards approaches are capable of adequately dealing with facilities under safeguards. In this regard, the recent conclusion of the project to design a safeguards régime for centrifuge enrichment plants and its implementation is welcomed. This project allows the application of an effective régime to

all plants of this type in the territories both of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

12. The Conference emphasizes the importance of continued improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards, for example, but not limited to:

(a) Uniform and non-discriminatory implementation of safeguards;
(b) The expeditious implementation of new instruments and techniques;
(c) The further development of methods for evaluation of safeguards effectiveness in combination with safeguards information;
(d) Continued increases in the efficiency of the use of human and financial resources and of equipment.

13. The Conference believes that further improvement of the list of materials and equipment which, in accordance with Article III (2) of the Treaty, calls for the application of IAEA safeguards should take account of advances in technology.

14. The Conference recommends that IAEA establish an internationally agreed effective system of international plutonium storage in accordance with Article XII(A)5 of its statute.

15. The Conference welcomes the significant contributions made by States Parties in facilitating the application of IAEA safeguards and in supporting research, development and other supports to further the application of effective and efficient safeguards. The Conference urges that such co-operation and support be continued and that other States Parties provide similar support.

16. The Conference calls upon all States to take IAEA safeguards requirements fully into account while planning, designing and constructing new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and while modifying existing nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

17. The Conference also calls on States Parties to the Treaty to assist IAEA in applying its safeguards, *inter alia*, through the efficient operation of State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, and including compliance with all notification requirements in accordance with safeguards agreements.

18. The Conference welcomes the Agency's endeavours to recruit and train staff of the highest professional standards for safeguards implementation with due regard to the widest possible geographical distribution, in accordance with Article VII D of the IAEA Statute. It calls upon States to exercise their right regarding proposals of designation of IAEA inspectors in such a way as to facilitate the most effective use of safeguards manpower.

19. The Conference also commends to all States Parties the merits of establishment of international fuel cycle facilities, including multination participation, as a positive contribution to reassurance of the peaceful use and non-diversion of nuclear materials. While primarily a national responsibility, the Conference sees advantages in international co-operation concerning spent fuel storage and nuclear waste storage.

20. The Conference calls upon States Parties to continue their political, technical and financial support of the IAEA safeguards system.

21. The Conference underlines the need for IAEA to be provided with the necessary financial and human resources to ensure that the Agency is able to continue to meet effectively its safeguards responsibilities.

22. The Conference urges all States that have not done so to adhere to the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material at the earliest possible date.

Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7

1. The Conference affirms that the NPT fosters the world-wide peaceful use of nuclear energy and reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of any Party to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II.

2. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty, in accordance with Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange. In this context, the Conference recognizes the importance of services. This can contribute to progress in general and to the elimination of technological and economic gaps between the developed and developing countries.

3. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. In this context the Conference recognizes the particular needs of the least developed countries.

4. The Conference requests that States Parties consider possible bilateral co-operation measures to further improve the implementation of Article IV. To this end, States Parties are requested to give in written form their experiences in this area in the form of national contributions to be presented in a report to the next Review Conference.

5. The Conference recognizes the need for more predictable long-term supply assurances with effective assurances of non-proliferation.

6. The Conference commends the recent progress which the IAEA's Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) has made towards agreeing a set of principles related to this matter, and expresses the hope that the Committee will complete this work soon. The Conference further notes with satisfaction the measures which CAS has recommended to the IAEA Board of Governors for alleviating technical and administra-

tive problems in international shipments of nuclear items, emergency and back-up mechanisms, and mechanisms for the revision of international nuclear co-operation agreements and calls for the early completion of the work of CAS and the implementation of its recommendations.

7. The Conference reaffirms that in accordance with international law and applicable treaty obligations, States should fulfil their obligations under agreements in the nuclear field, and any modification of such agreements, if required, should be made only by mutual consent of the parties concerned.

8. The Conference confirms that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies. International co-operation in this area, including international transfer and subsequent operations should be governed by effective assurances of non-proliferation and predictable long-term supply assurances. The issuance of related licences and authorization involved should take place in a timely fashion.

9. While recognizing that the operation and management of the back-end of the fuel cycle including nuclear waste storage are primarily a national responsibility, the Conference acknowledges the importance for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of international and multilateral collaboration for arrangements in this area.

10. The Conference expresses its profound concern about the Israeli military attack on Iraq's safeguarded nuclear reactor on 7 June 1981. The Conference recalls Security Council Resolution 487 of 1981, strongly condemning the military attack by Israel which was unanimously adopted by the Council and which considered that the said attack constituted a serious threat to the entire IAEA safeguards régime which is the foundation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[2] The Conference also takes note of the decisions and resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the International Atomic Energy Agency on this attack, including Resolution 425 of 1984 adopted by the General Conference of the IAEA.

11. The Conference recognizes that an armed attack on a safeguarded nuclear facility, or threat of attack, would create a situation in which the Security Council would have to act immediately in accordance with provisions of the United Nations Charter. The Conference further emphasizes the responsibilities of the Depositaries of NPT in their capacity as permanent members of the Security Council to endeavour, in consultation with the other members of the Security Council, to give full consideration to all appropriate measures to be undertaken by the Security Council to deal with the situation, including measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

12. The Conference encourages Parties to be ready to provide immediate peaceful assistance in accordance with international law to any

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 227–228.

Party to the NPT, if it so requests, whose safeguarded nuclear facilities have been subject to an armed attack, and calls upon all States to abide by any decisions taken by the Security Council in accordance with the United Nations Charter in relation to the attacking State.

13. The Conference considers that such attacks could involve grave dangers due to the release of radioactivity and that such attacks or threats of attack jeopardize the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference also acknowledges that the matter is under consideration by the Conference on Disarmament and urges co-operation of all States for its speedy conclusion.

14. The Conference acknowledges the importance of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the principal agent for technology transfer among the international organizations referred to in Article IV (2) and welcomes the successful operation of the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programmes. The Conference records with appreciation that projects supported from these programmes covered a wide spectrum of applications, related both to power and non-power uses of nuclear energy notably in agriculture, medicine, industry and hydrology. The Conference notes that the Agency's assistance to the developing States Party to the Treaty has been chiefly in the non-power uses of nuclear energy.

15. The Conference welcomes the establishment by the IAEA, following a recommendation of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, of a mechanism to permit the channelling of extra-budgetary funds to projects additional to those financed from the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund.[3] The Conference notes that this channel has been used to make additional resources available for a wide variety of projects in developing States Party to the Treaty.

16. In this context, the Conference proposes the following measures for consideration by the IAEA:

(i) IAEA assistance to developing countries in siting, construction, operation and safety of nuclear power projects and the associated trained manpower provision to be strengthened.

(ii) To provide, upon request, assistance in securing financing from outside sources for nuclear power projects in developing countries, and in particular the least developed countries.

(iii) IAEA assistance in nuclear planning systems for developing countries to be strengthened in order to help such countries draw up their own nuclear development plans.

(iv) IAEA assistance on country-specific nuclear development strategies to be further developed, with a view to identifying the application of nuclear technology that can be expected to contribute most to the development both of individual sectors and developing economies as a whole.

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[3] *Ibid., 1975*, p. 151.

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(v) Greater support for regional co-operative agreements, promoting regional projects based on regionally agreed priorities and using inputs from regional countries.

(vi) Exploration of the scope for multi-year, multi-donor projects financed from the extra-budgetary resources of the IAEA.

(vii) The IAEA's technical co-operation evaluation activity to be further developed, so as to enhance the Agency's effectiveness in providing technical assistance.

17. The Conference underlines the need for the provision to the IAEA of the necessary financial and human resources to ensure that the Agency is able to continue to meet effectively its responsibilities.

18. The Conference notes the appreciable level of bilateral co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and urges that States in a position to do so should continue and where possible increase the level of their co-operation in these fields.

19. The Conference urges that preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty in access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking particularly into account needs of developing countries.

20. Great and serious concerns were expressed at the Conference about the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel and that the development of such a capability by South Africa and Israel would undermine the credibility and stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime. The Conference noted the demands made on all States to suspend any co-operation which would contribute to the nuclear programme of South Africa and Israel. The Conference further noted the demands made on South Africa and Israel to accede to the NPT, to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities and to pledge themselves not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

21. The Conference recognizes the growing nuclear energy needs of the developing countries as well as the difficulties which the developing countries face in this regard, particularly with respect to financing their nuclear power programmes. The Conference calls upon States Party to the Treaty to promote the establishment of favourable conditions in national, regional and international financial institutions for financing of nuclear energy projects including nuclear power programmes in developing countries. Furthermore, the Conference calls upon the IAEA to initiate and the Parties to the Treaty to support the work of an expert group study on mechanisms to assist developing countries in the promotion of their nuclear power programmes, including the establishment of a Financial Assistance Fund.

22. The Conference recognizes that further IAEA assistance in the preparation of feasibility studies and infrastructure development might enhance the prospects for developing countries for obtaining finance, and recommends such countries as are members of the Agency to apply for such help under the Agency's technical assistance and co-

operation programmes. The Conference also acknowledges that further support for the IAEA's Small and Medium Power Reactor (SMPR) Study could help the development of nuclear reactors more suited to the needs of some of the developing countries.

23. The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the progress in the preparations for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) and its conviction that UNCPICPUNE will fully realize its goals in accordance with the objectives of resolution 32/50 and relevant subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly for the development of national programmes of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries.

24. The Conference considers that all proposals related to the promotion and strengthening of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which have been produced by the Third Review Conference of the NPT, be transmitted to the Preparatory Committee of the UNCPICPUNE.

Article V

1. The Conference reaffirms the obligation of Parties to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty in full accordance with the provisions of article V and other applicable international obligations, that such services should be provided to non-nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

2. The Conference confirms that the IAEA would be the appropriate international body through which any potential benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to non-nuclear weapon States under the terms of article V of the Treaty.

3. The Conference notes that the potential benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have not been demonstrated and that no requests for services related to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have been received by the IAEA since the Second NPT Review Conference.

Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8–12

A.

1. The Conference recalled that under the provisions of article VI all parties have undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith:

—on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date;
—on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament;

—on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

2. The Conference undertook an evaluation of the achievements in respect of each aspect of the article in the period under review, and paragraphs 8 to 12 of the preamble, and in particular with regard to the goals set out in preambular paragraph 10 which recalls the determination expressed by the parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty to:

—continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.[4]

3. The Conference recalled the declared intention of the parties to the Treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament and their urging made to all States parties to co-operate in the attainment of this objective. The Conference also recalled the determination expressed by the parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions on nuclear weapons for all time and the desire to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

4. The Conference notes that the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations concluded, in paragraph 50 of its Final Document, that the achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiations of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-tables whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.[5]

5. The Conference also recalled that in the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference, the parties expressed the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests was one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race and expressed the hope that the nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty would

[4] The text of the Treaty may be found *ibid., 1963,* pp. 291–293.
[5] *Ibid., 1978,* pp. 420–421. The complete text of the Final Document may be found *ibid.,* pp. 411 ff.

take the lead in reaching an early solution of the technical and political difficulties of this issue.[6]

6. The Conference examined developments relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, in the period under review and noted in particular that the destructive potentials of the nuclear arsenals of nuclear-weapon States parties, were undergoing continuing development, including a growing research and development component in military spending, continued nuclear testing, development of new delivery systems and their deployment.

7. The Conference noted the concerns expressed regarding developments with far reaching implications and the potential of a new environment, space, being drawn into the arms race. In that regard the Conference also noted the fact that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are pursuing bilateral negotiations on a broad complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, with a view to achieving effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth.

8. The Conference noted with regret that the development and deployment of nuclear weapon systems had continued during the period of review.

9. The Conference also took note of numerous proposals and actions, multilateral and unilateral, advanced during the period under review by many States with the aim of making progress towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

10. The Conference examined the existing situation in the light of the undertaking assumed by the parties in Article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The Conference recalled that a stage of negotiations on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II) had been concluded in 1979, by the signing of the Treaty which had remained unratified. The Conference noted that both the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have declared that they are abiding by the provisions of SALT II.[7]

11. The Conference recalled that the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America which were held between 1981 and 1983 were discontinued without any concrete results.

12. The Conference noted that bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America had been held in 1985 to consider questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. No agreement has emerged so far. These negotiations are continuing.

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[6] *Ibid., 1975,* pp. 153–154.

[7] The text of the SALT II Treaty may be found *ibid., 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

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13. The conference evaluated the progress made in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in the period of the Review.

14. The Conference recalled that the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, begun in 1977 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, had not continued after 1980, that the Committee on Disarmament and later the Conference on Disarmament had been called upon by the General Assembly of the United Nations in successive years to begin negotiations on such a Treaty, and noted that such negotiations had not been initiated, despite the submission of draft treaties and different proposals to the Conference on Disarmament in this regard.

15. The Conference noted the lack of progress on relevant items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular those relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

16. The Conference noted that two Review Conferences had taken place since 1980, one on the Sea-bed Treaty [8] and one on the Environmental Modification Treaty [9] and three General Conferences of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. In 1982, a Special United Nations General Assembly Session on Disarmament took place without any results in matters directly linked to nuclear disarmament.

17. The Conference also noted the last five years had thus not given any results concerning negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.

B.

1. The Conference concluded that, since no agreements had been reached in the period under review on effective measures relating to the cessation of an arms race at an early date, on nuclear disarmament and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the aspirations contained in preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 had still not been met, and the objectives under Article VI had not yet been achieved.

2. The Conference reiterated that the implementation of Article VI is essential to the maintenance and strengthening of the Treaty, reaffirmed the commitment of all States Parties to the implementation of this Article and called upon the States Parties to intensify their efforts to achieve fully the objectives of the Article. The Conference addressed a call to the nuclear-weapon States Parties in particular to demonstrate this commitment.

[8] The text of the Seabed Treaty may be found *ibid., 1971*, pp. 7–11.
[9] *Ibid., 1977*, pp. 322–326.

3. The Conference welcomes the fact that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are conducting bilateral negotiations on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms—both strategic and intermediate-range—with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. It hopes that these negotiations will lead to early and effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. Such agreements will complement and ensure the positive outcome of multilateral negotiations on disarmament, and would lead to the reduction of international tensions and the promotion of international peace and security. The Conference recalls that the two sides believe that ultimately the bilateral negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

4. The Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament, as appropriate, to proceed to early multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament in pursuance of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.

5. The Conference reaffirms the determination expressed in the preamble of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, confirmed in Article I (b) of the said Treaty and reiterated in preambular paragraph 10 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

6. The Conference also recalls that in the Final Document of the First Review Conference, the Parties expressed the view that the conclusion of a Treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests was one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race. The Conference stresses the important contribution that such a treaty would make toward strengthening and extending the international barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons; it further stresses that adherence to such a treaty by all States would contribute substantially to the full achievement of the non-proliferation objective.

7. The Conference also took note of the appeals contained in five successive United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1981 for a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban Treaty, and of similar calls made at this Conference. It also took note of the measure announced by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions from 6 August 1985 until 1 January 1986, which would continue beyond that date if the United States of America, for its part, refrained from carrying out nuclear explosions.[10] The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics suggested that this would provide an example for other nuclear-weapon States and would create favourable conditions for the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the

[10] Document 126.

promotion of the fuller implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

8. The Conference took note of the unconditional invitation extended by the United States of America to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to send observers, who may bring any equipment they deem necessary, to measure a United States of America nuclear test in order to begin a process which in the view of the United States of America would help to ensure effective verification of limitations on under-ground nuclear testing.[11]

9. The Conference also took note of the appeals contained in five United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1982 for a freeze on all nuclear weapons in quantitative and qualitative terms, which should be taken by all nuclear-weapon States or, in the first instance and simultaneously, by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the understanding that the other nuclear-weapon States would follow their example, and of similar calls made at this Conference.

10. The Conference took note of proposals by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America for the reduction of nuclear weapons.

11. The Conference took note of proposals submitted by States Parties on a number of related issues relevant to achieving the purposes of Article VI and set out in Annex I to this document and in the statements made in the General Debate of the Conference.

12. The Conference reiterated its conviction that the objectives of Article VI remained unfulfilled and concluded that the nuclear-weapon States should make greater efforts to ensure effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, for nuclear disarmament and for a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The Conference expressed the hope for rapid progress in the United States-USSR bilateral negotiations.

The Conference except for certain States whose views are reflected in the following subparagraph deeply regretted that a comprehensive multilateral Nuclear Test Ban Treaty banning all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time had not been concluded so far and, therefore, called on the nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and called on all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a Treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament.

At the same time, the Conference noted that certain States Party to the Treaty, while committed to the goal of an effectively verifiable comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, considered deep and verifiable reductions in existing arsenals of nuclear weapons as the highest priority in the process of pursuing the objectives of Article VI.

[11] Document 125.

The Conference also noted the statement of the USSR, as one of the nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty, recalling its repeatedly expressed readiness to proceed forthwith to negotiations, trilateral and multilateral, with the aim of concluding a comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the submission by it of a draft Treaty proposal to this end.

Article VII and the Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

1. The Conference observes the growing interest in utilizing the provisions of Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

2. The Conference considers that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure and therefore the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account.

3. The Conference emphasizes the importance of concluding nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements in harmony with internationally recognized principles, as stated in the Final Document of the First Special Session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.

4. The Conference holds the view that, under appropriate conditions, progress towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones will create conditions more conducive to the establishment of zones of peace in certain regions of the world.

5. The Conference expresses its belief that concrete measures of nuclear disarmament would significantly contribute to creating favourable conditions for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

6. The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the continued successful operation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).[12] It reaffirms the repeated exhortations of the General Assembly to France, which is already a signatory of Additional Protocol I, to ratify it, and calls upon the Latin American States that are eligible to become parties to the treaty to do so. The Conference welcomes the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II to this Treaty by all nuclear-weapon States.

7. The Conference also notes the continued existence of the Antarctic Treaty.[13]

8. The Conference notes the endorsement of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty [14] by the South Pacific Forum on 6 August

[12] For the texts of the Treaty and its Protocols, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69–83.
[13] *Ibid., 1945–1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550–1556.
[14] See Document 137.

1985 at Rarotonga and welcomes this achievement as consistent with Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference also takes note of the draft Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and further notes the agreement at the South Pacific Forum that consultations on the Protocols should be held between members of the Forum and the nuclear-weapon States eligible to sign them.

9. The Conference takes note of the existing proposals and the ongoing regional efforts to achieve nuclear-weapon-free zones in different areas of the world.

10. The Conference recognizes that for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary. In this connection, the nuclear-weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of States to create nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

11. The Conference welcomes the consensus reached by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security, and urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

12. The Conference also invites the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to the letter and spirit of United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/54.

13. The Conference considers that acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and acceptance of IAEA safeguards by all States in the region of the Middle East will greatly facilitate the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region and will enhance the credibility of the Treaty.

14. The Conference considers that the development of a nuclear weapon capability by South Africa at any time frustrates the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa [15] and that collaboration with South Africa in this area would undermine the credibility and the stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. South Africa is called upon to submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to IAEA safeguards and to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All States Parties directly concerned are urged to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. The nuclear weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of States to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and to enter

[15] For the Declaration, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 294–295.

into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

15. The Conference considers that the most effective guarantee against the possible use of nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear war is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of this goal on a universal basis and recognizing the need for all States to ensure their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Conference reaffirms the particular importance of assuring and strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Conference recognizes that different approaches may be required to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

16. The Conference underlines again the importance of adherence to the Treaty by non-nuclear-weapon States as the best means of reassuring one another of their renunciation of nuclear weapons and as one of the effective means of strengthening their mutual security.

17. The Conference takes note of the continued determination of the Depositary States to honour their statements, which were welcomed by the United Nations Security Council in resolution 255 (1968), that, to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.[16]

18. The Conference reiterates its conviction that, in the interest of promoting the objectives of the Treaty, including the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, all States, both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, should refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or the use of force in relations between States, involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons.

19. The Conference recalls that the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly in paragraph 59 of the Final Document took note of the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States regarding the assurance of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and urged them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

20. Being aware of the consultations and negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which have been under way in the Conference on Disarmament for several years, the Conference regrets that the search for a common approach which could be included in an international legally binding instrument, has

[16] *Ibid., 1968*, p. 444.

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been unsuccessful. The Conference takes note of the repeatedly expressed intention of the Conference on Disarmament to continue to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in its work and to carry out negotiations on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this connection, the Conference calls upon all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to continue the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament devoted to the search for a common approach acceptable to all, which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

Article VIII

The States Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference propose to the Depositary Governments that a fourth Conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1990.

The Conference accordingly invites States Party to the Treaty which are Members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the forty-third session of the General Assembly:

> Implementation of the conclusions of the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the fourth Conference.

Article IX

The Conference, having expressed great satisfaction that the overwhelming majority of States have acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and having recognized the urgent need for further ensuring the universality of the Treaty, appeals to all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other States advanced in nuclear technology, which have not yet done so, to adhere to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.

180. Declaration by the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States Taking Part in the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Review of the Operation of the Treaty and Recommendations, September 21, 1985 [1]

The delegations of the States members of the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States taking part in the Third Review Confer-

[1] A/C.1/40/9, Annex II. The declaration, along with the Final Declaration of the third NPT review conference, was submitted by Mexico to the First Committee of the 40th U.N. General Assembly. The text of the NPT may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

ence of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons submitted to the Conference the following three draft resolutions:

1. Draft resolution on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (NPT/CONF.III/L.1)
2. Draft resolution on a Nuclear Test Ban Moratorium (NPT/CONF.III/L.2)
3. Draft resolution on a Nuclear-Arms Freeze (NPT/CONF.III/L.3)

The objective pursued by the first of those three draft resolutions was achieved on the closing day of the Conference thanks to the approval by consensus, for inclusion in [Article VI B,] paragraph 12 of the Final Declaration of the Conference, of a text in which, with the exception indicated therein, it is unequivocally declared that:

> The Conference . . . deeply regretted that a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test-ban treaty banning all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time had not been concluded so far and, therefore, called on the nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and called on all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament.[2]

With regard to the other two above-mentioned draft resolutions, the sponsoring delegations wish to place on record that they have decided not to press them to a vote on this occasion for the following reasons: that there was unanimous acceptance for the reproduction of their texts together with this Declaration, immediately following the text of the Final Declaration, and that in paragraphs B–7 and B–9 of the Final Declaration, the Conference explicitly took note of the repeated appeals contained in many resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, as well as of "similar calls made at this Conference" in connection with a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing and a quantitative and qualitative freeze of all nuclear weapons, respectively.

GROUP OF NON-ALIGNED AND NEUTRAL STATES

Draft Resolution on a Nuclear Test Ban Moratorium

(Document NPT/CONF.III/L.2)

The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recalling that article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contains an undertaking by each of the Parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date",

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[2] *Supra.*

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Considering that the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests would constitute a most important and effective measure for the qualitative cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Considering further that a moratorium on nuclear test explosions, as a provisional measure, has been called for by the General Assembly of the United Nations at each of its last five sessions,

Calls upon the three Depositary States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to institute, as a provisional measure, an immediate moratorium on all nuclear weapon tests.

GROUP OF NON-ALIGNED AND NEUTRAL STATES

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON A NUCLEAR-ARMS FREEZE

(DOCUMENT NPT/CONF.III/L.3)

The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recalling that the Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contains an undertaking by each of the Parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament",

Considering that a nuclear-arms freeze, while not an end in itself, would constitute the most effective first step for a cessation of the nuclear-arms race,

Calls on the three Depositary States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

1. To agree on a complete freeze on the testing, production and deployment of all nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles;
2. To begin negotiations for substantial reductions of their existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.

181. Interview of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) on ABC–TV's "This Week With David Brinkley": Antiballistic Missile Treaty Limits on Research, Testing, and Development [Extract], September 22, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

Q. A senior White House official told a group of reporters the other day on background that if it came to having to violate the Antiballistic

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, November 1985, p. 34. The interview was conducted by David Brinkley and Sam Donaldson of ABC News and George F. Will, ABC News analyst. The Antiballistic Missile Treaty is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

Missile (ABM) Treaty, in the national interest I suppose, to test an SDI system in space, that we'd have to do it, or words to that effect. Is that the policy of this Administration?

A. The President has said that our program will be carried out in accordance with the ABM Treaty, and it will. The ABM Treaty was written in 1972 and doesn't encompass what, indeed, can be done in the way of research or testing of many kinds of systems. An Agreed Statement "D," for example, says that systems based on other concepts—research, testing, even development of those—are not proscribed. But I don't assert that there isn't some margin in the distant future for both sides examining the ABM Treaty, if they both conclude that both of us can benefit from the—

Q. Are you suggesting that the Treaty be revised by mutual consent, or are you saying that at some point the United States may, in its national interest, have to violate the present provisions of that Treaty?

A. We don't foresee that, surely in the Reagan Administration, and the President has said SDI will be conducted in accordance with the treaty.

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182. Address by Secretary of State Shultz Before the U.N. General Assembly [Extract], September 23, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

The reality of the nuclear age has impelled the United States and the Soviet Union to engage in a dialogue, of varying intensity, for the past 40 years. This dialogue has been an unprecedented attempt by two rivals to manage their competition and avert war. We know that we share a responsibility for maintaining peace, not just for our peoples but for all the earth's people.

Despite all the difficulties, let us remember what has been accomplished. After the two most destructive wars in history, the superpowers have averted world war for four decades. We have had some success in limiting nuclear testing. Working together with other nations since the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968,[2] we have succeeded in restricting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Twenty years ago it was conventional wisdom that there would be 15–25 nuclear-weapons states by today; yet the number of states acknowledged to possess nuclear weapons has held at five for the past 20 years. The United States remains committed to all the goals of the NPT, whose third review conference just successfully concluded in Geneva. And the United States and the Soviet Union have taken

[1] Department of State, Current Policy No. 743.
[2] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

practical steps to avoid conflict. Our navies have long agreed to work together to prevent incidents at sea.[3] And we have set up and improved the Hot Line for crisis communications.[4]

In the nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva, the United States has advanced far-reaching proposals: a reduction by almost one-half in the most destabilizing weapons, strategic ballistic missile warheads, and elimination of the whole class of U.S. and Soviet longer range INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] missiles worldwide—all leading ultimately to the complete elimination of nuclear arms. We repeatedly have stressed our readiness for give-and-take and to consider alternative proposals. Each of our proposals has been followed up by further attempts to find common ground with the Soviet Union. We have offered tradeoffs and made clear our readiness to take account of legitimate Soviet concerns to obtain an agreement that would enhance strategic stability and strengthen deterrence.

Progress at Geneva has been slow. Thus far the Soviet Union has not negotiated with the responsiveness that the talks require. Nonetheless, our determination to reach an equitable agreement has not wavered.

In this spirit, President Reagan last June decided to continue our policy of taking no action that would undercut the limits of previous agreements, to the extent the Soviet Union shows comparable restraint.[5] Despite serious reservations about those agreements, and serious concerns about the Soviet record of noncompliance, the President made this decision to foster a climate of truly mutual restraint to facilitate progress in arms control.

While the most direct path to a safer world is through equitable, verifiable reductions, we also see value in verifiable limitations on nuclear testing. For that reason, President Reagan, in his speech to this body last year, proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union exchange visits of experts at test sites to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests.[6] This would significantly improve confidence in the verifiability of proposed treaty limits on underground testing. The Soviet Union rejected this offer. Nevertheless, last July, the President issued an unconditional invitation for a Soviet team to observe and measure a nuclear test at the Nevada test site.[7] We again call on the Soviet Union to take up this offer, which is a concrete, positive step toward *verifiable* restrictions on nuclear testing.

When the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty[8] was signed in 1972, it was assumed that tight limits on defensive systems would make

[3] 23 UST 1168, TIAS 7379, 852 UNTS 151; Protocol, 24 UST 1063, TIAS 7624.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 236–238; *ibid., 1971*, pp. 635–639; *ibid., 1984*, pp. 520–523.
[5] Document 100.
[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, p. 692.
[7] Document 125.
[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff.

possible real reductions in strategic offensive arms. But the Soviet Union has never agreed to any meaningful reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Instead, it has continued an unprecedented military buildup—particularly in heavy ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] with a first-strike capability—which is eroding the basis on which deterrence has rested for decades. The strategy of reliance on offensive retaliation to preserve deterrence and prevent war thus is being called into question by Soviet actions.

The answer is, first, for us both to agree strategically significant, verifiable reductions in the numbers and destructive potential of offensive weapons. But there are additional ways to redress the problem. President Reagan has directed our scientists and engineers to examine—in light of new technologies and fully in accord with the ABM Treaty—the feasibility of defense against ballistic missile attack. Strategic defense could give our children and grandchildren a safer world. We would continue to rely on deterrence to prevent war, but deterrence would be based more on denying success to a potential attacker and less on threatening massive mutual destruction. Such a means of deterrence should be safer and more stable. Our goal is not to achieve superiority but to add to the security of both sides. As former Soviet Premier Kosygin said, an antimissile system "is intended not for killing people but for saving human lives." [9]

We want to cooperate with the Soviet Union in making progress on these most important of all issues. Progress requires—it demands—good will, realism, and honesty. Behind the curtain that encloses Soviet society, free from the open debate we see in the West, a major strategic defense program has proceeded for decades. The current Soviet leaders know that. In the past 20 years, the Soviet Union has spent about as much on strategic defense as on their offensive nuclear forces. They know that. The Soviets have the world's most active military space program, last year conducting about 100 space launches—some 80% of which were purely military in nature—compared to a total of about 20 U.S. space launches. The Soviets know that, too. They deploy the world's only ABM system, whose nuclear-armed interceptors and other components are undergoing extensive modernization. They are researching many of the same new technologies as we and are ahead in some. And the Soviet Union has the world's only extensively tested and fully operational antisatellite system. The Soviet leaders know full well their own efforts in these fields. Their propaganda about American programs is blatantly one-sided and not to be taken seriously.

So let's get down to real business, with the seriousness the subject deserves. And let us do so in the quiet of the negotiating room, where we can really make progress on narrowing our differences.

Progress needs to be made in other arms control areas as well. Restraints against chemical and biological weapons have eroded in

[9] *Ibid., 1967,* p. 60.

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recent years as international agreements have been violated by the Soviet Union and others. In April 1984 the United States proposed a comprehensive treaty for a global ban on chemical weapons.[10] We will again introduce a resolution on chemical weapons in the First Committee. We must have talks on serious, *verifiable* proposals.

To reduce the risk of conflict through miscalculation, we and our Atlantic allies have proposed significant confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe. To enhance security in Central Europe, we have repeatedly sought ways to move the mutual and balanced for reduction talks in Vienna forward.

In sum, the United States and the Soviet Union now have a historic opportunity to reduce the risk of war. President Reagan looks forward to his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in November. We have a long agenda. The United States is working hard to make it a productive meeting. And we want the meeting itself to give further impetus to the wide-ranging dialogue on which we both are already embarked. Soviet acts of good faith and willingness to reach fair agreements will be more than matched on the American side.

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183. Letter From the Israeli Resident Representative (Katz) to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Blix): Attacks on Nuclear Facilities, September 23, 1985 [1]

I have the honour to refer to your statement of 23 September 1985, reporting on the efforts you made in response to the mandate given to you by Resolution 425 of the General Conference 1984, and in order to clarify the position of the Government of Israel regarding this item I would like to make the following statement:

—The Government of Israel appreciates very much the major efforts you have personally made in carrying out your mandate and in striving to achieve a solution. Unfortunately, as your report has made clear, this has not as yet been achieved.

—From the very beginning of your efforts, the Government of Israel has offered you its fullest co-operation and in the course of the discussions a number of basic principles were formulated with which the Government of Israel could fully subscribe.

A. One of the main tasks of the IAEA is to promote the contribution of atomic energy, health and prosperity throughout the world.

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[10] *Ibid., 1984*, pp. 269–299.
[1] ACDA files.

B. States developing and utilizing nuclear energy are entitled to be confident that nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes will not be subjected to armed attack.

C. All states must refrain from attacking or threatening to attack nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, it being understood that the safeguards system operated by the IAEA brings evidence of the peaceful operation of a facility.

D. Fora which are competent for this purpose should work out binding agreements protecting nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes from attack and threat of attack.

Already last year the policy of the Government of Israel specified that nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes be inviolable from military attacks, and that Israel has great respect for the manner in which the IAEA fulfils its mission in the field of safeguards.

Israel holds that all states must refrain from attacking or threatening to attack nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, and that the safeguards system operated by IAEA brings evidence of the peaceful operation of a facility.

It is within this context that Israel reconfirms that under its stated policy it will not attack or threaten to attack any nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes either in the Middle East or anywhere else.

Israel will support any subsequent action in competent fora convened to work out binding agreements protecting nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes from attack and threat to attack.

We believe that the record demonstrates that Israel has attempted to facilitate the mission of the Director General in a very forthcoming manner.

We believe that the clear position taken by the Government of Israel as stated above fully responds to Resolution 425 and should be accepted by the General Conference as an answer to your wish as well as that of many others to see this matter behind us.

I would appreciate it very much if you would circulate this letter to all delegations under item 10 of the agenda.

184. Report by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment on Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies: Executive Summary—Concluding Remarks [Extract], September 24, 1985 [1]

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[1] U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies*, pp. 31–34.

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Debated Issues

The question of the role of ballistic missile defense in U.S. national security is complex. However, national debate has tended to polarize between support of and opposition to the SDI.

Both proponents and opponents agree on two major points:

- *The United States should adopt whatever BMD posture will be most likely to minimize the risk of nuclear war.*
- *The United States should be carrying out some research on BMD technology.*

The strongest disagreements regarding SDI center on two related issues:

- *How likely is it that technology will reach a point where it would be desirable to deploy BMD?* This disagreement partly reflects differing guesses about the future cost and rate of technological progress. More significantly, however, differing views about how valuable BMD would be for our national security, and how effective a BMD system must be for the benefits of deployment to outweigh the risks.
- *Should the research program be carried out with the vigorous commitment that characterizes the SDI?* The central idea of the SDI seems to be an ardent belief that a program of urgent, centrally directed, and generously funded research and development would have a good probability of bringing us within a few years to the point where we would be justified in deciding to deploy a high-technology ballistic missile defense system. The central concern of SDI opponents, apart from skepticism that such a system could be effective and affordable, is that the technology development may be much more likely to destabilize the superpower strategic balance and set off an arms race than to justify a decision to deploy. For this reason they favor a less urgent, less expensive, and less prominent research program, mainly to hedge against unexpected technological breakthroughs and as a means of deterring the Soviets from adandoning the ABM Treaty [2] by providing the United States with an adequate response if they do.

Proponents of SDI are not all of one mind. However, they stress some or all of the following:

1. The most important national goal we can have is assured survival; that is, President Reagan's goal of a world in which "free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not depend on the threat of instant retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reach our soil or that of our allies." [3] This goal may be attainable, particularly if the development of defenses induces the Soviets to agree on reductions of offensive forces, and therefore it is worth pursuing vigorously.

2. Even if we cannot achieve assured survival, a strategic policy that relies to a significant extent on strategic defenses would be better for the United States than our ex-

[2] The Treaty is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[3] *Ibid., 1983*, p. 200.

isting policy of deterring aggression only by the threat of retaliation by our offensive nuclear forces.

3. The strategic balance has gradually been shifting against the United States, and developing and deploying ballistic missile defenses (with or without accompanying arms control measures limiting strategic offensive forces) offers the best opportunity to reverse this trend.

4. Many of the new ideas proposed for ballistic missile defense are now ripe for intensive research and development. If the United States develops these technologies vigorously, we can expect major improvements in potential BMD capabilities. There are grounds for believing that defensive technologies may improve so much faster than offensive technologies that it will become cheaper to deploy defenses than to deploy offensive countermeasures to overcome the defenses. This would give the Soviets a powerful incentive to agree to reduce offensive arms and concentrate on building their own defensive systems. If the Soviets exploited these BMD technologies and we did not, our security might be severely jeopardized.

Opponents of SDI argue some or all of the following:

1. Assured survival is so extremely improbable in the foreseeable future as to be irrelevant as a national goal. If it could be attained at all, it would require drastic reductions and stringent limitations of all offensive nuclear arms even if very effective defenses could be deployed. But since the vigorous pursuit of defensive capabilities now would make such offensive arms control much less likely to be attained, we should pursue offensive arms control first and defensive deployments afterwards, if at all.

2. Ballistic missile defenses that are highly effective, but not adequate to provide assured survival, could create dangerous instabilities. Developing them would set off an offensive/defensive arms race. Furthermore, defensive deployments could provide great incentives to preempt in a crisis by holding out the possibility of "victory" to the side launching a massive first strike and defending against the presumably less effective retaliatory second strike. If deployed BMD systems were themselves vulnerable to attack, the incentive to strike first could be even greater.

3. The buildup of Soviet strategic forces in recent years, while certainly undesirable, has not reduced the U.S. ability to deter a Soviet attack. The continuing Soviet buildup does not pose a serious threat to the credibility of our deterrent. A U.S. strategic defense would not improve the strategic balance. Modernization of our strategic forces and vigorous efforts to make the arms control process effective would be far more likely than BMD to improve U.S. security.

4. While nobody can predict with certainty the results of future research, it is highly unlikely that we could develop BMD systems which could not be overcome by affordable Soviet countermeasures. Therefore, the SDI is not the most fruitful area in which to concentrate our limited resources for military R & D. While research on BMD is necessary, an overly vigorous U.S. BMD program would be likely to stimulate a buildup of Soviet offensive forces, which would preclude meaningful offensive arms control measures and make it harder to maintain the survivability of our retaliatory forces.

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OTA Findings

1.—*Both the capability of a BMD system to defend the United States, and the strategic value to the United States of any given BMD capability, depend on the interaction of all the kinds of the defenses actually deployed with all the kinds of offensive threat against which they must actually defend. In the past, the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons has meant that offensive strategic technologies have had a large and fundamental advantage over defensive technologies. Unless this imbalance between the offense and defense disappears, strategic defenses might be plausible for limited purposes, such as defense of ICBM silos or complication of enemy attack plans, but not for the more ambitious goal of assuring the survival of U.S. society.* This imbalance might be changed either by political decisions of both superpowers to reduce the kinds and levels of offensive deployments to capabilities much less than available technology permits, or by development and deployment of defensive systems able to overcome whatever offenses could be developed and deployed in the same period. While it is certainly possible that defensive technological development could outpace the development of offensive weapons and countermeasures to defenses, this does not appear very likely.

2.—*Assured survival of the U.S. population appears impossible to achieve if the Soviets are determined to deny it to us.* This is because the technical difficulties of protecting cities against an all-out attack can be overcome only if the attack is limited by restraints on the quantity and quality of the attacking forces. The Reagan Administration currently appears to share this assessment.

3.—*If the Soviets chose to cooperate in a transition to mutual assured survival, it would probably be necessary to negotiate adequately verifiable arms control agreements on reducing present and restricting future offensive forces and on the manner, effectiveness, and timing of defensive deployments.* OTA was unable to find anyone who could propose a plausible agreement for offensive arms reductions and a cooperative transition that could be reached before both the Soviets and the United States learn more about the likely effectiveness and costs of advanced BMD technologies. Indeed, such a transition could hardly be planned until engineering development was well advanced on the actual defensive systems to be deployed. Even then, adequate verification would be difficult. Without such agreement on the nature and timing of a buildup of defensive forces, it would be a radical departure from previous policies for either side to make massive reductions in its offensive forces in the face of the risk that the other side's defenses might become highly effective against the reduced offenses before one's own defenses were ready. Such a transition would be more appealing to both sides if BMD technologies could be developed which cost less to deploy than the offensive countermeasures needed to overcome them than it would be if the historic and current advantages of offense over defense persist. In essence, *the question is whether a vigorous U.S. program to develop BMD, and the prospect that both sides might deploy effective BMD, will make the Soviets more*

willing than they have been in the past (or now say they are) to agree to deep reductions of strategic offensive forces on terms acceptable to the United States.

4.—*There is great uncertainty about the strategic situation that would arise if BMD deployment took place without agreement between the United States and Soviet Union to reduce offensive forces as defensive forces grew.* Until the actual offensive systems (including ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers, and cruise missiles) and defensive systems (including BMD and air defenses) were specified and well understood, no one could know with confidence whether a situation of acute crisis instability (i.e. striking first could appear to lead to "victory") could be avoided. A fear on either side that the other could obtain such a first strike capability could lead both sides to build up both their offenses and their defenses. Such build-ups would make it even more difficult to negotiate a cooperative transition from offense dominance to defense dominance.

5.—*The technology is reasonably well in hand to build a BMD system that could raise significantly the price in nuclear warheads of a Soviet attack on hardened targets in the United States; such a system, if combined with a re-basing of U.S. ICBMs, could protect a substantial fraction of those U.S. land-based missiles against a Soviet first strike.* However, it is not clear whether BMD would be the best way to provide missile survivability, nor is it clear whether the combination of a U.S. program protecting ICBMs and the Soviet response—perhaps expansion of their Moscow defense to other Soviet cities—would on balance strengthen or weaken our deterrent.

6.—*It is impossible to say at this time how effective an affordable BMD system could be.* To answer this question requires extensive research on sensor, command and control, and weapons technologies; and on system architecture (including survivability and computer software); on counter-counter-measures. Credible cost estimates based on this research will also be necessary.

7.—*The decision whether to push ahead vigorously with the SDI or to scale back the Administration proposal involves a balancing of opportunities against risks, in the face of considerable uncertainty.* The SDI offers an *opportunity* to substantially increase our nation's safety *if* we obtain great technical success and a substantial degree of Soviet cooperation. The argument that sufficiently great U.S. technical success would force the Soviets to cooperate in their own security interests is logically compelling, but there can be no assurance that the Soviets would actually behave as we think they should. The SDI carries a *risk* that a vigorous BMD research program could bring on an offensive and defensive arms race, and a further risk that BMD deployment, if it took place without Soviet cooperation, could create severe instabilities. Whether BMD deployed in the face of intense Soviet efforts to counter it would enhance U.S. security depends on a judgment that decreased Soviet confidence that they could destroy targets in the United States or on allied territory would, in Soviet minds, outweigh their increased confidence that targets in the Soviet Union would survive because of their own BMD.

8.—*Whatever type of BMD research program the United States decides to pursue, it would be prudent to carry out that research in such a way as to minimize Soviet*

incentives to decide to deploy their own BMD beyond the limits set by the ABM Treaty before the United States has completed the research necessary to make our decision. This might be done by unilaterally restraining our BMD research. We would have greater influence over Soviet actions, however, if we reached agreement with the Soviets regarding disputed interpretations of the ABM Treaty—including the boundaries of permitted research—and regarding the conditions under which future BMD deployments would be desirable. Such an agreement would also reduce Soviet incentives to build up their offensive forces in order to overcome anticipated U.S. defenses. However, it must be recognized that acting to deter a Soviet decision to deploy BMD may require limiting and slowing our own BMD research.

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185. Report by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment on Antisatellite Weapons: Executive Summary—Principal Findings [Extract], September 24, 1985 [1]

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Current Soviet military satellites pose only a limited threat to U.S. military capabilities, but future space systems will pose a greater threat.

The Soviet Union currently uses satellites to perform a wide variety of tasks including missile launch detection, communications, navigation, meteorological surveillance, photographic and radar reconnaissance, and collection of electromagnetic intelligence (e.g., radar emissions). Many of these satellites, although not "weapons" themselves, support and enhance the effectiveness of terrestrial Soviet forces that would engage in direct combat. For example, if navigation satellites improve munition delivery accuracies, then fewer munitions are required to accomplish a given objective. The growing military utility of satellites has rekindled U.S. interest in ASAT weapons.

Some Soviet satellites already supply limited targeting information to other terrestrial assets. The Administration has expressed its concern about:

> . . . present and projected Soviet space systems which, while not weapons themselves, are designed to support directly the U.S.S.R.'s terrestrial forces in the event of a conflict. These include ocean reconnaissance satellites which use radar and electronic intelligence in efforts to provide targeting data to Soviet

[1] U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control*, pp. 3–13.

weapon platforms which can quickly attack U.S. and allied surface fleets.[2]

At present Soviet radar (RORSAT) and electronic intelligence (EORSAT) ocean reconnaissance satellites pose only a limited threat to U.S. and allied surface fleets. RORSATs and EORSATs are typically deployed at altitudes and inclinations which offer limited observation range. Although the observation "swath" of these satellites will eventually cover most of the Earth, if only one or two of these satellites are operational—as has been customary in peacetime—then a ship would be exposed to observation only intermittently and might successfully evade the satellite. The Soviet Union could increase the number of deployed RORSATs and EORSATs, thereby making evasion more difficult. Other countermeasures exist which could further reduce the threat posed by these satellites, but such measures might not be available to merchant resupply vessels operating during a protracted nonnuclear conflict.

In the future, sophisticated communication, navigation, and surveillance satellites are likely to play a greater role in all levels of terrestrial conflict. This will increase the incentive for both the United States and the Soviet Union to develop and deploy ASAT weapons.

Possible responses to the threat posed by Soviet military satellites are numerous and diverse.

A variety of options are available to mitigate the threat to U.S. and allied security posed by Soviet military satellites (MILSATs). These options include nondestructive as well as destructive measures; those presented below are not mutually exclusive.

- Possible nondestructive responses to Soviet MILSATs:

  —*Force Augmentation:* U.S. combat or support forces could be increased to counter the increase in effectiveness which Soviet forces could derive from use of military satellites. Force augmentation is often, but not always, more costly than other means of mitigating the threat posed by Soviet military satellites.

  —*Passive Countermeasures:* By using passive measures to conceal or disguise their identity and nature, U.S. forces could reduce the utility of Soviet reconnaissance satellites. For example, assets now detectable by radar might be redesigned to reflect radar signals only weakly in order to evade detection by radar satellites, or radio silence might be practiced, or covert signaling techniques used to prevent detection by satellites that collect signals intelligence.

  —*Electronic Countermeasures and Electro-optical Countermeasures:* Electronic countermeasures such as "jamming" (i.e., overloading enemy receivers with strong signals) and "spoofing" (i.e., sending decep-

[2] President Ronald Reagan. *Report to the Congress: U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control*, March 31, 1984. Reprinted in *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 204–219. The passage quoted appears on p. 210.

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tive signals) could be used to interfere with satellite functions. Electro-optical countermeasures such as "dazzling" (temporary "blinding") or spoofing optical sensors are also available. However, these countermeasures—especially spoofing—require detailed knowledge of the satellite systems (e.g., operational frequencies, receiver sensitivity, etc.) against which they are directed.

- Possible Destructive Responses to Soviet MILSATs:
  - —*Inadvertent But Inherent ASAT Capabilities:* The inherent ASAT capabilities of nuclear weapons such as ICBMs and SLBMs could be used to destroy low-altitude Soviet satellites; with some modifications, these weapons might also be used to attack satellites at higher altitudes. Some types of nonnuclear interceptors (e.g., that demonstrated in the U.S. Army's 1984 Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE)) which might eventually be developed and deployed for BMD purposes, would have some inherent ASAT capability. Finally, any highly maneuverable spacecraft capable of noncooperative rendezvous—e.g., the U.S. Space Shuttle—has some ASAT potential.
  - —*Planned ASAT Weapons*: When operational, the current USAF MV ASAT weapon will be able to destroy Soviet military satellites in low-Earth orbit.
  - —*Advanced ASAT Weapons*: Space- or ground-based directed-energy weapons or advanced kinetic-energy weapons could be developed that would be able to destroy Soviet satellites beyond the range of existing or planned U.S. ASAT weapons.

The United States is now more dependent on satellites to perform important military functions than is the Soviet Union.

In choosing between ASAT weapon development and arms control, one wishes to pursue that course which makes the greater contribution to U.S. national security. This is often characterized as a choice between developing a capability to destroy Soviet satellites while assuming U.S. satellites will also be at risk, or protecting U.S. satellites to some extent through arms control while forfeiting effective ASAT weapons. The better choice could, in principle, be identified by comparing the utility which the United States expects to derive from its military satellites with the disutility which the United States would expect to suffer from Soviet MILSATs during a conflict. Such a comparision—although possible in principle—is made exceedingly difficult by the number of conflict scenarios which must be considered and by the lack of consensus or official declaration about the relative likelihood and undesirability of each scenario.

Although national utility for space system support is difficult to assess precisely and meaningless to compare between nations, it is apparent that the United States is more dependent on MILSATs *to perform important military functions* than is the Soviet Union. The United States has global security commitments and force deployments, while the Soviet Union has few forces committed or deployed outside the

borders and littoral waters of members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and Cuba. The United States has corresponding requirements for global and oceanic command and control communications (C^3) capabilities and relies largely on space systems to provide these requirements. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, can rely on landline communications systems and over-the-horizon radio links for many of its C^3 needs. Satellite communications links are used by the Soviet Union but are not as essential as those of the United States. In addition, the Soviet Union has greater capability to reconstitute satellites which are lost in action; hence even to the extent the Soviet Union is dependent on space system support, it is less dependent on individual satellites for some functions. The United States also has fewer alternative terrestrial means for collecting intelligence than does the Soviet Union, which can exploit the freedom and openness of U.S. society for this purpose.

Soviet ASAT capabilities threaten U.S. military capabilities to some extent now and potentially to a much greater extent in the future.

The Soviet Union tested a coorbital satellite interceptor system from 1968 until its self-imposed moratorium of August 1983. The Reagan Administration considers this ASAT system to be operational. The interceptors are believed to be capable of attacking satellites at altitudes of up to 5,000 kilometers, depending on their orbital inclination. At pr[illegible]t there appear to be only two launchpads for Soviet coorbital int[illegible]ors, both located at Tyuratam.

The existing Soviet ASAT weapon may be effective for negating low-altitude U.S. military satellites, such as are used for navigation (Transit), meteorological surveillance (Defense Meteorological Support Program satellites), and other purposes. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle has stated:

> We believe that this Soviet anti-satellite capability is effective against critical U.S. satellites in relatively low orbit, that in wartime we would have to face the possibility, indeed the likelihood, that critical assets of the United States would be destroyed by Soviet anti-satellite systems. . . . If, in wartime, the Soviet Union were to attack critical satellites on which our knowledge of the unfolding conventional war depended, . . . we would have little choice but . . . to deter continuing attacks on our eyes and ears, without which we could not hope to prosecute successfully a conventional war.[3]

The current Soviet interceptor and the booster that it has been tested with cannot reach critical U.S. early warning and communication satellites in high orbits. If the Soviet ASAT weapon were mated

[3] Statement of The Honorable Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy), in *Hearings before the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Senate Committee on Armed Services: Review of the FY 1985 Defense Authorization Bill.* Mar. 15, 1984 [S.Hrg. 98–724. Pt. 7., p. 3452]. [Footnote in original.]

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with a larger booster—a procedure which has yet to be tested—it might be able to reach these U.S. satellites.

In addition to the coorbital interceptor, the Soviet Union is testing ground-based lasers which the Reagan Administration believes have ASAT capabilities. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that the U.S.S.R. could test a space-based laser within the decade.[4] Advanced directed-energy weapons such as lasers and particle beam weapons—if developed and deployed—could give the Soviets an "all altitude," "instantaneous kill" capability. As the United States increases its reliance on space systems to perform vital military functions (e.g., the MILSTAR communication satellite system), an increase in Soviet ASAT capabilities could create a significant threat to U.S. national security.

Aside from its intentional ASAT capabilities, the Soviet Union could currently attack low-altitude satellites with its nuclear ABMs, ICBMs, and SLBMs. With some modification, these nuclear assets might also be used to attack satellites in higher orbits. Current Soviet spacecraft (i.e., Soyuz, Salyut), because of their limited maneuver and rendezvous capabilities, do not have a significant ASAT potential. Future Soviet spacecraft, such as the expected Soviet "Shuttle" and space plane, will have greater inherent ASAT capabilities. The Soviets also have the technological capability to conduct electronic warfare against space systems.

Several technologies on the horizon could lead to a new generation of highly capable ASATs.

The following advanced ASATs could be developed and deployed by either the United States or the Soviet Union:

- *Space Mines:* These would be deployed within lethal range and would continuously trail their target. Using a conventional or nuclear explosive charge, a space mine would destroy its quarry almost instantly on command or (if salvage-fused) when attacked or disturbed.
- *High-Power Radio-Frequency Weapons:* These would be devices capable of producing intense, damaging beams of electromagnetic radiation that could be used to jam communication and radar systems at low power levels or to overload and burn out satellite electronics at higher power levels;
- *High-Energy Laser Weapons:* High-energy lasers may eventually be capable of producing intense, damaging beams of electromagnetic radiation that could jam optical communication and sensor systems at low power levels or cause permanent damage at higher power levels. Ground-based lasers would have infrequent opportunities to attack satellites but, unless attacked themselves, could shoot inexpensively and repeatedly. Space-based reflectors could also be used to relay laser beams from ground-based lasers to their targets. Space-based lasers might be able to attack several

[4] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 1985, p. 44. [Footnote in original.]

satellites in quick succession; space-based X-ray lasers might be able to attack several satellites instantly and simultaneously.

- *Neutral Particle Beam Weapons:* Powerful particle accelerators, similar to those now used in scientific research, might eventually be developed which could destroy the hardened electronics of a spacecraft.
- *Kinetic-Energy Weapons:* Space- or ground-based kinetic-energy weapons (similar to the current U.S. MV ASAT) would probably be small, homing vehicles that destroy their target by colliding with it at extremely high velocities.

Possible U.S. responses to the Soviet ASAT threat are numerous and diverse.

The United States could respond to the threat posed by the Soviet ASAT threat in several ways; both unilateral and diplomatic options are available.

- Possible unilateral responses to Soviet ASATs:
  - —*Reduce Dependence on Military Satellites:* No matter what satellite survivability or arms control measures are taken, there will always be some risk that critical satellites can be destroyed or rendered inoperable. The United States must exercise caution in the extent of its reliance on space assets to perform tasks essential to the national security. Nonetheless, some space systems perform vital military functions which cannot be duplicated—or can be duplicated only imperfectly— by terrestrial systems.
  - —*Passive Countermeasures:* Passive countermeasures such as hiding, deception (use of decoys), evasion (maneuvering), hardening (making satellites more durable), and proliferation (adding more satellites) all offer significant protection from the current and perhaps future Soviet ASAT weapons. Decoys would probably be effective against a wide variety of ASAT weapons and will be particularly economical for the protection of small satellites capable of being imitated by small, cheap decoys. Combinations of these passive responses—e.g., decoys for "dark" space satellites—could offer even greater protection than individual measures alone.
  - —*Active Countermeasures:* Active countermeasures may be destructive or nondestructive. Destructive countermeasures could include giving satellites a self-defense capability or providing critical satellites with an escort defense. Nondestructive countermeasures might include electronic countermeasures and electro-optical countermeasures such as jamming. Attacking Soviet ASAT control facilities is also a potential—though dangerous—active countermeasure.
  - —*Deterrence:* The Soviets might be deterred from attacking U.S. satellites if the United States declared its willingness to retaliate for attacks on U.S. space assets. Such retaliation could be against Soviet space assets, in which case the United States would need a capable ASAT weapon, or it could be against Soviet terrestrial assets. The former alternative assumes that the Soviets value the preservation of their satellites at least as highly as they value the destruction of U.S. satellites. The latter

alternative, of course, carries a greater risk of uncontrolled escalation, if deterrence should fail.

—*Keep-Out Zones:* The United States could declare and defend protective zones around critical satellites. Defended keep-out zones could offer significant protection against current ASAT weapons for some satellites. This subject is discussed in detail below.

- Possible diplomatic responses to Soviet ASATs:

—*Arms Control:* The United States, the Soviet Union, and other spacefaring nations could negotiate limitations on the testing, deployment, or hostile use of anti-satellite systems.

—*Rules of the Road:* The United States, the Soviet Union, and other spacefaring nations could negotiate restrictions on potentially provocative activities in space, such as unexplained close approaches to foreign satellites or irradiation of foreign satellites with low-power directed-energy beams. With such agreed restrictions in force, these activities would justify defensive or retaliatory measures.

Of the future ASAT weapons now foreseeable, those which would be most effective if used in a preemptive or aggressive surprise attack would be space-based and therefore subject to attack by similar weapons.

Preemptive attack would be an attractive countermeasure to space-based ASAT weapons. If each side feared that only a preemptive attack could counter the risk of being defeated by enemy preemption, then a crisis situation could be extremely unstable. While salvage-fusing, if it proved practicable, would diminish this risk, it would create a risk of space war breaking out by accident. For example if a meteoroid destroyed a satellite, it might set off a chain reaction of salvage-fusing which would destroy all satellites. To the extent that protection was sought through "shoot-back" rather than "shoot-first" tactics, a premium would be placed on having the biggest and best ASATs deployed, which could lead to an intense arms race.

Foreseeable passive or active countermeasures may be inadequate to guarantee the survival of large military satellites attacked by advanced ASAT weapons.

Passive or active countermeasures might have only limited effectiveness against very advanced ASAT or BMD weapons. For example, it might be uneconomical to rely on passive measures to protect large and expensive satellites from a powerful neutral particle beam weapon. Shielding satellites against a neutral particle beam weapon could cost more than it would to scale up the weapon to penetrate the shielding, and such a weapon could slew its beam quickly enough to make evasion infeasible. With such a weapon it might be as economical to damage spare satellites as they are brought "on line" as it would be to damage initially operational satellites.

Active measures, such as "shoot-back" with a weapon of longer effective range, could provide protection against some ASAT weapons but not against weapons such as space mines or single-pulse lasers

which could destroy satellites instantly and without warning. However, it might not be economical to attack satellite systems composed of many small, cheap satellites—and possibly decoys as well—with expensive advanced ASAT weapons. Such satellites could perform a number of important functions (e.g., communication or navigation) without encouraging a proliferation of advanced weapons to attack them. Therefore, although it would be difficult to protect *individual* satellites, satellite *systems* performing some critical functions might retain a fair degree of survivability.

A commitment to satellite survivability is important whether or not ASAT development, or arms control, or both, are pursued.

The United States should place more emphasis on means to ensure the survivability of critical military satellites and, particularly, their associated ground stations and data links, regardless of whether ASAT limitations are agreed upon. The existence of non-ASAT weapons (e.g., ICBMs, ABMs) and space systems (e.g., maneuverable spacecraft) with some inherent ASAT capability makes it impossible to ban the ability to attack satellites. Therefore, even under the most restrictive ASAT arms control regime, programs for satellite survivability and countermeasures must be pursued. In the absence of arms control limitations on ASATs, ensuring satellite survivability will be a more demanding task since highly capable directed-energy ASAT weapons or space mines could be deployed.

In the absence of restrictions on the development or deployment of ASAT weapons, satellite survivability can be enhanced if the United States is willing to negotiate or declare keep-out zones and is able thereafter to defend such zones against unauthorized penetration by foreign spacecraft.

Although passive or active countermeasures alone may be insufficient to protect satellites, if combined with keep-out zones they could offer a significant degree of protection from certain ASAT weapons. Without keep-out zones space mines could be predeployed next to all critical military space systems. A keep-out zone of sufficient size would reduce the effectiveness of such weapons. However, advanced, directed-energy or kinetic-energy ASAT weapons may be able to function effectively even outside of very large keep-out zones.

Should ASAT development be pursued, the United States will need to formulate an employment policy.

At present, no clear consensus exists among those Administration military space policy analysts and executives interviewed by OTA on the conditions under which the United States would attack foreign satellites or on the manner in which it would retaliate for an attack on U.S. satellites. If the United States continues with its ASAT development and deployment plans, it will be necessary to formulate an employment policy.

If the United States wishes to enhance the deterrent value of its ASAT weapons, it may choose to publicize certain aspects of its

employment policy. It might, for example, promise that the United States would not use its ASAT capabilities in an aggressive or preemptive first strike but might use them in a defensive or retaliatory reaction to an attack against the United States or its allies, even if U.S. satellites were not attacked. That is, the United States might announce a "no first strike but possible first use" policy for the employment of ASAT weapons as it has for the employment of nuclear weapons.

If defensive satellites (DSATs) are deployed by the United States to defend its satellites, or if certain satellites are given self-defense capabilities, the United States would have to decide under what circumstances it would use these assets and whether it wished to publicly announce this employment policy. The United States might declare in advance that it would fire at satellites suspected of being ASATs if they approached U.S. satellites within possibly lethal range. However, such a declaration would have an uncertain legal status and might generate considerable political opposition from both spacefaring and non-spacefaring nations.

Certain arms control provisions would reduce the probability that advanced ASATs will be developed or deployed. However, arms control could not guarantee the survival of U.S. satellites attacked by residual or covert Soviet ASAT weapons.

Arms control provisions, such as a ban on all testing of all systems "in an ASAT mode," would reduce the likelihood that the Soviet Union could successfully develop and deploy advanced, highly capable ASAT weapons. The categories of weapons eliminated might include space mines capable of "shadowing" valuable military assets in any orbit, directed-energy weapons with kill radii of hundreds to thousands of kilometers, and advanced kinetic-energy weapons. In the absence of an agreement limiting their development, each side would have a strong incentive to seek continually more effective means to attack threatening satellites and to defend valuable assets. In the absence of adequate countermeasures, the "instantaneous kill" capability of some advanced ASATs might be destabilizing in a crisis, because they would give each side an incentive to "shoot first" or else risk the loss of its space assets.

A ban on testing weapons in an ASAT mode would be less effective at reducing the threat posed by weapon systems with inherent ASAT capability and by the existing Soviet ASAT weapon. ICBMs, SLBMs, and ABM interceptors with nuclear payloads are examples of systems with residual ASAT capability. Although these systems lack the kind of precision guidance necessary to actually collide with a satellite, the long-range destructiveness of their nuclear payloads makes them potentially effective ASATs. The Shuttle's recent success at retrieving satellites strongly suggests the ASAT potential of future maneuverable spacecraft, although costly vehicles like the Shuttle would probably not risk approaching satellites which might be booby-trapped. However, the range, effectiveness, and reaction time of even advanced maneuverable spacecraft not designed as weapons would be less than

those of intentional ASAT weapons. Although the development of maneuverable spacecraft would not be inhibited by most ASAT testing limitations, some limits could be placed on operating them "in an ASAT mode."

Arms control provisions might substitute for passive and active countermeasures in reducing the threat posed by ASAT weapons, but arms control would be more effective if combined with countermeasures.

U.S. satellites can be protected either by increasing their survivability or by reducing the threat posed by Soviet ASAT weapons. Passive or active countermeasures are designed to do the former while arms control provisions would hopefully do the latter. In considering the advantages and disadvantages of ASAT arms control, ASAT development, and countermeasures, it is important to consider them in packages. A combination of arms control provisions and passive countermeasures, for example, or of passive countermeasures and active countermeasures, could provide greater security than each component of such a package might provide alone.

The benefits of most ASAT limitations conflict with the benefits of ASAT exploitation.

Although ASAT arms control might prevent the Soviet Union from developing advanced, highly capable ASAT weapons, it would also place a similar restriction on the United States. Therefore, although U.S. satellites might be less vulnerable to ASAT attack, the United States would have to give up the ability to strike at Soviet satellites which threaten U.S. and allied forces. Although arms control might prevent an expensive and potentially destabilizing arms race in space, it would also limit the ability of the United States to use its comparative advantage in advanced technology to protect U.S. satellites and place threatening Soviet satellites at risk.

Not all arms control regimes are inconsistent with ASAT development or deployment. "Rules of the road" for space—e.g., negotiated keep-out zones—might be pursued simultaneously with ASAT research, testing, and deployment.

Effective ASAT arms control would likely place significant restrictions on the testing and deployment of future ballistic missile defense systems.

There is considerable overlap between BMD and ASAT technologies. Since even a poor ballistic missile defense system would probably have excellent ASAT capabilities, any ASAT limitation or test ban would almost certainly impede BMD development. Conversely, technology development ostensibly for advanced ASAT systems might provide some limited BMD capabilities, or, at minimum, information useful in BMD research.

Some available unilateral actions have clear benefits:

- *Deployment of attack sensors* on valuable satellites in order to provide information to support a retaliation decision;

- *Deployment of a space-based, space surveillance system* in order to provide information to support verification of compliance with future arms control agreements; to provide warning information required for effective evasion or dispensing of decoys; to support a decision to retaliate in the event of an attack; and to provide information required for the targeting of ASAT/DSAT weapons; [5]
- *Hardening of military satellites* against nuclear effects to a modest degree in order to preclude "cheap kills" by nuclear-armed ICBMs, SLBMs, or ABMs;
- *Development or maintenance of electronic countermeasures and electro-optical countermeasures,* which would be relatively cheap, useful at all conflict levels, and unlikely to be prohibited by arms control agreements.

The ASAT weapon under development in the United States is sufficient to meet the threat posed by current, low-orbit Soviet military satellites.

Should the United States decide that it is in our national security interest to deploy ASAT weapons, the current MV program and, potentially, interceptors based on the recently tested HOE technology, are sufficient to respond to the threat posed by existing Soviet military satellites in low orbit. The current U.S. ASAT could be made even more effective by the addition of a space-based space surveillance system to aid the process of targeting and/or additional basing facilities.

Many of the functions performed by Soviet military satellites may eventually be performed by more capable satellites orbiting at altitudes out of reach of the U.S. MV. Should this happen, it would provide a strong incentive to extend the MV's capabilities by adding a larger booster or to develop a newer, more capable ASAT system.

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186. Statement by the Chinese Representative (Zhou Ping) to the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency: Chinese Voluntary Safeguards Offer [Extracts], September 24, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

China is a peace-loving country pursuing a foreign policy of peace. We are in favor of nuclear disarmament. We need an international environment of peace to carry out our modernization program. We are endeavoring to create and maintain such an environment of peace. The

[5] Because of its usefulness, such a surveillance system would be an attractive target for a Soviet ASAT attack. The ultimate utility of such a system, therefore, hinges on its survivability. [Footnote in source document.]

[1] ACDA files.

decision made by the Chinese Government not long ago on cutting China's armed forces by one million men is an action contributing to the maintenance of world peace. To China, peace and development are the two major goals of its basic state policies. As far as nuclear policy is concerned, China supports the peaceful application of nuclear energy all over the world and is ready to contribute to the promotion of using nuclear energy in industry, agriculture, people's health, and other fields for the benefit of mankind. All our present and future cooperation with other countries in the nuclear field will be limited only to peaceful purposes, and not for non-peaceful purposes. Our Premier Zhao Ziyang solemnly declared in 1984 that "China is not in favor of nuclear proliferation and will not engage in nuclear proliferation. Nor will it help other countries develop nuclear weapons." [2] This is the basic policy followed by China in its nuclear cooperation with other countries.

In line with China's peaceful nuclear policy, we have conducted serious studies on safeguards over civilian nuclear installations. Now we wish to state here that the Chinese Government has decided to voluntarily offer to place some of its civilian nuclear installations under IAEA's safeguards at an appropriate time and will have consultations with the agency on this matter. Here, I would like to point out with emphasis that this decision of the Chinese Government was made in line with China's independent foreign policy. It is not the result of any bilateral negotiations.

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187. Responses by President Reagan to Questions Submitted by *Le Figaro*: European Security and the Strategic Defense Initiative [Extract], September 26, 1985 [1]

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Q. From the point of view that the setting of a nuclear shield in the United States seems to put in question the principle of linkage, do you foresee a defense of Europe by conventional means? In your opinion, if there were to be a threat to European security and integrity, what would be the role of the French deterrent?

The President. Let me make clear that there is no thought whatever of calling into question the principle of linkage between the U.S. and its European allies. The U.S. remains fully committed to the defense of its European allies, and our research under the Strategic Defense Initiative seeks to strengthen that unalterable commitment.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, p. 410.
[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, October 7, 1985, pp. 1156–1158.

It will be years before we can make a judgment about the feasibility of defensive technologies. Meanwhile, we must continue to rely on our existing deterrent forces. NATO's strategy of flexible response remains as valid today as when it was first adopted.

The Strategic Defense Initiative does not replace the current energetic efforts to improve the conventional defenses of the alliance. Moreover, by countering ballistic missile threats against all members of the alliance, including the United States, strategic defenses would strengthen the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence and NATO's flexible response doctrine by reducing the vulnerability of United States reinforcements to Europe.

Finally, the United States fully supports the independent French nuclear deterrent force, and the Strategic Defense Initiative does not weaken or call into question that support.

Q. A corollary question, how do you intend to convince Europe, and especially West Germany, that SDI can improve their security?

The President. Research into new technologies which could provide effective defenses against nuclear attack is both prudent and necessary. Indeed, defensive systems are consistent with a policy of deterrence, both historically and in practical terms.

Moreover, the Soviet Union clearly believes in defenses. They continue to improve their ballistic missile defense system in place around Moscow. Their activities have violated the ABM Treaty and raise even more serious questions about their future intentions.[2] They have an extensive and longstanding strategic defense research program which is exploring many of the areas in which the United States is interested, and they have a sizable headstart. Thus, the question should be, can we afford not to pursue this research?

Effective defenses against ballistic missiles have the potential for enhancing deterrence by increasing an aggressor's uncertainties and helping reduce or eliminate the apparent military value of nuclear attack to an aggressor. The U.S. will continue its close consultations with our allies regarding SDI research. We would ultimately make a decision on whether to deploy strategic defense systems only after consultations with our allies and negotiations with the Soviet Union, as envisioned by the ABM Treaty.

Q. Is the Strategic Defense Initiative, to which you intend to associate your European allies, only an update of the ABM system, or does it further mean a revision by the United States of its commitment to a nuclear protection of Europe?

The President. The Strategic Defense Initiative is a research program to pursue vigorously important new technologies that may be used to create a defense against ballistic missiles, which could strengthen deterrence and increase the security not only of the United States but of our allies as well. The prevention of war through deterrence is fundamental to U.S. and NATO defense policy. If our re-

[2] The Treaty is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

search bears fruit, increasing reliance on defensive systems which threaten no one would be fully compatible with that objective. In our SDI research, we seek to reduce the incentives—now and in the future—for Soviet aggression and thereby to ensure effective deterrence for the long term. This represents a reaffirmation, not a revision, of the U.S. commitment to the protection of Europe.

Defensive technologies, should they prove feasible, would counter the threat posed by the massive growth of Soviet offensive nuclear forces during a period in which the United States exercised considerable restraint. For it is a fact that while the United States significantly reduced the number of weapons in our nuclear arsenal, the Soviet Union was continually adding to its arsenal. SDI also responds to the Soviets' longstanding and extensive strategic defense efforts. In the near term, then, SDI is a direct response to the Soviet efforts, which include longstanding advanced research in many of the areas we are now exploring, as well as the world's only deployed antiballistic missile (ABM) system. Our program provides a powerful deterrent to any Soviet decision to break out of the ABM Treaty, which in fact the Soviets are already violating. Our SDI research, however, is fully compatible with the terms of the ABM Treaty.

Because the security of the United States is inextricably linked to that of our friends and allies, the SDI program is not confining itself solely to an examination of technologies with the potential to defend against intercontinental ballistic missiles, but it is also carefully examining promising technologies with potential against shorter range ballistic missiles as well. An effective defense against short-range ballistic missiles would have a significant impact on deterring aggression against Europe. By reducing or eliminating the military effectiveness of such ballistic missiles, defensive systems have the potential for enhancing deterrence against both nuclear and conventional attacks on any members of our alliance.

Q. Would the fact that France has clearly shown its doubts towards this project, despite your administration's approval of the Eureka program, mean that its scientists and firms will be excluded from this trans-Atlantic cooperation?

The President. No, certainly not. The United States has made very clear that we do not see any competition between SDI research and the Eureka program. We welcome participation in SDI research by allied, including French, institutions and companies.

Q. The Germans and the British are on the eve of being associated with the SDI program. At which level, at which stage of its development would you require their participation?

The President. Although the United States welcomes the participation of its allies in the various stages of SDI research, it is a decision for each ally. We have invited such participation and are convinced that such participation will bring real benefits for participating allies,

for the research program itself, and for the security of the alliance as a whole.

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188. Statement by the Israeli Representative (Eilam) to the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency: Attacks on Nuclear Facilities [Extract], September 26, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

I am directed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on behalf of my Government, to state that one, Israel holds that all states must refrain from attacking or threatening to attack nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, and that the safeguards system operated by IAEA brings evidence of the peaceful operation of a facility.

Two, it is within this context that Israel confirms that under its stated policy it will not attack or threaten to attack any nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes either in the Middle East or anywhere else. I would like to emphasize that clearly no state in the Middle East is excluded. Mr. President, I have been asked by my delegates whether Iraq is included in the Middle East. My answer is yes, of course.

Israel will support any subsequent action in competent fora convened to work out binding agreements protecting nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes from attack and threat to attack.

We believe that the record demonstrates that Israel has attempted to facilitate the mission of the Director General in a very forthcoming manner.

We further believe that the clear position taken by the Government of Israel as I have just stated is responsive to Resolution 425 and provides a sound base for finishing the consideration of this item on our agenda.

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[1] ACDA files. Israeli Representative Eilam is the Director General of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission.

189. Letter From Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany to Czechoslovakian Prime Minister Strougal and General Secretary Honecker of the German Democratic Republic: Establishment of a Chemical-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe, September 27, 1985 [2]

I have noted with interest your letter of 12 September 1985 proposing that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany enter into negotiations on chemical weapons with the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Government of the German Democratic Republic.[3] As you know, the Federal Government is resolutely working in the appropriate forum, namely the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, for a treaty establishing a comprehensive ban and has presented a number of concrete proposals which have received much attention; in particular, it introduced a comprehensive verification model into the negotiations in 1982.[4] In 1979 and 1984, it held international seminars on the subject of verification, which were attended by diplomats and experts of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. In 1985, the Federal Government continued its efforts for a treaty establishing a comprehensive, world-wide ban on chemical weapons. It is convinced that there is no expedient alternative in the continuation of these efforts.

In conformity with the policy of the Federal Government to achieve, through negotiations, co-operative solutions in the field of disarmament and arms control serving to safeguard peace with lasting effect, I suggest that our delegations enter into talks within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in order to discuss the still unresolved questions concerning a treaty for a world-wide ban on chemical weapons. By jointly working for a solution to this central problem, our Governments can make a valuable contribution to promoting the ongoing Geneva negotiations.

190. Statement by the U.S. Representative (Kennedy) to the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency: Attacks on Nuclear Facilities, September 27, 1985 [1]

This resolution [2] urges all member states to make further efforts aimed at the prompt adoption of binding international rules prohibiting armed attacks against all nuclear installations devoted to peaceful

[2] A/C.1/40/8.
[3] Document 170, *n.* 1.
[4] CD/326.
[1] ACDA files.
[2] *Infra.*

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purposes. Of course, the U.S. is aware of the concerns that have been raised about this issue.

The United States, however, does not consider the IAEA an appropriate forum for dealing with this matter. Indeed, if this matter is to be discussed at all, the Committee on Disarmament is the appropriate forum.

The United States believes that the question of new protections against such armed attacks raises a number of serious military, technical, and legal questions. Naturally, we oppose all threats or use of force against states in violation of the United Nations Charter, including attacks against nuclear facilities. The United States' position on this question at the Committee on Disarmament has been limited to a consideration of whether further protections against such attacks might be feasible, necessary or desirable. This resolution, however, concludes that binding international rules prohibiting armed attacks against all nuclear installations should be adopted. Thus, in our view, the resolution prejudges the outcome of the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament. For that reason and others, we must indicate that we would vote "no" on this resolution.

191. Resolution of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency: Consequences of the Israeli Military Attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Research Reactor, September 27, 1985 [1]

The General Conference

(a) *Having considered* agenda item 10,

(b) *Taking note* of Security Council resolution 487 unanimously adopted on 19 June 1981, which, *inter alia*, called upon Israel to refrain in the future from any such acts or threats thereof, and urgently to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards,[2]

(c) *Recalling* relevant General Conference resolutions, particularly GC(XXVII)/RES 407 (1983) and GC(XXVIII)/RES/425 (1984), which, *inter alia*, demanded that Israel undertake forthwith not to carry out any further attacks on nuclear facilities in Iraq or on similar facilities in other countries, devoted for peaceful purposes, in disregard of the Agency's safeguards system,

(d) *Taking note* of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/14 and earlier relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on the same subject,

(e) *Recalling* that, as stated in resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/407, it is an objective of the International Atomic Energy Agency to "seek to accel-

[1] GC(XXIX)/RES/443. The full title of the resolution includes the following: " . . . and the Standing Threat to Repeat This Attack for: (a) the Development of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes; and (b) the Role and Activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency."

[2] For the full text of this resolution, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 227–228.

erate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world" and that in carrying out its functions the Agency shall "conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations to promote peace and international co-operation, and in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies",

(f) *Reaffirming* the right of all nations to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for their development programmes under effective international safeguards,

(g) *Considering* that any attacks or threats of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities jeopardize the development and further promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and, therefore, the achievement of one of the main objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

(h) *Concerned* that such attacks raise fears about the safety of present and future nuclear facilities,

(i) *Aware* that all States developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes need assurances against armed attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities,

(j) *Reaffirming* its confidence in the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system as a reliable means of verifying the peaceful use of a nuclear facility,

(k) *Taking into account* that the question of the protection of nuclear facilities against armed attack is under consideration in other international organizations, including the Conference on Disarmament,

(l) *Bearing in mind* the report of the Director General of the IAEA contained in document GC(XXVIII)/719,

(m) *Having heard* the Director General's report, in his statement of 23 September 1985, of his discussions in compliance with GC(XXVIII)/RES/425,

(n) *Having studied* the letter of 23 September 1985[3] addressed to the Director General by the Resident Representative of Israel, and circulated to the members of the Conference, and

(o) *Taking note* of the statement made on 26 September 1985 in the General Conference by the Representative of Israel, as directed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel and on behalf of his Government according to which:

> (1) Israel holds that all States must refrain from attacking or threatening to attack nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, and that the safeguards system operated by IAEA brings evidence of the peaceful operation of a facility;
>
> (2) Israel reconfirms that under its stated policy it will not attack or threaten to attack any nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes either in the Middle East or anywhere else and emphasizes specifically that Iraq is included;
>
> (3) Israel will support any subsequent action in competent fora convened to work out binding agreements protecting nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes from attack and threat to attack.

[3] Document 188.

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1. *Thanks* the Director General for the skill and perseverance with which he carried out the task entrusted to him by resolution GC(XXVIII)/RES/425;

2. *Declares* that all States must refrain from attacking or threatening to attack peaceful nuclear facilities in other countries;

3. *Considers* that the letter of 23 September 1985 from the Resident Representative of Israel and the statement by the Representative of Israel on 26 September 1985 contain undertakings on behalf of their Government in response to resolution GC(XXVIII) /RES/425 and notes in particular the statement that Israel will not attack or threaten to attack any nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes either in the Middle East, including Iraq or anywhere else;

4. *Notes* that Israel has thereby committed itself not to attack peaceful nuclear facilities in Iraq, elsewhere in the Middle East, or anywhere else;

5. *Calls upon* Israel urgently to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards;

6. *Considers* that the safeguards system of the IAEA brings evidence of an opportunity to review the peaceful nature of nuclear facilities subject to such safeguards;

7. *Reaffirms* that any attack on a peaceful nuclear facility subject to IAEA safeguards would constitute a serious threat to the safeguards system of the IAEA;

8. *Appeals* to competent international organs to take steps, in accordance with their mandates, to ensure the inviolability of peaceful nuclear facilities and to contribute thereby to the safe development of nuclear energy;

9. *Affirms* the readiness of the International Atomic Energy Agency to assist the competent international organs, if they so request, in any technical and safeguards aspects of this matter; and

10. *Declares* that if such attacks or threats of attack were to occur again, the matter will be examined by the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with its Statute and the relevant resolutions.

192. Resolution of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency: Protection of Nuclear Installations Devoted to Peaceful Purposes Against Armed Attacks, September 27, 1985 [1]

The General Conference,

(a) *Recalling* its resolution GC(XXVII)/407 on protection of nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes against armed attacks,

[1] GC(XXIX)/RES/444. The resolution was introduced by Argentina. Canada and the United Kingdom said they would have voted "Yes" if there had been a vote. For the U.S. statement on the resolution, see Document 190.

(b) *Recalling* that the General Conference has declared that armed attacks must be explicitly prohibited, urged all Member States of the International Atomic Energy Agency to make individually and through competent international organs every possible effort for the adoption of binding international rules prohibiting such attacks and requested the Director General to keep the General Conference informed of developments in this area,

(c) *Having considered* the reports by the Director General contained in document GC(XXVIII)/721 and his statement made to the 29th regular session of the General Conference,

(d) *Reaffirming* its confidence in the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system as a reliable means of verifying the peaceful use of nuclear facilities,

(e) *Considering* that any attacks or threats of attack against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize the development and further promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and therefore, the achievement of one of the main objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

(f) *Concerned* that such attacks raise fears about the radiological safety of present and future nuclear facilities, and

(g) *Aware* that all States developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes need assurances against armed attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities,

1. *Expresses* its appreciation for the steps already taken by the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament in an area that the IAEA considers of fundamental importance for the promotion of peace and international co-operation, the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy, and the fulfillment of the objectives enshrined in the Statute of the IAEA;

2. *Considers* that any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency;

3. *Urges* once again all Member States to make, individually and through competent international organs, further continuous efforts aimed at the prompt adoption of binding international rules prohibiting armed attacks against all nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes;

4. *Affirms* the readiness of the International Atomic Energy Agency to assist the competent international organs, if they so request, in any technical and safeguards aspects of the matter;

5. *Declares* that in the case of any armed attack to a nuclear installation devoted to peaceful purposes the matter will be examined by the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with its Statute and the relevant resolutions; and

6. *Requests* the Director General to continue to keep the General Conference informed of further developments in this area.

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193. Interview of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Perle) With *U.S. News and World Report:* Value of Arms Control Agreements, September 30, 1985 [1]

Q. Mr. Perle, given the lack of progress in Geneva, has the West placed too much hope in arms control?

A. Yes, we have. Here we are, roughly 15 years after we opened the arms-control process in Helsinki. The Soviets have 8,000 more strategic weapons now than they had then. They have expanded their military forces across the board. Against that background, to expect arms control by itself to diminish the threat we face seems to me to expect too much.

Q. Is it in the interests of the United States to accept restraints on the Strategic Defense Initiative to get a deal with Moscow?

A. It would be a mistake to accept limitations on our freedom to pursue strategic defenses beyond those limits already contained in the Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty.[2]

The Soviets would very much like to terminate the U.S. research program while continuing their own. And because limitations on research are not verifiable, the Soviets might well cheat, as they have been cheating in other areas of arms control. Therefore, the effect of an agreement restricting research would be unilateral and very dangerous.

Q. Has the President flatly ruled out restraints on SDI short of deployment, or is there still room for bargaining?

A. The President has ruled out limitations on research and testing, although there are questions of treaty interpretation that determine where the line is drawn between permitted testing and prohibited testing.

I should observe that we ought to interpret the ABM Treaty in the same manner in which the Soviets interpret it—which is to consider themselves bound only by the letter of the agreement and not at all by the spirit.

Q. Should the U.S. serve notice that SDI is not on the summit agenda?

A. I think the President has made that pretty clear. Further limits would only cripple the U.S. research program. While the President is prepared to find ways to improve the relationship with the Soviet Union, I don't believe he regards crippling one of his most important programs as the way to do it.

Q. If SDI is not on the table in November, what framework do you see for a possible agreement?

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[1] Copyright, 1985, *U.S. News and World Report,* September 30, 1985, p. 26.
[2] The Treaty is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197–201.

A. The evidence is overwhelming that the Soviets desire a buildup in strategic offensive forces. They are engaged in one and have been for the last 15 years. There is no reason to believe they would significantly reduce those forces, even if we were to talk to them about limitations on strategic defenses.

They are, by the way, busily engaged in developing strategic defenses of their own. So there is more than a little hypocrisy in the Soviet position.

Q. Can we trust the Russians to abide by an agreement if one is reached?

A. Of course we can't trust the Russians—nor should we. What we can do is structure agreements so we can monitor carefully their activities and know when they're complying and when they're not.

194. Nineteenth Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, April 1, 1985–October 1, 1985: Confidence-Building Measures [Extract], October 1, 1985 [1]

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The signatories to the Helsinki Final Act are required by the act's Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament to give prior notification of "major military maneuvers exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with possible air or naval components." Notification is required for maneuvers that take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State and must be made 21 days or more in advance of the start of the maneuver. The notification "will contain information on the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the maneuver, and type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, and the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. Participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces." [2]

In addition, signatories are encouraged to engage in other confidence-building measures on a voluntary basis. These voluntary CBMs include the invitation of observers to maneuvers and prior notification of major military movements and exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops.

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[1] Department of State Special Report No. 134, p. 15.

[2] The arms control portions of the Final Act may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

Implementation

The United States and its NATO allies continued their excellent record of implementation of these CBMs. The United Kingdom notified participating states concerning the major maneuver, Brave Defender, which took place from September 2–13, 1985, on the territory of the United Kingdom and involved 65,000 troops from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. The Federal Republic of Germany provided notification of the major maneuver, Trotzige Sachsen (Defiant Saxon), which took place from September 12–21, 1985, involving 60,000 troops from the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. Observers were invited to attend both of these maneuvers.

Among the neutral and nonaligned (NNA) countries, Switzerland notified participating states of the military maneuver, Tornado, which took place from October 7–17, 1985, and involved approximately 25,000 Swiss troops. No observers were invited.

The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies provided notification of three major maneuvers during the reporting period. The U.S.S.R. notified participating states of the military maneuver, Kavkaz 85, which took place from July 15–21, 1985, in the Caucasus region of the Soviet Union, involving approximately 25,000 Soviet troops. In a rare move, the Soviet Union invited observers from Turkey, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, as well as Malta and Yugoslavia, to attend the maneuver, in addition to Warsaw Pact observers. The U.S.S.R. and the German Democratic Republic also provided notification of an unnamed maneuver which took place on G.D.R. territory from July 6–14, 1985, with the participation of about 25,000 Soviet and East German troops. No observers were invited to attend. Czechoslovakia notified participating states of an unnamed maneuver conducted on Czechoslovak territory from May 25–31, 1985, involving about 25,000 Soviet and Czechoslovak forces. No observers were invited.

The Soviet and Warsaw Pact notifications provided the bare minimum of information required under the CSCE provisions, consistent with the East's practice of maintaining a very restrictive interpretation of its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet invitation of selected Western observers to the major maneuver, Kavkaz 85, was a notable exception. In the last 5 years, Western observers have been invited to only one other Soviet maneuver, Dnestr 83. That exercise, involving less than 25,000 Soviet troops, was also the first voluntary notification by the Soviet Union. In the current reporting period, Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces participated in at least two smaller scale maneuvers which could have been notified on a discretionary basis. Danube 85 in Hungary involved some 23,000 Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and Soviet troops from June 28–July 4. Friendship 85 took

place in Poland in the first half of September, with Polish, East German, and Soviet troops participating.

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195. Address by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev Before Members of the French National Assembly [Extract], October 3, 1985 [1]

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Alas, it is not always that the gains of civilization are a boon for people. All too often and too vigorously the achievements of science and technology are being used also for the creation of means on annihilating humans, for the development and stockpiling of ever more terrible types of weapons.

In these conditions Hamlet's famous question: "to be or not to be" is being set already not before a single individual but before mankind. It develops into a global problem. There can be only one answer to it—mankind, civilisation must survive at all costs. But this can be ensured only if we learn to live together, to get along on this small planet by mastering the difficult art of taking account of each other's interests. This we call the policy of peaceful coexistence.

We are strong enough to give a crushing rebuff to any attempt to encroach on our people's security and peaceful work. But we hold that it is not by force of arms but only and exclusively by force of example that one must prove the correctness of one's ideology, the advantages of the system that each people has chosen of its own will. Such is our firm conviction.

I spoke yesterday to the president about our perception of the main axis of contradictions, the struggle of the two tendencies in world politics. We regard as extremely dangerous the view, no matter how it is being justified, that the tasks facing the international community can be solved by the creation and stockpiling of ever new and more destructive types of arms—on earth and in outer space. We regard as dangerous also actions that preserve and aggravate international tension. It is incandescent as it is. It is so incandescent that now it has become extremely difficult to reach agreement not only on complex, urgent matters but also on relatively simple problems. If we do not stop the present tendencies, tomorrow we will not be able to overcome their monstrous inertia. It will become ever more difficult to talk.

That is why we consider it so important already now, immediately, before it is too late to stop the "infernal train" of the arms race, to

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[1] Moscow *Pravda* in Russian, October 4, 1985, first edition, pp. 1, 2; FBIS *Daily Report*, October 4, 1985, vol. III, pp. G5–G9.

start the reduction of arms, improve the international situation and develop peaceful cooperation among peoples. This is in mutual interest, this is everybody's task. Nobody can permit himself to sit it out on the sidelines.

The Soviet Union, as you probably know, not only issues calls but also acts in this direction.

We have unilaterally suspended the further siting of medium-range missiles in Europe and called on the United States to respond in kind.[2] We stopped all nuclear explosions and called on the United States to respond in kind.[3] Quite naturally, we address this call to the other nuclear powers as well.

The Soviet Union proposes to start a reduction of the armed forces and armaments of both sides in Central Europe—and to start with a reduction of Soviet and American troops. Moreover, we are prepared to reduce more troops than the Americans.

As for outer space, we are for its use exclusively for peaceful purposes and persistently call for the reaching of agreement on this because a transfer of the arms race into outer space will make the reduction of nuclear arsenals objectively impossible. As you know, we have submitted to the United Nations Organisation a proposal on international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space.[4]

And now I would like to inform you of the new steps taken by the Soviet Union. They pursue the same aim: to stop the baleful process of the arms race and ward off the war danger overhanging mankind.

First. A few days ago we proposed to the government of the United States to come to terms on the total prohibition of space strike arms for both sides and to reduce really radically, by 50 per cent, the nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory.

In other words, we propose a practical solution to the very same tasks that were agreed upon by both sides early this year as being the aims of the Geneva talks: not only to stop the arms race but also to drastically lower the level of armaments and at the same time avert an arms race in outer space.

There is hardly any need to say how all this would strengthen strategic stability and mutual trust.

I can inform you that our delegation in Geneva has been instructed to present concrete proposals on this question and authorised to give the partners exhaustive explanations.

I am saying all this because a multitude of versions and false rumours are already circulating in the West concerning our proposal, and it is time for some clarification.

Second. Concerning medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. With the aim of making easier agreement on their speediest mutual reduction (as we are often told, in Western Europe, too, there is great

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, p. 119.
[3] Document 126.
[4] Document 141.

interest in this) we consider it possible to conclude a corresponding agreement separately, outside of direct connection with the problem of space and strategic arms. This road, as it appears to us, may turn out to be practical.

In this connection I consider it important to explain our position on such a question as the place of the nuclear potential of France and Britain in the European balance of forces. This potential is growing rapidly and we can no longer ignore it. It was said from the French side that the nuclear forces of France are not subject to discussion without her participation. This stands to reason. It follows from this that it is time to start between us a direct dialogue on this theme to try to find an acceptable way out through joint efforts. The Soviet Union is prepared for such a direct dialogue with France just as with Britain, of course.

Here I want to stress that we will take into account the security interests of France in the most attentive manner. And today, as it appears to us, the question of a reduction of her armaments is not on the agenda.

Third. You know that we have announced a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe. The number of SS–20 missiles that the Soviet Union has on standby alert in the European zone is now 243. This means that it precisely accords with the level of June 1984 when the additional deployment of our missiles was started in response to the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe. The SS–20 missiles that were additionally deployed in the process have now been withdrawn from operational readiness and the fixed installations for housing these missiles will be dismantled within the next two months.

This is verifiable. As to our reply measures in respect of the territory of the United States itself they continue to remain in force.

I would also wish to explain the meaning with which we invest the term "European zone" in this case. This is the zone in which medium-range missiles capable of striking targets on the territory of Western Europe are deployed.

It should be added to this that we have already totally phased out the old, and very powerful, SS–5 missiles and are continuing to phase out SS–4 missiles. This means that on the whole the number of medium-range carrier missiles in the European zone of the USSR is now much smaller than ten or even fifteen years ago. In accepting this self-limitation we are guided by the broad interests of European security. I think Europe is now entitled to expect a reply step by the United States—the termination by it of the further deployment of its medium-range missiles on the European Continent.

You see what serious steps the Soviet Union is taking. In combination with the previous actions our latest proposals, as it seems to us, are a package of constructive and realistic measures the implementation of which would bring about a genuine breakthrough in the

development of international relations. A breakthrough in favour of peace, security and cooperation among peoples.

This, if you please, is our programme of improving the explosive international situation that threatens peace. We expect that in response to our proposals the West too will traverse its part of the road.

I would like to stress that the realisation of the programme proposed by us would also signify substantial advance toward an aim that is so desired by all the peoples and is so important to them—the prohibition and total liquidation of nuclear arms, the total delivery of mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

There can be no victors in a nuclear war. It seems that all responsible politicians are in agreement on this. It is time to draw a practical conclusion from this—to stop the nuclear arms race. And we believe that this demand will be supported by all honest, realistically thinking political forces, public figures, all people who cherish their homeland, their life, the life of their children and grandchildren.

The task of totally prohibiting chemical weapons and liquidating their stockpiles is becoming ever more urgent. At the conference on disarmament in Geneva the Soviet Union is actively taking part in the drafting of a relevant convention. We are meeting our partners in the talks half-way in a number of substantial aspects, including in respect of verification. I am sure that it is quite possible to reach agreement on reliable verification.

Incidentally, the following thought also prompts itself here. If it was possible to reach agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear arms why not apply the same method in respect of chemical weapons? This would be in the general channel of efforts to achieve their total prohibition. The Soviet Union would be prepared to take part in the drafting of an international accord on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons. We are also prepared to do everything depending on us for the creation of a zone in the centre of Europe free from chemical weapons.

As I speak here, in Paris, in the heart, it can be said, of Western Europe, I cannot but speak about some substantial problems of European security, about how we in the Soviet Union see them.

I will start with the most general question. What, after all, is security in Europe? It is the absence of war and the danger of war. The interconnection and intertwining of the destinies of peoples, despite the difference of the social roads chosen by them, is felt in Europe with special force. Because of geographical density, oversaturation with armaments Europe, like no other continent, is vulnerable to an armed conflict, the more so a nuclear one.

This means that Europe's security cannot be ensured by military means, by military force. This is an absolutely new situation and means a departure from traditions, from a mentality and manner of action that took centuries, even millenniums to form. It is not at once that human thought adjusts itself to something that is new. This applies to all. We are feeling this. We have started the rethinking, the

adjustment to full conformity with the new realities of many customary things, including in the military and, naturally, the political fields. We would want such a rethinking to take place both in Western Europe and beyond it.

So far fear of unacceptable retribution is one of the obstacles to war, to the use of military force. But everybody understands, however, that it is impossible to build a lasting peace on fear alone. But the entire question is where to search for the alternative to fear or, to use military language, deterrence?

We see what attempts are now being made to find a way out—by using new arms in the so-called "star wars". This is an illusion. And an extremely dangerous one at that. It is naive in general to search for a solution of the problem of security in the perfection of the shield and the sword. Security in Europe, just as international security as a whole, can be achieved only on the road of peaceful coexistence, relaxation of tension, disarmament, strengthening of trust and development of international cooperation.

This is a long and difficult road, the more so that it requires the overcoming of mutual suspicions, mistrust and prejudices accumulated over decades. But there is no other road, if we want to live. And like any long road, it begins with the first steps which often are the most difficult ones to make. We understand this and want to help ensure the solution of the task—for ourselves and for you. It is this that motivates the proposals that I have already mentioned.

This applies also to the conference in Stockholm which is discussing the important problem of mutual trust in the military field. As it appears to us, the contours of future accords are gradually beginning to take shape there. They include making more concrete and imparting maximum effectiveness to the principle of the non-use of force. They include a definite set of confidence-building measures in the military field, these so to say safety fuses to prevent an erroneous interpretation of the actions of the other side in conditions of an aggravation of the military confrontation. A number of states, first of all neutral ones, propose to reach agreement on mutual exchanges of annual plans of military activity subject to notification. We are prepared for such an accord in the hope that it will help overcome suspiciousness and impede covert preparations for war.

The ideas of setting up nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, including on our continent—in the north of Europe and in the Balkans, are spreading ever more wider. We support these ideas, are ready to take part in the appropriate guarantees where this is required. We view as useful the idea to create a corridor free of nuclear arms along both sides of the line dividing the two military-political groupings. We also hold that states that do not possess nuclear arms and do not have them on their territory have full right to reliable guarantees of their security based on international law, guarantees that nuclear arms will not be used against them.

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Many aspects of all-European cooperation are recorded in the Helsinki Final Act.[5] We hold that it is a serious achievement and fully retains its importance. When the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki accords was marked, all the participants in the all-European process declared for its continuation. The Soviet Union is prepared to take the most vigorous part in this. Every European country has contributed a share of its national experience to the Helsinki process. This is a common asset of the peoples of Europe, and it should be protected and multiplied by joint effort.

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196. Interview of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) on NBC News "Meet the Press": Limitations of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty [Extract], October 6, 1985 [1]

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Mr. Kalb: We're back on MEET THE PRESS with the President's National Security Adviser, Robert McFarlane. Mr. McFarlane, once again picking up the point of Mr. Novak's question, whether SDI is or is not a bargaining chip, it seems that every single large American weapons system breaks down into research, development and deployment. The President is saying that in terms of research he is also talking about research and testing. The Russians consider that testing is part of development. Now, is there not in there some area for potential compromise, if in fact, both sides are seeking an agreement that embraces SDI?

Mr. McFarlane: Well, Marvin, I think that the President is guided by the ABM Treaty, and the terms of that Treaty are very explicit in Articles II, III, IV and V, plus Agreed Statement D.[2] They make clear that on research involving new physical concepts, that that activity, as well as testing, as well as development indeed, are approved and authorized by the Treaty. Only deployment is foreclosed, except in accordance with Articles XIII and XIV. So our program is compatible with the Treaty, and will remain so.

Mr. Kalb: Doesn't the Treaty also talk about development?

Mr. McFarlane: The Treaty does, indeed sanction research, testing and development of these new systems.

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[5] The arms control portions of the Final Act may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975,* pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin,* September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

[1] NBC News transcript.

[2] The texts of the Treaty and Agreed Statements may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197 ff.

Mr. Kaiser: Only by mutual agreement, though. It says that there should be negotiated introduction of new exotic technologies.

Mr. McFarlane: Their deployment should be negotiated in accordance with Articles XIII and XIV.

Mr. Kaiser: But the Treaty, it seems to me, could also be clearly read to say any testing of a space based anti-missile system is clearly forbidden. It says that very explicitly, doesn't it? Article IV?

Mr. McFarlane: The Agreed Statement D, which is compatible with the other terms of the Treaty, provides that research on new physical principles or other physical principles is authorized as is testing and development.

Mr. Kaiser: I thought it said it should be the subject of mutual consultation.

Mr. McFarlane: Well, now what you're referring to, in II, III and IV, are components that are defined in the Treaty as missiles, launchers or radars. Now, we're not talking here about missiles, launchers or radars.

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197. Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs (Wolfowitz) Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, October 9, 1985 [1]

Before the Committee resumes its questioning, I would like to pose a couple of questions myself. I will offer my own answers, but would ask you to consider them seriously yourselves.

This committee's actions on the agreement for cooperation with China will have ramifications for our overall national security interests, our non-proliferation policy, and our bilateral relationship with the PRC.

Just as Ambassador Kennedy and his team of negotiators did not enter into this agreement lightly, just as the President did not authorize its approval without careful analysis, neither, I submit, should the Senate or House study this agreement without serious consideration of the questions I now pose.

—First of all: What are the benefits of this agreement for U.S. national security and non-proliferation interests?; and do these benefits not outweigh any possible risks?

—And secondly: What will be the result if the agreement is *not* brought into force? How will *U.S. interests* be served if that happens?

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[1] *United States-People's Republic of China Nuclear Agreement: Hearing. . . .*, pp. 145–150. For the proposed agreement, see Document 118.

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In addressing these questions, first I would like to reiterate something Ambassador Kennedy has said many times. This agreement would not be before the Congress if the Executive Branch did not believe that it meets all relevant requirements of U.S. law. In addition, we spent more than a year after the initialing of the agreement to reach a clear and complete understanding of China's non-proliferation policies and practices. Reaching that clear understanding also was a prerequisite for moving the agreement forward.

I would point out, as others have before me, that during the course of our discussions on the agreement, the Chinese became increasingly involved in the international non-proliferation regime. And they have come to play a much more constructive role. They joined the IAEA, announced they would apply IAEA safeguards to the nuclear exports, and entered into several bilateral agreements for cooperation. Recently, they made the important announcement that they will undertake discussions with the IAEA on a voluntary offer. The Chinese also have made a number of high-level policy statements—these were *not* a mere "toast" tossed off in haste—which clearly set forth their position that they are opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons and do not assist or encourage others to develop such weapons.[2]

Given this background, once we reached the stage where we could move the agreement forward, we felt a great deal had already been accomplished. We now look forward to building on that progress under the terms of a bilateral agreement for cooperation.

This speaks to my first question. I believe it has been very much in our national security interest, including our very important interest in nuclear non-proliferation, that we were able to engage the Chinese in concrete and meaningful discussions about their nuclear export policies and practices. There is no doubt that this dialogue also had a salutary effect on the evolution of the PRC's non-proliferation policy.

Why was this dialogue possible? Because the Chinese want this agreement. They want American firms to compete for their nuclear power business. They recognize the advantages of American technology. They want nuclear power to be a part of their energy modernization program. They see American participation as lending credibility to their energy development plans, which are a key to their overall program of economic revitalization.

From the PRC's point of view, they made a number of important concessions to reach the point where we could sign an agreement. They now understand clearly that if they want to engage in nuclear trade with us they will not only have to observe the terms of this agreement, which conforms to the requirements of U.S. law; they also fully understand the further implications which the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, as amended,[3] carries for their future cooperation with us and for their own non-proliferation practices.

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[2] For more details, see the ACDA Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement of July 19 in Document 112.

[3] 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2011 *et seq.*

Does this turn of events *not* serve U.S. interests? Can further progress be made if we turn our back on this agreement now before you?

This brings me to my second question. After all of this—the painstaking negotiations, the extensive discussions with them about *our* bottom-line requirements, and their own considerable movement in a positive direction—there is no question that the Chinese will resent it if we walk away from this agreement. And re-negotiation would be, in effect, walking away from the agreement that is now before you. The Chinese are not of a mood to re-draft the agreement after all we have been through. Furthermore, we ourselves believe there is no need for a re-negotiation, as the agreement meets all U.S. legal requirements and will make a valuable contribution to our non-proliferation goals.

A great deal of progress will go up in smoke if the agreement is torpedoed. I think we have to ask ourselves: what will be the consequences for U.S. non-proliferation goals if we walk away from it? How will our interests be served if China proceeded to make use of its own considerable nuclear technology, and that which it can obtain from non-U.S. sources, without influence by us?

China is quite capable of pursuing nuclear development on its own. This is a central fact that I think the critics too often fail to address. China has been a nuclear weapons state for 21 years without any help from us. It is a significant nuclear supplier to third countries, and will continue to be, even without this agreement. Do we want to enhance our influence over China's non-proliferation policies and in their nuclear power development, or do we want to be bystanders? The answer, to me, is clear.

Finally, I must point out that failure to bring this agreement into force will be harmful to the developing relationship that we are in the process of building with China. That relationship is important. China is an important country, one that is, after years of isolationism, expanding its contacts with the West. We look to strengthen our own ties with the PRC under a framework of agreements and arrangements consistent with our national interest. Our strengthening relationship with the PRC has positive implications for our own security interests as well as for social and economic developments within China.

Consistent with our own policy goals—which we believe this agreement supports—we want to encourage China's opening to the outside, not slam the door in its face; we want to encourage China's increasingly responsible behavior as a nuclear supplier, not lend encouragement to those who might argue that China should follow its own course, taking no account of our concerns.

For all of these reasons, I believe the agreement before you deserves your support.

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198. Statement by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev: Arms Control in the Mediterranean Region [Extract], October 11, 1985 [1]

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Guiding itself by the general principles of its foreign policy the Soviet Union sincerely strives for the seats of tension in the Mediterranean to be liquidated by peaceful political means. We stand for continuing the drawing together of positions, for facilitating more actively the search for a settlement of regional problems at the negotiating table, and for protecting the sovereign rights of states and peoples subjected to pressure and flagrant interference in their internal affairs.

Together with other Warsaw Pact states, the Soviet Union comes out for renunciation of the deployment of nuclear arms on the territory of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries and for the adoption by nuclear powers of the commitment not to use nuclear arms against any Mediterranean country that does not allow the stationing of such arms on its territory. We have long declared for the withdrawal of nuclear-capable ships from the Mediterranean Sea.

The Soviet Union also comes out for spreading to this area military-technical confidence-building measures in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act [2] that have already proven their worth in world practice. A limitation of naval activity and naval armaments in the region would, as it appears to us, play a positive role.

The question of banning chemical weapons has been appearing lately on the agenda with all urgency and agitating minds. The idea of creating a zone free from chemical weapons in central Europe is now being discussed as a step in this direction.

But, perhaps this idea is applicable to the Mediterranean area as well; then to the African Continent as a whole? It is obvious, for instance, that the use of chemical weapons in the Mediterranean Basin, one of the most densely populated areas of the world, would pose a tremendous danger.

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[1] Moscow *Pravda* in Russian, October 13, 1985, first edition, pp. 1, 2; FBIS *Daily Report*, October 15, 1985, vol. III, p. H5. Gorbachev spoke at a dinner held in honor of Libyan leader al-Qadhafi.

[2] The arms control portion of this Act may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

199. Address by Secretary of State Shultz Before the Thirty-first Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly: U.S. Proposals at the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks [Extract], October 14, 1985 [1]

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The United States has serious proposals now on the table at Geneva. We have been criticized for our restraint in the public-relations field. But our proposals were not made for propaganda; they were made to make progress toward these central objectives. Our proposals cover reductions in strategic offensive forces; reduction or elimination of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces; and a serious dialogue on defensive weapons and the relationship between offense and defense. These issues are being discussed now in the Geneva negotiations in three separate but interrelated forums.

First, in the talks on strategic arms reduction, the United States has proposed radical reductions down to 5,000 ballistic-missile warheads on each side. This represents a cut of nearly 50 percent from the current Soviet level. We have proposed substantial reductions in the number and destructive power of ballistic missiles, and limits on heavy bombers and on the cruise missiles they carry.

The strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union are very different. The great majority of Soviet warheads and destructive power are concentrated on their large, land-based ICBMs. We have a more balanced approach, with as much emphasis on submarine-based missiles and bombers as on ICBMs. The Soviet force is designed for preemption, ours for retaliation. These differences greatly complicate the achievement of an equitable agreement. We are prepared to explore tradeoffs between areas of relative advantage—such as our advantage in bombers versus their advantage in ICBMs—to establish an overall balance.

Our proposal is comprehensive, but its core is a recognition that reductions should focus on the most destabilizing systems. Weapons like large fixed land-based ICBMs with multiple warheads, capable of destroying missile silos—these are the most powerful strategic weapons, the most rapid, the most provocative, the most capable of carrying out a preemptive strike, the most likely to tempt a hair-trigger response in a crisis.

The Soviets have over 300 heavy ICBMs; we at present have none. (Our first deployments of MX, a smaller missile but roughly comparable because of its accuracy, will begin late next year.) With their accuracy, destructive power, and multiple warheads, the Soviet weapons are capable of destroying virtually the entire land-based portion of our retaliatory force. For nearly a decade this category of weapons has

[1] ACDA files. The address was delivered in San Francisco.

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been, for us, one of the central issues of arms control. One of the odd features of the current debate is that the Soviets would have us believe this central issue has disappeared. It's as if the threat from these powerful weapons, which already exist in the hundreds, is somehow less important than research into new categories of systems which don't exist, won't exist for many years at best, and won't come into being at all unless research is successful in meeting stringent criteria we ourselves have set.

The second negotiation in Geneva is about intermediate-range nuclear forces, or INF. This negotiation is taking place because in 1977 the Soviet Union began deploying SS–20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles in the western USSR, aimed at our European allies, and in the Soviet Far East, aimed at our friends and allies in East Asia. Today there are 441 operational launchers deployed, with three warheads on a missile, that makes over 1,300 modern nuclear warheads aimed at the cities and defense facilities of our friends and allies.

In response—and I repeat, in response—the Atlantic Alliance decided in 1979 that it had no choice but to deploy weapons of its own in this category, as a deterrent, while seeking to negotiate with the Soviet Union on a formula for mutual restraint.[2] The Soviets agreed to talk, but have not negotiated on the basis of mutuality. They insisted on their right to a monopoly of longer-range INF missiles; they waged an unprecedented campaign of political warfare to intimidate our allies into retreating from the NATO decision of 1979. Our allies—governments and legislatures—stood firm, NATO Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles began to be deployed in several allied countries in 1983—6 years after the SS–20 deployment began.

The United States proposed at Geneva that we agree to eliminate both sides' longer-range land-based INF missiles on a global basis. The Soviets refused. Then we proposed that both sides reduce to the lowest possible equal number of warheads. The Soviets still refuse. Our position is based on the principle of equality between the United States and the Soviet Union. And limits must be applied globally, since the SS–20 is a mobile missile and it is not our objective simply to shift the SS–20 threat from Europe to Asia.

The threat of the SS–20 goes to the heart of our commitment to our allies. These are weapons aimed at Europe—although they could be aimed at America. Their purpose is to "decouple," that is to separate you from us by intimidating you. The alliance's response is a united response, and a unifying response, in that it symbolizes once again that our destinies are tied together. The principle of collective security is thus confirmed, and reinforced. Europe is safer, because deterrence is strengthened.

The third area of negotiation is that of defense and space arms. But the core issue is the same: the stability of deterrence.

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[2] For the NATO decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

The SALT I Accords of 1972 limited anti-ballistic missile systems and were also a partial first step toward limiting offensive weapons.[3] We continue to comply with them, provided the Soviet Union corrects its noncompliance and negotiates seriously in Geneva. We must remember, however, that those accords of 13 years ago, and the hopes they engendered, were founded on certain assumptions. Developments since then have called those assumptions into question.

First of all, when the ABM Treaty was signed, it was assumed that offensive weaponry would be reduced by further negotiations. In fact, offensive weapons proliferated. Each side now—and particularly the Soviets side—has vastly higher numbers than in 1972. We see the Soviet heavy ICBMs with a first-strike potential. On both sides we see offensive weapons of astonishing accuracy, and with multiple warheads. The Soviets are developing two new varieties of ICBM whose mobility makes them harder to identify and count. If we fail to respond to these trends, at some point in the future they could undermine the military balance on which deterrence is based.

Secondly, in the ABM Treaty we also assumed that we had set up critical barriers that would prevent any breakout, that is, any sudden and significant expansion of ABM systems in violation of the Treaty. In fact, while the United States has dismantled even the one ABM complex that was permitted, the Soviets have taken full advantage of the deployments allowed by the Treaty. And some Soviet activities are clear violations, such as the large radar at Krasnoyarsk, which raises a question of whether the Soviets might be planning a nation-wide ABM system, negating the Treaty entirely.

But technological advance, which helps create these new problems, also offers other possibilities. Methods of defense against ballistic missiles, which were relatively rudimentary in 1972, now offer new hope as a possible counter to the growing offensive threat. What if it were possible, even in this age of ballistic missiles, to block an attack, rather than simply suffer the attack and then retaliate? What if the balance of power could rest more on a mutual sense of security, and less on a mutual threat of annihilation? Thus the President's strategic defense initiative (or SDI), research program to explore promising new technologies. Effective strategic defenses, able to intercept and destroy missiles before they reach their targets, would strengthen security. Even if far less than 100 percent perfect, such a defensive system would vastly complicate any aggressor's first-strike planning and frustrate any temptation to consider launching an attack.

In an age of anxieties about nuclear weapons, this should provide enormous hope for the future. As former Soviet Premier Kosygin once eloquently stated, an antimissile system "is intended not for killing people but for saving human lives." [4]

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[3] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 197 ff.
[4] *Ibid, 1967,* p. 60.

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The last few decades' emphasis on offensive strategies reflected the state of technology, not a law of nature. Mutual vulnerability was a fact of life, not a positive virtue. A new strategic equilibrium based on defensive technologies and sharply reduced offensive deployments on both sides could be the most stable and secure arrangement of all. It cannot be fully achieved without negotiations, and therefore we have sought the fullest dialogue on this subject with the Soviet Union—as well as with our allies. In fact, General Abrahamson, Director of our SDI office, traveled to Geneva to take part in a briefing of the Soviet negotiators on our program, its potential and its prospects.

Our research program is and will continue to be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The Treaty can be variously interpreted as to what kinds of development and testing are permitted, particularly with respect to future systems and components based on new physical principles. The Treaty's text, the Agreed Statements accompanying it, the negotiating record, and official statements made since that time are subject to differing interpretations.

Because of the great potential contribution that SDI could make to our security, and because of our interest in a rigorous implementation of the ABM Treaty by both sides, we have devoted much attention to the question of how to interpret the treaty. It is our view, based on a careful analysis of the treaty text and the negotiating record, that a broader interpretation of our authority is fully justified. This is, however, a moot point; our SDI research program has been structured and, as the President has reaffirmed, will continue to be conducted in accordance with a restrictive interpretation of the treaty's obligations. Furthermore, any SDI deployment would be the subject of consultations with our allies, and of discussion and negotiation, as appropriate, with the Soviets in accordance with the terms of the ABM Treaty.

Our policy thus reflects:

—The President's commitment to explore thoroughly the potential contribution of strategic defenses to peace and stability, and his vision of a "balance of safety" replacing the "balance of terror."

—Our commitment to pursue the program as currently structured, which is consistent with a restrictive interpretation of our obligations under the ABM Treaty.

—Our judgment that the SDI program, provided that it is consistently funded at the levels required, will be adequate to answer the question of whether a cost effective and survivable defense against ballistic missiles is feasible.

In sharp contrast to Soviet behavior, our policy of restraint with respect to the conduct of the SDI program demonstrates by deeds U.S. seriousness and sincerity in seeking a more stable international environment.

The American proposals in Geneva are a comprehensive blueprint for reducing nuclear weapons, for strengthening deterrence, and for making the world safer. They are paralleled by other proposals in other forums:

—To strengthen safeguards and controls against the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.

—To ban chemical weapons, and to prevent chemical weapons proliferation.

—To stabilize the conventional military balance in Europe, by mutual and balanced reductions of forces, and by measures to reduce the risk of war by surprise attack, accident or miscalculation, which would give concrete form to a reaffirmation of the principle of non-use of force.

This is President Reagan's arms control agenda—the most comprehensive arms control agenda of any President in our history.

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200. Statement by the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union (Troyanovsky) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Ensuring the Nonmilitarization of Outer Space [Extracts], October 14, 1985 [1]

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For objective reasons, ensuring non-militarization of space is now of key importance in reducing the nuclear threat. We heard with satisfaction the same notion expressed by the representative of Mexico, Mr. García Robles, whose statement on various other aspects also deserves the highest commendation.[2] Those who like to dictate their will to other countries and nations regard space as pivotal to their plans for upsetting the strategic equilibrium, an equilibrium which makes it possible for each side, even if it is subjected to a nuclear attack, to retain sufficient strategic capacity to strike an equally devastating blow at the aggressor, leaving no doubt in anyone's mind that starting a nuclear war is tantamount to suicide.

Everyone understands that durable peace cannot be built merely on fear of retaliation. However, the question remains: where should one look for an alternative to fear or, speaking in military terms, deterrence? The Soviet Union believes that the way out is to stop the nuclear arms race and to bring military forces down to the lowest possible balanced level. Implementation of the programme that we have put forward would mean substantial progress towards the goal to which all nations aspire and which is so important for them, namely, prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons and completely ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war. This task should be tackled immediately, before it is too late.

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[1] A/C.1/40/PV.3, pp. 34–49.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 23–31.

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As noted in numerous decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, parity is a good prerequisite for first stopping the build-up of nuclear arms and then proceeding to their radical reduction. A realistic and responsible policy should be aimed at ensuring precisely such a solution and making use of the existing opportunities.

However, diametrically opposite goals are pursued by the "star wars" plan, the so-called strategic defense initiative of the United States. Its officially declared objective is to create a large-scale anti-missile defense. In conditions of nuclear-missile face-off, the very fact of declaring such an aim amounts to seeking a potential for resorting to a nuclear attack or blackmail with impunity; for it is obvious that if one side thought that it could deprive the other side of its ability appropriately to retaliate against the aggression, the aggressor might be tempted to launch or threaten to launch a first disarming nuclear strike.

It is not accidental that against the background of talk about the defensive nature of the "star wars" programme there is a continued build-up of the United States offensive potential. All its elements are being given a first-strike capability. Hence, the intention is to render unnecessary and obsolete the weapons of only one side, that is, the defensive potential of the USSR, rather than all nuclear weapons. It is relevant to recall a remark made in December 1983 by the United States Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, that if the USSR, rather than the United States, embarked upon the development of a large-scale ballistic missile defense, it "would be one of the most frightening prospects I could imagine". A White House document issued last January stated that, should this happen, the United States "would have no choices between surrender and suicide".[3] Both those quotations are from page A14 of *The New York Times* of 8 March 1985. Presumably, this is precisely the situation in which the proponents of "star wars" would like to place the Soviet Union.

The so-called defensive "star wars" systems are nothing but space strike weapons. They would be intended for attacking not only missiles but also satellites. They would be targeted above all at surveillance satellites of the other side so as to "blind" its strategic retaliatory forces. They could also be used from space for striking land-based, air-based and sea-based targets, including missiles in their launch sites and command and control centres.

The appearance of space strike weapons, which would have automatic, global and practically instantaneous action, would open a qualitatively new stage in the arms race. Uncontrollable processes could be unleashed. The risk of nuclear war being started either deliberately or by accident would sharply increase. Such weapons would be capable of appearing over any region or State at any time and striking any target. It is clear that the aggressive circles, should they acquire a space

[3] Document 2.

"big stick", could develop an illusion of being permitted to do anything with impunity.

It is important to emphasize that what is involved here is an entirely new class of means of warfare. The existing surveillance and communication satellites are not weapons in the proper sense of the word. They cannot "shoot" or kill. Moreover, to a certain extent they even contribute to maintaining strategic stability, specifically by depriving the other side of an ability to launch a surprise attack. In this regard it is incorrect to assert that space has already been militarized. An arms race in space would be started if weapons intended for striking targets both in space and on Earth from space were to be placed in space, and if weapons designed for striking targets in space were to appear on Earth.

In this context, I should like to endorse the viewpoint expressed by the Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Dumas, to the effect that "the deployment of new types of anti-missile or anti-satellite weapons on earth or in space would lead to a new race, with its risk of destabilizing effects" (*A/40/PV.10, page 66*).

The need for preventing such an evolution has been emphasized in recent years by the United Nations General Assembly. One may recall the resolution on preventing an arms race in space which was endorsed last year by 150 States.[4] As we all know, only one country did not support that decision. Its representatives state that they do not intend to abandon the strategic defence initiatives, while depicting the "star wars" plan as a research programme which does not yet mean the beginning of an arms race in space.

There should be complete clarity about this question. First of all, this programme cannot be regarded as research. It is sufficient to consider its scope to see that this is the first stage of a project aimed at developing space strike weapons. Seventy billion dollars will be spent on it over the next few years. At current prices this is more than four times the cost of the Manhattan Project, which led to the development of the atomic bomb, and more than twice the cost of the Apollo programme, which culminated in man's landing on the moon.

Even now the so-called research goes far beyond theoretical studies. Reports are continually coming in about the development and, in some cases, the testing, of prototypes of space strike weapons such as chemical and X-ray lasers, electromagnetic guns, interceptor missiles and anti-satellite systems. As recently as 13 September last the United States conducted a test of the anti-satellite (ASAT) complex, destroying an active satellite which had been used for scientific purposes. Thus the first victim, a peaceful space object, has already been sacrificed on the altar of "star wars".

One cannot but note that the ASAT testing took place immediately following the Soviet Union's proposal at the United Nations on the

[4] General Assembly Resolution 39/59 of December 12, 1984.

peaceful exploration of outer space [5] and while the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on placing anti-satellite weapons in space [6] was in effect.

Assertions that the United States is "catching up" with the Soviet Union in developing anti-satellite weapons are intended for the uninformed. The United States was the first country to test such weapons back in 1959. In the early 1960s the United States deployed two land-based anti-satellite complexes on Kwajalein Atoll and Johnston Island. Thus at present it is already developing a second-generation anti-satellite system.

As for the Soviet Union, forced to take counter-measures, it began tests of anti-satellite systems much later. However, they were suspended after the introduction of the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium in 1983. Our country is, of course, doing space research, including military-related space research, but it is aimed at improving space surveillance and communications systems and not at developing strike weapons or anti-ballistic missile systems banned, as is well known, by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.[7]

In the meantime every step to implement the "star wars" programme inevitably results in undermining the Soviet-United States strategic arms-limitation agreements, above all the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which bans the development as well as the testing and deployment of space-based anti-ballistic missile components. The Treaty's overall objective is to prevent precisely what the "star wars" programme seeks to achieve, namely, the development of a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system.

"Star wars", however, undermines not only the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, but the entire process of strategic-arms limitation and reduction. In the words of the Treaty, its signatories consider:

> that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons.

It is clear that the consequences of the development of a ballistic-missile defense would be quite the reverse.

This organic interrelationship exists objectively and is of an enduring nature. It will not disappear with the advent of new sophisticated space-weapon systems.

The development and deployment in space of strike weapons by one side will require that the other side restore the equilibrium that would thereby be upset. This will inevitably lead to a quantitative increase and qualitative upgrading of strategic nuclear weapons and will dash the hopes of humanity for their limitation and reduction. It is in effect being frankly admitted today that one of the reasons for

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[5] Documents 141 and 142.
[6] For the announcement on the moratorium, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, p. 650.
[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

the reluctance of the United States to conduct talks on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapons tests is that nuclear tests may become necessary to develop "star wars" systems.

With the militarization of outer space, an unconstrained arms race would spread in all directions. The pendulum of action and reaction would begin to swing with an ever-widening amplitude. The furnace of the arms race would devour additional colossal resources that otherwise could serve the cause of mankind's peaceful development. Those resources are indispensable, both for the progress of science and technology in space exploration and for the solution of other urgent problems facing the peoples. Militarization, like a painful, incurable disease, would spread to all areas of space activities. It would create insurmountable barriers to the development of international co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space.

It is obvious that co-operation in space is unthinkable without a certain degree of trust and without a free exchange of scientific information and ideas. In conditions of a spiralling arms race, however, relations among the leading space Powers would be dominated by mistrust and fear, suspicion and secrecy. Scientists engaged in research would find themselves tightly enclosed in the armour of war.

While space weapons have not yet become a reality there is still time to prevent a new stage in the arms race and ensure for the people a peaceful outer space and confidence in their future. To achieve this goal, courageous and responsible political decisions are needed. This is now becoming a test of political maturity, of the level of humanism and the degree of civilization of society and its leaders.

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The Soviet Union proposes that the General Assembly should once again most strongly urge all States, in particular those which possess major space potential, immediately to reach agreement on effective measures aimed at preventing an arms race in space. This would create conditions for wide-ranging international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

Until only recently, space was the realm of science-fiction writers, but it has now become a theatre of man's practical activities. Suffice it to say that, since the day when the Soviet Union launched its first artificial satellite, over 3,000 unmanned and manned vehicles have been placed in space by various countries. There remains not a single area of scientific inquiry whose achievements would not be used in space science and technology. Similarly, there is no science and, in general, no field of human activity which would not feel, directly or indirectly, the impact of space research. Further exploration of outer space would open to mankind truly boundless prospects, including possibilities of solving large-scale problems on Earth.

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The Soviet Union is proposing the implementation of a complex of specific measures that would help combine the concerted efforts of States in the peaceful use of space technology for the benefit of all countries. This is spelled out in detail in the document submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly which is entitled "Main directions and principles of international co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space in conditions of its non-militarization".[8]

Such co-operation, in the view of the Soviet Union, could be implemented in the ascendant, ranging from exchanges of scientific and technical information to pooling the efforts of States for the solution of large-scale problems of space exploration. Eventually, joint operation of orbital factories manufacturing new materials and industrial products in conditions of deep vacuum and weightlessness would also become a reality.

Even now it is possible to set in motion work both in fundamental space research and in space technology applications. The possibility of the development and utilization of space technology, including large international orbital scientific stations as well as manned spacecraft of various types, is well within reach.

To organize and implement the interaction of States, a world space agency, entrusted with important functions, could be established. It would give all States mutually beneficial and non-discriminatory access to the results of scientific and technological achievements, implement international space projects, help involve the developing countries in space activities, and promote utilization by those countries of the practical results of such activities. It goes without saying that no conditions infringing on their sovereignty would be imposed.

The organization could also assume the necessary function of verifying compliance with agreements which have been or will be concluded concerning the prevention of an arms race in space.

Naturally, the peaceful exploration of space should be based on the principles stemming from the United Nations Charter.

Along with all this, however, it is necessary to emphasize the indisputable and objective fact that qualitatively higher international co-operation in space can develop unimpeded only in conditions of its non-militarization. Such co-operation requires strict compliance with the treaties aimed at preventing an arms race in space. This constitutes an integral part of the Soviet proposal.

Today, when there are no strike weapons in space, such conditions exist. Therefore we propose that a representative international conference should be convened not later than in 1987 to consider in its entirety the question of international co-operation in the exploration of space and to agree on its main directions and principles.

The conditions necessary for such co-operation will continue to exist in the future if space remains free from weapons and if a ban is

[8] See Documents 141 and 142.

imposed on the development, including research, and the testing and deployment of space strike weapons.

We approach the issue from concrete and realistic positions. That is why we are saying frankly that the success of the conference would be facilitated by genuine movement towards the solution of the problem of preventing the spread of weapons into outer space. Thus, the task of convening the conference, as well as establishing an international space organization, should become an integral part of efforts to prevent the militarization of space. It is clear that the adoption by this session of a decision along the lines of the Soviet proposal would be a major contribution to accomplishing this task.

Naturally, such an important and positive step by the United Nations would help create a favourable climate for the work of the existing forums where space issues are being discussed. This concerns the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva, the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Soviet Union is in favour of energetically continuing all those efforts and striving for appropriate practical results. What we want is not to substitute one forum for another but to give an impulse to progress in all directions leading to the prevention of an arms race in space and to its peaceful utilization.

We are convinced that the proposals of the Soviet Union would contribute both to a better understanding among States and to the effective utilization of mankind's material and intellectual resources. A fresh impulse would be given to the development of science and technology. An important step would be made in using the achievements of space exploration for the benefit of the economic and social progress of the peoples. This would bring closer the solution of global problems, including the most urgent ones such as the elimination of hunger and disease and overcoming the economic backwardness of the developing countries.

Such an approach to space is certainly not directed against any State. It is important to emphasize its non-confrontational character. In substance, it is in harmony with the broadest interests of the whole of mankind and, indeed, of the whole planet. I wish to quote in this connection the words of the founder of the theory of space travel, Konstantin E. Tsiolkovsky, who said that in the development of space technology it was necessary "to set peaceful and noble goals for conquering the universe for the benefit of mankind".

The substance of the USSR proposal is that we should once and for all adopt a decision worthy of the people living in the space age—"star peace" instead of "star wars". This would be a major step towards relaxation of tension and implementation of the lofty goals of the United Nations aimed at the development of international co-operation, towards saving present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

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201. Statement by the Swedish Representative (Théorin) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Naval Arms Race [Extract], October 15, 1985 [1]

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The seas and the oceans, covering more than 70 per cent of the earth's surface, are also the scene of an intensive technological arms race. The tasks of national navies range from coastal patrol to intervention in distant conflicts, from local self-defence to global power projection, and from age-old gunboat diplomacy to nuclear deterrence.

The major maritime Powers maintain naval forces ready for rapid deployment also in distant areas. Naval units often operate off the coasts of other countries and even penetrate their territorial waters. This increases tension and further accelerates the arms race.

The naval arms race does not involve only conventional weapons; far from it. The nuclear-weapon Powers possess more than 7,000 submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads. They also have an estimated 5,900 tactical nuclear weapons for use by naval forces against surface ships, submarines, aircraft, and land targets. Thus, about 13,000 nuclear weapons are earmarked for naval use, that is every fourth nuclear weapon in the world.

The principle of freedom of navigation permits the nuclear Powers to move these nuclear weapons across the seas and oceans, and to deploy them almost off any coastal point to their liking. Indeed, they frequently do so as a matter of routine.

The great number of tactical nuclear weapons on board warships has largely been overlooked. One reason is the policy pursued by nuclear-weapon Powers neither to confirm nor to deny the presence of any nuclear weapons on board any particular ship at any particular time. This creates legitimate concern in many countries, especially when warships of nuclear Powers in accordance with international law make use of their right to innocent passage through these countries' territorial waters or call at their harbours. The policy neither to confirm nor to deny does not build confidence between States. Quite the opposite. It is in fact a confidence-blocking practice that should be abandoned.

The technological development of the means for naval warfare has been no less rapid than that concerning warfare on land. The nuclear revolution, the electronic revolution, the aviation revolution, the computer revolution, the automatic battlefield revolution, the weapon-effect revolution, all apply to naval forces.

It is a source of concern to my Government that growing naval activities have increased both the risk of deliberate confrontation at sea, and the risk of unintentional incidents in the vast sea areas.

[1] A/C.1/40/PV.4, pp. 10–12.

The nuclear-arms race at sea has been largely neglected in multilateral disarmament negotiations. The new Convention on the Law of the Sea provides some new elements for discussing naval arms limitation and disarmament.

In 1983, Sweden initiated a General Assembly resolution calling for a United Nations study on the naval arms race. The aim of the study was to facilitate "the identification of possible areas for disarmament and confidence-building measures". (General Assembly resolution 38/1886 [38/188 G]). The study, which was adopted by consensus by the group of governmental experts, is now before the General Assembly.[2] In our view, the time has come to address maritime confidence-building measures and naval disarmament.

I should like to mention some measures that, in Sweden's view, should be worked out without delay:

First, long-range sea-based cruise missiles should be banned before they are produced in large numbers;

Secondly, all tactical nuclear weapons on board warships should be taken ashore and not be on board on routine patrol;

Thirdly, the legitimate claim of coastal states to reasonable "seaboard security" should be confirmed;

Fourthly, the inalienable right of all States to the freedom of the seas should not be infringed upon by military activities;

Fifthly, a modernization of the current laws of sea warfare should be undertaken.

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202. Communique of the Nordic Foreign Ministers [Extracts], October 18, 1985 [1]

The international situation, especially the disarmament efforts, the situation in Southern Africa and the essential role of the United Nations, were topics in focus during the Nordic foreign ministers' regular autumn meeting in Oslo, 17–18 October 1984.

The ministers welcomed the upcoming summit meeting between President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev. They stressed the importance of the meeting leading to a more positive development in the East-West relations.

The ministers underlined the importance of the ongoing negotiations in Geneva and expressed the hope that these will result in a halt of the arms race, including sizable reductions of the parties' nuclear arsenals and a prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The ministers reaffirmed their governments' commitments to the CSCE process. They expressed their satisfaction that the significance

[2] A/40/535, annex. For an extract of the study, see Document 173.
[1] ACDA files.

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of this process for the future of Europe was emphasized from all sides at the 10th anniversary meeting recently held in Helsinki. Furthermore, the ministers noted with satisfaction the progress achieved at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (Stockholm Conference). A positive outcome of the conference will create favourable conditions for a satisfactory outcome of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna in the autumn of 1986, and represent a balanced follow-up of the Final Act.[2]

The ministers stressed the importance of rapid negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a comprehensive test ban treaty, and stressed the importance of progress in the negotiations regarding a global agreement on a total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. They welcomed that the conference in a separate committee has initiated the work on prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The ministers also expressed the hope that real results will soon be reached at the MBFR negotiations in Vienna.

The ministers continued their exchange of views on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic area and agreed to remain in contact on this question. During their deliberations the question of a corridor free of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe was also raised.

The ministers expressed their satisfaction with the adoption of a final document at the Third Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which confirms the parties' strong support to the non-proliferation regime.[3] They urged those states who have not yet adhered to the treaty to do so immediately.

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The meeting was attended by Denmark's Foreign Minister, Mr. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Finland's Foreign Minister, Mr. Paavo Vayrynen, Iceland's Foreign Minister, Mr. Geir Hallgrimsson, Sweden's Foreign Minister, Mr. Sten Andersson, and Norway's Foreign Minister, Mr. Svenn Stray.

At the invitation of the Swedish Government, the next meeting of the Nordic foreign ministers will take place in Stockholm on 8–9 April 1986.

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[2] The arms control portions of the Helsinki Final Act are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

[3] Document 179. For the Treaty text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465

203. Article by the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces (Akhromeyev), October 19, 1985 [1]

The Soviet Union has advanced concrete proposals at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on the complex of problems related to space and nuclear (strategic and medium-range) armaments. These proposals are being examined by the delegations. Their essence was set forth by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev in his statements in Paris.[2] Thus, they are known to the entire world.

These are the proposals for a total ban on space strike weapons and a radical, by 50 percent, reduction of the nuclear armaments of the USSR and the United States capable of reaching each others territories; for concluding agreements on nuclear medium-range systems in Europe and direct talks with France and Britain on the European balance of nuclear forces; for working out an agreement on a range of interim measures designed to facilitate the early and successful completion of the talks in Geneva.

Combined with the earlier advanced proposals, these new proposals constitute the Soviet program of realistic and far-reaching measures whose implementation may bring about normalization of the complicated and dangerous international situation. Implementing this program would ensure a substantial advance toward the goal considered most important by all peoples—that of preventing the militarization of outer space, prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons, and saving mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet initiatives have received broad support from peace-loving public opinion, including Western Europe and the United States. It is recognized everywhere that the program put forward by the Soviet Union contains proposals which may bring the world out of the arms race deadlock and remove the obstacles on the path of achieving accords at the Geneva talks.

Having received the Soviet proposals, the United States now has the opportunity to move forward and try to bring the positions of the sides at the talks closer together. After all, Washington makes daily statements about its readiness and desire for a radical cut in nuclear weapons. The Soviet proposals go out to meet those desires.

But how does the U.S. react to the Soviet proposals? After making an initial assessment (it is impossible to study deeply and evaluate such fundamental proposals in a brief period), many officials from the White House Administration, as is now evident, embarked on a path of falsifying and publicly discrediting our initiatives, trying to misinterpret them, presenting them in a spurious light, and belittling their significance. Realizing that it is impossible to reject the Soviet propos-

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[1] *Pravda* in Russian, October 19, 1985, first edition, p. 4; FBIS *Daily Report*, October 21, 1985, vol. III, pp. AA1–AA7.

[2] See his address before members of the French National Assembly, an extract of which is printed in Document 195.

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als as a whole, they say in Washington that they recognize they "warrant further discussion" and could be accepted as "a starting point at the talks." However, this is said just as a disguise. In actual fact, something quite different is taking place. High-ranking U.S. Administration representatives have in the past few days actively come out against the Soviet proposals. They are letting it be known that such proposals are unacceptable to them and are attempting to discredit and reject, not the details, but the essence, the foundations of the Soviet Union's proposals.

U.S. Administration officials, considering the people's fear of nuclear weapons, declare the U.S. "star wars" program may, allegedly, rid the world of nuclear weapons. They in Washington flatly reject the idea of banning the development [*sozdaniye*] [3] and deployment [*razvertyvaniye*] of space strike weapons, while in order to cover up their aggressive designs, they have worked out a false concept of gradual transition from the deployment of nuclear offensive systems to the development and deployment of non-nuclear, so-called "defensive" systems. Its authors' line of argument is as follows: It is necessary to continue the deployment of strategic nuclear armaments, constantly threatening the Soviet Union with their use. Simultaneously, it is necessary to develop a "multitiered ABM' defense." This is how they describe space strike armaments. After the system is developed, "probably, in a few decades," it will be, purportedly, possible to come to an agreement on the reduction and even elimination of nuclear armaments.

It turns out that in order to eliminate nuclear weapons it is necessary to plunge mankind into an arms race that is hard to even imagine today. The road to nuclear disarmament, according to this inside-out logic, lies in the buildup of nuclear offensive armaments and the militarization of space. It will take tens of years and the cost of innumerable material and other resources of mankind to accumulate the huge piles of weapons. There is no other way, nor can there be any, claims the U.S. Administration.

Why all this is being done is understood in the Soviet Union. Deceiving peoples, diverting them from immediate measures for the reduction of nuclear arsenals are the aims of these manipulations. Washington transforms, turns upside-down, the objective need for a total elimination of nuclear weapons in order to gain an opportunity for an uncontrolled buildup of nuclear armaments. The United States is implementing this in practice. It is developing first-strike weapons; five new types of strategic delivery vehicles—two types of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), two types of heavy bombers—and is also deploying long-range cruise missiles of various basing modes and other systems of nuclear armaments.

[3] Brackets here and following are in the source document.

If the propaganda is cast aside and the essence of the U.S. "star wars" program is revealed, it pursues the treacherous aim of giving the United States the potential to make a first nuclear strike at the Soviet Union with impunity and deprive it, by creating a national anti-missile defence, of the opportunity to make a retaliatory strike.

The Soviet Union suggested to the U.S. Administration a ban on the development of the two sides' space strike weapons. We are against the spread of the arms race into outer space. If that happens, mankind may find itself facing an unpredictable situation. The risk of war will grow many times. In order to prevent this, the USSR proposes renouncing, once and for all, the development and deployment of space strike armaments.

That is why an accord banning the development of space strike weapons is a key, fundamental question. If no ban exists, an unchecked arms race will start, both of strategic offensive and space weapons. Such is the objective reality. There should be no misunderstanding on this point. The Soviet Union is far from naive and cannot count only on peaceful assurances by U.S. leaders, which serve as a cover for developing strike weapons in space. If that is continued, nothing will remain for us, but to adopt countermeasures in the field of both offensive and other, not excluding defensive, armaments, including those based in space.

The White House wants to present the Soviet Union with a *fait accompli* of the deployment of space strike systems which are aimed at it. But Washington underestimates the potentialities of the Soviet Union.

There will be no U.S. monopoly in outer space. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev has declared this with all clarity.

In order to justify the militarization of outer space, Washington alleges that U.S. work on the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), in fact a "star wars" program, is "something quite legitimate" and even almost allowed by the 1972 Soviet-American Treaty limiting antiballistic missile defenses.[4] A "new interpretation" of the Treaty has been offered, according to which, it allows, purportedly, the development [*razrabatyvet*], testing, and creation [*sozdavat*] of anti-missile weapon systems on the basis of "other physical principles," that is laser, particle-beam, and other types of weaponry, both land- and space-based.

Thus, the presidential assistant for national security affairs R. McFarlane, when appearing on an NBC television program on October 6, distorted the essence of the ABM Treaty.[5] Trying to substantiate the "lawfuiness of experiments" within the framework of the ill-famed "Strategic Defense Initiative," he contended that "the Treaty sanctions tests of any ABM system as long as they are based on other

[4] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.
[5] Document 196.

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principles of physics." The ABM Treaty is also falsified by the "new confidential study" prepared by the Pentagon and concerning limitations envisaged by the Treaty. It is contended in the study that provisions of the Treaty supposedly can be applied only to radars and anti-missiles, but not to the development [*razrabotka*] and testing of "exotic" ABM systems (lasers, beam weapons).

Such "interpretations" of the ABM Treaty, to put it mildly, are deliberate deceit. They contradict reality. Article 5 of the Treaty absolutely unambiguously bans the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems or components of space or mobile ground basing and, moreover, regardless of whether these systems are based on existing or "future" technologies.

In accordance with the agreed-upon Statement "D" ["E"] appended to the Treaty, to which the administration now refers so often, the conduct of research, development, and testing of ABM systems or their components, based on other physical principles, is allowed in areas that are strictly limited by the Treaty, clearly defined by it and use only fixed ground ABM systems (as they are defined in Article 3 of the treaty). Moreover, if either side wants to deploy its new systems in these limited areas, it cannot do so without preliminary consultations with the other side and without introducing the appropriate agreed-upon amendments in the Treaty.

Only such and no other interpretation of the key provisions of the ABM Treaty, that was initiated by the United States itself, was worked out and adopted by the two sides in the course of talks on this Treaty. The present aim of the U.S. Administration is clear: To prepare a "legal base" for carrying out all stages of practical work within the framework of the SDI program, that is the development [*razrabotka*], testing, and deployment [*razvertyvaniye*] of space strike systems.

The ABM Treaty is becoming an obstacle to the United States in the fulfillment of "star wars" plans. In striving to clear the road for the militarization of outer space, the head of the Pentagon Caspar Weinberger, when speaking at the National Press Club in Washington, threw aside the subterfuges of McFarlane and others and bluntly stated, "We should study the possibility of really breaking with the ABM Treaty." Such is the actual position of the United States.

The Soviet Union is of a diametrically opposite opinion. The open-ended ABM Treaty is fundamentally important for the entire process of nuclear arms limitation; even more, it is the basis on which strategic stability and international security rest. We are convinced that everybody, including the United States, will stand to lose from a violation of this Treaty.

The USSR is strictly observing all commitments under the Treaty and is not doing anything that would contradict its provisions.

The Soviet stand on space strike arms was clearly formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev. It is necessary, he stated in the interview for *Time* magazine, for a ban to embrace every phase of the inception of this

new class of arms.[6] This, however, does not deny the right and possibility of conducting basic research in outer space. But, it is one thing to conduct research and studies in laboratory conditions and quite another when models and prototypes are created and samples of space arms are tested. This is always followed by the deployment [*razvertyvaniye*] of arms. It is precisely such a line, backing it up accordingly with propaganda, that the U.S. Administration is pursuing as regards the "star wars" program. The USSR views as impermissible any out-of-laboratory work connected with the development and testing of models, pilot samples, separate assemblies, and components. Everything that is being done for the subsequent design and production of space strike systems should be banned.

The Soviet Union's approach is substantiated and realistic also from the point of view that out-of-laboratory work can be verified by national technical means. If this process is cut short at the initial stage of research, the possibility of developing [*razrabotka*] space strike arms will vanish.

The United States representatives pile up false arguments and distort the Soviet proposal on a very radical cut, by 50 percent, of the nuclear arms of the USSR and the United States capable of reaching each other's territory.

Flowing from Washington is a large stream of contentions that the Soviet proposal puts the United States in an unequal position because it will have to reduce not only the strategic "triad," but also its forward-based systems in Europe and Asia and medium-range missiles that are being deployed in Western Europe. As for the Soviet Union, it is contended, account is only taken of strategic nuclear arms while the SS–20 missiles, deployed in the European zone and creating a threat to the West European allies of the United States, are supposedly ignored (taken out of the bracket of reductions).

The United States uses such arguments as a means of avoiding the main issue—the genuine fact that apart from the strategic nuclear force, the Soviet Union does not have other nuclear systems capable of reaching the territory of the United States. However, the territory of the Soviet Union is under a dual threat from the U.S. strategic offensive force and U.S. medium-range missiles and forward-based systems deployed around the Soviet Union. We have never held an unconcerned attitude toward this dual threat, nor will we do so.

As for the Soviet SS–20 missiles in the European zone, our proposal is long known: The USSR is prepared to reduce them and leave no more than the number of corresponding missiles in the possession of Britain and France (counting by warheads). If the United States withdraws its medium-range missiles from Europe, the Soviet Union will immediately carry out such a reduction.

On the event of an accord in Europe, the USSR does not intend to deploy additional SS–20 missiles in the east of the country on the

[6] Document 159.

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understanding that there will be no substantial changes in the strategic situation there and no additional U.S. nuclear systems capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union will be deployed.

Further, the U.S. Administration is trying to present matters as though, according to our proposal, the U.S. side, unlike the Soviet side, will have to reduce its "triad" by more than 50 percent because, in view of its "allies commitments," the United States, supposedly, cannot renounce its medium-range missiles and forward-based systems.

But the USSR also has allies and corresponding obligations have also been signed between them and the Soviet Union that are being strictly observed. Why, after all, should the United States leave intact its medium-range missiles and forward-based systems that threaten the USSR and its allies? The United States wants to entrench itself with its first-strike systems near the borders of the Warsaw Pact states and thereby secure for itself strategic superiority. This is the crux of the matter.

A version is spreading within U.S. ruling circles, according to which the USSR, after the reduction, will preserve its "most dangerous" and "destabilizing" strategic armaments—land-based ICBM's. The U.S. Administration has a rule of its own: The systems which are most developed in the USSR and which make up the backbone of its military might are designated as "destabilizing", while those which make up the strength of the United States, for instance, SLBM's, and heavy bombers, each with 20–28 long-range cruise missiles on board are systems of "stability and security". The Soviet Union does not agree with this.

Strategic offensive weapons are now approaching one another in their destructive capabilities. There is no difference as far as combat effectiveness is concerned, between the Soviet ICBM's and the American Trident SLBM's. That is why strategic armaments should be regarded and assessed in their entirety, as a single whole. This has always been the basic principle of negotiations. The new Soviet proposal proceeds from this as well. It stipulates that none of the elements of the strategic triad of each side—either Soviet ICBM's or American SLBM's—account for more than 60 percent of the sum total of warheads (6,000 units) remaining after the reduction. This means that, under implementation of our proposal, the reduction would apply to each of the elements of the triad, including the Soviet ICBM's.

In a bid to justify the escalation of war preparations and the Washington-instigated arms race, U.S. leaders are seeking to convince the public that no rough military strategic balance currently exists between the USSR and the United States; that the United States is allegedly "lagging behind" the USSR in strategic offensive armaments. Lately, they have been asserting that the USSR also allegedly leaped forward in the field of developing [*sozdaniye*] an anti-missile defense of the country's territory. The anti-Soviet propaganda about "Soviet mili-

tary superiority" is continuing. The arguments are not new. Every thesis they contain is false.

The truth is that a rough balance in strategic armaments does exist between the USSR and the United States. This was verified during the seven years of work on the SALT II Treaty and was officially endorsed by Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter in 1979 during the signing of the Treaty.[7] At the present time, the number of strategic delivery vehicles on both sides has not changed in comparison with 1979. The USSR has somewhat more of them than the United States (2,504:2,210), but the United States still has a greater quantity of warheads on them. But, on the whole, there is a rough equality. This is confirmed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Its report to Congress (1984) notes: "In the present period, there exists an approximate nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union."

The approximate balance will still be preserved after 50 percent reductions in the corresponding nuclear armaments, though of course, at a substantially lower level. Although the number of delivery vehicles possessed by the United States will be somewhat greater than those of the USSR (1,680 and 1,250 respectively), the sides will be left with an identical quantity of warheads—6,000 units each, which will ensure approximate strategic equilibrium.

The statements by Washington officials about the USSR's purported three-time super superiority in ICBMs (warheads and their destruct capabilities) are one-sided.

As a matter of fact, the United States has roughly the same superiority in warheads on its SLBMs.

The United States' desire to "rectify" the nuclear armaments balance is aimed, in fact, at altering the rough equality in strategic systems in favour of the United States. It is very indicative that they want to "rectify" the nuclear balance. According to the Pentagon, a nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union existed twenty years ago when the United States had in service more than 1,000 ICBMs, 656 SLBMs, more than 600 heavy bombers, and a considerable number of forward-based nuclear weapon delivery vehicles close to Soviet territory, while the USSR had only 600 strategic delivery vehicles.

In the opinion of the U.S. side, the "imbalance" appeared when the USSR acquired an equivalent capability of replying to a strike against its territory with a strike at the potential aggressor's territory. We got this capability mostly with the development [*razvitiye*] of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. That is why the United States views our ICBM's as the "main source of the problem".

But we do not think the ability to respond equally with a blow to a blow against our territory is an imbalance. On the contrary, this is the foundation of supporting equilibrium in nuclear forces, an important

[7] The SALT II Treaty is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

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factor of maintaining peace and stability. Rough equality is also the necessary basis for the process of nuclear arms limitation. We know that in the United States some people are still dreaming about returning to the state when the invulnerable "fortress North America" could threaten any state with nuclear annihilation. There is no returning to the past. Neither will there be any unilateral disarmament of the USSR.

It is not difficult to understand what is concealed behind the inventions of the Pentagon and the United States Department of State that the Soviet Union supposedly has all but created an ABM system for the defense of the territory of the country: This is deception of the public. The Soviet Union is not engaged in the development [*razrabotka*] and, consequently, testing of any models of space arms whatsoever; we do not have programs for creating space strike systems nor plans of "star wars" analogous to the U.S. ones. The USSR is strictly fulfilling the indefinite ABM Treaty of 1972. We suggest that the United States should also join us in this and give up plans of militarizing outer space before it is too late. There are no strike arms in outer space now, and there should be none.

With an eye to the forthcoming Soviet-American summit, the question is being asked throughout the world: What are the Soviet Union and the United States taking to that meeting? The USSR is seriously and thoroughly preparing for it. Having made the proposals on space and nuclear arms it actually covered its half of the road. Moreover, the Soviet Union proceeds from the broad interests of European and international security. It is not seeking any military advantages whatsoever for itself and is pressing only for one thing—just and honest agreements. Its proposals are a good basis for the talks in Geneva. The USSR is going to the summit with a firm desire to reach agreement on joint measures to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and strengthen security and stability.

What about the other side? There are no signs yet of businesslike and constructive preparations for the meeting on its part. On the contrary, the Soviet position is being distorted, real facts are being presented wrongly and attempts are being made to spread doubts in the world about the sincerity of the Soviet Union's intentions. At the same time, the United States has not made a single positive step, has not made a single constructive proposal. All this intensifies the growing concern of the peaceloving public.

The truth is that there can be no more marking time. Stressing the dangerous processes threatening the very existence of mankind, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade M.S. Gorbachev said: "As a result, international developments have approached a line which cannot be overcome without making decisions of the highest level of responsibility in order to limit the arms race and halt the slide toward war". The time has come to adopt these decisions. And the world is awaiting these decisions.

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204. Chinese Proposals Submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Measures To Promote Disarmament and Reduce the Danger of War, October 21, 1985 [1]

In the world today, the nuclear arms race is continuing both quantitatively and qualitatively, conventional armaments are still heavily concentrated in certain parts of the world, the arms race is even undergoing a change in quality as a result of the development of space weapons and there are still cases of the use of chemical weapons. In view of the grave threat to world peace and ardent desire of all peoples for the cessation of the arms race and for disarmament, the Chinese Delegation has put forward the following four-point proposal:

1. In order to reduce the danger of a nuclear war and create favourable conditions for its complete elimination, all nuclear-weapon States, particularly the two Powers with the largest nuclear arsenals, should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances and should unconditionally pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. On such a basis, an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons should be concluded with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

2. In order to diminish the risk of conventional wars and avert the possible escalation of a conventional war into a nuclear war in areas with a high concentration of nuclear and conventional weapons, the two military blocs, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, should reach agreement as early as possible on the drastic reduction of their conventional armaments.

3. Outer space belongs to all mankind and ought to be used solely for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all. The United States and the Soviet Union should immediately stop the arms race in outer space in all its forms. All the countries with space capability should refrain from developing, testing or deploying outer space weaponry. An international agreement on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of outer space weaponry should be concluded as soon as possible.

4. In view of the fact that the race in the development of chemical weapons has not been checked, the Conference on Disarmament is called upon to complete negotiations at an early date and conclude a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. Pending this, all the countries capable of manufacturing and producing chemical weapons should refrain from testing, producing, transferring and deploying chemical weapons and pledge not to use such weapons.

These four points are all reasonable measures for resolving pressing disarmament issues of our time. It is hoped that they will be considered by the First Committee of the General Assembly at its fortieth

[1] A/C.1/40/6, Annex.

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session in the interest of promoting disarmament and reducing the danger of war.

205. Address by Secretary of Defense Weinberger: Ethics and Arms Control [Extract], October 22, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

I often hear that arms control is a more ethically justifiable course of action than attempting to strengthen deterrence through defensive weapons. But how can arms control, in itself, be either good or bad—for it is obviously the consequences of arms control that we're worried about, not simply the process of negotiations. And recent history shows that arms control has hardly been a raving success.

SALT I, for instance, did little more than provide a fleeting record of the existing balance of forces, which rapidly began to shift.[2] The Soviets continued to modernize their nuclear arsenal, adding so many weapons of such accuracy and throw-weight that they threatened our retaliatory force. Since 1971, they have deployed at least four new types of ICBMs, nine improved versions of their existing ICBM and SLBM force, and we will soon see their new intercontinental bomber—the Blackjack.

Furthermore, today I can officially confirm that one of their new ICBMs, the mobile SS–25, is now being deployed and is an unquestionable violation of Soviet assurances given to us under the SALT II accord. This single warhead missile measures just under 20 meters in length and has a range of 10,500 kilometers. The SS–25 is road-mobile and can be housed in launcher garages equipped with sliding roofs. This makes it an extremely versatile weapon. The SS–25 violates the SALT II agreement that permits development of only one new type of ICBM.[3] Their first new type developed, the SS–X–24, is now being tested.

This isn't, sadly, the only case of a Soviet violation of arms control agreements. A particularly troublesome violation is taking place with their construction of a missile detection and tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk. This is a blatant violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which limits such radars to the periphery of the nation, pointing outward to operate only as early warning radar.

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[1] Department of Defense release no. 623–85. The speech was made at the Ethics and Public Policy Center Conference on Ethics, Arms Control, and the Strategic Defense Initiative, Capitol Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C.

[2] The SALT I agreements comprise the so-called ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms and its Protocol, and Agreed Interpretations. For the texts of these agreements, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–207. A further Protocol to the ABM Treaty may be found *ibid., 1974*, pp. 229–231.

[3] For the SALT II agreement, see *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189–222.

The Krasnoyarsk radar, however, is located 750 kilometers from the nearest Soviet border and looks across 4,000 kilometers of Russian territory. This radar closes an important gap in their defense radar coverage.

Now there has been a lot of controversy over our interpretation of this violation and many people in the West have attempted to explain it away. The technical information we have convinces us that this radar is a violation. But even if there were some doubt about this, what does it say about the Soviet Union that they have so little regard for the ABM Treaty that they would not even consult us before they began to build this radar? Even if their motives were pure, why did they not avail themselves of this Treaty and explain the intention of this radar? Instead they have pressed ahead with construction.

Even more damaging about the history of "arms control" is that it has not brought about any *reductions* in arms. Given the recent history of arms control, it is, I think, difficult to argue that the only moral course of action open to the United States is more of the same. There is nothing moral about a situation in which the strength of the democratic nations is slowly eroded. Again, it is the consequences of negotiations that must concern us. And that is exactly why President Reagan has insisted on real, equitable, and verifiable arms reductions in Geneva.

Also quite frankly, I am at a loss to understand why it is moral to allow the Soviets to develop a defensive shield while we sit back and do nothing. And why is it immoral to research the possibility of creating options for a safer future, which may lessen the risk of war?

Indeed we do not think that there is any contradiction between serious arms reduction negotiations and vigorous research into strategic defense. In fact, the efforts are completely complementary.

Our critics, however, don't appreciate why real arms reduction agreements with the Soviets are so difficult. The reason lies in exactly what I have been speaking about—the moral foundations of our two governments.

Let me give you one example, of many, to illustrate this point. The United States has openly conducted vigorous research into the potential of strategic defense. We even briefed the Soviets in Geneva on our project, and we are attempting to engage them in serious discussions on the future relationship between offensive and defensive weapons. We stated, as clearly as we could, our desire to determine if we can move beyond deterrence through mutual vulnerability, to deterrence based on defense. We think this is an effective and moral way to ensure peace—and a better way than the mutual suicide pact we now live under.

The Kremlin, however, has been anything but open and candid. Around Moscow, the Soviets have the world's only operational ABM system, and they spend about ten times as much as we do on all forms of strategic defense. More than 10,000 of their scientists and engineers are involved in one aspect of strategic defense research—laser weap-

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ons. In some cases, they are well beyond the research stage. For example, they now have ground-based lasers that could be used to interfere with our satellites. By the late 1980s, the Soviets could have prototypes of lasers that could hit ballistic missiles.

Indeed, the Soviets are using what systems they already have for a potent defense capability. They now have nearly 12,000 surface-to-air missile launchers at over 1,200 sites and more than 1,200 interceptor aircraft dedicated to strategic defense—with an additional 2,800 interceptor aircraft if required.

When faced with this evidence, the Soviets simply deny the existence of their own strategic defense program despite our certain knowledge of its existence. Their primary concern is to insure that our SDI research is curtailed, so they constantly denounce us for generating a new round in the arms race, or attempting to acquire a first-strike capability, or attempting to "militarize space." These cynical assaults against SDI should not surprise us. The Soviets are simply implementing Marx's doctrine that "criticism is . . . a weapon. Its object is an enemy it wants not to refute but to destroy. . . ."

If our critics would take a long and sober look at the reality behind Soviet sophistry, they would soon understand why arms reductions are so difficult.

They would surely see that the Soviet Union and the United States have fundamentally opposing views on the nature and goals of politics. While we attempt to secure individual rights and encourage the widest possible diversity, the Soviets attempt to impose, within the limits of their power, the greatest conformity to their own doctrines. This desire for obedience to their dictates, of course, permeates their foreign policy. Consequently, they will never feel they have accomplished Marx's and Lenin's orders until they have neutralized the world's free nations.

The point is that relations between our countries, at best, will always be difficult. But unlike the liberal perfectionists of whom Niebuhr spoke, we do not expect any kind of complete resolution of our differences. We, therefore, have realistic notions of what can be accomplished in Geneva, and at a meeting between the heads of state.

Let me conclude by suggesting that there is today a considerable amount of moral and political confusion about our strategic defense program in particular, and U.S.-Soviet relations in general.

Edmund Burke said that "the people never give up their liberties but under some delusion." We now see one of the most ugly consequences of the delusion that there exists no essential moral distinction between democracy and communism—the idea that there is no ethical foundation for the defense of free government.

Free people do not always choose wisely, but we believe there exists no better guide to prudent politics than the open clash of opinions.

The result of that free clash of ideas is obvious to all—especially our adversaries. We have created the freest, most prosperous and strongest

nation in the history of the world. We have a moral obligation to defend it—and we will.

206. Statement by the Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: The Antiballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, October 22, 1985 [1]

When the President initiated the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] research program, he ordered that it be conducted in full compliance with our legal treaty obligations; he directed, from its inception, that the SDI program be planned accordingly; there is no intention to deviate from that commitment.

The SDI is a research program. It is investigating the feasibility of new defensive technologies, both earth- and space-based—no more, no less. The fundamental purpose of the SDI program is to determine whether and, if so, how it can contribute to the realization of a situation in which nations can live secure in the knowledge that their security increasingly rests on the ability to defend against potential attacks, thus to deter by denial rather than merely by the threat of mutually devastating nuclear retaliation.

More than 13 years have elapsed since the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty was negotiated.[2] A number of mutually inconsistent statements as to its proper interpretation have been made over this time period. In view of the importance of the current issue, a review of the basic facts was mandatory. Not only the Defense Department lawyers but also Judge Sofaer, Legal Adviser of the State Department, and his staff have recently conducted such a review on the ABM Treaty, its agreed statements, and associated negotiating record in full detail.[3]

The reexamination of the Treaty's text, the agreed statements and common understandings accompanying it, the negotiating record, and official statements made since 1972 shows that they have been variously interpreted as to what kinds of development and testing, as well as what kinds of research, are permitted, particularly with respect to future systems and components based on what are called in the treaty "other physical principles."

Because of the great potential contribution that deployment of systems flowing from SDI could make to our security, because of appar-

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[1] Department of State, Current Policy No. 755. The statement was made before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science.

[2] Brackets are in source document. For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

[3] *Infra.*

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ent Soviet treaty interpretations different from ours, and because of our interest in a rigorous implementation of the ABM Treaty by both sides, we have devoted much attention to the question of how to interpret the Treaty. It is our view, based on our recent analysis of the Treaty text and all of the accompanying records, that a broader interpretation of our authority than that which we have applied to restrict our SDI research program is fully justified. This is, however, a moot point. Our SDI research program has been structured and, for solid reasons, will continue to be conducted in accordance with a restrictive interpretation of the Treaty's obligations. We believe that the SDI program can adequately answer those pertinent questions regarding new defensive technologies originally posed by the President while strictly adhering to this more restrictive interpretation.

There can be no double standard as to the way we interpret our treaty obligations vis-a-vis the interpretation the Soviets apply to those same treaty obligations. To do otherwise would outline a formula for potential disaster to our national security interests. In sharp contrast to Soviet behavior, our conservative and principled restraint with respect to our own SDI program demonstrates, by our deeds, our sincerity toward commitments—commitments to our Congress, to our allies, and to our respective publics.

207. Statement by the Department of State Legal Adviser (Sofaer) Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, October 22, 1985 [1]

This is my first appearance before your committee. I am honored by your invitation to discuss the meaning of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with respect to so-called future ABM systems or components, including some contemplated as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative.[2]

The ABM Treaty is an important element of our strategic arms control structure. When the President first announced the SDI program in March 1983, he made clear that it would be conducted "consistent with our obligations [under] [3] the ABM Treaty." [4] This commitment has been maintained. The United States has scrupulously complied with the treaty, notwithstanding such clear Soviet violations of it as the Krasnoyarsk radar station.

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[1] Department of State, Current Policy No. 755. The statement was made before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science.

[2] For the texts of the ABM Treaty, agreed interpretations, and Protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201 and 205–206, and *ibid., 1974*, pp. 229–231.

[3] These and following brackets are in source text.

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, p. 200.

Broad vs. Restrictive Interpretation

Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, the implementation of our SDI program, and the ongoing arms negotiations at Geneva recently caused various agencies to consider more thoroughly than ever before the appropriate interpretation of the ABM Treaty as it relates to future or "exotic" systems. By that, I mean defensive systems that serve the same functions as ABM systems and components but that use devices based on technology not understood in 1972 when the Treaty was negotiated and that are capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars. This examination has led to the conclusion that a reading of the ABM Treaty that would allow the development and testing of such systems based on physical principles other than those understood in 1972 is wholly justified.

At the same time, however, I want to emphasize a critical point made by Secretary Shultz in his speech to the North Atlantic Assembly last week: "[O]ur SDI research program has been structured and, as the President has reaffirmed [on October 11], will continue to be conducted in accordance with a restrictive interpretation of the treaty's obligations." Secretary Shultz assured our NATO allies of "[o]ur commitment to pursue the program as currently structured, which is consistent with a restrictive interpretation of our obligations under the ABM Treaty." [5] Accordingly, he described the debate over the two interpretations as "moot." The issue may have practical significance only when the SDI program has reached the point at which questions regarding the feasibility of strategic defense have been answered and engineering development, with a view to deployment, becomes a real option.

I was well aware when I began my work on this issue that several officials associated with the SALT I [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negotiations and others still in the government had advanced the view that the ABM Treaty is unambiguous in its treatment of such future systems. They argued that article V of the Treaty forbids development, testing, or deployment of any future ABM systems and components other than those that are fixed land-based. They read Agreed Statement D as relevant only to fixed land-based systems and components, arguing that it permits "creation" of such systems and components when they are based on "other physical principles" but conditions their deployment on agreement between the parties on specific limitations. Other persons were contending, however, that this "restrictive" view of the ABM Treaty is based on unilateral assertions by U.S. negotiators; that the treaty is ambiguous; and that the negotiating record supports a broader view of our freedom to develop, test, and deploy future systems.

My study of the Treaty led me to conclude that its language is ambiguous and can more reasonably be read to support a broader

[5] Document 199.

interpretation. An examination of the three provisions primarily at issue will demonstrate why this is so.

- Article II(1) defines an "ABM system" as "a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of" ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars.
- Article V(1) provides that the parties agree "not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."
- Agreed Statement D, a side agreement that accompanies the treaty, provides as follows:

> In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

The restrictive interpretation rests on the premise that article V(1) is clear on its face: it says no development, testing, or deployment of "ABM systems or components" other than those that are fixed land-based. But this language does not settle the issue of the article's applicability to future systems and components. That issue depends on the meaning of the term "ABM systems or components": is that phrase limited to systems and components based on then-current technology, or does it also include those based on future technology?

In attempting to answer this question, one must turn to the definition of "ABM system" in article II(1). Proponents of the restrictive view contend that this definition is functional: anything ever conceived that could serve the function of countering strategic missiles in flight falls within the definition. These persons argue that the three components identified in that paragraph—missiles, launchers, and radars—are merely listed as the elements that an ABM system is "currently consisting of" and that all future components of a system that satisfies the functional definition are also covered by article II(1). Only when armed with these meanings can proponents rely on article V(1) as a ban on development, testing, and deployment of all non-fixed, land-based systems or components, whether current or future.

Shortcomings of the Restrictive Interpretation

This reading of the Treaty is plausible, but it is not the only reasonable reading; on the contrary, it has serious shortcomings. The premise that article II(1) defines "ABM system" in a functional manner, meant to include all future systems and components, is difficult to sustain. The provision can more reasonably be read to mean

that the systems contemplated by the treaty are those that serve the functions described *and* that currently consist of the listed components. The Treaty's other provisions consistently use the phrases "ABM system" and "components" in contexts that reflect that the parties were referring to systems and components based on known technology.

Article II(2), for example, further describes the "ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article," to include those that are operational, being tested, under construction, etc.—thereby indicating that the definition in article II(1) was not merely illustrative but was intended to describe the actual components covered by the Treaty. To take another example, article V(2) sets limits on the types of "launchers" that may be developed, tested, or deployed—thus reflecting, in the same article as the alleged prohibition on future mobile systems and components, an exclusive concern for one of the current components listed in article II(1).

Systems and components based on future technology are not discussed anywhere in the Treaty other than in Agreed Statement D. In that provision, the parties felt a need to qualify the term—systems and components created in the future—with the phrase "based on other physical principles." If "ABM system" and "components" actually meant all systems or devices that could serve ABM functions, whether based on present or future technology, the parties would not have needed to qualify these terms in Agreed Statement D. That this qualification was added suggests that the definitions of "ABM system" and "component" in article II(1) extended only to those based on presently utilized physical principles and not on "other" ones.

The existence of Agreed Statement D poses a fundamental problem for the restrictive view. Nothing in that statement suggests that it applies only to future systems that are fixed land-based; on the contrary, it addresses all ABM systems and components that are "based on other physical principles." Moreover, the restrictive interpretation would render this provision superfluous. If article II(1) extended to all ABM systems and components, based on present as well as on future technology, then article III implicitly would have banned all future fixed land-based systems and components. Such an interpretation, by rendering a portion of a Treaty superfluous, violates accepted canons of construction.

The serious difficulties of construction created by the restrictive reading are avoided if one reads articles II(1) and V(1) as referring only to ABM systems and components based on currently utilized physical principles. Read in this manner, the Treaty establishes a coherent, nonredundant scheme that prohibits:

- The deployment of all fixed land-based systems and components derived from current technological principles, except as specifically permitted (article III);

- The development, testing, and deployment of all mobile systems and components derived from current technological principles (article V(1)); and
- The deployment of all forms of systems and components derived from "other" physical principles until after agreement on specific limitations (Agreed Statement D).

Other reasonable constructions of the Treaty have been advanced, but I think that the arguments that I have presented serve to demonstrate the ambiguities present in the text of the ABM Treaty.

Historical Support for a Broader Interpretation

Under international law, as under U.S. domestic law, once an agreement has been found ambiguous, one must seek guidance in the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the agreement. Thus, in the present situation, once we concluded that the Treaty is ambiguous, we turned to the negotiating record to see which of the possible constructions most accurately reflects the parties' intentions.

Examining the negotiating record for the ABM Treaty presented some real, albeit mundane, difficulties. No single agency has systematically collected and preserved the entire record in a readily usable form. My staff and I, therefore, obtained from various sources everything that we could find that might be relevant to the issue of future systems and components. Because we are still in the process of collecting material, I cannot tell you with certainty that I know every single step in the negotiating process. But we are far enough along that I can say with confidence that a much stronger case exists in the record for the broader interpretation of the Treaty than for the restrictive interpretation.

The entire negotiating record is classified, and I, therefore, cannot reveal any detail in open session. If, after this public session, the committee chooses to go into executive session, I will be free to explain much more. I can tell you in general, however, that I personally reviewed all of the significant statements and drafts in the available negotiating history regarding future systems. I reached the firm conclusion that, although the U.S. delegates initially sought to ban development and testing of nonland-based systems or components based on future technology, the Soviets refused to go along, and no such agreement was reached. The Soviets stubbornly resisted U.S. attempts to adopt in the body of the Treaty any limits on such systems or components based on future technology; their arguments rested on a professed unwillingness to deal with unknown devices or technology. The farthest the Soviets were willing to go with respect to such future systems or components was to adopt a side agreement prohibiting only the deployment of such systems and components, once created, until the parties agreed on specific limitations. The parties did not agree to ban development and testing of such systems or components, whether on land or in space.

The negotiating record also contains strong support for a reading of article II(1) that restricts the definitions of "ABM system" and "components" to those based on current physical principles. The Soviets specifically sought to prevent broad definitions of these terms, and our negotiators acceded to their wishes. Moreover, our negotiators ultimately convinced the Soviets to adopt Agreed Statement D by arguing that, without it, the treaty would leave the parties free to deploy systems or components based on other physical principles, such as lasers.

I am aware that some U.S. negotiators in the SALT I talks assert that they achieved a total ban on the development, testing, and deployment of all future mobile systems and components, including those based on other physical principles. The negotiating history contains suggestions as to why they reached their conclusions. But the record of the negotiations fails to demonstrate that they actually succeeded in achieving their objective. On the contrary, the record reflects that they failed to obtain the ban they sought and that we could never have enforced such a ban against the Soviets. Treaties, like other agreements, are enforceable only to the extent they create mutual rights and duties. In effect, because the Soviets succeeded in avoiding a broad, binding commitment regarding the development and testing of mobile systems and components based on future technology, we cannot properly be said to be bound by such a commitment.

Conclusion

I wish to close by reiterating a critical point. Notwithstanding our belief in the merits of the broader interpretation, the President has decided to pursue the SDI program as currently structured, which can be accommodated within the confines of the "restrictive" interpretation—namely, research into, but not development or testing of, systems or components based on future technology and capable of substituting for ABM interceptors, launchers, or radars.

208. Analysis Submitted by the Department of State Legal Adviser (Sofaer) to a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Public Statements on the Applicability of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty to Future Systems, October 22, 1985 [1]

SUMMARY

Proponents of a "restrictive" interpretation of the latitude granted by the ABM Treaty with respect to future systems have frequently

[1] *ABM Treaty Interpretation Dispute: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science . . .* , 99th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 200–212.

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asserted that this restrictive view is the "traditional" U.S. position.[2] Ambassador Smith, for example, has described the restrictive view as the unvarying U.S. interpretation for the past 13 years.

A careful review of the record, however, demonstrates that the restrictive theory cannot accurately be labeled traditional. For example, in every one of its periodic compilation of arms control agreements, from 1975 to the most recent edition in 1982, ACDA offered the following description of the ABM Treaty:

> Further, to decrease the pressures of technological change and its unsettling impact on the strategic balance, both sides agree to prohibit development, testing, or deployment of sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems and their components, along with mobile land-based ABM systems. Should future technology bring forth new ABM systems "based on other physical principles" than those employed in current systems, it was agreed that limiting such systems would be discussed, in accordance with the treaty's provisions for consultation and amendment.

(ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements 138 (1982 ed.); see also the 1975, 1977, and 1980 editions.)

This ACDA statement is in accord with a majority of USG explanations or interpretations of the Treaty given at or near the time of its signature and ratification. The early statements are consistent with the "broader" reading of the Treaty: that systems based upon future technologies are dealt with exclusively in Agreed Statement D, which bans only their deployment.

Several later official statements support the restrictive interpretation. The overall record of post-negotiation statements, however, is mixed. Certainly, there has been no one uniform, unvarying interpretation of the Treaty.

When greater weight is accorded to earlier statements the record can fairly be read to support the so-called broader interpretation. Attaching greater weight to these earlier statements is justified by standard principles of interpretation. Those statements are more nearly contemporaneous with the drafting, signature, and ratification of the Treaty than are later statements. Moreover, they were made in the context of a detailed description of the Treaty's content to both the Congress and the public and are thus more accurate and reliable indicators of its meaning.

ANALYSIS

Three distinct time periods are considered: (A) between signature and ratification; (B) during the ratification process; and (C) post-ratification.

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[2] For the ABM Treaty, Agreed Interpretations, and Protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201 and 205–206, and *ibid., 1974*, pp. 229–231.

A. The Period Between Signature and Ratification

Of the USG statements made in the period between the ABM Treaty's signature and its ratification, we have found two that dealt with the Treaty's application to future systems.

On May 26, 1972, the day the Treaty was signed, Ambassador Smith and Dr. Kissinger (then National Security Advisor) held a news conference in Moscow to present the Treaty to the press. Kissinger undertook to provide "a general background of the [ ] negotiations," recognizing that Smith was "in the best position to go through the details of the agreement." (66 DOS Bulletin 868 (1972)) In the course of this article-by-article review of the Treaty, Smith offered the following analysis:

> Now, Article II defines what we are talking about and has a very important bearing on the whole question of what we call future ABM systems. This Treaty has as a most significant aspect that it not only limits the present situation but has a choking-off effect on future systems which, under the terms of the Treaty as we have reached understandings, will not be *deployable* unless this treaty is amended.[3]

(66 DOS Bulletin 870 (1972) (emphasis added)) It is unlikely that Ambassador Smith, the negotiator of the Treaty, would have referred to only a ban on deployment if he had meant testing and development were banned as well. Moreover, Smith failed to refer to Article V as relevant to the choking-off of future systems.

The second preratification statement was made in a report by Secretary Rogers to the President on June 10, 1972. The report was part of the Secretary's formal submission of the Treaty to the President for transmission to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. This report is the most comprehensive official USG explanation of the ABM Treaty. It has a subsection explicitly dealing with future systems. Subsection 3, "Future ABM Systems," of the part of the report entitled, "Limitations on ABM Systems" provides this analysis:

> A potential problem dealt with by the Treaty is that which would be created if an ABM system were *developed* in the future which did not consist of interceptor missiles, launchers and radars. The Treaty would not permit the *deployment* of such a system or of components thereof capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars. . . .[4]

(67 DOS Bulletin 6 (1972) (emphasis added)) This description of the limitations placed on future systems by the Treaty does not mention Article V. Instead, it quotes from Articles II and III and Agreed Statement D. This strongly indicates that Article V was not thought to apply to future systems; rather, those systems were regulated by Agreed Statement D. The report expressly contemplates the "develop-

[3] *Ibid., 1972,* p. 211.
[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 272–273.

ment" of future systems; given the context, it is unlikely the term "developed" was casually used. Moreover, the section immediately preceding the "Future ABM Systems" section, entitled "Development, Testing, and Other Limitations," expressly dealt with Article V, but did not mention future systems.

B. The Ratification Process

1. *Prepared Statements to Committees.* Extensive Congressional hearings were held on the two SALT I agreements. In the course of these hearings, the two principal administration spokesmen on the ABM Treaty, Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Smith, made prepared statements touching upon the treatment of future systems.

Rogers made two such statements. In his testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 19, 1972, Rogers provided the following description of the Treaty's prohibitions:

> The Treaty provides for other important qualitative limitations. The parties will undertake not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. They have also agreed not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify launchers to provide them with such a capability; not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers; not to develop, test, or deploy ABM missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.
>
> Perhaps of even greater importance as a qualitative limitation is that the parties have agreed that future exotic types of ABM systems, i.e., systems depending on such devices as lasers, may not be deployed, even in permitted areas.[5]

(67 DOS Bulletin 52 (1972)) Similarly, in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 20, 1972, Rogers first listed prohibitions contained in other parts of the Treaty, including Article V. He then noted:

> Such limitations [undertakings] are important. It may be of even greater importance that both sides have agreed that future types of ABM systems based on different physical principles, for example, systems depending on such devices as lasers, that do not consist of ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars, cannot be deployed even in permitted areas. So there is a limitation on what may be employed in the ABM systems now in operation and it prohibits the deployment of new esoteric systems in these areas.

(1972 Documents on Disarmament 492) Both of Rogers' statements contradict the "restrictive" interpretation. They treat the prohibition on future systems as distinct from the Treaty's other prohibitions, undercutting the assertion that Article V applies to future systems. In

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 314.

addition, far from treating Agreed Statement D as redundant, Rogers seems to attach great, independent importance to it.

Ambassador Smith's statements follow the same lines as his earlier comment at the Moscow news conference and are in accord with the views expressed by Secretary Rogers. On June 23, [*28*] 1972, Smith told the Senate Committee on Armed Services that "[t]he development and testing, as well as deployment, of sea-, air-, space-based, and land-mobile devices is prohibited. Of perhaps[6] even greater importance, the parties have agreed that no future types of ABM systems based on different physical principles from present technology can be deployed unless the treaty is amended." (67 DOS Bulletin 148 (1972)) Similarly, his statement to the House Armed Services Committee on July 25, 1972 first reviewed the restrictions of Article III and Article V, and then offered the following observation: "Of perhaps even greater importance as a qualitative limitation is the prohibition on the deployment of future types of ABM systems that are based on physical principles different from present technology." (1972 Documents on Disarmament 522) Smith explicitly located this ban on deployment in Agreed Statement D:

> On this point, Mr. Chairman, there is an agreed interpretation with respect to ABM systems based on different physical principles, and including components capable of substituting for those components used at present—that is, launchers, missiles and radar components. If such new systems are developed, and one or the other side wants to deploy them under the limitations of this treaty, there would have to first be a discussion of the question in the Standing Consultative Commission we are proposing to establish under this treaty, and then the Treaty would have to be amended before such novel ABM systems could be deployed.

(Id.) In this analysis Smith makes clear that the Treaty's ban on future systems is found in Agreed Statement D and recognized that such systems could be developed. It is unlikely that the lead U.S. negotiator, in a prepared statement in this context, would have imprecisely used the term deployment—a term of art under the Treaty. The testimony does not support Smith's current statements that he viewed Agreed Statement D as limited to fixed land-based systems, or as superfluous—views central to the "restrictive" interpretation.

2. *Oral Testimony Before Senate Armed Services Committee.* Another source of information from the ratification process is the responses of various witnesses to questions from Committee Members. The most extensive hearings on the pact were held by the Senate Committee on Armed Services. (See Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. [hereinafter cited as "Hearings"]) During the course of these, and other, Congressional

[6] The word "perhaps" does not appear in the quoted source.

hearings, the issue of future systems was addressed. Several statements made by Administration witnesses dealt with the issue. While these statements may be crafted less carefully than prepared statements, they still provide some insight. The record as to such statements is more ambiguous than that of the prepared statements; certain statements could be read as supporting the "restrictive" view, some the "broad."

In response to a question in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings about the use of lasers as an ABM system, Secretary Rogers noted that "[u]nder the agreement we provide that exotic ABM systems may not be *deployed* and that would include, of course, ABM systems based on the laser principle." (Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1972) (emphasis added)) Rogers mentioned no limitation on development or testing. Similarly, Ambassador Smith made several comments in response to questions that reaffirmed his earlier statements. The following exchange is illustrative:

> Senator SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, you say that the treaty prohibits the development of other ABM systems. Would this affect a development of a laser ABM system by the United States?
>
> Mr. SMITH. Senator Smith one of the agreed understandings says that if ABM technology is created based on different physical principles, an ABM system or component based on them can only be deployed if the Treaty is amended.
>
> Work that is direction, development work, research, is not prohibited, but deployment of systems using those new principles . . . would not be permitted unless both parties agree by amending the Treaty.

(Hearings at 295) Smith later reiterated this point, responding "no" to the question: "[U]nder this agreement are we and the Soviets precluded from the development of the laser as an ABM?" (Hearings 306) Smith did not distinguish between fixed land-based lasers or space-based lasers. The import of his comments is that he viewed future systems such as lasers as regulated exclusively by Agreed Statement D.

Some witnesses made statements that support the "restrictive" view. For example, Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, appeared to read Agreed Statement D as limited to fixed land-based systems. Foster, in describing the impact of the Treaty on defense research, said "[o]ne cannot deploy a fixed land-based laser ABM system which is capable of substituting for an ABM radar, ABM launcher, or ABM interceptor missile. . . . You can develop and test up to the development phase of future ABM system components which are fixed and land based." (Hearings 275)

Similarly, General Palmer, Acting Army Chief of Staff, stated at one point that "[w]e can look at futuristic systems as long as they are fixed and land based." (Hearings 443) This assertion, however, must be read in light of General Palmer's earlier testimony:

Senator GOLDWATER. . . . [Ambassador Smith said] we were allowed to continue with laser research and development. Is that your understanding?

General RYAN. Yes, Sir.

Senator GOLDWATER. Is it yours, too General?

General PALMER. My understanding is in the defensive area, R. & D. on such systems is basically prohibited.

Senator GOLDWATER. Prohibited?

General PALMER. Basically prohibited.

Senator GOLDWATER. Here is another point that we have trouble on, a very simple point.

General PALMER. Talking about defensive now.

Senator GOLDWATER. Ambassador Smith didn't delineate between the two: Offensive or defensive. I am interested in not particularly offensive because I think for our purposes we have made progress in this field, but I am thinking of the extent of research on laser that could result in a perfect ABM weapon. . . .

General PALMER. I would like to correct my statement. I was referring to the deployment of such systems. There is no limit or understanding of a limit on R & D in the futuristic systems, but [it] would require an amendment of the Treaty or further agreement to deploy such a system.

(Hearings 432–33) In this exchange, Palmer seems to take the position that only the deployment of future systems is banned, a position in accord with the "broad" interpretation of the Treaty. He does not indicate at this point that Agreed Statement D and its deployment-only ban is limited to fixed land-based systems.

In addition to this testimony, comments made by several Senators are relevant. During the testimony of General Palmer, the following exchange took place:

Senator DOMINICK. . . . There isn't any ban, as I understand it, on research and development on either side?

General RYAN. That's right.

Senator DOMINICK. So, therefore, the onsite inspection is no different; the offsite inspection is not different now than it was before?

Senator JACKSON. Yes, but under Article V of the ABM Treaty "Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."

Senator GOLDWATER. Fixed based.

Senator JACKSON. The fixed-base ABM is exempt. . . .

Senator GOLDWATER. We could then replace the Sentry with the laser if it became effective?

Senator JACKSON. The prohibition runs to sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABMs.

Senator GOLDWATER. Not fixed land?

Senator JACKSON. That's right. That is exempt. I am just pointing this out. . . .

General PALMER. Let me try to clarify that, Senator Jackson. The treaty, as you have just read, does limit radars, launchers, and

> missiles; it does not limit R&D on futuristic systems. We could not deploy such a new system, however. . . .

While these comments draw a distinction between fixed land-based systems and other types of systems, they do not distinguish between current and future technologies. Article V undoubtedly bans development and testing of components based on current technology. Fairly read, Senator Jackson's comments do not address future systems. The difference he was noting—between fixed land-based and other basing modes—derived from the treatments in Article III and Article V of fixed land-based systems; it could reasonably be read to have no bearing on Agreed Statement D's treatment of future systems. General Palmer's statement, does, however, deal with the current-future distinction. His comments indicate that systems based on radars, launchers, and missiles are regulated by Article V; but they also appear to suggest that future devices are dealt with separately, and that only their deployment is banned.

In sum, throughout the Congressional hearings, Ambassador Smith consistently took the position that only the deployment of future systems was banned. At no point did Smith suggest that Agreed Statement D was limited to fixed land-based systems or components. Different positions were taken by Dr. Foster and General Palmer, but these statements lack the authority of Smith's interpretation, as their authors were not involved in the drafting or negotiation of the Treaty. Moreover, General Palmer's statement cannot fairly be taken as his definitive interpretation. At a different point in his testimony, he takes what appears to be a contrasting position, that the deployment-only ban, and by implication Agreed Statement D, applies to all futuristic systems, not just fixed land-based systems. Senator Jackson's comments do not appear to address future systems.

3. *Committee Report.* Both the House and Senate Reports dealing with the Treaty address the future systems issue. The Senate Report, however, does so only by reprinting Secretary Rogers' report on the Treaty as the description of the agreement's terms. The House Foreign Affairs Committee Report treats the issue more directly and independently. In summarizing the provisions of the ABM Treaty, the Report states:

> The two nations additionally agree to ban development, testing or deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based or land-mobile ABM systems. Nor will they deploy ABM systems [or components] based on new technology without prior discussion and amendment of the Treaty.

(1972 Documents on Disarmament 557) This statement follows the same pattern as the descriptions by Smith and Rogers: listing other prohibitions, then discussing the non-deployability of future systems, implicitly distinguishing between the prohibitions of Article V and the prohibitions of Agreed Statement D.

4. *Floor Debates.* The floor debates are ambiguous on the future systems issue; the few statements addressing the question can be read to

support both theories. On one hand, Senator Buckley opposed the Treaty at least in part because of his reading of its limitations on future technologies. Buckley read Article V as applicable to future systems:

> Thus, the agreement goes so far as to prohibit the development, test or deployment of sea, air or space based ballistic missiles defense systems. This clause, in Article V of the ABM Treaty, would have the effect, for example, of prohibiting the development and testing of a laser type system based in space which could at least in principle provide an extremely reliable and effective system of defenses against ballistic missiles. The technological possibility has been formally excluded by this agreement.

(1972 Cong. Rec. 26703) Similarly, Senator Thurmond felt that "[u]nder the Treaty, we also give up the right to deploy any land-based ABM systems of a new type, should they be developed. At the same time we undertake 'not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.'" Thurmond's comment could be read to indicate development of future systems, other than fixed land-based, was prohibited.

On the other hand, Senator Fong was of the view that the Treaty "[a]llows research and development on ABM systems to continue, but not the deployment of exotic or so-called future systems. (1972 Cong. Rec. 26707) While "research and development" may not be equivalent to development and testing, Senator Fong's indication that only deployment is banned suggests he viewed Agreed Statement D as regulating future systems.

Given the presence of statements on each side of the issue, and the possibility that opponents of the treaty may have tried to exaggerate its limitations, one cannot draw reliable conclusions from the floor debates.

B. Post-Ratification

1. *Early Statements.* Early post-ratification statements tend to support the "broad" view of the Treaty's restrictions. On October 23, 1972, shortly after the Treaty was ratified, then-Ambassador Bush presented the following analysis to the United Nations General Assembly:

> A number of important qualitative restraints are also specified [in the Treaty]. For example, the parties have accepted limitations on development and testing. They have agreed not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based; ABM launchers for launching more than one interceptor missile at a time; automatic or semiautomatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers; and multiple independently guided warheads for ABM missiles. They have also decided not to deploy new ABM systems based on other physical principles, such as those which

employ laser beams, for example, without discussion and agreement on their limitation.

(67 DOS Bulletin 74 (1972)) [7] Like previous statements of Smith and Rogers, Bush's statement indicates that future systems were treated distinctly, that Agreed Statement D was not limited to fixed land-based systems, and that Agreed Statement D was not a superfluous but a significant part of the Treaty.

Two 1973 statements—the ACDA Annual Report of January 31, 1973 [8] and Secretary Rogers' Foreign Policy Report of April 19, 1973 [9]—treat future systems in much the same way as the Bush statement, thereby adding further support for the "broad" interpretation.

2. *Later Statements.* By about 1978, the ABM Treaty's provisions had come to be viewed somewhat differently. Several statements made since 1978 support the "restrictive" theory.

The first indication that the Treaty banned the development and testing of future systems came in a book written by John Rhinelander in 1974. He took the position that the Treaty's "overall effect . . . is to prohibit any deployment of future systems and to limit their development and testing to those in a fixed land-based mode." (Salt: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond 136 (M. Willrich & J. Rhinelander eds. 1974)) Rhinelander has subsequently reaffirmed that he takes the "restrictive" view of the Treaty. (See T. Longstreth, J. Pike & J. Rhinelander, The Impact of U.S. and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty (March 1985))

The first Administration statement reflecting the "restrictive" view, however, did not come until 1978. The Fiscal 1979 Arms Control Impact Statement, filed with Congress in 1978, assessed the arms control impact of particle beam weapons programs. It noted such weapons have ballistic missile defense potential and thus were affected by the ABM Treaty. The impact statement thus discussed the Treaty, offering the following analysis of its provisions:

> Article V . . . prohibits the development, testing or deployment of all types of ABM systems or their components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. Article III . . . prohibits all deployment of ABM systems or their components except for the two land-based deployments permitted

[7] Also *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, p. 704.

[8] The ACDA report offered the following analysis of the Treaty: Another important element is the agreement that if future types of ABM systems or components based on physical principles different from present technology become feasible, specific limitations thereon will be a subject of discussion and agreement in accordance with Treaty provisions regarding amendments. An example of such a future system would be one depending on the use of laser beams for destruction of missile reentry vehicles. (1972 Documents on Disarmament 875) [Footnote in original.]

[9] In its summary of the SALT agreements, the Report states: The Treaty also provides for important qualitative limitations on ABMs, including an agreement that ABM systems based on physical principles different from those of existing systems should not be deployed under the Treaty in its present form. (1973 Documents on Disarmament 181) [Footnote in original.]

> pursuant to such article. Article II defines an ABM system . . . Thus, [particle beam weapons] used for [ballistic missile defense] which are fixed land-based could be developed and tested but not deployed without amendment of the ABM Treaty, and the development, testing, and deployment of such systems which are other than fixed land-based is prohibited by Article V of the Treaty.

(Fiscal Year 1979 Arms Control Impact Statements (Committee Print 1978)) The Arms Control Impact Statements for fiscal years 1980 to 1986 offer similar assessments of the ABM Treaty. (See also Dep't of Defense, Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative app. B (1985))

These later statements are directly supportive of the "restrictive" theory. They view Article V as regulating future as well as current systems, prohibiting their development and testing, as well as deployment. Moreover, these statements suggest that Agreed Statement D is limited to fixed land-based systems. This view increasingly was adopted as a standard interpretation. Ambassador Smith appears to have first offered this view in this 1980 book on SALT I, "Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I."

The "restrictive" view, however, has never been uniformly accepted. For example, ACDA's periodic compilation of arms control agreements has consistently supported the "broad" view of the Treaty. Every edition since SALT I (1975, 1977, 1980, and the most recent edition in 1982) offered the description of the ABM Treaty referred to in the Summary. ACDA's analysis is consistent with the "broad view." Specifically, their discussion of the Treaty provisions notes that "[s]hould future technology bring forth new ABM systems 'based on other physical principles' than those employed in current systems, it was agreed that limiting such systems would be discussed, in accordance with the treaty's provisions for consultation and amendment." (ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements 138 (1982 ed.)) Moreover, in introducing SDI, President Reagan referred to the ABM Treaty as banning only deployment. In a 1983 news conference, responding to a question concerning potential ABM Treaty limits on SDI, the President noted that SDI "doesn't violate the ABM Treaty. . . . The ABM Treaty has to do with deployment." (Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan 448 (1983)) [10]

The record of post-ratification statements is thus mixed. The earlier statements continue to support a "broad" reading of the Treaty. Several later statements present a contrasting view, accepting the restrictive construction. At no time, however, was there a universal interpretation. Indeed, the one document that tracks the issue over the 1972–82 period—the ACDA publication "Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements"—appears to reflect that future systems are regulated only by Agreed Statement D.

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[10] Also reprinted in *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, p. 208.

Document 208

CONCLUSION

The overall record of U.S. interpretative public statements, like the Treaty language and negotiating history, is mixed. Those statements made at or near the time of the Treaty's signature and ratification offer fairly consistent support for the broader interpretation now adopted as USG policy. In contrast, several later statements favor the "restrictive" view of the Treaty.

Under accepted principles of construction, those statements made nearer the Treaty's drafting should be given more credence, and later statements accorded less weight. Contemporaneous constructions are generally considered better guides to discerning an agreement's true meaning than later ones, especially those that take place in contexts which could provide alternative explanations for the statements made. Furthermore, the earlier readings in this instance were carefully considered, and delivered in the context of presenting a new agreement to both Congress and the public.

With these principles in mind, the "broad" view of the Treaty has as strong a basis as the "restrictive" view for being called "traditional" or "accepted." U.S. statements made between signature and ratification—the period closest to the Treaty's actual drafting and negotiation—consistently advanced the broader interpretation. Prepared statements made during the ratification process also provide strong support. Finally, early post-ratification statements reaffirm the construction. Later statements that clearly adopt the restrictive view make it inappropriate to claim that any view had been authoritative until the President's recent decision that the broader view is wholly justified. On the other hand, the record clearly refutes the proposition, advanced by opponents of SDI development and testing, that the USG has suddenly changed a view of the Treaty consistently advanced since 1972.

209. Statement by the Former Legal Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to SALT I (Rhinelander) Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: The Antiballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative [Extract], October 22, 1985 [1]

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[1] *ABM Treaty Interpretation Dispute: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science . . .*, 99th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 66–81. For the texts of the ABM Treaty, Interim Agreement, and Agreed Statements, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–207.

II.

In April 1971, while I was serving in Washington as a Deputy Legal Adviser at the Department of State, Ambassador Gerard Smith asked me to come to the fourth negotiating session of SALT I in Vienna and prepare drafts of an ABM Treaty and an Interim Offensive Agreement. In March, the Soviet delegation had tabled a draft ABM Treaty. The US delegation believed it was appropriate to begin to prepare formal texts of agreements on defensive and offensive strategic weapons limitations. I spent most of that session reviewing the record of the negotiations (plenary statements, memoranda of conversations, reporting cables, etc.), familiarizing myself with US position papers and the technical characteristics of the weapons, and in discussions with members of the US delegation. I also prepared rough first drafts of texts. The negotiating session ended in May 1971, shortly after the "May 20 understanding" between the US and Soviets was announced.

During the remainder of May and in June in Washington, I prepared successive drafts of an ABM Treaty and an Interim Agreement after input from others. I recollect that the Soviet draft of Article III was permissive—it stated both sides may deploy a single, fixed land-based ABM system with 100 ABM launchers and no limits on ABM radars within the deployment areas. This text was vague, imprecise and, among other things, an invitation to pursue and deploy both stand-alone components, such as long lead-time ABM radars, and ABM systems based on "exotic" technologies. In my drafts, I turned Article III around into the form eventually agreed upon and also tightened it.

Article III, as drafted, prohibited deployment of any ABM system or components *except* those in the deployment areas and as limited quantitatively, qualitatively and geographically. The text of Article III, standing alone, prohibited the *deployment* of fixed land-based "exotic" ABM systems and components because only systems utilizing ABM launchers, ABM missiles and ABM radars could be deployed. This raised the "exotic sytems" question directly for inter-agency consideration.

The other substantive Articles always referred to "ABM systems" and to "components" to make clear the US position that components were limited and not just entire systems.

The Soviet draft of March 1971 contained prohibitions on testing and deployment of "space-based" in what is now Article V(1), as did my drafts of May-June 1971 which, I believe, added "develop". The gist of this article was derived from the August 4, 1970 proposal by the US for bans on production, testing and deployment of all mobile-type ABM systems.

The drafts of May-June 1971 were reviewed by members of the SALT delegation while in Washington. Some of them had sharply differing views on "exotic systems" and other questions.

III.

The fifth negotiating session began in Helsinki in early July 1971. After taking into account the President's written instructions, the delegation revised my drafts, cabled texts of an ABM Treaty and an Interim Agreement to Washington, and sought authorization to table them in a plenary session. On the "exotic systems" questions, the delegation was split. Gerard Smith wrote in *Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I* (Doubleday, 1980), that he and Harold Brown supported a broad ban; Paul Nitze concurred except for sensors; but General Allison and Ambassador Parsons favored no restraints at all on "exotic systems" (pp. 263–65).

The delegation was subsequently authorized to table the text of both agreements, which it did on July 27, but with the article in the ABM Treaty covering space-based systems omitted. The Verification Panel in Washington was still analyzing the "exotic systems" question. Eventually, the President rejected an ABM ban which Ambassador Smith had urged, but about the same time he approved a White House staff compromise to the basic Smith-Brown position on "exotic systems" which would prohibit (1) the deployment of fixed land-based and (2) the development, testing and deployment of all other basing modes. The Joint Chiefs of Staffs were particularly interested in preserving the option to develop and test fixed-land-based lasers. The President's decision preserved this option, as does the ABM Treaty itself. See John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (Holt, Reinhart, 1973), pp. 230–31, 237; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Brookings Institution, 1985) ch. 5.

The US delegation filled in the blank Article in its ABM Treaty in mid-August 1971. The Soviets initially balked at discussing, let alone agreeing to any limitations on, "exotic systems". They were probably without any instructions on this issue and may have felt the US was on an intelligence-fishing expedition. Progress was soon made nevertheless. Various working groups and a drafting group were set up to seek agreement issue by issue. Joint Draft Texts of the Soviet and US drafts of the Treaty were prepared with disagreed language, which at first was extensive, in brackets.

The Graybeal-Karpov Working Group focused on Article V. (Sid Graybeal was later the US Commissioner to the Standing Consultative Commission. Victor Karpov is currently the head of the Soviet delegation in Geneva.) Before the conclusion of the fifth negotiating session in September 1971, the Graybeal-Karpov working group agreed, *ad referendum* to the two delegations, that current Article V(1) covered "current" as well as "exotic" technologies. The US delegates agreed that the Americans on this working group (which included Albert Carnesale, now at the Kennedy School at Harvard) had carried out the President's instructions. The brackets around "develop" in that paragraph in Article V in the Joint Draft Text were subsequently removed

in the drafting group during the sixth negotiating session after both delegations had noted their approval. The Administration now contends that *either* the Soviets never agreed with the US interpretation *or* that the Soviets later modified their agreement or changed their interpretation during negotiations over Agreed Statement D. The US members on this Working Group would sharply differ with this view.

The major sticking point then, and through late into the sixth negotiating session, was on fixed land-based systems. US instructions were to preserve the right to develop and test, but not to deploy, fixed land-based lasers. Accordingly, the US delegation insisted that Article III should authorize deployment of only ABM systems and components which are based on "current" technology. Further, development and testing, whatever the technology, of fixed land-based systems and components could be carried out only at ABM test ranges. The Soviets resisted any limitations on *fixed land-based* "exotic systems". As John Newhouse, who many believe was given at least some access to NSC files, wrote (*Cold Dawn*, p. 237):

> Back in the summer, Moscow's attitude, as reflected by its delegation, had been sympathetic. Then, in the autumn, it hardened, probably under pressure from the military bureaucracy. Washington was accused of injecting an entirely new issue. Moscow would not agree to a ban on future defensive systems, except for those that might be space-based, sea-based, air-based, or mobile land-based. The U.S. delegation persisted and was rewarded. Land-based exotics would also be banned. The front channel had produced an achievement of incalculable value.

IV.

The Article III issue was not resolved until late in the sixth (Vienna in November 1971–February 1972) negotiating session. It was handled principally in the Garthoff and Kishilov or Grinevsky working group and also in the Garthoff/Parsons-Kishilov/Grinevsky group (Ray Garthoff and Nicolai Kishilov were the executive secretaries of the respective delegations.) The US proposed the "currently consisting of" phrase which was agreed upon for Article II to make clear that the Treaty was *not* limited to "traditional" technology. The US proposal for the "except that" formulation for Article III was accepted which made clear that fixed land-based "exotic" systems could not be deployed. The ban against a nationwide defense or "base" for such a defense in Article I(2), which was a Soviet initiative intended in part to deal with "exotic systems", was agreed. In each case, agreement was *ad referendum* to the delegations. Together, these textual provisions completed all the key words in the Treaty relating to "exotic systems".

An agreed interpretation tied to Articles I and III was first proposed by Garthoff in mid-December 1971. I distinctly recollect advising that no supplementary interpretation was technically necessary. The US effort, therefore, was to reinforce the clear meaning of the specific Article III and the more general Article I(2).

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The US had originally proposed a paragraph for the Treaty in August 1971. It stated: "Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems using devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars to perform the functions of these components". *Doubletalk*, pp. 265, 343–44. The Soviets balked at any Treaty language and, subsequently, the initial US proposals for an agreed interpretation. Eventually the Soviets proposed a counter draft. This was modified several times at US insistence (including the insertion of the opening phrase "In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty . . . "). The reference to Article XIV in Agreed Statement D indicated that the Treaty would have to be amended before a fixed land-based "exotic", such as a laser, could be deployed. The final compromise language was proposed by Garthoff to the Soviets in late January 1972 and early in February Kishilov informed Garthoff of Soviet agreement. This was eventually noted in an US plenary statement. Agreed Statement D and the other Agreed Statements were initialed on May 26, 1972 by Ambassadors Smith and Semenov.[2]

Agreed Statement D refers to, and interprets, Article III only, although the references to "other physical principles" and "components capable of substituting for" are equally applicable to Article V(1). While the language is admittedly opaque, the US has always understood that Agreed Statement D reinforced Articles I(2) and III and reinforced the prohibition on deployment of *fixed land-based* "exotic systems" unless and until the Treaty is amended. *Finally, and most importantly, Agreed Statement D certainly does not diminish or amend Article V(1) and the other substantive Articles such as I(2), IV, V(2) and IX.*

V.

During the seventh negotiating session, I prepared detailed memoranda on both the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement intended to serve four distinct purposes: (1) inform the delegation on what was agreed with the Soviets and what was not; (2) suggest whether the US should consider seeking one or more Agreed Statements to provide more specific interpretations; (3) indicate what types of weapons programs, current and future were prohibited and permitted; and (4) serve as the basis for the eventual transmittal documents to Congress and background for the Congressional hearings.

Successive drafts of my memoranda were shared within the delegation. Where there was any doubt that a matter was agreed, the proposition was enclosed in brackets. The brackets were removed only after I, and others on the US delegation, were satisfied. I constantly revised

[2] In the source given in *n.* 1, above, the Agreed Statements, captioned "Agreed Interpretations," are arranged in a slightly different sequence, so that agreed statement "D" referred to is listed as agreed interpretation "E."

the drafts as issues were reviewed. The draft memoranda were never made "final".

In certain cases the US delegation sought and achieved Agreed Statements. In others it did not seek them. Some matters were judged agreed, while others were not. To the best of my recollection, the US delegation never sought an Agreed Statement confirming that Article V(1) covered "exotic systems". We probably felt that seeking further specific agreement was unnecessary and would not be productive. In any event, I am absolutely certain that my *contemporaneous advice* to the US delegation on the scope of Articles III and V(1) with respect to "exotic" systems was clear and that *none of the delegates nor their advisors (State, ACDA, JCS and OSD) disagreed with that advice.* I recall no indication that the Soviets thought otherwise.

VI.

During SALT I the US delegation, and particularly Washington, did not insist on the kind of precision reached in the SALT II Treaty with its 98 Agreed Statements and Common Understandings. The Soviets stubbornly resisted the level of textual detail the US had initially sought at SALT I. Neither the President nor Henry Kissinger cared much for detail. During the final three negotiating sessions, the US delegation made *ad hoc* decisions on how the Presidential instructions should be sought and recorded on many issues, how hard to push for additional clarity, and what sufficed, but constantly reported to Washington.

In one instance relating to the ABM Treaty ("current" Soviet ABM test ranges), the US delegation identified the two US ABM test ranges and the Soviet test range at Sary Shagan. The Soviet response noted national technical means permitted the identification of test ranges. (The US and Soviet statements are set forth in Common Understanding B.)[3] The US delegation noted immediately that the Soviets did not respond to the US identification of Sary Shagan as their ABM test range, but the delegation believed the Soviet response reflected extreme Soviet sensitivity to any discussion of their test range. However, in the mid-1970s the Soviets claimed a second "current" ABM test range at Kamchatka based on the presence of an old radar. Paul Nitze has referred to this negotiating technique as unworthy of bazaar traders. I agree. The US eventually accepted the Soviet claim in 1978 because there was a factual basis for it, but learned from this example, and particularly from the Moscow Summit negotiations on the Interim Agreement, that explicit agreement and written precision is important. The *SALT II* documentation reflects this learning.

SALT I, however, did not have this benefit of later-day hindsight indicating the need for precision and detailed Agreed Statements and Common Understandings reflected in the SALT II Treaty. Some of the Salt I underlying understandings are reflected in formal plenary state-

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 282–283.

ments, others in less formal mini-plenary statements, and some in working documents, memoranda of conversations ("memcons") and reporting cables. Agreement was reached *ad referendum* in one or more working groups, approved by the two delegations, referred to the drafting group, to the interpreters, etc. On many points there will not be simple, clear documentation. In addition, the US Government (but not the Soviets) has lost most of its SALT I historical memory.

Some interpretation matters were in 1972, and remain today, ambiguous and need clarification. The dividing line between permitted "research" and prohibited "develop" and "test" is *not* clear, nor is the related meaning of "component", in the broad prohibitory context of banning "exotic systems" under Article V(1). There is no Agreed Statement on either issue. The former was discussed in a formal statement delivered by Harold Brown and a general understanding, although not a fully documented record, was reached. I do not recall any discussion of the latter with the Soviets.

VII.

The SALT delegation remained in Helsinki until agreement on open points, primarily the Interim Agreement, was reached at the Moscow Summit. When the delegation returned to Washington and the transmittal documents and Congressional statements were being prepared under White House control, Henry Kissinger directed that all "understandings" be culled from the negotiating record and made public to refute criticism of secret agreements. This was the derivation of the SALT I Common Understandings. The search of the files for Common Understandings was limited. It did not cover all the myriad of agreed understandings reached in less formal ways during the negotiations.

The hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and particularly the Senate Armed Services Committee, led to a much fuller public record on many of the nuances. Some of the initial testimony of officials was not clear, but the record was frequently supplemented. This includes the statement for the record of the Senate Armed Services Committee, prepared after inter-agency review of reporting cables, on the difference between research and development for purposes of Article V. It includes explicit confirmations submitted by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Under Secretary for DDR&E John Foster, and Acting Chief of Staff of the Army General Palmer, all to Senator Jackson, that development and testing, as well as deployment, of space-based "exotic systems" were prohibited. Senator Jackson (D, Wash.), who was a sharp critic of SALT I but voted in *favor* of the ABM Treaty, understood this point clearly. He was probably the most knowledgeable Senator on the impact of SALT I on weapons programs. Finally, Senator James Buckley (R, NY) stated on the Senate floor on August 3, 1972 that he opposed the ABM Treaty and would vote *against* it largely because of this prohibition. He said:

Thus the agreement goes so far as to prohibit the development, test or deployment of sea, air or space based ballistic missile defense systems. This clause, in Article V of the ABM Treaty, would have the effect, for example, of prohibiting the development and testing of a laser type system based in space which could at least in principle provide an extremely reliable and effective system of defenses against ballistic missiles. The technological possibility has been formally excluded by this agreement.[4]

The vote in favor of advice and consent to ratification was 88–2.

VIII.

I resigned from government in June 1972 after the transmittal documents had been sent to Congress and before the hearings. While I later served at HEW as General Counsel and at HUD as Under Secretary between 1973 and 1977, I have had no official role in the SALT process since June 1972. I left behind at ACDA two complete file cabinets of all my working papers which I have not seen since 1972. I understand they were later sent to a warehouse by ACDA and the files cannot now be located although copies of some documents, including at least the last two drafts of my memoranda analyzing the ABM Treaty, were preserved by the JCS and perhaps in some other files.

In 1972–73 while in private practice, I co-edited a book on SALT and wrote chapter 5 on "The SALT I Agreements". I have attached to this statement the pages from that chapter (Willrich and Rhinelander (editors), *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond* (Free Press, 1974)) on the ABM Treaty (see App. 23). Pages 128–29 and 134 are directly on point with respect to "exotic systems". They summarize my immediate recollection of the advice I gave to the US delegation which was the basis for the Executive position before, during and after the ratification process. Prior to publication of the book, I informally cleared my chapter with government officials to ensure both accuracy and non-disclosure of sensitive information.

Over the past eight years, I have been informally queried on various issues by officials at the JCS, OSD, State, ACDA and the CIA. One question in the late 1970s was whether there were any *deployment* limits on *fixed land-based* "exotic systems". This question had been reopened in OSD, sharply debated with JCS supporting the traditional US position, and then correctly resolved. This question also involved Agreed Statement D, but in this case the OSD argument was that there were no *deployment* limits under Article III on fixed land-based "exotic systems" and only an obligation to discuss. This is almost the exact reverse of the Reagan Administration's "reinterpretation" which now claims the deployment limits in Agreed Statement D *prohibits only deployment* of systems referred to in Articles III and V(1).

[4] 118 Cong. Rec. 26, 703 (1972).

To the best of my knowledge, the challenge to Article V(1) within the Executive arose only recently although the Heritage Foundation circulated a Backgrounder dated April 4, 1985 rejecting the traditional interpretation. A footnote stated it was authored by an unnamed government official.

This past spring I co-authored with Tom Longstreth and John Pike a booklet on *The Impact of U.S. and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty*, National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty (March 1985). In April, I testified before this Subcommittee and excerpts from my formal statement were reprinted in *Arms Control Today* (May 1985). In July I presented a paper at a SIPRI conference which sets forth my most recent analyses and recommendations. A copy of the latter, as revised in August, (see Appendix 24) [*sic*]. These documents reflect my views on the correct interpretations of the ABM Treaty and basic issues raised by current US and Soviet BMD programs.

In my judgment, the FY85 Arms Control Impact Statement prepared by the Reagan Administration correctly states the agreement reached with the Soviets in 1971–72 on the meaning of Article V(1). It provides (pp. 251–52):

> The ABM Treaty bans the development, testing and deployment of *all* ABM systems and components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based . . . The ABM Treaty prohibition on development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems, or components for such systems, *applies to directed energy technology (or any other technology used for this purpose.)* Thus, when such directed energy programs enter the field testing phase they become constrained by these ABM Treaty obligations. [Emphasis added.]

The SDI Report to Congress (April 1985), especially Appendix B, is consistent with this statement.[5]

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210. Communique of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting [Extracts], October 22, 1985 [1]

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Disarmament

6. Heads of Government welcomed the reactivation of bilateral arms talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. They recog-

[5] An extract of the report is printed in Document 59.

[1] A/40/817, pp. 10–11, 15, 16, 17. The meeting was held in Nassau during October 16–22. Of the 46 countries attending, 41 were represented by their Heads of State or Prime Ministers.

nised that these negotiations would be significantly influenced by the forthcoming meeting in November between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan, and stressed the importance of a constructive and positive outcome. They urged the two leaders to achieve their declared objective of preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth.

7. As world civilisation was already under threat from existing nuclear arsenals, they appealed to the two leaders to halt the nuclear arms race and begin without delay the process of reversing it through significant measures of nuclear disarmament. Most stressed in particular the need to prevent a new and uncontrolled arms race in outer space.

8. Recognising the significant contribution which the cessation of nuclear testing within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would represent, they called upon nuclear weapons states to facilitate and pursue vigorously through the Committee on Disarmament the early resolution of outstanding problems, including the problem of verification, over a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In the meantime most Heads of Government stressed the need for earnest effort to be made for an immediate halt to the testing of nuclear weapons. Most Heads of Government recalled the importance of the consensus declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[2]

9. Heads of Government expressed special concern that some countries might be involved in the actual or potential manufacture of chemical weapons, and urged that a global and verifiable agreement to ban the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of chemical weapons be achieved as soon as possible.

. . . . . .

South Pacific

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32. Heads of Government expressed their belief that nuclear weapon free zones, on the basis, among other criteria, of agreements freely arrived at among states of a region, could constitute an important disarmament measure. They welcomed the adoption of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty by the South Pacific Forum on 6 August 1985 at Rarotonga as an important step in global and regional efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation.[3] They noted that consultations would be held on the draft Protocols to the Treaty to enlist the support of nuclear weapon states for the Treaty and its Protocols.

[2] Document 179.
[3] Document 137.

Document 210

33. Heads of Government recognised that continued nuclear testing in the region by France was a major reason for the Forum's adoption of the Treaty. Most of them also expressed their strong opposition to the continuation of nuclear tests and to proposals to dump or store nuclear waste in the region.

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Indian Ocean

36. Heads of Government noted the efforts made in the past two years towards agreement on the preparatory work for the long delayed United Nations Conference on the Implementation of the 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.[4] They emphasised the importance of the Conference in view of the continuing military presence of outside powers in the Indian Ocean against the wishes of most littoral and hinterland states. They reiterated the need to carry forward the preparations in order that the holding of the Conference could be made possible, with the participation of all concerned States, in the first half of 1986 as called for by the relevant United Nations General Assembly Resolution in 1984.

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Mediterranean

39. Heads of Government noted with concern the continuing dangerous situation of accumulation of forces in the Mediterranean region and the persistence of unresolved conflicts. They called for restraint and expressed the view that the prospects of reduction of forces and armaments in the region would be enhanced through a just and durable settlement to all the problems in the region.

40. Heads of Government noted initiatives being taken by various Mediterranean countries with the objective of transforming their region into a zone of peace, security and co-operation. They reaffirmed that security, co-operation and confidence-building in the Mediterranean and in Europe are closely interrelated.

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[4] General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI). For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1971*, pp. 901–903.

211. Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact [Extract], October 23, 1985 [1]

The highest-level representatives of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics assembled in Sofia on 22 and 23 October 1985 for a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, reviewed in detail the situation in Europe and exchanged views on the key issues of international relations as a whole, devoting prime attention to the urgent tasks of the struggle to eliminate the nuclear threat and to strengthen peace. A fruitful discussion of the urgent problems relating to the further development of cooperation among the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty also took place.

Aware of their responsibility to their peoples and to mankind for the fate of peace in Europe and the rest of the world and guided by their desire to make a positive breakthrough in the present alarming development of international affairs, the participants in the meeting jointly make the following Declaration:

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In recent years international tension has sharply increased. The world has moved closer to the point beyond which events could get out of hand.

The arms race is on a swiftly rising curve. The deployment of United States medium-range nuclear missiles in a number of Western European NATO countries has precipitated a new dangerous situation on the continent and has forced the Soviet Union and some other socialist countries to take counter-measures.

Of particular concern is the threat of an extension of the arms race to outer space, which would destabilize the overall strategic situation and transform outer space into a new source of mortal danger to mankind.

The causes of the mounting tension and of the threat of war are rooted in the policy of imperialism and primarily that pursued by the United States, which does not conceal its intention to achieve military superiority in order to dictate its will to other peoples and States.

Under no circumstances will the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty sacrifice the security of their peoples. They are not seeking military superiority, but neither will they allow military superiority to be established over them. They are firmly opposed to the arms race and its escalation, and advocate maintaining a balance of forces at the lowest level.

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[1] A/C.1/40/7, Annex, pp. 3–9. The declaration was issued at Sofia.

The principal objective of their foreign policy has been and still is the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, the lowering of the level of military confrontation and the evolution of international relations in a spirit of peaceful coexistence and détente. They are guided by the premise that ideological differences should not be transposed to international relations and thus undermine their stability, and that the active co-operation of all States and of all forces striving for normalization of the international situation is needed today more than ever before. This is the aim of the wide spectrum of proposals that have been put forward by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and by other peace-loving countries. The political dialogue among States with different social systems, the statements coming from sober-minded circles, the activities of the anti-war movements and of all peace forces show that a return to détente, its extension to all areas of international relations and a shift to reliable security and co-operation are quite possible.

For such a reversal to take place, it would be necessary to put an end to power politics and confrontation. All States must strictly abide by the principles of respect for national independence and sovereignty, non-use of force or threat of force, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, equality, and other universally recognized norms of international relations. Slanderous campaigns giving a distorted picture of the situation in this or that country and of its policies are also inadmissible. Intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples and pursuit of a policy of State terrorism are totally unjustifiable. Nobody should encroach on the sovereign right of every nation to live and work under the socio-political systems that it has itself freely chosen.

A turn for the better in international affairs requires a new political approach corresponding to the realities of the present-day world, as well as mutual restraint. Urgent measures are necessary to end the arms race and prevent its extension into outer space and to achieve a sharp reduction in armaments and nuclear weapons in particular. In this connection, the participants took note of the great importance of the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on the range of issues related to space and nuclear weapons, both strategic and medium-range. The participants in the meeting support the constructive stand of the Soviet Union aimed at practical success in averting an arms race in outer space and terminating it on earth, as well as its major new initiative, namely, the proposal for the USSR and the United States of America to reach agreement on a total ban on space attack weapons and on a truly radical reduction by 50 per cent of their nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory.

The leaders of the allied socialist States are of the opinion that the forthcoming Soviet-American summit meeting should contribute to easing the present dangerous tension in the world, to decreasing the

threat of war and to reaching mutually acceptable solutions designed to halt the arms race and to make real progress towards disarmament.

II

The main focus of efforts to eliminate the nuclear threat consists in checking the present dangerous course of events and lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe. European security, like international security as a whole, cannot be achieved by military means or by armed force. A stable peace on the continent can be attained only through détente, disarmament, building of confidence and development of international co-operation.

It is necessary to halt the further deployment of nuclear weapons on the continent and to proceed to their reduction. The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty are most firmly in favour of ridding the whole of Europe of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons.

A major step in this direction, which would facilitate the negotiation of speedy mutual reductions in medium-range nuclear systems in Europe, would be the attainment of a separate agreement to this end without direct linkage to the problem of space and strategic armaments.

Exceedingly important in this context are the unilateral actions of good will undertaken by the Soviet Union, including the moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and the removal from combat duty of the quantity of Soviet SS–20 missiles additionally installed in the European part of the USSR in response to the stationing of the American medium-range missiles in Europe.

At this stage, it is highly important for all States on the continent, and for the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries in particular, to contribute actively to the efforts aimed at reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons in Europe, achieving success in the negotiation on these matters and preventing nuclear war. Those States on whose territory the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles is under way or is planned assume a great responsibility for the fate of European and world peace.

Full support was voiced at the meeting for the initiatives concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the European continent, more specifically in Northern Europe and the Balkans, as well as a nuclear-weapon-free corridor along the line dividing the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries in Central Europe.

The States represented at the meeting recall their proposals, addressed to the NATO member countries and still in effect, for direct talks concerning:

—The conclusion of a treaty on mutual non-use of military force and on maintaining peaceful relations between the States Parties to the

Warsaw Treaty and the NATO member countries which would be open also to all interested European and other countries; [2]

—Non-increase and reduction of military spending; [3]

—Freeing Europe from chemical weapons.[4]

They support the efforts of the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for the creation in Central Europe of a zone free of chemical weapons.[5]

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty favour the attainment of an early agreement at the Vienna talks on mutual reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe and suggest that a start be made by reducing Soviet and American troops.

They call for major mutually complementary measures, of both a political and military nature, to be worked out in the very near future at the Stockholm Conference with the aim of building confidence and security in Europe.

European co-operation, as well as trade and economic ties between the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and of the European Economic Community would be advanced by the establishment of direct business-like relations between the two organizations and by mutual contacts on specific questions.

The calls for revision of the borders of European States or of their socio-political systems jeopardize the strengthening of trust and mutual understanding and of good-neighbourly relations in Europe. Post-war borders in Europe are inviolable. Any attempt to encroach directly or indirectly on them would be tantamount to undermining the foundations of the peaceful order in Europe and would endanger peace and the security of peoples. Respect for the present territorial and political realities is a necessary prerequisite for normal relations among European States.

In this connection, the danger of a revival of revanchist forces, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany, was pointed out. The encouragement of revanchism by official and other circles, wherever they may be, is contrary to the interests of ensuring peace, détente and co-operation on the continent and runs counter to the treaties and agreements signed in the 1970s and to the Helsinki Final Act.

The participants emphasized the great importance of the Conference of the leaders of European States, the United States and Canada, held 10 years ago, which adopted the most important principles and provisions upon which security and co-operation in Europe were to be built. That Conference was a convincing demonstration of realistic policy, good will and readiness to take into account the legitimate interests of each country. The Final Act of the Conference, permeated by the spirit of détente, has stood the test of time and, as demonstrat-

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 381–383, 455–457.
[3] *Ibid*, pp. 136–138.
[4] *Ibid*, pp. 9–11.
[5] Documents 170 and 230.

ed by the recent meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs at Helsinki, remains a long-term programme for European co-operation.[6]

At the present moment, it is vitally important to intensify on this basis the political dialogue between the European countries in various forums and at various levels, in the interest of improving the climate on the continent, and to strengthen mutual trust. The States represented at this meeting express their readiness to search for new forms of economic, scientific and technical co-operation with the Western European countries on the basis of equality and mutual advantage. They are also determined to promote co-operation in environmental protection, culture, education, health care and other matters. They have invariably declared themselves in favour of the promotion and protection of human rights in all fields, while taking due account of the sovereignty of States.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty will continue to participate constructively in the work of the all-European forums, including the cultural forum now being held in Budapest. They intend to continue their efforts to make the multilateral process started at Helsinki evolve in a steady and balanced manner. In their view, the forthcoming meeting of the States participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to be held in Vienna in 1986, will be called upon to play a major role in this respect.

The States represented at this meeting have invariably advocated the implementation of all the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act by all the signatory countries. The development of inter-State relations on such a basis would help to make Europe a continent of lasting peace and mutually advantageous co-operation.

III

The cardinal task of our time is to halt the arms race, and the nuclear arms race in particular, and to proceed to disarmament.

The implementation of a number of priority measures by the Soviet Union and the United States would be a major practical contribution to this task. This means, first and foremost, the cessation of any work on the development, testing and deployment of space attack weapons, including anti-satellite systems, a freeze of existing nuclear arms at the present quantitative levels limiting to the maximum their modernization and also ending the development, testing and stationing of new kinds and types of such weapons, and suspension of the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe. These steps could be undertaken even before an agreement is reached between the USSR and the United States on the entire set of questions relating to nuclear and space weapons.

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[6] The statement refers to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. For the arms control portions of the Final Act of that conference, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

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The interests of halting the nuclear arms race urgently demand the implementation also of such a measure as a ban on all nuclear explosions. The meeting expressed its support for the unilateral moratorium on such explosions announced by the Soviet Union. Now it is for the United States, above all, to have its say.

This same purpose could be served by the assumption by the Soviet Union and the United States of a mutual obligation to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons, as well as not to increase stockpiles of nuclear arms or replace them with new ones in countries where such weapons have already been installed.

The USSR and the United States could also set a good example by ending the race in non-nuclear armaments.

The participants in the meeting propose that the USSR and the United States assume the obligation not to develop and manufacture new types of conventional weapons, comparable in destructiveness to weapons of mass destruction.

They also propose that the armed forces of the USSR and the United States, including those outside their national territories, be frozen at the level of 1 January 1986.

The mutual non-increase of military budgets of the USSR and the United States, starting with the next fiscal year, would be an effective measure for limiting the arms race in all its aspects.

The meeting expressed its support for the new proposal made by the USSR for "International co-operation in the peaceful exploitation of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization", submitted for consideration by the fortieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.[7] The implementation of this major initiative would provide mankind with reliable protection against the lethal effects of an arms race in outer space and would also permit through concerted efforts a decisive spurt towards new peaks in the development of science and technology for the benefit of all nations.

As staunch advocates of the general and complete abolition of nuclear weapons, the States participating in the meeting declare to be still valid their earlier proposals for a pledge by all nuclear Powers not be the first to use such weapons,[8] for a comprehensive nuclear test ban and for prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear arms in any form.

They believe that States which do not possess or have nuclear arms on their territory are fully entitled to solid international legal guarantees that such weapons will not be used against them.

In present-day conditions, the objective of a total ban and elimination of chemical weapons, including their particularly dangerous binary version, acquires even greater importance and urgency. This objective is quite achievable, as is the solution of the problem of

[7] Document 141.
[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1976*, pp. 855–856.

monitoring the observance of the respective international agreement, given a mutual demonstration of realism and good will. The participants in the meeting are of the opinion that an international agreement on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons would help in the common efforts for their total prohibition and are ready to take part in the drafting of such an agreement.

The States represented at the meeting call once again for the holding of concrete negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the limitation and reduction, whether at the global or regional level, of conventional weapons and on curbing the race in sea-based armaments.

They further confirm their unswerving stand on the question of making fresh efforts on an international scale for the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories.

The States participating in the meeting deem it necessary to enhance the effectiveness of the existing multilateral forums—the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the Stockholm Conference and the Vienna talks—and to start a fruitful discussion of those questions related to arms limitation and disarmament which are currently not covered by negotiations. There is no type of weapon that they are unwilling to limit, reduce or withdraw from their arsenals and destroy for ever under an agreement with the other States, while abiding by the principle of equality and equal security.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty have always considered with the greatest attention all constructive initiatives concerning the problems of arms limitation and reduction. They will continue to do so in the future.

The socialist States represented at the meeting call for an increased contribution by such a representative forum as the United Nations to efforts for halting the arms race and achieving disarmament.

Established 40 years ago by the nations of the anti-Fascist coalition for the purpose of saving present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war and maintaining peace and security, the United Nations has become a universal organization called upon fully to perform its mission of serving as a centre for co-ordinating the activities of nations for the prevention of war. Strict adherence to the lofty purposes and principles proclaimed in the United Nations Charter is a necessary prerequisite for safeguarding peace.

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212. Address by Pakistani President Zia-ul Haq Before the U.N. General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons [Extract], October 23, 1985 [1]

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The vision of a world free from conflict was vivid in the minds of a generation reacting to the devastation caused by two successive world wars. The dawn of the nuclear age has transformed this vision into a fundamental requirement, since the spectre of nuclear holocaust leaves no alternative to peace. If mankind is to survive, the nuclear arms race must be halted. The use and possession of nuclear weapons should be universally outlawed.

Nuclear proliferation has so far been dealt with in a global context or within the framework of the special interests of the two super-Powers. I believe that at the present stage a major impetus to proliferation emanates from regional perspectives. I suggest that the United Nations should examine the regional perspectives on nuclear non-proliferation with a view to devising effective and equitable means to prevent the spread of nuclear arms.

I take this opportunity to reaffirm Pakistan's policy of developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only and its irrevocable commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Pakistan has neither the capability nor the desire to develop nuclear weapons. As an earnest [sic] of our sincerity of purpose, we have made several equitable and non-discriminatory proposals by which Pakistan and India could reassure each other and the world about their respective nuclear intentions and programmes. From this rostrum I wish to reiterate these proposals: first, simultaneous accession by India and Pakistan to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; [2] secondly, simultaneous acceptance by both countries of full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; thirdly, mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities; fourthly, a joint declaration renouncing the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons; and, finally, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, an objective repeatedly endorsed by this Assembly.

Pakistan is prepared to enter into any agreement or arrangement with India on the basis of sovereignty and reciprocity to keep our area free of nuclear weapons. We would welcome any ideas, participate in any consultations, attend any conference, in order to achieve this objective.

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[1] A/40/PV.47, pp. 7–10.
[2] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

213. Address by President Reagan Before the U.N. General Assembly: Forthcoming Geneva Summit Meeting and the Strategic Defense Initiative [Extract], October 24, 1985 [1]

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When Mr. Gorbachev and I meet in Geneva next month, I look to a fresh start in the relationship of our two nations. We can and should meet in the spirit that we can deal with our differences peacefully. And that is what we expect.

The only way to resolve differences is to understand them. We must have candid and complete discussions of where dangers exist and where peace is being disrupted. Make no mistake, our policy of open and vigorous competition rests on a realistic view of the world. And therefore, at Geneva we must review the reasons for the current level of mistrust.

For example, in 1972 the international community negotiated in good faith a ban on biological and toxin weapons; [2] in 1975 we negotiated the Helsinki accords on human rights and freedoms; [3] and during the decade just past, the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated several agreements on strategic weapons.[4] And yet we feel it will be necessary at Geneva to discuss with the Soviet Union what we believe are violations of a number of the provisions in all of these agreements. Indeed, this is why it is important that we have this opportunity to air our differences through face-to-face meetings, to let frank talk substitute for anger and tension.

The United States has never sought treaties merely to paper over differences. We continue to believe that a nuclear war is one that cannot be won and must never be fought. And that is why we have sought for nearly 10 years, still seek, and will discuss in Geneva, radical, equitable, verifiable reductions in these vast arsenals of offensive nuclear weapons.

At the beginning of the latest round of the ongoing negotiations in Geneva, the Soviet Union presented a specific proposal involving numerical values. We are studying the Soviet counterproposal carefully. I believe that within their proposal there are seeds which we should nurture, and in the coming weeks we will seek to establish a genuine process of give-and-take.

The United States is also seeking to discuss with the Soviet Union in Geneva the vital relationship between offensive and defensive sys-

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, October 28, 1985, pp. 1292–1293.
[2] The Convention is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[3] The arms control portions of the Helsinki Final Act are printed *ibid., 1975*, pp. 304–305. The entire Act may be found in *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.
[4] The SALT I agreements are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201; the SALT II Treaty *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

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tems, including the possibility of moving toward a more stable and secure world in which defenses play a growing role.

The ballistic missile is the most awesome, threatening, and destructive weapon in the history of man. Thus, I welcome the interest of the new Soviet leadership in the reduction of offensive strategic forces. Ultimately, we must remove this menace, once and for all, from the face of the Earth.

Until that day, the United States seeks to escape the prison of mutual terror by research and testing that could, in time, enable us to neutralize the threat of these ballistic missiles and, ultimately, render them obsolete.

How is Moscow threatened if the capitals of other nations are protected? We do not ask that the Soviet leaders, whose country has suffered so much from war, leave their people defenseless against foreign attack. Why then do they insist that we remain undefended? Who is threatened if Western research and Soviet research, that is itself well-advanced, should develop a nonnuclear system which would threaten not human beings but only ballistic missiles?

Surely, the world will sleep more secure when these missiles have been rendered useless, militarily and politically; when the sword of Damocles that has hung over our planet for too many decades is lifted by Western and Russian scientists working to shield their citizens and one day shut down space as an avenue of weapons of mass destruction.

If we're destined by history to compete, militarily, to keep the peace, then let us compete in systems that defend our societies rather than weapons which can destroy us both and much of God's creation along with us.

Some 18 years ago, then Premier Aleksei Kosygin was asked about a moratorium on the development of an antimissile defense system. The official news agency, TASS, reported that he replied with these words: "I believe the defensive systems, which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute a factor preventing the death of people. Maybe an antimissile system is more expensive than an offensive system, but it is designed not to kill people, but to preserve human lives."[5]

Preserving lives—no peace is more fundamental than that. Great obstacles lie ahead, but they should not deter us. Peace is God's commandment. Peace is the holy shadow cast by men treading on the path of virtue.

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[5] *Ibid., 1967,* p. 60.

214. Address by Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang Before the U.N. General Assembly [Extracts], October 24, 1985 [1]

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At present, all the peace-loving countries and peoples are faced with a common task, namely, to check the arms race. We are opposed to the arms race, be it conventional, nuclear, on ground or in outer space. Neither "deterrent force" nor "balance of terror" can ensure peace. On the contrary, they are bound to give rise to spiralling intensification of the arms race. There is every reason to ask the two super-Powers that possess the largest nuclear arsenals to take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear armaments so as to create the necessary conditions for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Like many other countries, China is paying close attention to the forthcoming summit meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is hoped that, in conformity with the demands of the people of the world, they will really abandon their attempt to seek military superiority and reach an agreement through negotiations which is conducive to world peace and, furthermore, translate it into action.

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China loves peace and needs peace. It is essential for it to have an international environment of durable peace and stability in which to eradicate its prolonged backwardness and turn it into a modernized socialist country with Chinese characteristics where there will be prosperity for all.

Pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace, China considers itself in duty bound to oppose hegemonism and safeguard world peace. China hopes to live in harmony with its neighbours and all other countries, and wishes to see peaceful coexistence among all countries. China's initiative in cutting the size of its military force by one million has once again demonstrated its firm stand against the arms race. China does not set up military bases or station troops abroad, nor does it seek hegemony or interfere in the internal afairs of other countries. It steadfastly pursues a policy of opening to the outside world and engages in reciprocal and mutually beneficial economic and technological exchanges with countries in the North and the South, the East and the West in the interest of common progress. China will always remain a reliable friend and partner to all countries

[1] A/40/PV.48, pp. 22–25, 27–31.

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that work for world peace and promote international economic growth.

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215. Address by the Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze): Soviet Proposal at the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, October 24, 1985 [1]

Three weeks ago, at the nuclear and space arms control talks in Geneva, the Soviet Union presented a counterproposal in response to the detailed proposal for offensive arms reductions introduced by the United States last March. Since then, our negotiators in Geneva have been exploring the details of this counterproposal to the extent that Soviet negotiators have been willing or able to provide them. Although there are questions yet to be answered regarding the counterproposal, we have been able to reach initital conclusions. I will review those conclusions with you today.

Description

The counterproposal consists of various bans and freezes, as well as limitations on, and reductions of, offensive forces. The Soviets propose a reduction of 50% of each side's "strategic delivery systems," that is, strategic missile launchers and aircraft, as they define such a category of systems. The remaining forces would also have to take account of the Soviet-proposed bans and freezes.

The 50% reduction as such does not apply to warheads. The Soviets propose a ceiling of 6,000 on what they call "nuclear charges" on the delivery systems remaining after their proposed reductions, bans, and freezes have taken effect. They further propose that no more than 60% of the thus-permitted "charges" be on any one component, that is, on ICBMs, SLBMs, or "delivery aircraft." This would limit their permitted ICBM RVs to 3,600. Each side would have freedom to structure its permitted forces as it sees fit within the constraints of this "60%" rule.

Among the Soviet-proposed bans is a ban on all long-range cruise missiles, including ALCMs, SLCMs, and GLCMs (in the past they have interpreted "long range" to cover those cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers).

Further, the Soviets propose to ban or severely limit all "new" nuclear delivery systems, defining as new types those systems not tested as of an agreed date. Assuming the agreed date would not be in

[1] Department of State, Current Policy No. 758. The address was delivered before the American Defense Preparedness Association, Washington, D.C.

the past, such a ban could include Midgetman, D–5, and the advanced technology bomber, while it would exclude their SS–X–24, SS–25, and SS–NX–23, and the Blackjack bomber.

In the INF area, the Soviets propose to stop all further deployments in Europe of what they call "medium-range" missile systems. This would halt our LRINF missile deployment at a point where there is significant imbalance between U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile warheads, with the Soviets retaining many times the number of such warheads as the United States.

The Soviets propose that the sides refrain from deploying any nuclear arms to states where none now exist and refrain from building up stockpiles, or replacing nuclear arms with new weapons, in countries where such weapons are already deployed. This is aimed directly at prohibiting deployment of LRINF missiles in the Netherlands, stopping further deployment in the other basing countries, and precluding the modernization envisaged in NATO's Montebello decision regarding the reduction and modernization of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons.[2]

On the defensive side, the Soviet negotiators have proposed the banning of development, "including scientific research," testing, and deployment of "space strike arms." As a first step, they propose a suspension of all work on "space strike arms." This proposal appears to be in contradiction with General Secretary Gorbachev's indication that fundamental research and laboratory research are permissible and will continue on both sides.

The Soviet-proposed ban on "space strike arms" does not appear, as previously, to be an absolute precondition to detailed negotiation on the START and INF issues. The Soviets indicate, however, that "agreement" on other subjects (except possibly for some interim INF agreement) would be contingent on "agreement" to a ban on "space strike arms."

Assessment

One of the principal problems with the Soviet counterproposal is hidden in their definition of "strategic delivery systems." That definition would include those systems, and only those systems, that, by virtue of their location, can "strike the territory of the other side."

This definition goes back to the Soviet position of 15 years ago. Neither we nor our NATO allies could accept it then or at any time since then. It was not reflected in SALT I or in SALT II or in the distinction between START systems and INF systems which was the basis of the 1981–83 Geneva negotiations. We and our allies have always successfully and justifiably maintained the distinction between systems of intercontinental range—i.e., ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers—on the one hand, and intermediate-range systems—i.e., INF missiles and aircraft—on the other.

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[2] For the Montebello decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 917–918.

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The effect of the Soviet definition would be to include within "strategic" limits three categories of U.S. systems while excluding comparable Soviet systems. The first of these is U.S. longer range INF missiles in Europe. The deployment by the United States of LRINF missile systems was mandated by the 1979 NATO decision that, in the absence of an equitable arms control agreement, there would be no other way to counter the growing threat presented by the deployment of Soviet SS–20s and similar systems.[3] Since the Soviets claim the SS–20 cannot strike the United States from its bases, application of the Soviet definition would entail no reduction in the SS–20 threat to European NATO but would entail a radical and unilateral reduction of the NATO counter to that threat.

Second, the Soviet definition would include as "strategic" U.S. dual-capable aircraft located both in Europe and Asia. All of our attack aircraft in Europe and Asia (except for our A–10s) are dual capable; their primary role is to contribute to a conventional defense of threatened allies although they also are capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Finally, the Soviet definition would include all the attack aircraft on 14 U.S. aircraft carriers, one of which is still under construction. The deployment area of those carriers is not limited to any particular region. The primary role of the aircraft on them is conventional; their nuclear role is secondary. By including these carrier-based aircraft, the Soviet definition includes U.S. systems which are not at any given time in a position to strike Soviet territory but which could, in theory, be moved so such a position. The Soviets do not include in their definition some 2,000 Soviet "medium-range" missiles and aircraft, although those systems can also, in theory, be moved so that they could strike not only all NATO targets in Europe but U.S. territory as well.

The Soviets say that by their count the 50% reductions in delivery vehicles would leave the United States with 1,680 delivery vehicles, as they would define and limit such systems, while leaving the U.S.S.R. with 1,250. They arrive at that computation by asserting that we have 2,215 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; 209 "medium-range" missiles; 380 "medium-range" aircraft in Europe and Asia; and 560 carrier-based aircraft for a total of 3,364 "relevant systems," according to their definition of what is relevant. The Soviets say that they have 2,504 such "relevant systems," which include only their ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. A 50% reduction in "relevant" delivery systems on both sides would thus leave the United States with 1,680 delivery vehicles while the Soviets would be left with 1,250.

The Soviet inclusion of U.S. LRINF missile and aircraft systems and carrier-based aircraft and the failure to include comparable Soviet systems make the apparent U.S. advantage of 430 "strategic delivery systems" wholly illusory. The inclusion of 1,149 U.S. LRINF missiles and aircraft is more than offset by the exclusion of approximately

[3] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 814–816.

2,000 comparable Soviet systems, as well as nearly 300 Backfire bombers.

If the United States were to retain equality in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles with the Soviets, our LRINF and medium-range aircraft systems would have to be cut radically to 430, which would be 60% below present levels and only 20% of comparable Soviet delivery vehicles. On the other hand, if the United States were to retain its LRINF and medium-range aircraft systems at current levels, the United States could retain less than one-half of the Soviets' 1,250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

The inclusion of U.S. LRINF missile warheads and carrier-based and medium-range aircraft weapons, and exclusion of comparable Soviet weapons, under a common 6,000-weapon ceiling as defined in the Soviet proposal would guarantee U.S. inferiority in the number and power of strategic ballistic missile and LRINF missile warheads while maintaining Soviet first-strike capability.

There are, though, interesting new elements in the Soviet proposal. For the first time the Soviets are proposing a 1,250 limit on their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, approximately 50% below their current level. The proposed 6,000 limit on weapons is far lower than the 10,000–12,000 weapons their previous position implied they would seek to permit. The proposed 6,000 limit is about 40% below our estimate of the current Soviet level.

In its impact, the Soviet counterproposal would, however, actually decrease rather than enhance stability.

First, the combination of modernization constraints, which would asymmetrically affect U.S. forces, and the lack of restrictions on Soviet heavy ICBMs would guarantee Soviet retention of a great advantage in missile throw-weight. That advantage is now approximately 3 to 1.

Second, even though the proposed maximum of 60% of all weapons permitted in one component of the force would limit Soviet ICBM RVs to 3,600, the Soviets could keep a large number of prompt, hard target-kill-capable warheads on heavy missiles such as the SS–18s and potential modernizations to them, as well as on SS–19s. Indeed, under the Soviet proposal they could retain all 308 SS–18 ICBMs. Thus Soviet prompt counterforce attack capabilities would grow against a reduced number of U.S. hardened facilities.

Third, the U.S. heavy bomber force would be penalized. Bombs and SRAMs would be counted as equivalent to ballistic missile RVs, despite the fact that massive Soviet air defenses make defense penetration less certain for bombers than for ballistic missiles and despite the lower readiness rates of bombers compared to ballistic missiles.

Fourth, the proposed ban on long-range cruise missiles would terminate the U.S. ALCM program and thus degrade the retaliatory effectiveness of U.S. heavy bombers in future years—again in the face of unconstrained Soviet air defenses. It would also terminate the U.S. SLCM program. In contrast, the Soviets would be free to retain their

shorter range ALCMs and SLCMs, which are capable of attacking many targets in Western Europe and along the U.S. coasts.

Fifth, movement toward more stabilizing forces requires flexibility in modernization. While the U.S. B–1 bomber and MX missile programs could probably go forward because they have already been flight tested, the proposed ban on new types of offensive nuclear arms could preclude the D–5 SLBM, the advanced technology bomber, and more survivable ICBMs, including the new small ICBM, Midgetman. In contrast, new Soviet systems—including the SS–X–24, SS–25, SS–NX–23, and Blackjack bomber could proceed since they have already been flight tested.

Finally, the proposed ban on "space strike arms" would halt the U.S. SDI research program. Because of the potential benefit for strategic stability of this research, as well as the unverifiability of research limits, the President has stated that we cannot agree to such a provision.

In sum, although the Soviet counterproposal for the first time envisages significant reductions in Soviet forces, there are major shortcomings, the adoption of which would unacceptably degrade U.S. capabilities, decrease stability, and undermine deterrence.

There are some positive elements of Gorbachev's statements in Paris which we will continue to explore in Geneva.

- Gorbachev seems to acknowledge that at least some U.S. LRINF missile systems might remain in Europe, although the Soviets have not explained how they would preclude double counting of these systems, both as "strategic"—and thus aggravating an unfavorable balance in ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers—and as INF systems counting against SS–20s. Gorbachev's acknowledgment that some U.S. LRINF missiles might remain in Europe reflects the failure of the earlier Soviet effort to prevent NATO's response to SS–20 deployments and vindicates NATO's unity behind the dual-track decision.[4]
- While in Paris, Gorbachev said that a Soviet-American agreement may be possible on medium-range systems—to use his phrase—"without the direct link with the problem of space and strategic armaments." [5] The United States intends to pursue, at the table in Geneva, this aspect of Gorbachev's position.
- Also while in Paris, Gorbachev acknowledged that the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom are not appropriate topics for the U.S.-Soviet talks in Geneva. Of course, Paris and London will decide themselves whether or not to enter negotiations with Moscow over their independent, strategic nuclear capabilities, but it is clear that the United States cannot and will not negotiate with the Soviets on that topic.

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[4] The decision cited in n. 3, above, is also known as the dual-track decision.
[5] Document 195.

Conclusion

It is important to keep the Soviet counterproposal in proper perspective. We should not forget that it was the Soviets who walked out of the START and INF negotiations in 1983 and that that caused an interruption of more than a year in negotiations. Further, once the negotiations resumed, it was the Soviets who refused to engage in detailed discussions of offensive arms reductions, insisting that the United States first agree to abandon its SDI research program. The United States, in contrast, immediately put on the negotiating table a series of far-reaching arms reduction proposals. These call for equitable, verifiable, and strategically significant cuts in strategic ballistic missiles to 5,000 warheads on each side, and strict limits on heavy bombers and the ALCMs they carry; for reductions to the lowest possible equal global level, or preferably the complete elimination, of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles; and for the reversal of the erosion of the ABM Treaty.[6]

We welcome the fact that the Soviets finally have put forward a specific counterproposal. We welcome, as well, the fact that they have indicated for the first time a willingness to accept deep cuts in strategic nuclear forces. However, the details of their counterproposal, as they have presented them, would have the effect of:

- Blocking our strategic defense program, while their large program could proceed;
- Halting U.S. strategic modernization—a modernization in response to the Soviet buildup of the last decade—and locking in current Soviet advantages;
- Producing a clearly one-sided result in the nuclear force balance by including U.S. systems that directly defend our allies while excluding Soviet systems that threaten them; and
- Forcing us to choose between systems that defend our allies and systems that defend us while maintaining, and in some senses increasing, the Soviet threat to both the allies and the United States.

In his preparations for his November meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, President Reagan is focusing on ways to add momentum to serious give-and-take on the issues facing us in Geneva. The President will not, however, ever agree to sacrifice our basic objectives and principles. We are realistic and realize that the complex issues which affect the basic security of both sides are not likely to be resolved in the short term. No one should expect that the November meeting will produce a comprehensive arms control agreement. But with hard work we can hope to define more clearly a new and potentially fruitful basis on which hard negotiations can proceed.

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[6] The Treaty is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

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216. Joint Statement by the Leaders of Six Nations: Comprehensive Test Ban, October 24, 1985 [1]

The world's highest expectations are focused on your meeting at Geneva next month. All peoples and Governments hope that you will be able to stop the deepening of tensions of the last years, opening an era of peace and security for humanity.

You know, as we do, that the growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, if used, even though by accident or by miscalculation, will engulf us all in complete destruction. No interest can justify this threat to present and future generations. Hence the prevention of nuclear war is a key issue not only for your peoples and their destinies but for all people on every continent. Since the citizens of all nations are equally threatened by the consequences of nuclear war, it is of utmost importance to us also that your meeting should create appropriate conditions and produce concrete steps towards disarmament and peace.

The tragedy of our time is that, mainly due to mutual distrust, it has so far been impossible to end the nuclear arms race. For your own security and that of all nations and human beings and in order to ensure the preservation of the planet we all share, it is of paramount importance to build mutual confidence.

Your meeting offers a historic opportunity to step boldly out of the vicious circle of the escalating arms race. We hope that, through the demonstration of will to establish mutual confidence by overcoming differences, new impetus will be imparted to your bilateral negotiations and also to multilateral negotiations at Geneva, Stockholm and Vienna.

We recognize as a positive development that during the present year your Governments have initiated at Geneva negotiations covering both space and nuclear arms to be considered in their interrelationship. We are concerned that such negotiations have not yet produced results. We feel, however, that various recent proposals and developments seem to offer new hope that both deep cuts in the arsenals of nuclear weapons and effective measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space will now be seriously considered in the bilateral negotiations at Geneva in conformity with the conclusions we expect you to reach at your meeting.

In our Delhi Declaration of January this year (A/40/114–S/16921, annex), we called for a complete halt in the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, and of space weapons, to be immediately followed by substantial reductions in nuclear forces.[2] This would facilitate the task of preventing an arms

[1] A/40/825 S/17596, pp. 3–4. The statement was addressed to President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev and was signed by Argentinian President Alfonsín, Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, Mexican President de la Madrid, Swedish Prime Minister Palme, and Tanzanian President Nyerere.

[2] Document 10.

race in space and terminating it on Earth, ultimately eliminating nuclear arms everywhere.

Since January some of us have had the privilege of discussing our proposals with you in person, as well as with the leaders of the other nuclear-weapon States. One suggestion that we particularly emphasized in our message from Delhi was for a halt to all nuclear-weapons testing and the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In the light of these valuable discussions, we have decided to put forward some ideas for consideration at your meeting at Geneva.

We propose that you suspend all nuclear tests for a period of 12 months. Such a suspension could be extended or made permanent. We expect that the other nuclear-weapon States also should take corresponding action.

We believe that this would greatly improve the prospects for substantive agreements and would restrain the development of new, faster and more accurate weapons, which continues unabated even while negotiations are under way.

The problems of verifying the suspension we propose are difficult, but not insurmountable. We believe that you yourselves could find a solution satisfactory to both. If you would consider it helpful, we are ready to offer our good offices in order to facilitate the establishment of effective verification arrangements.

Third-party verification could provide a high degree of certainty that testing programmes have ceased. We propose to establish verification mechanisms on our territories to achieve this objective.

The responsibility entrusted to you is indeed awesome. We are convinced that the international community will support you in your endeavours. For our part, we reiterate our readiness to work together with you for the common security and survival of humanity.

217. Chinese Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, October 25, 1985 [1]

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming that the peaceful exploration and use of outer space including the Moon and other celestial bodies, as a common aspiration of all countries of the world, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind,

Recalling the principles and objectives of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and in particular articles III and IV thereof,[2]

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[1] A/C.1/40/L.4. At the request of the sponsor, no action was taken on the draft resolution.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 38–43.

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Further recalling paragraph 80 of the Final Document of its tenth special session [3] and its relevant resolutions since 1981,

Especially bearing in mind its resolution 39/59 adopted on 12 December 1984,

Convinced that the development of outer space weapon systems entails a qualitative escalation of the already serious arms race and further aggravates the world situation,

Fully taking note of the urgent demand of the international community that immediate and effective measures be taken to prevent an arms race in outer space,

Believing that the two countries with the largest space capabilities bear a special responsibility for the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Taking note of the consideration by the Conference on Disarmament of this question,

Welcoming the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on this question by the Conference on Disarmament during its 1985 session,

1. *Calls upon* all States, especially those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the realization of the objective of peaceful uses of outer space and to adopt prompt and effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, to speed up the consideration of the question of preventing an arms race in outer space in all its aspects as a matter of priority and urgency, taking into account all the relevant draft resolutions and proposals;

3. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to initiate negotiations without delay for concluding an agreement, or agreements, as appropriate, on the prohibition and destruction of all outer space weapon systems;

4. *Calls upon* all States possessing outer space capabilities to refrain from developing, testing and deploying outer space weapons, so as to create propitious conditions for negotiations;

5. *Urges* the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to conduct serious bilateral negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to keep the Conference on Disarmament properly informed of the progress of these negotiations;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all the documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its fortieth session;

7. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit its report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-first session;

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[3] *Ibid., 1978*, pp. 411 ff.

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-first session an item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

218. Communique of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, October 30, 1985 [1]

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) met in ministerial session at NATO Headquarters on 29th and 30th October, 1985. Spain attended as an observer.

On the eve of the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, we declare that the President goes to Geneva with the full support and solidarity of the Alliance.

We reviewed the status of Alliance nuclear forces including the ongoing arms control negotiations in Geneva. In this context, we received comprehensive briefings by the United States secretary of defense on developments in the balance of nuclear forces, the arms control negotiations, the continuing Soviet deployment, improvement and research programmes in the field of ballistic missile defense, and the United States Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research programme. We continue to support the United States and the United Kingdom efforts to maintain the credibility of their strategic nuclear deterrent in preserving security, peace and freedom.

We welcome the opportunity for effective arms control offered by the Geneva negotiations now underway. We reviewed the status of the Geneva negotiations and expressed strong support for United States positions concerning intermediate, strategic, and defense and space systems. We discussed the prospects for progress in each of these areas stressing that close consultation among the Alliance partners remains essential. We hope that the recent Soviet counterproposals, despite their one-sided and self-serving nature indicate a Soviet willingness to accept verifiable and equitable arms control agreements involving deep reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons. We stressed the flexibility contained in the United States proposals for significant reductions, which have been on the table since the opening of the negotiations.

We received a detailed briefing from the United States secretary of defense on the evidence of Soviet treaty violations. We take the most serious view of this and call on the new Soviet leadership to take the steps necessary to assure full compliance with its commitments. We noted in this connection that a double standard of compliance with arms control agreements would be unacceptable and would undermine the security of the Alliance. In this context, we reaffirmed the requirement for effective verification of, and full compliance with, all arms control agreements.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, January 1986, pp. 61–62.

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We continue to be concerned by the steady buildup of Soviet nuclear forces, in particular the testing and deployment of new strategic systems, including the SS–X–24 and the recently deployed SS–25, the deployment of a new generation of air-launched cruise missiles and the preparation for deployment of ground- and sea-based versions. We also note that the total SS–20 force has further increased to 441 launchers with 1,323 warheads. Alliance policy in comparison is to maintain only the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary for credible deterrence.

In accordance with the Montebello decision,[2] SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] presented at our meeting in Luxembourg a programme to reduce NATO's nuclear stockpile in Europe by a further 1,400 warheads by the end of 1988. These reductions are underway; they include the withdrawal of Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs), from the Alliance's nuclear stockpile. Taken together with the 1,000 warheads already withdrawn, this would reduce the number of nuclear warheads in the Alliance's stockpile to the lowest point in 20 years. At the Luxembourg meeting, SACEUR also presented his proposals to improve the responsiveness, effectiveness, and survivability of the remaining forces. At this meeting we received a progress report reflecting the status of SACEUR's proposals. We continued to review those reduction and improvement measures, recommended by SACEUR, which are currently being undertaken through the appropriate channels by the nations concerned. We agreed to consider periodically the progress of further implementation which depends on decisions by the nations concerned.

We noted the progress made on longer range INF (LRINF) deployments by NATO nations and the fact that negotiations on INF systems are currently underway. We reviewed, in particular, the status and the prospects for these negotiations and expressed support for the United States negotiating position developed in close consultation with its Allies. We emphasized NATO's determination to continue the deployment of LRINF missiles as scheduled in the absence of a concrete negotiated result with the Soviet Union obviating the need for such deployment. At the same time, we reiterated our willingness to reverse, halt or modify the LRINF deployment—including the removal and dismantling of missiles already deployed—upon achievement of a balanced, equitable and verifiable agreement calling for such action.

We accepted with pleasure an invitation from Dr. M. Woerner, the German Minister of Defense, to hold our next meeting in the Federal Republic of Germany in spring 1986.

Greece expressed its views in a statement included in the minutes. Denmark reserved its position on the INF part.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 917–918.

219. Interview of President Reagan by Soviet Journalists: Answers to Questions Previously Submitted, October 31, 1985 [1]

Question: The forthcoming meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev [M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee] and you, Mr. President, is for obvious reasons looked upon as an event of special importance. Both sides have stated their intention to make an effort to improve relations between our two countries, to better the overall international situation. The Soviet Union has, over a period of time, put forward a whole set of concrete proposals and has unilaterally taken steps in various areas directly aimed at achieving this goal. What is the United States for its part going to do?

Answer: I fully agree that my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev has special significance, and I am personally looking forward to it very much. I sincerely hope that we will be able to put relations between our two countries on a safer and more secure course. I, for my part, will certainly do all I can to make that possible.

We of course study every Soviet proposal carefully and when we find them promising we are happy to say so. If, on the other hand, we find them one-sided in their effect, we explain why we feel as we do. At the same time we, too, have made concrete proposals—dozens of them—which also cover every sphere of our relationship, from the elimination of chemical weapons and resolution of regional conflicts to the expansion of contacts and exchanges, *and we hope these receive the same careful attention that we give to Soviet proposals.*

Let me give you a few examples. One thing that has created enormous tension in U.S.-Soviet relations over the last few years has been attempts to settle problems around the world by using military force. The resort to arms, whether it be in Afghanistan, Cambodia, or in Africa, has contributed nothing to the prospects for peace or the resolution of indigenous problems, and has only brought additional suffering to the peoples of these regions. This is also dangerous, and we need to find a way to stop attempts to solve problems by force. So I have proposed that both our countries encourage parties to these conflicts to lay down their arms and negotiate solutions—and if they are willing to do that our countries should find a way to agree to support a peaceful solution and refrain from providing military support to the warring parties. And if peace can be achieved, the United States will contribute generously to an international effort to restore war-ravaged economies—just as we did after the Second World War,

[1] FBIS Special Memorandum, "Soviet Treatment of President Reagan's Interview With Soviet Journalists," November 19, 1985, FB85-10061, pp. 5–14. Most of these questions and responses were published in *Izvestiya* in Russian on November 4 and 5, 1985. The passages omitted by *Izvestiya* are printed here in italics. Passages added or changed by the paper are set off in brackets. For extracts of the portion of the interview consisting of answers to oral questions, see *infra*. A lengthy article by the four journalists was published along with the interview.

contributing to the recovery of friends and foes alike, and as we have done on countless other occasions.

Both of our governments agree that our nuclear arsenals are much too large. We are both committed to radical arms reductions. So the United States has made concrete proposals for such reductions: to bring ballistic missile warheads down to 5,000 on each side, and to eliminate intermediate-range ballistic missiles from our arsenals altogether. These have not been "take-it-or-leave-it" proposals. We are prepared to negotiate, since we know that negotiation is necessary if we are to reach a solution under which neither side feels threatened. We are willing to eliminate our advantages [in certain areas] if you will agree to eliminate yours. The important thing is to begin reducing these terrible weapons in a way that both sides will feel secure, and to continue that process until we have eliminated them altogether.

Events of the past 10 to 15 years have greatly increased mistrust between our countries. If we are to solve the key problems in our relationship, we have to do something to restore confidence in dealing with each other. This requires better communication, more contact, and close attention to make sure that both parties fulfill agreements reached. That is why we have made literally 40 to 50 proposals to improve our working relationship, expand communication, and build confidence. For example, we have proposed an agreement to cooperate on the peaceful use of space. The Apollo-Soyuz joint mission was a great success in 1975, and we should try to renew that sort of cooperation. We have also made several proposals for more direct contact by our military people. If they talked to each other more, they might find that at least some of their fears are unfounded. But, most of all, ordinary people in both countries should have more contact, particularly our young people. The future, after all, belongs to them. I'd like to see us sending thousands of students to each other's country every year, to get to know each other, to learn from each other, and—most of all—to come to understand that, even with our different philosophies, we can and must live in peace.

Obviously, we are not going to solve all the differences between us at one meeting, but we would like to take some concrete steps forward. Above all, I hope that our meeting will give momentum to a genuine process of problem solving and that we can agree on a course to take us toward a safer world for all—and growing cooperation between our countries.

Question: The Soviet Union stands for peaceful coexistence with countries which have different social systems, including the United States. In some of your statements, the point has been made that in spite of differences between our countries, it is necessary to avoid a military confrontation. In other words, we must learn how to live in peace. Thus, both sides recognize the fact that the issue of arms limitation and reduction is and will be determining in these relations. The special responsibility of the United States and the USSR for the

fate of the world is an objective fact. What in your opinion can be achieved in the area of security in your meeting with Gorbachev?

Answer: Well, first of all, I would say that we think all countries should live together in peace, whether they have the same or different social systems. Even if social systems are similar, this shouldn't give a country the right to use force against another.

But you are absolutely right when you say that we must learn to live in peace. As I have said many times, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. And this means that our countries must not fight any type of war.

You are also right when you say that our countries bear a special responsibility before the world. This is the case not only because we possess enormous nuclear arsenals, but because as great powers, whether we like it or not, our example and actions affect all those around us.

Our relations involve not only negotiating new agreements, but abiding by past agreements as well. Often we are accused by your country of interfering in your "internal" affairs on such questions as human rights, but this is a case in point. Ten years ago we both became participants in the Helsinki Accords and committed ourselves to certain standards of conduct.[2] We are living up to those commitments and expect others to do so also. Soviet-American relations affect as well regional conflicts, political relations among our friends and allies, and many other areas.

The fact that our countries have the largest and most destructive nuclear arsenals obliges us not only to make sure they are never used, but to lead the world toward the elimination of these awesome weapons.

I think that my meeting with General Secretary [M.S.] Gorbachev can start us on the road toward the goal our countries have set: the radical reduction of nuclear weapons and steps to achieve their complete elimination. We can do this by finding concrete ways to overcome roadblocks in the negotiating process [at the (summit) talks] and thus give a real impetus to our negotiators [at the (arms) talks]. Of course, we will also have to deal with other problems, because it will be very hard to make great progress in arms control unless we can also act to lower tensions, reduce the use and threat of force, and build confidence in our ability to deal constructively with each other.

Question: As is well known, the United States and the USSR reached an understanding last January in Geneva that the top priority of the new negotiations must be the prevention of the arms race in space. But now, the American delegation in Geneva is trying to limit the discussion to consideration of the question of nuclear arms and is

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[2] The arms control portions of the Helsinki Final Act may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. The entire Act is printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

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refusing to talk about the prevention of the arms race in space. How should we interpret this American position?

Answer: You have misstated the January agreement.[3] Actually, our foreign ministers agreed to "work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability." Further, they agree that the "subject of negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms—both strategic and medium range—with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."

Since your question reflects a misunderstanding of the United States position, let me review it for you:

First, we believe that the most threatening weapons facing mankind today are nuclear weapons of mass destruction. These are offensive weapons, and they exist today—in numbers that are much too high [in very large numbers]. Our most urgent task therefore is to begin to reduce them radically and to create conditions so that they can eventually be eliminated. Since most of these weapons pass through space to reach their targets, reducing them is as important to prevent an arms race in space as it is to terminate an arms race on earth.

As I noted earlier, we have made concrete, specific proposals to achieve this. Recently, your government *finally* made some counterproposals, and we will be responding in a genuine spirit of give-and-take in an effort to move toward practical solutions both countries can agree on.

Second, we believe that offensive and defensive systems are closely interrelated, and that these issues should be treated, as our foreign ministers agreed, as interrelated. Our proposals are fully consistent with this understanding. We are seeking right now with Soviet negotiators in Geneva a thorough discussion of how a balance of offensive and defensive systems could be achieved, and how—if scientists are able to develop effective defenses in the future—we might both use them to protect our countries and allies without threatening the other. And if we ever succeed in eliminating nuclear weapons, countries are going to require a defense against them, in case some madman gets his hands on some and tries to blackmail other countries.

Specifically, we have proposed:

- On strategic nuclear arms, a reduction of each side's nuclear forces down to 5,000 warheads on ballistic missiles. That would be a very dramatic lowering of force levels, in a way that would greatly enhance strategic stability. We have also offered to negotiate strict limits on other kinds of weapons. Because our force structures are different, and because the Soviet Union has complained about having to reconfigure its forces, we have offered to seek agreements which would balance these differing areas of American and Soviet strength.

[3] See Document 3.

- On intermediate-range nuclear forces, we believe the best course is to eliminate that entire category of forces, which includes the 441 SS–20 missiles the Soviet Union has deployed, and our Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. If this is not immediately acceptable we have also offered an interim agreement which would establish an equal number of warheads on U.S. and Soviet missiles in this category, at the lowest possible level.
- In the area of space and defense, we are seeking to discuss with Soviet negotiators the possibility that new technology might allow both sides to carry out a transition to greater reliance on defensive weapons, rather than basing security on offensive nuclear forces.

So that there would be no misunderstandings about our research program on new defensive systems which is being carried out in full compliance with the ABM Treaty,[4] *I sent the director of our Strategic Defense research program to Geneva to brief Soviet negotiators. Unfortunately, we have not had a comparable description of your research in this area, which we know is longstanding and quite extensive.*

Frankly, I have difficulty understanding why some people have misunderstood and misinterpreted our position. The research we are conducting in the United States regarding strategic defense is in precisely the same areas as the research being conducted in the Soviet Union. There are only two differences: first the Soviet Union has been conducting research in many of these areas longer than we have, and is ahead in some. Second, we are openly discussing our program, because our political system requires open debate before such decisions are made. But these differences in approaches to policy decisions should not lead to erroneous conclusions. Both sides are involved in similar research, and there is nothing wrong in that.

However, this does make it rather hard for us to understand why we should be accused of all sorts of aggressive intentions when we are doing nothing more than you are. The important thing, however, is for us to discuss these issues candidly.

In sum, what we are seeking is a balanced, fair, verifiable agreement—or series of agreements—that will permit us to do what was agreed in Geneva in January: to terminate the arms race on earth and prevent it in space. The United States has no "tricks" up its sleeve, and we have no desire to threaten the Soviet Union in any way. Frankly, if the Soviet Union would take a comparable attitude, we would be able to make very rapid progress toward an agreement.

Question. Mr. President, officials of your Administration claim that the United States, in its international relations, stands for the forces of democracy. How can one reconcile statements of this kind with the actual deeds of the United States? If you take any current example, it seems that when a particular country wants to exercise its right to independent development—whether it be in the Middle East, in Southern Africa, in Central America, in Asia—it is the United States in

[4] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

particular which supports those who stand against the majority of the people, against legitimate governments.

Answer: Your assertion about U.S. actions are totally unfounded. From your question, one might think that the United States was engaged in a war in some other country and in so doing had set itself against the majority of the people who want self-determination. I can assure you that this is not the case. I am proud, as are all Americans, that not a single American soldier is in combat anywhere in the world. If every country could say the same, we would truly live in a world of less tension and danger.

Yes, we are very supportive of democracy. It is the basis of our political system and our whole philosophy. Our nation was not founded on the basis of one ethnic group or culture, as are many other countries, but on the basis of the democratic ideal. For example, we believe that governments are legitimate only if they are created by the people, and that they are subordinate to the people, who select in free elections those who govern them. But democracy is more than elections in which all who wish can compete. In our view there are many things that even properly elected governments have no right to do. No American government can restrict freedom of speech, or of religion, and no American government can tell its people where they must live or whether they can leave the country or not. These and the other individual freedoms enshrined in our Constitution are the most precious gift our forefathers bequeathed us, and we will defend them so long as we exist as a nation.

Now this doesn't mean that we think we are perfect. Of course we are not. We have spent over 200 years trying to live up to our ideals and correct faults in our society, and we're still at it. It also doesn't mean that we think we have a right to impose our system on others. We don't, because we believe that every nation should have the right to determine its own way of life. But when we see other nations threatened from the outside by forces which would destroy their liberties and impose the rule of a minority by force of arms, we will help them resist that whenever we can. *We would not be true to our democratic ideals if we did not.*

We respond with force only as a last resort, and only when we or our Allies are the victims of aggression. For example, in World War II we took a full and vigorous part in the successful fight against Hitlerism, even though our country was not invaded by the Nazis. We still remember our wartime alliance and the heroism the peoples of the Soviet Union displayed in that struggle. And we also remember that we never used our position as one of the victors to add territory or to attempt to dominate others. Rather we helped rebuild the devastated countries, friends and erstwhile foes alike, and helped foster democracy where there was once totalitarianism. Have we not all benefited from the fact that Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany are today flourishing democracies and strong pillars of a stable and

humane world order? Well, the German and Japanese people deserve the most credit for this, but we believe we helped along the way.

In the areas you mention, we are heartened by trends we see, although there are still many troubling areas. In the southern part of Africa, Angola is torn by civil war, yet we have determined not to supply arms to either side, and to urge a peaceful settlement. In South Africa, the system of apartheid is repugnant to all Americans, but here as well we seek a peaceful solution and for many years we have refused to supply arms or police equipment to the South African Government. In Latin America, great progress in the transition from authoritarian to democratic societies has been made, and now on that continent there exist only four countries that do not have democratically elected governments. Since 1979 seven Latin American countries have made major strides from authoritarian to democratic systems [toward the democratization of the continent]. Over the years, we have been a leading voice for decolonization and have used our influence with our closest friends and allies to hasten this process. We are gratified by the nearly completed process of decolonization and take pride in our role.

I should emphasize that our aim has been to encourage the process of democratization through peaceful means. And not just the American Government, but the American people as a whole have supported this process with actions and deeds.

American society has long been characterized by its spirit of volunteerism and by its compassion for the less fortunate. At home, we are proud of our record of support for those who cannot manage for themselves. It is not simply that the government, but the American people, through a host of voluntary organizations, who bring help to the needy—the victims of floods and fires, the old, the infirm, and the handicapped. Americans have been no less generous in giving to other peoples. I remember the efforts of Herbert Hoover in organizing the American Relief effort to feed Soviet victims of famine in the 1920's, and these efforts continue to this day, whether it be food for the victims of famine in Ethiopia, or of earthquakes in Mexico.

Question: The Soviet Union has unilaterally taken a series of major steps. It has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It has undertaken a moratorium on any kind of nuclear tests. It has stopped deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the European part of its territory and has even reduced their number. Why hasn't the United States done anything comparable?

Answer: Actually, we have frequently taken steps intended to lower tension and to show our good will, *though these were rarely reciprocated. Immediately after World War II, when we were the only country with nuclear weapons, we proposed giving them up altogether to an international authority, so that no country would have such destructive power at its disposal. What a pity that this idea was not accepted!*

Not only did we not use our nuclear monopoly against others, we signaled our peaceful intent by demobilizing our armed forces in an

extraordinarily rapid way. *At the end of the war in 1945, we had 12 million men under arms, but by the beginning of 1948 we had reduced our forces to one-tenth of that number, 1.2 million. Since the 1960's we unilaterally cut back our own nuclear arsenal: we now have considerably fewer weapons than in 1969, and only one-third of the destructive power which we had at that time.*

The United States and the NATO allies have repeatedly said that we will never use our arms, conventional or nuclear, unless we are attacked.

Let me add something that might not be widely known in the Soviet Union. In agreement with the NATO countries, the United States since 1979 has removed from Europe well over 1,000 nuclear warheads. When all of our withdrawals have been completed, the total number of warheads withdrawn will be over 2,400. That's a withdrawal of about five nuclear weapons [shells] for every intermediate-range missile we plan to deploy. It will bring our nuclear forces in Europe to the lowest level in some 20 years. *We have seen no comparable Soviet restraint.*

If the Soviet Union is now reducing its intermediate-range missiles in Europe, that's a long overdue step. The Soviet Union has now deployed 441 SS–20 missiles, each with three warheads—that is 1,323 warheads. I don't have to remind you that this Soviet deployment began when NATO had no comparable systems in Europe. We first attempted to negotiate an end to these systems, but when we could not reach agreement, NATO proceeded with a limited response which will take place gradually. Today, the Soviet Union commands an advantage in warheads of 7 to 1 on missiles already deployed. Our position remains as it always has been, that it would be better to negotiate an end to all of these types of missiles. But even if our hopes for an agreement are disappointed and NATO has to go to full deployment, this will only be a maximum of 572 single-warhead missiles.

Moreover, President Carter canceled both the enhanced-radiation warhead [5] and the B–1 bomber [6] in 1978, and the Soviet Union made no corresponding move. *In fact, when asked what the Soviet Union would reduce in response, one of your officials said, "We are not philanthropists."* In 1977 and 1978 the United States also tried to negotiate a ban on developing antisatellite weapons. The Soviet Union refused and proceeded to develop and test an antisatellite weapon. Having already established an operational antisatellite system, the Soviet Union now proposes a "freeze" before the United States can test its own system. *Obviously, that sort of "freeze" does not look very fair to us; if the shoe were on the other foot, it wouldn't look very fair to you either.*

The issues between our two countries are of such importance that the positions of each government should be communicated accurately to the people of both countries. In this process, the media of both countries have an important role to play. We should not attempt to

[5] *Ibid., 1978,* p. 230.
[6] *Ibid., 1977,* pp. 386–391.

"score points" against each other. And the media should not distort our positions. *We are committed to examining every Soviet proposal with care, seeking to find areas of agreement. It is important that the Soviet Government do the same in regard to our proposals.*

The important thing is that we both deal seriously with each other's proposals and make a genuine effort to bridge our differences in a way which serves the interests of both countries and the world as a whole. It is in this spirit that I will be approaching my meeting with [CPSU Central Committee] General Secretary Gorbachev.

220. Interview of President Reagan by Soviet Journalists: Answers to Oral Questions on the Strategic Defense Initiative and the Antiballistic Missile Treaty [Extracts], October 31, 1985 [1]

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Question: *I would like to have another question for you, Mr. President.* According to a survey taken by The Washington Post and ABC on Tuesday it was found that 74 percent of the American people as compared to 20 percent said that they would like the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their nuclear arsenals and not to have the U.S. develop space weapons. This seems to be the choice which the American people have made. *It seems clear that without stopping the development of weapons in space there can be no reduction of nuclear weapons. This is the position of the Soviet side.* So how then will you react, Mr. President, to this opinion expressed by the American public?

The President: For one thing, it is based on a misconception. The use of the term "Star Wars" came about when one [was coined by an American] political figure *in America used that to describe what it is we are researching and studying, and then our press picked it up* and it has been [has spread] worldwide. We're not talking about Star Wars at all. We are talking about seeing if there isn't a defensive weapon that does not kill people, but that simply makes it impossible for nuclear missiles, once fired out of their silos, to reach their objective—to intercept those weapons.

Now it is also true that, to show that this is a misconception on the part of the people when you use the wrong terms, not too long ago there was a survey taken, a poll of our people, and they asked them about Star Wars. And similar to the reaction in this poll, only about

[1] FBIS Special Memorandum, "Soviet Treatment of President Reagan's Interview With Soviet Journalists," November 19, 1985, FB85-10061, pp. 15–17, 21–23. Most of these questions and responses were published in *Izvestiya* in Russian on November 4 and 5, 1985. The passages omitted by *Izvestiya* are printed here in italics. Passages added or changed by the paper are set off in brackets. For the portion of the interview consisting of answers to questions previously submitted, see *supra*. A lengthy article by the four journalists was published along with the interview.

30 percent of the people in our country favored it and the rest didn't. But in the same poll they then described, as I have tried to describe, what it is we are researching—a strategic defensive shield *that doesn't kill people, but would allow us one day—all of us—to reduce—get rid of nuclear weapons.* And over 90 percent of the American people favored our going forward with such a program.

Now this is one of the things that we will discuss. We are for, and have for several years now, been advocating a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. It is uncivilized on the part of all of us to be sitting here with the only deterrent to war—offensive nuclear weapons that in such numbers that both of us could threaten the other with the death and the annihilation of millions and millions of each other's people.

And so that is the deterrent that is supposed to keep us from firing these missiles at each other. Wouldn't it make a lot more sense if we could find—that as there has been in history for every weapon a defensive weapon. Weapon isn't the term to use for what we are researching. We are researching for something that could make it, as I say, virtually impossible for these missiles to reach their targets. And if we find such a thing, my proposal is that we make it available to all the world. We don't just keep it for our own advantage.

Question: *Mr. President,* with the situation as it stands today in the international arena, attempts to create such a space shield will inevitably lead to suspicion on the other side that the country creating such a space shield will be in a position to make a first strike [in fact wants to acquire the capability for a first nuclear strike]. This is a type of statement whose truth is agreed to by many people. Now, it's apparent that the American people have indicated their choice, that if it comes down to a choice between the creation of such a space system and the decrease in nuclear arms, they prefer a decrease in nuclear arms. So, it seems to be a realistic evaluation on the part of the American people. And I would like to ask how the American Government would react to the feelings of the American people in this regard.

The President: In the first place, yes, if someone was developing such a defensive system and going to couple it with their own nuclear weapons—offensive weapons—yes, that could put them in a position where they might be more likely to dare a first strike. But your country, *your government,* has been working on this same kind of a plan beginning years before we ever started working on it, which, I think, would indicate that maybe we should be a little suspicious that they want it for themselves.

But I have said, and am prepared to say at the summit, that if such a weapon is possible, and our research reveals that, then, our move would be to say to all the world, "Here, it is available." We won't put this weapon—or this system in place, this defensive system, until we do away with our nuclear missiles, our offensive missiles. But we will make it available to other countries, including the Soviet Union, *to do the same thing.*

Now, just what—whichever one of us comes up first with that defensive system, the Soviet Union or us or anyone else—what a picture if we say no one will claim a monopoly on it. And we make that offer now. It will be available for the Soviet Union, as well as ourselves.

And if the Soviet Union and the United States both say we will eliminate our offensive weapons, we will put in this defensive thing in case some place in the world a madman some day tries to create these weapons again—nuclear weapons—*because, remember, we all know how to make them now. So, you can't do away with that information.* But we would all be safe knowing that if such a madman project is ever attempted there isn't any of us that couldn't defend ourselves against it.

So, I can assure you now we are not going to try and monopolize this, *if such a weapon is developed,* for a first-strike capability.

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Question: Mr. President, with relation to the ABM Treaty, which was signed in 1972, Article V of that treaty indicates, and I quote, [in 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the ABM Treaty at the summit level, which states absolutely clearly] "that each side will not develop, test or deploy antiballistic missile components or systems which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based." [2] Now, some Administration representatives say that the treaty is such that it permits all of these things—the development, the testing, and deployment of [space-based] ABM systems. Such an interpretation of that treaty certainly cannot help achieve agreement.

What is the true position of the American Administration with regard to the interpretation of this treaty? Will the United States abide by the treaty or not? *And certainly the results of your meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev will depend a great deal on that fact.*

The President: There are two varying interpretations of the treaty. There is an additional clause in the treaty that would seem to be more liberal than that paragraph 5—or clause 5. On the other hand, we have made it plain that we are going to stay within a strict definition of the treaty. And what we are doing with regard to research—and that would include testing—is within the treaty.

Now, with regard to deployment, as I said earlier, no we are doing what is within the treaty and which the Soviet Union has already been doing for quite some time, same kind of research *and development.* But, when it comes to deployment, I don't know what the Soviet Union was going to do when and if their research developed such a weapon, or still if it does. But I do know what we're going to do and I have stated it already. *We would not deploy—my—it is not my purpose for deployment—until we sit down with the other nations of the world, and those that have nuclear arsenals, and see if we cannot come to an agreement on which there will be deployment only if there is elimination of the nuclear weapons.*

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* p. 199.

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Now, you might say if we're going to eliminate the nuclear weapons, then why do we need the defense? Well, I repeat what I said earlier. We all know how to make them—the weapons, so it is possible that some day a madman could arise in the world—we were both allies in a war that came about because of such a madman—and therefore, it would be like, in Geneva after World War I when the nations all got together and said no more poison gas, but we all kept our gasmasks. Well, this weapon, if such can be developed, would be today's gasmask. But we would want it for everyone and the terms for getting it, and the terms for our own deployment would be the elimination of the offensive weapons—*a switch to maintain trust and peace between us of having defense systems that gave us security, not the threat of annihilation—that one or the other of us would annihilate the other with nuclear weapons.*

So, we will not be violating this treaty at any time, *because, as I say, it is not our purpose to go forward with deployment if and when such a weapon proved practical.*

Question: *Mr. President, we've about run out of time unless you had something in conclusion you wanted to state.*

The President: Well, I—we haven't covered—I guess I've filibustered on too many of these questions here with lengthy answers. I know you have more questions there. I'm sorry that we haven't time for them.

But I would just like to say that the Soviet Union and the United States—well, not the Soviet Union, let us say Russia and the United States have been *allies in two wars. The Soviet Union and the United States,* allies in one, the last and greatest war, World War II. Americans and Russians died side by side, fighting the same enemy.

There are Americans buried on Soviet soil. And it just seems to me—and what I look forward to in this meeting with the general secretary—[I want to say to the general secretary:] is that people don't start wars, governments do. And I have a little thing here that I copied out of an article the other day and the author of the article uttered a very great truth. "Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed. They arm themselves because they distrust each other." *Well,* I hope that in the summit maybe we can find ways that we can prove by deed—not just words, *but by deeds*—that there is no need for distrust between us. And then we can stop punishing our people by using our wherewithal to build these arsenals of weapons instead of doing more things for the comfort of the people.[3]

[3] This is the end of the formal interview. [Footnote in source document.]

221. Statement by the Swedish Representative (Cars) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Report on the Construction of Military Price Indexes and Purchasing-Power Parities for Comparison of Military Expenditures, November 1, 1985 [1]

In pursuance of General Assembly Resolution 37/95 B of 13 December 1982, the Secretary-General appointed a Group of Experts to undertake the task of constructing military price indexes and purchasing-power parities of States voluntarily participating in this exercise. This task included, *inter alia,* in an introductory phase, assessment of the feasibility of such an exercise and the design of the project and methodology to be employed. I had the honour and pleasure to serve as the Chairman of that Group.

In the course of its work the Group submitted two progress reports; the final report, contained in document A/40/421, was unanimously adopted in June of this year and is now before the Committee.

The background of this exercise was the need for adequate and acceptable means and methods of comparing military expenditures over time and between countries in connection with possible future international negotiations on the reduction of military expenditures. The preceding Group of Experts had stated in its 1982 report that general price indexes and prevailing exchange rates in fact constituted rather poor instruments for intertemporal and international comparisons of military expenditures. It suggested, however, that specifically constructed price indexes and purchasing-power parities of military expenditures would make possible much more accurate comparisons. That Group also concluded that the successful demonstration of the feasibility of constructing military price indexes and purchasing-power parities for different States would contribute much to preparing the ground for future negotiations on a reduction of military expenditures.[2]

Thus, the Group considered that the purpose of its task was to throw light on the question whether such instruments of comparison as just mentioned might be successfully constructed in the context of future negotiations with a view to facilitating agreements among the parties. A practical exercise of this kind might also provide experience that can be useful in connection with future negotiations. However, that experience came to be limited because of the lack of participation of countries with different budgeting and accounting systems and at very different levels of economic development. The following countries chose to participate in the exercise: Australia, Austria, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

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[1] A/C.1/40/PV.22, pp. 11–17.
[2] A/S–12/7.

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To carry out the Group's task there was an obvious need for a certain amount of relevant statistical data. Part of these were expenditure data of the same kind as those annually reported to the United Nations in the framework of its international system for standardized reporting of the military expenditures of Member States. In addition to such data, the Group also had to request and collect data concerning prices and descriptions of a selected number of military goods and services. For this purpose the Group elaborated a few questionnaires that corresponded closely to the structure of the reporting matrix.

The data received from participating States in response to the Group's requests were rather abundant with regard to operating costs, that is, the cost of such resources which are used for the basic training and maintenance of soldiers; on the other hand, information on items which fall within the procurement category, that is, weapons, weapon systems and other military equipment, not unexpectedly turned out to be much less available.

The limited amount of available data on military hardware presented a major problem for the Group. That problem was further aggravated by the fact that only a few of those already scarce data could be regarded as being comparable with each other. Thus, quite a few of the data submitted concerning procurement had to be disregarded, because they could not be matched with similar data from other countries.

It should therefore be acknowledged that the purchasing-power parities that the Group managed to construct for military hardware are based on a limited amount of data and may, as a consequence, be less reliable. However, the main point is that the method itself proved to be feasible also for the hardware category and that the results could be largely improved, given greater availability of relevant information. It might seem somewhat speculative but, nevertheless, the Group concluded that States participating in future negotiations on agreements to reduce military expenditures might well be more willing to exchange among themselves more information on characteristics and prices of military goods and services compared to what they were willing to publicize under present circumstances.

Another major problem that the Group faced was the comparison of conscripted and enlisted soldiers. Those two categories of military personnel are undoubtedly meant to fulfil about the same functions in the case of a war. On the other hand, it is clear that conscripts undergoing the first part of their basic training are far from being as skilled and experienced as the average professional soldier. Upon careful examination of this question the Group finally decided to regard conscripts with a training of six months or more to be comparable, by and large, to the average enlisted soldier. Thus, total maintenance costs for each one of these conscripts, including daily pay, food charges and cost of accommodation, were compared with the average salary of enlisted soldiers. On this basis purchasing-power parities were also constructed for that category of personnel for all participating States.

The results of the Group's exercise as presented in its report are as follows:

(a) Military price indexes have been constructed for all participating States, both for their total military expenditures and for a great number of different expenditure categories and sub-categories. These results are also compared with two types of general civilian price indexes.

(b) Military purchasing-power parities have been constructed for all participating States, both for their total military expenditures and for some expenditure categories and sub-categories. These results are also compared with exchange rates and a set of civilian purchasing-power parities as constructed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

However, to achieve those results the Group had to use a limited number of surrogate indexes and parities, which were provided either by the participating States themselves or in some cases collected from other sources.

With reference to the military price indexes, the Group believes that it has arrived at fairly reliable results, as some of them come very close to those obtained through extensive national efforts in the respective countries. This seems to be an interesting observation and it may be worth noting that the Group has obtained its results by means of a simplified method, using a relatively limited amount of information. This matter may also be of special interest in the light of possible future negotiations on the reduction of military expenditures, as a simple method and the use of easily verifiable data might greatly help to facilitate such negotiations.

As for military purchasing-power parities, the Group believes that those for operating costs are fairly reliable, but, as mentioned earlier, those for procurement items could be considerably improved if more data were to be made available and if more time and effort could be devoted to the actual comparisons. Nevertheless, the Group is pleased to present the results it has achieved and feels that the price indexes and purchasing-power parities constructed by the Group would be much better used for the comparison of participating States' military expenditures than general price indexes and official exchange rates. The Group would also underline that another important result of this exercise is the experience and knowledge which it has provided and which should, in spite of the limitations imposed by the small number of participating States, prove to be useful in the event of future international negotiations on agreements to reduce military expenditures.

I now come to the Group's conclusions. To summarize, the Group has concluded: first, that the construction of useful instruments for intertemporal and international comparisons of military expenditures—namely military price indexes and purchasing-power parities—is feasible, given a sufficient availability of relevant statistical information and that good results can be obtained with a relatively limited amount

of data, provided that necessary efforts are made to select and collect the information and to make the appropriate comparisons; secondly, that this exercise bears a clear relationship to the endeavours made by the United Nations to explore the link between disarmament and development, as in both cases the aim is to obtain a release of resources through a reduction of military efforts in real terms; and thirdly, that in addition to technical-statistical matters there are also other important aspects of the question of reducing military expenditures which would deserve careful attention. Such aspects are to some extent described in chapter V of the Group's report.

On the basis of its conclusions the Group finally recommends: first, that the consideration of technical and other aspects of problems related to agreements to reduce military expenditures should be continued and that appropriate measures should be taken to promote and to facilitate international negotiations on such agreements; secondly, that all Member States should be invited to express their views on the present report, including the prospects of wider participation, in particular by countries with different budgeting and accounting systems and at very different levels of economic development, as well as on all matters dealt with in this report, and to suggest further steps on measures with a view to promoting and facilitating future international agreements to reduce military expenditures; thirdly, that a report on the above matters should be submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its forty-first session; and finally, the Group recommends that all Member States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, should be urged to help create the necessary conditions for fruitful negotiations on agreements to reduce military expenditures, and to recognize that in this process and in the course of such negotiations a reasonable availability and exchange of statistical data would be required.

The Group recommends that, on this basis, Member States should start negotiations as soon as possible.

222. Radio Address by President Reagan on the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, November 2, 1985 [1]

Yesterday in Geneva American negotiators presented to their Soviet counterparts new proposals designed to achieve real reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union. My instructions to our negotiators also asked that this round of the negotiations be extended into this coming week so that our team can make a full presentation of our new proposals and so that the Soviets have the opportunity to ask questions about them.

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, November 2, 1985, pp. 1341–1342. The President spoke from Camp David.

I am very pleased that the Soviet Union has agreed to this extension of the talks. I know you join me in hoping that this will be a productive week in Geneva. Our new proposals address all three areas of these negotiations: strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and defense and space systems. They build upon the concrete reduction proposals American negotiators have had on the table since early in the talks, and they take into account expressed Soviet concerns.

Our objective since the start of the administration in 1981 has been to achieve real progress in reducing not only nuclear arms but conventional forces and chemical weapons as well. We've been firm and consistent in our arms control approach. Just as important, we have placed great value on maintaining the strength and unity of our alliances and ensuring that the security interests of our allies are enhanced in these negotiations. And we've demonstrated flexibility in taking legitimate Soviet interests into account.

I'm pleased to report to you that our strategy has been working. I believe we've laid the groundwork for productive negotiations in Geneva. The first sign of this was when Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze presented to me at our White House meeting in September a Soviet counteroffer to our own earlier proposals. The Soviet negotiators then presented this in detail in Geneva, and our negotiators and our experts here at home have had a chance to analyze it carefully.

Based on this analysis, I decided upon the new U.S. proposals and instructed our negotiating team to present them in Geneva. Judged against our very careful criteria for reaching sound arms control agreements, we found that the Soviet counterproposal had some flaws and in some ways was onesided. But as I made clear in my speech to the United Nations, the Soviet move also had certain positive seeds which we wish to nurture.

Our new proposals build upon these positive elements. One of them is the Soviet call for 50-percent reduction in certain types of nuclear arms. For more than 3 years we've been proposing a reduction of about half in the strategic ballistic missiles of both sides. We therefore have accepted the 50-percent reduction proposed by the Soviets.

At the same time, we're making it clear that we have a safer and more stable world. And if we're to have that, reductions must be applied to systems which are comparable, and especially to those which would give either side a destabilizing first-strike advantage.

We not only want to bring nuclear arms way down to equal levels in a stable way, we also want to decrease our mutual reliance for security on these extremely destructive offensive arsenals. Thus, we're seeking to discuss at the same time with the Soviets in Geneva how together we can try to help make the world a safer place by relying more on defenses which threaten no one, rather than on these offensive arsenals. Each of us is pursuing research on such defenses, and we need to be talking to each other about it.

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I have written to both allied leaders and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev about our new proposals. And I have informed Mr. Gorbachev how much I am looking forward to our meeting later this month in Geneva. He and I will have a broad agenda at our meeting, one that includes human rights, regional issues, and contacts between our peoples, as well as the Geneva and other arms control negotiations.

If we hope to succeed in our efforts to create a safer world and to bring about a fresh start in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, progress will be needed in all of these areas. And this can only be accomplished if the Soviet leaders share our determination. We're encouraged because after a long wait, legitimate negotiations are underway.

Now, we've had a proposal on the table in Geneva for quite a while. Now the Soviet Union has offered a counterproposal, and we, in turn, have a new proposal now reflecting some of the elements of both of the others. And this is what negotiation is all about.

I can't give you any more details about our new arms control proposals because we have to let the negotiators work this out behind closed doors in Geneva. But I want to leave you with the four key objectives our American negotiators are seeking: deep cuts, no first-strike advantages, defensive research—because defense is much safer than offense—and no cheating.

Until next week, thanks for listening. God bless you.

223. Statement by the U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative (Okun) to the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolution on Israeli Armed Attack Against Iraqi Nuclear Facilities, November 5, 1985 [1]

The United States will vote against this draft resolution [2] because we strongly believe that the issue it purports to address was decisively resolved by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in September, after four years of difficult and painstaking consideration.

As all member delegations are aware, the International Atomic Energy Agency Conference adopted a resolution which concluded that Israel had

> committed itself not to attack peaceful nuclear facilities in Iraq, elsewhere in the Middle East or anywhere else.[3]

Israel explicitly confirmed its acceptance of this commitment at the Conference, including the 26 September statement made by the Direc-

[1] A/40/PV.59, p. 53.
[2] Iraq introduced the draft resolution (A/40/L.9) directly in the General Assembly, where it was considered without reference to a main committee. The General Assembly adopted a revised version containing a new oper. par. as resolution 40/6.
[3] Document 191.

tor-General of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission at the direction of the Foreign Minister of Israel.[4] That statement was circulated on 24 October as a General Assembly document.

The attempt to reopen this issue flouts the clear intention of the majority of the membership of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States considers this issue closed, and views the draft resolution before us as an unfortunate attempt to reopen it.

224. Italian Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, November 6, 1985 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its relevant Resolutions and the applicable provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,[2]

Reaffirming that the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,[3] have undertaken, in article III, to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and of promoting international co-operation and understanding,

Emphasizing the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing international arms control and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space,

Aware of the fundamental contribution that space activities can make to international security and strategic stability, to the goal of averting the danger of war and to the implementation of disarmament agreements,

Convinced that further efforts should be made in the search for effective and verifiable agreements on the interrelated questions of preventing an arms race in outer space and terminating it on Earth, of limiting and reducing nuclear arms and of strengthening strategic stability,

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[4] Document 188.

[1] A/C.1/40/L.22. The draft resolution was co-sponsored by Belgium, Canada, FRG, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. A revised version, submitted on November 20 (see Document 250) was subsequently withdrawn.

[2] The text of the Final Document (resolution S–10/2) may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411 ff.

[3] Reprinted *ibid., 1967*, pp. 38–43.

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Aware of the crucial role that pertains to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the pursuance of these goals,

Noting the work so far undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its *Ad Hoc* Committee to consider all issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and convinced that those issues can be dealt with in a manner consistent with and complementary to the ongoing bilateral negotiations,

1. *Recalls* the obligation of all States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from the threat or use of force;

2. *Expresses its great satisfaction* at the agreement reached in 1985 in the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum, on the establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Committee on item 5 of its agenda, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"; [4]

3. *Notes furthermore* that the *Ad Hoc* Committee initiated examination of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, taking into account all existing agreements and proposals;

4. *Deems it necessary*, as recognized by the *Ad Hoc* Committee, that all efforts should be made to assure that substantive work on the agenda item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" will continue at the next session of the Conference;

5. *Emphasizes* the great responsibility towards mankind as a whole which falls on the major space and nuclear Powers in the search for effective and verifiable agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its termination on Earth;

6. *Welcomes* the fact that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have initiated bilateral negotiations on both strategic and intermediate-range, space and nuclear arms, with all these questions to be resolved in their interrelationship;

7. *Expresses its satisfaction* at the agreed objective of these negotiations, that is, to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability;

8. *Emphasizes* the necessity of preventing the erosion of relevant existing treaties;

9. *Calls upon* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to spare no effort to reach early agreement in conformity with the agreed objective of the negotiations;

10. *Calls upon* all States to encourage an early and successful outcome of these negotiations;

11. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-first session;

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[4] Document 61.

12. *Decides* to resume consideration of this issue at its forty-first session under the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

225. Reply by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to a Joint Statement by the Leaders of Six Nations on a Comprehensive Test Ban, November 7, 1985 [1]

Your joint message has been examined most attentively by the Soviet leaders. It confirms the fact that we have common goals, that your proposals dealing with the curtailment of the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race, and the prevention of the militarization of space are consonant with our approach.

You repose hopes, and with good reason, in the coming Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva and expect it to bring about positive changes in international relations. On our part, we actively come out for reaching at the meeting concrete, tangible agreements that would promote the consolidation of security and trust in the world, that would open up a possibility to stop the accelerating process of the accumulation and further improvement of armaments. This is what peoples are waiting for.

Realizing its responsibility for the destinies of the world, the Soviet Union has come up with a package of new initiatives practically in all the spheres of the termination of the arms race and of disarmament. We have stated that we are ready to agree to the reduction by half of the Soviet and American nuclear armaments reaching the territories of each other if the creation of space strike weapons is banned.

This is the real practical formula of preventing the arms race in space and of truly drastic reductions of nuclear armaments on earth. The USSR also took unilaterally, lately in particular, a number of steps which are well known.

I would like to touch upon the question on which you lay special emphasis in your message, namely, that of declaring by the USSR and the United States of a 12-month moratorium on nuclear explosions.

We share your assessment of the importance of this measure. You link with good reason the termination of the tests with hopes for erecting a reliable barrier in the way of the nuclear arms race, with a turn towards eliminating in practice nuclear weapons.

Indeed, the cessation of the nuclear tests would make it possible steeply to slow down and in many respects preclude practical work to upgrade qualitatively nuclear weapons, develop their new types and enhance their destructive as it is effect. [*sic*] In such conditions the nuclear arms race would be tangibly undermined.

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[1] Moscow TASS in English, November 7, 1985; FBIS *Daily Report*, November 8, 1985, vol. III, pp. AA1–AA2. The joint statement by the leaders of six nations is printed in Document 216.

This is the reason why the Soviet Union attaches so much importance to a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests, works perseveringly and consistently to achieve this. Striving to lead the resolution of this problem out of the deadlock, the USSR unilaterally terminated starting August 6 this year any nuclear explosions either [*sic*]. So, whether the Soviet moratorium will continue to be in effect after the mentioned date expires depends totally on the United States.

There exists now a real possibility to take at last a decisive and historic, in the full sense of this word, step to stop the tests once and for all. As for the Soviet Union, I repeat that we could go to the prolongation of our moratorium after January 1, 1986 if the United States joins it. Moreover, we are prepared already now, today, for a timeless treaty ban on all nuclear weapon tests.

If political will is displayed, it would be quite possible, we believe, to solve the question concerning verification. The present state of national technical means in possession of the USSR and the United States allows the sides to determine without difficulty whether nuclear tests are conducted or not. Facts of the most recent time confirm this.

In addition, in reaching an accord on banning nuclear weapon tests totally and universally, other mutually acceptable verification methods too, including those involving the use of the possibilities which are mentioned in your message, could be looked for.

The solution of the problem of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests, as well as a temporary moratorium on the nuclear tests, require steps towards each other, the taking into account of each other's security interests. Any hopes to achieve unilateral advantages in this sphere are groundless.

We continue to believe in the effect of a good example, in the triumph of common sense which should get an upper hand in the long run when the point at issue is the problem connected with the very existence of the civilization.

I should like to express hope that the efforts in this direction stimulated by the opinion of the influential leaders of the states—signatories to the Delhi Declaration representing various continents on our planet will bear fruit. You can always count on the Soviet Union in this noble work.

226. Polish Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Study of the Various Consequences of the Militarization of Outer Space, November 7, 1985 [1]

The General Assembly,

[1] A/C.1/40/L.45. Poland submitted a revised version on November 14, Document 233, which it subsequently withdrew.

Gravely concerned at the impending danger posed to all mankind by the real prospect of extending the arms race into outer space,

Reaffirming that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and its peaceful exploration and use shall be the province of all mankind,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, have undertaken, in article IV, not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner,[2]

Determined to prevent the militarization of outer space,

Aware of the various proposals submitted to that end by Member States to the General Assembly in recent years,

Recalling its resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 of 9 December 1981, 37/83 of 9 December 1982, 37/99 D of 13 December 1982, 38/70 of 15 December 1983 and 39/59 of 12 December 1984,

Taking note of paragraph 99 of the report of the Conference on Disarmament,[3] containing the report of its *Ad Hoc* Committee on the agenda item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space",

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive study of the various consequences of the militarization of outer space;

2. *Recommends* that the study be prepared on the basis of accessible material, with the assistance of eminent consultant experts of various nationalities appointed by the Secretary-General, taking into account the views expressed and the suggestions made during the discussion of this subject at the fortieth session of the General Assembly;

3. *Calls upon* Governments and international scientific institutions and organizations to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the preparation of the study;

4. *Requests* that the study be transmitted to the Conference on Disarmament, the Security Council and the General Assembly by 1 July 1987, and to the Governments of Member States in time to permit its consideration at the forty-second session of the General Assembly;

5. *Recommends* that Member States give the study wide distribution in their respective languages, through various media of communication, so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 38–43.

[3] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/40/27 and Corr.1).

Document 226

227. Draft Resolution Introduced in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly by the Federal Republic of Germany: Prevention of War in the Nuclear Age, November 7, 1985 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recalling the determination of the peoples of the world to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and, to this end, to strengthen their resolve to maintain international peace and security,

Emphasizing the special significance the commitment of States Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security takes on in the fortieth year of the Organization's existence,

Noting with grave concern the implications of a continuing arms buildup, particularly in its nuclear aspect, and expressing its profound conviction that the prevention of nuclear war, indeed all war, remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

Convinced that the successful fulfilment of this task requires all States to do their utmost to avoid conflict and to resolve disputes peacefully, so as to ensure that war is no longer viewed as an instrument for settling international disputes and that the use and the threat of force are eliminated from international life as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations,

Further convinced that the prevention of war, and particularly nuclear war, requires that all States respect the sovereignty, equality, independence and territorial integrity of all other States, and recalling the commitment by all Member States under the Charter of the United Nations to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force,

Recalling none the less the inherent right of States individually or collectively to defend themselves against armed attack, recognizing the vital importance of preventing armed conflict in any form and recognizing further that States may legitimately take measures necessary to restrain, or in other words deter, the initiation of, or persistence in an attack,

Reiterating the vital interest of the peoples of the world in disarmament, but also recognizing the importance of confidence-building measures for the establishment of more co-operative relationships between States, the prevention of conflicts, in particular by lessening the possibility of surprise attack, and the facilitation of further disarmament measures, and noting in that regard the large number of proposals for additional confidence-building measures currently considered in a large number of multilateral forums,

[1] A/C.1/40/L.74. Also sponsored by Canada, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, and the U.K., this draft resolution was subsequently withdrawn by the sponsors.

Stressing the necessity of building on the important steps that have already been taken to reduce the risk of war, most notably on the verifiable arms control agreements that have already been concluded, and stressing the importance of compliance with existing arms control commitments, so as to encourage the conclusion of further and more far-reaching agreements,

Recalling paragraphs 47 to 50 and 56 to 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, regarding the necessity for, and the process of, nuclear disarmament,[2]

Underlining the primary responsibility of nuclear-weapon States, in particular those with the largest nuclear arsenals, for the prevention of a war involving the use of nuclear weapons and for nuclear disarmament, but also bearing in mind the collective responsibility of all States to work towards these ends,

Believing that—notwithstanding the vital contribution of concrete disarmament measures—the goals of securing peace and preventing nuclear war and any armed conflict can most effectively be served by fully recognizing and respecting the dignity of man, basic freedoms and the right of national self-determination,

Noting with deep concern that, in spite of their important contribution to the prevention of war, arms control negotiations tend to proceed at a pace which is clearly inadequate to the seriousness of the threat and the urgency of the problem,

1. *Reaffirms* that reducing and removing the threat of nuclear war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day and that eliminating the threat of all armed conflict remains the ultimate goal of the international community;

2. *Urges* all States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, and further urges them never to use any of their weapons, except in the exercise of their inherent right of individual or collective self-defence;

3. *Calls upon* all States to maintain, as a priority objective of their policies, the removal of the danger of war at any level of hostility, thereby precluding the use of nuclear weapons;

4. *Urges* all States to exercise restraint in their relations with others, to act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations which could cause dangerous exacerbation of their relations, to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of war;

5. *Emphasizes* the importance of concluding agreements on militarily significant and verifiable reductions of armament and forces, including nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States con-

[2] For the Final Document, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411 ff.

cerned, and of achieving stable military balance, globally and regionally, at the lowest possible levels;

6. *Welcomes warmly* in this connection the initiation of the bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

7. *Urges* all States to work for concrete and verifiable results in arms control negotiations, especially those aimed at the elimination of whole categories of weapons and of weapons that have destabilizing effects, as well as those that enhance the prospects for the reduction of current armaments to lower levels consistent with strictly defensive needs;

8. *Urges* all States to promote, to the best of their ability, the objective of the prevention of war, through, *inter alia*, more openness and an enhancement of mutual knowledge about military activities, an expanded exchange of information and views on military matters and other confidence-building measures, with a view to enhancing both confidence and stability;

9. *Underlines* the importance of regional efforts at peace-keeping and conflict resolution among States, given that such efforts aimed at building confidence, promotion of co-operative relations and finding local solutions to local disputes among the States of the regions concerned can play a vital role in enhancing the objectives of peace and security, disarmament and development in the region;

10. *Stresses* the necessity of preventing military conflict which may take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure, by taking steps to maintain, or where necessary improve, communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension;

11. *Calls upon* all States to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons because such proliferation would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war, and to exert all endeavours to solve outstanding regional issues which may involve the risk of such proliferation;

12. *Rejects* military doctrines and policies which explicitly or implicitly aim at the achievement of military superiority in the place of balance, stability and undiminished security for all States;

13. *Declares* its view that a nuclear war cannot be won and that a conventional war may involve the risk of escalation to nuclear war;

14. *Takes note* of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1985 session concerning the consideration of the agenda item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters",[3] and requests the Conference to continue its substantive consideration of this issue;

15. *Commends* the Secretary-General for having prepared a report on the prevention of nuclear war (A/40/498) and expresses the hope that this report will facilitate mutually acceptable solutions to this vital problem;

[3] *General Assembly Official Records: Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/40/27 and Corr. 1).

16. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-first session an item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

228. Statement by the U.S. Representative (Lowitz) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolution on a Chemical Weapons Ban [Extract], November 7, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

In the opening statement of the United States delegation on 25 October,[2] the urgent questions of the use and spread of chemical weapons were briefly addressed. Today I want to return to these important issues and to introduce a draft resolution under agenda item 63, "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons". This draft resolution calls for important actions to solve these problems permanently. It was submitted on 6 November, under the sponsorship of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Kenya, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States, and is numbered A/C.1/40/L.31.[3]

Last year the General Assembly voted by a large majority to condemn any and all use of chemical weapons and any other actions in contravention of existing relevant international accords. It is disturbing that since that time at least one new case of the employment of these weapons, in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925,[4] has been confirmed. It is important, therefore, that this body again place on record its convictions both that the task of putting a stop to the use of chemical weapons is urgent and that strict observance of existing international instruments and obligations in this field is required.

It is disquieting indeed that chemical-weapons capabilities are spreading to the arsenals of additional States, for this means that the existing international barriers to the use of chemical and biological weapons are in danger of being further eroded. It means that the likelihood of the use of chemical weapons in situations of conflict is increasing. And it may make the task of concluding a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons more complicated and difficult. As Secretary of State Shultz stated in his remarks before the United States National Academy of Sciences on 6 March,

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[1] A/C.1/40/PV.30, pp. 11–15.
[2] A/C.1/40/PV.13, pp. 16–23.
[3] This draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 40/92 C on December 12 (see Document 268).
[4] For the text of the Protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

Document 228

> The sad fact is that a half century of widely accepted international restraint on the use or development of chemical weapons is in danger of breaking down.[5]

The number of States possessing chemical weapons has grown from about 5 in 1963 to 15 or more today, and other States are also seeking to acquire chemical weapons. This disturbing trend is clearly an urgent matter for the entire international community. The United States welcomes the expressions of concern on the part of other States about the spread of chemical weapons. The General Assembly should join in recording its concern over this unfortunate development.

The draft resolution we have introduced would, moreover, record the continuing and strong support of the General Assembly for efforts to strengthen existing agreements respecting biological and chemical weapons.

We hope that it will attract even broader support than was the case last year, not the least because there is today a wider appreciation of the dangerous trends I have cited and of the necessity, therefore, of accelerating the pace of work in the Conference on Disarmament. The United States strongly supports the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. It believes that a comprehensive, effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons is the best way to put an end, once and for all, to the threat of the further use and spread of these weapons.

The Geneva Protocol and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention[6] are of great importance, but we know from bitter experience that they have not been sufficient to remove the threat to international stability that is posed by chemical weapons. They have not completely eliminated the threat of more terror, terror like that experienced by the million gas casualties in the First World War.

The specter of chemical-weapons use continues to haunt States, in both developed and developing regions; it continues to menace people, both military and civilian. Unlike nuclear weapons, which require sophisticated manufacturing operations and delivery systems, chemical weapons are relatively cheap and easy to acquire, and therefore pose a special threat to developing countries. It is indeed in such countries that chemical weapons have been used.

We should do all in our power to reverse the present dangerous trends and to promote the swiftest possible progress towards more and effective international restraints. The force of our common opinion voiced in this forum can make an impact on these efforts. Let us make that impact as strong as possible.

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[5] *Department of State Bulletin*, May 1985, p. 31 col. 3.
[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 133–138.

229. Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986: ABM Treaty, "Matters Relating to Arms Control," and Chemical Weapons [Extracts], November 8, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

SEC. 225. CONGRESSIONAL EXPRESSION ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AND THE ABM TREATY

(a) FINDINGS REGARDING ABM TREATY.—The Congress finds—

UST 3435.

(1) that the President's Commission on Strategic Forces declared in its report to the President, dated March 21, 1984, that "One of the most successful arms control agreements is the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972"; [2] and

(2) that the Secretary of State has stated that the "ABM Treaty requires consultations, and the President has explicitly recognized that any ABM-related deployments arising from research into ballistic missile defenses would be a matter for consultations and negotiation between the Parties".[3]

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING SDI AND THE ABM TREATY.—It is the sense of Congress—

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

(1) that it fully supports the declared policy of the President that a principal objective of the United States in negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear and space arms is to reverse the erosion of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972;

(2) that action by the Congress in approving funds for research on the Strategic Defense Initiative—

(A) does not express or imply an intention on the part of the Congress that the United States should abrogate, violate, or otherwise erode such treaty; and

23 UST 3435.

(B) does not express or imply any determination or commitment on the part of the Congress that the United States develop, test, or deploy ballistic missile strategic defense weaponry that would contravene such treaty; and

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[1] P.L. 99–145, Title X, Sec. 225, 1001–1006, 1411–1413.

[2] The commission's report is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 171–180. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty may be found *ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–201.

[3] Cf. the *Department of State Bulletin*, December 1985, p. 23.

Document 229

23 UST 3435

(3) that funds appropriated for the Strategic Defense Initiative program should not be used in a manner inconsistent with any of the treaties commonly known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty,[4] the Threshold Test Ban Treaty,[5] the Outer Space Treaty,[6] or the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.

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99 STAT. 705

SEC. 1001. POLICY ON COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AGREEMENTS

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States should vigorously pursue with the Soviet Union the resolution of concerns of the United States over Soviet compliance with existing strategic arms control agreements and should seek corrective actions through confidential diplomatic channels, including, if appropriate, the Standing Consultative Commission and the Nuclear and Space Arms negotiations;

(2) the Soviet Union should take positive steps to resolve the compliance concerns of the United States about existing strategic offensive arms agreements in order to maintain the integrity of those agreements and to strengthen the positive environment necessary for the successful negotiation of a new strategic offensive arms agreement;

(3) the United States should continue, through December 31, 1986, to refrain from undercutting the provisions of existing strategic offensive arms agreements—

(A)(i) to the extent that the Soviet Union refrains from undercutting those provisions; and

(ii) if the Soviet Union actively pursues arms reduction agreements in the Nuclear and Space Arms negotiations; or

(B) until a new strategic offensive arms agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union is concluded;

President of U.S.

(4) the President—

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[5] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–229.
[6] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 38–43.

(A) should carefully consider the impact of any change in the current policy of the United States regarding existing strategic offensive arms agreements on the long-term security interests of the United States and its allies; and

(B) should consult with Congress before making any change in that policy; and

(5) any decision by the President to continue the existing United States no-undercut policy beyond December 31, 1986, should be a matter for consultation between the President and Congress and for subsequent review and debate by Congress.

President of U.S.

(b) REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT.—Not later than February 1, 1986, the President shall submit to Congress a report containing the following:

(1) A range of projections and comparisons, on a year-by-year basis, of United States and Soviet strategic weapons dismantlements that would be required over the next five years if the United States and the Soviet Union were to adhere to a policy of not undercutting existing strategic arms control agreements.

(2) A range of projections and comparisons, on a year-by-year basis, of likely United States and Soviet strategic offensive force inventories over the next five years assuming a termination at the end of 1985 in the current no-undercut policy.

(3) An assessment of the possible Soviet political, military, and negotiating responses to the termination of the United States no-undercut policy.

(4) Recommendations regarding the future of United States interim restraint policy.

(c) PROPOSAL OF MEASURES.—If the President finds and reports to Congress that—

(1) the Soviet Union has violated the provisions of any strategic arms agreement; and

(2) such violations impair or threaten the security of the United States, the President may propose to Congress such measures as he considers necessary to protect the security of the United States.

99 STAT. 706

President of U.S. Defense and national security

(d) SCOPE OF POLICY.—Nothing in this section shall be construed—

(1) to restrain or inhibit the constitutional powers of the President;

(2) to endorse unilateral United States compliance with existing strategic arms agreements;

(3) as prohibiting the United States from carrying out proportionate responses to Soviet undercutting of strategic arms provisions;

(4) as prohibiting or delaying the development, flight testing, or deployment of the small intercontinental ballistic missile (SICM) as authorized by law; or

(5) as establishing a precedent to continue the no-undercut policy beyond December 31, 1986.

President of U.S.
22 USC 2592a.

SEC. 1002. ANNUAL REPORT ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL COMMITMENTS

Not later than December 1, 1985, and not later than December 1 of each following year, the President shall submit to the Congress a report (in both classified and unclassified versions) containing, with respect to the compliance of the Soviet Union with its arms control commitments, the findings of the President and any additional information necessary to keep the Congress currently informed.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. President of U.S.

SEC. 1003. STUDY OF ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES

(a) INTERAGENCY STUDY.—The President shall provide for an interagency study with the purpose of determining possible avenues for cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the development of capabilities not subject to national security restrictions for verification of compliance with arms control agreements. Areas of possible cooperation to be examined shall include—

(1) limited exchanges of data and scientific personnel; and

(2) the conduct of a joint technological effort in the area of seismic monitoring.

(b) AGENCIES INCLUDED.—The President shall provide for participation in the interagency study under subsection (a) by—

(1) the Secretary of State;

(2) the Secretary of Defense;

(3) the Secretary of Energy;

(4) the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;

(5) the heads of appropriate intelligence agencies;

(6) the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and

(7) such other officers as the President may designate.

(c) REPORT.—(1) The President shall submit to Congress a report on the results of the interagency study.

(2) The report shall be submitted in both a classified and unclassified version.

(3) The report shall be submitted not later than May 1, 1986.

SEC. 1004. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO UNITED STATES-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR ARMS

It is the sense of the Congress—

(1) that the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should be commended for their willingness to meet to discuss major issues in United States-Soviet relations; and

(2) that following thorough preparation, such meetings should be used to work for the realization of mutual, equitable, and verifiable reductions in nuclear arms.

99 STAT. 707

SEC. 1005. PILOT PROGRAM FOR EXCHANGE OF CERTAIN HIGH-RANKING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WITH THE SOVIET UNION

(a) SUBMISSION OF PLAN.—The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a plan for the establishment and operation during fiscal year 1986 of a pilot program for the exchange of visits between—

(1) high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the United States and high-ranking civilian officials of the Department of Defense; and

(2) corresponding high-ranking officers and officials of the Soviet Union.

(b) REQUIREMENTS OF PLAN.—Such plan shall include—

(1) specific identification of the United States officers and officials selected for participation in the program;

(2) the proposed length of the exchange visits with the Soviet Union;

(3) a description of the specific goals of each exchange visit;

(4) an estimate of the cost to the United States of participation in each visit,

(5) a description of any special actions that will be taken to protect classified information of the United States during any visit to the United States by offi-

cers or officials of the Soviet Union who are participating in the program; and

(6) any other details of the program that the Secretary considers appropriate.

Auth. p. 615.

(c) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Of the funds appropriated pursuant to section 301(a), the sum of $100,000 shall be available only for costs required for participation by the United States in the pilot program described in subsection (a), including costs for travel, subsistence, and other support expenses.

(d) DEADLINE FOR PLAN.—The Secretary shall submit the plan required by subsection (a) not later than December 1, 1985.

SEC. 1006. REPORT ON NUCLEAR WINTER FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

(a) CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN INTERAGENCY STUDIES.—Notwithstanding any limitation in any other provision of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with section 1107(a) of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 (Public Law 98–525), shall participate in any comprehensive interagency study conducted on the atmospheric, climatic, environmental, and biological consequences of nuclear war and the implications that such consequences have for the nuclear weapons strategy and policy, the arms control policy, and the civil defense policy of the United States.

98 STAT. 2583

(b) REPORT ON NUCLEAR WINTER FINDINGS.—Not later than March 1, 1986, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives an unclassified report suitable for release to the public, together with classified addenda (if required), concerning the subject described in subsection (a). The Secretary shall include in such report the following:

(1) A detailed review and assessment of the findings in the current body of domestic and international scientific literature on the atmospheric, climatic, environmental, and biological consequences of nuclear explosions and nuclear exchanges.

(2) A thorough evaluation of the implications that such findings have on—

(A) the nuclear weapons policy of the United States, especially with regard to strategy, targeting, planning, command, control, procurement, and deployment;

(B) the nuclear arms control policy of the United States; and

(C) the civil defense policy of the United States.

(3) A discussion of the manner in which the results of such evaluation of policy implications will be incorporated into the nuclear weapons, arms control, and civil defense policies of the United States.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(4) An analysis of the extent to which current scientific findings on the consequences of nuclear explosions are being studied, disseminated, and used in the Soviet Union.

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PART B—CHEMICAL WEAPONS

99 STAT. 746

SEC. 1411. CONDITIONS ON SPENDING FUNDS FOR BINARY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS

(a) LIMITATION ON FY86 FUNDS—Funds appropriated pursuant to authorizations of appropriations in title I may not be used—

(1) for procurement or assembly of binary chemical munitions (or components of such munitions); or

(2) for establishment of production facilities necessary for procurement or assembly of binary chemical munitions (or components of such munitions),

except in accordance with subsections (b) and (c).

(b) NATO CONSULTATION.—Subject to subsection (c), funds referred to in subsection (a) may be used for procurement or assembly of binary chemical munitions or for the establishment of production facilities necessary for the procurement or assembly of binary chemical munitions (or components of such munitions) if the President certifies to Congress that the United States—

(1) has developed a plan under which United States binary chemical munitions can be deployed under appropriate contingency plans to deter chemical weapons attacks against the United States and its allies; and

(2) has consulted with other member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on that plan.

A plan under clause (1) shall be developed in cooperation with the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

(c) CONDITIONS FOR FINAL ASSEMBLY.—Funds referred to in subsection (a) may not be used for the final assembly of complete binary chemical munitions before October 1,

1987, and may only be used for such purpose on or after that date if—

(1) a mutually verifiable international agreement concerning binary and other similar chemical munitions has not been entered into by the United States by that date;

(2) the President, after that date, transmits to Congress a certification that—

Defense and national security

(A) final assembly of such complete munitions is necessitated by national security interests of the United States and the interests of other NATO member nations;

(B) performance specifications and handling and storage safety specifications established by the Department of Defense with respect to such munitions will be met or exceeded;

(C) applicable Federal safety requirements will be met or exceeded in the handling, storage, and other use of such munitions; and

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(D) the plan of the Secretary of Defense for destruction of existing United States chemical warfare stocks developed pursuant to section 1412 (which shall, if not sooner transmitted to Congress, accompany such certification) is ready to be implemented;

(3) final assembly is carried out only after the end of the 60-day period beginning on the date such certification is received by the Congress;

(4) the plan of the Secretary of Defense for land-based storage of such munitions within the United States during peacetime provides that the two components that constitute a binary chemical munition are to be stored in separate States; and

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(5) the plan of the Secretary of Defense for the transportation of such munitions within the United States during peacetime provides that the two components that constitute a binary munition are transported separately.

(d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that existing unitary chemical munitions currently stored in the United States and in European member nations of NATO should be replaced by modern, safer binary chemical munitions.

(e) REPORT.—Not later than October 1, 1986, the President shall submit to Congress a report describing the results of consultations among NATO member nations concerning the organization's chemical deterrent posture.

The report shall include descriptions of any consultations concerning—

(1) efforts to provide key civilian workers at military support facilities in Europe—

(A) with personal and collective equipment to protect against the use of chemical munitions; and

(B) with the training required for the use of such equipment;

(2) efforts to upgrade the chemical reconnaissance, decontamination, and protective capabilities of the military forces of each NATO member nation to a level adequate to meet the chemical threat identified in NATO intelligence estimates;

(3) efforts to initiate a NATO-wide study of measures required to protect ports, airfields, logistics centers, and command and control facilities in European member nations of NATO against chemical attack; and

(4) efforts to initiate a NATO-wide study of equitable and efficient sharing among NATO member nations of responsibilities with regard to deterring the use of chemical munitions in Europe.

50 USC 1521.

SEC. 1412. DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING STOCKPILE OF LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS

(a) IN GENERAL.—(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Secretary") shall, in accordance with the provisions of this section, carry out the destruction of the United States' stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions that exists on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) Such destruction shall be carried out in conjunction with the acquisition of binary chemical weapons for use by the Armed Forces.

(b) DATE FOR COMPLETION.—(1) Except as provided by paragraphs (2) and (3), the destruction of such stockpile shall be completed by September 30, 1994.

(2) If a treaty banning the possession of chemical agents and munitions is ratified by the United States, the date for completing the destruction of the United States' stockpile of such agents and munitions shall be the date established by such treaty.

(3)(A) In the event of a declaration of war by the Congress or of a national emergency by the President or the Congress or if the Secretary of Defense determines that there has been a significant delay in the acquisition

of an adequate number of binary chemical weapons to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces (as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as of September 30, 1985), the Secretary may defer, beyond September 30, 1994, the destruction of not more than 10 percent of the stockpile described in subsection (a)(1).

(B) The Secretary shall transmit written notice to the Congress of any deferral made under subparagraph (A) within 30 days after the date on which the determination to defer is made or by August 31, 1994, whichever is earlier.

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(c) ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND USE OF FACILITIES.—(1) In carrying out the requirement of subsection (a)(1), the Secretary shall provide for—

(A) maximum protection for the environment, the general public, and the personnel who are involved in the destruction of the lethal chemical agents and munitions referred to in subsection (a); and

(B) adequate and safe facilities designed solely for the destruction of lethal chemical agents and munitions.

(2) Facilities constructed to carry out this section may not be used for any purpose other than the destruction of lethal chemical weapons and munitions, and when no longer needed to carry out this section, such facilities shall be cleaned, dismantled, and disposed of in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

(d) PLAN.—(1) The Secretary shall develop a comprehensive plan to carry out this section.

(2) In developing such plan, the Secretary shall consult with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

(3) The Secretary shall transmit a copy of such plan to the Congress not later than March 15, 1986.

(4) Such plan shall provide—

(A) an evaluation of the comparison of onsite destruction, regional destruction centers, and a national destruction site both inside and outside of the United States;

(B) for technological advances in techniques used to destroy chemical munitions;

(C) for the maintenance of a permanent, written record of the destruction of lethal chemical agents and munitions carried out under this section; and

(D) a description of—

(i) the methods and facilities to be used in the destruction of agents and munitions under this section;

(ii) the schedule for carrying out this section; and

(iii) the management organization established under subsection (e).

(e) MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION.—(1) In carrying out this section, the Secretary shall provide for the establishment, not later than May 1, 1986, of a management organization within the Department of the Army.

(2) Such organization shall be responsible for management of the destruction of agents and munitions under this section.

(3) The Secretary shall designate a general officer as the director of the management organization established under paragraph (1). Such officer shall have—

(A) experience in the acquisition, storage, and destruction of chemical agents and munitions;

(B) training in chemical warfare defense operations; and

(C) outstanding qualifications regarding safety in handling chemical agents and munitions.

(f) IDENTIFICATION OF FUNDS.—Funds for carrying out this section shall be set forth in the budget of the Department of Defense for any fiscal year as a separate account. Such funds shall not be included in the budget accounts for any military department. Funds for military construction projects necessary to carry out this section may be set out in the annual military construction budget separately from other funds for such project.

(g) ANNUAL REPORT.—(1) Except as provided by paragraph (4), the Secretary shall transmit, by December 15 of each year, a report to the Congress on the activities carried out under this section during the fiscal year ending on September 30 of the calendar year in which the report is to be made.

99 STAT. 749

(2) The first such report shall be transmitted by December 15, 1985, and shall contain—

(A) an accounting of the United States' stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions on the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(B) a schedule of the activities planned to be carried out under this section during fiscal year 1986.

(3) Each report other than the first one shall contain—

(A) a site-by-site description of the construction, equipment, operation, and dismantling of facilities (during the fiscal year for which the report is made)

used to carry out the destruction of agents and munitions under this section, including any accidents or other unplanned occurrences associated with such construction and operation; and

(B) an accounting of all funds expended (during such fiscal year) for activities carried out under this section, with a separate accounting for amounts expended for—

(i) the construction of and equipment for facilities used for the destruction of agents and munitions;

(ii) the operation of such facilities;

(iii) the dismantling or other closure of such facilities;

Research and development.

(iv) research and development; and

(v) program management.

(4) The Secretary shall transmit the final report under this subsection not later than 120 days following the completion of activities under this section.

(h) PROHIBITION ON ACQUIRING CERTAIN LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), no agency of the Federal Government may, after the date of the enactment of this Act, develop or acquire lethal chemical agents or munitions other than binary chemical weapons.

(2)(A) The Secretary of Defense may acquire any chemical agent or munition at any time for purposes of intelligence analysis.

Research and development.

(B) Chemical agents and munitions may be acquired for research, development, test, and evaluation purposes at any time, but only in quantities needed for such purposes and not in production quantities.

(i) REAFFIRMATION OF UNITED STATES POSITION ON FIRST USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should publicly reaffirm the position of the United States as set out in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which the United States ratified with reservations in 1975.[1]

(j) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section:

(1) The term "chemical agent and munition" means an agent or munition that, through its chemical properties, produces lethal or other damaging effects on human beings, except that such term does not include riot control agents, chemical herbicides, smoke and other obscuration materials.

[1] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

(2) The term "lethal chemical agent and munition" means a chemical agent or munition that is designed to cause death, through its chemical properties, to human beings in field concentrations.

(3) The term "destruction" means, with respect to chemical munitions or agents—

(A) the demolishment of such munitions or agents by incineration or by any other means; or

(B) the dismantling or other disposal of such munitions or agents so as to make them useless for military purposes and harmless to human beings under normal circumstances.

(k) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The provisions of this section shall take effect on October 1, 1985.

SEC. 1413. REPORT CONCERNING THE TESTING OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS

The Secretary of Defense shall, within 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, transmit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives describing the following matters concerning the testing of diluted or undiluted chemical warfare agents:

(1) The criteria and process used for selecting sites for such testing.

99 STAT. 750

(2) The nature and extent of any consultation carried out with State and local officials before the site for such testing is selected.

(3) The consideration that is given to the proximity of residential dwelling units, schools, child care centers, nursing homes, hospitals, or other health care facilities to the testing site.

(4) Whether an environmental impact statement should be required prior to the approval of a contract for such testing.

(5) Any costs that may have to be incurred by the Federal Government to assist companies that carry out such testing to relocate to more isolated areas.

(6) The degree to which the Secretary estimates that such testing will increase or decrease.

(7) Any recurring problems associated with such testing or the site selection process for such testing.

(8) Any changes in site selection process that are to be implemented by the Secretary or for which legislative action is necessary.

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230. Note from the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany: Establishment of a Chemical-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Europe, November 8, 1985 [1]

The Government of the German Democratic Republic welcomes the interest in a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons expressed in the letter of Dr. Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, of 27 September 1985.[2]

As the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany knows, the German Democratic Republic, at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, consistently stands up for the early conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons as well as on their destruction. It is actively involved in the activities of the respective Committee and has submitted specific proposals on how to solve a number of substantive issues. In line with this, the German Democratic Republic is of course ready to take up the proposal put forward in the letter of 27 September 1985 to the effect that the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament should conduct talks on the problem of chemical weapons. It is the position of the German Democratic Republic that in these talks attention should be focused on the interrelationship between global and regional accords on the prohibition of chemical weapons. At the same time, solutions could be sought for a number of open questions relating to a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons.

However, the Government of the German Democratic Republic is firmly convinced that, in the face of the danger of the production of a new kind of chemical weapons—binary weapons—and the menace of their being stationed in Central Europe, consistent use must also be made of every opportunity for regional measures to prohibit chemical weapons. That is why it proposed, jointly with the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe.[3] Such a regional measure would not only promote a world-wide prohibition of chemical weapons but would also be apt to make a constructive contribution to détente, disarmament and confidence in Europe in the interest of strengthening security. The participation of the two German States in the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the heart of Europe would be a concrete step towards ensuring that never again will a war start from German soil, but that only peace will emanate from it.

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[1] A/C.1/40/11, Annex 1. The Government of Czechoslovakia sent a substantially similar note the same day.
[2] Document 189.
[3] Document 170.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic proposes that, parallel to the talks between the delegations in Geneva, proposed by the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Helmut Kohl, Foreign Ministries' representatives authorized by the Governments of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, should take up consultations to discuss questions relating to the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone. The time and place of these consultations could be agreed through diplomatic channels.

231. Statement by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Perle) Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Strategic Defense and Mobile ICBMs, November 12, 1985 [1]

I think it is important in considering strategic defenses generally in the SDI program to recall the logic that was thought to prevail in 1972, when the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Forces were negotiated.[2]

I think it was the general understanding in this country that we would be prepared to give up a potential defense, a defense that had been designed and developed and that was ready for deployment, if the Soviets would obviate the requirement for that defense by accepting significant limitations on the projected growth of their offensive forces.

Indeed, it made a good deal of sense. If the Soviets were going to restrain the offense, it would not be necessary for us to deploy a defense, and we would both be better off.

The phrase that was most commonly used in 1972 to describe what had been agreed on the 26th of May was that we had succeeded in the agreement on offensive forces, an interim agreement that would have expired in 1977, in halting the momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup.

There were others who thought at the time that the Soviets had accepted a broader concept, the concept that it is desirable for both sides to remain vulnerable to retaliatory attack.

I think the historical record on that does not support the conclusion that the Soviets accepted that view. I think it is sufficient to explain their willingness to sign the ABM Treaty in terms of their capacity to deploy an ABM system at that time, measured against our demonstrated capacity to deploy such a system.

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[1] *Commitments, Consensus and U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings . . .*, pp. 601–605.

[2] The texts of the Treaty, the Interim Agreement and its Protocol, and the Agreed Interpretations may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–207.

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But, in any case, it is now clear that we did not succeed in halting the momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup. The Soviet strategic buildup continued unabated, with the result that some 8,000 or so strategic weapons have been added to the Soviet arsenal since that interim agreement was signed in 1977 [1972], fully half of those added to Soviet forces since the SALT II Treaty was signed in 1979.[3]

Not only has the Soviet buildup in offensive forces of all kinds continued; but from 1972 on, the Soviets redoubled their efforts with respect to strategic defenses. While the United States, by contrast, chose not to proceed even with the defenses that it was permitted to build under the Treaty, the Soviets greatly increased their investment in research and development on defensive forces. They have made a sustained effort since to upgrade the Moscow ABM system, deploying new interceptors, including above-ground interceptors that can be rather rapidly deployed, developing new radars, including radars that can be rapidly deployed, and filling out a network of large phased array radars, similar in nature to the radars the U.S. had planned to build in 1972, a network that includes a radar at Krasnoyarsk that has been the subject of much discussion because it is our view that this radar constitutes a violation of the ABM Treaty and a rather important violation.

In addition to augmenting the classical sorts of antiballistic missile defense permitted under the Treaty, the Soviets have had, for many years, a vigorous research and development program with respect to exotic approaches to strategic defense, approaches that were defined in the ABM Treaty as those based on other physical principles. Many elements of that Soviet program reach back into the 1960's, and they have been sustained throughout the whole of this period.

This leaves us in 1985 with a very large Soviet offensive force, a force that threatens the survivability of major elements of the U.S. strategic deterrent, certainly those portions of our deterrent that are land-based, and a vigorous Soviet program in the defensive area, that includes violations of the ABM Treaty—and, by the way, there have been violations as well of the various agreements on offensive forces, including SALT II.

In my judgment, it does not make much sense for the United States to compete with the Soviet Union in an area where the Soviets are strong and we are weak. It does make sense for us to compete with the Soviet Union in the interest of maintaining a stable strategic balance by exploiting the areas where we are strong.

One of the areas in which I think we are notably weak is the deployment of additional offensive missiles, and, in particular, additional land-based offensive missiles. I think we are weak in this regard for a variety of reasons. We have all seen the difficulty entailed in deploying the MX missile. A number of issues arise when mobile missiles are considered; they have to be placed somewhere and

[3] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 189–219.

nobody is very keen to accept them. And I think there is a great reluctance in this country to go on deploying offensive missiles.

The Soviets are not troubled by any obvious reluctance to do that. They are, in fact, doing it. They have many times the land area in which it is possible to deploy land-based ballistic missiles, including mobile missiles, and, indeed, they are now in the process of doing precisely that.

So, competing with them in that area seems to me to be a foolish choice of the terms on which a continuing competition is likely to be played out.

We do have some advantages or potential advantages with respect to high technology, and one of the areas in which it may be possible to bring our technological base to bear is the development of strategic defenses which, if successfully deployed, would have the consequence, in the first instance, of diminishing the effective size of the Soviet offensive force, because some fraction of it, hopefully a large fraction, could be intercepted.

So, rather than match the Soviets in offensive weapons, it seems to me to make sense to see whether we can develop defensive weapons exploiting one of our areas of strength, rather than competing with the Soviets where they are strong.

In any case, I believe that the size and magnitude and vigor of the Soviet strategic defense program—and they have one, although they are loath to acknowledge it, has created a situation in which defenses are likely to be developed, and the question that remains is whether they will be developed on one side alone or on both sides.

In this I think we face a situation analogous to the situation faced by President Truman, when he had the difficult decision to make whether to proceed to develop thermonuclear weapons. Many of you will recall that, in that very difficult debate, there was division in the scientific and technical community, rather strikingly like the division that applies today over the question of SDI. Indeed, some of the players are the same.

In those days, Edward Teller argued that we ought to proceed to develop thermonuclear weapons in the belief that the Soviets would do so whether we did or not, and if we did not and they did, they would emerge with a monopoly of those weapons.

Robert Oppenheimer and a large fraction of the scientific community who supported him held the view that we ought not to proceed to the development of thermonuclear weapons because if we did so, the Soviets would surely follow suit and we would be worse off.

We now know that even as President Truman was grappling with that difficult issue, a young physicist named Andrei Sakharov had been drafted by Stalin to initiate work on the Soviet thermonuclear weapon development program, which ultimately succeeded.

I think it is clear that, had Truman listened to Oppenheimer and not Teller, the thing Teller feared most would have come about, that is,

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the Soviets would have emerged in the early 1950's with a monopoly of thermonuclear weapons.

I think the situation we face today is rather analogous to that. The Soviets, in my judgment, are going to continue their program, both the advanced research associated with the technologies that we subsume under the term strategic defense initiative and steady improvements to defense systems of the more classical sort.

The term "breakout" has been used here this morning, and let me say a word about the concerns we have that the Soviets may, even now, be breaking out of the ABM Treaty.

It was understood in 1972, and a great deal of time was spent negotiating the specifics because of that understanding, that the key to the deployment of a nationwide defense, a territorial defense, based on classical technologies, was the construction of large phased array radars—they were key because they take anywhere from 5 to 7 years to build; they are highly visible and can be observed—while the other elements of a territorial defense can be built and stockpiled and rather rapidly deployed, so one could be surprised by all the elements of a strategic defense except the large phased array radars.

The Soviets have been building these large phased array radars ever since 1972, and they now have in place roughly twice the number the United States anticipated building for the defense that we had in mind in 1972, the Safeguard antiballistic missile system.

One of these radars is the radar at Krasnoyarsk, and that radar essentially completes the comprehensive radar coverage of the Soviet Union of a sort that could be used—I cannot say will be used because I think the evidence is not in—but of a sort that could be used to support a territorial defense which would, itself, be a violation of the ABM Treaty.

In addition to the large phased array radars that take years to deploy, the Soviets have developed smaller radars that can be deployed in a matter of months, and we have no way of knowing to what extent the Soviets may have produced other radars similar to the ones that we have seen, no way of knowing whether they may choose, at some point in the future, to deploy significant numbers of these radars, which would be tied in to the large phased array radars that are already in evidence.

Moreover, the Soviets have, for many years, been experimenting in order to determine the effectiveness of air defense systems used for the purpose of intercepting ballistic missiles. The Soviets have many thousands of these surface-to-air missiles deployed for air defense purposes. They have new ones under development and in the testing phase. And some of these new Soviet air defense weapons have at least some capability to intercept ballistic missiles.

So we are faced with the prospect—and, again, we cannot be definitive because it is simply too soon to say, but it is important to anticipate these developments—that with the large phased array radar complete and the 5- to 7-year lead-time essentially gone, of the

addition to that large phased array radar, network, of the other important ABM elements, that the Soviets could deploy rapidly a territorial ABM defense.

This is a matter of significant concern to the administration and to our military planners. It is what we mean when we talk about breakout and it is a matter that is not theoretical, it is here and now.

The only uncertainty that remains is whether what we are seeing is, in fact, evidence that the Soviets are headed in that direction or not. But what we are seeing disturbs us greatly.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would say just a word about the question that has arisen this morning about the inclusion or exclusion of mobile ICBM's in any arms control regime that may be negotiated.

We think there are a number of good reasons why mobile ICBM's ought to be banned. One of them has to do with verification.

The observation has been made this morning that we are able to verify the deployment of the SS–20, and it is sometimes assumed, as a consequence of that fact, that we will be able to verify Soviet deployments of mobile ICBM's.

So, let me be clear about what it is we can verify with respect to the SS–20.

The Soviets have obliged our efforts at verification by associating SS–20 launchers with large and highly visible structures, single bay garages, as we call them. They did not have to deploy the SS–20 in that manner; they chose to do so.

There is no reason to believe that if they were to embark upon a covert program of the deployment of mobile ICBM's, they would ease our verification problem by associating those ICBM's with fixed and highly visible installations. Indeed, the SS–25, a MIRV'd mobile ICBM, is likely to be deployed on railcars, and it is entirely possible that those railcars, containing those SS–25's, will be indistinguishable from railcars conveying ordinary commodities.

So we will have a potentially severe verification problem, leaving us in the dark as to the number of mobile ICBM's that the Soviets might possess over and above any limit agreed upon.

Moreover, we are hoping that in the course of the Geneva negotiations we would be successful in persuading the Soviets to accept the sort of deep reductions that we have in mind. I believe that in a regime for the future, in which deep reductions have been taken, the requirement for a mobile ICBM on our side would be greatly diminished. It is by no means certain, although we are trying to develop it, that we will be successful in developing an effective and survivable mobile ICBM that can be deployed, given all of the constraints that apply to the deployment of such weapons.

So we think that the argument for banning these missiles on both sides is a very powerful one: We face two Soviet mobile ICBM's and the likelihood that there will be variations of those two and possibly even additional mobile ICBM's while we have now on the drawing

board a mobile ICBM that under the best of circumstances would be deployed in a rather limited area of our national territory.

So we think the world would be better off without mobile ICBM's, and for that reason the new proposal made by the administration would ban those missiles, solve the verification problem, and reduce one potential source of instability in the future.

232. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan: Soviet Treaty Violations, November 13, 1985 [1]

On June 10, 1985, when you announced that the U.S. would go "the extra mile" to give the U.S.S.R. time to correct its treaty violations,[2] you asked us, in National Security Decision Directive 173, to give you an analysis of Soviet violations of arms control and other treaties. You also asked me to recommend incentives we might provide to the Soviets to correct their violations and, should such corrective action not be forthcoming, to effect appropriate and proportionate responses to those violations.

I am attaching Part One of this report you requested, together with an executive summary covering its main points. The report's principal conclusion is that Soviet violations are continuing and require an appropriate and proportionate response on our part.[3] The Joint Chiefs generally feel that your Strategic Modernization Program, as announced by you in October 1981,[4] and the conventional and readiness improvements requested in your budgets would constitute the "appropriate and proportionate response" if fully funded by the Congress. I tend to agree with this opinion but, of course, Congress has made many cuts in your requests.

The Soviet violations put us in a particularly vulnerable and dangerous position when these violations are compared with the sharp reductions in our requests for Strategic Defense [Initiative] funding. We all feel that it is essential to move as rapidly and effectively as possible on SDI because Soviet violations do give them an advantage which makes it very difficult for us to maintain a deterrence balance with them.

Of course, their violations also constitute a powerful argument for getting the deepest possible cuts in nuclear arms by agreement, if we can secure agreements that bring us to parity at these lower levels and are thoroughly verifiable. Also, as we approach budget time for next year we may want to consider a supplemental for this year or more than 3 percent growth next year to compensate in specific ways for

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[1] *The Washington Post*, November 17, 1985, p. A30.
[2] Document 88.
[3] Classified report.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*; pp. 461–464.

these violations. We will present to you on your return from Geneva a range of options for appropriate responses. I will be glad to take up with you the responses we can make within various classified programs.

If I may be permitted, I would like to mention a few other points here:

In Geneva, you will almost certainly come under great pressure to do three things that would limit severely your options for responding to Soviet violations:

- One is to agree to continue to observe SALT II.[5]
- The second is to agree formally to limit SDI research, development, and testing to only that research allowed under the most restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty,[6] even though you have determined that a less restrictive interpretation is justified legally. The Soviets doubtless will seek assurances that you will continue to be bound to such tight limits on SDI development and testing that would discourage the Congress from making any but token appropriations.
- Third, the Soviets may propose communique or other language that obscures their record of arms control violations by referring to the "importance that both sides attach to compliance."

Any or all of these Soviet proposals, if agreed to, would sharply restrict the range of responses to past and current Soviet violations available to us. A pledge to continue to adhere to SALT II, even though the Soviets are violating it, could make it difficult, if not impossible, to do other things we should do to make up for their violations. We can, of course, continue to observe parts of SALT II, at your option, but a pledge to continue observing it all, could put rigid constraints on your ability to respond to Soviet violations.

Also, such a pledge would require us to dismantle far larger numbers of modern weapons than the Soviets over the near-term. (See pages 1–4 of the attached Annex A. This annex indicates the dramatic disparity between our respective dismantling requirements. Essentially, the U.S. would have to dismantle between 1,320 and 2,240 MIRVed [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle] ballistic missile warheads by 1991, whereas the Soviets would have to dismantle only about 558 ballistic missiles, of which just 112 would be MIRV systems. Because Soviet modernization processes can go on, the net effect would be thousands of additional U.S.S.R. warheads by the early 1990s.)

Any agreement to limit the SDI program according to a narrow (and, I believe, wrong) interpretation of the ABM Treaty—a Treaty which the Soviets are violating under any interpretation—would di-

[5] The SALT II Agreement may be found *ibid., 1979*, pp. 289 ff.
[6] The ABM Treaty and other SALT I Agreements may be found *ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–207.

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minish significantly the prospects that we will succeed in bringing our search for a strategic defense to fruition.

Communique or other language that enables the Soviets to appear equally committed to full compliance—even as they continue to enlarge their pattern of violations—will make the difficult task of responding to those violations even more problematic.

Geneva offers the opportunity to underline the importance we attach to strict compliance with arms control agreements previously made. And it will help to build the foundation on which any proportionate response must be based.

My report to you emphasizes that our failure over the years to respond promptly to Soviet violations can only encourage them to commit more—and more significant—violations. It is significant that you are the *first* president to report to Congress violations by the U.S.S.R. that have continued for 20 years. The verification the Soviets have agreed to in the past is no substitute for actual compliance. This simply emphasizes that determined action to avoid a double standard, in which we comply and the Soviets do not, is as necessary as it is difficult.

233. Revised Polish Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Study of the Various Consequences of the Militarization of Outer Space, November 14, 1985 [1]

The General Assembly,

Gravely concerned at the danger posed to all mankind by the prospect of extending the arms race into outer space,

Reaffirming that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and its peaceful exploration and use shall be the province of all mankind,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, have undertaken, in article IV, not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner,[2]

Determined to prevent the militarization of outer space,

Aware of the various proposals submitted to that end by Member States to the General Assembly in recent years,

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[1] A/C.1/40/L.45/Rev.1. The original draft resolution was submitted on November 7, see Document 224. Poland subsequently withdrew the revised draft resolution.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967,* pp. 38–43.

Recalling its resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 of 9 December 1981, 37/83 of 9 December 1982, 37/99 D of 13 December 1982, 38/70 of 15 December 1983 and 39/59 of 12 December 1984,

Taking note of paragraph 99 of the report of the Conference on Disarmament,[3] containing the report of its *Ad Hoc* Committee on the agenda item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space",

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive study of the various consequences of the militarization of outer space;

2. *Recommends* that the study be prepared on the basis of accessible material, with the assistance of eminent consultant experts of various nationalities appointed by the Secretary-General, and in co-operation with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, taking in account [*sic*] the views expressed and the suggestions made during the discussion of this subject at the fortieth session of the General Assembly;

3. *Calls upon* Governments and international scientific institutions and organizations to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the preparation of the study;

4. *Requests* that the study be transmitted to the Conference on Disarmament, the Security Council and the General Assembly by 1 July 1987, and to the Governments of Member States in time to permit its consideration at the forty-second session of the General Assembly;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session an item entitled: "Consequences of the militarization of outer space".

234. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolution on Reduction of Military Expenditures, November 14, 1985 [1]

I wish to set forth the position of the Soviet Union on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.16.[2]

We have constantly been in favour of reducing military expenditures. Taking into account the fact that increasing military expenses directly connected with the stepping up of the arms race, the Soviet Union, together with its friends and allies under the Warsaw Treaty, put forward in March 1984 a well-developed proposal with regard to negotiations aimed at achieving practical agreement among the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-

[3] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/40/27 and Corr.1). [Footnote in original.]

[1] A/C.1/40/PV.37, pp. 7–11.

[2] This draft resolution was introduced by Sweden and cosponsored by 20 additional states. The General Assembly adopted a slightly revised version (oper. par. 3) as resolution 40/91 B.

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zation (NATO) on freezing nuclear expenditures and their subsequent reduction in percentage or absolute terms.[3]

We continue to believe that efforts to avoid increasing, and in fact to reduce, military expenditures should be shared by all States, primarily the States which possess a major military potential. At the same time, the implementation of such measures by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would be of particular importance in the light of their heavy burden of military expenditure.

The urgency of our proposal was confirmed once again in the Declaration entitled "For the elimination of the nuclear threat and for a turn for the better in European and world affairs", adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Sofia on 23 October of this year.[4] Another effective measure for limiting the arms race in all areas, as was stressed in that same Declaration, could be a reciprocal freeze, beginning with the regular fiscal year, of the military budgets of the USSR and the United States.

The attainment of practical agreement with regard to the reduction of military budgets would not require a great deal of time if States Members of the United Nations were to evince the necessary political will and a real desire to bring about an early solution to this extremely important and urgent problem. The USSR would of course be ready on the basis of reciprocity to make a major reduction, in percentage or in absolute terms, of its military budget.

Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.16, on defining the machinery for accounting and comparability of military expenditures, would, in essence, be a diversion from the actual task of reducing military expenditures.

We believe that draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.16 leaves the problem of reducing military budgets at a dead end, as have similar draft resolutions in the past. We will therefore vote against it.

235. Statement by the Israeli Representative (Issacharoff) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East [Extract], November 14, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

I should like to emphasize the position of my delegation that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 133–138.
[4] Document 211.
[1] A/C.1/40PV.37, p. 27.

should be on the basis of arrangements directly and freely arrived at among the States of the region. That position is consonant with the recommendation contained in paragraph 5.3 of the recommendations and proposals of the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues—also known as the Palme Commission—reproduced in document A/CN.10/38 of 8 April 1983.[2]

236. Interview of French Foreign Minister Dumas with *Le Nouvel Observateur:* Geneva Summit Meeting and Strategic Defense Initiative [Extract], November 15–21, 1985 [1]

[Text] ***Le Nouvel Observateur:*** France is not taking part in the Geneva negotiations which start in Geneva this week between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. But it may one day be concerned with the strategic arms reduction process. What is its viewpoint on this question?

Roland Dumas: France is indeed not involved in these discussions. It should be remembered that our nuclear forces amount to less than 5 percent of the forces of either of the two superpowers. In Geneva the aim, among other things, will be to seek a way of reducing excessive levels of strategic arms—a problem which now concerns only the United States and the Soviet Union.

We welcome this summit meeting, but we are not expecting any miracles. It would be surprising if a compromise could be achieved on the essence of the problem, and especially on SDI at this stage. The most we can expect is a kind of framework on major principles, as was the case in Vladivostok in 1974 [2] where the foundations were laid for the SALT II negotiations, which were only concluded in 1979.[3] The most important thing in my view is that the two superpowers should show a real desire to negotiate. We hope that the plan for regular meetings between them is accepted on this occasion and that progress is made toward "responsible compromises," as President Mitterrand said. However, this meeting is taking place after the periods of tension which have characterized East-West relations. This may only be the start of detente . . . But it looks like detente which is a good thing.

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[2] Ambassador Issacharoff was commenting on the Egyptian draft resolution, A/C.1/40/L.5, which the General Assembly adopted by consensus on December 12 as resolution 40/82.

The recommendations and proposals of the Palme Commission's report to which he refers may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 227–256.

[1] Paris *Le Nouvel Observateur* in French, November 15–21, 1985, pp. 32–33; FBIS *Daily Report*, November 26, 1985, vol. VII, pp. 1–2.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 746–747.

[3] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

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Le Nouvel Observateur: On what conditions, from what "threshold" so to speak, might France be concerned with this disarmament process?

Roland Dumas: It is difficult to say, and even more difficult to put a figure on it, because the difference between the superpowers and France is so great. The figures I have given you give an idea of the disproportion between our forces and the excessive arsenals of the United States and the USSR. It is this difference in nature which must go before comparisons can have any meaning. For the time being Mikhail Gorbachev's proposals only relate to 50 percent of his offensive strategic nuclear weapons. In our view the disarmament process should also include conventional and chemical weapons.

For the time being the question is certainly not being raised in France! But it is important that the move should be started and gather impetus. When the time comes France will not shirk the issue. Let us not forget that France has always advocated maintaining the balance of strategic forces at the lowest possible level.

Le Nouvel Observateur: What effects will the launching of the SDI program have on our defense policy?

Roland Dumas: The aim of the SDI program is apparently to replace offensive weapons with defensive weapons, "the sword by the shield." But that is an illusion. The type of system which could render strategic weapons obsolete will depend on its complete impenetrability. If even 1 percent of the missiles succeed in penetrating the protective shield, the potential aggressor will then be tempted to increase this 1 percent to the maximum. No one can now promise this complete reliability. For the time being, and for a long time to come, the replacement of one system by the other remains uncertain. So each may then be tempted to strike first. This increases instability and hence the risk of war. SDI presents France with a technological challenge, which we must take up, more than a defense problem. If it can be successfully implemented one day, it will not happen before the year 2020. . . Until then peace will be maintained by the balance of offensive systems.

Le Nouvel Observateur: Do you think that Mikhail Gorbachev's personality and the ascent to power of a new political generation in the USSR could change East-West relations?

Roland Dumas: Mikhail Gorbachev differs from his predecessors: He seems more flexible, more astute, and also more skillful and more "modern" in the way he deals with problems. His generation, the postwar generation, feels more concerned by the USSR's image abroad and more anxious to improve it. Mikhail has time on his side. He seems to want to start introducing radical reforms to improve living conditions for the Soviets, and to increase consumption. In the short term the changes will not ncessarily be seen very quickly. But I bet that in 10 or 15 years time the Soviet Union will have made considerable progress on the path of change. Look at the new team which is taking the reins of power: It is different from the outgoing team.

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Le Nouvel Observateur: Eureka, the French project, seems to be receiving the approval of our partners in Europe and even outside Europe. Is it an adequate response to the "technological challenge" with which SDI presents us, and which you mentioned before?

Roland Dumas: Eureka is not in response to SDI, but without SDI there would perhaps not have been Eureka. The American initiative showed the European countries the dangers of technological inadequacy compared with the United States and Japan. We were in danger of becoming areas operating under license and of seeing a brain drain from our countries to the other side of the Atlantic, where research efforts will be made. That is why François Mitterrand drew up the Eureka project to meet this challenge. All the structural problems have now been solved. Ten enterprise contracts have already been signed, public funds have been announced, the permanent secretariat will become operational in January 1986. The first repercussions of Eureka will be felt from next year. But Europe has already benefited considerably. In addition to its scientific, technological, and economic importance this plan is sparking off, without seeming to do so, the recovery which Europe needs. Europe was built around the coal-steel pool and progressed with the agricultural community. It must be admitted that we have marked time since then. Europe's future lies in advanced technology. It is in this sense that Eureka is promoting European unity.

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237. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolutions on Chemical Weapons, November 15, 1985 [1]

In connection with the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.31,[2] relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Soviet delegation would like to make the following statement.

The Soviet Union views the prohibition and destruction of this type of weapon of mass destruction as one of the most important and urgent tasks in the field of disarmament and vigorously condemns the use of chemical weapons. Quite recently, once again a statement to this effect was made by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Gorbachev.[3] With regard to the interest of the Soviet Union in a business-

[1] A/C.1/40/PV.39, pp. 18–20.

[2] The United States introduced this draft resolution. It was adopted by the General Assembly on December 12 as Resolution 40/92 C. The texts of all three parts of Resolution 40/92 may be found in Document 268.

[3] Document 195.

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like, dynamic round of negotiations on this problem at the Conference on Disarmament and in speeding up work on the text of the convention, this is demonstrated by our actions at the Geneva multilateral forum and the proposals we have made there. We believe that the earliest possible achievement of agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons would be greatly helped by draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.15/Rev.1 [4] and L.24.[5] They are aimed at energetic progress in the responsible matter of working towards agreement on the provisions of a future convention and are fully in keeping with the concerting of the efforts of States parties in the achievement of that goal.

As for draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.31, we are firmly convinced that all it would do is create additional obstacles to the elimination of the chemical-weapon threat, among other things, through the trumping up of artificial issues about creating verification machinery outside the context of the current multilateral negotiations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. At previous sessions the Soviet Union has already stressed that the idea of creating verification machinery has been outside the current talks in Geneva, and it remains a stillborn idea that could only lead to illegal actions and would in essence be tantamount to a revision of the Geneva Protocol.[6] Our position on this matter remains unchanged, and the Soviet delegation will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.31.

238. Statement by the Netherlands Representative (van Schaik) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolutions on Chemical Weapons, November 15, 1985 [1]

My delegation wishes to explain its position on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.15, introduced by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic.[2]

In 1985 the Conference on Disarmament continued its efforts aimed at the early conclusion of a comprehensive, effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. That task is all the more pressing, as we witnessed, as we did also in 1984, the repeated use of those appalling weapons in the ongoing Gulf war. In the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban a number of important problems remains to be solved. These problems continue to demand our full attention and our united efforts. Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.24,[3] co-sponsored by the Nether-

[4] Introduced by the GDR and adopted as G.A. Resolution 40/92 A.
[5] Introduced by Canada and adopted as Resolution 40/92 B.
[6] For the text of the Protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.
[1] A/C.1/40/PV 39, pp. 27–28.
[2] Adopted as G.A. Resolution 40/92 A on December 12. The Netherlands voted against.
[3] Introduced by Canada and adopted as Resolution 40/92 B.

lands, on which consensus has just been reached, gives expression to our common determination to do so. This draft certainly underlines the general agreement existing among States to participate in the final elaboration of a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date.

Having said that, I cannot but deplore the fact that the German Democratic Republic and the other sponsors have introduced draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.15, as they have done in previous years. As my delegation observed last year, this draft resolution casts growing doubt on the sincerity of the participation of the countries concerned in the consensus approach I just mentioned. The draft once again criticizes the intended resumption of chemical weapons production by the United States, a country that has unilaterally observed a freeze on such production for over 15 years. The Soviet Union on the other hand has not matched that restraint shown by the United States and has, on the contrary, to the best of our knowledge, continued its massive build-up of stockpiles of chemical weapons of all sorts.

The time has come for my delegation seriously to reconsider our vote on this draft resolution. The main reason for this was our feeling that the annual return and virtually automatic introduction of the draft resolution is not conducive to the constructive work of the Conference on Disarmament, nor is it to the serious approach to this matter that is to be expected from the First Committee. The draft resolution is superfluous in view of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.24, just adopted.

Our reaction in the past few years has been one of moderation and restraint. We fostered the hope, apparently in vain, that the authors of this draft resolution would in the end show the wisdom to discontinue the exercise. Unfortunately, this year again we are faced with a text similar to the one submitted last year, which cannot convince us.

239. Responses by President Reagan to Questions Submitted by Japanese Journalists: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Asia [Extract], November 18, 1985 [1]

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Q. Large numbers of Soviet SS–20's have been deployed in the Pacific Far East in recent years, but the Soviets have refused to negotiate their presence. Is the U.S. planning to try to include these SS–20's in the Geneva arms control talks? What is the U.S. position on the strategic importance of the Soviet SS–20's that are stationed in Asia? Do they threaten Western security interests in the Pacific region?

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, November 18, 1985, pp. 1404–1405.

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The President. These missiles are included in the Geneva talks. The Soviet SS–20 is more accurate than earlier Soviet intermediate-range forces. It is mobile and thus easily redeployed. It also carries three independently targetable warheads, as opposed to the single warhead of the earlier generation of Soviet intermediate-range missiles; thus, the SS–20 greatly increases the threat to Asia as well as to Europe.

In 1981 we advocated that a total elimination of U.S. and Soviet missiles in this category is the best solution,[2] and we have made this proposal to the Soviets in the Geneva arms control talks. As an interim measure, we have proposed reductions to the lowest possible equal number of these U.S. and Soviet missile warheads on a global basis. We have made this position clear in the Geneva talks.

Nuclear weapons that threaten our allies and friends anywhere in the world are, of course, of deep concern to us. We could not, therefore, accept any Soviet proposal in Geneva which would endeavor to address European security by increasing the threat to our friends and allies in Asia. We have consulted and will continue to consult with the Japanese Government as negotiations over Soviet intermediate-range forces proceed.

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240. Statement by the British Representative (Edis) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolution on the Naval Arms Race, November 18, 1985 [1]

I wish to make some remarks about two draft resolutions, A/40/C.1/L.36 [2] and L.46,[3] now before the Committee, on which we shall be voting shortly and which come under the general heading of naval issues. The major part of what I shall have to say relates to A/40/C.1/L.46, but I should first like to say a few words about A/40/C.1/L.36.

My delegation will support draft resolution A/40/C.1/L.36, entitled "Study on the naval arms race"; which was introduced by the delegation of Sweden and is supported by a broadly based group of countries. My delegation does not necessarily share the views expressed on every aspect of the draft resolution or in the study on which it is

[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 573–574.

[1] A/C.1/40/PV.40, pp. 17–25.

[2] Introduced in the First Committee by Sweden, this draft resolution was also sponsored by Australia, Austria, China, Finland, France, Gabon, Indonesia, Iceland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Yugoslavia. It was adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 40/94 F on December 12.

[3] This draft resolution was co-sponsored by Democratic Yemen, GDR, Laos, Libya, Poland, Syria, and Viet Nam. Entitled "Curbing the naval arms race: limitation and reduction of naval armaments and extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans," it was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 40/94 I.

based. However, we do believe that it offers a generally acceptable and reasonable basis for work on the subject of naval issues by the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

In this respect, Mr. Chairman, we wish to pay a tribute to you in your capacity as the Chairman of the Study Group for its positive outcome. We shall play a full and active part in the debate on this subject at the Disarmament Commission.

The substance of what I have to say relates to draft resolution A/40/C.1/L.46, introduced in the name of Bulgaria and supported by a number of other Soviet allies.

We were somewhat surprised that the Bulgarian delegation has persisted in pursuing this initiative, which we regard as deeply flawed and which now seems to us to be irrelevant in the face of a generally acceptable resolution firmly grounded on a United Nations expert study. At no stage has this Warsaw Treaty initiative generated much enthusiasm. The predecessor resolutions of L.46 which are quoted in its first preambular paragraph, received very poor votes, in fact with fewer States voting in favour than those voting against and abstaining. The same initiative received a dismal reception at this year's session of the Disarmament Commission.

The reasons for this situation are as follows. This initiative cuts across that proposed by Sweden and a number of other countries in 1983 for a study on naval issues carried out by a group of experts. It seems that those concerned are more interested in making propaganda than in contributing to an attempt at a factual and balanced study of naval issues. In this respect it is interesting to note that, despite the supposed interest in and concern about the subject of naval activities, both the Soviet Union and Bulgaria declined to participate in the group established under General Assembly resolution 38/188 G, despite initially indicating a willingness to take part.[4] Instead the Soviet Union opted to put forward unilaterally a set of proposals on naval issues which are somewhat coyly referred to in the eleventh preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/40/C.1/L.46. These proposals are discriminatory and contain too many propaganda points to be treated as a serious initiative on which the Governments concerned would wish to begin substantive negotiations.

For example, they are designed to limit naval deployments only in areas which are extensively used by Western navies while areas which are used by the Soviet Navy are not mentioned. Limits on particular types of naval vessels concentrate exclusively on types where Western countries currently hold the advantage, while types in which the Soviet Union has numerical superiority—such as submarines designed to attack surface vessels, including merchant ships—are not mentioned.

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[4] The study was issued as document A/40/535. An extract of the study is printed in Document 173.

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This same group of countries also attempted to induce the Disarmament Commission this May to embark upon a premature examination of the subject of naval activities in advance of the finalization of the United Nations expert study. In the process, in an attempt to get their way, they held up an important initiative by a group of African countries on the review of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Ultimately, however, that tactic failed.

Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.46/Rev.1 is no exception to the approach to which I referred just now. Although naval activities are undoubtedly of legitimate international concern, draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.46/Rev.1, like its predecessors, seeks to convey the impression that we are in the middle of some dangerous escalation of a "naval arms race" which poses a new and volatile threat. I draw the Committee's attention, for example, to its second preambular paragraph. We do not share that view.

Further, it seeks to give the impression that the West, especially the United States, is to blame for this new "threat" that it has identified. That is the purpose of the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs.

What are the facts? Overall, in the last 20 years, there has been a sharp drop, even a worrying drop, in the total naval forces available to the Western alliance. Perusal of the definitive reference work *Jane's Fighting Ships* illustrates this point irrefutably.

On the other hand, despite the fact that the Soviet Union does not make objective information on military matters available publicly, the same period has seen a massive and unprecedented build-up in Soviet naval might.

Fortunately, we do have Soviet sources to illustrate my point that it is the Soviet Union, not the West, which is engaged in a naval arms race. Understandably proud of his achievement, the father of the new-style Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, said the following in a book entitled *The Sea Power of the State*:

> . . . within the briefest time a qualitatively new [Soviet] fleet was built, capable of fulfilling tasks of a strategic character and waging a successful struggle with a powerful sea adversary.

How, in more detail, does the language in draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.46/Rev.1 square with the real situation?

Of course, despite the sharp drop in naval units, countries of the Western alliance do have substantial naval forces. This naval capability is of long standing—historic in the case of my country's Royal Navy—and essential to our security. Why is this so? One part of the answer lies in the fact that the component elements of the Western alliance are separated by gigantic bodies of water, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The other major part of the explanation lies in the fact that all allied countries, especially those in Western Europe, Japan and Australia, depend for their very economic existence on sea-borne trade. The countries of the alliance thus depend vitally on sea communications which have to be safeguarded and, if necessary, defended.

This situation is in contrast to that of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The Soviet Union and its allies constitute a massive contiguous land mass with secure interior land communications and little sea-borne trade. The sea approaches to the Soviet Union are limited and difficult, and can be easily defended by relatively small naval forces.

What, then, can be the purpose and effect of the massive Soviet naval build-up? By the potential and growing threat that it presents to Western lines of communication and trade it can, in our view, only be offensive and therefore inherently destabilizing. Is this exaggeration on my part? I think not. I turn again to Admiral Gorshkov, a very handy source of reference. In the same work that I quoted earlier, he said:

> . . . an ever-growing role is being played by [our] sea power, expressing the real ability of the State to make effective use of the world ocean in the interest of communist construction. . . . The naval forces are becoming the main carrier of weapons, including nuclear missiles capable of striking at the enemy in all continents and seas.

Particularly remarkable has been the expansion of the Soviet submarine fleet, both nuclear-missile and ship-attack types. The Soviet submarine fleet, comprising up to 300 units, is the largest in the world. I note that at the beginning of the Second World War our then adversaries had only 50 or 60 submarines available. But look at the havoc that they caused.

The Soviet Union has also built up enormously its capacity in surface vessels, including aircraft carriers, landing ships and marines. What is the purpose of those developments? Once again Admiral Gorshkov had an interesting comment to make in this connection:

> . . . with the emergence of her navy on the oceanic expanses, the Soviet Union has gained new and wider possibilities for its use in peacetime to ensure her State interests. . . . The mobility of the fleet and its flexibility where limited military conflicts come to a head enable it to exert an influence on coastal countries, employ and extend a military threat at any level, starting from a show of military force and ending with the mounting of landings. . . .

Looking at the language of the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.46/Rev. 1, it seems to me that its sponsors are addressing themselves.

It is also remarkable that all the sponsors of that draft resolution, with the exception of one land-locked State, furnish the Soviet Union with naval facilities. In the case of two of those States, both of which are far distant from the shores of the Soviet Union—one being on the Indian Ocean and the other on the Pacific Ocean—they play host to large and increasingly significant permanent Soviet naval bases.

In the light of what I have said, it will come as no surprise that my delegation will cast a negative vote on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.46/Rev. 1.

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241. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolution on the Naval Arms Race, November 18, 1985 [1]

The Soviet delegation also wishes to speak to draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.36 [2] and L.46/Rev.1.[3] Together with the other socialist countries, the Soviet Union has consistently advocated that the question of curbing the arms race of the seas and oceans should be brought down to a practical level. We have repeatedly taken initiatives in this regard, and they are summarized in the letter of 9 [*10*] April 1984 from the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union addressed to the Secretary-General.[4]

We note with satisfaction that many of the Soviet Union's proposals on concrete measures for curbing naval activities and naval armaments, as well as on the form that negotiations should take, have been reflected in the United Nations study conducted under your guidance, Mr. Chairman.[5]

We cannot, however, agree with a number of the points made in that document. There is no need for me at this stage to go into a detailed analysis of the report. I would merely refer to its main flaws, namely, the unbalanced nature of many of its arguments, its unjustified attempts to blame the Soviet Union for the naval arms race and the tendentiousness and inaccuracy of the statistics it presents which give a distorted picture of the actual situation.

Much of what is said in the report requires further study by States. We thus do not consider ourselves bound in any way by this report, and we reserve our right to revert to this subject during the Committee's further consideration of the question of curbing naval armaments. Nonetheless, the Soviet delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.36, because we feel that consideration of the question of naval armaments in the Disarmament Commission can help to open up serious negotiations on the matter with the participation of all the major naval Powers and other interested States. Now that the study on naval armaments has been prepared, any further delay in this important matter is obviously unwarranted.

Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.46/Rev. 1 is also aimed at bringing about negotiations on curbing the naval arms race. I should again like

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[1] A/C.1/40/PV. 40, pp. 26–27.

[2] Introduced by Sweden, this draft resolution was cosponsored by Australia, Austria, China, Finland, France, Gabon, Indonesia, Iceland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Yugoslavia. The General Assembly adopted it as Resolution 40/94 F on December 12.

[3] This draft resolution was entitled "Curbing the naval arms race: limitation and reduction of naval armaments and extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans." Its cosponsors were: Democratic Yemen, GDR, Laos, Libya, Poland, Syria, and Viet Nam. The General Assembly adopted it as Resolution 40/94 I.

[4] A/39/419, p. 17.

[5] A/40/535. An extract of the study is printed in Document 173.

to draw attention to the main provisions of that draft resolution, and specifically to the appeal addressed to all Member States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States and other major naval Powers—and here I would emphasize that, contrary to what was stated by the United Kingdom representative, no discrimination whatever is being made against any State—to refrain from increasing their naval presence and activities in areas of conflict or tension, or far from their own shores. In our view, the draft resolution rightly expresses alarm at the increasingly frequent use of fleets or other naval formations for the demonstration or use of force and as a means of exerting pressure against sovereign States, especially developing countries, interfering in their internal affairs, and committing acts of armed aggression and intervention in order to preserve the vestiges of the colonial system. The Soviet delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

It is obviously that provision, and in particular the second one I mentioned, that prompted the representative of the United Kingdom once again to make slanderous remarks about the Soviet Union.[6] I do not understand precisely why he chose to do so today, on the eve of important events designed to improve the international climate. His statement with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.46/Rev. 1 was tantamount to a lament over the United Kingdom's erstwhile role as the ruler of the seas and oceans when it sent vessels to the colonial countries over which it held sway. I shall not at this time reply to the United Kingdom representative, but I would point out that anti-Sovietism is a dangerous disease and that we are seeing that many conservative statesmen are gradually being cured of it. That, unfortunately, cannot yet be said of the representative of the United Kingdom.

242. Statement by the U.S. Representative (Lowitz) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolution on the Naval Arms Race, November 18, 1985 [1]

I wish to explain the vote my delegation cast on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.36.[2] Two years ago, the United States voted against resolution 38/188 G, calling for a comprehensive study on the naval arms race, a naval arms race which, in the view of my Government did not and does not exist. The United States is not engaged in a naval arms race.

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[6] *Supra.*

[1] A/C.1/40/PV.40, p. 41.

[2] This draft resolution was introduced by Sweden and cosponsored by Australia, Austria, China, Finland, France, Gabon, Indonesia, Iceland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Yugoslavia. The General Assembly adopted it on December 12 as Resolution 40/94 F.

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Geography dictates that naval forces will play an important—indeed, a vital—role in the national security of maritime nations. Other States, either by their very geography or for other reasons rely to a greater extent upon land-based military power. Any study that focuses only on naval forces in isolation, ignoring those inter-related threats which make maritime forces necessary in the first place, will perforce be skewed against those nations and groups of nations with vital maritime interests that must be defended.

Recognizing that these infirmities are inherent in the concept of this study, the United States opposed the resolution calling for such a study and did not participate in it. Therefore, my delegation did not support draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.36, which refers the completed study to the Disarmament Commission for its consideration, thereby diverting that Commission's attention from more appropriate pursuits. Our opposition to this draft resolution in no manner casts doubt upon the capabilities of the experts who participated in the study or upon your efforts, Mr. Chairman, in bringing the study to completion. Recognizing the good intentions of the sponsors, we regret our inability to support the draft resolution.

243. Statement by the Indian Representative (Gonsalves) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in South Asia, November 18, 1985 [1]

This Committee is once again about to take a decision on the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, which has become an annual ritual. My delegation has gone along with proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones in certain regions because they enjoy the support of all the States of those regions, although we have at the same time expressed reservations about the efficacy of such partial nuclear disarmament measures, particularly in the context of the now well-authenticated nuclear winter findings.

In regard to the nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, we would further elaborate our position of principle with the support of the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,[2] which enjoys the unanimous support of the membership of the United Nations. That document stipulates categorically that nuclear-weapon-free zones can be established exclusively on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of a region and taking into account the characteristics of each region.

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[1] A/C.1/40/PV.41, pp. 13–17.
[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411–439.

In their statements in this Committee, several delegations have taken care to recall these vital criteria. So far as South Asia is concerned, it has been abundantly evident that no consensus exists on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. A reiteration, and support for this proposal, thus amounts not only to overlooking this critical criterion but also to putting the cart before the horse.

In regard to the characteristics of the region, it must be emphasized that in areas immediately adjacent to the proposed zone, nuclear weapons exist and continue to proliferate in menacing numbers both on land and at sea. In such a security environment, my Government remains totally unconvinced by seemingly related proposals for negative security assurances.

The proposal covered by draft resolution L.10 [3] must, in realistic terms, be viewed in terms of a regional and global arms and nuclear weapons perspective, as also in terms of the process of regional confidence-building on which the States of the region continue to be engaged. It should be only too obvious that the establishment of a climate of mutual confidence must constitute the basis for, and necessarily precede, a variety of rhetorical proposals for arms limitation.

For the various weighty reasons I have cited, my delegation will vote against the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia contained in L.10. It is our earnest hope that all delegations which have unreservedly subscribed to the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will, while voting on this proposal, bear fully in mind their solemn commitments to the proposition that a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia can be established only if and when all the States of the region have successfully and freely arrived at arrangements for the establishment of such a zone and that the characteristics of the region being proposed for a nuclear-weapon-free zone can objectively be seen as justifying the establishment of such a zone in South Asia. That is manifestly not the case under existing circumstances.

244. Statement by the U.S. Representative (Lowitz) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolutions on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and on Israeli Nuclear Armament, November 18, 1985 [1]

I have asked to be allowed to speak to explain my Government's position on several of the draft resolutions on which we have just

[3] This draft resolution, which was introduced in the First Committee by Pakistan, was eventually adopted as G.A. Resolution 40/83 on December 12.
[1] A/C.1/40/PV.41, pp. 39–42.

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voted that address the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, specifically draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.10 [2] on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, A/C.1/40/L.61 [3] on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, A/C.1/40/L.38 [4] on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, and A/C.1/40/L.40 [5] on the nuclear capability of South Africa.

In general, the United States supports the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a non-proliferation measure when consistent with the following criteria. The initiative for the creation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone should come from the States in the region concerned. All States whose participation is deemed important should participate in the zone. The zone arrangements should provide for adequate verification and compliance with the zone's provisions. The establishment of the zone should not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security. The zone arrangements should effectively prohibit the parties to it from developing any nuclear explosive device for whatever purpose. The zone arrangements should not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise of rights recognized under international law, in particular the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and in international air space and in straits used for international navigation and the right of innocent passage through territorial areas. The establishment of a zone should not affect the existing right of its parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges, including port calls and overflight to other States. Those are the criteria by which the United States judges the effectiveness of any nuclear-weapon-free zones. We believe that effective nuclear-weapon-free zone, negotiated and supported by States of the region, can enhance the security of those States as well as reinforce non-proliferation goals on a regional basis.

We believe, moreover, that nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements must effectively preclude the conduct of any nuclear explosions.

In addition, I have asked to speak in order to explain the vote of the United States on draft resolution L.63 on "Israeli nuclear armament".[6] This draft resolution, much like those of previous years on the same subject, is discriminatory. It singles out one Member State for criticism and condemnation, while it patently ignores a number of other States

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[2] A Pakistani draft resolution, it was adopted on December 12 as G.A. Resolution 40/83.

[3] This draft resolution was introduced by Mexico and cosponsored by 17 other Latin American states. The General Assembly adopted it as Resolution 40/79.

[4] Introduced by Mauritius on behalf of members of the African Group at the United Nations, the draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 40/89 A.

[5] Also introduced by Mauritius on behalf of the African Group, this draft resolution was eventually adopted as G.A. Resolution 40/89 B.

[6] Iraq introduced this draft resolution, which was sponsored also by 23 Arab and Moslem states. In the First Committee, separate votes were taken on oper. pars. 4 and 5. Oper. par. 4 reiterates the request that the Security Council "investigate Israel's nuclear activities and the collaboration of other states . . . in these activities." Oper. par. 5 calls for the discontinuation of all cooperation with, and assistance of, Israel in the nuclear field.

which have neither become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) [7] or placed their nuclear facilities under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The United States, whose support for the NPT and IAEA safeguards is second to none, would welcome a balanced resolution calling for all non-nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so to request the IAEA, pursuant to article III A. 5 of its statute, to apply safeguards continuously to all their nuclear facilities. The application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in a State contributes significantly to increased confidence among neighbouring States as well as other States regarding the peaceful nature of such activities. My Government could support an approach along these lines and hopes that the sponsors of L.63 will approach this question in a more constructive way next year.

245. Revised Soviet Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: International Cooperation in the Peaceful Exploitation of Outer Space Under Conditions of its Non-militarization, November 19, 1985 [1]

The General Assembly,

Determined to ensure that outer space be used for peaceful purposes and be an area of broad, equitable and mutually beneficial international co-operation,

Reaffirming the urgent need to prevent an arms race in outer space, which would increase the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race and divert the material and intellectual resources necessary for the peaceful exploitation of outer space and for extended international co-operation in this field,

Guided by a desire to ensure that the exploration and use of outer space will most effectively serve the scientific, technical, economic and social progress of all peoples and the solution of the global problems facing mankind, including that of development,

1. *Urges* all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, as an essential condition for the promotion of international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes;

2. *Calls upon* all States to examine the possibility of convening at a proper stage an international conference with the participation of

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[7] The text of the Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[1] A/C.1/40/L.1/Rev.1. The Soviet Union subsequently decided not to press the draft resolution to a vote. The original draft resolution, which was submitted to the U.N. General Assembly by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on August 15 and subsequently submitted to the First Committee, is printed in Document 142.

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States with major space capabilities and of other interested countries to consider in all its aspects the question of international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space and of ensuring the most favourable conditions for it, including consideration of the question of the setting up of a world space organization;

3. *Requests* the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to take into consideration the content of the present resolution, as well as all documents related to this item, and in particular to examine the possibility of preparation of the international conference, and to submit a report on the work carried out and appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-first session;

4. *Invites* all States to communicate to the Secretary-General not later than 1 March 1986, for transmittal to the General Assembly at its forty-first session, any views and suggestions with regard to the convening of the international conference.

246. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolution on Objective Information on Military Matters, November 19, 1985 [1]

With regard to [the] vote which will take place on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.56,[2] the Soviet delegation would like to bring the following considerations to the attention of the Committee.

This draft resolution reflects an imprecise idea of the military potential of States, which could be provoked by the absence of objective information, and could lead States to the implementation of an arms programme that would accelerate the arms race, in the belief that the dissemination of information of this kind could promote confidence and the conclusion of concrete agreements in the area of disarmament. Thus, the draft resolution places the transparency of military budgets, as it is called, practically as a pre-condition to measures of disarmament and arms control. We do not at all agree with that conclusion. The history of disarmament negotiations confirms that it is not a question of transparency. In our view, the reason why there is no progress towards disarmament rests with the absence of a political will to bring the arms race to a halt and the absence of a deposition [disposition] to reach agreements based on legality and equality.

We believe that it is impossible to acquire the needed confidence in relations between States without the elimination of the causes for the distrust. We are convinced that military transparency in itself, separate from disarmament measures—and I stress "disarmament measures"—would not only not lead to arms control but would, on the contrary, only intensify the arms race.

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[1] A/C.1/40/PV.42, pp. 16–20.

[2] This draft resolution was introduced by the United Kingdom and cosponsored by 10 Western States. The General Assembly eventually adopted it as Resolution 40/94 K.

No flow of information on disarmament or any survey on the comparability of military data or similar exercises could replace real efforts to limit the arms race. In effect, hundreds of thousands of words have been written in articles on transparency. Nevertheless there is still no progress in negotiations. It is another matter to exchange information on arms and the arms race as part of the process of negotiation—to put it on the negotiating table, if you wish—with achievements and concrete measures based on concrete agreements. This is the exchange of information which is not only not to be excluded but which is desirable and can be achieved. The experience which has preceded other disarmament measures makes this point. But the exchange of information should be done together with concrete disarmament measures and not in isolation, not as an isolated measure, not, certainly, as a pre-condition, for the holding of negotiations.

Unfortunately, draft resolution L.56 on "Objective information on military matters" not only is not related to concrete disarmament measures but in its substance subjects those concrete measures to preconditions. The delegation of the Soviet Union will therefore vote against that draft resolution.

247. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolution on Compliance With Arms Control Agreements, November 19, 1985 [1]

The Soviet delegation wishes to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.66/Rev.1.[2] The Soviet Union has consistently and vigorously supported strict compliance with obligations assumed by States under international agreements. In the course of its more than 60 years of history, the Soviet Union has been a party to several hundred bilateral and multilateral international agreements, and for us, compliance with any obligations assumed by the Soviet Union is a hallmark of our foreign policy.

In general, therefore, we are in favour of the proposal in the draft resolution which is aimed at bringing about compliance with international agreements. At the same time, however, we condemn the use of the question of compliance with agreements as a pretext either for postponing the entry into force of international agreements or the opening of negotiations or for breaking off negotiations currently in progress. We also condemn unfounded assertions with regard to non-

[1] A/C.1/40/PV.42, pp. 41–42.

[2] This draft resolution became General Assembly Resolution 40/94 L. It was introduced by the United States and cosponsored by Denmark, France, Iceland, and Norway. Before its revision by the sponsors, oper. par. 2 contained a reference to ". . . unresolved questions concerning compliance . . ."

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compliance with agreements as aimed at covering up a negative attitude to arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

We also wish to draw attention to the fact that the Soviet Union condemns the practice of not bringing into force agreements already concluded on arms limitation and disarmament, particularly those that have been signed at the very highest level by Heads of State. We call for the entry into force of agreements already concluded on arms limitation and disarmament. As the operative part of the draft resolution points out, we call upon all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions subscribed to.

Unfortunately, the international community cannot pride itself on a large number of bilateral and multilateral agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. As members know, many of the existing agreements have been the targets of criticism and attempts to weaken them. We call upon all parties to preserve the great and precious results that have been achieved in the past through arduous and difficult international negotiations, and we call upon everyone to abide by them strictly, as we do in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

248. Report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, November 20, 1985 [1]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 404) with respect to the Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and the People's Republic of China Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

The amendments are as follows:

Strike out all after the resolving clause and insert in lieu thereof the following:

That (a)(1) the Congress does favor the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, done on July 23, 1985 (hereafter in this joint resolution referred to as the "Agreement").[2]

(b) Notwithstanding section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,[3] the Agreement becomes effective in accordance with the provisions of this joint resolution and other applicable provisions of law.

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[1] *With Respect to the Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and the People's Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: Report Together With Additional and Dissenting Views* [To accompany H.J. Res. 404], (Rept. 99–382; 99th Cong., 1st. sess.).

[2] See Document 118.

[3] 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2011 *et. seq.*

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any international agreement, no license may be issued for the export to the People's Republic of China of any nuclear material, facilities, or components subject to the Agreement, and no approval for the retransfer to the People's Republic of China of any nuclear material, facilities, or components subject to the Agreement shall be given—

(1) until the expiration of a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress after the President has certified to the Congress that—

(A) the reciprocal arrangements made pursuant to article 8 of the Agreement have been designed to be effective in ensuring that any nuclear material, facilities, or components provided under the Agreement shall be utilized solely for intended peaceful purposes as set forth in the Agreement;

(B) the Government of the People's Republic of China has provided additional information concerning its nuclear nonproliferation policies and that, based on this and all other information available to the U.S. Government, the People's Republic of China is not in violation of paragraph (2) of section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; and

(C) the obligation to consider favorably a request to carry out activities described in article 5(2) of the Agreement shall not prejudice the decision of the United States to approve or disapprove such a request; and

(2) until the President has submitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report detailing the history and current developments in the nonproliferation policies and practices of the People's Republic of China.

The report described in paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form with a classified addendum.

(c) Each proposed export pursuant to the Agreement shall be subject to United States laws and regulations in effect at the time of each such export.

(d) Nothing in the Agreement or this joint resolution may be construed as providing a precedent or other basis for the negotiation or renegotiation of any other agreement for nuclear cooperation.

(e) For the purposes of subsection (b)—

(1) the continuity of a session of Congress is broken only by the adjournment of the Congress *sine die* at the end of a Congress; and

(2) the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of not more than 3 days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of the period indicated.

Amend the title of the joint resolution to read as follows:

Joint Resolution relating to the approval and implementation of the proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

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COMMITTEE COMMENT

On July 24, 1985, the President formally submitted to the Congress the proposed Agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Users of Nuclear Energy, pursuant to sections 123(b) and 123(d) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,[4] as amended (H. Doc. 99–86). Under the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, such proposed nuclear cooperation agreements must be reviewed by the Congress for a total of 90 days of continuous session. Under section 123(b) the President is specifically required to consult with the congressional committees of jurisdiction regarding the consistency of the text of the proposed nuclear cooperation agreements with the requirements of law. Such consultations must occur for a period of not less than 30 days of continuous session. The balance of 60 days, set forth in section 123(d), is set aside for congressional review of the overall merits of such proposed nuclear cooperation agreements.

If a proposed agreement for cooperation is exempted by the President from any of the criteria contained in section 123(a) of the Atomic Energy Act, such proposed agreement may not take effect unless the Congress approves by joint resolution. If no exemption is requested, the proposed agreement takes effect at the end of the review period unless the Congress disapproves by joint resolution. No exemption was requested by the President for the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with the People's Republic of China.

Pursuant to section 130i of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Chairman Fascell and Representative Broomfield, the ranking minority member, on October 1 introduced by request House Joint Resolution 404, a resolution approving the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with the People's Republic of China, which was used as the committee markup document. On November 13, the committee chose to amend House Joint Resolution 404 to add requirements for a one-time Presidential certification and report in advance of the issuance of any nuclear export licenses or retransfer approvals for the People's Republic of China. This action was taken in order to address the concerns set forth below.

The committee has long been concerned with the national security threat posed by the spread of nuclear explosives, and of the capabilities for their manufacture, to additional countries. In reviewing nuclear cooperation agreements, the committee takes special care to ensure that no peaceful nuclear cooperation in which the United States engages will further the abilities of additional countries to manufacture nuclear explosive devices. In this light, the committee notes that, while United States nuclear cooperation with the People's Republic of China will in no way further the ability of that country to use nuclear energy for military or explosive uses, it has long been concerned by

[4] 42 U.S.C. 2153 (b) and 2153 (d).

reports of Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan's clandestine nuclear program. Other reports of uncontrolled nuclear exports by the People's Republic of China to other countries of proliferation concern similarly raised issues regarding the adherence of the PRC to internationally recognized norms and practices of peaceful nuclear trade. The committee thus welcomes the statements by the People's Republic of China that it will not assist other countries to develop nuclear explosive devices, that it requires the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to its nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapons states, and that it is undertaking discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards to some nuclear facilities in the PRC. The committee expects the Government of the People's Republic of China to continue to pursue policies consistent with the international nonproliferation regime.

The committee notes the obligation of the President, pursuant to the requirements of section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act, to cease nuclear cooperation with countries found to be in violation of certain conventions of nuclear trade and technology transfer. Section 129 requires the President to terminate nuclear exports to any nation—

> found by the President to have * * * (A) materially violated an agreement for cooperation with the United States, * * * (B) assisted, encouraged, or induced any non-nuclear-weapon state to engage in activities involving source or special nuclear material and having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and has failed to take steps which, in the President's judgment, represent sufficient progress toward terminating such assistance, encouragement, or inducement; or (C) entered into an agreement * * * for the transfer of reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to the sovereign control of a non-nuclear-weapon state except in connection with an international fuel cycle evaluation in which the United States is a participant or pursuant to a subsequent international agreement or understanding to which the United States subscribes; unless the President determines that cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security * * *

The committee carefully reviews proposed nuclear cooperation agreements to ensure that the necessary controls required over U.S. nuclear exports are included in such agreements. During the committee's consideration of the proposed agreement, concern was raised over the unusual provisions in the agreement regarding the verification of the peaceful use of U.S. nuclear exports and the approval process for reprocessing or other alteration of U.S.-supplied nuclear materials.

Regarding the verification of peaceful-use guarantees covering items transferred under the agreement, the committee believes that International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards are not required by U.S. law for nuclear exports to nuclear-weapons states such as the People's

Republic of China. Section 123(a)1 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 required that all nuclear cooperation agreements contain—

> a guaranty by the cooperating party that *safeguards as set forth in the agreement for cooperation* be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant thereto, and with respect to all special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating party, *irrespective of the duration of other provisions in the agreement or whether the agreement is terminated or suspended for any reason;*. (Italic added.)

While article 8 of the proposed agreement will remain in effect for the duration any times transferred [*sic*] remain in the territory of the People's Republic of China, such "safeguards" as are "set forth" in the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with the People's Republic of China are indefinite as to their nature. Article 8 of the proposed agreement, among other things, states only that "In order to * * * ensure that the provisions of this agreement are effectively carried out * * * the parties will use diplomatic channels to establish mutually acceptable arrangements for exchanges of information and visits to material, facilities and components subject to this agreement." The committee would have preferred that these reciprocal arrangements be in place before the submission of the nuclear cooperation agreement to the Congress so as to remove any uncertainty as to their effectiveness; hence the requirement in subsection (b)(1)(A) of H.J. Res. 404, as amended, that the President must certify that these arrangements will be effective to ensure the peaceful use of items provided under the proposed agreement. The committee expects: (1) that these arrangements will be made well in advance of the issuance of any export licenses or retransfer approvals to the People's Republic of China; (2) that the arrangements will apply to all items requiring a United States export license or retransfer approval; and (3) that the arrangements will be submitted to the Congress for review as a "subsequent arrangement" pursuant to section 131a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

The committee notes the requirement of section 123(a)7 of the Atomic Energy Act, which requires a United States right of prior approval before any material supplied pursuant to nuclear agreements for cooperation, or material produced through the use of material or facilities supplied pursuant to such agreements, is reprocessed, enriched or otherwise altered in form or content. Article 5(2) appears to predispose the United States to approve any of these activities should they ultimately be considered by the People's Republic of China. As such, the committee would have preferred the inclusion of clearer language setting forth a reciprocal right of prior approval for these activities, and believes that nothing in the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement should prejudice the United States rights of prior approval for these activities. The committee further expects that any arrangements agreed to under the terms of article 5(2) of the proposed

agreement will also be submitted to the Congress for review pursuant to section 131a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

The committee is concerned that the vague and unorthodox language of the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with the People's Republic of China might lead to future misunderstandings in the implementation of the provisions of the agreement, and expects that future nuclear cooperation agreements submitted for its review will contain clear and unequivocal provisions regarding U.S. consent rights and other requirements of law. Further, the committee expects that the provisions of the proposed agreement will in no way be construed as precedents for the negotiation of any new or amended nuclear cooperation agreements.

SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS

Subsection (a)(1) states that the Congress does favor the proposed nuclear Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Subsection (a)(2) states that, notwithstanding section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Agreement becomes effective in accordance with House Joint Resolution 404, as amended, and with other applicable provisions of law.

Subsection (b)(1) states that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, no nuclear export license or retransfer approval for any nuclear material, facilities or components subject to the Agreement shall be given until the expiration of a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress after the President has certified that:

> (A) the reciprocal arrangements made pursuant to article 8 of the agreement have been designed to be effective in ensuring that items transferred under the agreement shall be utilized only for peaceful purposes;
>
> (B) the People's Republic of China has provided additional information regarding its nonproliferation policies and that, based on this and all other available information, it has not been found to have materially violated the Agreement, assisted other countries to develop or acquire nuclear explosive devices, or entered into an agreement to provide reprocessing materials equipment or technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state; and
>
> (C) the obligation in article 5(2) of the agreement to consider favorably a request to reprocess, enrich or otherwise alter in form or content any U.S.-controlled nuclear material shall not prejudice the United States decision regarding such a request.

Subsection (b)(2) requires a report, in unclassified form with a classified addendum, detailing the history and current developments in the nonproliferation policies and practices of the People's Republic of China, in advance of the issuance of any nuclear export licenses or retransfer approvals for the People's Republic of China.

Subsection (c) states that each proposed export under the agreement shall be in accordance with all applicable United States laws at the time of such export.

Subsection (d) states that nothing in the agreement may provide a precedent or other basis for negotiation or renegotiation of any other nuclear agreement for cooperation.

Subsection (e) defines "continuous session of Congress."

REQUIRED REPORTS SECTION

Cost estimate

The resolution will not involve any additional direct cost to the U.S. Government.

Inflationary impact statement

Enactment of this resolution by both Houses of Congress will have no impact on inflationary forces.

Statements Required by Clause 2(l)(3) of House Rule XI

(a) *Oversight Findings and Recommendations.*—In addition to the markup cited above, Members of Congress and their staffs have participated in hearings, numerous briefings, and other discussions regarding the proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation between the United States and the People's Republic of China and other related issues. As a result of these oversight activities, the committee recommends that House Joint Resolution 404, as amended, be approved.

(b) *Budget Authority.*—The adoption of House Joint Resolution 404, as amended, will create no new budget authority.

(c) *Committee on Government Operations Summary.*—No oversight findings and recommendations which relate to this measure have been received by the Committee on Government Operations under clause 4(c)(2) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives.

(d) *Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimates.*—No cost estimate concerning this measure has been received from the Congressional Budget Office.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, HON. HOWARD WOLPE, HON. MICHAEL D. BARNES, HON. MORRIS K. UDALL, HON. GERRY STUDDS, HON. TED WEISS, HON. LAWRENCE J. SMITH, HON. MEL LEVINE, AND HON. HOWARD L. BERMAN

While we understand the considerations leading to the adoption of the Senate amendment language to House Joint Resolution 404, we remain deeply concerned about the implications of allowing the implementation of the U.S./China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement without significant clarification.

Specifically, we believe that, even with the Presidential certifications outlined in the Committee resolution, what is a terribly flawed and

ambiguous Agreement falls far short of what should be required of any agreement for peaceful nuclear trade. The certifications required by this Committee remain unilateral assertions of the United States and provide no assurance whatsoever of PRC concurrence with such interpretations. As the Agreement leaves serious questions regarding safeguards, prior consent rights, and the non-proliferation policy of the PRC, we feel that it still invites the kind of misunderstanding and difference of interpretation which undermined the strength of a similar agreement with India and served to damage, rather than strengthen, our diplomatic relations with that country.

In summary, we would prefer clarifications of the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation outlined in legislation offered by Reps. Feighan and Wolpe, and concurrently by Senator John Glenn in the other body. We believe that the willingness of the Executive Branch and the Congress to let anything short of full and explicitly shared understanding prevail in nuclear matters indicates a failure to promote vigorously our commitment to nuclear non-proliferation as outlined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.[5] Particularly in light of terrorist threats around the world, and the growing likelihood that an attack will eventually involve nuclear materials, we believe the NNPA should set the minimum standards for any nuclear agreement, and not be considered a limitation on the process.

With these reservations, we concur in the Committee's action and strongly support expeditious action by the full Congress.

HOWARD WOLPE.
MICHAEL BARNES.
GERRY STUDDS.
LARRY SMITH.
HOWARD L. BERMAN.
EDWARD FEIGHAN.
MORRIS UDALL.
TED WEISS.
MEL LEVINE.

DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. DAN BURTON

I concur with the strong misgiving expressed in the Additional Views of Representative Feighan *et al* but would go further: I believe we should have no agreement involving nuclear technology with the People's Republic of China so long as they remain advocates of nuclear proliferation and threaten aggression against the Republic of China (Taiwan).

It is reckless for the United States not to take every opportunity to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons to terrorist states, such as Libya and Iran. The PRC has explicitly stated that it is their policy to increase the spread of nuclear weapons to "socialist" nations "so long as the imperialists refuse to ban nuclear weapons." While I agree with

[5] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164.

those who agree that this agreement would not appreciably increase the PRC's capability to carry out their nuclear proliferation policy, the disapproval of a nuclear co-operation agreement is the least the United States Congress can do to signal its condemnation of this policy.

It is equally important that the United States not place the interests of a communist nation with an atrocious record on human rights above a democratic ally. The Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party stated in May 1985:

> Everyone knows we do not yet have the military power [to attack Taiwan]. This temporary period may last 4, 5 or 7, 8 years; . . . We have to wait until our economy is on the right track . . . By then if most Taiwan people wish to return [to the mother country] and only a few saying no, we will have to use some force on them.[6]

The current relationship between the United States and the PRC, including this agreement is predicated on a pledge made on January 1, 1979 and reiterated on September 30, 1981 and August 17, 1982 that it was the policy of the PRC to strive for "peaceful reunification of the Motherland." The United States should make no agreement with the PRC until that country renounces the above and similar statements that constitute a policy of aggressive intent against Taiwan.

DAN BURTON,
Member of Congress.

249. Statement by the ACDA Assistant Director for Nuclear and Weapons Control (Dunn) Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: Results of the 1985 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, November 20, 1985 [1]

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to discuss the results of the 1985 Conference on the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the so-called NPT.[2] I have a detailed statement, which I would ask be included in the record. What I would like to do is sum up the statement.

Over the past years, the administration has worked to put together a defense indepth in the nonproliferation area. We have worked strenuously to strengthen export controls to make it technically more diffi-

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[6] Hu Yaobang during an interview with the editor of *Pai Hsing*, a Hong Kong magazine (FBIS *Daily Report*, vol. I, June 3, 1985, p. W7).

[1] *Third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference . . . Hearing . . . .* 99th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 5–9. The hearing was before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes.

[2] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

cult for a country to acquire nuclear explosives. We have worked to reduce the motivations that a country might have and which could lead a country toward a nuclear explosive capability. And finally, we have worked as part of this endeavor, to strengthen international institutions which are a key part of our global nonproliferation effort. One of those institutions is the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

With regard to the recent Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, let me sum up first the big picture and then turn to a more detailed discussion of some of the elements of the Review Conference.

Despite predictions by some observers that this Conference would end in deadlock and confrontation, or even worse, threatened withdrawals from the treaty, the parties engaged in a full and successful review of the treaty's implementation, and even adopted a consensus final declaration.[3]

In this declaration, the parties unequivocally reaffirmed their support for the treaty and concluded that the NPT is essential to international peace and security. They expressed their determination as well to enhance the treaty's implementation, building on its strengths in the years ahead. Although the United States had stressed during the 2 years' preparation for the conference that agreement on such a final document should not be the measure of a successful review, the final declaration that did result is, nonetheless, a valuable political statement.

It sets out recommendations for strengthening further the nonproliferation regime and supports our global nonproliferation efforts, especially through this declaration's strong endorsement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, strong endorsement of the need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and strong endorsement of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its system of international safeguards.

The key to this successful review, in our view, was the recognition of the parties' common stake in the NPT. As President Reagan said in his message to the 1985 Review Conference, "The NPT is an historical accomplishment, and it serves all countries' security."[4] This theme was repeated by virtually all of the states represented at the Review Conference.

As provided for under the treaty, the parties have conducted three major multilateral reviews of the treaty's operation. The Third Review Conference met for 4 weeks in Geneva in August and September; 86 of the 130 parties to the treaty participated. In addition, a number of nonparties participated as observers.

There also was heavy attendance by various nongovernmental organizations. For our part, the United States at this Third Review Conference sought two broad objectives: First, we wanted a reaffirmation by the parties of their support for this vital arms control agreement and the international nonproliferation regime of which it is a key part.

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[3] Document 179.
[4] Document 157.

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Second, we sought to identify ways to strengthen the overall nonproliferation regime and the NPT without amending the treaty. Both objectives were achieved, as evidenced by the basic themes of the debate and the specific elements of the final declaration.

Turning to the basic themes, during the general debate at the start of the Conference when parties delivered national statements, one basic theme struck by virtually all the parties was strong support for the NPT. Speaker after speaker acknowledged the treaty's important contribution to international security and warned that the further spread of nuclear weapons would add to regional and global tensions and increase the risk of nuclear war. Many states called it the most important arms control agreement in history.

Strong endorsement of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its international safeguards system was another basic theme. There also were calls for increased assistance to developing countries interested in pursuing peaceful nuclear programs.

Finally, throughout the debate, there was widespread criticism and disappointment over the slim progress made toward achieving the objectives of article 6, negotiation of effective measures to end the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament. We, for our part, shared the disappointment over the slender progress that had been made since the treaty came into effect in 1970.

Following a general debate, the Conference undertook an article by article review of the implementation of the treaty. I shall sketch some of the key results and request that the final declaration of the Conference be included in the record as an appendix to my testimony.

Under articles 1 and 2 of the treaty, nuclear weapons states and nonnuclear weapons states, respectively, commit themselves to policies and practices designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. In its final declaration, the final declaration [*sic*] states these commitments have been met under the period under review, greatly helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Concerning article 3, which provides for the application of IAEA safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities in nonnuclear weapons states, the parties concluded that such safeguards are a fundamental element of the treaty, play a key role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promote confidence among states, are essential to peaceful nuclear commerce and help to strengthen international security.

Significantly, the 1985 Review Conference declared that unsafeguarded nuclear activities in nonnuclear weapon states pose serious proliferation dangers and urge countries with such activities to accept IAEA safeguards on present and future peaceful facilities. President Reagan previously had urged all nuclear suppliers to agree to require comprehensive safeguards in nuclear weapons states as a condition for any nuclear supply commitment.

Tilting in that direction, the final declaration calls on the parties "specifically as a necessary basis for the transfer of relevant nuclear

supplies to nonnuclear weapon states to take effective steps toward achieving acceptance of such safeguards by those states."

Turning to peaceful uses in article IV, the Conference affirmed that the nonproliferation and safeguards commitments of the NPT provided an essential framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation and that the NPT does foster the worldwide peaceful use of nuclear energy. In contrast to 1980,[5] at the last Review Conference, it acknowledged that an appreciable level of bilateral cooperation had taken place. At the same time, the Conference reaffirmed the parties' commitment to help foster peaceful nuclear cooperation and welcomed the IAEA's technical assistance and cooperation programs. It identified the [*for*] IAEA consideration possible measures to strengthen peaceful assistance.

As expected, evaluation of the slender progress toward the nuclear arms limitation and disarmament objectives of article VI was the most difficult issue at the Review Conference. Much of the discussion centered on the relative priority to be placed on a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, a so-called CTB. On the one hand, virtually all parties present supported immediate negotiations on an urgent conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The United States, on its part, while making clear its commitment to the long-term goal of the CTB, stressed its conviction that deep and verifiable reductions in existing nuclear weapons must have the highest priority. In our view, only such reductions would represent progress toward the shared goal of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

In the Conference's final declaration, the parties agreed, after intensive negotiations, to reflect these legitimate differences of view in a straightforward, factual manner. All the Conference participants, including the United States, first endorsed language that said that the objectives of article VI remain unfulfilled and that welcomed the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations in Geneva.

Then the compromise language that followed set out the strong belief of the great majority of the parties present that CTB negotiations should resume in 1985. But that language equally reflected the U.S. conviction that deep and verifiable reductions of existing nuclear arsenals should be the first step.

The 1985 Review Conference also was the scene of extensive behind-the-scenes maneuvering on a number of regional-political issues, which threatened the work of the Conference. These issues were how to characterize Israel's 1981 bombing of Iraq's research reactor, calls for Conference action on nuclear cooperation with Israel and South Africa, and on the final night, how to deal with alleged Iraqi attacks on an Iranian nuclear reactor.

In each case, outcomes satisfactory to the United States eventually were reached.

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[5] The final declaration of the 1980 conference may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, pp. 152–156.

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Many factors, in my view, contributed to the successful outcome of the 1985 Review Conference. For over 2 years, the United States had been preparing for this Review Conference. Throughout these preparations, we conducted extensive consultations with our allies, with the Soviets and other members of the Socialist group, and with many members of the Neutral and nonaligned group. In these consultations, we sought not only to explain U.S. views, but also to gain a better understanding of the concerns of other parties. We stressed the need for an honest review, a review which recognized where there was less progress than wanted in meeting certain of the Treaty's goals, but also emphasized many of the Treaty's successes. The strong common interest of the United States and the Soviet Union and the NPT played a part, too. It fostered a general cooperative instructive working relationship at the Review Conference.

Polemical exchanges in Geneva, which would have served only to distract attention from the many security benefits of the NPT, were avoided. A general desire on the part of virtually all countries to avoid a repetition of the acrimonious disagreement of 1980 also played a role. That said, I believe that the most important factor which led to success in 1985 and clearly the most significant from the perspective of the long-term health of the treaty, was the recognition by all of the parties of their vital stake in this important arms control agreement.

This was evident throughout the Conference as the parties worked intensely to find the common ground to reaching consensus. It was most evident on the final night when the parties including many of the nonaligned, urged Iran and Iraq to compromise and kept the Non-Proliferation Treaty from becoming a political hostage.

Simply, even with less progress than desired on article VI, there was more that united the parties than divided them. The NPT was too important to risk damaging in order to make a particular political point, whether a political point about regional politics, nuclear supply, or disarmament.

Above all, all of the parties recognized that without this treaty, every one of them would be less secure and the world a much more dangerous place.

What about the impact of the Review Conference on the future of the NPT? The final declaration contains many specific inclusions and recommendations which need to be followed up. As such, it makes a real contribution to global nonproliferation efforts.

On a broader level, however, the significance of the Review Conference lies in the fact that through the parties' unequivocal reaffirmation of support for the NPT, the treaty regime has been strengthened by this review. The debate and the results of the conference underscore the vitality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Momentum, also buttressed by more than a dozen new adherents to the treaty in the past few years, is with the NPT. U.S. nonproliferation and security interests are supported by this Review Conference.

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Looking ahead, the United States, can work on several fronts to strengthen the effectiveness of the NPT. As I suggested, various proposals within the final declaration need to be followed up. U.S. diplomacy can work with other countries to convince additional countries to adhere to the Treaty, building on the momentum of the review. Strong support is required for peaceful nuclear cooperation with the NPT parties.

In addition, despite the fact that the parties' vital security interests in the NPT carried the day in 1985, we cannot dismiss the great disappointment that more far-reaching results had not yet been achieved on arms limitation and disarmament. Implementation of article VI will remain a major issue. For our part, the Reagan administration will continue to negotiate flexibly and seriously in Geneva toward the goal of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Most important, by way of conclusion, Mr. Chairman, as we look to the future, we should recall the words of the Review Conference President, Mohamed Shaker. I quote, "We must build on the NPT's successes, not belittle them."

This Review Conference has reaffirmed successfully broad, international support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There was an honest taking stock and the NPT stood on its merits. This outcome will keep momentum behind the Treaty, and will support our nonproliferation efforts in the coming years.

250. Revised Italian Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, November 20, 1985 [1]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its relevant resolutions and the applicable provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.[2]

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming that the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,

[1] A/C.1/40/L.22/Rev.1. This version of the Italian draft resolution had the same sponsors as the original draft, see Document 224. Subsequently, the sponsors decided not to press for a vote on the revised draft.

[2] For the Final Document, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411–439.

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including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies,[3] have undertaken, in article III, to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and of promoting international co-operation and understanding,

Emphasizing the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing international arms control and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space,

Aware of the fundamental contribution that space activities can make both to the economic and social progress of mankind, and to international trust, implementation of arms control agreements, peace and stability,

Convinced that further efforts should be made in the search for effective and verifiable agreements on the interrelated questions of preventing an arms race in outer space and terminating it on Earth,

Aware of the crucial role that pertains to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the pursuance of these goals,

Noting the work so far undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its *Ad Hoc* Committee to consider all issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and convinced that such a multilateral process and bilateral negotiations are both complementary and essential,

1. *Recalls* the obligation of all States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from the threat or use of force, which applies in all environments including outer space;

2. *Reiterates* that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating forum, has a primary role in the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;

3. *Expresses its satisfaction* at the agreement reached in 1985 in the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum, on the establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Committee on item 5 of its agenda, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"; [4]

4. *Notes furthermore* that the *Ad Hoc* Committee initiated examination of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, taking into account all existing agreements and proposals;

5. *Deems it necessary*, as recognized by the *Ad Hoc* Committee, that all efforts should be made to assure that substantive work on the agenda item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" will continue at the next session of the Conference;

6. *Emphasizes* the great responsibility towards mankind as a whole which falls on the major space and nuclear Powers in the search for effective and verifiable agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its termination on Earth;

[3] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 38–43.
[4] See Document 61.

7. *Welcomes* the fact that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have initiated bilateral negotiations on both strategic and intermediate-range, space and nuclear arms, with all these questions to be resolved in their interrelationship;

8. *Expresses its satisfaction* at the agreed objective of these negotiations, that is, to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability;

9. *Emphasizes* the necessity of preventing the erosion of relevant existing treaties;

10. *Calls upon* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to spare no effort to reach early agreement in conformity with the agreed objective of the negotiations;

11. *Calls upon* all States to encourage an early and successful outcome of these negotiations;

12. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-first session;

13. *Decides* to resume consideration of this issue at its forty-first session under the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

251. Statement by the Japanese Representative (Imai) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolutions on a Nuclear Weapons Freeze, November 20, 1985 [1]

I wish to explain my delegation's votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.18 [2] and L.44,[3] which we shall vote against, and A/C.1/40/L.25,[4] on which we shall abstain.

We shall vote in that way because we have certain reservations about the practicability and meaningfulness of these so-called freeze proposals. I do not need to emphasize here the long and continued efforts of Japan in pursuit of nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons from the earth. We have been engaged in such efforts at the United Nations, at the Conference on Disarmament, and in various other international forums. We play an active part in such matters as a nuclear-test ban. We take an active

[1] A/C.1/40/PV.43, pp. 22–25.

[2] The draft resolution was introduced in the First Committee by Mexico and cosponsored by Ecuador, Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sweden, and Uruguay. In December, the General Assembly adopted it as Resolution 40/151 C.

[3] Introduced in the First Committee by the Soviet Union and 12 of its allies, this draft resolution was adopted as General Assembly Resolution 40/94 H.

[4] India introduced this draft resolution, which the General Assembly adopted in December as Resolution 40/151 E.

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interest in the promotion of nuclear disarmament and arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In all those processes towards the achievement of serious measures of nuclear disarmament, we cannot and should not overlook the reality that there is a certain balance of military strength which works to maintain an equilibrium, and that nuclear power undoubtedly plays a very major role in formulating that equilibrium. If the peace and security of the international community is in reality so greatly dependent upon the notion of deterrence, then any realistic steps of disarmament should be predicated upon the workings of that mechanism and should be mindful of the underlying stability that is created through various balancing acts.

A nuclear freeze, unless it is immediately followed by firmly and delicately constructed arrangements for balanced reductions in nuclear arms, could be used as a means to freeze the real or perceived nuclear superiority of one side over the other. Such an outcome would contribute to destabilizing the basic fabric of international security.

In addition to such conceptual difficulties as those, it is also widely recognized that the verification of a nuclear freeze would be extremely difficult and thus could not lead to proper confidence-building. It would be more useful and meaningful if, instead of playing with the somewhat unrealistic notion of a freeze, we worked more on such priority items as a nuclear test ban and nuclear non-proliferation, and then went on to verifiable arrangements to reduce the existing nuclear weapons that are being deployed by the nuclear-weapon States.

Those are the basic reasons why we cannot support draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.18, L.25 and L.44.

252. Statement by the U.S. Representative (Lowitz) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolution on the Program of Fellowships on Disarmament, November 20, 1985 [1]

The United States delegation greatly regrets that, despite consultations with the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.54/Rev.1,[2] we were not able to support it. As the draft resolution itself notes, the United States has been a strong supporter of the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament. Representatives of the United States Government have spoken to several classes of Fellows, both in Geneva and Washington, and we have ourselves profited from such exchanges, as we hope the Fellows have.

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[1] A/C.1/40/PV.44, pp. 17–18.

[2] This draft resolution was introduced by Nigeria. It became General Assembly Resolution 40/151 H.

My delegation is grateful for the recognition given our efforts in operative paragraph 5 of this draft resolution. Nevertheless, as members of the Committee are aware, United States representatives throughout the United Nations are under strict instructions to oppose any real increase in spending such as would result from this proposal and is detailed in document A/C.1/40/L.79. What is more, we are concerned that beyond the $63,700 required for 1986–1987 there could be substantial additional costs in later years if the programmes described in operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft resolution are implemented.

We would have hoped that more careful preparations, including earlier consultations with interested States, could have taken place so that my delegation could have joined in a consensus resolution on the Disarmament Fellows.

253. Statement by the U.S. Representative (Lowitz) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolution on Climatic Effects of Nuclear War, November 20, 1985 [3]

The United States' negative vote on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.43 [4] in no way signifies that we consider the issue of nuclear winter unimportant. On the contrary, we believe that the issue merits intensive study by highly qualified scientists and technicians. We further believe that it is critical that such work be shielded from emotionally and politically charged atmospheres. That would be impossible in a study such as that proposed in this draft resolution. In addition, the draft resolution has financial implications which further persuaded my Government to vote "no". In any event, the United States Government—and, I know, other national and international bodies of high qualification—will continue to study this question.

254. Joint Statement by the United States and the Soviet Union on the Geneva Summit Meeting, November 21, 1985 [1]

By mutual agreement, President of the United States Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev met in Geneva November 19–21. Attending the meeting on the U.S. side were Secretary of

[3] A/C.1/PV.44, p. 43.
[4] Mexico introduced this draft resolution in the First Committee. On December 16, the General Assembly adopted a revised version as Resolution 40/152 G.
[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, November 25, 1985, pp. 1422–1424.

State George Shultz; Chief of Staff Donald Regan; Assistant to the President Robert McFarlane; Ambassador to the USSR Arthur Hartman; Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Arms Control Paul H. Nitze; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Rozanne Ridgway; Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jack Matlock. Attending on the Soviet side were Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs E. A. Shevardnadze; First Deputy Foreign Minister G. M. Korniyenko; Ambassador to the United States A. F. Dobrynin; Head of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CPSU, A. N. Yakovlev; Head of the Department of International Information of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. M. Zamyatin; Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, A. M. Aleksandrov.

These comprehensive discussions covered the basic questions of U.S.-Soviet relations and the current international situation. The meetings were frank and useful. Serious differences remain on a number of critical issues.

While acknowledging the differences in their systems and approaches to international issues, some greater understanding of each side's view was achieved by the two leaders. They agreed about the need to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and the international situation as a whole.

In this connection the two sides have confirmed the importance of an ongoing dialogue, reflecting their strong desire to seek common ground on existing problems.

They agreed to meet again in the nearest future. The General Secretary accepted an invitation by the President of the United States to visit the United States of America and the President of the United States accepted an invitation by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU to visit the Soviet Union. Arrangements for and timing of the visits will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

In their meetings, agreement was reached on a number of specific issues. Areas of agreement are registered on the following pages.

Security

The sides, having discussed key security issues, and conscious of the special responsibility of the USSR and the U.S. for maintaining peace, have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

Nuclear and Space Talks

The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

They agreed to accelerate the work at these negotiations, with a view to accomplishing the tasks set down in the Joint U.S.-Soviet Agreement of January 8, 1985,[2] namely to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability.

Noting the proposals recently tabled by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, they called for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement.

During the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon.

Risk Reduction Centers

The sides agreed to study the question at the expert level of centers to reduce nuclear risk taking into account the issues and developments in the Geneva negotiations. They took satisfaction in such recent steps in this direction as the modernization of the Soviet-U.S. hotline.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan reaffirmed the commitment of the USSR and the U.S. to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [3] and their interest in strengthening together with other countries the non-proliferation regime, and in further enhancing the effectiveness of the Treaty, *inter alia* by enlarging its membership.

They note with satisfaction the overall positive results of the recent Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.[4]

The USSR and the U.S. reaffirm their commitment, assumed by them under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty.

The two sides plan to continue to promote the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to support the activities of the Agency in implementing safeguards as well as in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

They view positively the practice of regular Soviet-U.S. consultations on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which have been businesslike and constructive and express their intent to continue this practice in the future.

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[2] Document 3.
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[4] The final declaration of the review conference is printed in Document 179.

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Chemical Weapons

In the context of discussing security problems, the two sides reaffirmed that they are in favor of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter.

The two sides agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on the level of experts on all aspects of such a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification. They agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.

MBFR

The two sides emphasized the importance they attach to the Vienna (MBFR) negotiations and expressed their willingness to work for positive results.

CDE

Attaching great importance to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and noting the progress made there, the two sides stated their intention to facilitate, together with the other participating states, an early and successful completion of the work of the conference. To this end, they reaffirmed the need for a document which would include mutually acceptable confidence and security building measures and give concrete expression and effect to the principle of non-use of force.

Process of Dialogue

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed on the need to place on a regular basis and intensify dialogue at various levels. [*sic*] Along with meetings between the leaders of the two countries, this envisages regular meetings between the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Secretary of State, as well as between the heads of other Ministries and Agencies. They agree that the recent visits of the heads of Ministries and Departments in such fields as agriculture, housing and protection of the environment have been useful.

Recognizing that exchanges of views on regional issues on the expert level have proven useful, they agreed to continue such exchanges on a regular basis.

The sides intend to expand the programs of bilateral cultural, educational and scientific-technical exchanges, and also to develop trade and economic ties. The President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU attended the signing of the Agreement on Contacts and Exchanges in Scientific, Educational and Cultural Fields.

They agreed on the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in the spirit of cooperation.

They believe that there should be greater understanding among our peoples and that to this end they will encourage greater travel and people-to-people contact.

Northern Pacific Air Safety

The two leaders also noted with satisfaction that, in cooperation with the Government of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to a set of measures to promote safety on air routes in the North Pacific and have worked out steps to implement them.

Civil Aviation/Consulates

They acknowledged that delegations from the United States and the Soviet Union have begun negotiations aimed at resumption of air services. The two leaders expressed their desire to reach a mutually beneficial agreement at an early date. In this regard, an agreement was reached on the simultaneous opening of Consulates General in New York and Kiev.

Environmental Protection

Both sides agreed to contribute to the preservation of the environment—a global task—through joint research and practical measures. In accordance with the existing U.S.-Soviet agreement in this area, consultations will be held next year in Moscow and Washington on specific programs of cooperation.

Exchange Initiatives

The two leaders agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and contacts including some of their new forms in a number of scientific, educational, medical and sports fields (*inter alia*, cooperation in the development of educational exchanges and software for elementary and secondary school instruction; measures to promote Russian language studies in the United States and English language studies in the USSR; the annual exchange of professors to conduct special courses in history, culture and economics at the relevant departments of Soviet and American institutions of higher education; mutual allocation of scholarships for the best students in the natural sciences, technology, social sciences and humanities for the period of an academic year; holding regular meets in various sports and increased television coverage of sports events). The two sides agreed to resume cooperation in combating cancer diseases.

The relevant agencies in each of the countries are being instructed to develop specific programs for these exchanges. The resulting programs will be reviewed by the leaders at their next meeting.

Fusion Research

The two leaders emphasized the potential importance of the work aimed at utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes and, in this connection, advocated the widest practicable devel-

opment of international cooperation in obtaining this source of energy, which is essentially inexhaustible, for the benefit of all mankind.

255. News Conference Remarks by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev at the Close of the Geneva Summit Meeting [Extracts], November 21, 1985 [1]

. . . . . .

Here is what I would like to talk about now: This analysis has shown that notwithstanding the diversity of approaches and evaluations which came to the surface during this very serious and necessary work—without which, without doing this work it would have been impossible to come to the meeting—we discovered, so it seems to us, that we have something in common which could serve as a starting point in improving our relations. This is an understanding of the fact that nuclear war is inadmissible, that it cannot be waged and it cannot have any victors. This thought was expressed more than once, both on our side and the U.S. side. And from this it follows that the central problem in relations between our countries in the present stage is the problem of security. We are resolutely in favor of attaining agreements ensuring equal security for both our sides. We imagine that it is precisely on this basis that it will be possible to effect consistent strengthening of mutual trust and a general improvement in the political atmosphere, within which one can hope for the development of political dialogue, for fruitful discussion of economic problems, humanitarian problems, problems of contacts, reciprocal information, and so forth.

Here also is the key to the problem of preservation of life on earth and the problem of the change of atmosphere toward good will.

We told the President that we have not been striving and will not be striving to achieve superiority over the United States in the sphere of security. Futhermore, I tried more than once in private and at plenary sessions of the delegations, to express our deep conviction that less security for the United States of America, if compared with the Soviet Union, would be disadvantageous for us because it would lead to distrust and lack of faith, and would generate instability. But we, at the same time, reckon on the same approach by the U.S. side concerning us. We told the President and all members of the delegation that we in turn, would not allow the United States to achieve superiority over us under any circumstances. I think this is a logical argument. Both sides would have to become used to strategic parity as the natural state of Soviet-U.S. relations. If there is anything to talk about,

[1] Moscow Television Service in Russian, November 21, 1985; FBIS *Daily Report*, November 21, 1985, vol. III, no. 225, supp. 013, pp. 2–8.

it is how, by joint efforts, to reduce the level of this parity. In other words, to implement realistic measures for the reduction of nuclear arms on a common basis. Here is a sphere worthy of leaders of such great states as the Soviet Union and the United States of America, and also a sphere of action for other states' leaders, because this is our common question.

From this, the following conclusion of fundamental importance also follows quite logically: Neither of us, neither the United States of America nor the Soviet Union, must do anything that opens doors for an arms race in space or in new spheres—specifically in space. This is why, if this is done, then the scale of military rivalry [pauses, restarts] If this were to be done—if the doors were opened to space—then the scale of this rivalry would grow immeasurably, and the arms race, I think, would assume—it can even now be forecast to a certain extent—an irreversible character, because it is very difficult to keep controls on it.

It is very difficult to verify it. And each side would have the feeling at any moment that it is losing out in something and it would feverishly search for ever new methods of responding. This would urge on the arms race, and not only in space, but on earth too, for the responses do not necessarily have to be in that sphere. They simply have to be effective. This is my reasoning, and I am reasoning before you in the same way as when I was conversing with the President. One can imagine that if such a situation were to begin, the possibility of an agreement on some restraint of this military rivalry, the arms race, would become, in general, very, very problematical. I should like to return again to my assertion that the present period is characterized by the fact that we have reached a certain point. And if one fails to consider and weigh everything in a truly responsible fashion, one could reach such political conclusions and, as a result of incorrect, erroneous conclusions for politicians. . . . [appears to correct himself] for politics, one could embark on such steps as will have grave consequences for our peoples.

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I would like to return once again to the main issue which was, so to speak, the crux of the meeting. There was not a session, nor a face-to-face meeting, where it did not occupy the central position. I am thinking of the issue of war and peace, arms control. This was the crux of the Geneva meeting.

We explained to the U.S. side that the "star wars" program will not only give an impulse to the arms race in all types of weapons, but will also put an end to all restraint in this race. In reply, they spoke again and again about the supposedly defensive nature of a large-scale system of antimissile defense with space-based elements. They said to us: What will you tell your people after Geneva—that you refused to make reductions in offensive weapons? On this score our answer was

this: I repeat, we are ready for a radical reduction in nuclear weapons on the condition that the door be shut firmly on the development of an arms race in space. We are ready to go the first step, on the basis of applying a 50 percent principle of reduction, and then, bringing in other nuclear powers, to go further.

Among the people, to a certain extent in the world perhaps, even among certain politicians and even journalists, there is, so to speak, a certain positive reaction to SDI. They say that after all, we are talking about defensive weapons, about a shield.

That is completely wrong. After all, the main point—taking into consideration the fact that mountains of weapons have already been stockpiled in the world now—is that it is further being proposed to us that since there is an arms race and we cannot get the better of this process or take it in hand, curb it, and go backwards, it is further being proposed to us, in this most complex situation, to open up competition in space. Who will guarantee, who will be able to give a guarantee that we will then be able to organize any kind of productive talks? I think no sensible person will be able to. And then the U.S. side does not want to admit SDI means putting weapons into space. But it does mean weapons in space.

And if today there are weapons on earth and under the water, then we will have waves of Soviet—of U.S. and Soviet weapons—over the heads of all peoples. And we will look, gaze at that sky, and wait for something to crash down. Let us all imagine—this is what we wanted to say to the U.S. side—let us imagine for a moment—given the collisions there have been and are happening now—something separates from a rocket, the head goes on, the carrier part falls away, and it collides with some kind of grouping of these space weapons. Signals will be set off, which may be seen almost as an attempt by the other side—I am not saying by whose side, by ours or whose, in this case—as a signal that an attempt is being undertaken to annihilate this. [as heard] All computers are switched on, the politicians cannot do anything sensible in that case, and we are at the mercy of events.

Yes, one can paint many pictures. I said to the President that in as far as we feel this idea has captured him, as a person, we can perhaps even understand to some extent; but that his position as a politician—answering for such a powerful state, for its defence, for questions of security—this we cannot understand. We think that after these conversations, the U.S. side will weigh all that we said on this theme in the most responsible manner.

We saw at the meeting that the Americans do not like our logic, but we can in no way discover any logic in their arguments. They say: Believe us, if we are the first to invent it, we will share it with you. Then, Mr. President, I call on you to believe us. We have already stated that we will not use weapons and we will not attack the United States of America. Why are you beginning—while not just preserving the entire offensive potential on earth and under the water—why are you further proposing, why do you intend to launch an arms race in

space? Don't you believe us? It becomes clear that you do not believe us. And why should we believe you any more than you believe us? We have all the more grounds not to believe you, as we are calling on you not to clamber into space, and to engage in disarmament on earth. That is a thought which every person can understand.

On the whole, one would like to hope—and this is what we believe—that this was not the U.S. side's last word. The talks were thorough: We listened attentively to each other's arguments and recorded all of it. If the United States finds the will and resolve to think again and evaluate all the destructive aspects and consequences of the "star wars" program, a path will open up for a constructive solution to the problems of the international situation and of halting the arms race.

When I speak of this, I bear in mind that this also applies to problems of verification. A large amount of speculation is being built up around this problem, with the USSR's position being deliberately distorted. But the truth boils down to the fact that the Soviet Union is open to verification. If an accord is achieved on banning the transfer of weapons to space, we are prepared on a mutual basis to open our laboratories for monitoring an accord of that kind. What has been suggested to us is something like: Let us open up the laboratories and monitor how the arms race in space is going. That is naivete; the starting point is fallacious and unacceptable. If the U.S. side also halts all nuclear weapons tests and we conclude an agreement on this, again there will be no problems whatsoever from our side regarding verification, including international inspection. If both sides agree to reduce nuclear weapons by 15 [50] percent, then of course the reduction process will have to be monitored; we are interested in that no less than the Americans are.

I would like to say literally two words about the fact that at this stage differences also came to light in the positions regarding a 50-percent reduction in nuclear weapons. We have observations on the plan presented by the Americans; the Americans have observations on our plans. But we are not making a drama out of these differences; we are ready to search for a mutually acceptable solution in the event that a race does not begin in space. The two sides' proposals form a basis for a search for mutually acceptable solutions: Compromises are possible here; time and clarification of the situation are required. We are ready to search for these solutions, proceeding from the founding principle that we are not striving to achieve superiority and we are for equal security.

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Question. Mikhail Sergeyevich, what specific practical steps could the Soviet Union and the United States take to halt the arms race as soon as possible?

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Gorbachev. It seemed to me that I devoted my entire speech to this. However, I should like to say that we have to stop. If we can avoid an arms race in space, what we have contributed and what the U.S. side has contributed enables us to advance toward each other, to seek compromises, to seek parity at a lower level. I could of course add, there is a good mechanism for this, the Geneva talks. I should like to add further that we hope the U.S. Administration has not yet said its last word on the banning of all tests of nuclear weapons. The whole world is in favor of this, the whole world. The U.S. side still has time to think over the situation. This would be a tremendous step. I think this is another step which would speed up the process of halting the arms race and reducing armaments. I think it would facilitate the process, the Geneva process, and the further intensifying of the political dialogue between USSR and U.S. leaderships. We agreed to expand it and I think the participation of the top leaders of our countries will also facilitate this. And another thing; the subject at Geneva, I refer to the Geneva talks with their known subject and aims, is a matter for all peoples, and each people, and each responsible politician, particularly the head of one state or another, must now take a firm position on this matter. This would be of tremendous significance. I think an absolute, overwhelming majority of politicians favor speeding up the process in Geneva and finding ways to halt the arms race and get on with disarmament.

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Unidentified speaker in French with superimposed translation. You have said you completely disagree with the United States regarding "star wars." Would it be possible to discuss this again?

Gorbachev. I would have to repeat again to significant extent what I have already said. But I would just like to express our position in a few words. It amounts to the fact that we are in a constructive frame of mind at the negotiations in Geneva. We will strive to search for solutions in order to stop the arms race and achieve a radical reduction in nuclear armaments, so that later, at some stage of this process, we realistically approach the question of altogether eliminating nuclear weapons, by then with the participation of the entire world community. We say firmly that this is possible, this achievement would be possible if the door to the arms race, to expanding the arms race in space, were to be tightly shut both by the Soviet Union and by America.

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Unidentified speaker in English with superimposed translation. Mr. Gorbachev, you spoke of the President's personal commitment to the "star wars" program and that you discussed it in detail. How did the President react to your arguments regarding the "star wars" pro-

gram? Did he evaluate your arguments? Do you see a possibility of shifting this question out of the impasse?

Gorbachev. I would reply to your question like this. I think the U.S. side has every reason after the meeting to think over all that which we said. We are hoping for an understanding of our arguments. They are founded, we think, on a sense which corresponds to the spirit of the January accord, namely that as a result of the Geneva process, we should enter a road of radical reductions in nuclear weapons on the condition of preventing, with a simultaneous prevention of arms race in space [as heard]. That objective has been defined by us. The President considered it to be a shield, but we have shown, I hope convincingly, that these space weapons could be used equally against missiles, against satellites, and against facilities on earth. These space weapons are a new kind of weapons and thereby, a new sphere of arms race opens up.

Therefore, it is unacceptable. It would complicate the entire situation and make the situation at our negotiations in Geneva very problematic. Therefore, I appreciate that at the President's level and at the CPSU General Secretary's level it has been emphasized that the work would be accelerated in Geneva in the course of negotiations on the basis of the January accord. Now this is a point of view reinforced not only by foreign affairs ministers' signatures, but also by state leaders. We view this as a specific signal and hope.

Unidentified speaker. What is your question, please?

Unidentified speaker in English, with superimposed translation. Peter Snow, BBC Television "Newsnight" program. Mr. General Secretary, I represent the BBC. If you are unable to negotiate an end to the arms race in space, will you be able to keep up with U.S. technology in this field, or will you be left behind?

Gorbachev. Here you have touched on a very interesting question. I have tried to say to Mr. President in a frank and direct conversation that, as it seems to me, much in U.S. policy in relation to the Soviet Union is based on misconceptions. In one case, they have it in their minds, that by the arms race, by continuing it, they will exhaust the Soviet Union economically, weaken its influence in the world, and thus give the United States of America a free hand. History has shamed these prophets. There was a time when our society had different potential and capacities. Now we have tremendous capacities, and this misconception is simply a hindrance to conducting a realistic policy. There have been misconceptions in the military sphere, also. They tried to overtake us, they invented the intercontinental ballistic missile; the response came, with a little time lag, but it came. Then multiple warheads appeared. The response came. We have always found a response.

It seems to me that there is an illusion in military circles, which has apparently been transmitted in some degree to political circles, and in particular possibly to the President—though I am not asserting that this is so, but we have formed this impression—that, no, the United

States has a certain lead in certain aspects of technology, in particular as regards computer technology and radio technology. Again there appears the desire to seize this and achieve an advantage; and here again that fine winged phrase resounds through the air—Johnson's phrase, President Johnson's. He once said, long ago, that the nation which rules in space will also rule on earth. Some people are rubbing their hands over this; they are so keen, you see, to achieve this world supremacy, to look down on the whole world from above—old ambitions, from those years.

The world has changed a lot in many respects. So if one speaks of this so-called technological superiority which they contemplate realizing with the SDI, thus putting the Soviet Union in a difficult position, this is another misconception. A response will be found. I said to the President: Bear in mind, Mr. President, you do not have simpletons sitting in front of you. And if the President was gripped by this idea, then it was my obligation as general secretary—indeed it is the obligation of all the Soviet leadership—to go thoroughly into this; after all, this is the President's point of view to go into this idea. We considered it and came to the conclusion that if we proceed along this road, and there is a certain proposal from the American side,—let's see, let's study it, in general, let us discuss not the question of not permitting the militarization of space, but what weapons to take into space—then we are against this. We are against the race. We analyzed the other side of the question, too. All right, if the United States does not accept our arguments and our good will, so that we could at least start along the road of a reduction in armaments, the reduction of nuclear armaments, those which now exist, and if they take this other course, we shall of course find a response. And the instructions which the Soviet leadership gave in the past to the competent authorities, organizations, and scientists show that our response will be effective, and less expensive, and that it can be implemented in a shorter period.

But our political choice does not consist of this, not of welcoming such a turn of events, that we should proceed along the road of a suitable response to the SDI, but that we should all the same think over the situation and pursue a responsible policy on the basis of common sense, on the basis of the mood and the longings of people, and not whip up, not complicate, this most acute problem of external international relations.

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256. Address by President Reagan Before a Joint Session of the Congress: Discussion of Arms Control at the Geneva Summit Meeting [Extract], November 21, 1985 [1]

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We discussed nuclear arms and how to reduce them. I explained our proposals for equitable, verifiable, and deep reductions. I outlined my conviction that our proposals would make not just for a world that feels safer but one that is really safer.

And I am pleased to report tonight that General Secretary Gorbachev and I did make a measure of progress here. While we still have a long way to go, we're still heading in the right direction. We moved arms control forward from where we were last January, when the Soviets returned to the table. We are both instructing our negotiators to hasten their vital work and the world is waiting for results.

Specifically, we agreed in Geneva that each side should move to cut offensive nuclear arms by 50% in appropriate categories. In our joint statement, we called for early progress on this, turning the talks toward our chief goal—offensive reductions. We called for an interim accord on intermediate-range nuclear forces, leading, I hope, to the complete elimination of this class of missiles. And all of this with tough verification.

We also made progress in combating, together, the spread of nuclear weapons—an arms control area in which we've cooperated effectively over the years. We are also opening a dialogue on combating the spread and use of chemical weapons, while moving to ban them altogether. Other arms control dialogues—in Vienna on conventional forces and in Stockholm on lessening the chances for surprise attack in Europe—also received a boost. And finally, we agreed to begin to work on risk reduction centers, a decision that should give special satisfaction to Senators Nunn and Warner, who so ably promoted this idea.

I described our Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—our research effort that envisions the possibility of defensive systems which could ultimately protect all nations against the danger of nuclear war. This discussion produced a very direct exchange of views.

Mr. Gorbachev insisted that we might use a strategic defense system to put offensive weapons into space and establish nuclear superiority.

I made it clear that SDI has nothing to do with offensive weapons; that, instead, we are investigating non-nuclear defense systems that would only threaten offensive missiles, not people. If our research succeeds, it will bring much closer the safer, more stable world that we seek. Nations could defend themselves against missile attack and

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[1] Department of State, Current Policy No. 766, p. 2.

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mankind, at long last, escape the prison of mutual terror. This is my dream.

So I welcomed the chance to tell Mr. Gorbachev that we are a nation that defends rather than attacks, that our alliances are defensive, not offensive. We don't seek nuclear superiority. We do not seek a first-strike advantage over the Soviet Union. Indeed, one of my fundamental arms control objectives is to get rid of first-strike weapons altogether. And this is why we've proposed a 50% reduction in the most threatening nuclear weapons, especially those that could carry out a first strike.

I went further in expressing our peaceful intentions. I described our proposal in the Geneva negotiations for a reciprocal program of open laboratories in strategic defense research. We're offering to permit Soviet experts to see firsthand that SDI does not involve offensive weapons. American scientists would be allowed to visit comparable facilities of the Soviet strategic defense program, which, in fact, has involved much more than research for many years.

Finally, I reassured Mr. Gorbachev on another point. I promised that if our research reveals that a defense against nuclear missiles is possible, we would sit down with our allies and the Soviet Union to see how, together, we could replace all strategic ballistic missiles with such a defense, which threatens no one.

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257. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolutions on a Comprehensive Test Ban, November 21, 1985 [1]

The Soviet delegation wishes to explain its position on draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1,[2] L.49 [3] and L.73,[4] all relating to the question of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to a general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing, and has worked consistently towards that end. Accordingly, we gauge draft resolutions by the extent to which they aim at achieving that goal.

The Soviet delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1, sponsored by Mexico and several other countries, since it is intended to bring about an early start to negotiations on that

[1] A/C.1/40/PV.45, pp. 7–12.

[2] I.e., the draft resolution that was adopted on December 12 as General Assembly Resolution 40/80 A.

[3] This draft resolution, also sponsored by Mexico as well as several other countries, later became General Assembly Resolution 40/80 B.

[4] This was a New Zealand draft resolution whose cosponsors included Australia, other South Pacific states, and the Scandinavian states. It subsequently became General Assembly Resolution 40/81.

subject in the Conference on Disarmament. It names as the goal of those negotiations a treaty to achieve the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions.

In that connection, we must observe that, in our view, the goal of negotiations should be the preparation of a draft treaty that would effectively ban all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States everywhere and would contain provisions, acceptable to all, preventing the circumvention of this ban by means of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. That formulation, contained in draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.42,[5] submitted by the delegation of Hungary, is better balanced and takes into account the views of a broad range of States.

The Soviet delegation takes a favourable view of the idea of a moratorium on nuclear explosions, as set out in paragraph 7 of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1. Unfortunately, the text of the draft resolution does not state the objective fact that on 6 August 1985 the Soviet Union unilaterally declared a moratorium on such explosions,[6] in response to resolution 39/52 of 1984. We are grateful to the representative of Mexico, who in his statement today took a very favourable view of the initiative taken by the Soviet Union in declaring that moratorium.

As to verification of such a moratorium, the current technological state of the art makes it possible easily to determine whether or not nuclear explosions are being detonated. Of course, if agreement is reached on a prohibition of nuclear weapons everywhere and for all time, it will be possible to look for other mutually acceptable means of verification.

We have reservations also concerning another draft resolution introduced by Mexico, draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.49, which seeks to convert the 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water into a comprehensive ban on test explosions.[7] We take an extremely positive view of the 1963 Moscow Treaty and are in favour of strengthening it and of increasing the number of its signatories until all nuclear States have become Parties to it. It is well known that two nuclear Powers, France and China, are not Parties to the Moscow Treaty. We would favour a tripartite prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing, but with the additional participation of the other two nuclear States. Nevertheless, we shall vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.49.

We have already noted that draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73, introduced by New Zealand, urges the beginning of negotiations on a test ban. We welcome this as a step in the right direction, although we feel that in the proposed programme of work for the proposed *ad hoc* committee excessive stress is placed on the question of verification.

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[5] Cosponsored by 12 Communist states, including the USSR, this draft resolution was subsequently adopted as G.A. Resolution 40/88.

[6] See Gorbachev's statement of July 29 in Document 126.

[7] For the Treaty text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.

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In paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73, as in previous similar draft resolutions, it is proposed that verification elements, including an international seismic network and an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity, be established apart from the development, and prior to the conclusion, of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests. For reasons it has stated repeatedly in the past, the Soviet delegation cannot agree with this approach to the question. We therefore request that a separate vote be taken on paragraph 5 of this draft resolution. We shall vote against that paragraph. If paragraph 5 is adopted, we shall have to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

We also have objections to paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73, whose recommended programme of work for an *ad hoc* committee of the Conference on Disarmament is improper, particularly since it is not in keeping with the position of the socialist countries, as set forth in the documents of the Conference on Disarmament.

258. Statement by the British Representative (Cromartie) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolutions on a Comprehensive Test Ban, November 21, 1985 [1]

I should like to explain why my delegation will vote against draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35,[2] L.42 [3] and L.73.[4]

The British Government understands the wish of many Member States to see early negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. We continue to believe, however, that an essential preliminary to the beginning of negotiations is the reaching of some agreement on how to solve the outstanding and serious problems of verification. I note that the communiqué issued on 22 October 1985 by Commonwealth leaders meeting in Nassau, Bahamas,

> called upon nuclear-weapon States to facilitate and pursue vigorously through the Conference on Disarmament the early resolution of outstanding problems, including the problem of verification, over a comprehensive test-ban treaty.[5]

We strongly endorse this approach to that problem, which continues to present a major and substantive obstacle to the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban. A comprehensive test ban or moratorium on nuclear tests which is not adequately verifiable would be worse than useless.

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[1] A/C.1/40/PV.45, p. 14–16.
[2] See *n.* 2 to *supra*.
[3] *Ibid.*, *n.* 5.
[4] *Ibid.*, *n.* 4.
[5] Document 210.

My delegation participated actively in the working group set up by the then Committee on Disarmament in 1982 and 1983. In recent years we have submitted three detailed technical papers in the Conference on Disarmament, but they have, regrettably, not yet been discussed because of the refusal of some delegations to renew the mandate of the working group as an *ad hoc* committee in the 1984 and 1985 sessions of the Conference.

At the 1984 session, in an effort to resume substantive work on this issue in the Conference on Disarmament, my delegation joined with others in proposing a broader draft mandate for an *ad hoc* committee. At the 1985 session we also joined with others in putting forward a detailed work programme for such a committee, which would include the important issue of scope, which remains to be resolved, as well as that of verification.

This programme of work remains on the table at the Conference on Disarmament, and we hope that the interval before the Conference's next session will give delegations time to reconsider their approaches so that a practical discussion of the issues can begin again.

Finally, my delegation cannot support draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.49 [6] since it follows from what I have just said that we should not favour a meeting of States parties to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty [7] for the purpose suggested.

259. Statement by the U.S. Representative (Lowitz) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolutions on a Comprehensive Test Ban, November 21, 1985 [1]

The United States wishes to explain its votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35,[2] L.49 [3] and L.73,[4] all of which address the issue of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

It is well known that a comprehensive test ban continues to be a long-term objective of the United States arms control policy. Such a ban should be achieved in the context of broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities and expanded confidence-building measures.

Additionally, of course, the United States recognises the necessity for maintaining an effective deterrent. My Government has taken an important step towards that goal by pursuing with a sense of great urgency deep, equitable and verifiable arms reductions during the

[6] See Document 257.
[7] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[1] A/C.1/40/PV.45, pp. 34–37.
[2] See *n.* 2 to Document 257.
[3] *Ibid.*, *n.* 3.
[4] *Ibid.*, *n.* 4.

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course of the negotiations in Geneva with the Government of the Soviet Union. We are confident that progress in that forum will open the way towards a comprehensive test-ban.

I must also call attention to an additional reason why the United States could not support draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35 and L.49. Those draft resolutions contain paragraphs that imply that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) reached consensus on a call for immediate negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban. A reading of that document clearly establishes that there was no such consensus.[5] The United States is of course fully committed to the implementation of the NPT.[6] The recent Review Conference demonstrated once more the importance of that Treaty.

In addition, the United States voted in favour of operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73. My Government has consistently supported, and has actively contributed to, the development and improvement of the seismic monitoring network. That effort centred in the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament should go forward.

The United States looks forward to being able to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban, but such negotiation must rest upon a sound foundation, not upon emotion, however well intentioned, and not on the basis of inaccurate scientific information. We intend to continue to devote large sums of money to the scientific research and development of seismic and other technologies that will serve as a basis for a sound régime of verification for nuclear testing. We hope that other nations will co-operate in the proper use of this technology for verification.

We particularly regretted, in this respect, the declining by the Soviet Union of our invitation to be present, with whatever equipment it deemed necessary, at a recent nuclear test. We invite all other nations to join us in building such a foundation for a comprehensive test-ban.

260. Statement by the U.S. Representative (Akalovsky) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, November 22, 1985 [1]

The United States will abstain from the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.68/Rev.1 as a whole and will vote against its paragraphs 5 and 9.[2]

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[5] See Document 179.
[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[1] A/C.1/40/PV.47, pp. 12–15.
[2] This draft resolution was introduced by Egypt. It was sponsored also by Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe.

While draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.22/Rev.1 [3] reflected my Government's views on outer space arms control issues in a satisfactory way, my delegation was more than willing to bend every effort to achieve the objective of a single resolution on this agenda item—a draft resolution that could be adopted by consensus. We regret that such a consensus resolution has not been achieved. That it has not been, we are convinced, was not through lack of effort on the part of my delegation or of most other delegations.

With regard to operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/40.L.68/Rev.1, my delegation most strongly objects to certain wording contained therein. It is clear that the paragraph in question has been included to give some recognition to subjects associated with agenda item 145.[4] We see no merit in those proposals, and saw no need for any paragraph in this draft resolution that implied otherwise.

Beyond that, however, the United States believes that it is totally inappropriate for the First Committee to consider the issue of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space; that is the responsibility of the Special Political Committee under agenda item 76. Since the Special Political Committee's consideration of item 76 is based on the consensus procedure, the effect of such action by the First Committee is to denigrate the functions of the Special Political Committee, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and a 25-year tradition in the United Nations of dealing with matters relating to co-operation in peaceful uses according to consensus. For the body to countenance the linking of the question of preventing an arms race in space with the issue of peaceful co-operation in space is fraught with danger. Those who value such peaceful co-operation and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, we believe should stand up and speak out against that paragraph.

With reference to operative paragraph 9 of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.68/Rev.1, a certain number of delegations maintained that balanced language—language that would not prejudice the position of any group in the Conference on Disarmament—was unacceptable. Such language, we believe, was within reach. I would note in this regard as well that the language of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.22/Rev.1 avoided intervention in the internal consultations and decision-making of the Conference on Disarmament and was consistent with

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Par. 5 requests the Secretary General to invite member states to submit their views on the possibility of enhancing international cooperation in preventing an outer space arms race "and the peaceful use of outer space, including the desirability of establishing relevant machinery for that purpose . . . ." Par. 9 urges the Soviet Union and the United States "to pursue their bilateral negotiations [on an agreement on outer space] in a constructive spirit . . . and to advise the Conference on Disarmament regularly of the progress of their bilateral sessions. . . ." The draft resolution was later adopted as General Assembly Resolution 40/87.

[3] See Document 224.

[4] Agenda item 145 included the Soviet proposal and draft resolution in Documents 141 and 142.

the conclusions set forth in paragraph 56 of the 1985 Final Report of the Conference's *Ad Hoc* Committee on Outer Space.[5]

For those reasons, my delegation must record its opposition to paragraphs 5 and 9 and its abstention on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.68/Rev.1 as a whole.

261. Report by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to the Supreme Soviet: The Geneva Summit Meeting [Extracts], November 27, 1985 [1]

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I have already had occasion to speak of my first impressions of the talks with the U.S. President at the press conference in Geneva.[2] The final document of the meeting, the joint statement, is also well known.[3] Today, speaking at this session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, I would like to appraise the results and the significance of the Geneva meeting in the context of the present-day situation, taking into account the experience of the past, and the prospects for the future and the tasks we have to solve. First of all I must say that the path to the Geneva dialogue was long and not easy for many reasons.

The U.S. Administration that came to power at the beginning of the eighties openly took a course toward confrontation, rejecting the very possibility of a positive development of Soviet-U.S. relations. I think that everyone recalls the intensity of the anti-Soviet rhetoric of those years, the "strong-arm" nature of the U.S. ruling circles. The joint efforts of many years to create the necessary minimum of confidence in these relations were committed to oblivion. Almost all the threads of bilateral cooperation were sundered. Detente itself was declared as being counter to U.S. interests. Having taken up a course toward military superiority over the USSR, the administration began the realization of programs for re-equipping the United States with nuclear and other arms. The deployment [*razvertyvaniye*] of U.S. first-strike missiles began in Western Europe. A situation was created which was fraught with a high level of military-political uncertainty and its attendant risks. And finally, in addition, the "star wars" program, the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" appeared. Washington seized on this idea, not giving much thought to the grave consequences which are inevitable in the event of its realization.

The idea of taking weapons into space is extremely dangerous for all the peoples of the world, without exception. But we know something

[5] Document 155.

[1] *Pravda* in Russian, November 28, 1985, first edition, pp. 1–2; FBIS *Daily Report*, December 3, 1985, vol. III, pp. R13–R23.

[2] Document 255.

[3] Document 254.

else: This policy of the United States must inevitably lead to a clash with realities. That is what happened. The Soviet Union, together with its allies, stated clearly: Military superiority over us will not be permitted. Even among the allies of the United States there arose confusion in the face of this evident disregard for the interests of their security and Washington's readiness to put everything at stake in pursuit of the chimera of military superiority. This course aroused serious doubts even in the United States itself. The proclamation of the plan for the preparation of "star wars" resounded like an alarm throughout the planet. Those who thought that their line toward a confrontation would become the determinant one for international development were mistaken. I will add, perhaps, in this connection, that dreams of world domination are false from the outset. Both as far as the purpose and the means are concerned. Just as the idea of perpetual motion comes from a lack of knowledge of the elementary laws of nature, imperial claims grow from a picture of the present-day world that is far removed from reality.

The Soviet Union has coupled its firm rebuff to the U.S. line toward disturbing the military-strategic balance with the promotion of large-scale peace initiatives and a display of restraint and constructive attitude in the approach to the central issues of peace and security. By our initiatives, and these amount to quite a few, we have clearly demonstrated what we are striving for in the world—aims which we call the United States and its allies to strive for. These actions of the USSR have met with the warm approval of the world public, and they have been highly appraised by the governments of many countries. Influenced by these factors, Washington has been forced to maneuver. A show of love of peace has appeared in the statements of the U.S. Administration. It has not been backed up by facts, but the very fact that it has been made is symptomatic.

At the beginning of the year, at our initiative, an accord was reached on new talks between the USSR and the United States, talks which were to interlink the whole complex of space and nuclear armaments, and to make their goal the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to end it on earth.[4]

The atmosphere of Soviet-U.S. relations, to some extent, and the international behavior of the United States began to undergo change, and thus of course could not be taken into account when examining the question of the possibility of a summit meeting.

In making such a decision our firm premise was that at the talks, central place must be given to those questions which determine our relations and also the whole world situation, questions of security. And at the same time we took into account the political and strategic realities in Europe and in the world, the opinion of our friends and allies, the positions of governments and public circles of many countries, and insistent appeals to the Soviet Union to do everything

[4] Document 3.

possible so that the summit might take place. We realized how much hope was being pinned on this meeting throughout the world, and we took specific steps to improve the international climate and to make it more favorable for the meeting.

At the talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva we put forward specific, radical proposals. What is the gist of these proposals? We proposed primarily to ban completely space strike weapons. We proposed this because starting an arms race in space, and even the deployment [*razvertyvaniye*] in near-earth space of antimissile systems alone, would not strengthen anyone's security. Covered by a space shield, nuclear attack weapons would become still more dangerous. The appearance of space strike weapons could turn the present strategic balance into strategic chaos, provoke a feverish arms race in all directions and undermine one of the most important foundations of its limitation, the ABM Treaty.[5] As a result, mistrust among countries would grow, but security would be considerably reduced.

Further, together with a complete ban on space strike weapons, we proposed a one-half reduction of all existing USSR and U.S. nuclear weapons capable of reaching one another's territory, and to limit each side's overall number of nuclear warheads on them to a ceiling of 6,000 units. That is a radical reduction, measurable in thousands of nuclear warheads. Such an approach is just: It embraces all the weapons which make up the strategic correlation of forces. It makes it possible to take into account the volume of the nuclear threat really existent for each side, independent of how and from where the nuclear warheads are delivered to their territory—by missile or by aircraft, from one's own territory or from allies' territory.

We regard that 50 percent reduction of the nuclear weapons of the USSR and the United States as a start: We are ready to go further, until complete destruction of nuclear weapons with the participation, of course, of other nuclear states also. Understandably, especial unease is provoked among the European peoples by the nuclear arms race. We well understand this unease. Europe is saturated with nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union advocates complete liberation of Europe from nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical. But the United States and its NATO partners do not agree to this. Then we proposed starting merely interim solutions, later to be extended to further reductions. We are convinced that our proposals are in keeping with the European peoples' hopes of weakening the nuclear threat and increasing Europe's security. I want to stress the fundamental aspect of the matter: In three spheres of the talks—on space, strategic offensive weapons, and medium-range nuclear weapons—we are not making any proposals to the United States that would reduce its security.

Moreover, our proposals provide the opportunity for the resolution of such matters which the U.S. side also places among its "particular concerns". For example, much is being said about Soviet interconti-

[5] For the text of the Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

nental ballistic missiles. Our proposals envisage that the number of these missiles will be reduced; the proportion of their warheads [*boyegolovka*] within the overall level of nuclear charges [*zaryad*] will be limited.

Or, to give another example: There is much noise made in the West over the Soviet SS–20 missiles. We are proposing to reduce these considerably in the context of resolving the problem of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

The nuclear weapons of Britain and France are the stumbling block. They say that these cannot be discussed at Soviet-U.S. talks. We are ready to seek a solution to this: We propose a direct exchange of views with these countries regarding their nuclear weapons.

The Soviet proposals have been met with a broad and positive reaction worldwide. Behind them is the prestige of the Warsaw Pact states who unanimously support our constructive stance. To a considerable extent, also in accord with our approach is the joint statement by the leaders of six countries—Argentina, Mexico, Tanzania, India, Sweden and Greece.[6] The Soviet initiative was perceived with approval and hope by the communist and workers' parties, major public organizations of various countries and continents, world-famous scientists, eminent political and military figures. It received a positive reaction from the majority of parties in the Socialist International, not to mention the thousands of letters from Soviet and foreign citizens which arrived for me on the eve of and during the meeting in Geneva. I would like to take this opportunity to express gratitude to their authors for the good wishes, for the advice and support, for their profound and sincere concern for the preservation of peace. [applause]

On the eve of the meeting, the Americans put forward their counterproposals. This is, in itself, a positive fact. One of our numerous initiatives evoked a favorable response. Much has been written in the press about the essence of these counterproposals. I shall not repeat their content. I shall only say that they are proposals which only go halfway, and in many ways are unfair. They are based on a one-sided approach, obviously dictated by a desire for military superiority for the United States and NATO as a whole. But the main point is that the U.S. position does not allow for a ban on the making of offensive space weapons. On the contrary, they want to legalize their creation. The position adopted by the U.S. side on the matter of "star wars" is the main obstacle on the path toward an agreement on arms control. And this is not our opinion alone. The Governments of France, Denmark, Norway, Greece, the Netherlands, Canada and Australia also refused to take part in the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative." On the eve of the Geneva meeting, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon the leaders of the USSR and the United States and some of its allies which considered it possible not to support this

[6] Document 10.

clear appeal from the world community.[7] This is a fact, which, as they say, needs no comment.

One should, perhaps, also recall that there were powerful political forces at work in the United States, who were doing everything they could to at least emasculate the content of the meeting, to bring to nought its significance, even to wreck it. I think many people have fresh recollection of actions such as the testing of an anti-satellite system, the appearance of the battleship "Iowa", carrying long-range cruise missiles, in the Baltic, the forced deployment of Pershings in the FRG, the decision to create binary chemical weapons, and finally, the adoption of yet another record military budget, and so on and so forth.

The President was already on his way to Geneva when the letter from the U.S. Defense Secretary became known, which entreated him not to agree to any accord with the USSR that would confirm the treaties on the limitation of strategic arms and antimissile defense, in other words, leaving the United States full freedom of action in all directions of the arms race, both on earth and in space.[8] But was the matter really limited to the Pentagon alone? A sort of order, given to the U.S. President by U.S. ultra-rightwing circles represented by the ideological headquarters of the Heritage Fund, did not escape our attention. The President was instructed to continue the arms race, not to give the Soviet Union the opportunity to switch funds to the realization of socioeconomic programs, and to strive, in the final analysis, to squeeze the USSR out of international politics. These gentlemen went so far as to set the U.S. Administration the task of forcing us to change our system and our constitution.

These are familiar themes, comrades. We have had to listen to all this many times already. In a word, there were a good many attacks. All the same, we made a decision in favor of the meeting with the U.S. President. We made it because we did not have the right to neglect even the slightest chance restraining the dangerous development of events in the world. We made the decision realizing that if we do not manage to start a direct and frank conversation now, tomorrow it will be a hundred times more difficult, and maybe altogether too late.

There is no argument, the differences between us are enormous. However, in the world today the interlinkage and interdependence between us are so great. The acuteness of the times we are living through does not leave the leaders of the USSR and the United States, the peoples of the USSR and the United States, any alternative but to comprehend the great science of living together. From our very first tete-a-tete with the President—and such conversations occupied a great deal of the meeting in Geneva—the question was directly posed

[7] Resolution 40/18 of November 18.
[8] Document 232. For the texts of the treaties and accompanying documents referred to here, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–207. and *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

that the Soviet delegation had come to seek the solution of the most burning problem which is at the center of international life, the problem of preventing nuclear war and curbing the arms race. As I said to the President, therein lies the basic point of our meeting and this will also determine its results.

I must stress that the talks in Geneva were at times very pointed, I would say frank to the utmost. Here it is impossible to outwit each other or to escape with political and propaganda cliches. Too much depends on these pivotal questions of war and peace. During the talks the U.S. side stubbornly insisted on the realization of its SDI program. We were told that the issue is of the creation of purely defensive means, which are allegedly in no way a weapon. It was said that these means will help to stabilize the situation and get rid of nuclear weapons altogether. It was even proposed that these means be shared sometime in the foreseeable future, to open laboratory doors to one another. We frankly told the President that we do not agree with such assessments. We have carefully analyzed all these questions and arrived at the unequivocal conclusion that space weapons are not at all defensive; that they are capable of giving rise to the dangerous illusion that a nuclear first-strike can be made from behind a space "shield," and a counterstrike be prevented, or at least attenuated. What guarantee is there that space weapons themselves would not be used as a means to knock out targets on earth? There is every indication that the U.S. antimissile space system is being planned not as a shield at all, but as part of a single offensive system.

Naturally, we cannot agree with the assertion that the space systems envisaged in his program are not weapons at all, just as we cannot rely on the assurance that the United States will share with us what they succeed in setting up in this sphere. If the laboratories are to be opened, then it is only for purposes of verification of compliance with the ban on the creation of offensive space weapons, and certainly not to legitimize them.

We are told of the desire to remove the fear of missiles, to secure the elimination of nuclear weapons overall. Such a wish can only be welcomed. It fully corresponds with the aims of our policy. It is, however, a lot simpler to eliminate these weapons without creating offensive space systems for this purpose. Why spend tens or hundreds of billions of dollars and pile up more mountains of space weapons along with the nuclear weapons? What is the sense in that? I asked the President, does the U.S. leadership really seriously suppose that while U.S. space weapons are being set up, we will reduce our strategic potential, and help the United States to weaken it with our own hands? It is useless to count on that. It is precisely the reverse that will happen. To restore balance the Soviet Union will be forced to raise the efficiency, precision, and might of its weapons in order to neutralize, if this is required, the electronic space machine of "star wars" being created by the Americans.

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Will the Americans feel more comfortable if the echelons of space weapons planned by the U.S. is complemented in space by our weapons? People in the United States surely cannot hope that they will retain a monopoly in space. At the least, all this is not serious. However, the U.S. Administration is still not abandoning the temptation to try out the possibility of gaining military supremacy.

Right now, by venturing into an arms race in space, they intend to outpace us in electronics and computers.

But, as has been the case many times in the past, we will find a response. It will be an effective response, sufficiently quick and quite likely cheaper than the U.S. program. We also said this to the President with all clarity. [prolonged applause]

I think that new approaches are needed, a fresh look at many things and, the main thing, political will from the leadership of both countries, for a real upturn in our relations, which would serve the interests of the USSR and the United States and the interests of the peoples of the world. The USSR, and I stressed this in Geneva, does not feel emnity for the United States. It respects the American people. We do not base our policy upon a desire to encroach upon the national interests of the United States. I would say more. We, for example, would not want to change the strategic balance in our favor. We would not want this because this kind of situation will increase the suspicion of the other side and increase the instability of the overall situation. The way things are [*zhizn skladyvaetsya tak*], both our countries will have to get used to strategic parity as the natural state. We will have to reach a common understanding of what level of weapons on each side could be considered relatively sufficient, from the point of view of its reliable defense. We are convinced that the level of this sufficiency is much lower than that which the USSR and United States in fact possess at the moment. And this means that weighty practical steps for the limitation and reduction of weapons are perfectly possible, measures which not only will not lessen, but strengthen security both for the USSR and the United States, and the entire strategic stability of the world.

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How then is one to assess the main results of the Geneva meeting? The meeting was undoubtedly a significant event. Direct, clear and specific talks are useful; the opportunity to compare positions in a well-defined manner is useful. Too many explosive and acute problems had built up. We needed to discuss these seriously and attempt to move out of the impasse.

We value the personal contact established with the U.S. President. A dialogue between top leaders is always a moment of truth in relations between states. It is important that such a dialogue has taken place. In the present difficult times it is, in itself, a stabilizing factor.

But we are realists, and we must say straight out that at the meeting we did not succeed in finding solutions for the very important questions connected with ending the arms race. The unwillingness of the U.S. leadership to give up the "star wars" program made it impossible for specific accords to be reached at Geneva on real disarmament and, primarily, on the central problem of nuclear and space armaments.

The meeting did not result in any reduction in the amount of armaments stockpiled by both sides. The arms race is continuing. This cannot but cause disappointment. The USSR and the United States are still divided by major differences on a number of other fundamental questions concerning the world situation and the development of events in individual regions.

But we are far from belittling the importance of the accords reached in Geneva. I will recall the most important of them.

There is, first and foremost, the affirmation in the joint statement of the understanding held in common that nuclear war should never be unleashed and that there can be no victor in one, and the pledge by the USSR and the United States to construct their relations on the basis of this indisputable truth and not to strive for military superiority.[9]

We consider that this understanding, jointly affirmed at summit level, should in practice be used as the basis for the foreign policy of the two states.

As soon as it is recognized that by its very nature nuclear war cannot serve to achieve any rational aims, the stronger should be the incentive for preventing it, for ceasing the development [*razrabotka*] and testing of means of mass annihilation, and for the total liquidation of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons. And the more impermissible it now is to open up new directions for the arms race.

Of course, the joint statement is not a treaty. But it is a fundamental declaration of the positions of the leaders of the two countries, which imposes many obligations. The USSR and the United States also confirmed in precise terms their pledge to promote the enhancement in every possible way of the effectiveness of the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and they came to an agreement on joint practical steps in that direction.

In the current unsettled international situation this has no little significance for maintaining stability in the world, and reducing the risk of nuclear wars flaring up. The joint statement of the leaders of the two countries in favour of a comprehensive and total ban on and destruction of such a barbaric weapon of mass destruction as chemical weapons, has fundamental significance. I would like to hope that the United States in its practical policies will follow this important understanding. The accord of the leadership of the USSR and the United States to contribute jointly with other states participating in the Stockholm Conference to its early completion by adopting a document

[9] Document 254.

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which would include both concrete obligations on the non-use of force and also mutually acceptable measures for strengthening trust, also goes far beyond the framework of Soviet-U.S. relations. One can only welcome the fact that as a result of the meeting a number of useful accords in many areas for the development of bilateral cooperation between the USSR and the United States have appeared. I think that they will serve as a good base for raising the level of trust between our countries and peoples, if of course one takes an attitude of care to what has been worked out, and if one develops everything good that is laid down in it and does not seek artificial reasons to refute it.

Special mention must be made of the significance of the accord achieved in Geneva on the continuation of political contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States, including new meetings at summit level. And so we are right in saying that the overall balance of Geneva is a positive one. The achievement of such a promising [*obnadezhivayushchiy*] result undoubtedly to a decisive extent was contributed to by the constructive, consistent policy of our country. At the same time it would be unfair not to say here also that in the position of the U.S. side at the meeting, certain elements of realism came through, which contributed to the solution of a number of issues.

Of course, the real significance of everything useful that was agreed on in Geneva can only become manifest in practical deeds. In this connection I want to state that the Soviet Union for its part intends, with all determination, not to slacken the pace and in the spirit of honest cooperation with the United States, to continue its attempts to achieve a curtailment of the arms race and a general improvement in the international situation. We are counting on such an approach being manifested also by the United States.

I am sure the work carried out in Geneva will then bear real fruit. [applause]

Such is our assessment of this event and its role in international relations. I am pleased to be able to say that this assessment is shared by our allies, the fraternal socialist countries, as the meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact member countries in Prague immediately after the conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. summit negotiations, bears witness with utmost clarity. The participants in the Prague meeting stressed that the situation, of course, is still not a simple one.[10] The struggle to improve it goes on, but the conditions of this struggle—this one can say already today—have gotten better. The meeting in Geneva is an important link in our long-term, joint, closely coordinated efforts which aimed to secure peace.

One naturally poses the question: How does one proceed in light of the results of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue in Geneva? As I have already said, we attribute great importance to the agreements reached in

[10] *Pravda*, November 22, 1985, p. 1; *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVII, No. 47 (December 18, 1985), pp. 5–6.

Geneva on holding new Soviet-U.S. summit meetings. I would like to stress that we do not approach this matter in a formal manner. What is important is not just the fact that there will be another meeting between the leaders of the two countries: The important thing is what its results will be. The peoples will await practical progress along the path outlined in Geneva; we shall strive towards precisely this. One must start preparing even now for the next Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, first and foremost in the sphere of practical policy.

In order not to make it more difficult to attain future accords, we are convinced that both sides must first and foremost refrain from actions which undermine what has been achieved in Geneva; must refrain from actions which would block negotiations and erode the existing factors limiting the arms race. This assumes, in particular, honest and precise observance of the agreement limiting antimissile defense systems, and further mutual observance by the sides of the relevant provisions of SALT-II.

The main thing, however, is of course to create the possibility of a genuine halt to the arms race and to start practical steps to cut the stockpiled nuclear arsenals. Does such a possibility exist? We are firmly convinced that it does. It does exist. It is true that at the present time our proposals, and the U.S. ones, on reducing nuclear weapons diverge in many respects. But we do not dramatize this fact. Compromise solutions are possible here, and we are ready to seek them. There is no doubt that with a development of events such as this, questions of reliable monitoring—in which the Soviet Union has a very direct interest—would also be resolved. One cannot rely on words here, all the more so when it is disarmament and the country's defense which is involved.

But in order to solve all these questions it is absolutely necessary to tightly close the door through which weapons might penetrate outer space. Without this a radical reduction in nuclear armaments is impossible. I want to say this with all responsibility, on behalf of our people and its supreme body of power. [prolonged applause]

An accord is attainable if it takes into account the interests of both sides. The stubborn desire of the American side to go on with the creation [*sozdaniye*] of space weapons can have only one end result—the blocking of the opportunity of ending the nuclear arms race. Naturally, such an outcome would give rise to bitter disappointment among the peoples of the whole world, including, I am sure, the American people.

Today there is a real opportunity to sharply reduce the threat of a nuclear war, and subsequently to eliminate fully the possibility of one. It would be a fatal mistake to let this opportunity pass. We hope that what was said in Geneva about the SDI is not the last word from the U.S. side.

President Reagan and I made an arrangement to instruct our delegations at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space armaments to speed up the talks and to conduct them on the basis of the January accord

between the two countries. Thus, it has been reaffirmed by both sides at summit level: An arms race in outer space must be prevented by tackling this question in conjunction with a reduction of nuclear armaments. This is precisely what the Soviet Union will be striving for, and this is precisely what we are urging the United States to emulate. By fulfilling in practice the commitments we have jointly undertaken, we will justify the hopes of the peoples of the whole world. [prolonged applause]

The longer it goes on, the more acute becomes the question of ending nuclear tests, first and foremost because an end would be made to the creation [*sozdaniye*] of new and the perfection of existing types of nuclear weapons. Because, further, without tests, without modernization, the process of the dying out of nuclear arsenals and the phasing out of nuclear weapons would gradually proceed. Because, finally, it can no longer be permitted that nuclear explosions—they have amounted to hundreds—disfigure our beautiful earth, swelling the alarm as to how future generations will live. That is why the Soviet Union announced its moratorium on all types of nuclear tests through 1 January 1986 [11] and is prepared to extend this moratorium if there is reciprocity from the U.S. side.

We await from the U.S. leadership a concrete and positive decision which would have a very favorable effect on the whole situation, which would in many ways change it and would strengthen trust between our countries. We asked this question of the U.S. President in Geneva. The answer was silence. In reality, there are no reasonable arguments against banning nuclear tests. In fact, there are no arguments at all. Sometimes reference is made to the difficulties of monitoring. But the Soviet Union has clearly demonstrated the total possibility of the implementation of such monitoring by means of national facilities. This year we detected an underground nuclear explosion of extremely small capacity carried out by the United States and not announced by it. We are ready also to examine the possibility of setting up international monitoring. Deserving attention in this connection are the considerations submitted in the message from six states proposing the creation on their territories of special stations for observing the fulfillment of an agreememt on halting tests.

The whole world is raising its voice in favor of halting nuclear tests. At the UN General Assembly a resolution has just been passed calling for such a halt. Only three countries, the United States, Britain, and France, voted against it.[12] This is worthy of deep regret.

But there is still time. I think that the leaders of the United States and the other nuclear powers will take the opportunity which has opened up, proceeding from the interests of peace, and will display the necessary responsibility. I should like to recall that our moratorium

[11] Document 126.
[12] Resolution 40/80 of December 12. The First Committee of the General Assembly adopted it in November.

remains in force and we hope that the discussion of this question at the USSR Supreme Soviet will be assessed as an urgent appeal for a realistic and immediate ban on all nuclear tests.

Altogether, the Soviet Union proposes an all-embracing complex of measures which would block all the roads of the arms race, whether in space or on earth, whether in nuclear, chemical, or conventional weapons. The specific proposals in this respect are known in Vienna, in Geneva, and in Stockholm. They remain in force and retain all their topicality.

Europe should be mentioned separately. The task of preventing the further raising of the level of military confrontation is more acute here than ever before. The European house is a house in common, where geography and history have closely interlinked the fates of dozens of countries and their peoples. The Europeans can only preserve their house and make it better and safer by collective efforts, following the sensible standards of international intercourse and co-operation. We proceed on the basis that Europe, which has given so much to the world in the fields of culture, science, technology, and progressive social thought, is capable of setting an example also in solving the highly complex problems of contemporary international life. The foundations for this were laid 10 years ago in Helsinki.[13] In the final analysis, we are most deeply convinced that the whole world, including the United States of America, will gain from the positive development of the situation in Europe. We have been working and shall continue to work for the more energetic consolidation on the long-suffering European Continent of the principles and policy of detente, for overcoming the obstructions of the past and the consequences of the confrontation of recent years.

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262. Agreement Between Brazil and Argentina To Establish a Joint Working Group for Nuclear Cooperation, November 30, 1985 [1]

The President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Dr. José Sarney, and the President of the Argentine Republic, Dr. Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín, following conversations that were held in Puerto Iguazu, Argentina, and the Foz do Iguacu, Brazil, November 29 and 30, 1985.

Considering:

[13] The reference is to the CSCE Final Act, the arms control portions of which may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

[1] ACDA files. The agreement was signed in Foz do Iguacu.

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That nuclear science and technology, in the life of modern countries, are of transcendental value in promoting their social and economic development;

That, for many years, both countries have been actively engaged in the research and the study of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that this effort has required from the two countries substantial investment in order to reach a significant level of knowledge which now allows their respective peoples the possibility of benefiting from the progress derived from the peaceful use of nuclear energy;

That cooperation between Brazil and Argentina will have a multiplier effect on the reciprocal benefits that the two countries will be able to obtain from the peaceful use of nuclear energy; and that it will permit the two countries to face, under better conditions, the growing difficulties involved in the international supply of nuclear equipment and materials;

That the above-mentioned cooperation should remain open to all interested Latin American countries;

Reiterate:

1) Their commitment to the development of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes;

2) Their intention to cooperate closely in all peaceful applications of nuclear energy and to enter into mutual cooperation on aspects they consider convenient to both countries;

3) Their hope that this cooperation be extended to other Latin American countries which have the same objectives;

Declare:

4) Their decision to create a joint working group under the aegis of the Brazilian and Argentine foreign ministries, composed of representatives of their respective nuclear commissions and enterprises, for the encouragement of relations between the two countries in this area, the promotion of nuclear technological development and the creation of mechanisms which will insure the highest interests of peace, security and development in the region, without prejudice to the technological aspects of nuclear cooperation which continue to be regulated by existing instruments.

Based on the above-mentioned objectives, the two Presidents have instructed their respective foreign ministries to convoke a meeting of the working group within a period of 120 days in order to study the procedures aimed at implementing this declaration.

263. Statement by the Chinese Representative (Wang Zhiyun) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Draft Resolutions on a Nuclear Weapons Freeze, November 30, 1985 [2]

The Chinese delegation has maintained all along that, owing to the ever escalating arms race between the two super-Powers with the largest nuclear arsenals, they should bear special responsibility for the achievement of nuclear disarmament. We are of the view that that special responsibility requires that not only should the two super-Powers be the first to stop testing, improving and producing nuclear weapons; they should also take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear arsenals. When they have taken effective action in the field of nuclear disarmament, other nuclear-weapon States should also take corresponding measures. Basing ourselves on that fundamental position, we abstained in the votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.18,[3] L.25[4] and L.44.[5]

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.64,[6] the Chinese delegation voted in favour, for we support its main thrust. However, in our view, this draft resolution fails to mention the special responsibility to be shouldered by the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals, and there is more room for improvement on that point.

264. Statement by President Reagan on the New NATO Proposal Introduced at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, December 5, 1985 [1]

Consistent with the Joint Statement issued by General Secretary Gorbachev and me at the conclusion of the Geneva meeting,[2] and with our efforts to promote a more constructive East-West relationship, we and our NATO allies are introducing in Vienna today a new proposal designed to break the long deadlock on conventional arms reductions in Europe.

Since the early 1970's, NATO has engaged the Warsaw Pact in discussions aimed at limiting the numbers of troops on both sides in central Europe. These discussions, known as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (MBFR), now constitute one of the longest continuously running arms control negotiations in history.

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[2] A/C.1/40/PV.43, pp. 37–38.
[3] See *n.* 2 to Document 251.
[4] *Ibid.*, *n.* 4.
[5] *Ibid.*, *n.* 3.
[6] I.e, a draft resolution introduced by Argentina entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament," which the General Assembly subsequently adopted as Resolution 40/152 P.
[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, December 9, 1985, pp. 1465–1466.
[2] Document 254.

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The NATO allies have consistently tried to move these negotiations forward. In 1982 and 1984, the U.S. and the allies presented new proposals designed to achieve progress in the MBFR negotiations.[3] Regrettably both proposals were rejected by the Warsaw Pact. After extensive national reviews of these talks and their objectives, we and our allies have concluded that a significant and forthcoming new move could provide new impetus to the negotiations.

In an effort to move the negotiations forward, and taking into account expressed Eastern concerns, we have today tabled a new proposal for reductions with effective verification.

The proposed package of verification measures is intended to verify the numbers of troops withdrawn as well as the numbers which will remain. Thus, in exchange for a comprehensive and effective package of verification measures, NATO would be willing to accept the general framework of the February 1985 model proposed by the Soviet Union and its allies for a noncomprehensive agreement.[4] We will no longer insist, as we have since the outset of negotiations, that the sides come to an agreement on Eastern troop levels before treaty signature. Nor will we continue to insist, for now, on a comprehensive approach whereby East and West must agree at the outset on all steps needed to reduce to parity.

In this context, the U.S. is now prepared to accept a reduction of 5,000 U.S. and 11,500 Soviet ground troops in the central European reduction area. These figures reflect the ratio between existing U.S. and Soviet troop levels in the area.

As soon as these reductions are completed, NATO is prepared to accept a commitment by both alliances not to increase forces in central Europe. As verified by implementation of the verification measures, this no-increase commitment would last for 3 years.

The new Western proposal builds on key aspects of the Warsaw Pact's ideas of February 1985. These include a time-limited, noncomprehensive agreement; reductions without prior data agreement on Eastern forces; and a no-increase agreement. The main element which NATO has added is in the area of verification.

Fair, effective, and reciprocal verification measures are essential so that both sides will be able to know whether the terms of the accord are being complied with. This is especially important if we are to accept a no-increase commitment on troops in the area without prior agreement on the level of those troops. The Soviets have contended that such prior agreement was unnecessary and that Western concerns could be satisfied through implementation of verification measures. This new Western proposal offers them an opportunity to pursue that approach. Agreement on all aspects of the proposed verification meas-

[3] For statements about these proposals, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 418–421, 908–909, and *ibid. 1984*, pp. 322–324, 421–422. An article on the 1982 proposal may be found *ibid., 1982*, pp. 869–871.

[4] A Soviet statement on this proposal is printed in Document 23.

ures would, of course, have to be reached prior to the signature of a treaty.

We urge the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries to consider carefully the details of our proposal. This NATO initiative can help fulfill the commitments made at the Geneva summit and produce real progress in Vienna which would reduce forces in central Europe.

265. Address by the Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze): Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, December 5, 1985 [1]

We stand today at the edge of what we hope can be a fresh start in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, ushered in by the summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. We are poised not just between rounds III and IV of the Geneva talks but also, in a sense, between the first summit and the beginning of preparations for the second.

It does not detract from the worthwhile nature of the November summit to reflect on the difficult issues which continue to divide the two sides at the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space arms. It is my intent to review the positions of the two sides in the talks and to dwell for a moment on those differences which appear most intractable.

The November summit and the autumn events leading up to it represent not only the possibility for a fresh start in the U.S.-Soviet relationship but mark what we hope is the beginning of a genuine process of give-and-take in the nuclear and space arms talks. The barriers to agreement are, however, substantial.

Soviet Counterproposal

The first break in the ice came at the end of September with the tabling of a Soviet counterproposal to our March 1985 offer. While the effects of that counterproposal would be inequitable and destabilizing, it also contains, as the President expressed it, "seeds which should be nurtured."

The Soviet offer consists of various bans and freezes, as well as limits on and reductions in offensive forces.

- "Strategic delivery systems" would be reduced by 50%, to a level of 1,250 for the U.S.S.R. and 1,680 for the United States. However, the Soviet definition of strategic delivery vehicles would also cover, on the U.S. side, LRINF missiles and "medium-range" nu-

[1] Department of State, Current Policy No. 770. The address was delivered before the Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C.

clear-capable aircraft in Europe, in Asia, and on all of our aircraft carriers, while about 2,000 comparable Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles, as well as 300 Backfire bombers, would not be limited. Thus, were the United States to retain equality in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, it would have to cut LRINF missiles and dual-capable aircraft to 430, 20% of the current Soviet level. If the United States were to retain LRINF missiles and dual-capable aircraft at current levels, it would have to cut strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to less than half the allowed Soviet number.

- "Nuclear charges" would be sharply reduced to a level of 6,000. However, they would be defined to include the gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles carried by U.S. heavy and medium-range bombers. By counting such bomber weapons as equivalent to Soviet ballistic missile RVs, despite the massive Soviet air defenses faced by bombers and the lower readiness rate of bombers compared to ballistic missiles, the United States would be significantly penalized.
- "Charges" on any one component (that is, ICBMs, SLBMs, or bombers) would be reduced to 60% of the total, leading to a maximum level of 3,600 ICBM RVs. Although this sublimit would represent a major reduction, Soviet prompt counterforce capabilities would actually grow against the reduced number of U.S. hardened facilities.
- All cruise missiles with ranges above 600 kilometers would be banned, terminating the U.S. ALCM, SLCM and GLCM programs.
- All "new" nuclear delivery systems would be banned, probably precluding the U.S. D–5 and Midgetman missiles and advanced technology bomber, while allowing the Soviet SS–25, SS–X–24 and SS–NX–23 missiles and Blackjack heavy bomber.
- Research, development, and deployment of "space-strike arms" would be banned, halting the U.S. SDI program and allowing many Soviet ABM activities to continue.

In sum, despite significant reductions, the Soviet counterproposal would block U.S. strategic defense programs while allowing Soviet programs to proceed; it would halt the modernization of U.S. strategic offensive forces; and it would include in reductions U.S. systems which defend our allies and exclude Soviet systems which threaten them. The net effect would be a lopsided nuclear balance, a weakened U.S. deterrent, and decreased stability for both sides.

However, in spite of its numerous flaws, the detailed Soviet counterproposal did include the principle of deep cuts in strategic offensive arms and, along with subsequent offers in Geneva, seemed to contemplate an interim INF outcome which would allow for U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe. Building on such positive elements, President Reagan directed that a new U.S. proposal be advanced at the negotiations on November 1.

U.S. November Proposal

Strategic Offensive Arms. The new U.S. proposal builds on the 50% reduction concept in a constructive and equitable way.

- Reentry vehicles on ICBMs and SLBMs would be reduced to a limit of 4,500—about 50% below current levels.
- Reentry vehicles on ICBMs would be reduced to 3,000—about 50% below the current Soviet level and roughly halfway between our earlier proposal for a limit of 2,500 and their proposed limit of 3,600.
- The highest overall strategic ballistic missile throw-weight of either side would be reduced by 50%, in this case, from the Soviet level of 11.9 million pounds. (By way of comparison, the United States has 4.4 million pounds.)
- Contingent upon acceptance of RV and throw-weight limits, the United States would accept equal limits of 1,500 on the number of long-range ALCMs carried by U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers—about 50% below planned U.S. deployment levels.
- For reasons previously alluded to, the United States cannot agree to one common limit on ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs. But if the Soviets were to accept our proposed limit of 4,500 RVs along with our proposed limit of 1,500 ALCMs, it would result in reduction to a total of 6,000 ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs on each side.

With respect to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the United States has proposed a reduction in strategic ballistic missiles to a limit of 1,250–1,450, or about 40–45% below the current higher Soviet level. In this context, the United States could accept further reduction of heavy bomber limits to 350 (compared to our earlier proposal of 400)—about 40% below the current U.S. SALT-accountable level.

For reasons similar to those applying to an RV and ALCM aggregate, the United States cannot agree to the Soviet proposal to include in a single aggregate strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. However, if agreement were reached on a range of 1,250–1,450 for ICBMs and SLBMs, and on heavy bomber limits of 350, it would result in reduction of the total of strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to between 1,600 and 1,800.

The U.S. proposal also contains a ban on the development and deployment of all new heavy strategic ballistic missiles and on the modernization of existing heavy missiles due to the destabilizing character of such systems. All mobile ICBMs would also be banned because of inherent verification difficulties and asymmetries in deployment opportunities between the sides. "Build-down" is the suggested means of implementing the agreed reductions.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces. With respect to intermediate-range nuclear forces, the United States continues to prefer total elimination of the entire class of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles. Thus, our

previous proposals remain on the table. We have also made a new proposal as an interim step toward this goal.

- The United States would cap its own LRINF missile launcher deployments in Europe at the number deployed as of December 31, 1985 (140 Pershing II and GLCM) in return for Soviet agreement to reduce SS–20 missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to the same number.
- There would be freedom to mix between systems deployed as of December 31, 1985, but the mix would be a subject for discussion. For example, we could agree on a mix giving the United States an approximately equal number at around 420 to 450 LRINF missile warheads in NATO Europe (based on 4 warheads per GLCM launcher, 1 warhead per Pershing II launcher, and 3 warheads per SS–20 launcher).
- The Soviets would be required to reduce SS–20 launchers in Asia (not within range of NATO Europe) by the same proportion as the reduction of launchers within range of NATO Europe. The end result would be equal global LRINF warhead limits.
- Appropriate constraints would also be applied to shorter range INF missiles.

Defense and Space. With respect to defense and space, the United States has made clear that we are committed to the SDI research program, which is being carried out in compliance with the ABM Treaty.[2] We seek a Soviet commitment to explore with us now how a cooperative transition could be accomplished, should new defensive technologies prove feasible. We are also proposing that the Soviets join us, even now, in an "open laboratories" arrangement under which both sides would provide information on each other's strategic defense research programs and provide reciprocal opportunities for visiting associated research facilities and laboratories.

Verification and Compliance. The United States continues to stress the critical importance of agreeing to effective means of verification so as to be able to assess with confidence compliance with provisions of all agreements resulting from the negotiations. The importance of verification is more evident now than it was before, given Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements.

The United States continues to stress the need for the Soviets to take necessary steps to correct current instances of noncompliance with existing arms control agreements, for noncompliance is both politically corrosive and militarily hazardous. Restoring compliance is, thus, a critical step.

The Soviet Union must alter current practices which obstruct U.S. verification of compliance. One initial step is for Soviets to alter their current encryption of telemetry and revert to telemetry practices in use

[2] The Treaty is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

at the time of signing the SALT II.[3] This is militarily important in its own right and is also of considerable political significance.

The November Summit

You know the duration of the sessions at the November summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev: some 5 hours of one-on-one dialogue and more than 8 hours of discussion in plenary. The two leaders had an intensive and frank examination of the issues in all four agenda categories. The potential intangible benefits to be derived from the development of personal rapport between these two men is obvious, so I will confine my observations to the language relating to the nuclear and space talks which appeared in the joint statement published at the conclusion of the summit and to a discussion of issues it addresses.[4]

We were able in the joint statement to achieve Soviet commitment to early progress in the negotiations, focusing particularly on "the principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and USSR appropriately applied" and "the idea of an interim INF agreement." As I have already mentioned, these concepts are common elements in the fall proposals of the two sides, but it is not clear that the Soviets do not still link such language to termination of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. SDI is, of course, not mentioned at all in the joint statement. The Soviets were content, in the end, to repeat the language of the joint agreement of January 8, 1985, which included the goal of preventing an arms race in space.[5] We have made abundantly clear to the Soviets that, in our view, SDI is consistent with this goal; we are calling for a cooperative approach to the deployment of defensive systems—as opposed to a "race"—were our research, or theirs, to demonstrate that such systems could help the world get rid of the threat of mutual destruction.

I would highlight another passage in the joint statement: "During the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon." It will be useful for us during the negotiations to have this acknowledgment that effective verification measures must be devised concurrently with the resolution of other issues. It represents another modest step in our efforts to put verification concerns on a par with the reductions or limitations themselves.

One of the less encouraging aspects of the summit was Gorbachev's unwavering opposition to SDI. There were, indeed, no signs of movement from even the most untenable elements of the Soviet position on strategic defenses, such as the proposed ban on all research. The Soviets also refused to move from any of their fundamentally unacceptable positions on START and INF. More encouraging are the

[3] The SALT II Treaty may be found *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.
[4] The joint statement is printed in Document 254.
[5] Document 3.

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growing indications that the Soviets may be willing seriously to discuss all three aspects of the negotiations concurrently when the nuclear and space arms talks resume in Geneva in January without demanding a prior agreement on a ban on SDI research.

It is also noteworthy that the President seems to have made some progress in convincing Gorbachev that he is sincere in his stated intentions for SDI, even though the Soviet leader vigorously disputed the President's conclusions about its consequences.

During the next round of the nuclear and space arms talks, commencing on January 16, 1986, we will be able to judge the Soviet implementation of our mutual commitment to accelerate work. We plan to spend the opening weeks describing our November 1 proposal in greater detail. Max Kampelman, Senator Tower, and Mike Glitman will have authority to explore opportunities for give-and-take. We hope to elicit constructive responses from the Soviet side so that we may then be able to report that they are engaged in a genuine process of serious negotiation toward balanced and verifiable agreements which will improve stability and reduce the risk of war.

266. Resolution Adopted by the Organization of American States: Limitation of Conventional Weapons, December 9, 1985 [1]

WHEREAS:

The essential purposes of the Organization of American States are:

a) To strengthen the peace and security of the Continent;

b) To prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the Member States;

c) To provide for common action on the part of those states in the event of aggression;

d) To seek the solution of political, juridical, and economic problems that may arise among them; and

e) To promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social, and cultural development.

Article 3 of the Charter contains a reaffirmation of principles, salient among which are the following:

a) International law is the standard of conduct of States in their reciprocal relations;

b) The American States condemn war of aggression: victory does not give rights;

c) An act of aggression against one American State is an act of aggression against all the other American States;

[1] OEA/Ser. P, AG/doc. 2003/85 rev. 1, December 9, 1985.

d) Controversies of an international character arising between two or more American States shall be settled by peaceful procedures;

e) Economic cooperation is essential to the common welfare and prosperity of the peoples of the Continent.

In successive declarations, adopted at Inter-American conferences, regular sessions of the General Assembly of the Organization, and the Meetings of Consultation appeals have been made to the member governments of the system to limit, without prejudice to the requirements of national security, military expenditures as a recognition that the demands of economic development and social progress make it necessary to apply thereto a maximum of available resources in Latin America;

The presidents of America, in the declaration signed in Punta del Este, Uruguay, on April 14, 1967, stated that "conscious of the importance of the armed forces in maintaining security, at the same time they recognize that the demands of economic development and social progress make it necessary to devote the maximum resources available in Latin America to these ends", and therefore "express their intention to limit military expenditures in proportion to the actual demands of national security, in accordance with each country's constitutional provisions, avoiding those expenditures that are not indispensable for the performance of the specific duties of the armed forces and, where pertinent, of international commitments that obligate their respective governments"; [2]

The peaceful disposition of the peoples of Latin America and the adherence of their governments to the essential principles of this organization recommends a study of mechanisms that regulate the growth of armaments and military troops in the region and enable their inspection and control as one of the factors that ensure a lasting peace;

It is necessary and urgent to update and strengthen the inter-American system and to adapt it to present political, social, and economic circumstances; and

The Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization, adopted in Cartagena de Indias during the fourteenth special session of the General Assembly, made it one of the essential aims of the OAS to achieve an effective limitation of conventional weapons that will make it possible to devote the largest amount of resources to the economic and social development of the member states,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

RESOLVES:

To request the Secretary General to carry out consultations with the member states on the matter referred to in paragraph 7 of the Preamble, so that as comprehensive a report as possible on the outcome

[2] *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967*, pp. 684–685.

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thereof may be submitted to the General Assembly at its sixteenth regular session.

267. Statement by the U.S. Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (Blackwill) Before the Arms Control Panel of the House Committee on Armed Services, December 12, 1985 [1]

I am very pleased to be here today to discuss the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) with you. As you are aware, the NATO allies participating in these talks put forward to the Warsaw Pact last week an imaginative and far-reaching proposal aimed at breaking the decade-long deadlock in these discussions on conventional force reductions in central Europe.

Before turning to this new Western move, perhaps some general comments regarding the Vienna negotiations are in order.

These talks—which now constitute the longest continuous arms control negotiations in history—are a unique case of NATO-Warsaw Pact dialogue. They are the only forum in which we and our NATO partners regularly discuss security concerns and arms control with the Warsaw Pact on an alliance-to-alliance basis. As you know, our NATO allies attach great political and military importance to MBFR—not least because it is an East-West arms control forum in which they are able to participate directly and actively.

This said, the talks have failed to date to achieve their declared objective; that is, the negotiated reduction and limitation of forces in central Europe. During the past 12 years, some progress has been made on several issues, but real success has remained out of reach. Fundamental differences have persisted on two key points.

First, there has been a longstanding disagreement over the number of Warsaw Pact troops stationed in central Europe—the so-called data issue. Since the outset of the negotiations in 1973, the West has tried unsuccessfully to persuade the East of the merits of first reaching a common understanding on the size of forces in the reductions area.

Second, the sides remain far apart on the question of verification. There are differences on the actual scope and functioning of negotiated verification measures and on the necessary degree of intrusiveness of the verification regime. There are also differing views over the question of when measures should go into effect, i.e., during or after reductions. The East has so far refused to accept verification measures as precise and comprehensive as those proposed by the West.

After extensive national reviews of these talks and their objectives, we and our NATO allies recently concluded that a significant and forthcoming new move could provide new impetus to the negotiations.

[1] *Department of State Bulletin,* February 1986, pp. 63–64.

Consistent with the joint statement issued by the President and General Secretary Gorbachev at the conclusion of the Geneva summit meeting [2]—and with our efforts to promote a "fresh start" and a more constructive East-West relationship—the United States, together with our NATO allies, introduced on December 5 a major new proposal designed to break the long deadlock in Vienna.

Despite our continuing conviction that prior agreement on force data would have been the more sensible and effective means to making progress, NATO now is willing to drop this longstanding, important aspect of its position in the interest of breaking the decade-long logjam at the Vienna talks. This move comes in response to repeated Eastern suggestions over the years that if the West were to drop demands for prior data agreement, substantive progress could be made—indeed, that the path would be cleared to an agreement.

In addition to this major step, the West now accepts the general framework of the East's February 1985 "basic provisions" proposal; [3] that is, we agree to negotiate on a time-limited, first phase agreement consisting of initial U.S. and Soviet ground force reductions, followed by a no-increase commitment covering the forces in central Europe of all participants in the MBFR negotiations.

This willingness to accept the framework proposed by the other side is an important development. In the past, the negotiations have been characterized by one side advancing a proposal, followed by the other side—usually after some interval—tabling a counterproposal. Too often these have borne little or no relation to each other, thus limiting practical possibilities for real negotiation. Now for the first time in the negotiations, the sides—as a result of the Western move—are in a position where they are talking about the same kind of approach at the same time. Whether this marks a beginning of real negotiations will depend, of course, upon the Eastern reaction to our proposal.

With regard to the specifics of the Western proposal, we have identified at least 16 specific points on which, as a result of the West's review of its position and subject to resolution of detail, there would now seem to be broad agreement between the two sides. These are identified in the attachment to my statement. There also are a number of areas in which the sides appear to be in near agreement—for example, on a provision allowing for normal peacetime military activities such as NATO reinforcement exercises and the call-up of reservists for training.

The most important differences between the new Western positions and those of the East are as follows.

First, the West is now proposing that initial reductions should be 5,000 American and 11,500 Soviet ground troops. These figures reflect the ratio of the U.S. and Soviet forces in the reductions area. The new

[2] Document 254.
[3] A Soviet statement on this proposal is printed in Document 23.

figures thus continue to provide for a proportionate level of reduction and verification procedures of this first-phase agreement.

Second, while the East has proposed that troops to be withdrawn take with them their organic armaments and combat equipment, the West proposes that, in order to achieve a timely first-phase agreement, each side should have discretion to decide for itself how to deal with such armaments. Moreover, we do not believe it would be meaningful or practicable to apply a no-increase commitment to armaments, as the East has proposed. Indeed, the East itself has begun to recognize recently the difficulties of including armaments in a limitations agreement.

Third, as noted previously, the East envisages minimal provisions for verification. The West proposes an effective verification system which has several key features.

- It converts the observation points proposed by the East into permanent and permanently manned entry and exit points through which all forces—those entering as well as those leaving the reductions area—should pass.
- It provides for the exchange of detailed information, disaggregated down to the battalion level, on forces remaining in the reductions area after initial U.S. and Soviet withdrawals. The initial information exchange would constitute the basis for verifying the no-increase commitment.
- It provides for an inspection regime under which each side would have the right to conduct 30 inspections during each of the 3 years immediately following the completion of U.S. and Soviet reductions.
- It provides for the establishment of a consultative commission, whose tasks would include clarifying ambiguities expeditiously and helping to resolve disputes.

Fourth, while the East envisages both alliance-wide and national ceilings on armed forces, the West believes the no-increase commitment should simply be alliance-wide, with subceilings only on U.S. and Soviet forces, since they are the only forces involved in initial reductions.

Finally, as in any international agreement of this kind, the West proposes to include a clause recognizing the right of each side to take steps to protect its security interests in the event of activities by the other side which are incompatible with the object or purposes of the agreement or which jeopardize those interests.

It is too soon to predict how the negotiations will evolve in the wake of the West's new proposal. The Western move, however, offers a unique opportunity to maintain the momentum following the Geneva summit and to produce real progress in Vienna.

The Soviet representative, on behalf of the East, has promised that the Western proposal would be "thoroughly studied." We will probably have to wait until the next negotiating round, which begins on January 30, before any authoritative Eastern views are registered. It

was, however, disappointing that the Soviet representative, as a preliminary reaction, also ventured to express the view that the Western proposal "does not inspire optimism" and to suggest that the Western position on dealing with armaments and verification "does not contribute to the achievement of a mutually acceptable agreement." Eastern press reaction we have seen thus far, moreover, has followed this line and has failed to acknowledge the many positive elements in the new NATO initiative.

This said, it is now up to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies to show that they can match the West in flexibility, imagination, and pragmatism.

ATTACHMENT: POINTS OF AGREEMENT

As a result of the West's review of its position and subject to resolution of the details, there would now seem to be broad agreement between the two sides on the following points.

1. The concept of a first-phase agreement as providing a general framework for our future work.

2. The omission in the context of a first-phase agreement of any reference to the need for prior agreement on data.

3. Initial reductions by the United States and the Soviet Union within 1 year from the entry into force of the agreement.

4. Reductions in units, with up to 10% as individuals.

5. Withdrawn forces shall return to within their national boundaries.

6. Withdrawn forces shall not be deployed in new locations in such a way as to diminish the security of any state participant in the negotiations, including those with special status.

7. Lists shall be exchanged of the American and Soviet military units to be withdrawn from the area of reductions.

8. The United States and the Soviet Union shall inform all parties about the start of the practical arrangements to reduce their ground forces in central Europe and about their completion.

9. Observation points should be established through which withdrawn Soviet and American forces shall pass.

10. Each side should determine independently the location of these points in its own territory.

11. There shall be a no-increase commitment following the period of reductions.

12. National technical means of verification should be used in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law and the sides should undertake not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other side.

13. The agreement envisaged should be of limited duration.

14. Implementation of a verification regime would also provide most valuable experience in applying associated measures, which would prove useful in the future in the course of more substantial reductions.

15. The agreement should be legally binding.

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16. The East proposes that the sides should undertake to pursue the negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe with the object of reaching parity at equal collective levels of up to 900,000 men, including up to 700,000 men in ground forces. The West agrees that, subject to the successful implementation of a first-phase agreement, this should remain our objective.

268. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 40/92: Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, December 12, 1985 [1]

A [2]

PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,[3] which states that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represents one of the most urgent measures of disarmament,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and to their destruction,

Convinced of the need for the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would significantly contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Stressing the continuing importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed sixty years ago at Geneva,[4]

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the earliest conclusion and implementation of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical

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[1] A/RES/40/92.

[2] The original draft of this resolution was introduced in the First Committee by the GDR and sponsored also by Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, and Viet Nam. The sponsors made two changes in the draft resolution: (1) They inserted "highly appreciating" in line 3 of preambular par. 6, and (2) changed line 4 of oper. par. 3 from "proceed immediately to drafting such a convention." [The General Assembly adopted the revised draft resolution by 93 votes to 15 (U.K., U.S.), with 41 abstentions (China).]

[3] Resolution S–10/2. See *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 425.

[4] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765, or League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138, p. 65.

weapons and on their destruction, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,

Taking into consideration the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its session in 1985 regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons and, in particular, highly appreciating the work of its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons,

Expressing profound concern at recent decisions on the production of binary chemical weapons, as well as at their intended deployment,

Deeming it desirable for States to refrain from taking any action that could delay or further complicate negotiations and to display a constructive approach to such negotiations and the political will to reach an early agreement on the chemical weapons convention,

Aware that the qualitative improvement and development of chemical weapons complicate ongoing negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons,

Taking note of proposals on the creation of chemical-weapon-free zones aimed at facilitating the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and at contributing to the achievement of stable regional and international security,

1. *Reaffirms* the necessity of the speediest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

2. *Appeals* to all States to facilitate in every possible way the conclusion of such a convention;

3. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons with a view to achieving accord on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date and, for this purpose, to intensify the drafting process of such a convention for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-first session;

4. *Reaffirms its call* to all States to conduct serious negotiations in good faith and to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons on the territory of other States;

5. *Calls upon* all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

B [5]

CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS

The General Assembly,

[5] Part B, which was introduced by Canada in the First Committee, was sponsored also by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, FRG, GDR, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and to their destruction,

Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,[6]

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, which incorporates, *inter alia*, the report of its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons,[7]

Convinced of the necessity that all efforts be exerted for the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

1. *Takes note* of the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its session in 1985 regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons and, in particular, appreciates the work of its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons on that question and the progress recorded in its report;

2. *Expresses again its regret and concern* that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated;

3. *Urges again* the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its session in 1986, the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce further its efforts, *inter alia*, by increasing the time during the year that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons for this purpose with the 1985 mandate;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-first session on the results of its negotiations.

C [8]

CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS

The General Assembly,

Japan, Kenya, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rwanda, Spain, Ukrainian SSR, U.K., Uruguay, and Viet Nam. The General Assembly adopted it by consensus.

[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 133–138, or Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

[7] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/40/27 and Corr.1), sect. III.D, para. 9o. See also Document 154.

[8] The U.S. introduced Part C in the First Committee (Document 228). There were 26 cosponsors: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Samoa, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecua-

Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington, on 10 April 1972,

Noting with concern reports that chemical weapons have been used, as well as indications of their emergence in an increasing number of national arsenals,

Expressing concern over the increasing risk that chemical weapons may be resorted to again,

Noting international efforts to strengthen relevant international prohibitions, including efforts to develop appropriate fact-finding mechanisms,

Recalling its resolution 39/65 A of 12 December 1984 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons,

Rededicating its efforts to protect mankind from chemical and biological warfare,

1. *Reaffirms* the need for strict observance of existing international obligations regarding prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons and condemns all actions that contravene those obligations;

2. *Welcomes* the ongoing efforts to ensure the most effective prohibitions possible on chemical and biological weapons;

3. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to accelerate its negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction;

4. *Calls upon* all States, pending the conclusion of such a comprehensive ban, to co-operate in efforts to prevent the use of chemical weapons.

269. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 40/94 A: Conventional Disarmament on a Regional Scale, December 12, 1985 [1]

The General Assembly,

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dor, France, FRG, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, U.K., Uruguay.

The General Assembly adopted Part C by 112 (China) votes to 16 (USSR), with 22 abstentions (India, Iraq, Mexico).

[1] A/RES/40/94. This resolution comprises part A of a 15-part resolution with the overall title of "General and Complete Disarmament." Peru introduced part A on October 22 in the First Committee, and, together with 10 cosponsors (Bolivia, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Pakistan, Paraguay, and Romania), submitted a revised draft on November 4. These 11, together with 8 additional sponsors

Reaffirming the determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war that is expressed in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations,

Again recognizing the urgent need for the harmonizing of political wills in order to promote initiatives aimed at reducing expenditure on armaments so that the resources thus released can be devoted to the social and economic development of all peoples,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it states, *inter alia,* that the nuclear and conventional arms build-up threatens to stall the efforts aimed at reaching the goals of development, to become an obstacle on the road of achieving the new international economic order and to hinder the solution of other vital problems facing mankind,[2]

Recalling further that in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it declared, *inter alia,* that priorities in disarmament negotiations should be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces; and that nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently,

Recognizing that unilateral measures to limit or reduce armaments can make a contribution to the attainment of disarmament,

Recalling its resolution 37/100 F of 13 December 1982 on regional disarmament, in which it stresses, *inter alia,* the importance of the regional measures already adopted, as well as of efforts of a regional nature undertaken in the field of nuclear and conventional disarmament,

Recalling likewise its resolutions 38/73 J of 15 December 1983 and 39/63 F of 12 December 1984 on regional disarmament,

1. *Urges* Governments, where the regional situation so permits and on the initiative of the States concerned, to consider and adopt appropriate measures at the regional level with a view to strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces through the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, under strict and effective international control, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and of the self-determination of peoples, in conformity with the Charter, and taking into account

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(Bangladesh, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Sudan, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia) submitted a further revised version on November 11. This third version was adopted by the First Committee at its 38th meeting on November 14 and by the General Assembly on December 12. The vote in the General Assembly was 128 to 0, with 8 abstentions (Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Laos, Uganda, Viet Nam).

[2] For the Final Document, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* pp. 411–439.

the need to ensure balance in each phase and to avoid impairing the security of any State;

2. *Expresses* its most firm support for recent unilateral measures, adopted by some Governments, which are intended to limit conventional armaments and reduce military expenditures and which contribute to the creation of an atmosphere favourable to the realization of conventional disarmament on a regional scale;

3. *Endorses* most emphatically the recent regional and subregional initiatives directed towards the conclusion of agreements to limit armaments and reduce military expenditures;

4. *Reaffirms* the primary responsibility of the militarily significant States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, for halting and reversing the arms race, and the priority assigned to nuclear disarmament in the context of the advances towards general and complete disarmament;

5. *Requests* all States to facilitate progress towards regional disarmament by strictly honouring their commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force and to contribute to the creation of an atmosphere favourable to the realization of conventional disarmament on a regional scale;

6. *Also urges* countries which are suppliers of conventional weapons to co-operate with regional efforts;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide interested Governments, upon request, with such technical services and assistance as may be useful in measures of conventional disarmament on a regional scale and also requests him to submit a report on the situation with regard to this matter to the General Assembly at its forty-first session;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-first session an item entitled "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale".

270. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 40/94 K: Objective Information on Military Matters, December 12, 1985 [1]

The General Assembly,

Noting that misperceptions of the military capabilities and the intentions of potential adversaries, which could be caused, *inter alia,* by a lack of objective information, could induce States to undertake armaments programmes leading to the acceleration of the arms race, in

[1] A/RES/40/94. This is part K of a 15-part resolution with the overall title of "General and Complete Disarmament." Part K was introduced in the First Committee by the United Kingdom and cosponsored by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, and Turkey. It was adopted by the First Committee at its 42d meeting on November 19 and by the General Assembly on December 12. The vote in the General Assembly was 107–13, with 16 abstentions. *Against:* Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia, Poland, Ukraine, USSR, Viet Nam. *Abstaining:* Algeria, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Congo, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Iran, Madagascar, Mexico, Nicaragua, Tanzania.

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particular the nuclear-arms race, and to heightened international tensions,

Recalling paragraph 105 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, which encourages Member States to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament, to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the arms race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control,[2]

Recognizing that the adoption of practical, confidence-building measures on a global, regional or subregional level would greatly contribute to a reduction in international tension,

Aware that objective information on the military capabilities, in particular of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, could contribute to the building of confidence among States and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements, and, thereby, help to halt and reverse the arms race,

Recalling its resolutions 37/99 G of 13 December 1982 and 38/188 C of 20 December 1983,

Aware of the existence, under the auspices of the United Nations, of an international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, and that annual reports on military expenditures are now being received from an increasing number of States,

1. *Expresses* its conviction that a better flow of objective information on military capabilities could help relieve international tension and contribute to the building of confidence among States on a global, regional or subregional level and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements;

2. *Urges* all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to consider implementing additional measures based on the principles of openness and transparency such as, for example, the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures with the aim of facilitating the availability of objective information on, as well as objective assessment of, military capabilities;

3. *Invites* all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General before 30 April 1986 the measures they have adopted to contribute to greater openness in military matters in general and in particular to improve the flow of objective information on military capabilities;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-first session on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-first session the item entitled "Objective information on military matters".

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 430.

271. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 40/94 L: Compliance With Arms Limitation and Disarmament Agreements, December 12, 1985 [1]

The General Assembly,

Conscious of the abiding concern of all Member States for preserving respect for rights and obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law,

Convinced that observance of the Charter of the United Nations, relevant treaties and other sources of international law is essential for the strengthening of international security,

Mindful, in particular, of the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them,

Stressing that any violation of such agreements not only adversely affects the security of States parties but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements,

Stressing further that any weakening of confidence in such agreements diminishes their contribution to global or regional stability and to further disarmament and arms limitation efforts and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system,

Believing that compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements by States parties is, therefore, a matter of interest and concern to the international community, and noting the role that the United Nations could play in that regard,

1. *Urges* all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions subscribed to;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to give serious consideration to the implications of non-compliance with those obligations for international security and stability, as well as for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament;

3. *Appeals* to all Member States to support efforts aimed at the resolution of non-compliance questions, with a view towards encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to and maintaining or restoring the integrity of arms limitation or disarmament agreements;

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[1] A/RES/40/94. This is Part L of a 15-part resolution entitled "General and Complete Disarmament." Introduced in the First Committee by the United States on November 11, it was cosponsored by France, Iceland, Norway, and Denmark. On November 15, the original sponsors and four additional states—Costa Rica, Greece, Italy, and New Zealand—submitted a revised version. This version was adopted by the First Committee at the 42d meeting on November 19 and by the General Assembly on December 12. The General Assembly vote was 131 to 0, with 16 abstentions. *Abstaining:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia.

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide Member States with assistance that may be necessary in this regard.

272. Communique of the North Atlantic Council, December 13, 1985 [1]

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 12th and 13th December 1985. Ministers agreed as follows:

1. Encouraging developments have taken place in East-West relations since our meeting in Lisbon in June. They demonstrate the validity of our policy—reaffirmed in the Washington Statement—of preserving peace in freedom through adequate military strength and political solidarity and, on that basis, pursuing a more stable and co-operative relationship between the countries of East and West.[2]

2. We welcome recent high level East-West contacts, notably the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, which marks an important step in our efforts to develop a realistic and constructive dialogue with the countries of the East. We hope that this will lead to improved relations, more extensive contacts, including regular high level meetings, and broad co-operation on the full range of East-West questions. We shall all play our full part in making further progress. We call upon the Soviet Union and its allies to join us in this endeavour.

3. Meanwhile, the continuing build-up of Soviet nuclear and conventional arms remains a major Allied concern. We do not seek military superiority. But we are determined to safeguard our security by maintaining adequate conventional and nuclear forces. Our strategy of deterrence has proved its worth in preserving peace, and remains fully valid.

The close and permanent link between North American and European Allies, which has kept the peace for 36 years, remains the basis of our collective security. Alliance cohesion will continue to be ensured through close consultations on all matters affecting our common interests and security. The value of these consultations has again been clearly demonstrated in recent months.

4. We are committed to substantive progress in arms control. This must be based on the criteria of strengthened stability, equitable and significant reductions, and effective verification.

5. We have reviewed the US-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on their strategic and intermediate range nuclear weapons, and on defense and space systems. These aim to prevent an arms race in space and terminate it on earth, limit and reduce nuclear arms and strengthen strategic stability. We strongly support US efforts in all three areas of negotiation. We welcome the agreement between President Reagan and Gen-

[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 33, No. 6 (December 1985), pp. 21–22.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 427–430.

eral Secretary Gorbachev to accelerate work at Geneva, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions in US and Soviet nuclear arms, appropriately applied.

The Allies concerned endorse the constructive proposals on US and Soviet INF systems recently tabled in Geneva by the US, and support the idea of an interim agreement. They reiterate their willingness to modify, halt, reverse, or dispense with longer range INF (LRINF) deployment as part of an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement. In the absence of such an agreement, they will continue to deploy LRINF missiles on schedule.[3]

6. The Allies participating in the Vienna MBFR negotiations proposed on 5th December 1985 a verifiable agreement for US-Soviet ground force reductions, followed by a collective no-increase commitment of three years on US and Soviet and NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.[4] The proposal embodies associated measures which open the way to the establishment of reliable force levels and which are essential to verify compliance with the Agreement's provisions. It responds to an earlier Eastern proposal and represents an imaginative attempt to break a longstanding dead-lock.

7. We remain deeply concerned about the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. At the Geneva Conference on Disarmament we seek an effective and verifiable convention on a general and complete prohibition of such weapons and on the destruction of existing stockpiles. We strongly support the agreement between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to accelerate their efforts to this end.

8. We call upon the Soviet and East European governments to implement effectively all provisions of the Helsinki Final Act[5] and the Madrid Concluding Document.[6] We note with regret that the Ottawa meeting on Human Rights and the Budapest Cultural Forum, although useful in themselves, revealed persisting deficiencies in the implementation of these documents, and were unable to reach common conclusions.

At the Stockholm Conference (CDE), an integral part of the CSCE process, we are actively working for early agreement consistent with the Madrid Mandate. Such an agreement would embody a substantial set of militarily significant confidence and security building measures, covering the whole of Europe, and give concrete expression and effect to the existing duty of all participating states to refrain from the threat or use of force.

All participating states reaffirmed their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act on its 10th anniversary. We seek to promote genuine and

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[3] Denmark and Greece reserve their positions on the INF part of this paragraph. [Footnote in original.]

[4] For statements on this proposal, see Documents 264 and 267.

[5] The arms control portions of the Final Act may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 791–793. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 83, No. 2079, pp. 53–60.

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balanced progress in all its aspects, including those concerned with respect for human rights and the fundamental freedoms of the individual, and those relating to co-operation between states. We remain committed to meaningful results at the forthcoming Berne meeting on human contacts. The Vienna Follow-up meeting will review all aspects of the CSCE process.

9. The maintenance of a calm situation in and around Berlin, including freedom of access to the city, remains of fundamental importance for East-West relations. The strict observance and full implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement are essential to this end. In this connection, we support all efforts to promote the prosperity and viability of the city. We also support the efforts of the Federal Republic of Germany further to develop inner-German relations as a significant contribution to peace and to the well-being of the people of a divided Germany, particularly the Berliners.

10. We urge the Soviet Union to end the unacceptable military occupation of Afghanistan, now approaching its seventh year, to withdraw its troops, and agree to a political solution restoring Afghanistan's independence and non-aligned status.

We emphasise the continuing need in Poland for genuine dialogue between the various elements of society and for national reconciliation.

We, for our part, respect the sovereignty and independence of all states. We will remain vigilant and will consult on events outside the Treaty area which might threaten our common security.

11. We strongly condemn terrorism and will continue to work to eliminate this threat. We invite all states to join us in this resolve.

12. We have examined ways of enhancing armaments cooperation among all the countries of the Alliance. This cooperation reflects our continuing concern for effective defence, particularly in the conventional field. In the light of our examination, we have decided to implement a strategy aimed at improving cooperation. This should give a fresh boost to the work being done in this field within the Alliance and lead in a short time to specific co-operative programmes encompassing both its European and North American members.

13. In the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty,[7] we reaffirm the importance of special programmes for less favoured partners and remain committed to promoting the stability and well-being of our community of free nations.

14. The Spring 1986 meeting of the Council in Ministerial Session will be held in Halifax, Canada, in May.

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[7] 63 Stat. 2241, TIAS 1964, 4 Bevans 828, 34 UNTS 243; 24 UST 2355, TIAS 7759; TIAS 10367.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain reserves his Government's position on the present Communique.

273. Senate Joint Resolution 238: Approval and Implementation of the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, December 16, 1985 [1]

Dec. 16, 1985 [S.J. Res. 238]

Relating to the approval and implementation of the proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Energy.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a)(1) the Congress does favor the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, done on July 23, 1985 (hereafter in this joint resolution referred to as the "Agreement").[2]

(2) Notwithstanding section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,[3] the Agreement becomes effective in accordance with the provisions of this joint resolution and other applicable provisions of law.

Exports.

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any international agreement, no license may be issued for export to the People's Republic of China of any nuclear material, facilities, or components subject to the Agreement, and no approval for the transfer or retransfer to the People's Republic of China of any nuclear material, facilities, or components subject to the Agreement shall be given—

(1) until the expiration of a period of thirty days of continuous session of Congress after the President has certified to the Congress that—

(A) the reciprocal arrangements made pursuant to Article 8 of the Agreement have been designed to be effective in ensuring that any nuclear material, facilities, or components provided under the Agree-

[1] Public Law 99–183; 99 Stat. 1174. The Senate approved the resolution November 21 by voice vote, the House on December 11 by a roll call vote of 307–112.
[2] Document 118.
[3] 42 U.S.C. 2153.

ment shall be utilized solely for intended peaceful purposes as set forth in the Agreement;

(B) the Government of the People's Republic of China has provided additional information concerning its nuclear non-proliferation policies and that, based on this and all other information available to the United States Government, the People's Republic of China is not in violation of paragraph (2) of section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; and

42 USC 2158.

(C) the obligation to consider favorably a request to carry out activities described in Article 5(2) of the Agreement shall not prejudice the decision of the United States to approve or disapprove such a request; and

President of U.S. Report.

(2) until the President has submitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report detailing the history and current developments in the nonproliferation policies and practices of the People's Republic of China.

The report described in paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form with a classified addendum.

Exports.

(c) Each proposed export pursuant to the Agreement shall be subject to United States laws and regulations in effect at the time of each such export.

(d) Nothing in the Agreement or this joint resolution may be construed as providing a precedent or other basis for the negotiation or renegotiation of any other agreement for nuclear cooperation.

(e) For purposes of subsection (b)—

(1) the continuity of a session of Congress is broken only by adjournment of the Congress *sine die* at the end of a Congress; and

(2) the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of the period indicated.

Approved December 16, 1985.

274. Statement by President Reagan on Signing Senate Joint Resolution 238 on the Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, December 16, 1985 [1]

I am pleased to sign into law today S.J. Res. 238, in which the Congress states that it favors the agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and the People's Republic of China,[2] which I transmitted to Congress on July 24, 1985. The agreement will have a significant, positive effect on the relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China and will lead to a continuing dialog with China on important nuclear energy and nonproliferation matters. It will further U.S. nonproliferation and other foreign policy interests. I therefore welcome the Congress' support for the agreement.

Since I submitted the agreement without exempting it from any requirement in section 123(a) of the Atomic Energy Act, [3] no affirmative legislation was required to permit the agreement to be brought into force after the legally stipulated time periods for congressional review had been completed. The agreement may therefore be brought into force at that time in accordance with the procedure set forth in article 10 of the agreement.

The joint resolution does require a one-time certification and a one-time report before exports to China under the agreement may commence. It assigns exclusively to the President the responsibility to review the matters to be certified to and to decide whether the certification may be made. Three matters must be certified: (1) that the arrangements for visits and exchanges of information made pursuant to article 8 of the agreement are, as called for by this article itself, designed to be effective in ensuring that nuclear exports under the agreement are used solely for intended peaceful purposes; (2) that, after examining all information available to the United States Government, including any additional information that China has provided, nuclear exports to China are not precluded under section 129(2) of the Atomic Energy Act; and (3) that the obligation to consider favorably a request to carry out activities described in article 5(2) of the agreement does not prejudice the decision of the United States to approve or disapprove such a request.[4] In addition, the joint resolution requires a report on Chinese nonproliferation policies and practices before exports commence.

The joint resolution also states that U.S. exports are subject to U.S. laws and regulations in effect at the time of export. This is a restate-

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, December 23, 1985, pp. 1506–1507.
[2] *Supra*. For the agreement, see Document 118.
[3] 42 U.S.C. 2153.
[4] 42 U.S.C. 2158.

ment of existing U.S. law and does not conflict with any obligations undertaken by the United States under the agreement. Finally, the joint resolution contains a section intended to ensure that the provisions in the China agreement that are textually different from provisions of the type contained in other U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements will not be the starting point for future nuclear cooperation agreement negotiations with other countries.

This joint resolution serves our interests in promoting peaceful nuclear cooperation and a nonproliferation dialog with China. For this reason, I have decided to sign the joint resolution.

I appreciate the efforts of Senators Lugar and Cranston and Representatives Fascell, Broomfield, Bonker, Solarz, as well as others, in developing a joint resolution text that both the administration and the Congress could accept.

I understand that an amendment relating to the U.S.-China peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement is currently under consideration in the conference on the continuing resolution. I strongly object to that amendment.

275. Letter From the Director, Geophysical Science Division, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Alewine) to the Chairman, Special Panel of the House Committee on Armed Services (Byron): Verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban, December 16, 1985 [1]

I am pleased to have the opportunity to respond to the testimony presented to the Arms Control and Disarmament Panel on 20 November 1985.[2] Perhaps the most telling conclusion from all of the technical witnesses that appeared before the Panel was the recognition that a Comprehensive Test Ban cannot be successfully monitored under any verification arrangements that can be practically obtained. In my testimony of 18 September 1985,[3] I pointed out that a Comprehensive Test Ban with the Soviet Union would be, from a monitoring point of view, a low-yield Threshold Test Ban Treaty with a vague, undefined threshold. This fact has been uncontested by any of the expert testimony before the Panel.

Much of the difference between the testimony presented by myself and by Dr. Sykes [4] on the verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban falls into two major areas:

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[1] *Review of Arms Control and Disarmament Activities, 99th Congress, 1st Session: Hearings Before the Special Panel on Arms Control and Disarmament of the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee . . .* [H.A.S.C. No. 99–18], pp. 438–441.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 307 ff.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 93 ff.

[4] For the Sykes testimony, see *ibid.*, pp. 317 ff.

—The way in which deliberate attempts at evasion and concealment must be taken into account; and

—The difficulties in confidently recognizing low level signals from small nuclear explosions, or decoupled larger explosions, amidst the large number of signals from earthquakes and chemical explosions.

Each of these areas has been treated in a most serious manner by the Department of Defense in its assessments of the verification potential of a nuclear test ban treaty.

Evasion

The flippant remarks by Dr. Sykes concerning the possibilities for cavity decoupling evasion gloss over a very difficult and threatening problem that must be addressed. Although it is possible that large underground cavities suitable for this purpose could be constructed in various kinds of rocks, the most practical geological formations usually considered are underground salt deposits. There is general agreement that the best verification capabilities should be focused on such regions. However, such regions are known to be very widespread. The best information available indicates that suitable bedded salt deposits and areas of salt domes together occur in at least over 2.9 million square kilometers in the Soviet Union. This is about 13% of the country and is equivalent in area to over four times the size of the state of Texas. Other areas that are not fully mapped or reported could increase this estimate.

Over 80% of the known salt areas in the Soviet Union contain salt formations which are thick enough for cavities to be constructed with volumes of 50 thousand cubic meters; easily large enough to fully decouple a one kiloton nuclear explosion. Underground cavities of this size and larger are in common use for the storage of petroleum products. Approximately 25% of the suitable salt areas contain very large salt domes, diapirs, and thick-bedded salt where cavities of about 500 thousand cubic meters could be constructed. Such cavities could fully decouple nuclear explosions of at least 10 kilotons. Solution mining of cavities of this type have been reported by the Soviets. About one-half of the area suitable for the construction of these very large cavities is located in the Caspian Sea lowlands, while the remaining areas are widely scattered from near the border with Afghanistan to along the coast of the Arctic Ocean.

There are indications from both theoretical work and from measurements that the cavity decoupling loses its effectiveness at high frequencies and thus, the question turns on the propagation efficiency of these signals that leak out. In my testimony, I described the ongoing research on this topic as highly promising. One can argue about the extent to which the promise of high frequency event detection has been rigorously proven—we are just beginning to collect and evaluate the relevant data. What can hardly be contested is that giving an identification to the origin of such signals (nuclear explosion, chemical explosion, earthquake, rock burst, etc.) is going to be extremely diffi-

cult for the small events of concern. As yet, no technique has been demonstrated to do this.

In summary, the potential for cavity decoupling evasion is widespread in the Soviet Union, even with today's limited knowledge of the geology. It is known that there are many cavities existing today in the Soviet Union which are large enough to decouple the 8 kiloton explosion referred to in Dr. Sykes' testimony. To recognize these facts is not being pessimistic, as some would say, but pragmatic and prudent.

Dr. Sykes fails to address adequately the possiblities for evasion in environments other than underground. In such cases, the seismological methods discussed in the testimony provided to the Panel do not apply.

Nuclear Explosion Identification

For a number of years, a rigorous research effort has been conducted to develop a robust signal analysis technique to differentiate earthquake and explosion signals using only data collected at regional distances. Thus far, such a robust technique has not been developed. The theoretical and observational work in this area has been conflicting. Dr. Sykes and his co-workers have chosen one purely theoretical approach as the solution to this problem. These untested hypotheses are presented as if they could be used universally.

In my testimony, I stated that a detection threshold of about magnitude 2.5 would be required to monitor the Soviet Union at the one kiloton level. Such a level could be achieved only by the installation of high quality stations and arrays inside the Soviet Union. Dr. Sykes stated that a less sensitive level of only 2.8 or 3.2 would be necessary for various parts of the Soviet Union. Such a statement fails to take into consideration the difference between detecting a signal and determining its nuclear origins. It is well established that the threshold for identification of seismic events, especially those at shallow depths, is larger than the detection threshold. Even assuming that discrimination procedures can be developed for signals at this level, some margin must be maintained for natural fluctuations in signal sizes and discrimination procedures. There remains a certain amount of uncertainty in all of these estimates. The values presented in my testimony represent our best current knowledge. Many of the differences between these values and those of Dr. Sykes are based on his use of optimistic and unproved assumptions.

At the one kiloton monitoring level (magnitude 2.5), there are many thousands of events occurring annually in the Soviet Union. Dr. Sykes has recently stated that it is possible to distinguish between earthquakes and small nuclear explosions of only one kiloton with 90% reliability. Even if such unfounded statements are correct, there remain hundreds of events annually which remain unidentified—each one a potential nuclear explosion. In order for the on-site inspection meas-

ures to be meaningful, the number of such unidentified events must be reduced to a more manageable number.

Dr. Sykes and I agree that at the present time, there is no seismic method for proving that an explosion is nuclear rather than chemical. This is one of the key concerns about CTBT verification capabilities. At the one kiloton monitoring level there will be many such chemical explosions that must be examined. Negotiating the on-site inspection provisions for monitoring such explosions would be a difficult matter and would require Soviet agreement to very intrusive verification measures that are certainly unprecedented. This task should not be underestimated.

Yield Estimation

The seismological methods which can be used to monitor the 150 kiloton Threshold Test Ban Treaty [5] have been under intense investigation and review within the Department of Defense for several years. Inherent in these methods are critical assumptions involving the geophysical character of the Soviet nuclear test sites and the conditions within the earth near those sites. No conclusive proof of these various assumptions is possible without direct and trustworthy information from the Soviet test sites themselves. The scientists involved in this research and review use their best professional judgement to select the most reasonable assumptions. On the yield estimation question, there has been, and continues to be, a range of professional judgements on these assumptions among the most knowledgeable and experienced geophysicists in this country. Dr. Sykes represents one extreme in the assumptions he advocates (leading to lower yield estimates than most). There are others, just as responsible and knowledgeable, who advocate extreme assumptions on the opposite end (leading to higher yield estimates). The reviews conducted by the DOD have tended to balance these extremes.

Dr. Sykes' assertion that seismic yield estimates of Soviet underground nuclear explosions can be made with a precision of 30% is overly optimistic about many of the aspects of this problem. Such a claim seems to ignore the possibility of variations in the coupling of explosion energy to seismic waves. This question cannot be resolved with the available seismological data. Direct information from the Soviet test sites is required. While it may be plausible to assume that the geological variations at the Nevada Test Site are greater than at the Soviet Semipalatinsk test site, we certainly do not know this to be the case.

Dr. Sykes gives a hypothesis for the increase in the size of yields tested at the Semipalatinsk site after the TTBT had been in effect for several years. This hypothesis ignores the fact that there were at least four underground explosions at the Semipalatinsk site before 1976 that appear to be as large, or larger, than the biggest test since 1976. The

[5] For the text of the Treaty and its Protocols, see *ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–229.

scenario of sudden Soviet concern about the level of ground shaking strikes those who are knowledgeable about Soviet practices as absurd.

I hope the Panel finds these remarks useful in its deliberations.

276. Statement by the Soviet Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (Mikhaylov), December 17, 1985 [1]

On 5 December of this year the recent round of negotiations on mutual bilateral force reductions ended in Vienna. In this, as in the two previous rounds, the Soviet delegation and the delegations of other member states of the Warsaw Pact, in aiming for the achievement of efficient progress in negotiations, urged their Western partners toward a business-like and constructive discussion of the 14 February 1985 proposals of the socialist countries concerning the initial curtailment of Soviet and U.S. land forces and armaments in central Europe with subsequent nonexpansion of the level of military forces and armaments of the countries in this region.[2] The draft proposed by us of the basic conditions of such an agreement has already been on the negotiation table for 10 months. We have provided all the explanations it needs. Correspondents, accredited in Moscow, were also informed in due time at briefings about the introduction and contents of the socialist countries' proposals.

Perhaps it should be recalled that, having advanced their proposal of 14 February, the Warsaw Pact countries proceeded on the basis that, given the impasse in which the Vienna negotiations found themselves—through no fault of ours—the attainment of an agreement in Vienna, however limited and provisional, would have been an expedient and useful practical step on the way to limiting the level of military confrontation in the heart of Europe.

The logic of such a step consists in the fact that it is impossible to begin limiting the level of military confrontation without first stopping the accumulation of military forces and arms.

Specifically, the socialist countries' proposal provides for a reduction of troops of the USSR and the United States of 20,000 and 13,000 men respectively along with their regular armaments and combat equipment over a 1-year period. It also provides for a subsequent nonexpansion, or, so to speak, a freeze on troop and armament levels in central Europe for all countries participating in the proposed agreements for 2 years both on a collective, i.e., within the alliance, and a national basis. The proposal also contains essential measures for monitoring the way the countries fulfill their obligations—measures which are adequate to these obligations.

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[1] ACDA files.

[2] For a Soviet statement on the proposal, see Document 23.

However, it must be confirmed that during the course of the completed round of negotiations, Western participants did not display a readiness for concrete discussion of the essence of our proposal. They limited themselves to an abstract repetition of their old position, which gave no way out of the impasse. Hence, there was no productive discussion during this round.

Nonetheless, as you know, in the last plenary session of 5 December, the NATO countries came out with responsive considerations of their own.[3] Their representatives also spoke for an initial reduction of Soviet and American troops, but in smaller numbers than we proposed and with no inclusion of armaments. They announced likewise their accord with a freeze in troop level, but, to be sure, without applying this obligation to armaments.

We regard as positive the very fact of the Western participants' reply to the proposal of the socialist countries, feeling that an exchange of signals as well as a political dialog corresponds to the agreement reached at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva. In the light of the readiness each side expressed in Geneva to strive for positive results at the Vienna negotiations, we are now thoroughly examining the Western countries' reply in order to ascertain to what degree it can facilitate progress in Vienna. At this time we can only speak about initial impressions. It appears that the step taken by the West in regard to the February proposal of the socialist countries can be assessed positively. At least a step has been taken toward our proposed plan for an initial agreement and toward a framework for further negotiations.

But along with certain constructive provisions, the Western proposal contains a series of questionable elements that do not answer the requirements of realism or the principle of fairness and equal security. The main deficiency of the proposal of the NATO countries consists in the fact that it brings to naught efforts toward a realistic decrease in the level of military confrontation in central Europe, while substituting instead a premeditated increase in monitoring measures. This inevitably prompts the question, "Why is this being done?" Monitoring, after all, should be in proportion to the obligations of the agreement and should facilitate their fulfillment by the parties without serving as a source of distrust or suspicion.

Thus, our proposal and the Western proposal still diverge in many respects. It is to be hoped that in the course of future negotiations realistic and mutually acceptable solutions will finally be found through the efforts of both sides. We consider it abnormal that in 12 years the Vienna negotiations have not yielded any practical results. We have the will to do everything within our power to bring these negotiations out of the deadlock and to achieve realistically tangible results.

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[3] For statements on the Western proposals, see Documents 264 and 267.

Document 276

277. White House Statement on Nuclear Testing, December 19, 1985 [1]

The Soviet Union has both publicly and through confidential diplomatic channels continued to press its proposal for a moratorium on all nuclear explosions that it made public on July 29.[2]

For our part, the President has long advocated a dialog with the Soviet Union to arrive at the improved verification procedures necessary for any testing limitations. It was the President who extended an unconditional invitation to Soviet experts to visit the U.S. nuclear test site to measure the yield of a U.S. nuclear test, with any instrumentation devices they deemed necessary.[3] This initiative was designed with the hope that it might set in motion a process that could increase confidence and cooperation between our nations regarding limitations on nuclear testing. The U.S. would, of course, welcome Soviet willingness to agree to reciprocal visits to nuclear testing sites.

It is through measures of this type that a basis could be created to develop and institute the type of verification measures needed to make effectively verifiable the pending treaties dealing with nuclear testing, namely, the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties.

This is an issue, however, quite separate from that of a moratorium on nuclear explosions. As we have stated many times previously, the U.S. has learned through experience that moratoria cannot be counted on to lead to the enhanced security desired. The Soviet Union broke a nuclear testing moratorium a quarter of a century ago with the most intensive nuclear test series in history—some 40 explosions over a period of several weeks.

We made clear when the Soviets announced their moratorium the reasons for our nuclear testing limitation policy, as well as for continuing the U.S. testing program. U.S. testing is required to ensure the continued credibility and effectiveness of our deterrent, and to ensure the reliability and safety of the U.S. arsenal.

While we are actively investigating technologies that may one day make the U.S. less dependent on offensive nuclear weapons for our security, nuclear weapons will remain, for the foreseeable future, the key element of our deterrent. In such a situation, where both the U.S. and our allies must rely upon nuclear weapons to deter aggression, nuclear testing will be required.

A comprehensive test ban, however, is a long-term objective of the U.S. in the context of achieving broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions; substantially improved verification capabilities; expanded confidence building measures; greater balance in conventional forces;

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, December 23, 1985, pp. 1514–1515. The statement was made by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President.

[2] Document 126.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, p. 692, and Document 125.

and at a time when a nuclear deterrent is no longer as essential an element as currently for international security and stability. The United States is currently involved in discussions with the Soviet Union in most of these areas.

278. Soviet Statement on Nuclear Weapon Tests, December 19, 1985 [1]

Since the summer of 1945, when nuclear weapons were spawned, like an evil spirit, by the Manhattan Project, humanity has been waging a persistent struggle for the limitation and, ultimately, the elimination of these means of mass destruction. The struggle against nuclear weapons has become an international, and, in the full sense of the word, a worldwide movement uniting representatives of the most diverse social classes, ideologies and professions. That is understandable, for what is at stake is no less than the eradication of a threat to life on Earth, the securing of a peaceful future for present and succeeding generations.

The question of a nuclear-weapon test ban is an important, integral part of this problem. It is common knowledge that tests are a kind of motor driving the nuclear arms race onwards. Thanks to tests, new and ever more terrible types of such weapons are developed and their, so to speak, "quality" is improved. This, in its turn, fuels the process of the further accumulation, in quantitative terms, of nuclear explosives: in the form of warheads for cruise missiles, ICBMs, submarine-launched missiles, and so on.

Only recently, yet one more, extremely dangerous aspect of nuclear experimentation has come to light: in the boreholes and galleries of a base in Nevada, the United States of America is developing lasers excited by nuclear explosions with a view to employing such devices in the "star wars" in the compilation of plans for which the country's strategists are now busily engaged.

In a word, the continuation of nuclear testing constitutes a source of increased tension and military threat and deepens the mistrust between peoples.

It is for that precise reason that the Soviet Union ha.. from the very onset of the nuclear age, consistently called, as it continues to call, for the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. It must be said that the efforts of the Soviet Union and of all peace-loving forces to that end have not been in vain. In the early 1960s there was concluded a multilateral treaty that is now in force which bans the conduct of nuclear tests in three media.[2] Under a treaty dating from 1974, the USSR and the United States agreed to limit the yield of underground explosions of

[1] CD/647.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.

Document 278

nuclear weapons to 150 kilotonnes.[3] A Soviet-United States treaty of 1976 also introduced stringent rules with respect to underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.[4] Substantial progress was made in trilateral talks (involving the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom) concerning the complete and general banning of nuclear-weapon tests, that is, their banning in all media: in the atmosphere, in space, under water and underground.

Unfortunately, the 1974 and 1976 treaties have yet to be ratified, but that is not the fault of the USSR. Nor was it because of any initiative on our part that the tripartite talks were broken off.

The complete cessation of nuclear explosions therefore remains one of the most urgent problems of contemporary international politics. As emphasized by M.S. Gorbachev, "The further things develop, the more acute the question of the cessation of nuclear tests becomes. Above all, because it would put an end to the creation of new, and the perfecting of existing, types of nuclear weapons. Because, too, without tests, without being renewed, nuclear arsenals would gradually disappear and nuclear weapons die out. And because, finally, nuclear explosions—which number in the hundreds—can no longer be allowed to deform our beautiful planet, increasing the concern about how future generations will live on it."[5]

The concern of world public opinion at the continuance of nuclear tests and determination to put an end to them were apparent in the well-known appeal by leaders of six States from different continents—Argentina, Greece, Mexico, India, Tanzania and Sweden—for the USSR and the United States to agree on the mutual cessation of nuclear tests. They also called for the speediest possible conclusion of a treaty on a complete and general nuclear-weapon test ban.[6] Recently, the United Nations General Assembly once again made a similar appeal.[7] The appeal made on this subject to the leaders of the USSR and the United States by a group of eminent, Nobel Prize-winning scientists won a wide international welcome.

In its striving for movement on the question of the cessation of testing, the Soviet Union came forward this summer with a major initiative: from 6 August, it unilaterally halted all types of nuclear explosions and it called upon the United States Government to act in the same way. As announced at the time, the Soviet moratorium will remain in effect until 1 January 1986, but can be extended beyond that date if the United States subscribes in its turn to a moratorium.[8]

In taking this step, the Soviet Government was moved by a desire to halt the further build-up and perfecting of nuclear arsenals, which have now been going on for over 40 years. In other words, a joint

[3] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–229.
[4] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.
[5] Document 261.
[6] Document 216.
[7] G.A. Resolution 40/80 of December 12, 1985.
[8] Document 126.

Soviet-United States moratorium on all nuclear explosions would be a major landmark on the road to the elimination of the nuclear threat.

The Soviet Union's decision was welcomed throughout the world and has been widely supported. But the attitude to it in Washington has been different, at least so far. There they have attempted, using all sorts of far-fetched excuses, and sometimes without adducing any arguments at all, to leave our appeals for the establishment of a joint moratorium without a positive response. An intensive programme of underground testing of nuclear weapons continues in the United States of America.

One cannot but be justifiably concerned about all this. After all, if the United States Administration continues to ignore the call to refrain from setting off nuclear explosions, that will lead to a situation in which, with the expiry of the declared time-limit, which is now very close indeed, the Soviet Union's undertakings under the unilateral moratorium will cease to be valid. The reasons for that are understandable: faced with the military preparations across the ocean, the USSR cannot sacrifice the interests of its own security, or the security of its allies and friends.

The Soviet population is, however, anything but anxious for the rivalry in the nuclear sphere to continue. Everything possible must be done not to let slip by the favourable prospect which the Soviet Union's efforts have created for halting nuclear tests. Although there is, we repeat, barely any time left for that, it is sufficient for the taking of a correct and duly-considered decision.

It must be clearly recognized that, if it is genuinely intended to bring about the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, there can be no objections to a reciprocal moratorium, for it would yield great benefits. The cessation of nuclear explosions is a subject concerning which concrete results—measurable, tangible results—can be achieved right now. Such a joint step by the USSR and the United States would be of enormous political significance: it would give a very definite signal to the other nuclear Powers and would create a radically new situation far more conducive to the positive development of the process initiated as a result of the Soviet-United States summit meeting at Geneva, to the adoption of effective practical measures to curtail the arms race.

It would unquestionably be another real step in that direction if the tripartite talks on a complete and general nuclear-weapon test ban were resumed. The Soviet Union is willing to resume those talks immediately, at the very beginning of next year.

When they consider the question of a moratorium on nuclear explosions, they refer in the West, and above all in the United States, to the difficulties of monitoring. But it is well known that both the Soviet Union and the United States have highly sophisticated national technical means capable of reliably providing the parties with the certitude that a moratorium is being observed.

A further guarantee of the effectiveness of monitoring would be to renounce—as the Soviet Union has just done—all nuclear explosions,

whether for military or for peaceful purposes. Against a background of silent test sites, in the absence of peaceful nuclear explosions, none of the parties would venture to breach the moratorium because it would not want to risk incurring the heavy burden of political responsibility in the face of the entire world for such a step.

With a view to increasing the effectiveness of monitoring—a matter in which the USSR has a direct interest—the Soviet Union has also expressed support for the idea of employing an international inspection system.

Advantage might be taken for this purpose of, for example, the proposal by six States for the setting up in their territories of special stations to observe the fulfilment of an agreement to halt tests.

The Soviet Union is prepared to go still further. It favours reaching agreement with the United States, in the event of the immediate institution of a reciprocal moratorium on nuclear explosions, concerning a number of *in situ* monitoring measures to eliminate possible doubts about the observance of that moratorium.

Thus, the problem of monitoring cannot be viewed as an obstacle to the achievement of an agreement on a reciprocal moratorium. It is entirely solvable and the Soviet Union is proposing concrete means for its mutually acceptable resolution.

For a joint Soviet-United States moratorium on all nuclear explosions to become a reality requires one thing: the political will to move forward along the path of adopting concrete measures aimed at curtailing the arms race and eliminating the threat of war. In other words, along a course of realizing the positive results of the Geneva meeting.

It is to be hoped that there will be a constructive approach in Washington to the question of a moratorium. The interests of all peoples, including the people of the United States, urgently require the halting of nuclear tests. The United States Government has every opportunity to respond to the popular aspirations by agreeing with the Soviet Union on a joint moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

279. Report by President Reagan to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements, December 23, 1985 [1]

In reporting to the Congress on February 7 [1] of this year on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, I stated that:

> In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less.

[1] ACDA files.

To do so would undermine the arms control process and damage the chances for establishing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship.

I further stated that:

Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. With regard to the issues analyzed in the January 1984 report, the Soviet Union has thus far not provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective actions sufficient to alleviate our concerns. The United States Government has vigorously pressed, and will continue to press, these compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels.[2]

The important role of treaty compliance for future arms control was recently recognized by the United Nations. On December 12, 1985, the General Assembly passed by a vote of 131–0 (with 16 abstentions) a resolution on arms control compliance which had been introduced by the United States and other co-sponsors. The resolution:

—urges all parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to comply with their provisions;
—calls upon those parties to consider the implications of noncompliance for international security and stability and for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament; and
—appeals to all U.N. members to support efforts to resolve noncompliance questions "with a view toward encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to and maintaining or restoring the integrity of arms limitation or disarmament agreements.[3]

At the request of the Congress, I have in the past two years provided three reports to the Congress on Soviet compliance issues. The first, forwarded in January 1984, reviewed seven compliance issues, concluding that the Soviet Union had, in fact, violated a number of important arms control commitments.

In September 1984 I provided, at the request of the Congress, a report on Soviet noncompliance prepared by the independent General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. That report concluded that over a 25-year span the Soviets had violated a substantial number of arms control commitments.[4]

In February 1985, I submitted a report to the Congress updating the Administration's January 1984 report and reviewing 13 issues that could be treated in unclassified terms and an additional group of 6 issues treated on a classified basis. That report discussed the pattern of

[2] Document 12. For the Presidential message and White House fact sheet on the January 1984 report, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 33–39.
[3] Document 271.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 715–725.

Soviet arms control violations, probable violations, or ambiguous activity in 17 cases. The U.S. Government found seven Soviet violations, three probable violations, one likely and one potential violation. The Soviets were found to be in compliance in two other cases examined.[5]

One of those issues, Yankee-Class submarine reconfiguration, is not addressed in the current report. While a submarine reconfigured to carry long-range cruise missiles constitutes a threat similar to that of the original SSBN, I reported in February that Soviet reconfiguration activities have not been in violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement.[6] This issue, therefore, requires no further judgment in terms of compliance at present.

Public Law 99–145 requires the Administration to provide on an annual basis by December 1 of each year a classified and unclassified report to the Congress containing the findings of the President and any additional information necessary to keep the Congress informed on Soviet compliance with arms control agreements.[7]

The current report responds to this Congressional requirement. It is the product of months of careful technical and legal analysis by all relevant agencies of the United States Government and represents the Administration's authoritative updated treatment of this important matter.

The current unclassified report examines one new issue and updates all of the issues studied in the classified report of February 1985, except the issue of Yankee-Class submarine reconfiguration. There are violations in nine cases. Of the nine cases involving violations, one SALT II issue[8]—that of Soviet concealment of the association between missiles and their launchers—is examined for the first time. The Soviet Union has now also violated its commitment to the SALT I Interim Agreement through the prohibited use of remaining facilities at former SS–7 ICBM sites. In addition, Soviet deployment of the SS–25 ICBM during 1985 constitutes a further violation of the SALT II prohibition on a second new type of ICBM. Several other issues involve potential, probable or likely violations.

The current unclassified report reaffirms the findings of the February 1985 classified report concerning ABM issues, making public two of them for the first time. It also reaffirms the February findings concerning SALT II issues involving violations, including one concerning strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which has not previously been made public. In two SALT II issues with respect to which the Soviets were not judged to be in clear violation in the classified report of last February, the findings are altered or updated. These two issues are the

[5] Document 12.
[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 202–204. The SALT I ABM Treaty is printed *ibid.*, pp. 197–201.
[7] Document 229.
[8] The texts of the SALT II agreements may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

SS–16 and an issue made public for the first time—Backfire Bomber production rate.

The Administration's most recent studies support its conclusion that there is a pattern of Soviet noncompliance. As documented in this and previous reports, the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligation under or political commitment to the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, the SALT II agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963,[9] the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,[10] the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons,[11] and the Helsinki Final Act.[12] In addition, the USSR has likely violated provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.[13]

While we remain concerned about Soviet violations of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act and the Limited Test Ban Treaty, there is no unambiguous evidence of new 1985 Soviet violations of these two treaties. With regard to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, or the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, there also is no unambiguous evidence of new 1985 Soviet lethal attacks that meets our strict standards of evidence. However, the Soviets clearly remain in violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE

Through its noncompliance, the Soviet Union has made military gains in the areas of strategic offensive arms as well as chemical, biological and toxin weapons. If the yields of Soviet nuclear tests have been substantially above 150 kilotons, then Soviet testing would allow proportionately greater gains in nuclear weapons development than the U.S. could achieve. The possible extent of the Soviet Union's military gains by virtue of its noncompliance in the area of strategic defense also is of increasing importance and serious concern.

In a fundamental sense, all deliberate Soviet violations are equally important. As violations of legal obligations or political commitments, they cause grave concern regarding Soviet commitment to arms control, and they darken the atmosphere in which current negotiations are being conducted in Geneva and elsewhere.

In another sense, Soviet violations are not of equal importance. While some individual violations are of little apparent military significance in their own right, such violations can acquire importance if, left unaddressed, they are permitted to become precedents for future, more threatening violations. Moreover, some issues that individually have little military significance could conceivably become significant when taken in their aggregate.

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[9] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[10] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.
[11] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.
[12] The arms control portions of the Final Act may be found *ibid., 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*; September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.
[13] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–229.

Document 279

The Krasnoyarsk Radar

The radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is disturbing for both political and military reasons. Politically, the radar demonstrates that the Soviets are capable of violating arms control obligations and commitments even when they are negotiating with the United States or when they know we will detect a violation. The 1972 ABM Treaty prohibits the Soviets from siting an ABM radar, or siting and orienting a ballistic missile detection and tracking radar, as the Krasnoyarsk radar is sited and oriented.

Militarily, the Krasnoyarsk radar violation goes to the heart of the ABM Treaty. Large phased-array radars (LPARs) like that under construction near Krasnoyarsk were recognized during the ABM Treaty negotiations as the critical, long lead-time element of a nationwide ABM defense.

When considered as a part of a Soviet network of new LPARs, the Krasnoyarsk radar has the inherent potential to contribute to ABM radar coverage of a significant portion of the central USSR Moreover, the Krasnoyarsk radar closes the remaining gap in Soviet ballistic missile detection and tracking coverage.

ABM Territorial Defense and Other ABM Activities

The Krasnoyarsk radar appears even more menacing when considered in the context of other Soviet ABM-related activities. Together they cause concern that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM territorial defense. Some of these activities, such as permitted LPARs and the Moscow ABM deployment area, are consistent with the ABM Treaty. Others involve potential or probable Soviet violations or other ambiguous activity, including:

—the apparent testing and development of components required for an ABM system which could be deployed to a site in months rather than years;
—the probable concurrent testing of air defense components and ABM components;
—the development of a modern air defense system, the SA–X–12, which may have some ABM capabilities; and
—the demonstration of an ability to reload ABM launchers and to refire the interceptor missile in a period of time shorter than previously noted.

Soviet deployment of an ABM territorial defense contrary to the ABM Treaty would have profound implications for Western security and the vital East-West strategic balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its credibility. Such a capability might encourage the Soviets to take increased risks in crises, thus degrading crisis stability.

SS–25

The SS–25, a clear and irreversible violation of the Soviet Union's SALT II commitment, also has important political and military implications. Testing and deployment of this missile violates a central provision of the SALT II Treaty, which was intended to limit the number of new ICBMs. The Treaty permits only one new type of ICBM for each Party. The Soviets have informed us that their one new type will be the SS–X–24, which is now undergoing testing, and have falsely asserted that the SS–25 is a permitted modernization of the silo-based SS–13 ICBM.

Under the pretext of permitted modernization, the Soviets, since the last compliance report, have deployed a prohibited second new type of missile, the SS–25, which is mobile and could be made more lethal. The SS–25 also could be modified to carry more than a single warhead. Most worrisome is the technical argument by which the Soviets sought to justify the SS–25, for it might be applied to additional prohibited new types of ICBMs in the future.

Telemetry Encryption and Concealment of Missile/Launcher Association

Two other Soviet violations impede our ability to verify the Soviet Union's compliance with its political commitments. Soviet use of encryption impedes U.S. verification of Soviet compliance and thus contravenes the provision of the SALT II Treaty which prohibits use of deliberate concealment measures which impede verification of compliance by national technical means. A new finding of this report is that current Soviet activities violate the provision of the Treaty which prohibits use of deliberate concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing. These deliberate Soviet concealment activities impede our ability to know whether a type of missile is in compliance with SALT II requirements. They could also make it more difficult for the United States to assess accurately the critical parameters of any future missile.

Since the SALT I agreement in 1972, Soviet encryption and concealment activities have become more extensive and disturbing. These activities, Soviet responses on these issues, and Soviet failure to take the corrective actions which the United States has repeatedly requested, are indicative of a Soviet attitude contrary to the fundamentals of sound arms control agreements. Soviet encryption and concealment activities present special obstacles to maintaining existing arms control agreements, undermine the political confidence necessary for concluding new treaties, and underscore the necessity that any new agreement be effectively verifiable. Soviet noncompliance, as documented in current and past Administration reports and exemplified by the encryption and concealment issues, has made verification and compliance pacing elements of arms control today.

Document 279

Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons

The Soviet Union's violations of its legal obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol have important political and military implications. The Soviets had a program of biological and toxin weapons before they signed the multilateral Treaty. Upon signing the Treaty, the Soviets not only did not stop their illegal program but they expanded facilities and were instrumental in the use of prohibited agents.

The Soviet Union has a prohibited offensive biological warfare capability which we do not have and against which we have no defense. This capability may include advanced biological agents about which we have little knowledge. Evidence suggests that the Soviets are expanding their chemical and toxin warfare capabilities in a manner that has no parallel in NATO's retaliatory or defensive programs. Even though there has been no unambiguous evidence of lethal attacks during 1985, previous activities have provided testing, development and operational experience.

Nuclear Testing

With respect to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, Soviet testing at yields above the 150 kiloton limit would allow development of advanced nuclear weapons with proportionately higher yields than the yields of weapons that the U.S. could develop under the Treaty. The U.S. Government judges that Soviet test activities constitute likely violations of the 150 kiloton limit.

Other Issues

Military significance is evidently not necessarily the determining factor in Soviet decisions or actions which violate their arms control commitments. The Soviet Union has also violated or probably violated arms control obligations and commitments from which at present it appears to reap little military gain. The following cases are relevant in this regard:

—the use of remaining facilities at former SS–7 ICBM sites since the February 1985 compliance report (SALT I Interim Agreement);
—exceeding the strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limits (SALT II);
—probable deployment of the SS–16 (SALT II); and
—underground nuclear test venting (Limited Test Ban Treaty).

The 1981 Soviet violation of the military exercise notification provisions of the Helsinki Final Act involved an action contrary to the confidence-building measures included in that agreement.

Soviet deployments of Backfire Bombers to Arctic staging bases are inconsistent with the Soviet Union's political commitment to the SALT II Treaty. In addition, while there are ambiguities concerning the data, there is evidence that the production rate of the Backfire Bomber was constant at slightly more than 30 per year until 1984, and slightly

less than 30 per year since then. These Soviet Backfire Bomber activities will continue to be monitored and assessed.

THE SOVIET RESPONSE

At the same time as the Administration has reported its concerns and findings to the Congress, the United States has had extensive exchanges with the Soviet Union on Soviet noncompliance in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), where SALT-related issues (including ABM issues) are discussed, and through other appropriate diplomatic channels. I expressed my personal concerns directly to General Secretary Gorbachev during my recent meeting with him in Geneva.

All of the violations, probable violations and ambiguous situations included in this report and previously reported on have been raised with the Soviets, except certain sensitive issues. The Soviet Union has thus far not provided explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns on these issues, nor has the Soviet Union taken actions needed to correct existing violations. Instead, they have continued to assert that they are in complete compliance with their arms control obligations and commitments.

U.S. POLICY

In contrast with the Soviet Union, the United States has fully observed its arms control obligations and commitments, including those under the SALT I and SALT II agreements. As I stated in my message to the Congress on June 10 of this year concerning U.S. interim restraint policy:

> In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint.[14] Despite my serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, I took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START.
>
> Since then, the United States has not taken any actions which would undercut existing arms control agreements. The United States has fully kept its part of the bargain. However, the Soviets have not. They have failed to comply with several provisions of SALT II, and we have serious concerns regarding their compliance with the provisions of other accords.
>
> The pattern of Soviet violations, if left uncorrected, undercuts the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world. The United States will continue to pursue vigorously with the Soviet Union the resolution of our concerns over Soviet noncompliance. We cannot

[14] *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, p. 332.

impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance.[15]

On June 10, I invited the Soviet Union to join the United States in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms and to pursue with renewed vigor our top priority of achieving deep reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals in the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. I noted that the U.S. cannot establish such a framework alone and that it would require the Soviet Union to take positive, concrete steps to correct its noncompliance, to resolve our other compliance concerns, to reverse its unparalleled and unwarranted military buildup, and actively to pursue arms reduction agreements in the Geneva negotiations.[16]

In going the extra mile, I have made clear that as an integral part of this policy, we will also take those steps required to assure our national security and that of our Allies that were made necessary by Soviet noncompliance. Thus, as I indicated to the Congress on June 10, "appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to ensure our security, to provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their noncompliance, and to make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control obligations entail real costs."[17]

As we monitor Soviet actions for evidence of the positive, concrete steps needed on their part to correct these activities, I have directed the Department of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment aimed at identifying specific actions that the United States could take to augment as necessary the U.S. strategic modernization program as a proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of those Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements which the Soviets fail to correct. We will carefully study this report as soon as it has been completed.

As we press for corrective Soviet actions and while keeping open all programmatic options for handling future milestones as new U.S. strategic systems are deployed, we will continue to assess the overall situation in light of Soviet actions correcting their noncompliance, reversing their military build-up, and promoting progress in Geneva.

I look forward to continued close consultation with the Congress as we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements.

The findings on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements follow.

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[15] Document 87.
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] Document 89.

THE FINDINGS

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

Treaty Status

The 1972 ABM Treaty and its Protocol ban deployment of ABM systems except that each party is permitted to deploy one ABM system around the national capital area or, alternatively, at a single ICBM deployment area.[18] The ABM Treaty is in force and is of indefinite duration. Soviet actions not in accord with the ABM Treaty are, therefore, violations of a legal obligation.

1. *The Krasnoyarsk Radar*

- *Obligation*: To preclude creation of a base for territorial ABM defense, the ABM Treaty provides that radars for early warning of ballistic missile attack may be deployed only at locations along the periphery of the national territory of each party and that they be oriented outward. The Treaty permits deployment (without regard to location or orientation) of large phased-array radars for purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification of compliance with arms control agreements.
- *Issue*: The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined the issue of whether the Krasnoyarsk radar meets the provisions of the ABM Treaty governing phased-array radars. This report reexamines this issue.
- *Finding*: The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the February 1985 report that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Continuing construction and the absence of credible alternative explanations have reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

2. *Mobility of ABM System Components*

- *Obligation*: The ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or components.
- *Issue*: The February 1985 report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed a mobile land-based ABM system, or components for such a system, in violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This report reexamines this issue.
- *Finding*: The U.S. Government judges that the evidence on Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility is ambiguous, but that the USSR's development and testing of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively limited site preparation, represent a po-

[18] For the ABM Treaty and its Protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201 and *ibid., 1974*, pp. 229–231.

tential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

3. *Concurrent Testing of ABM and Air Defense Components*

- *Obligation*: The ABM Treaty and its Protocol limit the Parties to one ABM deployment area. In addition to the ABM systems and components at that one deployment area, the Parties may have ABM systems and components for development and testing purposes so long as they are located at agreed test ranges. The Treaty also prohibits giving components, other than ABM system components, the capability "to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory" and prohibits the Parties from testing them in "an ABM mode." The Parties agreed that the concurrent testing of SAM and ABM system components is prohibited.
- *Issue*: The February 1985 compliance report examined whether the Soviet Union has concurrently tested SAM and ABM system components in violation of its legal obligation since 1978 not to do so. It was the purpose of that obligation to further constrain testing of air defense systems in an ABM mode. This report reexamines this issue.
- *Finding*: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the February 1985 Report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient fully to assess compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The large number, and consistency over time, of incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM components, plus Soviet failure to accommodate fully U.S. concerns, indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In several cases this may be highly probable. This and other ABM-related activities suggest the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

4. *ABM Capability of Modern SAM Systems*

- *Obligation*: Under the ABM Treaty, each party undertakes not to give non-ABM interceptor missiles, launchers or radars "capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode . . . "
- *Issue*: The February 1985 classified report examined whether the Soviet Union has tested a SAM system or component in an ABM mode or given it the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory in violation of their legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This report reexamines this issue.
- *Finding*: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the February 1985 report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM upgrade is insufficient to assess compliance with the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty. However,

this and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

5. *Rapid Reload of ABM Launchers*

- *Obligation*: The ABM Treaty limits to 100 the number of deployed ABM interceptor launchers and deployed interceptor missiles. It does not limit the number of interceptor missiles that can be built and stockpiled. The Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of "automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload" of the permitted launchers.
- *Issue*: The February 1985 classified report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed, tested or deployed automatic, semi-automatic, or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers in violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This report reexamines this issue.
- *Finding*: The U.S. Government judges, on the basis of the evidence available, that the USSR's actions with respect to the rapid reload of ABM launchers constitute an ambiguous situation as concerns its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty not to develop systems for rapid reload. The Soviet Union's reload capabilities are a serious concern. These and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

6. *ABM Territorial Defense*

- *Obligation*: The ABM Treaty allows each party a single operational site, explicitly permits modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components, and explicitly recognizes the existence of ABM test ranges for the development and testing of ABM components. The ABM Treaty prohibits, however, the deployment of an ABM system for defense of the national territory of the parties and prohibits the parties from providing a base for such a defense.
- *Issue*: The February 1985 report examined whether the Soviets have deployed an ABM system for the defense of their territory or provided a base for such a defense. This report reexamines this issue.
- *Finding*: The U.S. Government judges that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions (e.g., radar construction, concurrent testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload and ABM mobility) suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

SALT II Treaty

Treaty Status

SALT II was signed in June 1979 and has not been ratified. In 1981 the United States made clear to the Soviet Union its intention not to ratify the SALT II Treaty. Prior to this clarification of our position in 1981, both nations were obligated under customary international law not to take actions which would defeat the object and purpose of the signed, but unratified, Treaty. Such Soviet actions prior to 1981 are

violations of legal obligations. Since 1981, the United States has observed a political commitment to refrain from actions that undercut the SALT II Treaty so long as the Soviet Union does likewise. The Soviets have told us they also would abide by these provisions. Soviet actions inconsistent with this commitment are violations of their political commitment with respect to the SALT II Treaty.

1. *The SS–25 ICBM*

- *Obligation*: In an attempt to constrain the modernization and the proliferation of new, more capable types of ICBMs, the provisions of SALT II permit each side to "flight test and deploy" just one new type of "light" ICBM. A new type is defined as one that differs from an existing type by more than 5 percent in length, largest diameter, launch-weight or throw-weight or differs in number of stages or propellant type. In addition, it was agreed that no ICBM of an existing type with a post-boost vehicle and a single reentry vehicle would be flight-tested or deployed whose reentry vehicle weight is less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of that ICBM. This latter provision was intended to prohibit the possibility that single warhead ICBMs could quickly be converted to MIRVed systems.
- *Issues*: The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined the evidence: whether the Soviets have tested or deployed a second new type of ICBM (the SS–25) which is prohibited; whether the reentry vehicle (RV) on that missile, if it is not a new type, is in compliance with the provision that for existing types of single RV missiles, the weight of the RV be equal to at least 50 percent of total throw-weight; and whether encryption of SS–25 flight test telemetry impedes verification. This report reexamines these issues.
- *Findings*:

a. *Second New Type—Testing and Deployment*: The U.S. Government judges, based on convincing evidence about the SS–25, that the throw-weight of the Soviet SS–25 ICBM exceeds by more than five percent the throw-weight of the Soviet SS–13 ICBM and cannot therefore be considered a permitted modernization of the SS–13 as the Soviets claim. The SS–25 is a prohibited second "new type" of ICBM and its testing, in addition to the testing of the SS–X–24 ICBM, thereby is a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the "new type" provision of the SALT II Treaty. The deployment of this missile during 1985 constitutes a further violation of the SALT II prohibition on a second "new type" of ICBM.

b. *RV-to-Throw-weight Ratio*: The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion of the January 1984 report regarding the SS–25 RV-to-throw-weight ratio. That is, if we were to accept the Soviet argument that the SS–25 is not a prohibited "new type" of ICBM, it would be a violation of their political commitment to observe the SALT II provision which prohibits the testing of such an existing ICBM with a single reentry vehicle whose weight is less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of the ICBM.

c. *Encryption*: The U.S. Government reaffirms its judgment made in the January 1984 report regarding telemetry encryption during tests of the SS–25. Encryption during tests of this missile is illustrative of the deliberate impeding of verification of compliance in violation of the USSR's political commitment.

Despite U.S. requests for explanations and corrective actions with regard to the SS–25 ICBM-related activities, Soviet actions continue unchanged, and the Soviet Union has proceeded to deployment of this missile.

2. *Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle Limits*

- *Obligation*: The Soviet Union's political commitment to abide by SALT II is interpreted by the U.S. Government as including an obligation not to increase the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) in its arsenal. The Soviet Union had 2,504 SNDVs when it signed SALT II.
- *Issue*: The February 1985 classified report examined the issue of whether the Soviet Union has abided by its commitment not to exceed the level of 2,504 SNDVs. This report reexamines this issue.
- *Finding*: The U.S. Government interprets the Soviet commitment to abide by SALT II as including the existence of a cap on SNDVs—at a level of 2,504 existing at the time SALT II was signed. The Soviet Union has deployed SNDVs above the 2,504 cap in violation of its political commitment under SALT II. Such activity is indicative of a Soviet policy inconsistent with this political commitment.

3. *SS–16 Deployment*

- *Obligation*: The Soviet Union agreed in SALT II not to produce, test or deploy ICBMs of the SS–16 type and, in particular, not to produce the SS–16 third stage or the reentry vehicle of that missile.
- *Issue*: The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined the evidence regarding whether the Soviets have deployed the SS–16 ICBM in spite of the ban on its deployment. This report reexamines this issue.
- *Finding*: The President's February 1985 Report to Congress which noted that the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and we cannot reach a definitive conclusion, found the activities at Plesetsk to be a probable violation of the USSR's legal obligation and political commitment under SALT II. Soviet activity in the past year at Plesetsk seems to indicate the probable removal of SS–16 equipment and introduction of equipment associated with a different ICBM.

4. *BACKFIRE Bomber Intercontinental Operating Capability*

- *Obligation*: At the signing of SALT II, the USSR gave the U.S. assurances about the BACKFIRE bomber's intercontinental operating capability. The Soviet statement of June 16, 1979, read, in pertinent part, as follows:

> The Soviet side informs the U.S. side that the Soviet "Tu–22M" airplane, called 'BACKFIRE' in the USA, is a medium-range bomber, and that it does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this airplane in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the USA. Nor does it intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refueling . . .[19]

This unilateral statement is an integral part of the SALT II agreement and the U.S. considers it to be incorporated in the Soviet Union's political commitment to abide by SALT II.

- *Issue*: The February 1985 classified report addressed the issue of whether temporary deployments of BACKFIRE bombers to Arctic bases constitute actions inconsistent with Brezhnev's June 16, 1979, statement not to give the BACKFIRE an increased radius of action and the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. This report reexamines this issue.
- *Finding*: The U.S. Government judges that the temporary deployment of BACKFIREs to Arctic bases is cause for concern and continued careful monitoring. By such temporary deployment of BACKFIREs, the Soviet Union acted in a manner inconsistent with its political commitment in the June 1979 BACKFIRE statement not to give BACKFIRE the capability to strike targets on the territory of the United States.

5. *BACKFIRE Bomber Production Rate*

- *Obligation*: At the signing of SALT II, the USSR gave the U.S. assurances about the BACKFIRE bomber's production rate. The Soviet statement read, in pertinent part, as follows: " . . . the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present rate." Soviet President Brezhnev, according to Secretary Vance's SALT II transmittal letter to the Senate, "confirmed that the Soviet BACKFIRE production rate would not exceed thirty per year."[20] President Carter stated that the United States enters into the SALT II Agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations under the Treaty.[21] The U.S. considers the Soviet unilateral statement to be an integral part of the SALT II Agreement and, as such, to be incorporated in the Soviet Union's political commitment to abide by SALT II.
- *Issue*: The February 1985 report examined the question of whether the Soviet Union has produced more than 30 BACKFIREs per year and increased the production rate since signing SALT II. This report reexamines this issue.

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[19] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, p. 189.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 244.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 189.

- *Finding*: The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union is obligated to produce no more than 30 BACKFIRE bomber aircraft per year. There are ambiguities concerning the data. However, there is evidence that the Soviet BACKFIRE production rate was constant at slightly more than 30 per year until 1984, and decreased since that time to slightly below 30 per year.

6. *Encryption of Ballistic Missile Telemetry*

- *Obligation*: Provisions of SALT II ban deliberate concealment measures that impede verification by national technical means. The Treaty permits each party to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including encryption, but bans deliberate denial of telemetry, such as through encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification.
- *Issue*: The January 1984 compliance report examined whether the Soviet Union has engaged in encryption of missile test telemetry (radio signals) so as to impede verification. This issue was reexamined in the February 1985 compliance report and is examined again in this report.
- *Finding*: The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the February 1985 report that Soviet encryption practices constitute a violation of a legal obligation under SALT II prior to 1981 and a violation of their political commitment since 1982. The nature and extent of such encryption of telemetry on new ballistic missiles, despite U.S. requests for corrective action, continues to be an example of deliberately impeding verification of compliance in violation of this Soviet political commitment.

7. *Concealment of Missile/Launcher Association*

- *Obligation*: Article XV of the SALT II Treaty prohibits "deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty". This obligation is further clarified in a Common Understanding that states that Article XV applies to all provisions of the Treaty and "includes the obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing".
- *Issue*: This report examines for the first time the issue of whether the Soviets have concealed the association between an ICBM and its launcher during testing in violation of their obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification.
- *Finding*: The U.S. Government judges Soviet activities related to the SS–25 to be a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to abide by the SALT II Treaty provision prohibiting concealment of the association between a missile and its launcher during testing.

SALT I Interim Agreement

Treaty Status

The SALT I Interim Agreement entered into force for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972. Dismantling procedures imple-

menting the Interim Agreement were concluded in 1974. The Interim Agreement, by its own terms, was of limited duration and expired as a legally binding document in 1977. The applicability of the Interim Agreement to the actions of both parties has, however, been extended by the parties by a series of mutual political commitments, including the President's May 31, 1982 statement that the United States would refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint.[22] The Soviets have told us they would abide by the SALT I Interim Agreement and SALT II. Any actions by the USSR inconsistent with this commitment are violations of its political commitment with respect to the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

Use of "Remaining Facilities" at Former SS–7 Sites

- *Obligation*: The SALT I Interim Agreement and its procedures prohibit the Parties from using facilities remaining at dismantled or destroyed ICBM sites for storage, support, or launch of ICBMs. Any Soviet actions inconsistent with this commitment are violations of a political commitment with respect to the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.
- *Issue*: The February 1985 report examined whether the USSR has violated the SALT I Interim Agreement prohibition against using facilities remaining at dismantled former SS–7 ICBM sites for the storage, support or launch of SS–25 ICBMs. This report reexamines this issue.
- *Finding*: The U.S. Government judges that Soviet use of former SS–7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS–25 mobile ICBMs is in violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement. Should the Soviets use "remaining facilities" in the future at other former SS–7 sites where the SS–25 is now in the process of being deployed, such use will also constitute Soviet violation of its political commitment under the SALT I Interim Agreement.

Biological Weapons Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol

Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons

- *Treaty Status*: The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (the BWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol are multilateral treaties to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are parties. Soviet actions not in accord with these treaties and customary international law relating to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are violations of legal obligations.
- *Obligations:* The BWC bans the development, production, stockpiling or possession, and transfer of microbial or other biological agents or toxins except for a small quantity for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. It also bans weapons, equipment and means of delivery of agents or toxins. The 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules of customary international law prohibit

[22] *Ibid., 1982*, p. 332.

the first use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices and prohibits use of bacteriological methods of warfare.

- *Issues:* The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined whether the Soviets are in violation of provisions that ban the development, production, transfer, possession and use of biological and toxin weapons and whether they have been responsible for the use of lethal chemicals. This report reexamines this issue.
- *Finding:* The U.S. Government judges that ongoing Soviet activities confirm and strengthen the conclusion of the January 1984 and February 1985 reports that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Allegations concerning the use of lethal chemicals or toxins in Kampuchea, Laos, or Afghanistan have subsided in 1985. However, there is no basis for amending the February 1985 conclusion that, prior to this time, the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

Nuclear Testing and the 150 Kiloton Limit

- *Treaty Status:* The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed in 1974. The Treaty has not been ratified but neither party has indicated an intention not to ratify. Therefore, both Parties are subject to the obligation under customary international law to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT. Soviet actions that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT are therefore violations of their legal obligations. The United States is seeking to negotiate improved verification measures for the Treaty. Both Parties have separately stated they would observe the 150 kiloton threshold of the TTBT.
- *Obligation:* The Treaty prohibits any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under the jurisdiction or control of the Parties beginning March 31, 1976. In view of the technical uncertainties associated with estimating the precise yield of nuclear weapon tests, the sides agreed that one or two slight, unintended breaches per year would not be considered a violation.
- *Issue:* The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined whether the Soviets have conducted nuclear tests in excess of 150 kilotons. This report reexamines this issue.
- *Finding:* While ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and verification uncertainties continued in 1985, the U.S. Government reaffirms the February 1985 finding that Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which

banned underground nuclear tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons. These Soviet actions continued despite U.S. requests for corrective measures.

Limited Test Ban Treaty

Underground Nuclear Test Venting

- *Treaty Status:* The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty) (LTBT)) is a multilateral treaty that entered into force for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963. Soviet actions not in accord with this treaty are violations of a legal obligation.
- *Obligations:* The LTBT specifically prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It also prohibits nuclear explosions in any other environment "if such explosions cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted".
- *Issue:* The February 1985 report examined whether the USSR's underground nuclear tests have caused radioactive debris to be present outside of its territorial limits. This report reexamines this issue.
- *Finding:* The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the February 1985 report that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices resulted in the venting of radioactive matter on numerous occasions and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite numerous U.S. demarches and requests for corrective action.

Helsinki Final Act

Helsinki Final Act Notification of Military Exercises

- *Legal Status:* The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Helsinki in 1975. This document represents a political commitment and was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, along with many other States. Soviet actions not in accord with that document are violations of their political commitment.
- *Obligation:* All signatory States of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to give prior notification of, and other details concerning, major military maneuvers, defined as those involving more than 25,000 troops.
- *Issue:* The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined whether notification of the Soviet military exercise "Zapad-81" was inadequate and therefore a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment under the Helsinki Final Act. This report reexamines this issue.
- *Finding:* The U.S. Government previously judged and continues to find that the Soviet Union in 1981 violated its political commitment to observe provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act

by not providing prior notification of exercise "Zapad-81". While the USSR has generally taken an approach to the confidence-building measures of the Final Act which minimizes the information it provides, Soviet compliance with the exercise-notification provisions was improved in 1983. In 1984 the Soviets returned to a minimalist approach providing only the bare information required under the Final Act. The Soviet Union continued this approach during 1985.

280. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to the Leader of the Greater London Council (Livingstone): Nuclear Disarmament, December 30, 1985 [1]

I read with close attention your address, pervaded with awareness of the need to take urgent measures to rid the peoples of the nuclear threat. The worry of your compatriots about the dangerous development of the world situation is fully shared in the Soviet Union.

Mankind is living through a critical period in its history. It has no choice but to survive or to destroy itself entirely. So today, it is more incumbent than ever before upon all the politicians to whom people have entrusted responsibility for their future to display a broad statesman-like approach and the ability to rise above narrow, selfish interests and to realize in full, the collective and individual responsibility of states for the destinies of peace.

Pursuing a clear and consistently peace-loving course the Soviet Union is doing all that it can to close the path into space to arms and to achieve radical reduction in nuclear weapons and, in the final analysis, their complete elimination. The Soviet Union is undertaking positive steps in this direction, the need for which you mention in your address. The USSR already has pledged not to be first to use nuclear weapons [2] and has introduced a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions.[3] The prospects for transforming this moratorium into a mutual accord depend on the U.S. Government.

We favor an immediate freeze on nuclear weapons and a complete ban without an expiry date on testing them and with the most effective verification. We are ready in the very near future again to engage in tripartite talks in order to find a mutually acceptable solution to this problem, together with representatives of the United States and Great Britain.

You also know that our country has proposed a 50 percent reduction of the corresponding nuclear weapons of the USSR and United States. Of course, progress at the Geneva talks is possible only if there

[1] Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, January 2, 1986; FBIS *Daily Report*, January 2, 1986, vol. III, pp. G1–G2. The letter was in response to a December 4 letter from Mr. Livingstone.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 348.

[3] Document 126.

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is a full ban on offensive space weapons—in other words, the abandonment of the "star wars" program, the realization of which would result in strategic chaos and a qualitatively new, uncontrollable phase of the arms race. Unfortunately we see that the fatal consequences of joining in the "star wars" plans are still not realized fully by the ruling circles of either Great Britain or certain other of the United States' closest allies.

I warmly remember my visit to your country a year ago and the numerous meetings on British soil. I understand the striving of the British to preserve their traditions and their historical heritage, to augment achievements in various fields and pass all this on to their descendants intact.

People in other European countries, in the Soviet Union, and the whole world, are showing similar concern. This is why the peoples' concern is quite legitimate in connection with the fact that ever-increasing mountains of death-dealing weapons are appearing on the path to realizing these noble humane tasks. Even the relatively small British Isles are now filling up with nuclear weapons, the presence of which, it should be said outright, does not strengthen anyone's security.

An important place in the struggle to limit the area of nuclear preparations is occupied by nuclear weapons nonproliferation measures and measures to create non-nuclear zones in various parts of the world. The proclamation of specific areas and towns as nuclear-weapons-free zones, also goes in this direction. In this we perceive the peoples' realization of their responsibility for the world's fate and their intention to act in forms available to them. The edifice of peace is made of separate bricks. Detente is made up of tiny grains.

It is pleasing to see that the movement of local authorities and other organizations in support of setting up nuclear-freeze zones is growing and becoming stronger. In our view such zones are not wishful thinking or idealistic dreams, but a positive phenomenon in international life reflecting the will of ordinary people for peace, cooperation and detente.

In our attitude to nuclear-free zones we do not make exceptions for any states, be they participants or nonparticipants in military alliances. We have one condition: If any country refuses to acquire nuclear weapons and does not have them on its territory then it receives from us firm and effective guarantees. For example, if Great Britain fully rejects nuclear weaponry and eliminates foreign nuclear bases from its territory then the USSR would guarantee that Soviet nuclear weapons would not be targeted on British territory and would not be used against it. Such guarantees could also be formulated by concluding an official agreement that takes into consideration all the appropriate aspects of a military nature.

We value highly the aspiration of the Greater London Council, as well as of many hundreds of municipalities in dozens of countries of the world, who make their contribution to the common efforts of

peoples, which are directed toward removing the nuclear threat and of restoring an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding in relations between states.

I wish you further success in your noble activity in the name of preserving peace on earth. Accept my very best wishes for the coming new year.

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[3] The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1314 Kinnear Road, Columbus, Ohio 43212.

[4] Published for United States distribution by the Atlantic Council of the United States. English language editions distributed by the Atlantic Council, 1616 H St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 and by the Department of State (Bureau of Public Affairs [PA/OAP], U.S. Department of State, Room 5815A, Washington, D.C. 20520).

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the disarmament field each year as well as a brief history of the major aspects of the overall question. Volume 8 covers 1983 [Sales No. E.84.IX.3] and Volume 9, 1984 [Sales No. E.85.IX.4]. Another publication of the Department is a booklet, *The United Nations General Assembly and Disarmament, 1985* [Sales No. E.86.IX.11], which offers a summary of proposals made and actions taken on disarmament issues within the General Assembly at its 40th regular session. It has also issued as number 12 in its Study Series the *Study on Conventional Disarmament* [Sales No. E.85.IX.1], the report (A/39/348) prepared for the Secretary General pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 35/156A of December 12, 1980 and 36/97 of December 9, 1981. A summary of this study is available in the Disarmament Fact Sheets series [Sales No. E.85 IX.1]. Number 13 in the Department's Study Series is *Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament Measures* [Sales No. E.86.IX.2], the Secretary General's report (A/39/516) which was prepared in accordance with General Assembly resolution 38/183 of December 20, 1983.

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Department for Disarmament Affairs[5]

A report on the activities of the Department has been issued by the Secretary General in document A/40/618. The Department has published *Conference on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa: Meeting of Experts* [Sales No. E.86.IX.6], an account of the Lomé conference of August 1985. Other publications of the Department are listed above.

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The Report of the Disarmament has been published as *General Assembly Official Records: Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/40/42).

General Assembly

The Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its Fortieth Session have been published in *General Assembly Official Records: Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 53* (A/40/53).

Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development

The report of the Preparatory Committee has been published in *General Assembly Official Records: Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 51* (A/40/51).

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

A report on the activities of the Institute has been issued by the Secretary General in document A/40/725.

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[5] Title changed from Center for Disarmament as of January 1, 1983, pursuant to resolution 37/99K of December 13, 1982.

United Nations Publications—Continued

Secretary General

The report of the Secretary General on the work of the organization has been published as *General Assembly Official Records: Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 1* (A/39/1).

He has also issued the following reports that were prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolutions:

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cation of international safeguards and the peaceful development of nuclear power in various fields. It can be obtained, free of charge from the International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria. Volume 27 covers the year 1985.

List of Persons

ABRAHAMSON, JAMES A. (Lt. Gen., USAF). Formerly associate administrator in charge of U.S. space shuttle program, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Department of Defense, 1984– .

ABDULLAH, SAMSI. Minister Counselor, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations, 1985– ; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1985– .

ACHACHE, M'HAMED. Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Algeria; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and International Security, 1979–1980, on All Aspects of the Conventional Arms Race and on Disarmament Relating to Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces, 1982–1984, and To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study on Concepts of Security, 1984–1985.

ADELMAN, KENNETH L. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1976–1977; Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute, 1977–1981; U.S. Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 1981–1983; Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1983– .

ADENIJI, OLUYEMI (OLU). Director-General, Department of International Organizations, Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs; Ambassador to Switzerland and Permanent Representative at the U.N. Office at Geneva; leader of the Delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and its successor, the Committee on Disarmament, 1977–1982; President, U.N. Preparatory Conference on Prohibition or Restriction of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, 1979–1980; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts on Regional Disarmament, 1979–1980; Chairman, Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1980–1982; Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session, 1982; member, Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– , and Chairman, 9th session, 1983.

AHMAD, MANSUR. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva, 1981– ; member, Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1978–1981; Representative to the Committee on Disarmament, 1981– ; member, UNIDIR Steering Group Established To Guide an Investigation of the Modalities of an International Disarmament Fund for Development, 1983–1984; expert on the Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts on Unilateral Disarmament Measures, 1984; Chairman, Disarmament Commission, 1985. Chairman, CD *Ad Hoc* Committee on Effective International Arrangements To Assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1985.

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ALATAS, ALI. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations, 1982– ; Chairman, Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study on the Naval Arms Race, 1984–1985.

ALEKSANDROV-AGENTOV, ANDREY M. Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1976–1986.

ALEWINE, RALPH W., III (Dr.). Assistant Director, Geophysical Sciences Division, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense; U.S. expert who participated in the CD *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts To Consider International Cooperative Measures To Detect and Identify Seismic Events, 1985.

ALFARARGI, SAAD. Counselor for Political Affairs (Disarmament and International Security Affairs), Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations, New York, 1974–1977. Consultant, UNGA Special Session on Disarmament, 1977–1978; Secretary, Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1978–1979; Director, Office of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Cairo, 1980–1983; Ambassador and leader, delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, 1985– .

ALFONSÍN, RAÚL. President of Argentina, 1984– .

ALLISON, ROYAL. (Lt. Gen., USAF). Deputy Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Studies Group, 1964–1972; U.S. military representative, SALT I negotiations, 1969–1972.

ANDERSSON, STEN. Minister of Health and Social Affairs of Sweden, 1982– ; Foreign Minister, 1985– .

ARMACOST, MICHAEL H. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1984– .

ARMSTRONG, NEIL A. U.S. astronaut, Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, 1962–1970; command pilot, Gemini 8, March 1966. Commander, Apollo II, first man to walk on moon, 1969. Deputy associate administrator, Office of Advanced Research and Technology, NASA, 1970–1971. Recipient of numerous awards, Medal for Freedom, 1969. Professor, College of Engineering, University of Cincinnati, 1971– .

ATANASOV, ATANAS. Journalist with *Rabotnichesko Delo*, Bulgarian Communist Party daily newspaper.

AZZOUT, HADJ BENABDELKADER. Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Algeria; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

BAKES, JOHN PHILIP, Jr. President and chief operating officer, Continental Airlines, Houston, TX; member, President's Chemical Warfare Review Commission, 1985.

BARKER, ROBERT (Dr.). Deputy Assistant Director, Bureau of Verification and Intelligence, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1983–1986.

BARNES, MICHAEL D. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., MD), 1978–1985; member, House Foreign Affairs Committee.

BARRY, ROBERT L. U.S. Foreign Service Officer, 1962– . Consular, then political officer, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, 1968–1970; political officer, U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York, 1970–1971; Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State, 1975–1977; Director, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Department of State, 1977–1978; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, 1978–1979; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 1979–1981; Ambassador to Bulgaria, 1981–1984. John Sloan Dickey Fellow, Dartmouth College and Distinguished Visitor of W. Averell Harriman Institute for the Advanced Study of the USSR, Columbia University. Ambassador and U.S. Representative to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, September 1985– .

BARTHELEMY, THOMAS F. Foreign Affairs Officer, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1975–1985; Alternate U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, 1985– .

BAYART, LUVSANDORJIIN. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the U.N. Office at Geneva and head of the delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, 1985– .

BEESLEY, J. ALAN. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the Conference on Disarmament, 1984– .

BENSMAIL, ABDELKADER. Technical Adviser to the Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria and member of the delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1979; Senior Political Affairs Officer, Conference Secretariat of the U.N. Office at Geneva, 1982– .

BERASATEGUI, VINCENTE E. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Argentina at the U.N. Office at Geneva and head of the delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 1974–1976; Deputy Secretary General of the Conference on Disarmament, 1985– .

BERMAN, HOWARD L. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., CA), 1982– ; member, Foreign Affairs Committee.

BETHE, HANS A. (Dr.). Professor of Theoretical Physics, Cornell University, 1937–1975; now Professor Emeritus; Director, Theoretical Physics Division, Los Alamos Science Laboratory, 1943–1946. Received Enrico Fermi Award, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961, Nobel Prize for Physics, 1967.

BIDEN, JOSEPH R., Jr. U.S. Senator (D., DE), 1973– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations and Select Committee on Intelligence; headed senatorial delegation to USSR, August 1979.

BJÖRNERSTEDT, ROLF. Assistant Secretary General, United Nations Center for Disarmament until 1983; Secretary General's representative to both the *Ad Hoc* Group on Disarmament and International Security and to the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1978; Chairman of the Board, SIPRI, 1979– . Member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Study the Institutional Arrangements Relating to the Process of Disarmament, 1980–1981; Chairman, Group of Governmental Experts on Military Research and Development, 1983– . Chairman, Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

BLACKWILL, ROBERT DEAN. Peace Corps volunteer, Malawi, Africa, 1964–1966; Foreign Service Officer, 1967– ; Director, Western European Affairs, National Security Council, 1979–1981; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, 1981; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, 1982–1983; Associate Dean, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (sabbatical), 1983–1984; Ambassador and U.S. Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, 1985– .

BLIX, HANS (Dr.). Member, delegation of Sweden to the U.N. General Assembly, 1961–1981; member, delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), 1962–1978; Legal Adviser on International Law and Head of Department, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1963–1976; Under Secretary of State in charge of international development cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1976–1978; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1978–1979; Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1979–1981; third Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, December 1981– .

BLUM, JAMES L. Assistant Director for Budget Analyses, Congressional Budget Office.

BOGACHEV, VLADIMIR. Military commentator for TASS, 1981– .

BONKER, DON L. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., WA), 1975– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs; board member, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University.

BONNIER, ELISABETH (Mrs.). First Secretary of the Delegation of Sweden to the Conference on Disarmament, 1984; chairman, Working Group B on Elimination of Stocks and Production Facilities of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, 1985.

BOSCHWITZ, RUDY. U.S. Senator (R., MN), 1979– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations.

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BROOMFIELD, WILLIAM S. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., MI), 1957– ; ranking Republican, Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs; U.S. Ambassador, 22d session of the U.S. General Assembly, 1967; Congressional Adviser, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 1970–1974; delegate, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1977–1980 (SALT II); delegate, North Atlantic Assembly, 1955, 1960, and 1973–1980; Interparliamentary Union Conference, 1980 and 1982.

BROWN, HAROLD. Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, 1961–1965; Secretary of the Air Force, 1965–1969; President, California Institute of Technology, 1969–1977; U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1977–1981; Senior Counselor to the Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

BRUNDTLAND, GRO HARLEM. Chairman, Norwegian Labor Party, 1981– ; Prime Minister of Norway, 1986– .

BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW. Assistant professor of government and research associate, Russian Research Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1956–1960; associate professor of public law and government, Columbia University, 1960–1962, professor, 1962–1977; director, Trilateral Commission, 1973; Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs, and Chairman, Special Coordinating Committee, National Security Council, 1977–1981. Senior Adviser, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1981– ; member, Presidential Chemical Warfare Review Commission, 1985.

BUCKLEY, JAMES L. U.S. Senator (R., NY), 1971–1977; member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; private business consultant and corporate director, 1977–1981; Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, 1981–1982; Counselor, Department of State, 1982–1983, *ex officio* member, Board for International Broadcasting, 1983– .

BUNDY, MCGEORGE (Dr.). Dean, faculty arts and sciences, Harvard, 1953–1961; professor, 1954–1961; Special Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security, 1961–1966; president, Ford Foundation, 1966–1979; professor of history, New York University, N.Y.C., 1979– .

BURTON, DANNY L. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., IN), 1982– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

BUSBY, MORRIS D. Former Navy officer. U.S. Foreign Service Officer, 1975– ; member of staff of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Alternate Representative of the United States to the Committee on Disarmament, 1981–1983.

BUSH, GEORGE. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., TX), 1967–1971; Ambassador to the United Nations, 1971–1972; chairman, Republican National Committee 1973–1974; Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Peking, PRC, 1974–1975; Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1976–1977; U.S. Vice President, 1981– .

BUTLER, RICHARD. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the U.N. Office at Geneva; head of Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, 1984– ; Representative at the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, 1983– .

BUTT, MOHAMMED IQBAL. Minister of Information, Pakistan, 1975– .

BYKOV, OLEG N. Deputy Director, USSR Institute for World Economics and International Relations; USSR Academy of Sciences; governmental expert in the U.N. Secretary

General's Group of Governmental Experts on Confidence-Building Measures, 1980–1981; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–1982, 1983– .

CARASALES, JULIO CESAR. Ambassador and Special Representative of Argentina for Disarmament Affairs at the Committee on Disarmament, 1981; Head of Delegation, 1982– ; Argentine Representative to the First Committee of the General Assembly, 1982–1984.

CARROLL, EUGENE J. Jr. (Rear Adm., ret.). Deputy Director, Center for Defense Information.

CARS, HANS CHRISTIAN. Head of Division, Planning and Budget Secretariat, Swedish Ministry of Defense; Chairman, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1981–1982; Deputy Director, Planning and Budget Secretariat, Swedish Ministry of Defense, and Chairman, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1983–1985.

CARTER, JAMES EARL, Jr. (Jimmy). Member, Georgia Senate, 1962–1966; Governor of Georgia, 1971–1974; President of the United States, 1977–1981.

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CHŇOUPEK, BOHUSLAV. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, 1971– .

CLARK, THOMAS R. Manager Nevada Operations Office, Department of Energy.

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COUTAU-BÉGARIE, HERVÉ. Chargé de conférénces à l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (IV Section) Paris, France; Expert on the U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study on the Naval Arms Race, 1984–1985.

COX, CHAPMAN B. Deputy Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Navy for Logistics, 1982–1983; Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 1983–1984; General Counsel and Director, Defense Legal Services Agency, Department of Defense, 1984– .

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CROMARTIE, R. IAN T. (Dr., CHG), British Ambassador and Chairman, U.K. delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1983– ; representative at the United Nations, 1983– .

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DAM, KENNETH W. Deputy Secretary of State, 1982–1985.

DENG, SAN RUI. Professor of Naval Architecture, Harbin Shipbuilding Engineering Institute, China; expert on the U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study on the Naval Arms Race, 1984–1985.

DENG, XIAOPING. Chairman, Communist Party of China Central Advisory Commission, 1982– ; member, Standing Committee of the Politburo, 1956–1966, 1975–1976,

1978– . Chairman, Military Affairs Commission, 1981– . Chairman, Central Military Commission, 1983– .

DHANAPALA, JAYANTHA. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the U.N. Office at Geneva; leader of the Sri Lankan delegation at the Conference on Disarmament, 1984– .

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DODD, CHRISTOPHER J. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., CT), 1975–1980; Senator, 1981– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations.

DOMINICK, PETER H. U.S. Congressman (R., CO), 1959–1961 U.S. Senator, 1961–1973.

DONALDSON, SAM. Newsman, American Broadcasting Company.

DORNAN, ROBERT K. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., CA), 1977– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

DOUGHERTY, JAMES E. (Professor). Department of Politics, Saint Joseph's University, Philadelphia, PA; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–1982, 1983– .

DUBEY, MUCHKUND. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of India to the U.N. Office at Geneva; head of the Indian Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament, 1983– ; Chairman, Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1985– .

DUMAS, ROLAND. Foreign Minister of France, 1984– .

DUNN, LEWIS A. Professional staff member, Hudson Institute, 1974–1981; Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Management, 1981–1982; Counselor to Ambassador at Large Richard T. Kennedy, 1982–1983; Assistant Director (Bureau of Nuclear and Weapons Control), U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1983– .

EAGLETON, THOMAS F. U.S. Senator (D., MO), 1968, 1969– .

EDIS, RICHARD J.S. Alternate Representative of the United Kingdom in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, 1984– ; Counselor to the Delegation at the Conference on Disarmament, 1985– .

EILAM, UZI (Brig. Gen.). Director General, Atomic Energy Commission of Israel, 1975–1985.

EIMER, MANFRED. Assistant Director, Bureau of Verification and Intelligence, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1983– .

EKÉUS, ROLPH. Ambassador of Sweden and Head of the Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament, 1983– ; Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, 1983–1985.

ELBE, FRANK. Counselor and Alternate Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Committee on Disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament, 1983– ; Chairman, Working Group C on Compliance of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, 1985.

ELLEMANN-JENSEN, UFFE. Foreign Minister of Denmark, 1982– .

EMERY, DAVID F. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., ME), 1975–1981; Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982– .

ENCINAS DEL PANDO, JÓSE A. Professor (on research leave), University of Lima; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development 1978–1981; member of his Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1976, 1977, 1981–1982, 1983–1985.

ENE, CONSTANTIN. Ambassador of Romania, former Permanent Representative to the United Nations; Chairman, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Ex-

penditures, 1981–1982; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–1982; 1983– .

ERLENBORN, JOHN N. Attorney, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather and Geraldson, Washington, D.C.; former U.S. Congressional Representative from Illinois; member, President's Chemical Warfare Review Commission, 1985.

ETZOLD, THOMAS. Assistant Director (Multilateral Affairs Bureau), U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1984–1985.

EVANS, DANIEL J. U.S. Senator, (R., WA), 1983– .

EVERNDEN, JACK (Dr.). Research geophysicist and seismologist, U.S. Geological Survey; physical science officer, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1970–1972.

FASCELL, DANTE B. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., FL), 1955– ; Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs; member, U.S. Delegation to the 24th U.N. General Assembly, 1969; Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

FAURE, EDGAR. Member, French Academy; member, French Senate; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– ; Chairman, UNIDIR Steering Group Established To Guide an Investigation of the Modalities of an International Fund for Development, 1983–1984; member, U.N. Advisory Board for Disarmament Studies, 1985– . [Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1955; President, Council of Ministers, 1955–1956.]

FEIGHAN, EDWARD F. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., OH), 1982– .

FERM, ANDERS. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations, 1983– ; Chairman, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security, 1984–1985.

FISCHER, LUCAS. Chief, Strategic Affairs Division, Strategic Programs Bureau, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1987– ; Chief, Theater Affairs Division, Strategic Program Bureau, 1981–1987; Adviser to U.S. INF Delegation, November 1981–March 1982; member U.S. INF Delegation, May 1982–December 1983; Chief, Regional Division, International Security Programs Bureau, 1979–1981; U.S. Delegation to LRINF Exchanges, October–November 1980; U.S. Delegation to Madrid CSCE Review Conference, December 1980–June 1981; Foreign Affairs Officer, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1972–1979; member, U.S. MBFR Delegation Staff, October 1973–December 1973, Acting ACDA Representative, January–February 1976.

FISHER, ADRIAN S. (deceased). ACDA Deputy Director, 1961–1969; Ambassador and U.S. representative, Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, 1964, 1966–1969; Dean, Georgetown University Law Center, 1969–1975; ACDA Consultant, 1969–1977; Frances Cabell Brown, Professor of International Law, 1975–1977; U.S. Ambassador and Delegation leader at CCD/CD, 1977–1979; Special Adviser, U.S. Delegation at 32d UNGA, 1977–1978; U.S. representative to 34th UNGA, head, U.S. Delegation on U.S.-USSR working groups on prohibition of radiological weapons and new types, and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and chemical weapons, 1977–1979; Alternate Representative, Tenth Special Session (on Disarmament) of UNGA, 1978; Professor of Law, George Mason University, 1979–1982.

FORD, DANIEL. Former executive director, Union of Concerned Scientists; author, *The Button: The Pentagon's Command and Control System—Does It Work?* (Simon and Schuster, 1985).

FORD, WILLIAM D. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., MI), 1964– ; Democratic National Whip at Large.

FORTIER, ALISON. Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1985–1987.

FOSTER, JOHN S. (Dr.). Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, 1965–1973.

GAFFNEY, FRANK J., Jr. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Theater Nuclear Forces Policy, 1984–1985, for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy, 1985– .

GAGARIN, YURI. Soviet cosmonaut, first human to orbit the earth in 1961 in the Soviet spacecraft Vostok.

GANDHI, RAJIV. Prime Minister of India, 1984– .

GARCÍA PÉREZ, ALAN. President of Peru, July 1985– .

GARCÍA ROBLES, ALFONSO. Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mexico, 1964– ; former Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations; leader of the Delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), the Committee on Disarmament, 1967–1984, and the Conference on Disarmament, 1984– ; head, Drafting Group on "Introduction" in Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1978; Chairman, CD *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament, 1981; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1982, member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–1982, 1983– . Awarded Nobel Peace Prize, 1982.

GARTHOFF, RAYMOND L. Special Assistant, Soviet-bloc Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, 1961–1968; member, U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, 1962, 1964; counselor for politico-military affairs, U.S. Mission NATO, Brussels, 1968–1970; member, U.S. Delegation to the U.S.-USSR SALT negotiations, 1969–1972; Ambassador to Bulgaria, 1977–1981; Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Program, 1982– . Author: *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (1985).

GARWIN, RICHARD L. (Dr.). American physicist; Fellow at Thomas J. Watson Research Center, International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), 1967– ; adjunct professor of physics, Columbia University, 1959– ; consultant, Los Alamos Science Laboratory, 1949– ; member, President's Science Advisory Committee, 1962–1965, 1969–1972.

GLENN, JOHN H., Jr. U.S. Senator (D., OH), 1975– ; chairman, Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Services, Committee on Governmental Affairs, 1976–1981; member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs; member, Committee on Governmental Affairs and Democratic Policy Committee. [Astronaut, 1959–1965; first American to orbit the Earth, 1962.]

GLITMAN, MAYNARD V. U.S. Ambassador and Deputy Head of U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe, 1982–1984; leader of U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations on Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MBFR), 1984–1985. U.S. negotiator on intermediate-range nuclear arms at the U.S.-USSR Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva, 1985– .

GOLDWATER, BARRY. U.S. Senator (R., AZ), 1953–1964, 1969– ; member, Armed Services Committee and chairman (1981–), Subcommittee on Tactical Warfare; member, Select Committee on Intelligence; Republican candidate for President, 1964.

GOLOB, IGNAC. Assistant Secretary to the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Yugoslavia, 1978–1982; member, U.N. Secretary General's *Ad Hoc* Group on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1978; Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1981–1986; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–1982, 1983– .

GONSALVES, A.S. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of India at the U.N. Office at Geneva; head of the delegation at the Conference on Disarmament, 1985–1986.

GOODBY, JAMES E. Vice Chairman, U.S. Delegation to Strategic Arms Reductions Talks, 1982–1983; leader, U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, 1983–1985.

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S. Member, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1952– ; member, Central Committee of the CPSU, 1971– ; Secretary, CC CPSU, 1978– ; candidate member, Politburo, CC CPSU, 1979; member, Politburo, 1980– ; Chairman, Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 1984–1985; General Secretary, CC CPSU, 1985– .

GOTTFRIED, KURT (Dr.). Physicist and member, Union of Concerned Scientists.

GRAHAM, THOMAS, Jr. Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1973–1977; Legal Adviser to U.S. SALT Delegation, 1974–1979; General Counsel 1977–1981; Legal Adviser to U.S. Delegation at Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, August–September 1980; Director of Congressional and Public Affairs, September 1981–1983; General Counsel and Director of Congressional Affairs, 1983–1985; Director, Office of the General Counsel and Legal Adviser, Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, 1985– .

GRAYBEAL, SIDNEY N. (Dr.). Deputy Assistant Director for Science and Technology, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1964–1969; Special Assistant to the Director for SALT, 1969, 1971–1975; U.S. Commissioner, Standing Consultative Commission, 1973–1976; Alternate Executive Secretary, U.S. SALT Delegation, 1969–1972; ACDA representative, SALT II Delegation, 1973 and chairman, SALT backstopping committee, ACDA.

GROMYKO, ANDREY A. Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 1957–1985; Member, Politburo of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1973– ; First Deputy Premier, 1983–1985; President (Chairman, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet), 1985– .

GRINEVSKIY, OLEG A. Member, Soviet Delegation to the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, 1962–1963, 1966–1969; member, Soviet Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1969–1974; participant in U.S.-Soviet technical discussions on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, April 1969. Deputy Chief, International Organizations Department, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1966–1974; Deputy Chief, then Chief, Near East Department, 1974–1983; Ambassador and head of Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, 1983–1986.

GRUNDMANN, WILHELM (Dr.). First Secretary, Permanent Mission of the German Democrastic Republic to the United Nations, 1985– ; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1985– .

HAIG, ALEXANDER M., Jr. (Gen., USA, ret.). Military Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs, 1969–1970; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1970–1973; Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1973; White House Chief of Staff, 1973–1974; Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, 1974–1978; President and chief operating officer, United Technologies Corp., 1979–1981; U.S. Secretary of State, 1981–1982; President, Worldwide Consultants, Inc. (1985); member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983; member, President's Chemical Warfare Review Commission, 1985.

HALLGRIMSSON, GEIR. Foreign Minister of Iceland, 1983–1985.

HAMEED, ABDUL C.S. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, 1977– ; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–1982, 1983– .

HAMILTON, LEE H. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., IN), 1965– ; member House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

HARTMAN, ARTHUR A. Foreign Service Officer, 1954– ; Deputy Chief of Mission and Minister Counselor, Brussels/USEC, 1972–1974; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 1974–1977; Ambassador to France 1977–1981; U.S. Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1981– .

HAWKE, ROBERT J. Prime Minister of Australia (Labor Party, 1983–).

HONECKER, ERICH. Member, Politburo, GDR Central Committee, Socialist Unity Party; General Secretary, Central Socialist Unity Party, 1971– ; President, GDR Council of State, 1976– .

HOUCK, FRANK S. (Dr.). U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1963– ; Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1980– ; Senior Scientist, International Safeguards, ACDA, 1981– .

HUCKE, DIETMAR. Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations, 1983– ; Vice Chairman, Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1985– .

HUSLID, MARTIN (Norway). Vice Chairman, Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1985– .

HU YAOBANG. Secretary General, Communist Party of the People's Republic of China, 1982–1987.

IBRAHIM, IZHAR. Minister Counselor, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations, 1982–1985; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1982–1985.

IKLÉ, FRED C. Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964–1967; head, Social Sciences Department, RAND Corporation, 1968–1973; Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1973–1977; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 1981– .

IMAI, RYUKICHI (Dr.). Manager, Japan Atomic Power Company Nuclear Fuels Section, 1966–1971; General Manager, 1976–1979; Ambassador and head of the Delegation of Japan to the Committee on Disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament, 1983– ; Chairman, Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1984.

ISSACHAROFF, JEREMY. Representative of Israel to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, 1985– .

ISSRAELYAN, VIKTOR L. Ambassador of the Soviet Union, 1971– ; Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1968–1973; Chief, International Organizations Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973–1979; member, Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975– ; Representative and leader of the Delegation at the Committee on Disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament, 1979–1986; representative at the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, 1979– ; Permanent Representative at the U.N. Office at Geneva, 1980– .

JACKSON, HENRY M. (deceased). U.S. Congressional Representative (D., WA), 1941–1953, U.S. Senator, 1953–1983; member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; chairman, Committee on Armed Services and chairman, Subcommittee on Arms Control.

JASTROW, ROBERT (Dr.). American Physicist; head, theoretical division, Goddard Space Flight Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1958–1961; director, Goddard Institute of Space Studies, 1961–1981; adjunct professor, earth sciences, Dartmouth University, 1973– .

JESSEL, JACQUES. Ambassador and Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament, 1985– .

JIN GUIHUA. Counselor, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, 1984– ; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security, 1984–1985.

KAISER, ROBERT G. National editor, *The Washington Post*.

KALB, BERNARD. CBS correspondent, Moscow, 1960–1963; CBS diplomatic correspondent, Washington, 1963–1980; Washington anchor for CBS Morning News with John Hart, 1970–1972; Chief diplomatic correspondent for NBC News, 1980–1985; Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1985–1986.

KAMPELMAN, MAX. U.S. Attorney; Ambassador and cochairman, U.S. Delegation to the review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1980–1981; chairman, followup meeting, Madrid, 1981–1983; adviser, Department of State, 1983–1984; leader, U.S. Delegation to bilateral Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) with Soviet Union, and head of Group on Defense and Space, 1985– .

KARPOV, VIKTOR P. Member of staff, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 1955–1961; member, Soviet Embassy in Washington, 1962–1966; participant in SALT I and SALT II negotiations, 1969–1972, 1972–1979 (leader of delegation, 1978–1979); leader, delegation to U.S.-USSR talks on reduction of strategic arms (START), 1982–1983; leader, delegation to bilateral Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) and head of Group on Strategic Arms, 1985–1986.

KASSEBAUM, NANCY L. U.S. Senator (R., KS), 1979– ; member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

KATZ, SHALOM. Resident Representative of Israel to the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1981– .

KENDALL, HENRY W. (Dr.). Professor of Physics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Chairman, Union of Concerned Scientists.

KENNAN, GEORGE F. (Prof.). American historian and diplomat. U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1952–1953; Ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1961–1963; Professor, Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, 1953–1974; Professor Emeritus, Princeton, 1974– . Author: *Memoirs*, vol. 1, 1925–1950 (National Book Award, Pulitizer Prize, 1968), *The Cloud of Danger*, 1977 (jointly), others.

KENNEDY, JOHN F. U.S. President, 1961–1963.

KENNEDY, EDWARD M. U.S. Senator (D., MA), 1963– ; member, Judiciary and Joint Economic Committees.

KENNEDY, RICHARD K. Assistant Director, Deputy Director, then Director, Africa Region, International Security Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1964–1969; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Council Planning, 1969–1975; Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975–1980, and Alternate Delegate to IAEA General Conference, 1975, 1977; Under Secretary of State for Management, 1981–1982; Ambassador at Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on Non-Proliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs, 1982; Ambassador at Large and U.S. Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1983– .

KERR, DONALD M. Director, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, nuclear weapons testing program, 1966–1976; Deputy Manager, Nevada Operations Office, 1976–1977; Acting Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs, 1978–1979; Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Program Operations, 1979– . Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1979–1985.

KERRY, JOHN F. U.S. Senator (D., MA), 1985– .

KESTER, JOHN G. Attorney, Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C.; member, the President's Chemical Warfare Review Commission, 1985.

KISHILOV, NICOLAI. Member, Soviet SALT I Delegation, 1969–1972; First Secretary, International Organizations Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1977–1979; member, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1984– .

KISSINGER, HENRY A. Consultant, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1959–1960; National Security Council, 1961–1962; U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1961–1968; U.S. Department of State, 1965–1968; Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1969–1975; Secretary of State, 1975–1977; faculty member, Georgetown University, 1977– ; Consultant, NBC, Inc., 1977– ; Chairman, National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, July 1983.

KLEIN, PETER (Dr.). Professor and Head of Department, Institute of International Policy and Economics, German Democratic Republic; member, U.N. Secretary General's

Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security, 1984–1985.

KOHL, HELMUT. Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1982– .

KOKEYEV, MIKHAIL YEFIMOVICH. Member, Soviet Delegation at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, 1982– .

KOMATINA, MILJAN. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations and Vice Chairman of the delegation, 1978–1979; Chairman, 1980–1982; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1982. Personal representative of the U.N. Secretary General to follow global and regional efforts to increase confidence in international relations (Assistant Secretary General level, new position), effective January 14, 1984–1985; Secretary General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the U.N. Secretary General, 1985– .

KOMPLEKTOV, VIKTOR G. Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, 1982– .

KONDRACKE, MORTON. *Newsweek* reporter.

KORNIYENKO, GEORGIY M. Ambassador of the Soviet Union, 1969– ; Chief, USA Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 1966–1977; Deputy Foreign Minister, 1975–1977; First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1977– .

KOSYGIN, ALEKSEY. (deceased). Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers, 1964–1981.

KRATZER, MYRON. International Energy Associates, Ltd.

KRISTVIK, BJORN. Ambassador of Norway and Director General, Department of Disarmament and Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; President, Norwegian Council on Arms Control and Disarmament; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Affairs, 1985– .

KURCHATOV, IGOR V. (deceased). Soviet physicist and member, Academy of Sciences, 1943–1960.

KUZNETSOV, VASILY V. First Deputy Chairman, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, (October 7) 1977–(June 18) 1986; candidate member, Politburo, (October) 1977–(March) 1986.

KVITSINSKIY, YULIY A. Ambassador at Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; leader, Soviet Delegation to U.S.–USSR negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, 1981–1983; head of Group on Defense and Space at the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, 1985– .

LACLAUSTRA, ARTURO. First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations, 1981; Counselor of Embassy, 1982–1985; *Rapporteur, Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1982–1985; *Rapporteur*, 1985 session of the Disarmament Commission.

LAIRD, MELVIN R. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., WI), 1953–1969; Secretary of Defense, 1969–1972; domestic adviser to the President, 1973–1974; senior counselor, national and international affairs, Reader's Digest Association, 1974– ; Senior Counselor, President's Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

LANGE, DAVID. Prime Minister of New Zealand, 1984– .

LANTOS, TOM. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., CA), 1981– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

LEACH, JIM. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., IA), 1977– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs and Members of Congress for Peace Through Law.

LECHUGA HEVIA, CARLOS. Director of International Organizations, Cuban Ministry of External Relations, Vedado-Havana; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Study the Institutional Arrangements Relating to the Process of Disarmament, 1980–1981. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Cuba to the U.N. Office at Geneva, 1984– ; member, Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1984– .

LEHOVICH, VLADIMIR. U.S. Foreign Service Officer and Deputy leader, U.S. Delegation at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, 1984–1986.

LEPADAT, GHEORGHE. Romanian expert who replaced Col. Sasu in the U.N. Secretary General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets at the June 1985 Session.

LEVIN, AIDA LUISA (Ms.). Representative of the U.N. Center for Disarmament and Secretary, *Ad Hoc* Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament on a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament, 1981– .

LEVINE, MELVIN. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., CA), 1983– .

LEWIS, ANTHONY. Columnist for *The New York Times*.

LIANG YUFAN. Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, 1981– ; member, Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

LINEHAM, BRETT THOMAS. Charge d'Affaires, Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the U.N. Office at Geneva.

LI PENG. Vice Premier, State Council of the People's Republic of China, 1983– .

LIVINGSTONE, KEN. Member, Greater London Council.

LOORY, STUART (American). Senior correspondent Cable News Network Inc.

LOWITZ, DONALD S. Lawyer, Lowitz and Lowitz, 1952–1954; Lowitz, Vihon, Lowitz, and Stone, 1959–1969; Lowitz, Stone, Kipnis, and Goodman, 1971–1974; partner, Aaron, Schimberg, Hess, and Gilbert, 1974–1984. General Counsel, Office of Economic Opportunity, Washington, D.C., 1969–1971; member, later, Chairman of the Board of Foreign Scholarships and consultant, Executive Office of the President, 1974–1975 and Department of Defense, 1975. U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, 1984–1987; Ambassador, 1985.

LUGAR, RICHARD G. U.S. Senator (R., IN), 1977– ; Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1985– ; Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs.

MCFARLANE, ROBERT C. Counselor, Department of State, 1981–1982; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1982–1983; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1983–1985.

MCGRORY, MARY. American newspaper columnist.

MCNAMARA, ROBERT S. U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1961–1968; President, World Bank 1968–1981; Ford Foundation, 1981– .

MCNEILL, JOHN H. Assistant General Counsel (International), Department of Defense, 1983– .

MADRID HURTADO, MIGUEL DE LA. President of Mexico, 1982– .

MARTENS, WILFRIED. Prime Minister of Belgium, 1981– .

MARTINEZ COBO, JOSE RICARDO. (Dr., Ecuador). Secretary General, Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 1981–1985.

MASON, SIR RONALD. School of Molecular Science, University of Sussex, Brighton; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

MATHIAS, CHARLES MCC., Jr. U.S. Senator (R., MD), 1961–1986; member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; member, National Republican Senatorial Committee and Members of Congress for Peace Through Law.

MATLOCK, JOHN F., Jr. (Jack). Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1985– .

MATSUI, AKIRA. Ambassador and Vice President, Japan Atomic Energy Forum, Tokyo; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–1982, 1983– .

MATUSZEWSKI, ZBIGNIEW. Member, delegation of Poland to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, 1984–1986.

MATVEYEV, VIKENTIY. International affairs commentator for *Izvestiya*, 1948– .

MBOUMOUA, WILLIAM ETEKI. Minister at the Presidency in Charge of Special Functions, Cameroon, 1983; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– ; Foreign Minister, 1984– .

MELESCANU, THEODOR (Dr.). Member, Permanent Mission of Romania to the United Nations Office, Geneva, and member, Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1979–1982; Counselor and deputy head of the Romanian Delegation to the CD, 1982– ; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security, 1984–1985.

MIKHAYLOV, VALERIAN P. Soviet Ambassador and chief representative at Negotiations on Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MBFR), 1981– .

MINKO-MI-ENDAMNE. Ambassador and Director General of the Law of the Sea, Ministere des Domaines, du Cadastre, de l'Urbanisme, Chargé du droit de la mer, Gabon, expert on the U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study on the Naval Arms Race, 1984–1985.

MITTERRAND, FRANÇOIS. President of France, 1981– .

MONTGOMERY, WILLIAM. Administrative Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1981– .

MORELLI-PANDO, JORGE. Ambassador of Peru to Austria and to International Organizations in Vienna; expert in the U.N. Secretary General's Group of Experts on All Aspects of the Conventional Arms Race, 1982–1984; expert in his Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study on the Naval Arms Race, 1984–1985.

MORTEL, JAN HEIN VAN DE. Netherlands Ambassador and Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, 1984– .

MUDHO, BERNARD A.N. Counselor to the Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations and head of Chancery, 1984– ; *Rapporteur* of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1985– .

MUELLER, MANFRED (Professor, Dr.). Member, GDR Institute for International Relations, Academy for Political Science and Legal Studies, Potsdam; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

MURKOWSKI, FRANK H. U.S. Senator, (R., AK), 1981– .

NAZARE, ALVES (Dr.). Chairman, National Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil, 1982– .

NETANYAHU, BENJAMIN. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, 1984– .

NEWHOUSE, JOHN. Counselor, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1973–1977; Assistant Director for International Security Programs, 1977–1979. Author: *Cold Dawn* (1973).

NITZE, PAUL H. Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 1946–1953; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1961–1963; Secretary of the Navy, 1963–1967; Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1967–1969; staff member, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; member, U.S. Delegation to Strategic Limitation Talks, 1969–1974. Self-employed consultant, 1974–1981; head, U.S. Delegation to Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (INF), 1981–1984; Ambassador, 1982– ; Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, 1985– . [Awarded Presidential Medal of Freedom, 1985.]

NOVAK, ROBERT. (American columnist for *The Washington Post*).

NUNN, SAM. U.S. Senator (D., GA), 1973– ; member, Armed Services Committee and its Subcommittee on Arms Control; member, Government Affairs Committee.

NYERERE, JULIUS K. President of Tanganyika, 1962–1964; of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1964–1985; chairman of the country's only political party, Chama Cha Matinduzi (CCM), 1985– .

OBUKHOV, ALEKSEY A. Deputy head of U.S. Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; participant in U.S.-USSR SALT I and SALT II negotiations, 1969–1972, 1972–1979; deputy head of Delegation at START, 1982–1983; member, Soviet

Delegation at U.S.-USSR Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva and head of group on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Arms, 1985– .

OCLE, WILLIAM E. (Dr.). (mentioned in Clark 9/20 speech). Participant in the Manhattan Project; pioneer in all aspects of nuclear weapons testing at Los Alamos National Laboratory; delegate to 1959 nuclear test ban negotiations in Geneva; President CEO, Energy Systems, Inc. (Consultant to DNA, DOD, and DOE).

OKELY, JOHN C. First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations, 1985– ; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1985– .

OKUN, HERBERT S. Ambassador and Deputy Representative of the United States to the United Nations, 1985– .

O'NEILL, THOMAS P. ("TIP"), Jr. U.S. Congressional Representative, (D., MA), 1953– ; Speaker of the House, 1979–1987. Chairman, Democratic Steering and Policy Committee.

ORAMAS-OLIVA, OSCAR. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations, 1984– ; Vice Chairman, Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1985–

ORTIZ DE ROZAS, CARLOS. (Dr.). Ambassador of Argentina and Minister of External Relations and Worship; leader of delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 1970; Chairman, Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1977; Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Tenth Special Session, 1978. Ambassador to the Court of St. James, 1979–1980; Chairman, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Study the Institutional Arrangements Relating to the Process of Disarmament, 1980–1981; member, Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981-1982, 1983– .

OTUNNU, OLARA A. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations, 1981–1985; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security, 1984–1985.

PALME, OLOF (deceased). Prime Minister of Sweden (Social Democratic Party), 1969–1976, 1982–1986; founder, Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, 1980–1986.

PALMER, BRUCE Jr. (Gen., USA, Ret.). Vice Chief of Staff, USA 1969–1973; Executive Director, Defense Manpower Commission, 1974; member, conventional arms control policy board, U.N. Association, 1977.

PAPANDREOU, ANDREAS. Prime Minister of Greece, 1980– .

PARSONS, S. GRAHAM. U.S. Ambassador; member, U.S. Delegation to the SALT I negotiations, 1969–1972.

PELL, CLAIBORNE. U.S. Senator, (D., RI), 1961– ; U.S. delegate to the 25th General Assembly of the United Nations, 1970; member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; member, Democratic Policy Committee and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

PENNER, RUDOLPH G. Director, Congressional Budget Office, 1983– .

PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR, JAVIER. (Peru). Secretary General of the United Nations, 1982– .

PERLE, RICHARD. Staff member, Select Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, and staff member, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Senate Armed Services Committee, 1972–1980 [adviser to Senator Henry Jackson (D., WA)]; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, 1981–1987.

PETROSYANTS, ANDRANIK M. (Dr.). Chairman, USSR State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy, USSR, 1962– ; succeeded Morokhov as leader of the Soviet Delegation to U.S.-U.K.-USSR Working Group on a Comprehensive Test Ban, 1978–1980; member, USSR Delegation at the U.S.-Soviet consultations on nuclear nonproliferation, 1983; Chairman, 1984– ; leader of delegation to the Third Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1985.

PETROVSKIY, VLADIMIR F. (Dr.). Chief, International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 1979–1985; representative in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, 1978– .

POPTCHEV, PETER. First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Bulgaria to the U.N. Office at Geneva; representative at the Committee on Disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament, 1983– ; chairman, Working Group A on Scope, Definitions, Nonproduction, and Permitted Activities of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, 1985.

PRAWITZ, JAN. Special Assistant for Disarmament, Ministry of Defense of Sweden; Scientific Adviser to the Swedish Delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and the Conference on Disarmament, 1962– ; expert on the U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study on the Naval Arms Race, 1984–1985.

PRESSLER, LARRY. U.S. Congressional Representative, (R., SD), 1975–1979; U.S. Senator, 1979– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations and Chairman, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment.

PRZYGODZKI, STANISLAW. Ambassador and head of the Delegation of Poland to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, 1981– .

AL-QADHAFI, MU'AMMAR. Leader of the Revolution, Libya, 1969– .

RASGOTRA, MAHARAJAKRISHNA. Foreign Secretary, Ministry for External Affairs of India; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

REAGAN, RONALD W. Motion picture and television actor, 1932–1966; Governor of California, 1967–1974; President of the United States, 1981–1988.

VAN REDE, JAN HENDRIK. Retired Commodore, Royal Netherlands Navy; expert on the U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study on the Naval Arms Race, 1984–1985.

REGAN, DONALD. Chief of Staff to the President, 1985–1987.

RHINELANDER, JOHN. Legal Counsel, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1969–1972.

RIDGWAY, ROZANNE. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, 1985– .

ROGERS, WILLIAM P. U.S. Attorney General, 1957–1961; U.S. Secretary of State, 1969–1973.

ROWNY, EDWARD L. (Lt. Gen., USA, Ret.). Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, 1968–1969; Deputy Chief of Army Research and Development, 1969; Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee, Brussels, and Chairman, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Group, 1971–1973; Joint Chiefs of Staff representative at Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1973–1979; Ambassador and Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1981– ; leader of U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), 1982–1983, Special Adviser, Bilateral Nuclear and Space Arms Talks With the Soviet Union, 1985– .

ROZANOV, G.L. Professor, International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security, 1984–1985.

RUTH, FRIEDRICH ("FRED", Dr.). Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, FRG Military for Foreign Affairs, 1977– ; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– . [Has been associated with CSCE since 1970, also with MBFR, SALT, and START.]

SAGAN, CARL (Dr.). American educator and astronomer: faculty member, Cornell University, 1968– ; professor of astronomy and space science, 1970; David Duncan professor of physical sciences, 1976– . One of a group of scientists (TAPPS) who theorized that the detonation of a number of nuclear weapons would result in a drop in atmospheric temperatures, thus creating a "nuclear winter."

SANTOS, MANUEL DOS. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations, 1983– ; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1984– .

SARACHO, OCTAVIANO ADOLFO. Director General on Nuclear and Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of External Relations and Culture, Argentina; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security, 1984–1985.

SARBANES, PAUL S. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., MD), 1971–1977; U.S. Senator, 1977– ; member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

SARNEY, JOSE (Dr.). President of Brazil, 1985– .

SASU, ARCADIE (Col.). Colonel Engineer, Ministry of National Defense of Romania; member U.N. Secretary General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets in 1984 and in the 1985 February–March sessions.

VAN SCHAIK, ROBERT J. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Netherlands at the U.N. Office at Geneva; Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, 1984– .

SCHORI, PIERRE. Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, 1985– .

SEGARRA, AMADA (Dr.). Former representative for U.N. Center for Disarmament; Executive Secretary, Review Conference of the Parties to the seabed arms control treaty, 1977; Executive Secretary, Preparatory Conference for the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, 1978, 1979; Secretary, Preparatory Committee for the biological weapons convention review conference, 1979; Executive Secretary, U.N. Conference on Prohibitions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, 1979–1980; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Consultant Experts on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, 1983; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1985– .

SEMENOV, VLADIMIR S. Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, 1955–1978; Chairman, Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1969–1978; Ambassador to Bonn, 1978–1986.

EL SHAFEI, OMRAN. Ambassador of Egypt, Permanent Mission to the U.N. Office, Geneva and Representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 1977–1980; Under Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, 1980– ; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1978–1981; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

SHAHI, AGHA. Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan; Chairman of Delegation to the United Nations, 1974–1977; Chairman, 1978; Ambassador and Permanent Representative, 1979– ; member, Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1981–1982, 1983– .

SHAKER, MOHAMED I. Minister, Embassy of Egypt, Washington, D.C., 1979–1984; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts on Regional Disarmament, 1979–1980; Ambassador of Egypt and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1984– ; President, Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1985.

SHARON, ARIEL. Minister of Industry and Commerce of Israel, 1984– .

SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD A. First Secretary, Republic of Georgia, USSR, 1972–1985; candidate member, Politburo, 1978–1985, member, 1985– ; Soviet Foreign Minister, 1985– .

SHULTZ, GEORGE P. U.S. Secretary of Labor, 1969–1970; Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1970–1972; Secretary of the Treasury, also assistant to the President, 1972–1974; executive vice president, Bechtel Corp., 1974–1975; president, 1975–1982; U.S. Secretary of State, 1982–1989.

SILOVIC, DARKO. Minister Counselor, Deputy Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, 1980–1984; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Study the Institutional Arrangements Relating to the Process of Disarmament, 1980–1981; member, his Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security, 1984–1985.

SMITH, GERARD C. Assistant Secretary of State, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, 1957–1961; Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1969–1973; head, U.S. SALT Delegation, 1969–1972; Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters, 1979–1980.

SMITH, LARRY. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., FL), 1983– .

SMITH, RICHARD H. Correspondent for *Newsweek*.

SNOWE, OLYMPIA J. (Ms.). U.S. Congressional Representative (R., ME), 1979– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science.

SOFAER, ABRAHAM D. Member, New York Bar; author, *War, Foreign Affairs, and the Constitutional Power* (Ballinger, 1976); Adjunct Professor of Law, Columbia University; Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, 1985– .

SOLARZ, STEPHEN J. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., NY), 1975– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science.

DE SOUZA E SILVA, CELSO ANTONIO. Ambassador and Head of the Delegation of Brazil to the Committee on Disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament, 1979– .

SPEAKES, LARRY. Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President of the United States, 1981– .

STOESSEL, WALTER J., (deceased). U.S. Ambassador to Poland, 1968–1972, to the Soviet Union, 1974–1976, to the Federal Republic of Germany, 1976–1981; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1981–1982; Chairman, Presidential Chemical Warfare Review Commission, 1985.

STRAY, SVENN. Foreign Minister of Norway, 1981–1985.

STROUGAL, LUBOMIR. Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, 1970– .

STRULAK, TADEUSZ. Polish Representative at the Negotiations on Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Europe (MBFR), 1978–1981; Deputy Director, International Organizations Department, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; member, U.N. Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983– .

STUDDS, GERRY E. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., MA), 1973– .

SUAREZ, PABLO R. Ambassador of the Philippines to Malaysia; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security, 1984–1985.

SYKES, LYNN R. (Dr.). Professor of geological sciences at Columbia University; member of the U.S. delegation which negotiated the TTBT in Moscow, 1974.

TAHINDRO, ANDRE. First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Madagascar to the United Nations, 1981– ; *Rapporteur, Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1984– .

THANT, U. Secretary General of the United Nations, 1962–1971.

THATCHER, MARGARET. Prime Minister, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1979– .

THEORIN, MAJ BRITT. (Mrs.). Ambassador and member of the Swedish Parliament; Chairman of the Swedish Disarmament Commission and head of delegation *ex officio* when in attendance at the Conference on Disarmament, 1983– .

THOMAS, ROSS. Assistant Secretary, Strategic and International Policy Division, Department of Defense of Australia; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security, 1984–1985.

THORNE, GASTON, (Dr.), President, European Common Market Commission.

THORN, ROBERT N. (Dr.), Deputy Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory.

TEJA, J.S. (Dr.). Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs of India; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts To Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security, 1984–1985.

TOLUBKO, VLADIMIR. Commander in Chief, Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, 1972–1985.

TOMASZEWSKI, KAZIMIERZ. Counselor, Permanent Mission of Poland to the United Nations, 1985– ; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the World Disarmament Conference, 1985– .

TORNUDD, KLAUS. Director of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland; member, U.N. Secretary General's Group of Governmental Experts on Regional Disarmament, 1979–1980, and Chairman of his Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, 1983– .

TOWER, JOHN G. U.S. Senator (R., TX), 1961–1984; member, Committee on Armed Services and Joint Committee on Defense Production; chairman, Republican Senatorial Policy Committee, 93d and 94th Congresses (1973–1976); chief negotiator on strategic nuclear arms at U.S.-USSR Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST), 1985–1986.

TRIBLE, PAUL S., Jr. U.S. Senator (R., VA), 1983– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations and its Subcommittees on Western Hemisphere Affairs, on International Economic Policy, Oceans, and Environment, and on European Affairs.

TROYANOVSKY, OLEG A. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations, 1977–1985.

TURBANSKI, STANISLAW. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Poland to the U.N. Office at Geneva; head of the Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament, 1983– ; Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, 1985.

UDALL, MORRIS D. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., AZ), 1961– ; vice chairman, Board of Directors, Office of Technology Assessment; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

VAYRYNEN, PAAVO. Foreign Minister of Finland, 1983– .

WAGNER, BERNARD M. Prominent pathologist at Columbia University.

WANG ZHIYUN. (Ms.). Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of China at the U.N. Office at Geneva, 1981–1982; First Secretary, 1982–1984; Counselor 1984– ; representative at the Committee on Disarmament and Conference on Disarmament, 1981– .

WARNER, JOHN W. U.S. Senator (R., VA), 1979– ; member, Armed Services Committee and chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Forces.

WEGENER, HENNING. (Dr.). Ambassador and Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Committee on Disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament, 1982–1986.

WEINBERGER, CASPAR W. Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1970–1972, Director, 1972–1973; Counselor to the U.S. President, 1973; Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973–1975; General Counsel, Vice President, and Director, Bechtel Power Corp., 1975–1981; U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1981–1989.

WEINRAUB, BERNARD. *New York Times* correspondent.

WEISS, TED (Theodore S.). U.S. Congressional Representative (D., NY), 1977– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs and its subcommittees on International Operations, Western Hemisphere Affairs, and Africa.

WHITEHEAD, JOHN. Deputy Secretary of State, 1985– .

WIJEWARDANE, NISSANKA. Ambassador of Sri Lanka and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1984– ; Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1984; Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1984– .

WILL, GEORGE F. ABC news analyst and syndicated columnist.

WISNOEMOERTI, NOEGROHO. Counselor, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the U.N. Office at Geneva; Representative at the Committee on Disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament, 1982– ; Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons consultations on prohibition of chemical weapons use and herbicide problems, 1985.

WOERNER, MANFRED. Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1982– .

WOLPE, HOWARD. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., MI), 1979– ; member, Committees on Foreign Affairs and on Science and Technology.

WOLFOWITZ, PAUL D. Special Assistant to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Deputy Assistant Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1973–1976; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Planning, 1977–1980; Professor, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1980–1981; Director of Policy Planning, Department of State, 1981–1982; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1983– .

YAKOVLEV, ALEKSANDR N. Head of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CPSU, until March 1986.

ZAMYATIN, LEONID M. Director General of TASS, 1970–1978; Ambassador of the Soviet Union and Chief, International Information Department, CPSU Central Committee, 1978– .

ZHAO ZIYANG. Premier of China, 1980– ; Vice Chairman, Communist Party of the People's Republic of China, 1981– .

ZHOU PING. Vice Minister, Ministry of Nuclear Industry of China, 1983– ; Deputy Head, Nuclear Power Plants Leading Group under the State Council, 1986– ; member, Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1986– .

ZHUKOV, YURIY. Soviet journalist; political observer for *Pravda*.

ZIA-UL-HAQ, MOHAMMED. President of Pakistan, 1979–1988.

ZORIN, VALENTIN. Political commentator for the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, 1956– .

ZORINSKY, EDWARD. U.S. Senator (D., NE), 1977– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations and its Subcommittees on Western Hemisphere Affairs, on European Affairs, and on East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

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